Fire science unit I assessment two questions And DQ question

Psychiatry 68(2) Summer 2005 95

Understanding Mass Panic and Other Collective Responses to Threat and Disaster

Anthony R. Mawson

While mass panic (and/or violence) and self-preservation are often assumed to be the natural response to physical danger and perceived entrapment, the literature indicates that expressions of mutual aid are common and often predominate, and collective flight may be so delayed that survival is threatened. In fact, the typical response to a variety of threats and disasters is not to flee but to seek the proximity of familiar persons and places; moreover, separation from attachment figures is a greater stressor than physical danger. Such observations can be explained by an alternative “social attachment”model that recognizes the fundamentallygregarious nature of human beings and the primacy of attachments. In the relatively rare instances where flight occurs, the latter can be understood as one aspect of a more generalaffiliativeresponse that involvesescaping fromcertainsituationsandmoving toward other situations that are perceived as familiar but which may not necessarily be objectively safe. The occurrence of flight-and-affiliation depends mainly on the social context and especially the whereabouts of familiar persons (i.e., attachment figures); their physical presence has a calming effect and reduces the probability of flight-and-affiliation, while their absence has the opposite effect. Combining the factors of perceived physical danger and the location of attachment figures results in a four-fold typology that encompasses a wide spectrum of collective responsestothreatanddisaster.Implicationsofthemodelforpredictingcommunity responses to terrorist attacks and/or use of weapons of mass destruction are briefly discussed.

The collective response to threat and or bombing attacks (Janis, Chapman, Gillin, & Spiegel, 1955), structural fires (Best, 1978;disaster is often portrayed as tending toward

hysteria and social breakdown, with mass Keating, 1982; Proulx, 2002), and disasters (Fritz & Williams, 1957; Kinston & Rosser,panic (and/orviolence)as thenatural response

to physical danger and perceived entrapment. 1974; Noji, 1997; Quarantelli, 1960, 2001). Onthe contrary, expressionsof mutual aidareHowever, mass panic is uncommon in situa-

tions such as combat (L’Etang, 1966), air-raid common and tend to predominate. Nonethe-

Anthony R. Mawson, MA, DrPH, is Professor of Public Health, Director, Institute of Epidemiology andHealthServicesResearch,andCo-Principal Investigator,NationalCenter forBiodefenseCommunica- tions, School of Public Health, College of Public Service, at Jackson State University, 350 West Woodrow Wilson Avenue, Suite 2301-B, Jackson, MS 39213; E-mail: [email protected].

I am indebted to John Grundy and the late Professor Donald Mackay, Keele University, for their valuable comments and support during the early phases of my research on mass panic. I also thank GaChavisGreen,medical student, for researchassistance, and mywifeCarolAndersen foreditorial advice. Four anonymous reviewers provided additional useful comments. I dedicate this paper to the memory of the late Dr. Jonathan Sime, whose untimely death has robbed us of a brilliant scholar and colleague.

96 Understanding Mass Panic

less, given the September 11, 2001, attacks on as inappropriate or as highly intense fear or flight, instances of panic are difficult to iden-the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the

immediately subsequent anthrax letters, and tify in practice. The judgment of panic is usu- ally made retrospectively, especially if seriouswidespread continuing concerns regarding

population behavior in the event of terrorist loss of life occurred, but what may be consid- ered inappropriate, excessive, irrational, orattacks using weapons of mass destruction

(Durodié & Wessely, 2002; Hyams, Murphy, highly intense by observers may not be so judged by the participants themselves (Fore-& Weesely, 2002; Levy and Sidel, 2003), a

fresh appraisal of the literature on collective man, 1953; Mawson, 1978, 1980; Schoch- Spana,2003;Sime,1980;Swartz,1980;Wood,responses to threat and disaster is needed.

The review indicates that the typical 1972). For instance, rushing for the exits in a structural fire may be the only rational courseresponse to a variety of physical threats is nei-

ther “fight nor flight” but affiliation—that is, of action to take (Lazarus, 1966). Hence, the decision to label instances of collective flightseeking the proximity of familiar persons and

places, even though this may involve ap- as panic is arbitrary. Common symptoms of intense fear, suchas anxiety, nausea, vomiting,proaching or remaining in a situation of dan-

ger; indeed, separation from attachment fig- and dizziness, can be normal reactions to ab- normal events (Lacy&Benedek,2003;Pastel,ures is a greater stressor than physical danger

itself. Such observations can be explained by 2001). This discussion focuses on individual andcollective flightbehavior, recognizing thatan alternative, “social attachment” model of

collective behavior under threat, a model that such behavior can assume varying degrees of intensity.recognizes the fundamentally social nature of

humanbeingsandtheprimacyofattachments. In the relatively rare instances where flight does occur, the latter can be understood as THE CAUSES OF GROUP FLIGHT one aspect of a more general affiliative re- sponse that involves escaping from certain sit- According to the classical “entrapment

theory”ofmasspanic(e.g.,Chandessais,1971;uations and moving toward other situations that are perceived as familiar, but which may Fritz & Marks, 1954; Fritz & Williams, 1957;

Janis, 1971; Janis et al., 1955; Killian, 1972;notnecessarilybeobjectively safe.Theoccur- rence of flight-and-affiliation depends mainly Mintz, 1951; Quarantelli, 1954, 1957, 1977;

Smelser, 1963; Turner, 1964), flight occurs ifon the social context and especially the loca- tion of familiar persons (attachment figures); people believe that 1) major physical danger

is present or imminent, and 2) escape routesthat is, their physical presence is calming and reduces the probability of flight-and-affilia- are either limited or rapidly closing. Condi-

tions 1 and 2 are individually necessary; to-tion, while their absence has the opposite ef- fect.Combiningthefactorsofperceivedphys- gether they provide sufficient conditions for

groupflight.AccordingtoJanisandLeventhalical danger and the location of attachment figures results in a four-fold typology that en- (1968), “It is this combination of cognitions,

whether or not they are correct inferencescompasses a broad spectrum of collective re- sponses to threat and disaster. Implications about the situation . . . designated as ‘per-

ceived entrapment,’ which is most likely toof the social attachment model for predicting community responses to terrorist attacks and/ leadtowild flight, tramplingof fellowvictims,

andotheruncontrollable,distraught reactionsor the use of weapons of mass destruction are briefly discussed. of the type referred to as panic” (p. 1061).

Aspecificbelief indangercanbe inferred from the circumstances of many instances ofTERMINOLOGY mass flight, for example, from theater fires (Smelser, 1963, p. 151), but the existence ofTheterm“panic” refers to inappropriate

(or excessive) fear and/or flight and highly such beliefs among participants in some cases of troop flight has been questioned. For in-intense fear and/or flight. But whether defined

Mawson 97

stance,Marshall (1947)states that“every large tives and friends. Most of those who fled were either unattached to families in the area orpanic starts with some very minor event . . .

(T)roops will always run if they see others fled only after other family members had as- sembled (Cantril et al., 1940, pp. 144–146).running and do not understand why” (p. 145).

A belief in limited or closing escape routes appears This was contrary to newspaper reports at the time, of a mass exodus from New York City.to have been a necessary condition in many

historiccases(Smelser,1963,p.137),butsome A Swedish study of responses to a radio broadcast of a fictitious radioactive leak frommilitary panics have occurred in situations

where escape routes were virtually unlimited a nuclear power plant (Rosengren, Arvidson, & Sturesson, 1975) involved a telephone sur-(Schultz, 1964a, p. 11).

Are both beliefs sufficient to cause flight? vey of a representative sample of the popula- tion and unstructured interviews with policeThe theory accounts successfully for the clas-

sic, theater-fire type panics, such as the Chi- and other authorities. Contrary to media re- ports of widespread “panic,” only about 1%cago Iroquois Theater Fire of 1906, and the

February 17, 2003, fire at South Side Chica- reacted behaviorally to it, consisting “as a rule . . . of contacting family members, relatives orgo’s Epitome nightclub, in which 21 people

were killed and 19 others critically injured neighbors, over the telephone or face-to-face . . .” (p. 307). Not a single case was found(Rosengren et al., 1975; see http://www.cnn.

com/2003/US/Midwest/02/17/chicago.night among the 1,089 respondents of anyone actu- ally fleeing. If such reactions occurred, theclub/index/html). But flight does not always

occur even though both beliefs, or conditions, authors suggested, they were very rare. As mentioned, mass flight from theare present. Tyhurst (1951) studied reactions

to community disasters and found that only scene of community disasters is uncommon. “Organized” and often altruistic behavior is12% to 25% of adults responded by fleeing

when informed that their apartment house therule (Edwards,1976;Feinberg&Johnson, 2001; Glass & Schoch-Spana, 2002; Johnson,was on fire or that a flash flood was imminent.

Three-quarters or more engaged in aimless 1987;Keating,1982; Kinston&Rosser, 1974; Proulx,2002,2003;Quarantelli&Dynes,1977;and irrelevant movements rather than the ex-

pected flight behavior. Schoch-Spana, 2003). Although the condi- tions for flight stipulated by the theory doConvincingevidenceagainst the theory

comes from two detailed case studies specifi- not exist in most disasters, in those where the conditions would be expected to prevail, suchcally concerned with mass flight. The famous

Orson Welles radio broadcast, “War of the as anticipated bombing raids, approaching tidal waves, or fires in high-rise buildings,Worlds,” in October 1938 dramatically de-

picted the advance of Martians in terms of evacuation has often been minimal (Edwards, 1976;Kinston&Rosser,1974;Lachman,Tat-partial encirclement—precisely the conditions

for flight stipulated by the theory. The broad- suoka, & Bonk, 1961; Proulx, 2002). cast occurred when radio listening was at a peak in the United States and took the form of a newscast, that is, “news” being reported ASSUMPTIONS IN THE

“ENTRAPMENT” THEORYinahighly realisticmanner.According toesti- mates made at the time (Cantril, Gaudet, & OF FLIGHT Herzog, 1940), 6 to 12 million people heard the broadcast and 28% (i.e., 2.5 million) be- Earlier views of mass panic rested on

the following assumptions:lieved the program was an actual newscast. Of these2.5million,70%were“excited”orafraid (Lemkau, 1973). No estimate was provided of 1. The typical response to danger is self-

preservative aggression or flight (see, forthe number of persons who fled, but of those who listened to the broadcast, believed what example, Brown, 1954; Cannon, 1929;

McDougall, 1920; Petersen, 1953).they heard, and were frightened, the vast ma- jority did not flee but instead contacted rela- According to McDougall (1920),

98 Understanding Mass Panic

“(T)he sudden appearance of immi- imity of familiar conspecifics and places, even if this involves remaining in or approaching anentdangermayinstantaneouslycon-

vert any concourse of people into a situation of danger (Baker & Chapman, 1962; Henderson, 1977; Kinston & Rosser, 1974).crowd and produce the characteristic

and terrible phenomena of a panic. Bowlby (1973, p. 91) has suggested that at- tachment behavior serves the evolutionary-In each man, the instinct of fear is

intensely excited; he experiences that adaptive function of providing protection from natural predators, and notes that inhorrible emotion in full force and is

irresistibly impelledtosavehimselfby young animals of many species, attachment behavior frequently takes precedence over es-flight” (p. 24).

2. Flight is directed toward an objectively cape.BothCantril etal. (1940)andRosengren et al. (1975), in their studies of responses tosafe place, away fromdanger. Inhisclas-

sic text on collective behavior, Smelser threatening radio broadcasts, found that indi- viduals sought out loved ones and only fled(1963) defined panic as “collective

flight based on a hysterical belief,” when all family members had assembled. In the devastating Southeast Michigan Flint-and asserted that when people have

accepted a “belief about some gener- Beecher tornado of June 1953, people tended to turn to and protect loved ones rather thanalized threat [they] flee from estab-

lished patterns of social interaction in flee from the threat (Form & Nosow, 1958, pp. 26–27). Studies of behavior in structuralorder to preserve life, property, or

power from that threat” (p. 131). fires likewise showthatoccupants tendtocon- verge and cluster (Bryan, 1985, 1986, 2002).Quarantelli (1957)alsonoted the typ-

ically shortdurationof flightandsug- Governments and other official organi- zations have great difficulty getting people togested that this related directly to

the individual’s perception of having evacuate before and during disasters; “tradi- tional family ties often keep individual mem-reachedasafedistance fromthethreat.

3. Implicit in the disaster literature is bers in the danger zone until it is too late” (Hill & Hansen, 1962, p. 217). In Englandthatphysical dangersaremoredisturbing

or stressful than other kinds of events. during World War II, evacuation programs were seriouslyhampered becauseparents pre-4. Flight is prevented from occurring in

danger situations by social control in the ferred to keep their children with them at home in the cities rather than send them awayform of regimentation, discipline,

firm leadership (Boring, 1945, p. 456; to the safety of the countryside (Titmuss, 1950). Studies indicate that most residentsKelland, 1930; LaPiere, 1938; L’Et-

ang, 1966; Rickman, 1938), and other tendtoremain inthedisasterarea,while those who flee are unattached to the area (Cantril etsocialnorms(Smelser,1963,pp.157–

163) that take effect by regulating or al., 1940, pp. 144–146; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977). When residents are forced to evacuate,constraining the individual’s natural

tendency to flee. they tend to do so as a group (e.g., Cantril et al., 1940; Freeman & Cooper, 1940) or in family units (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977), thereby maintaining proximity and contactRESPONSE TO THREAT with familiars. Remaining close to compan- ions in combat is also more important to theEvidence suggests that each of the

above assumptions is questionable. individual thanavoidingenemyfire (Marshall, 1947, p. 195).1. Self-Preservative Flight. Human be-

ings under threat of death are not motivated 2.DirectionofFlight.Flight isnotalways directedtowardanobjectively safeplace, awayby a simple drive for physical safety. Rather

than fight or flight, the typical response to from danger, but tends to be part of a wider response that simultaneously involves move-danger is affiliation, that is, seeking the prox-

Mawson 99

ment away from danger and movement to- appearance of new types of weapon on the battlefield, explosions, flooding, disease epi-ward objects and situations that are familiar

andperceivedassafe.Studiesofyounganimals demics, military invasion, and the like. Predis- posing conditions implicated in cases of massand children indicate that flight is usually di-

rected not simply away from danger but to- flight (Schultz, 1965; Strauss, 1944) include fatigue, illness, malnutrition, and excessiveward familiar conspecifics andplaces. Inmany

species, “to move away from an alarming situ- heat or cold (Boring, 1945; Dollard, 1944; Lang & Lang, 1961; Meerloo, 1950), as wellation is . . . onlyhalf thepictureof fearbehav-

ior. The other half is to move towards some as psychosocial factors such as isolation, poor morale, loss of confidence in leaders, and theplace treated as though safe or to make physi-

cal contact with companions” (Bowlby, 1973, absence of leaders or companions (Boring, 1945; Janis, 1963; Lang & Lang, 1961; Mar-p. 129). Salzen (1978) also suggests that flight

orescapeserves tomoveorganismsfromareas shall,1947;Meerloo,1950;Quarantelli, 1954, 1957, 1977; Schultz, 1964b, 1971a).of strange to areas of familiar stimulation, and

Gray (1971) hypothesizes that active avoid- Attachment behavior is similarly elic- itedbyalarmingeventssuchas theappearanceance behavior is motivated by the search for,

and reinforced by, the attainment of “safety ofunfamiliarpersons,by strangeandunfamil- iar surroundings (Bowlby, 1969, p. 259;signals” in the environment.

In the classic cases of flight from the- Bowlby, 1973, pp. 96–123), as well as by the predisposing conditions listed above: fatigue,aters and other buildings, where escape seems

to be the single overriding motive, little con- hunger, ill-health, cold, and actual or threat- ened separation (Alloway, Pliner, & Krames,sideration has been given to the sequelae and

directionality of flight. Although the initial 1977; Bowlby, 1969, p. 259; Bowlby, 1973). 3. Physical versus Psychosocial Stress.response to sudden danger may be unidirec-

tional escape, the immediately subsequent re- Physical danger, as a whole, appears to be far less disturbing or stressful than separationsponse is to contact relatives and friends by

telephone or by going home, as soon as the from familiar conspecifics and surroundings (Janis & Leventhal, 1968, pp. 1061–1064;individuals concerned can do so. In general,

evacuees orient themselves in the direction of Kinston & Rosser, 1974; Edwards, 1976). During the bombing raids on London inrelatives whose homes are outside the danger

area (Drabek & Boggs, 1968; Moore, Bates, World War II, children showed no particular signs of distress, even if exposed to extremelyLaymon, & Parenton, 1963, p. 57). Evacuat-

ing families forced to go to official evacuation violent scenes, if they were with a parent dur- ingsuch incidents. Itwasonly if childrenweresites tend to form clusters that partially dupli-

cate their old neighborhoods (Bates, 1963), separatedfromparentsunder theseconditions that serious psychological disturbances oc-suggesting an “intention to restore the famil-

iar in the midst of unfamiliar surroundings” curred (Freud & Burlingham, 1945), suggest- ing that disruption of the family bond was a(Bolin, 1976, p. 268). Affiliative behavior con-

tinuesatahigh levelof intensityafterdisasters more traumatic factor than the air raids (Glover, 1942). Glass (1954) similarly foundinvolving escape behavior, and after disasters

ingeneral (Bloch,Silber,&Perry,1956;New- that only 15% of psychiatric casualties evacu- ated from battle zones and, given intensiveman,1976). Interactionswith familymembers

are also more frequent up to three years after psychotherapy, could subsequently be re- turned to combat. If these men were kept indisasters (Bates, 1963; Bolin, 1976; Drabek &

Key, 1976; Erickson, 1977, 1995). the battle zones with their own units, the rate of return to combat was much higher. In ana-All of the conditions known to elicit

flight in humans also elicit attachment behav- lyzing the social and psychological effects of tornado disasters, Moore (1958) found moreior (Bowlby, 1969). Precipitating conditions for

flight include “alarming events” of many dif- frequentsymptomsofdisturbanceamongper- sonsforcedtomovebecauseofseriousdamageferent kinds (Schultz, 1965) such as fires, the

100 Understanding Mass Panic

to their homes than among those who were 170) or if morale is high (LaPiere, 1938, pp. 458–459).Conversely,beingalone, inanunfa-able toremain.Non-returningevacueesexpe-

rience significantly more fearful reactions, in- miliarenvironment,orwithstrangersheightens the response to stress (Back & Bogdonoff,juries, and other problems than those remain-

ing in the disaster area (Milne, 1977a, b). In 1964; Edwards, 1976; Henderson, 1977; Kaplan, Cassel, & Gore, 1977; Kinston &general, separation fromorthe lossof familiar

persons and surroundings has profoundly ad- Rosser, 1974) and increases the probability of flight (Keegan, 1976, p. 271; Lanham, 1943).verse effects on mental and physical health

(DeVries, Glasper, & Detillion, 2003; Erick- son, 1977; Henderson, 1977; Jacobs & Ost-

THE RARITY OF FLIGHTfeld, 1977; Lynch, 1998; Rutter, 1972). IN COMMUNITY DISASTERS4.PreventionofPanic.Therarityofmass AND COMBATflight among combat troops has often been

attributed to regimental discipline and firm Flight is said to be rare in these situa- leadership, but social control in the form of tionsbecause thenecessaryandsufficientcon- coercion does not account for persistent com- ditions (belief in imminentdangerand limited bateffectiveness inthefaceofdanger(Keegan, escape routes) do not usually hold, and be- 1976, p. 277). Individuals of many species of- cause social controls are operative. However, ten remain calm and unafraid in danger situa- flight does not always occur even when both tions, an effect that seems to depend largely conditions appear to be present. As we have on the immediate social context; that is, indi- seen, physical danger tends to elicit approach viduals are calmed by the presence of attach- to familiar persons and places; most disasters ment objects, while the reverse is true if they tend to occur in familiar surroundings; and are alone, with strangers, or in unfamiliar sur- bothdisastervictims(andtroopsinthecombat roundings (Bovard, 1959; Bowlby, 1973, p. zone) tend to be with individuals to whom 297; DeVries et al., 2003; Epley, 1974; Gun- they are attached. Hence, affiliative “bunch- nar, 1998; Kamarck, Annunziato, & Amateau, ing” in thedangerzonewouldbe theexpected 1995). outcomeratherthanflight.Therarityof flight

Fighting effectiveness and the willing- in community disasters and combat may also ness toengage incombatdependontheestab- beexplainedbythe fact thatboththeappraisal lishmentandmaintenanceof“primarygroup” of and response to danger are diminished by relationsbetweenofficersandmenratherthan the presence of attachment objects, as noted on loyalty to political ideals or fear (Grinker above. The observations that visitors tend to & Spiegel, 1945; Janis, 1963; Marshall, 1947: be the ones to flee disaster areas, and that 150; Phillips, 1943; Shils & Janowitz, 1948; “panic” is more common in recently assem- Stouffer et al., 1949). As Marshall (1947) elo- bled than in long-established military units quently states: “I hold it to be one of the (Shils & Janowitz, 1948) can be explained by simplest truths of war that the thing which the fact that the persons concerned are in un- enables an infantry soldier to keep going is familiar territory and with comparative strang- the presence of a comrade . . . The other man ers, and would thus be expected to have an may be almost beyond hailing distance, but increasedtendencyforflight-and-affiliationto he must be there somewhere within a man’s their own objects of attachment and familiar consciousness or the onset of demoralization locations. is almost immediate . . .” (p. 17). Morale sur- veys conducted in World War II showed that Explaining the Occurrence many soldiers were reluctant to be allocated of Flight in Non-Threatening tootherunitsbecause they felt saferwith their Situations own group (Janis, 1963). The most extreme stresses, including drowning at sea, can be Collective flight on the battlefield has

been precipitated by the appearance of newcalmly faced if the individual is not separated from his fellows (Burns & Kimura, 1963, p. types of weapons (Auld, 1918; Meerloo, 1950,

Mawson 101

p. 49). However, flight can occur in the ab- of misgivings about him . . .” (Freud, 1922, p. 29), or because of the flight of a leader, entail-sence of danger and in situations where escape

routes are virtually unlimited (Freud, 1922; ing the break-up of affectional ties (Schultz, 1964b).Asaresult, theindividual fleesbecauseMarshall,1947;Schultz,1964a,p.11).Marshall

(1947) describes seven such incidents in World he suddenly feels alone and because his fears are intensified. The difference between theWar II, and noted their common origin: theories is that group ties must “break down”

[I]t can be laid down as a general rule that before external danger leads to flight. How- nothing is more likely to collapse a line of ever, when these ties have disintegrated, the infantry than the sight of a few of its number

behavior of individuals is the same, that is, ain full and unexplained flight to the rear Hobbesian struggle for survival in the face of. . . That was how each of these seven inci-

dents got its start. One or two or more men closing escape routes. madeasuddenruntotherearwhichothers in Here we suggest an alternative hypoth- the vicinity did not understand . . . [I]n every esis: namely, that the initial run is experienced case the testimony of all witnesses clearly de-

by the observer as a threat to social ties, andveloped the fact that those who started the more specifically, as signaling abandonmentrun . . . hadalegitimateorat leastareasonable

excuse for the action. (pp. 145–146) and separation. Thus, we interpret the subse- quent action of the observer not as an attempt

Two explanations have previously been to escape real or imagined dangers but as an suggested for such cases. First, according to attempt to maintain proximity with those who Smelser (1963): started the run, including the group leader,

that is, anaffiliative responsedesigned to reaf- [T]he initial flight itself creates—astheremarks firm social bonds (Mawson, 1978). ofMarshall show—anewset ofnecessary condi- In support of this interpretation, it hastions forpanic.Toseesomeonerunningwildly

been noted that combat troops and their offi-is prima facie evidence that he is seeking to cers—separated from family and familiar sur-escape through limited exits . . . and that he

is anxious. Furthermore, this observed flight roundings—grow fiercely attached to each is a precipitating event for the observer, and other; and these bonds are especially strong gives rise to the belief that something fright- prior to and during combat (Ambrose, 2002,ening is present, even though this “some-

p. 109, but see Moskos, 1975, on the Vietnamthing” may not be identical to that which War; Dasberg, 1976; George, 1971; Janis,caused the original flight. (p. 154) 1963; Little, 1964; Sohlberg, 1976; Stouffer et al., 1949; Teichman, 1977). The threat ofSmelser proposes that those who ran

after seeingothersdoing sobelieved thatdan- separation isalsoamajordeterminantofaffili- ativebehavior aswell as a commonexperienceger was imminent and that escape routes were

closing. This explanation cannot be entirely on the battlefield (Dasberg, 1976, p. 311), and thereismuchevidencethatattachmentbehav-discounted. However, the explanation dwells

exclusively on what the initial flight means to ior occurs under such conditions. Individual soldiers try to avoid being separated; they willthe observer in terms of objective dangers to

be anticipated rather than what it means in go through danger to be reunited with their unit, and tend to bunch together in combatlightoftheobserver’srelationship tothefleeing

individual(s), and it underemphasizes the nu- (Marshall, 1947, p. 340). ances of meaning that can arise when one or moremen, inwhomconfidenceandtrusthave THE SOCIAL ATTACHMENT been placed, behave contrary to expectations. MODEL OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

A second hypothesis begins with the IN DISASTERS observation that strong affectional ties exist- ing between the members of most military Thesocial attachmentmodel (Mawson,

1978,1980)representsasynthesisof theaboveunits make the danger of combat seem rela- tively slight. Panic arises because of the “loss observations and conclusions. Its central ten-

ets are as follows:of the leader in some sense or other, the birth

102 Understanding Mass Panic

1) Maintaining proximity to familiars is flight-and-affiliation depends largely on the se- verity of predisposing conditions. If precipitat-the dominant motive in disasters, an

intense expression of the fundamen- ingandpredisposingconditionsaresubdivided, respectively, into two extremes—“anxiety ver-tally gregarious nature of human be-

ings. susfearorterror”and“attachmentfigurespres- ent/absent”—a fourfold typology of progres-2) Flight can be considered the reverse

side of the coin of affiliative behavior, sively more intense responses emerges (labeled Outcomes A, B, C, and D) that incorporates athat is, one aspect of a more general

response that involves movement wide spectrum of collective reactions to threats and disasters (Figure 1).away from danger and toward people

and places viewed as familiar. Outcome A—Affiliation

3) The occurrence of flight-and-affilia- tion depends not only on the per- Where the level of physical danger is

low (causing anxiety) and individuals are inceiveddegreeofdangerbut,moreim- portantly, on the social context, that the presence of attachment figures or objects,

the threshold for flight-and-affiliation is high,is, the location or whereabouts of fa- miliar persons and places. and flight from the vicinity is rare; the usual

outcome is increased attachment behavior. This4) Thepresenceof familiarpersons influ- ences the perception of and response is the most common response to community

threats and disasters. Individuals tend to con-to danger, in that fear is diminished by proximity to attachment figures. tact relatives and friends and/or remain to-

gether at home. Other examples of Outcomea. In situations where individuals are close to attachment figures, not A are increased bunching activity among

troops in the combat zone, and the myriadeven the most severe environmen- tal threats ordinarily cause flight; everyday instances of attachment behavior

shown by children and adults in the face oftheusualoutcomeis intenseaffilia- tive behavior. mild threats (e.g., calling or going home).

b. On the rare occasions when flight Outcome B—Orderly Evacuation

does occur, individuals tend to by Non-Residents

move away as a group, thereby maintaining proximity with at- Where the degree of danger is low, but

individuals are alone or with strangers, thetachment figures. c. However, in situations where the threshold for flight-and-affiliation is still rela-

tively low,and flight-and-affiliationof lowinten-individual isaloneorwithstrangers, even mild threats can precipitate sity would be expected to occur. Such behavior is

often described not as panic but as orderlyflight-and-affiliationtofamiliarper- sons and locations at a distance. flight or evacuation. Exemplifying Outcome

B would be the flight-and-affiliative behavior of those temporarilyaway fromhometowards their own homes and families. At this level ofTYPOLOGY OF RESPONSES

TO DISASTER perceived danger (which tends to be mini- mized or downplayed in the home environ- ment), local inhabitants tend to remain in theirBased on the foregoing, a typology of

individualandcollectivereactionstothreaten- familiar environment. ing situations is proposed, combining the fac-

Outcome C—Evacuation tors of perceived degree of physical danger

by Community Residents (precipitating condition) and levels of social sup- port available in the situation (i.e., the presence Where the danger level is high (intense

fear or terror) but people are with familiars,or absence of attachment objects) (predisposing condition). Whether a particular threat leads to flight-and-affiliation occurs occasionally in spite

Mawson 103

Outcome A:

Affiliation

Increased attachment

behavior, that is, individuals

seek proximity with familiar

people and locations, as

occurs in most community

disaters.

Flight-and-affiliation of low

intensity. Orderly movement

away from danger and toward

the familiar, for example,

evacuation by tourists in

“mild” community disasters

and “bunching” among

combat troops.

Outcome B:

Orderly Evacuation by Non-Residemts

Mild (Anxiety)

Perceived Degree of Physical Danger

(Precipitating Conditions)

Severe (Fear, Terror)

Outcome C:

Evacuation by Community Residents

Outcome D:

Intense Flight-and- Affiliation

As in Outcome A, or

occasional low-to-intense

flight-and-affiliation, for

example, orderly evacuation

in major disasters: occasional

“panic” in seasoned combat

units due to the appearance

of new weapons.

Intense flight-and-affiliation,

that is, responses commonly

labeled “mass panic,” as in

structural fires, and in

unattached or weakly

attached combat units.

Present Absent

Location of Attachment Figures (Predisposing Conditions)

Figure 1. Typology of individual and collective reactions to threat and disaster (Outcomes A–D), based on a combination of precipitating conditions—degree of physical danger, ranging from anxiety (“mild”) to fear and/or terror (“severe”)— and predisposing conditions—the whereabouts of attachment figures (physically present or absent).

104 Understanding Mass Panic

of exceptionally strong bonds to persons and hand, in the case of fires occurring in familiar locations such office buildings (and especiallyplaces in the danger zone. In such cases, indi-

viduals tend to evacuate as a group, either homes), people would be expected to show a tendency to increase their attachment behav-as families or neighborhood groups, thereby

keepingclosetogether.Theintensityofegress ior within the structure (Outcome A) rather than evacuating it (Outcome C). Affiliativedepends on the magnitude and imminence of

the threat. Examples of Outcome C include tendencies would presumably be shown par- ticularly strongly by children in their ownoccasional “panics” in seasoned military units

in the face of overwhelming or unexpected homes, andperhapsalsobythe frail elderly. In fact, research is needed to determine whetherdanger, and large-scale community evacua-

tions during major fires or other disasters. young children are more apt to engage in at- tachment behavior under such conditions and whether this may account, in part, for theOutcome D—Intense Flight-

and-Affiliation increased susceptibility of children to injury and death in residential fires. In residential fires in general, the model would predict a)Where the danger level is high (induc-

ing fear or terror) and individuals are either numerous manifestations of attachment be- havior to persons and places within the struc-alone or with strangers, flight-and-affiliative

behavior of high intensity would be expected to ture, b) a widespread tendency to downplay thedanger, c)ageneral reluctance toevacuate,occur.Thisresponseisoftendescribedas“mass

panic.” Examples include the classic, entrap- d) prolonged delays in departure, and e) far less precipitous and intense escape behaviorment-type “panics,” together with cases of

flight-and-affiliation in combat units where than if the fire had occurred in an unfamiliar location. Several observations on behaviorattachments between individuals are either

weakor nonexistent and where, in effect, each duringandafterafireinanapartmentbuilding in Winnipeg, Canada, support these predic-person experiences the stress of combat as an

isolatedindividual. Inthesetypesofsituations, tions (Scanlon, 1979): flight-and-affiliation sometimes takes the

• “formerresidentscouldnotresistwand- form of highly individualistic and competitive

ering back to the abandoned building”; behavior. However, such behavior can be

• “44 percent of the occupants said that viewed as an attempt to seek proximity and

when the alarm was sounded they as- contact with distant attachment objects. Im-

sumed it was a false alarm”; mediately or very shortly after vacating a

• “Many of those who reacted to the burning building, individuals attempt to con-

alarm . . . went looking for confirma- tact relatives and/or go “home”, that is, seek

tory evidence of a fire”; the familiar.

• “Despite the evidence of their own senses, some people decided not to evacuate immediately . . . more than

BEHAVIOR IN half took their time leaving”;

STRUCTURAL FIRES • “Somepeople,despitehearinganalarm, carriedonwith incredibly inappropriate

Aspects of the typology can be illus- behavior and took enormous risks”;

trated by noting the importance of the social • “Manypeoplewanderedaround in the

context in understanding collective responses building before they finally left”; and

to different types of structural fire. In the case • “One in six people who left the build-

of fires in theaters and clubs, people generally ing, inspiteofseeingsmokeandflames

encounter danger in an unfamiliar place, sur- while theywere in theopen,wentback

rounded by unfamiliar people. Intense flight- inside.”

and-affiliation to attachment objects outside the theater (Outcome D) would therefore be Inhis reviewof the literatureonbehav-

ior in fire,Bryan (1986)citesnumerousobser-the expected behavior pattern. On the other

Mawson 105

vations consistent with social attachment direction of movement in the area was based on a combination of the person’s role (andtheory. hence familiarity with a particular escape route), affiliative ties to individuals who were inanother location inthebuilding, andconse-RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL

ATTACHMENT MODEL quent proximity to one exit or the other. The contributionofgroup ties todeaths and injur- ies resulting from the Summerland fire wasThe social attachment (“affiliative”)

model of group behavior in emergencies has also analyzed by Sime. He found that all of the 13 people in the MSB who died werebeen formally tested in a number of studies.

Noting that the “panic model” assumes that attached to their groups when alerted to the fire, but “[t]hese groups evidently delayedescapeinvolvesahomogeneousmassofpeople

competingfor limitedexits,whereas the“affil- their departure. In trying to escape in groups . . . thesepeoplewerecaughtbytheencroach-iative” model predicts that individuals with

close ties first seek and find each other and ing smoke and flames” (Sime, 1983, p. 38). Affiliativebehaviorincreasedthedangertothethenattempt toescapeasagroup,Sime(1983,

1985) studiedresponses to fire ina largeresort familygroupsbecausethelatterwereslowerto escape. On the other hand, separated individ-complex (Summerland) in the United King-

dom based on accounts collected from 500 ualswerequicker torespondtotheambiguous cues by escape behavior and hence none wassurvivors. About 3,000 vacationers were pres-

ent and 50 people died. Accounts of the fire seriously injured. Thus, group ties and affilia- tive patterns of behavior in entrapment situa-and behavior in the fire, collected from survi-

vors by the police, formed the basis of the tions created bybuilding fires can increase the riskof injuryanddeath toattached individualsstudy. This was a classic entrapment situation

inwhichacompletebreakdownofpsychologi- by delaying their departure. In a study of the evacuation behavior ofcal ties would have been expected on the

“panic” model. However, about 50 percent of occupants of the former World Trade Center following theexplosiononFebruary26,1993,those in the sample who were initially sepa-

rated from primary group members managed based on interviews with 350 participants, Aguirre, Wenger, & Vigo (1998) found thatto escape with the restof their primary group,

and 73 percent escaped with one or more evacuating groups comprising a high propor- tionofacquaintedpersonswithdeepsocial tiesgroup members (79 percent were members of

families). Consistent with the social attach- were the slowest to begin evacuating. Other research consistently shows that people arement model, mixed-group members were less

likely to stay together in intact groups while slow to react to initial warnings and wait to evacuatewiththeirprimarygroup(Fitzpatrickescaping, andseparated individualsdidnot try

to re-form into intact groups unless they had & Mileti, 1991; Perry, 1994). In high-rise buildings, a lethargic reaction is usually ob-family group attachments somewhere in the

building. Supporting the notion that move- served in response to fire alarms, voice com- munication instructions, or even initial cuesment toward familiarpersonsandplaces char-

acterizes flightbehavior,mostof thosestudied of a fire, andoccupants aregenerally reluctant to leave their floor (Proulx, 1999).headed toward the familiar main entrance. A

detailedanalysis ofbehavior in onearea of the In the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire in Southgate, Kentucky, in May 1977, whichbuilding (Marquee Show Bar—MSB) showed

that individualswhowereseparatedfromtheir resulted in 165 fatalities, social ties existing among the occupants of the club (family, so-grouphadpositionedthemselvesnear,andleft

near, the entrance they were familiar with; cial, and occupational ties) profoundly influ- enced behavior in the fire. A high level ofrestaurant staff left by their familiar route to

work (the fire exit staircase); and most of the assistance and civility was shown to others, and it was concluded that the data supportedseparated individuals had positioned them-

selvesclose to the familiarentrance.Thus, the a “social organization” rather than a “social

106 Understanding Mass Panic

breakdown” model of behavior in fire (Fein- need to reassess their assumptions about the public’s capacity to respond constructivelyberg & Johnson, 2001; Johnson, 1988).

When the M/V Estonia car ferry sank after a terrorist attack” (Schoch-Spana, 2003, p. 132).in 1994, 851 passengers and crew died and

only 137 (14%) survived. The high fatality ratewasdue to therapid sinkingof thevessel, coupled with physical barriers to escape RESPONSE TO

NUCLEAR ATTACKcaused by severe listing. This made it virtu- ally impossible for family members or the crew to help one another. However, eyewit- It is uncertain how the general popula-

tion would respond to an unprecedented actness testimony revealed that people tried to form human chains by holding on to one of terrorismusingbiological, chemical, ornu-

clear weapons. The nuclear bombings of Hi-another’s legs in the struggle to reach the upper deck, and great efforts were made to roshima and Nagasaki in 1945 may provide

a guideline. Some reports gave accounts ofprovide mutual aid. There were also many accounts of men fleeing with wives, mothers, confusion,hysteria,andmassflight(U.S.Stra-

tegic Bombing Survey, 1946, p. 28; Avalonor girlfriends, and of people attempting to stay together during the escape (Cornwell et Project, 1996–2003, ch. 23); however, these

were not the typical behavioral responses ofal., 2001). Following the more recent attack on survivors. Both cities were evacuated due to

hazardous conditions resulting from radioac-the World Trade Center in September 11, 2001,480first-personaccountswerecollected tivesubstances intheimmediateenvironment,

but initial evacuations by survivors were car-fromsurvivorsabout their evacuation,ofwhich 324accountswereavailableforanalysis (Proulx, ried out calmly and in an organized way. The

unexpected calmness of disaster victims has2003).Asmanyas83percent judgedthesitua- tion to be very serious in the first few minutes been termed “post-disaster utopia” (Cuthber-

tson & Nigg, 1987, pp. 444–462). As in mostafter the strike. Yet despite seeing flames, smoke,or fallingpaper, only55 percentof the disasters, people expressed a longing for the

familiarity of home and sought out other sur-survivors evacuated immediately; another 13 percent stopped to retrieve belongings, and vivors. One woman stated that “she struggled

toher feetandjoinedabandofothersurvivors20 percent secured files and searched floors before evacuating. Initially, eight percent de- . . . . Home, she had to get home . . .” (Kurz-

man, 1986, pp. 14, 413–114). Survivors werecided to stay but changed their minds, and four percent were trapped due to collapsing described as attempting to leave the city to

get to the suburbs, but most people lived inceilingand walls, but then managed toescape. Many commented on how calm and helpful the suburbs and were trying to get home.

Theywereseekingthe familiar ruralor subur-the occupants were during the evacuation (http://irc.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca). ban communities where they lived and where

the bombs’ effects were not felt. “All the peo-Otherreviewsofbehavior followingthe 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and ple were going in that direction and so I sup-

pose I was taken into this movementand wentPentagon and the subsequent anthrax letter mailings(Glass&Schoch-Spana,2002;Schoch- with them,” said one survivor, implying that

many people assembled into groups and evac-Spana, 2003) similarly discounted long-held views that terrorist attacks would cause mass uated in an organized manner (Lifton, 1967,

pp. 20, 21–40). Similar accounts of responsespanic and social disorder (DiGiovanni, 1999; Stern, 1999; WHO, 1970). On the contrary, a to the bombings were given, mentioning acts

ofbraveryandthestrongsenseofcompanion-broad range of positive public responses were noted, including rescue work, volunteering, ship that developed among the survivors as

they came together and returned to theirprovidingresources,anddonatingblood, indi- cating that “health and safety professionals homes (Barker, 1985; Linner, 1995; Wyden,

Mawson 107

1984, p. 255). Many hibakushas (survivors of toward other situations that are perceived as familiar but which may not necessarily be ob-theatomic bomb) related their experienceson

avideo (HiroshimaWitness, 1990)producedby jectively safe. We have suggested that some military “panics” occurring in the apparentthe Hiroshima Peace Cultural Center. These

graphic personal descriptions of events in Au- absence of physical threat or danger, but trig- gered by the suddendeparture of oneor moregust 1945 show that although most survivors

were terrified and in a state of shock, their men to the rear, may in fact be affiliative re- sponses to the perceived threat of abandon-overriding goal was to be reunited with famil-

iar people and surroundings. One witness, ment by or separation from comrades. Theoccurrenceof flight-and-affiliationHiroko Fukada, stated that he “went out of

the building because I thought it would be depends mainly on the social context and, more particularly, on the whereabouts of fa-dangeroustostay inside.SoonI foundsoldiers

walkinginthisdirection. Iwaswithmyfriends miliar persons (i.e., attachment figures); their presence has a calming effect and reduces theand we thought it would be safe to go with

soldiers, and so we (did) . . .” This account probability of flight-and-affiliation, while their absence has the opposite effect. Combiningshows neither hysteria nor panic but calm de-

cision-making and a desire for companion- the factors of perceived physical danger and the locationofattachmentfigures,andcatego-ship. rizing them respectively as “mild/severe” (i.e., anxiety versus fear or terror) and “present/ absent,” results in a fourfold typology thatCONCLUSIONS encompasses a wide spectrum of collective re- sponses to threat and disaster.Until recently, mass panic (and/or vio-

lence) was thought to be the natural response Studies of collective behavior in disas- ters thus show that fear tends to be minimalto physical danger and perceived entrapment.

However, contrary to the “panic” or social and expressions of mutual aid predominate. Onthenegativeside,however,peopleingroupsbreakdown model of collective behavior, the

typical response to a variety of threats and offamiliarsaregenerallyslowtoreacttoinitial warnings, slow to leave work areas, and waitdisasters is not to flee or attack but rather

affiliation, that is, to seek the proximity of to assemble with their primary group before evacuating. Thus, evacuation may be so de-familiarpersonsandplaces;moreover, separa-

tion from attachment figures is a greater layed that survival is threatened. In certain situations, such as structural fires, the ten-stressor than physical danger. Multiple social

tiesexistingamongparticipants indisaster sit- dency to seek the familiar in the face of immi- nent physical danger can have disastrous con-uations profoundly influence behavior. Men

flee with their wives, families, or girlfriends, sequences in terms of increasing the risk of severe injury or death. Ironically, becauseand attempt to stay together during escapes.

Nordoemployeesabandontheir responsibili- tendencies toward hysteria and mass panic on the part of the public are widely assumed,ties towardpatrons.Ahighdegreeofcivility is

shown, and heroic efforts are made to provide officials are often reluctant to issue warnings, or delay doing so, for fear of causing panicmutual aid and assistance.

Suchobservationscanbeunderstood in (Sime, 1980). Yet delays in providing correct or sufficient information can result in entrap-terms of an alternative, “social attachment”

model of behavior that recognizes the funda- ment and death as a result of inactivity or activeattachmentbehavior.Thus, fromapub-mentally gregarious nature of human beings

and the primacy of attachments. In the rela- lic health or safety point of view, the problem in disasters is not that people tend to panictively rare instances where flight does occur,

the latter can be viewed as one aspect of a and act precipitously in response to danger, but that people typically delay or fail to takemore general affiliative response that involves

escaping from certain situations and moving appropriate evasive action when it is needed.

108 Understanding Mass Panic

In recent decades, there has been an which attachments are essential for normal humangrowth, development, and social func-explosionof research interest inhuman bonds

andthewayinwhichtheymodulate theeffects tioning as well as health and longevity. We have seen that close personal rela-of environmental stress and influence health

and social behavior (Beatson & Taryan, 2003; tionships strongly determine individual and collective responses to threat, but the policyBerkman, Glass, Brissette, & Seeman, 2000;

Bowlby,1969,1973;Brownetal.,1975;Cobb, implications of the social attachment model for public health and safety remain largely1976; Henderson, 1977; Kaplan et al., 1977;

Kiritz & Moos, 1974). Under a variety of unexplored, for example, with respect to fire safety and all aspects of preparedness, includ-stressful conditions, individuals approach fa-

miliar persons and places and are calmed by ing counterterrorism. It remains now to apply the social attachment model of behavior intheir presence. In sociological terms, there is

an increase in“we-feeling,”solidarityandmo- disaster, aswell asobservations indicating that peoplegenerally show anunexpectedly strongrale, but also a parallel increased sensitivity

to perceived deviance and a tendency toward capacity to organize and respond positively and unselfishly under such conditions, suchsocial exclusion, scapegoating, and hate crime

(Taintor, 2003). The study of responses to as, providing valuable back-services for over- worked “first-responders.” As recently empha-stress thus provides clues for understanding

human bonds and behavior, the dynamics of sized (Glass & Schoch-Spana, 2002; Schoch- Spana, 2003; http://www.upmc-biosecurity.whicharemoredifficult toobserveundernon-

emergency conditions. Collective social phe- org/pages/events/peoplesrole/ursano/ursano_ trans.html), these findingsneedtobe incorpo-nomena, long considered a backwater of soci-

ology, canbe seen as continuouswith—andas rated intonewmodelsofhealtheducationand promotion so that community ties andillustrating—abroadermodelofhumansocial

behavior that emphasizes the primacy of at- strengths can be actively harnessed by public health and other governmental agencies totachments, not in the Durkheimian sense

(Mawson, 1970), in which social relationships prepareandrespondmoreeffectively tofuture disasters and possible terrorist attack.“restrain” an inherently selfish human nature,

but in a profoundly interactionist sense in

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