ETHICS

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Is employing children in the labor market ethical on the basis of virtue ethics, fundamental rights, or utilitarianism? Why, or why not? What factors would you consider and why?  Your response must be at least 250 words.

Here is the hyperlink to assist with completing this assignment:

http://businesstheory.com/child-labor-ethical/

Explain whether the ethical leaders at your current or at a previous employer act/acted as positive or negative role models in their visible ethical actions? Give an example in your analysis. How are/were ethics communicated in this employment culture?  Your response must be at least 250 words.

Moral relativism states that basic ethical beliefs of different people and societies are different and possibly conflict. Moral universalism claims that some moral standards are universally valid independently of individuals and culture. Between moral relativism and moral universalism, which paradigm do you agree with and why? Give an example to support your thesis. Your response must be at least 250 words.

In your view, what is the best philosophical approach (capabilities, ethical, economic, corporate citizenship, or utilitarianism) underpinning corporate social responsibility and on what basis? Give an example in arguing your viewpoint. Your response must be at least 250 words.

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Corporate Social Responsibility,

Utilitarianism, and the Capabilities

Approach Cecile Renouard

ABSTRACT. This article explores the possible conver-

gence between the capabilities approach and utilitarianism

to specify CSR. It defends the idea that this key issue is

related to the anthropological perspective that underpins

both theories and demonstrates that a relational concep-

tion of individual freedoms and rights present in both

traditions gives adequate criteria for CSR toward the

company’s stakeholders. I therefore defend ‘‘relational

capability’’ as a means of providing a common paradigm,

a shared vision of a core component of human develop-

ment. This could further lead to a set of indicators aimed

at assessing corporate social performance as the maximi-

zation of the relational capability of people impacted by

the activities of companies. In particular, I suggest a way

of evaluating the contribution of extractive companies to

the communities close to their industrial sites in extremely

poor areas, not from the viewpoint of material resources

and growth, but from the viewpoint of the quality of the

social environment and empowerment.

KEY WORDS: capabilities approach, corporate social

responsibility, Mill, Nussbaum, relational capability, Sen,

utilitarianism

Introduction

Several studies on CSR highlight the lack of a shared

definition of corporate social responsibility and

performance (McWilliams et al., 2006). Windsor

(2006) defends the idea that there are three main

moral and political perspectives on CSR: the first

two are opposed, one called ‘‘ethical’’ and the other

‘‘economic’’; the third, ‘‘corporate citizenship’’

(Moon et al., 2003) falls between the two, wavering

between the ‘‘ethical’’ perspective that puts emphasis

on the ideal role of the company within society and

toward its different stakeholders (Freeman, 2001),

and the ‘‘economic’’ view that maintains that the

firm must first maximize the value creation for its

shareholders, and only subsequently, may be

accountable to society (Carroll, 1991, 1998; Jensen,

2002). Very often authors either try to demonstrate

that CSR can be used as a tool to improve the

competitive advantage or the financial performance

of the company (Husted and de Jesus Salazar 2006;

Jones, 1995) or maintain that it is impossible to

demonstrate a connection between financial and

social performance and insist upon a normative

perspective (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Vogel,

2005). Two philosophical schools of thought

underpin these conflicting conceptions: on the one

hand, the reference to the utilitarian perspective as

related to the maximization of global or average

well-being (Bentham, 1815; Mertens and Dhillon,

1999); on the other hand, the defense of human

dignity and of individual rights and capabilities

(Kant, 1785; Sen, 2004).

Each one of these two perspectives encounters

difficulties in defining CSR in a satisfying and stable

way. As far as utilitarianism is concerned, insisting on

maximizing economic value may lead to three dif-

ficulties: first, increasing the inequalities between

people and between groups; and second, putting too

much emphasis on material wealth and economic

value creation, and thus neglecting other aspects of

well-being (Sen, 1999) and of social value creation.

For example, regarding a company’s compensation

scheme, utilitarianism may not criticize the increase

of salary discrepancies within the firm and the level

of ROE (return on equity) for shareholders, so long

as profit growth is ensured. However, the legitimacy

of such practices, which will reduce the share of

the profits directed toward employees and other

Journal of Business Ethics (2011) 98:85–97 � Springer 2010 DOI 10.1007/s10551-010-0536-8

stakeholders may be questioned (Bowie and Werh-

ane, 2005). Third, utility is usually considered in

atomistic terms, paying little regard to the norms

prevalent in more collectivistic cultures (Velasquez,

2006). The same criticism can be applied to the

capability approach, which is principally centered on

individuals. Moreover, focusing on individual free-

doms, entitlements, and capabilities may lead to

underestimate the role of collective structures and

institutions in promoting the social development of

people affected by economic activity (Deneulin

et al., 2006). The rights of some stakeholders, at the

individual and collective level, may be ignored

(Mellahi and Wood, 2003), and the responsibility of

the company toward those who are most vulnerable

remains unclear. As Ananya and Darryl Reed point

out (Reed and Reed, 2004, p. 3), ‘‘this approach

does not explore in any substantive sense the nature

of the corporate economy, the relationship between

state and capital and how they interact to impose

constraints on human development. Nor does it

specifically address CSR.’’ To sum up, these two

philosophical schools may fail to recognize the ten-

sions experienced by corporations dealing with

economic and social objectives (Margolis and Walsh,

2003).

By looking at the internal debates within each

tradition in order to face these problems, I make the

assumption that there may be some common ground

for these two theories (passing from atomistic

anthropology to relational anthropology), allowing

us to specify the content of CSR in a consistent

manner. The following pages defend the idea that a

critical aspect of CSR concerns the anthropological

perspective that underpins both theories and dem-

onstrates that a relational conception of individual

freedoms and rights which is present in both tradi-

tions gives adequate criteria for orienting societal

policy toward the maximization of the relational

capabilities of the company’s stakeholders.

The article is organized as follows: first (‘‘The

insufficiencies of utilitarianism and of the capabilities

approach toward CSR’’ section), I analyze the

insufficiencies of the mainstream utilitarian and

capabilities approaches for providing adequate

guidelines for CSR. Second (‘‘In defense of a rela-

tional anthropology’’ section), I defend the idea that

the capabilities approach points toward a relational

anthropology. I show how this anthropology exists

not just with the proponents of a virtue ethic

(Bertland, 2009) or a deontological conception of

morality (Bowie, 1998, 1999), but also with certain

utilitarian thinkers who have been forgotten in

the debate (especially Mill, 1861): thus, internal

resources exist within the utilitarian tradition which

counter the simplistic conception of the homo eco-

nomicus maximizer of his utility and defend the social

finality of the economic activity. Finally (‘‘Rela-

tional capability as the backbone of CSR’’ section), I

define relational capability – in reference to Martha

Nussbaum’s approach (Nussbaum, 2000) – and show

how such a conception of human development

allows us to make explicit the social responsibility of

companies toward stakeholders: for example, in the

case of setting up extractive industries in extremely

poor areas, philanthropic actions as well as programs

that are intended to buy short-term social peace have

very often had pernicious effects. If they were able to

improve the living conditions of some inhabitants,

they also created dependence and corruption and

increased the existing inequalities. Focusing on the

relational capability of persons and groups allows for

an evaluation of the contribution of companies to

the communities close to their industrial sites, not

from the viewpoint of material resources and

growth, but from the viewpoint of the quality of the

social environment and of empowerment.

The insufficiencies of utilitarianism and

of the capabilities approach toward CSR

Utilitarianism is a philosophical line of thought

whose aim was defined by Bentham (1815) as

maximizing the utility or happiness of the greatest

possible number of people. It has had many

important consequences on reflection about moral-

ity: it is a consequentialist perspective which focuses

on the outcomes of an action and has little regard for

its intentions. This philosophy has led to economic

and political choices focused on economic growth.

Social ethics is thus understood as the maximization

of the global or average well-being or material

growth in a society, and can justify a certain kind of

relativism. As Mandeville (1714) puts it, private vices

make public virtues: that is to say that economic

growth is due to the expenses made by very rich

people who behave in morally contestable ways, but

86 Cecile Renouard

these same people are useful to society through their

habits of consumption which provide employment

to the poorer members of the working class.

The utilitarian perspective encounters difficulties

in defining CSR with precision: utilitarianism may

lead to the moral justification of the prevalence of

profit-making and economic value maximization. It

is completely consistent with Friedman’s approach

concerning CSR (1970) and even with Carroll’s

pyramid (Carroll, 1991, 1998), according to which

the first goal of CSR is to make profit. This per-

spective raises many problems. Let’s focus on the

criticism of Rawls and Sen that have given rise to the

capabilities approach.

Sen’s perspective is rooted in a critical discussion of

utilitarianism following the debates initiated by John

Rawls’s Theory of Justice (1971). Rawls’s criticism

focuses on the sacrificial dimension of utilitarianism –

maximizing global or relative utility doesn’t take into

account the distribution of wealth and creates an

increase of inequalities in the society. 1

This critique

can be applied to CSR: focusing on the global or

average well-being of the stakeholders may increase

the inequalities among certain groups or between

them. In response to this sacrificial perspective, Rawls

defends a difference – or maximin – principle, which

aims at maximizing the situation of the worse off.

Rawls establishes a list of primary goods which every

human being may desire and to which he is entitled to

have access. The list entails political freedoms and

many other goods. Maximizing the situation of the

worse off implies trying to establish their access

conditions to all these primary goods.

In contrast, yet without denying the importance

of this list of primary goods, Sen gives priority to the

defense of individual freedoms. He criticizes utili-

tarianism, which focuses on the maximization of

collective well-being and reduces or ignores the

importance of freedoms. This also can be true as far

as CSR is concerned: some programs implemented

by multinationals in order to foster better living

conditions around their industrial sites have led to

paternalistic behaviors, without increasing the free-

doms of the people who are dependent on the good

will of the company. In Sen’s exposition of the

consequences of the utilitarian approach on the

evaluation of societies (Sen, 1990), the critique of

utilitarianism is the following: utilitarianism leads to

a social planning which may weaken or prevent

individual freedoms. Indeed, it doesn’t take into

account a bias: poor people may underestimate their

privations (their lack of pleasure or utility) because

they adjust to their situation (even if their condition

is objectively miserable). As a consequence of these

‘‘adaptive preferences,’’ utilitarian calculation raises

practical issues, and Sen gives two examples in the

Indian context: According to a utilitarian view (as

interpreted by Sen), the unequal condition of

women compared to men may not be a problem

because the former do not envy the latter’s situation,

and the same would apply to uneducated people

who do not consider their situation as unjust.

However, according to Sen, the objective situation

of women and uneducated people shows that they

enjoy fewer personal freedoms than men and edu-

cated people, respectively. Alone, the evaluation of

individual pleasures, according to their subjective

perception, may lead to underestimating their lack of

freedom and justifying the status quo. The same

phenomenon can be seen in companies where CSR

programs focus mainly on stakeholders’ expressed

expectations: this can lead to undermining the situ-

ation of the worse off, who have less ability to

analyze their situation. Subsequently, Sen agrees

with Rawls in his criticism of utilitarianism and

suggests an alternative: instead of focusing on the

primary goods as the necessary means to achieve

freedoms, he favors the effective possibilities that a

human being can choose, i.e., his capabilities: the

whole set of functionings of each individual must be

considered, taking into account the diversity of the

society. The capabilities approach aims at assessing

the situation of an individual or a group in terms of

abilities to do and to be, to convert their resources

into actual functionings which enable them to lead a

meaningful life (Alkire, 2002). Capabilities are sets of

combinations of functionings and express the real

possibilities of choices that people have. Sen (1990)

gives priority to individual freedoms, in intrinsic as

well as instrumental ways, and in particular, to

human agency. As in most liberal theories of soci-

ety, 2

John Rawls and Amartya Sen’s viewpoints fa-

vor a somewhat atomistic anthropology, where each

individual first seeks to develop his or her own

capabilities, and only subsequently, enters into rela-

tionship with others.

Certainly, as Robeyns (2005) has emphasized, it’s

important to distinguish between methodological

87CSR, Utilitarianism, and the Capabilities Approach

and ontological individualism. Sen and a number of

defenders of individual freedoms do not deny the

social dimension of human beings. In the same way,

works emanating from commentators of Sen under-

line ‘‘the quintessentially social nature of individual

freedom and agency’’ (Herdt and Deneulin, 2007,

p. 179) and look to see how social factors influence

individual capabilities (Longshore Smith and Seward,

2009). Nevertheless, it is vital to recognize that liberal

thought stresses the clearly separated rights and free-

doms of rational individuals, in order to protect

against excessive control by a social or political

community. It almost seems as though nothing pre-

vents these theories from cultivating the illusion that

people can develop their capabilities in a completely

solipsistic fashion. Of course, one immediately real-

izes that this makes little sense: Who would be capable

of anything without entertaining relationships with

others?

The starting point of this article consists in incor-

porating this remark within the very definition of

one’s capability. Unlike most of the various liberal

approaches just alluded to, a conception of freedom

defined as autonomy and interdependence can be

defended, as Martha Nussbaum has already shown.

Before developing this perspective, we have to

explain why the capabilities approach, when it is

centered on individual freedoms, is simply too weak

to specify CSR content.

According to Sen, social organization has to

enable the growth of capabilities while preventing an

excessive pressure of political power on the society.

Utilitarianism may favor a certain political constraint

in order to implement the fastest growth for the

greatest number of people.

Sen tries to articulate the priority that consists in

developing individual freedoms with an appropriate

social order. The anthropology which sustains this

approach denies the utilitarian conception of the

human being as a selfish maximizer of his sole

interests. According to Sen, this model doesn’t fit

with real life. On the one hand, passions are strong,

and on the other hand, human beings have a moral

sense: a capability of both indignation and altruistic

behavior. However, Sen only takes this altruistic

capability into account in a marginal way. This is

one of the reasons why one might consider that

Sen’s perspective insufficient: it is typical of liberal

atomism, which tends to weaken the idea that a

truly human life is reached through human

relationships and social contribution. 3

As a matter of

fact, Sen dissociates the defense of individual free-

doms from the individual contribution to social

goals (Sen, 1990). Human capabilities are seen by

Sen as rather different from people’s social goals.

On the contrary, one can favor the integration of

the social and inter-subjective dimension in the

definition and implementation of these individual

freedoms. Otherwise, one is led to defend an

atomistic view of freedom as independence, a

freedom that can be reduced by the freedoms of

others. That’s why liberalism focuses on the limi-

tation of the prerogatives of the State, which has the

unique task of imposing the law in such a way that

my neighbor’s freedom does not infringe on mine.

It does not give rise to any group project.

This appears to be very problematic when we

think about CSR. It may not lead to the criticism

of the economic institutions and corporate behav-

iors that infringe on some individual capabilities.

Focusing on individual rights may not be conducive

to specifying how different groups that are stake-

holders in companies can either improve their

capabilities by defending their collective rights or be

neglected. The games of power may not be clearly

identified. For example, a recent article (Reed and

Reed, 2009) assimilates the capabilities approach

with a liberal perspective on CSR, paying little

attention to the most vulnerable persons and

groups.

Nevertheless, current debates among capabilities

approach researchers show that there may be a way

to link CSR with a perspective that focuses on the

capabilities of individuals and groups by defining

relational freedom as the key component of a truly

human life. A definition of personal freedom can be

proposed: a relational freedom that flourishes not

only when a subject acts in an independent way, but

rather, when he is both autonomous and interde-

pendent and contributes to the implementation of

social goals. I will show that this relational anthro-

pology, present in Kant’s work (Kant, 1785), – and

has an impact on the way some capabilities approach

thinkers speak of CSR – can already be found in

utilitarian works such as Mill (1861), even though

utilitarianism is often superficially understood as

favoring an understanding of the human being as a

homo economicus aiming to maximize his own interest.

88 Cecile Renouard

In defense of a relational anthropology

I would therefore like to develop the utilitarian

perspective centered on a quantitative and material

measure of happiness, as viewed by Bentham (1815).

It is important to stress that such a critical perspective

was already presented by Mill (1838, 1861), who

developed his own account of utilitarianism. The

question is raised whether we can find within the

utilitarian traditions an openness to a relational

anthropology. If so, we could find some intellectual

resources within the utilitarian school of thought

which would enable it to counter the maximization

of personal utility and the sacrifice of freedoms and

capabilities of the most vulnerable.

Indeed, Mill (1861) not only leaves open the

possibility of altruism, but he even defines utilitarian

ethics as the effort to shape people’s altruism and to

find happiness within it. Relationship to others is

essential for Mill. He raises the problem in his pre-

sentation of utilitarianism: Are human beings natu-

rally inclined to care for others? Under what

conditions or with which incentives do they apply

the utility principle, i.e., the search for the greatest

degree of happiness for the greatest number of

people? Mill’s thesis is very clear: there are both

internal and external incentives, as well as sanctions.

He stresses the inner feeling experienced by the

educated person that enables him/her to recognize

his/her social being and the importance of altruism.

The arguments used by the philosopher consist in

emphasizing the importance of education to instill in

one’s character the feeling of being united to one’s

fellow human beings. What shapes a society is the

importance and the nature of the bonds between

people. Human progress is rooted in the strength-

ening of social bonds and the care for the others’

interests. Even more, the challenge is to help people

discover that looking for the good of others is a

source of personal flourishing and happiness.

‘‘Not only does all strengthening of social ties, and

all healthy growth of society, give to each individual

a stronger personal interest in practically consulting

the welfare of others; it also leads him to identify his

feelings more and more with their good, or at least

with an even greater degree of practical consider-

ation for it. …The deeply rooted conception which every individual even now has of oneself as a social

being, tends to make him feel it one of his natural

wants that there should be harmony between his

feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures’’

(Mill, 1861). Education is the core of the problem:

virtue has to become desirable, if understood as the

personal development of intellectual and moral

abilities and being linked with the search for the

other’s good and for the common good. Never-

theless, aside from this self-detachment and this

impetus toward the common good, establishing

safeguards through external legal constraints, regu-

lations, and sanctions is necessary in order to guar-

antee the realization of common interests.

Mill fights against a utilitarian conception centered

on the maximization of individual pleasures, while

refusing a moral perspective sacrificing the sensible

inclinations. The idea is to orient the individual desire

toward the care of others, so that the search for personal

happiness and the quest for the other’s good merge.

The same perspective can be found among contem-

porary thinkers, trying to make the most of the modern

claim for autonomy and personal flourishing. Bellah

(2007), for instance, defends a paradoxical thesis in the

context of what he considers as society’s gradual slip-

ping into a narcissistic cult of the self: self-love, rightly

understood, implies concern for the other. Self-fulfill-

ment has to be found in openness to the other, in an

attitude made of kindness and cooperation.

Mill stresses that the highest level of self-fulfill-

ment and happiness is reached when relating to

others. ‘‘The utilitarian morality does recognize in

human beings the power of sacrificing their own

greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses

to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good. …The only self-renunciation that it applauds, is devotion to the

happiness, or to some of the means of happiness, of

others’’ (Mill, 1861). In this regard, Mill’s view joins

the Kantian view according to which morality

encompasses a disinterested relationship with others,

but Mill takes into account human psychology: the

aim is not a total self-renunciation of the individual,

but his fulfillment in the care for both the other’s

good and the common good.

Whether it is embedded in a Kantian line of

thought or in a utilitarian one, relational anthro-

pology defines human relationships as the substance

of human identity: being is relational and a flour-

ishing human life is experienced in autonomy and

interdependence. With this conceptual background

we can define relational capability as a core human

89CSR, Utilitarianism, and the Capabilities Approach

functioning and then show how this perspective can

be applied to the definition of CSR toward society.

Relational capability as the backbone of CSR

Definition of relational capability

Relational anthropology states that personal identity

is shaped in the relationship with otherness. The

implementation of relational capability is a key

condition of human development. We draw on the

debates among Capability Approach researchers

concerning individual, collective, and external

capabilities (Foster, 2008; Ibrahim, 2006; Robeyns,

2005): these thinkers reflect upon the growth and

implementation of capabilities at a social and col-

lective level. They analyze how some personal

development can be achieved only in cooperation

with other human beings (external capabilities) and

how some collective capabilities can be defined as the

expression of more than the aggregation of individual

ones. Relational capability involves both individual

and collective capabilities; it tries to capture the

relational condition of human beings. It can be

applied both to individuals and groups: it fosters the

recognition of autonomy and individual rights as well

as the quality of the social climate and of the inter-

dependencies within a given group or political

community; thus it can be applied to the assessment

of the relationships within a company and between a

company and its stakeholders (Bowie and Werhane,

2005). Before detailing the consequences of this

relational capability approach in terms of CSR

implementation, let’s specify exactly what this means.

We distinguish four components of this capability 4 :

– to be integrated into networks.

– to commit oneself to a project within a group,

aimed at serving a common good, a social inter-

est; to take part in decision making in a political

society.

– to have specific attachments to others: friend-

ship, love.

– to try to value others’ objectives, considering

them as ends.

Integration into networks is the first component of

relational capability. A network is defined very

broadly as a set – open or closed – of relationships –

horizontal and vertical – organized within a society.

From the first network where the newborn is inte-

grated, his/her family, to the community that gathers

around the deceased person, human life is spent in

networks. At this stage we consider imposed and

inherited networks as well as chosen networks. Part

of our identity forms through given networks and

part of it through our voluntary commitment to

others (Coleman, 1988). The lack of freedom,

which is the very definition of prison, is a means of

preventing people from belonging to networks that

constitute social life. The characteristic of exclusion

consists in the absence of participation in networks

due to isolation and the inability to escape it

(Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999/2005). The lack of

exercise of relational capability can be measured

through a weak participation in networks – whether

institutional or not. Companies can be viewed as

networks of interrelationships that have an effect on

the different interrelations between individuals and

groups that are affected by their activity (Bird, 2006).

The quantity and the quality of relations within a

company and between the company and its stake-

holders have an impact on both social and economic

networks.

The second component is related to the voluntary

commitment with others for a specific project con-

cerning a common good or a collective interest. It

implies participation in the decision-making process

within a political community. We focus here on

chosen networks and, more specifically, on personal

commitment in society. This commitment can take

different forms: political, social, cultural, and asso-

ciative (Alkire, 2002; Nussbaum, 2003). It is a way

of participating in social development and it enables

the development of this relational capability toward

social utility. Stressing the importance of any such

commitment is closely related to the definition of a

fair society as a society promoting a complex

equality (Walzer, 1983) among citizens: it implies

the assessment of the capability owned by anybody

in a given community to be recognized in one or

another sphere of his life, and this recognition is

facilitated by the active and autonomous involve-

ment in a social network. This perspective implies

that measures be taken to avoid the pre-emption of a

few over certain functions and their domination on

different domains of social life, for example, when

90 Cecile Renouard

the richest are also the ones who lead the political

game, control the access to the best education for

their children, etc. This commitment to different

networks in a pluralist society can be measured by

several indicators: political vote, participation of the

worse off in the decision-making process at a local

level, voluntary commitment to a group or associa-

tion within the community, and the nature and

objective of the decided project. This second aspect

of relational capability can be applied to the study of

the active commitment of a company as a moral

person within society (French, 1979) and/or of its

members with various stakeholders.

The third component of relational capability

concerns the feelings for the others in an interper-

sonal relation, namely, developing friendship and

love. Human growth is favored by the quality of

love a human being receives and gives. This love

may be more or less exclusive; it implies the relation

between two free persons in the above-defined

sense. Love is the highest expression of human

freedom as autonomy and interdependence. Thus,

we can measure this by different indicators: by

whom a person feels he/she is loved, the number of

close friends, the number and the nature of the

persons to whom he/she could turn in case of dif-

ficulties (financial, professional, etc.). The quality of

interpersonal relationships within a company and the

respect for the private life of its members are also of

interest when assessing this dimension of relational

capability. This can also be related to the importance

given to human capital and to the human quality of

the leaders within a corporation (George, 2003).

The fourth component of relational capability

consists in seeing value in goals of another person, by

considering him/her as an end: this attitude consists

in extending the special care one might have for an

individual – through friendship and love – to any

interpersonal relation, either direct or mediated by

institutions. This is exactly what Paul Ricœur calls

the logic of overabundance, concerning the imple-

mentation of the biblical Golden Rule in social

networks (Ricœur, 1990). The negative definition

of the Golden Rule (‘‘Do not do to others what you

do not want them to do to you’’) is close to a

minimal and negative ethical principle (‘‘do no

harm’’) and expresses a logic of equivalence. But the

Golden Rule in its positive side (‘‘do unto others as

you would have them do unto you’’) has a broader

meaning: it is an invitation to contribute actively to

the other’s good without any reciprocity. It opens

the door to an excess: give according to your mea-

sure without expecting an equivalent gift in return.

This attitude involves face-to-face encounters but it

may also be integrated in social, economic, and

political institutions: it enables the respect for the

uniqueness of every person and expresses the

objective of a social organization serving the dignity

of each of its members. We can measure this com-

ponent by the level of gifts given or received, by the

time and energy freely given to community projects,

and by the level of trust in a given community. This

component may also be used to assess the quality of

the relations between groups within a society and

between societies. This, of course, points to the

philanthropic actions engaged by a corporation

within society; however, from a moral perspective it

has to be linked with a consideration of justice

principles (Bird and Velasquez, 2006; Bowie and

Werhane, 2005; Freeman, 2001); otherwise, charity

could just be a way of avoiding serious reflection on

the duties corporations must fulfill in terms of

implementing their societal responsibility toward

various stakeholders (Renouard, 2007).

This relational capability brings together several

dimensions necessary for a flourishing human life in

the list of central capabilities given by Martha

Nussbaum (Nussbaum, 2000), and among them,

emotions and affiliation. Emotions and affiliation are

defined as follows:

Emotions: ‘‘Being able to have attachments to

things and people outside ourselves; to love

those who love and care for us, to grieve at

their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to

experience longing, gratitude, and justified

anger. Not having one’s emotional development

blighted by overwhelming fear and anxiety, or

by traumatic events of abuse or neglect. (Sup-

porting this capability means supporting forms of

human association that can be shown to be cru-

cial in their development.)’’

Affiliation: ‘‘Being able to live with and toward

others, to recognize and show concern for other

human beings, to engage in various forms of

social interaction; to be able to imagine the situ-

ation of another and to have compassion for that

situation; to have the capability for both justice

91CSR, Utilitarianism, and the Capabilities Approach

and friendship. (Protecting this capability means

protecting institutions that constitute and nour-

ish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting

the freedom of assembly and political speech.)’’

Two ideas advocated by Martha Nussbaum are of

major importance regarding relational capability: her

invitation to focus public policy on the capabilities of

individuals and not on their functionings: this is not

about dictating to the members of a society their

modes of socialization and affiliation, to make sure

that they can choose to enter into relationships and

to make free choices within their political commu-

nity. Moreover, the insistence placed on affiliation

allows us to bring together attention to others in

terms of care with the political conditions of a

struggle against exclusion in terms of social justice

(Nussbaum, 2002, p. 134).

The present definition of relational capability

complements Martha Nussbaum in three different

ways.

First, the priority is given to this relational capa-

bility as being the core of a truly human life: in this

sense, the priority given by Sen to the notion of

freedom is favored; but this freedom is understood

differently, as autonomy and interdependence, in

accordance with Martha Nussbaum when she stres-

ses the fact that the capability approach for all implies

limiting certain freedoms in order to diminish

inequalities (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 44).

Second, the personal dimension (the immediate

relationship to others as fellow human beings) is

linked with the political dimension (the mediated

relationship to others as ‘‘socii’’ through institu-

tions). On the one hand, any human being is

immediately embedded in a culture, in a political

society. His relation to others is influenced by the

ethos, the system of norms and values, and the form

of the social bond in this particular society. On the

other hand, the interpersonal relations may con-

tribute to transforming political relations through the

diffusion of the logic of overabundance inside the

collective rules.

Third, this capability is considered within a group

(bonding) and between groups (bridging). The first

level deals with social inclusion and with the

implementation of a complex equality between cit-

izens of the same political community – or of

the same company. The second level entails the

consideration of the relational capability when ap-

plied to relations between different citizens or

groups from different communities or states and

between groups, between communities or between

states, particularly in economic matters concerning

distributive justice challenges.

Relational capability as a tool for promoting corporate social

responsibility

We have just seen how the capabilities approach,

based on relational anthropology, provides the cri-

teria of judgment for personal or collective action: it

concerns seeing in which measure the foreseen ac-

tion or project contributes to increasing the rela-

tional capability between persons and groups more

or less directly concerned by them. In this perspec-

tive, which makes the improvement of relational

capability the essential vector of human develop-

ment, the economic structures should be considered

according to this criterion. Applied to the social

responsibility of the company, it allows us to ask if

and how the measures taken by the company con-

tribute to improving – or not – the relational

capability of individuals and groups, the quality of

social relations in the company and between the

company and its stakeholders. Utility maximization

often understood, in the classic utilitarian perspec-

tive, by the optimization of profit for the share-

holders, is complemented by the research of the

maximization of people’s relational utility, which

brings up the issue of fair sharing of the value created

by the company in order to increase the relational

capability of the stakeholders – or, at least, to not

harm the quality of social relations in and around the

company.

Take the example of the societal activity of mul-

tinational extractive companies in extremely poor

areas such as Nigeria. These companies are charac-

terized by the significant impact they have on their

natural and human environment. Very often, the

actions taken in the villages close to the production

sites have encouraged dependence and corruption.

Not only are the multinational corporations operat-

ing in the developing world ill-equipped to tackle

development issues (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005;

Frynas, 2008) – because of the past confusion

between philanthropy and real contribution to local

92 Cecile Renouard

development, and because of their lack of internali-

zation of negative externalities within their core

business activities (Bird and Herman, 2004) – but

they also have to deal with local governance problems

and weak or failed states. Thus, most of the recent

attempts by oil companies to set up partnerships with

NGOs and development agencies to fight against

poverty in the Niger Delta result in failure and a

deterioration of the social environment (Idemudia,

2009). Nevertheless, some projects are creating hope,

as they are based on personal and collective empow-

erment, on an understanding of the measure of the

contribution of the oil activity to development with

the goal of preserving and improving the relational

quality between persons and between groups, and not

simply with the goal of improving living conditions

in the villages.

To support this perspective, I draw on the research

conducted in Nigeria since 2004 (Renouard, 2007)

and, in particular, on the results of an in-depth study

that I carried out in 2008, with 2000 people in two

areas: Onelga, an onshore oil production area – run by

the French company Total and by the Italian com-

pany Agip – in the State of Rivers; and Eastern

Obolo, in the State of Akwa Ibom, a coastal area in

which Shell has extracted oil since the end of the

1990s, and which is one of the communities affected

by the offshore activity of Total. Like the other oil

companies operating offshore, due to a 2002 regu-

lation, Total must contribute to the development of

areas that suffered collateral damages linked to oil

extraction (especially pollution). Total’s societal ac-

tion is direct in the onshore production area and

indirect in the coastal area: in this latter area, it is led

by Pro-Natura, a Franco-Brazilian NGO in Nigeria

which started a participative development project in

Akassa, in the state of Bayelsa, in 1996 (Maier, 2001).

Based on the same model, two local development

foundations were created by Pro-Natura in two

coastal local Governments, including Eastern Obolo.

The social–political context of the Niger Delta is

characterized by great insecurity, largely provoked by

the oil ‘‘manna’’: an increase in the number of acts of

sabotage and attacks on the onshore oil production sites

by armed groups like Mend (Movement for the Eman-

cipation of the Niger Delta), a high level of crime, an

upsurge of borderline social practices such as cultism and

prostitution involving young people, a low quality of

education set against a backdrop of uncontrolled

demographic growth, a strengthening of inter-clan

and interreligious tensions and an absence of national

unity and civic virtues. The combination of ‘‘strate-

gic’’ nationalism – oriented toward profit – and liberal

modernization, without ethos apart from favoritism,

has contributed to toughening the ethnic identities

and ‘‘retribalizing’’ Nigerian citizens.

In order to identify the social responsibilities of the

oil companies, the in-depth analysis of the situation

in the local governments of Onelga and Eastern Obolo

is instructive. It highlights the different models of

relations between oil companies, NGOs, govern-

ment institutions, local communities and different

types of partnerships aiming at local development.

The research carried out in 2008 was completed by

qualitative interviews conducted in 2009 in the two

areas. Regarding the statistical work in the study,

after having proposed a first version of an index of

relational capability at the individual level (based on

components detailed supra), we have also developed

an index which allows measuring the collective

empowerment, the relational capability within a village

– the density and the quality of the relations in the village

and between villages. In addition, we have established

an index of escaping poverty, based on the model of

Mohammed Yunus 5

– in the context of Bangladesh –

and adapted it to the Nigerian context, which allows

us to confirm the interest of measuring the devel-

opment in relational terms and not only in terms of

material living conditions. 6

All of our work is based on an analysis in terms of

‘‘relational capability,’’ aiming to measure the

development of an area in terms of empowerment of

populations: according to this approach, a community

is all the more ‘‘developed’’ if its members have more

opportunity to enter into relations of trust, integrate

into networks, get involved in community projects,

and worry about the future of their community. One

of the major conclusions reached in our analysis of the

qualitative and quantitative inquiries is that one of the

explanatory factors of the increase of violence in the areas

where the oil companies are established (in our research,

Onelga) is linked to the reduction of the relational capability

of the populations who live there. This reduction is the

result of the increase of inequalities in these areas as

well as between these areas and those which aren’t

directly affected by the oil activities – inequalities

perfectly compatible with the improvement of the

average standard of living in the oil regions.

93CSR, Utilitarianism, and the Capabilities Approach

This is where the approach in terms of relational

capability is interesting, where the more traditional

indices (such as the human development index –

HDI – or the index of ‘‘escaping poverty’’ of Yunus

and Weber, 2008) are limited to pointing out that the

populations living in the oil regions enjoy better

living conditions. But how are we to understand this

undeniable increase in the average well-being of

populations living in the oil areas compared with the

level of violence in the Niger Delta? By proposing a

criterion which considers both the autonomy of

people and their interdependence, relational capa-

bility makes the relational inequalities emerge as one of

the major explanatory factors of the degradation of

the social environment. Finally, these inequalities

themselves are, to a large extent, the product of a

reorganization of the networks of socialization within

the populations concerned due to the abuse of wealth

and power by the leaders placed in positions of ‘‘benefit

captors.’’ As far as CSR is concerned, a key challenge

for oil companies is to find ways of promoting

the increase of people’s relational capabilities. The

problem is primarily not one of knowing whether the

company has to spend more money on societal issues,

even if distributive justice questions have to be raised

(Bird, 2006); it is to change the mindset, both within

the company and within local communities, in order

to favor another type of relationship between

the company and the communities and among the

communities. This change of mindset involves the

promotion of moral imagination – the ability to

conceive of other new possibilities in a given situa-

tion – (Werhane, 1999) and ethical leadership

(Bowie and Werhane, 2005). It also points to a new

way of promoting cooperation among stakeholders

and even among competitors, in order to give rise to

a new economic order based on empathy (Rifkin,

2009). This may become all the more possible if

development in a given society is understood as the

increase of relational capabilities and not of material

well-being (when a certain threshold is achieved).

Concluding remarks

Connected in this way to relational anthropology, the

capabilities approach makes questioning possible

within companies about the criteria of a positive

contribution to development. It doesn’t make the

company a development agency or a substitute for

government institutions, but is in line with the goal of

liberal societies which are fairer and better organized

(Smucker, 2006). It reinforces the idea that economic

development is an auxiliary to social development:

the social responsibility of the company, in this per-

spective, is not a marginal aspect but results from the

core business of the economic actors. From the moment

that the increase of the relational capability is under-

stood as the essential criteria of development, CSR

will be carried out all the more if it favors the rela-

tional quality of people and groups in the company

and between the company and its environment.

Aspects of this thesis will require more details,

especially concerning the difficulties that arise from

the reality of the unequal relations between stake-

holders and, in general, the balances of power (Reed

and Reed, 2009). It is also necessary to satisfy pos-

sible conflicts between competing conceptions of

the good and between different assets – social, cul-

tural, environmental, etc. – for companies to pro-

mote in an area and/or at the planetary level. From

this viewpoint, our reflection, which is based partly

on the thought of John Stuart Mill and Martha

Nussbaum, aligns itself (by applying them to the

economic field) with contemporary debates – rarely

mentioned by the theorists of the capabilities ap-

proach – between liberal and communitarian phi-

losophers about the construction of personal and

collective identities and relations between what is

fair and good in liberal societies. By defending a

dynamic conception of the construction of personal

and collective identities and by stressing the social

and political conditions of the expression of these

identities, the position adopted in this article could

initiate a dialog with both Charles Taylor’s civic

humanism (1985) and Michael Walzer’s communi-

tarian or social liberalism (1991), which try to get

past the opposition between liberal atomism and

communitarian collectivism: the construction of a

just society goes with the recognition of shared

values among its members, and particularly of free-

dom as a ‘‘common good’’ (Honneth, 1992). This

article provides the primary elements for establishing

the criteria of economic organizations and CSR

consistent with these ethical and political values

centered on relational capabilities, i.e., the quality of

social bonds within a society. We have stressed that

this perspective is consistent with the utilitarianism

94 Cecile Renouard

of John Stuart Mill: this means that there is a possible

social critique from within liberal societies, replacing

the maximization of the individual material utility by

the maximization of the relational-social capability.

The defense of the relational capability of all citizens

and the improvement of the quality of human

relations in a society can’t be ensured without cor-

rective measures applied to economic institutions

and organizations in order to promote the fight

against unfair inequalities (Deneulin et al., 2006),

and especially against relational inequalities linked to

structures of oppression or exclusion.

Notes

1 This point has been further illustrated by Harsanyi

(1953). 2

E.g., Locke (1679) and Rousseau (1762). 3

Of course, altruism has already been formalized

within a neo-classical framework (cf. Becker, 1974).

Thus, our shift of viewpoint goes deeper than simply

adding altruism into people’s behavior. Altruism

remains, however, one of the key aspects of our

approach. 4

See Giraud and Renouard (2009). 5

The following criteria are given by Yunus and We-

ber (2008) in order to appreciate the efficiency of pro-

grams fighting against poverty:

a tin-roofed house (or a value equivalent to $370),

access to drinking water,

clean toilets,

grammar school education,

three complete meals per day,

sufficient clothes and protection (mosquito nets),

possibility of having medical expenses taken care of

in the case of illness,

a savings account with at least $75, and

sources of additional income possible in case of diffi-

culty.

6 For a detailed presentation of this study, see Giraud

and Renouard (2010).

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Gaël Giraud and Gerhard Schmetzer

for helpful comments.

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Study guide.pdf

BBA 4751, Business Ethics 1

Course Learning Outcomes for Unit I Upon completion of this unit, students should be able to:

1. Analyze the philosophical concept of ethics, its practical applicability to business, and its distinction from the law.

9. Identify ethical considerations related to child labor and sweatshops.

Reading Assignment In order to access the resources below, you must first log into the myCSU Student Portal and access the Business Source Complete database within the CSU Online Library. Gogoi, P. (2008, October 10). Wal-Mart supplier accused of sweatshop conditions. Businessweek Online, 5. Renouard, C. (2011). Corporate social responsibility, utilitarianism, and the capabilities approach. Journal of

Business Ethics, 98(1), 85-97. Trevino, L. K., Hartman, L. P., & Brown, M. (2000). Moral person and moral manager: How executives

develop a reputation for ethical leadership. California Management Review, 42(4), 128-142. Watson, A. (2014). Ethics vs. compliance: Do we really need to talk about both? InsideCounsel, 24(266), 23. Navigate to and read the following sources on the Internet: Mojonnier, T. (2012). When child labor is ethical. Retrieved from http://businesstheory.com/child-labor-ethical/

Unit Lesson

Click here to access an introduction video.

Click here to access the introduction video transcript.

Click here to access a video that briefly introduces topics in this unit.

UNIT I STUDY GUIDE

Introduction to Business Ethics

BBA 4751, Business Ethics 2

UNIT x STUDY GUIDE

Title

Click here to access the video transcript. Lt. Commander of the Star Trek Enterprise, Mr. Spock, part Vulcan, part human, famously suppresses his “human” side to his “rational” side in making decisions that profoundly affect the Star Trek’s exploration, mission, and success. Mr. Spock—on more than one occasion—risks his life stating "The needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few or the one." Mr. Spock engages in the same reasoning when he is willing to sacrifice his life to ensure that the prime directive of the mission is not violated. Revealing an alien presence to the native people of Nibiru would contaminate their entire culture. Mr. Spock believes that the needs of the Nibiru natives outweigh his need to live and risks his own life. Even in seemingly smaller decisions that do not affect life and death, Mr. Spock espouses this theory that if the benefit to a few or even one, is outweighed by the benefit to the many, the few must be sacrificed. Mr. Spock believes that individuals should act to serve the greatest good for the greatest number and determines what is best by looking principally at the end result. Does the end justify the means used to effectuate the goal? In this unit, we will explore what it means to be an ethical person and why it is important in both personal and business settings. We will read about the foundational concepts of ethics as well as the character and power of an ethical leader. Socrates said, “[t]he shortest and surest way to live with honor in the world is to be in reality what we appear to be.” Whom do you want to be and why? How will you become the person you want to be? On what basis will you judge what is ethical? These crucial questions serve to guide us during this course as well as help you to grow as individual leaders within your organizations. For example, corporate cultures, as we will examine later in the course, are comprised with a myriad of different aspects but the most important is you. Your actions and non-actions, as well as your verbal behavior, will ultimately determine the character and direction of your organization. In this unit, we will explore various principles of ethics, including ethical relativism, utilitarianism, and fundamental rights. Is ethics a fixed concept, or is it fluid? Does it take into consideration another’s culture, or are there some issues which are steadfast and nonnegotiable? For example, is cannibalism acceptable? Is it acceptable in some cultures? In 1972, a flight carrying 45 passengers from Uruguay to Chile crashed high in the Andes. The 16 survivors lived in sub-zero temperatures waiting to be rescued for 72 days. After the food on-board was consumed, and with no wildlife to catch because of the winter conditions and the fact that they had no tools with which to catch any animals, the survivors turned to eating the corpses of the dead passengers, since they all agreed without which they surely would have died. Due to their survival instincts, the survivors were later rescued. Was it unethical to have sustained themselves off of the dead bodies? Did it matter that they had already died, and they did not kill anyone? What if they had killed someone or let him or her die in order to use them as food? You will be asked to think about the hard, sometimes uneasy, questions of ethics in this course. Some will take a relativist approach by arguing that ethical decisions depend upon certain factors such as the situation or one’s culture. Such an approach asserts that we must look at the decision to be made from the perspective of the individual in the situation. From this viewpoint, using the corpses as food was ethical because no one was killed in the process, they were already dead, and they were providing nourishment for their bodies. From a utilitarian lens, some will argue that the actions were morally justified by the end result, as the benefits were great while the sacrifices were few. Some will argue that as a fundamental principle, cannibalism is wrong in any situation as people have fundamental rights—not to be defiled after death and to be properly buried. Based on the first two concepts, the theories differ though the end result is the same: cannibalism is acceptable in that situation. In addition to foundational concepts of ethics, we will explore corporate social responsibility (CSR) and theories surrounding how organizations should operate in the market, as there is a lack of shared definition as to what CSR means. What is the ideal role of for-profit organizations? We will think broadly and delve into the various key roles of an organization as it relates to CSR. Should an organization donate part of their profits? Engage in community-building within their area? Support the arts? Focus mainly on maximizing value- creation for its shareholders and then only subsequently focus on the community in which it operates? We will apply these concepts in moving from the moral person to the ethical manager, from the individual to the organization. We will address whether the same measures should be applied and how one becomes a leader and transmits his or her values in the organization. Is “walking the walk” enough? Will the organization grow and properly evolve through action alone? Will the action be understood as it was intended, or will there be confusion and ambiguity? You will be given the tools to decide how best to be the ethical leader you want to be.

BBA 4751, Business Ethics 3

UNIT x STUDY GUIDE

Title

Lastly, we will apply the concepts in this unit to the issues currently being debated in employing children as labor workers within developing countries and operating “sweatshops.” For example, we examine those involved in the child labor market and whether the issue is as “clear-cut” as it may seem. Both are bad, right? What if a child in a developing country has no opportunity for education and working is his or her only choice? What are the ramifications of seeing the issue through our lens of a first world country in taking away this child’s job in a third world country when she contributes to her destitute family’s financial well-being? How would you decide based on fundamental, utilitarianism, or relativist principles, for example? In this unit, we will challenge ourselves and our way of thinking. President Abraham Lincoln said “[w]hen I do good, I feel good; when I do bad, I feel bad, that is my religion.” We will explore our personal ethical “religion,” and likely discover it is not as easy as “doing good or bad.” We will analyze how, as individual leaders, we decide what is “good or bad,” and decide which of those involved are affected by these choices and in what ways.

Moral person and

moral manager.pdf

Moral Person and Moral Manager: H o w EXECUTIVES DEVELOP

A REPUTATION FOR

ETHICAL LEADERSHIP

Linda Klebe Trevino Laura Pincus Hartman Michael Brown

P lato asked, which extreme would you rather be: "an unethical person with a good reputation or an ethical person with a reputation for injus- tice?" Plato might have added, "or would you rather be perceived as ethically neutral—someone who has no ethical reputation at all?" Plato

knew that reputation was important. We now understand that reputation and others' perceptions of you are key to executive ethical leadership. Those others include employees at all levels as well as key external stakeholders.

A reputation for ethical leadership rests upon two essential pillars: per- ceptions of you as both a moral person and a moral manager. The executive as a moral person is characterized in terms of individual traits such as honesty and integrity. As moral manager, the CEO is thought of as the Chief Ethics Officer of the organization, creating a strong ethics message that gets employees' attention and influences their thoughts and behaviors. Both are necessary. To be perceived as an ethical leader, it is not enough to just be an ethical person. An executive ethical leader must also find ways to focus the organization's attention on ethics and values and to infuse the organization with principles that will guide the actions of all employees. An executive's reputation for ethical leadership may be more important now than ever in this new organizational era where more employees are working independently, off site, and without direct supervision. In these organizations, values are the glue that can hold things together, and values must be conveyed from the top of the organization. Also, a single employee who operates outside of the organizational value system can cost

This article is based upon the findings of a study initiated by and supported by the Ethics Resource

Center Fellows Program.

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the organization dearly in legal fees and can have a tremendous, sometimes irreversible impact on the organization's image and culture.

Moral Person + Moral Manager = A Reputation for Ethical Leadership

These ideas about a dual pillar approach to ethical leadership are not brand new. As the opening quotation suggests, the emphasis on reputation goes back to Plato. Chester Barnard addressed the ethical dimension of executive leadership sixty years ago. Barnard spoke about executive responsibility in terms of conforming to a "complex code of morals"' (moral person) as well as creating moral codes for others (moral manager).

If Plato and Barnard had this right, why bother revisiting the subject of ethical leadership now? We revisit the subject because, in our 40 structured interviews (20 with senior executives and 20 with corporate ethics officers), we found that many senior executives failed to recognize the importance of others' perceptions and of developing a reputation for ethical leadership. To them, being an ethical person and making good ethical decisions was enough. They spoke proudly about having principles, following the golden rule, taking into account the needs of society, and being fair and caring in their decisions. They assumed that if they were solid ethical beings, followers would automatically know that. They rejected the idea that successful ethical executives are often perceived as ethically neutral. Furthermore, they assumed that good leaders are by definition ethical leaders. One senior executive noted, "I don't think you can distinguish between ethical leadership and leadership. It's just a facet of leadership. The great leaders are ethical, and the lousy ones are not."

However, a reputation for ethical leadership can not be taken for granted because most employees in large organizations do not interact with senior exec- utives. They know them only from a distance. Any information they receive about executives gets filtered through multiple layers in the organization, with employees learning only about bare-bones decisions and outcomes, not the per- sonal characteristics of the people behind them. In today's highly competitive' business environment, messages about how financial goals are achieved frequently get lost in the intense focus on the bottom line. We found that just because executives know themselves as good people—honest, caring, and fair— they should not assume that others see them in the same way. It is so easy to forget that employees do not know you the way you know yourself. If employ- ees do not think of an executive as a clearly ethical or unethical leader, they are likely to think of the leader as being somewhere in between—amoral or ethi- cally neutral.

Interestingly, perceptions of ethically neutral leadership do not necessarily arise because the leader fs ethically neutral. In fact, many of the senior execu- tives we spoke with convinced us that it was impossible for them to be ethically

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neutraf in their jobs, given the many value-laden decisions they make every day. Rather, the perception of ethically neutral leadership may exist because the leader has not faced major public ethical challenges that would provide the opportunity to convey his or her values to others. As one executive noted, "They haven't had to make any decisions on the margin . . . once you're faced with [a major public ethical dilemma], you bare your soul and you're one or the other [ethical or unethical]." On the other hand, a reputation for ethically neutral leadership may exist because the leader has not proactively made ethics and values an explicit and evident part of the leadership agenda. Executives must recognize that if they do not develop a reputation for ethical leadership, they will likely be tagged as "ethically neutral." As a result, employees will believe that the bottom line is the only value that should guide their decisions and that the CEO cares more about himself and the short-term financials than about the long-term interests of the organization and its multiple stakeholders.

Figure 1 provides a summary of our study's findings.

Pillar One: Moral Person Being an ethical person is the substantive basis of ethical leadership.

However, in order to develop a reputation for ethical leadership, the leader's challenge is conveying that substance to others. Being viewed as an ethical per- son means that people think of you as having certain traits, engaging in certain kinds of behaviors, and makitig decisions based upon ethical principles. Further- more, this substantive ethical core must be autfientic. As one executive put it, "If the person truly doesn't believe the ethical story and preaches it but doesn't feel i t . . . that's going to show through. . . . But, [a true ethical leader] walks in [and] it doesn't take very long if you haven't met him before [you think] there's a [person] with integrity and candor and honesty."

Traits

Traits are stable personal characteristics, meaning that individuals behave in fairfy predictable ways across time and situations and observers come to describe the individuaf in those terms. Tlie traits that executives most often asso- ciate with ethical leadership are honesty, trustworthiness, and integrity. A very broad personal characteristic, integrity was the trait cited most frequently by the executives. Integrity is a holistic attribute that encompasses the other traits of honesty and trustworthiness. One executive said that the average employee would say that the ethical leader is "squeaky clean." They woufd think "I know that if I bring an issue to him or her that I can count on their honesty and integrity on this because I've seen their standards and that one, integrity, is one that's very important to them."

Trustworthiness is also important to executives. Trust has to do with consis- tency, credibility, and predictability in relationships. "You can't build a long-term relationship with a customer if they don't trust you." Finally, honesty, sincerity.

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^BffljJr

F I G U R E I . TheTwo Pillars of Ethical Leadership

Moral Person

Traits

• Integrity

• Honesty

• Trustworthiness

Behaviors

• Do the Right Thing

• Concern for People

• Being Open

• Personal Moralrty

Decision-Making

• Hold to Values

• Objective/Fair

• Concern for Society

• Follow Ethical Decision Rules

E

1 Moral Manager

Role Modeling Through

Visible Action

Rewards and Discipline

Communicating About Ethics

and Values

1

and forthrightness are also important. "An ethical leader . . . tends to be rather candid, certain, [and is] very careful to he factual and accurate. . . . An ethical leader does not sugarcoat things . . . he tells it like it is."

Behaviors

"Your actions speak so loudly, I can't hear what you're saying." That is the sentiment expressed hy one' executive. Although traits are clearly important to ethical leadership, hehaviors are perhaps more so, and these include: "The way you act even when people aren't looking." "People are going to judge you not hy what you say hut hy what you do." "People look at you and understand over time who you are personally as a result of their ohservations." Important hehav- iors include "doing the right thing," showing concern for people and treating

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people right, heing open and communicative, and demonstrating morality in one's personal life.

First and foremost, executives said that ethical leaders do the right thing. One retired CEO talked ahout the founder of his firm, a man who "was known for his strong helief that there is only one way to do husiness and that's the right way."

Second, executive ethical leaders show concern for people through their actions. They treat people well—with dignity and respect. "I think [the ethical leader] treats everyhody with dignity—meaning everyhody—whether they're at the lowest level or higher levels . . . everyone gets treated with dignity and respect. I've also found that if you treat people with dignity and respect and trust, they almost invariahly will respond in that fashion. It's like raising chil- dren. If you really don't trust them, they don't have much to lose hy trying to get away with something. If they feel you trust them, they are going to think long and hard hefore they do something that will violate that trust." Several of the executives used the military example. "In the military, the troops eat hefore the officers.. . . Leaders take care of their troops. . . . A leader is selfless, a leader shares credit, a leader sees that contrihutors are rewarded." -

Being open means that the executive is approachahle and a good listener. Employees feel comfortahle sharing had news with the ethical leader. One exec- utive said, "An ethical leader would need to he approachahle so that. . . people would feel comfortahle raising the tough issues . . . and know that they would he listened to." Another put it this way: "In general, the hetter leaders that I've met and know are more than willing to share their experiences of rights and wrongs, successes and failures." These leaders do not kill the messenger who hrings had news. They encourage openness and treat had news as a prohlem to he addressed rather than punished.

Finally, personal morality is associated with ethical leadership. We asked explicitly ahout personal morality hecause our interviews with executives took place during the Monica Lewinsky scandal in the Clinton Presidency and the topic was prominent in everyone's mind. When we asked whether personal morality was linked to ethical leadership, most executives answered yes. "You can not he an ethical leader if your personal morality is in question. . . . To he a leader . . . what you do privately reflects on that organization. Secondly, to he a leader you have a greater standard, a greater responsihility than the average person would have to live up to."

Decision Making

In their decision-making role, executive ethical leaders are thought to hold to a solid set of ethical values and principles. They aim to he objective and fair. They also have a perspective that goes heyond the hottom line to include concerns about the broader society and community. In addition, executives said that ethical leaders rely upon a numher of ethical decision rules such as the golden rule and

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the "New York Times Test." The "New York Times Test" says that, when making a decision, ethical leaders should ask themselves whether they would like to see the action they are contemplating on tomorrow morning's front page. This ques- tion reflects the ethical leader's sensitivity to community standards.

To summarize, the "moral person" pillar of ethical leadership represents the suhstance of ethical leadership and it is an important prerequisite to develop- ing a reputation for ethical leadership hecause leaders hecome associated with their traits, hehaviors, and decisions as long as others know ahout them. With the moral person pillar in place, you should have a reputation for heing an ethi- cal person. You can think of this as the ethical part of the term "ethical leader- ship." Having a reputation for heing a moral person tells employees what you are likely to do—a good start, hut it does not necessarily tell them what they should do. That requires moral managing—taking the ethics message to the rest of the organization.

Many of the executives we interviewed thought that heing an ethical person who does the right thing, treats people well, and makes good decisions was necessary and sufficient for heing an ethical leader. This is not surprising hecause executives know other executives personally. They have served under them, worked with them, and ohserved their hehavior at close hand. Therefore, in their minds, an executive's ethical traits, hehaviors, and decisions are auto- matically associated with a reputation for ethical leadership. However, some of the executives and even more of the ethics officers noted that heing an ethical person was not enough. To develop a reputation for ethical leadership with employees, leaders must make ethics and values a salient aspect of their leader- ship agenda so that the message reaches more distant employees. To do this, they must he moral managers as well as moral persons. As one executive expressed it: "Simply put, ethical leadership means doing the right thing, and it means comimunicating so that everyone understands that [the right thing] is going to happen at all t i m e s . . . I think that most of the people I've heen in husi- ness with adhere to the first hut do less well with the second. And, in my experi- ence, it is something that has to he reinforced constantly . . . the second part is the hardest."

Pillar Two: Moral Manager In order to develop a reputation for ethical leadership, a heavy focus on

the leadership part of that term is required. The executive's challenge is to make ethics and values stand out from a husiness landscape that is laden with mes- sages ahout heating the competition and achieving quarterly goals and profits. Moral managers recognize the importance of proactively putting ethics at the forefront of their leadership agenda. Like parents who should explicitly share their values with their children, executives need to make the ethical dimension of their leadership explicit and salient to their employees. Executives who fail to do this risk heing perceived as ethically neutral hecause other more pervasive messages ahout financial success take over. One CEO put it this way: "We do

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o * ^

Moral Person and Moral Manager: H o w Executives Develop a Reputation for Ethical Leadership

some good things [turn down unethical husiness opportunities, develop people, champion diversity], hut compare the numher of times that we recognize those [ethical] achievements versus how much we recognize financial achievements— it's not close. I mean, I cringe . . . saying t h a t . . . I'm not saying we don't work at these other things, h u t . . . the recognition is still very much on financial per- formance and . . . it's true in almost all organizations . . . And that's what's wrong. That's what's out of kilter."

Our study identified a numher of ways moral managers can increase the salience of an ethics and values agenda and develop a reputation for ethical leadership. They serve as a role model for ethical conduct in a way that is visihle to employees. They communicate regularly and persuasively with employees ahout ethical standards, principles, and values. Finally, they use the reward sys- tem consistently to hold all employees accountahle to ethical standards.

Role Modeling through Visible Action

Role modeling may seem similar to the "doing the right thing" category ahove. However, role modeling emphasizes visible action and the perceptual and reputational aspects of ethical leadership. Some ethical hehaviors will go com- pletely unnoticed while others will he noticed and will contrihute to a reputation for ethical leadership. Effective moral managers recognize that they live in a fishhowl of sorts and employees are watching them for cues ahout what's impor- tant. "You are demonstrating hy your example on and off the joh, in other words, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, you're a model for what you helieve in and the values." In addition, "if you're unethical. . . people pick up on that and assume hecause you're the leader that it's the correct thing to do . . . that not only are you condoning it, hut you're actually setting the example for it."

The effective moral manager understands which words and actions are noticed and how they will he interpreted hy others. In some cases, visihle exec- utive action (without any words at all) is enough to send a powerful message. One executive offered the following as an example of the power of executive action. "Some years ago, I was running one of our plants. I had just taken over and they were having some financial trouhles. . . . Most of our management was flying first class. . . . I did not want. . . my first act to he to tell everyhody that they are not gonna fly first class anymore, so I just quit fiying first class. And it wasn't long hefore people noticed it and pretty soon everyhody was flying coach. . . . I never put out a directive, never said a word to anyhody . . . and people noticed it. They got the message. . . . People look to the leader. If the leader cuts corners, they say its okay to cut corners around here. If the leader doesn't cut corners, we must he expected not to do any of that around here."

Negative signals can also he sent hy visihle executive action and moral managers must he particularly sensitive to these. For example, what kind of signal does it send when your organization's ethics policy prohihits employees from accepting any kind of gift from a prospective client and then employees see a group of senior executives sitting in a client's hox enjoying a professional

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Moral Person and Moral Manager: Hov̂ ^ Executives Develop a Reputation for Ethical Leadership

foothall or haskethall game? Unless the CEO is wearing a large sign that says "we paid for these tickets," the message is clear. Ethics policies do not apply equally to everyone. It hecomes much easier for an employee to rationalize receiving gifts. According to one interviewee, many executives "wouldn't think twice ahout it hecause you don't intend to do anything wrong." However, employees are generally not aware of your intent. They see the actions and make inferences hased upon them.

Communicating about Ethics and Values

Many executives are uncomfortahle talking ahout ethics and wonder ahout those who do. In our interviews, some executives expressed concern ahout the leader who talks ahout ethics too much. "I distrust people who talk ahout it all the time. I think the way you do it [ethical leadership] is to demon- strate it in action . . . the more a person sermonizes ahout it, the more worried I am . . . sometimes you have to talk ahout it, hut mostly you don't talk ahout it, you just do things." However, moral managers need to talk ahout ethics and values, not in a sermonizing way, hut in a way that explains the values that guide important decisions and actions. If people do not hear ahout ethics and values from the top, it is not clear to employees that ethics and values are im- portant. You may not feel comfortahle talking ahout ethics if it means discussing the intricacies of Aristotle or Kant. However, talking ahout ethics with your employees does not mean that at all. It means talking ahout the values that are important to you and the organization. It is a hit like teaching children ahout sex. Parents can choose to avoid the uncomfortahle suhject, hoping that their children will learn what they need to know in school; or, they can hring an expert home who knows more than they do ahout the physiology of the human reproductive system. However, what parents really want their children to know ahout and adopt is a set of values the family helieves in such as love, respect, and responsihility. To he most effective, that message must come from parents, in words and in actions. Similarly, the message ahout the values guiding deci- sions and actions in husiness should come from senior leaders.

The Reward System

Using rewards and discipline effectively may he the most powerful way to send signals ahout desirahle and undesirahle conduct. That means rewarding those who accomplish their goals hy hehaving in ways that are consistent with stated values. "The most senior executive should reward the junior executive, the manager, the line people who make these [ethical] decisions . . . reinforce- ment is very important."

It also means clearly disciplining employees at all levels when they hreak the rules. A financial industry executive provided the following two examples. "If there's a situation within the corporation of sexual harassment where [the facts are] proven and management is very quick to deal with the wrongdoer . . . that's leadership. To let the rumor mill take over, to allow someone to quietly

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go away, to resign, is not ethical leadership. It is more difficult, hut you send the message out to the organization hy very visihle, fair, halanced hehavior. That's what you have to do."

"If someone has taken money, and they happen to he a 2 5-year employee who has taken two hundred dollars over the weekend and put it hack on Mon- day, you have to . . . fire that person. [You have to make] sure everyhody under- stands that Joe took two hundred dollars on Friday and got [fired] . . . [they must also] he assured that I did have a fact hase, and that I did act responsihiy and I do care ahout 25-year people."

Another financial industry executive talked ahout how he was socialized early in his career. "When I was signed . . . to train under a tough, hut fair part- ner of the firm . . . he [said] there are things expected from you . . . hut if you ever make a transaction in a client's account that you can't justify to me was in the hest interest of the customer, you're out. Well that kind of gets your attention."

An airline executive said, "we talk ahout honesty and integrity as a core value; we communicate that. But then we hack it up . . . someone can make a mistake. They can run into the side of an airplane with a haggage cart and put a hig dent in i t . . . and we put our arm around them and retrain them. . . . If that same person were to lie to us, they don't get a second chance . . . When it comes to honesty, there is no second chance."

The moral manager consistently rewards ethical conduct and disciplines unethical conduct at all levels in the organization, and these actions serve to uphold the standards and rules. The ahove reward system examples represent clear signals that will he noticed and that demonstrate clearly how employees are held accountahle and how the leader hacks up words with actions.

In summary, to develop a reputation for ethical leadership, one must he strong on hoth dimensions: moral person and moral manager. The ethical leader has a reputation for heing hoth a suhstantively ethical person and a leader who makes ethics and values a prominent part of the leadership agenda.

What Does Ethical Leadership Accomplish?

The executives we talked with said that ethical leadership was good for husiness, particularly in the long term, and avoids legal prohlems. "It prohahly determines the amount of money you're spending in lawsuits and with corpo- rate attorneys. . . you save a lot of money in regulatory fees and lawyer fees and settlement fees." They also said that ethical leadership contrihutes to employee commitment, satisfaaion, comfort, and even fun. "People enjoy working for an ethical organization" and it helps the organization attract and retain the hest employees. "If the leadership of the company reflects [ethical] values . . . people will want to work for that company and will want to do well." Finally, employ- ees in an organization led hy an executive ethical leader will imitate the hehav- ior of their leader and therefore the employees will he more ethical themselves.

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F I G U R E 2 . Executive Reputation and Ethical Leadership

Strong

Moral Manager

Weak

Hypocritical Leader Ethical Leader

Unethical Leader |

? -^— Ethically Neutral Leader — • ?

Weak Strong

Moral Person

Next, we combine the two pillars of ethical leadership into a two by two matrix that can help us think about the kinds of reputation an executive can develop (see Figure 2). As noted, the combination of strong moral person and strong moral manager produces a reputation for ethical leadership. However, what happens if the leader falters in one of these areas? The matrix suggests the following possibilities: one may develop a reputation as an unethical leader, a hypocritical leader, or an ethically neutral leader.

The Unethical Leader

A leader who is perceived to be weak on both dimensions will develop a reputation for unethical leadership. A number of executives we spoke with named Al Dunlap as a prime example of someone with a reputation for unethi- cal executive leadership. Business Week recently published excerpts from John Byrne's book about Dunlap entitled Mean Business.^ The article describes Dunlap as the "no-nonsense executive famous for turning around struggling compa- nies—and sending their shares soaring in the process." However, Dunlap was also known for tirades against employees "which could reach the point of emo- tional abuse." "He was condescending, belligerent and disrespectful." "At his worst, he became viciously profane, even violent. Executives said he would throw papers or furniture, bang his hands on his desk, and shout so ferociously that a manager's hair would be blown back by the stream of air that rushed from Dunlap's mouth." He used the promise of huge rewards to get "employees to do things they might not otherwise do." In order to make the numbers that Dunlap demanded, creative accounting techniques were employed and "dubious tech- niques were used to boost sales." He also lied to Wall Street analysts. "Despite the chaos inside the company. Sunbeam's chief kept up a steady drumbeat of optimistic sales and earnings forecasts, promises of tantalizing new products, and assurances that the Dunlap magic was working." In the end, the lies could

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no longer cover up what was really going on. Wall Street abandoned the com- pany and the board of directors fired Dunlap. Sunbeam was left crippled and the company continues to struggle today.

On the moral person dimension, Dunlap was found to be dishonest, he treated people horribly and made decisions based upon the financial bottom line only, disregarding the interests of multiple stakeholders in the process. On the moral manager dimension, his own behavior, communications, and the reward system were used to send a single consistent message. The bottom line was the only thing that mattered.

The Hypocritical Leader

A leader who is not perceived to be a strong ethical person but who attempts to put ethics and values at the forefront of the leadership agenda is likely to be perceived as a hypocritical leader who "talks the ethics talk" but does not "walk the ethics walk." In such cases, people tend to see the talk only as window dressing. They watch for actions to match the words and if there is a mismatch, the words are dismissed. As suggested above, some executives expressed concern about the leader who talks about ethics too much. In terms of the leader's reputation for ethical leadership, communicating about ethics and values, without the actions to match, is probably worse than doing nothing at all because talk without action places a spotlight on the issue that would not other- wise be there. As a result, employees become cynical and distrust everything the leader says. They also figure that they too can ignore ethical standards if they perceive that the leader does so.

The Ethically Neutral Leader

This category generated a lot of comment. Half of the executives rejected it out of hand. The other half recognized its existence and almost all of the twenty corporate ethics officers we talked with readily acknowledged it. On the moral person dimension, it is most appropriate to say that this person is per- ceived to be not clearly unethical, but also not strongly ethical. Consider what peo- ple say about ethically neutral leaders. In terms of traits, the ethically neutral leader is seen as more self-centered than other-centered. In terms of behaviors, ethically neutral leaders are less open to input from others and they care less about people. They are less compassionate. In terms of decision making, ethi- cally neutral executive leaders are thought to have a narrower yiew than do ethical leaders. They focus on financial ends more than the means that are of interest to ethical leaders. They also are more likely to base decisions upon the short-term bottom line and they are less concerned with leaving the organiza- tion or the world a better place for the future. Interestingly, much of the empha- sis seems to be on what the ethically neutral leader is not (not open to input, not caring, not focused on means, not concerned with leaving a legacy). This is important because it means that to perceive ethical leadership, followers need evidence of positive ethical traits, behaviors, and decision processes. Lack of

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awareness of these positive characteristics leads to the perception that the leader is ethically neutral. Clearly, employees must be aware of these positive attributes in order for them to infer the existence of ethical leadership.

When asked to talk about ethically neutral leaders, people said virtually nothing about moral managing (role modeling, communicating, the reward system). Given that employees make sense of the messages they do get, the ethi- cally neutral leader's focus on the short-term bottom line gets employees' atten- tion by default. If that is what the leader is focusing on, it must be the only thing that is important. One executive said, "Ethics hasn't been on the scorecard for what's important here . . . It's kind of like quality. Quality is something that we slipped away from and someone had to say, 'It's important.' Maybe the same is true of e t h i c s . . . we need a Deming . . . to remind us of how important it is."

Perhaps the most important outcome of ethically neutral leadership is that employees then think that ethics is not particularly important to the leader, "So they're left deciding on their own what's important in a particular situa- tion." This means that they are acting without clear guidance about the ethics and values of the organization. The leader has not demonstrated it, has not thought through it, has not given an example of it, has not talked about it, and has not discussed it in an open forum.

Cultivating a Reputation for Ethical Leadership

Given the importance of ethical leadership, we offer the following practi- cal steps executives can take to cultivate a reputation for ethical leadership.

Share Your Values: Who You Are as an Ethical Person "Ethical leadership is not easy . . . the temptations and the rewards for

unethical behavior are great. So, ethical leadership requires a discipline, a men- tal and personal discipline that is not easy to come by." Some senior executives arrive in their leadership positions with all of the necessary cognitive and emo- tional tools to be an active ethical leader. Part of the reason many of them ascend to senior leadership positions is because they have a reputation for integrity, for treating people well and for doing the right thing. They have likely had a lifetime of personal and work-related mentors and experiences that have molded and reinforced their values. By the time they reach the executive level, these values are so solid, that when challenged, the leader holds to them with- out question.

On the other hand, senior executive positions have a way of challenging your values in ways you may not have been challenged before. If you think that this aspect of your leadership needs work, devote energy to developing this side of yourself. Read books. Attend workshops and seminars with other senior exec- utives who share your concerns. Work with a personal coach. Talk with your spiritual advisor about how your values can be applied in yojir work.

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It then becomes particularly important to share this side of yourself. Find out what employees know about you and how they think of you in ethical lead- ership terms. You may be a strong ethical person, but your employees may have no way of knowing that. Most people do not have an accurate view of how oth- ers see them, especially when it comes to ethics. Surveys consistently find that most people think of themselves as above average and more ethical than their peers. However, the only way to honestly assess where you stand in terms of others' perceptions is to ask for candid input. A leader should "always have someone who can tell the emperor that he has no clothes." So, ask those closest to you. You can also survey your employees to find out how much they know about you as an ethical leader. Be open to what you learn and do not be sur- prised if employees say they simply do not know. For example, if you have not been outspoken on ethics and values issues, or you have not managed a highly public crisis that provided an opportunity for employees to learn about your values, you may be surprised to learn that employees do not know much about this aspect of your leadership. They may even see you as "neutral" on the ethics dimension. Talk to your communications people and your ethics officer, if you have one, about how you might successfully convey your values to employees on a regular basis. Figure out a way to open the lines of two-way communica- tion on ethics and values issues. Ask employees to share the ethical dilemmas they face and to let you know what kind of guidance they would like from you.

Assume the Role of Moral Manager- Chief Ethics Officer of Your Organization

"Ethical leadership means that the person, the leader, who is exercising that leadership is well-grounded in a set of values and beliefs that we would view as being ethical. However, in a leadership sense . . . it means that the leader sets an example because ethical leadership doesn't just mean that leader, it means the entire organization. If there isn't an observed ethical leadership at the top, you won't find it in the organization."

As noted, moral management requires overt action on the part of the executive to serve as a role model for ethical behavior in highly visible ways, to communicate about ethics and values, and to use the reward system to hold people accountable. James Burke, former CEO of Johnson & Johnson provides an excellent example of highly visible action that gets everyone's attention. Soon after Burke assumed the presidency of Johnson & Johnson, he brought together 28 senior managers to challenge the age-old corporate credo. He asked them to talk about whether they could really live by the document that had been hang- ing on corporate walls for years. "If we can't live by this document then it's an act of pretension and we ought to tear it off the walls, get rid of it. If we can live with it but want to change it that's okay too, if we can agree on what the changes should be. And, we could also leave it the way it is." According to Burke, people "stayed up all night screaming at each other." When they were done, they had updated the credo. They then took it to J&J sites around the

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world, released a revised credo in 1979, and committed the organization to it. Less than three years later, the Tylenol poisoning occurred and lots of folks were waiting to see whether management would live up to the credo values. As every student of business ethics and corporate crisis management knows, they did, and the case is now held up as a premier example of good business ethics. Burke does not take credit for J&J's success in handling the corporate crisis. He attrib- utes the success to the value system that had been articulated. However, clearly he was responsible for guiding the organization through the values articulation process and for making the credo prominent in the corporate culture and con- sciousness. As another executive put it, "all the written statements in the world won't achieve ethics in an organization unless the leader is perceived as being very serious and committed."

Following the Tylenol crisis, in 1985 Burke launched the credo survey process. All employees were surveyed regarding the company's performance with respect to the credo. Based upon the results, managers held feedback and problem-solving sessions with their employees and developed action plans to address problems. The survey process continues today on a biannual schedule under Burke's successor, Ralph Larsen, and remains a valuable way to keep attention focused on the credo and the values it represents.

To better integrate the Credo into the reward system, Larsen instigated a "standards of leadership" program which holds leaders at all levels accountable to the credo values. "At the important succession planning meetings, when upward mobility in the company is discussed, 'Credo Values' is first on the agenda. 'Business Results' is next in line. The following behaviors associated with Credo values are noted: 'Behaving with honesty and integrity. Treating others with dignity and respect. Applying Credo values. Using Credo survey results to improve business. Balancing the interests of all constituents. Managing for the long term.'"'

Finally, violations of Credo policy are handled swiftly and clearly. In one incident that involved infiltration of a competitor's sales meeting. President Larsen wrote the following to his management, "Our behavior should deeply embarrass everyone associated with Johnson & Johnson. Our investigation revealed that certain employees had engaged in improper activities that violated our policies. These actions were wrong and we took steps, immediately, to disci- pline those involved and guard against a recurrence of this kind of activity.""

Conclusion

Being an ethical leader requires developing a reputation for ethical lead- ership. Developing a reputation for ethical leadership depends upon how others perceive the leader on two dimensions: as a moral person and as a moral man- ager. Being a moral person encompasses who you are, what you do, and what you decide as well as making sure that others know about this dimension of you as a person. Being a moral manager involves being a role model for ethical

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conduct, communicating regularly about ethics and values, and using the reward system to hold everyone accountable to the values and standards. Ethical leadership pays dividends in employee pride, commitment, and loyalty—all par- ticularly important in a full employment economy in which good companies strive to find and keep the best people.

Notes 1. C. Barnard, Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

1938andl968), p. 279. 2. J.A. Byrne, "Chainsaw," Business Week, October 18, 1999, pp. 128-149. 3. L. Foster, Robert Wood Johnson (State College, PA: Lillian Press, 1999), pp. 645-646. 4. Ibid., p. 646.

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Ethics vs

Compliance.pdf

c:cx> By Ashley Watson

Ethics vs. compliance: Do we realiy need to taik about botii?

ASHLEY WATSON IS SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE OFFICER

AT HEWLETT- PACKARD COMPANY.

SHE CAN BE REACHED AT ASHLEY.WATSON®

HP.COM.

I n the ethics and com- pliance profession, some companies use the title, "Chief Ethics and Compliance Of-

ficer," others use "Chief Ethics Officer" while others choose "Chief Compliance Oflicer." The terms "ethics" and "com- pliance" are often used sjoion- yinously; as a result, drawing a distinction between the two concepts may seem unimport- ant. In fact, the difference between the two can be very important for your training, communications and overall culture. Indeed, the conscious choices that companies make about these concepts often define their business.

Ethics and compliance are es- sentially difl̂ erent sides of the same coin. Compliance is following the law, while ethics is doing what is right regardless of what the law says. Compliance is something that the government requires you to do. Ethics, on the other hand, is some- thing you choose to consider when taking action. As an example, vari- ous countries have environmental laws that require products to be labeled in a certain way and may include font requirements, place- ment rules, etc. Eailing to properly label a product or follow some other technical regulation is not unethical or immoral, but it is noncompliant, meaning that the company may face fines, liability or other government action. By contrast, a government may not dictate whether a company makes its products more environ- mentally safe or easier to recycle, but doing so may be the ethical thing to do.

If your policies and training place great emphasis on high-level values of right and wrong, you may not be properly pushing a culture of compliance. Of course, too much focus on legal standards without strong ethics messaging may inhibit the kind of values-based culture that makes employees proud and companies great. It is important to think about and convey the impor- tance of both ethical considerations and compliance.

The distinction between ethics and compliance becomes even more interesting when you are dealing with a compliance issue that has an ethical component. The most obvi- ous example is corruption. Besides being prohibited by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act(ECPA), U.K. Anti-Bribery Act and scores of other local laws (and thus a compliance issue), most people would agree that corruption is wrong and has an ethical component. But even with a seemingly obvious ethics is-

Ifyqur policies and training place great emphasis on high- level values of right and wrong, you may not be properly pushing a culture of compliance.

sue, using a "do the right thing" message to drive your anti-cor- ruption program may not be the right move in every circum- stance.

Eor example, you likely have a policy that prohibits employ- ees ft'om giving cash, lavish gifts or favors to public sector employees. The policy is part of your anti-corruption pro- gram, and messages about right and vwong, values and moral- ity, should be the most effective way to motivate employees to follow the policy. After all, ev- eryone knows bribery is wrong. But actually, such a message may lack credibility with many

of your employees who live in cul- tures where lavish gifts are expected or cash gifts on certain occasions are appropriate. It may actually feel wrong to them to refrain ftom giving an expensive gift as part of a business relationship. Similarly, employees sometimes rationalize their actions as right because they believe the ends justify the means. Isn't it better to give a lavish gift and help the company get business than to let the work go to a competi- tor? What is really "right" here? For these employees, the more eflective message may be about compliance with the FCPA and similar laws, emphasizing the potential liability, brand impact and business risks of non-compliance.

The best programs will recog- nize the difference between ethics and compliance and drive both as integral components of company culture and successful performance. In the end, companies that follow the law and prioritize ethics have a competitive advantage.

February 2014 • INSIDE COUNSEL 23

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Corporate Social

Responsibility.pdf