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Habitat International 50 (2015) 90e98
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Habitat International
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/habitatint
Eighty years of urban growth and socioeconomic trends in Dammam Metropolitan Area, Saudi Arabia
Abdulkarim K. Alhowaish Department of Urban and Regional Planning, College of Architecture and Planning, University of Dammam, P.O. Box 2397, Dammam 31451, Saudi Arabia
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history: Received 24 May 2015 Accepted 11 August 2015 Available online 25 August 2015
Keywords: Urban growth Socioeconomic trends Dammam Metropolitan area Eastern province Saudi Arabia
E-mail address: [email protected].
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.08.019 0197-3975/© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
a b s t r a c t
The Dammam Metropolitan Area of Saudi Arabia gained a leading role on the world stage by establishing itself as a major supplier of energy to the rest of the world. At present, it is the third largest urban center in Saudi Arabia. Little attention has been paid to the environmental and/or developmental aspects of its urban growth in terms of the quality of the urban environment and the potential needs of future gen- erations. The purpose of this study was to examine Dammam's urban growth and socioeconomic trends during the past eight decades to identify present and future challenges. Particular attention was paid to its current and future urban growth and development challenges. The results suggest that Dammam's past and current development is primarily driven by the economic benefits realized by private sector.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
From the time that oil was discovered in the Dammam area of Saudi Arabia in 1937 to the present, development of the Dammam Metropolitan Area (DMA) has been closely linked to the mobilization of natural, capital, and human resources, transforming it into a major supplier of fossil fuel energy to the rest of the world. The DMA comprises the three major cities of Dammam, Alkhobar, and Dhahran and includes relatively new urban developments in Alaziziyah and Half-Moon Bay to the south. The DMA is located in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia alongthe coastof theArabian Gulf (26�260000
north and 50�70000 east) about 400 km east of Saudi Arabia's capital of Riyadh (Fig. 1). Dammam city is the seat of the regional administra- tive centers, Alkhobar is known for its commercial centers and business offices, and Dhahran has scientific and technological cen- ters. Alaziziyah and Half-Moon Bay are recreational centers.
Dammam Metropolitan Area is the third largest urban center in Saudi Arabia, with a population of about 1.66 million in 2014. The population doubled nine times over the past 50 years, from 0.18 millionin1964to1.66millionin2014.Itsstrictlyurbanareadoubledin size46timesduringthepast50years,increasingfromabout1162hain 1964e2050 ha in 1974 to more than 38,670 ha in 2014 (Fig. 2).
This study examined the 80-year pattern of urban expansion of the DMA together with its socioeconomic trends. Coverage begins a few years before the discovery of oil (1934) and concludes at the
present (2014). The specific objectives are to: (1) outline the pro- cess by which the DMA developed into its present form and func- tion, (2) discuss the pattern of changes in terms of socioeconomic development, and (c) assess current and future challenges to the DMA.
2. Historical growth and development
Upon the discovery of oil in 1937, the overall pace of develop- ment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia immediately accelerated, which was particularly evident in the area that would become the DMA. Rapid urban expansion occurred during the first oil boom, which lasted from the end of WWII until 1956. A period of eco- nomic crisis followed until 1974. Then, the second oil boom in 1975 significantly influenced the DMA (Daghistani, 1993). From 1975 until the present, the DMA developed at a breathtaking pace, pro- pelled by powerful physical, economic, environmental, and human developmental pressures. This study examined the growth and development of the DMA in four historical stages. Stage I was the initial stage of growth from 1932 until 1956, Stage II was the formative stage spanning 1956 to 1980, Stage III was the emerging stage that lasted from 1980 until 2000, and Stage IV is a period of maturity that began in 2000 and continues today.
3. Stage I: the initial stage (1932e1956)
This period began in 1932, when the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was founded, and ended in 1956, when the capital of the
Fig. 1. Location of Dammam Metropolitan area. Source: Ministry of Municipality and Rural Affairs (2008).
A.K. Alhowaish / Habitat International 50 (2015) 90e98 91
Eastern Province (in which the DMA is located) moved from Hofuf city to Dammam city. In 1932, Dammam was a small coastal town which, together with a tiny huddle of fishermen's huts known as Alkhobar, depended on fishing and pearl diving for subsistence. Some El-Dawasir tribesmen emigrated there from Bahrain, which boosted the two towns' populations (ARAMCO., 1968). According to Candilis-Metra (1974, p. 21), in 1935, the total population of the two towns was about 1700 (1500 in Dammam and 200 in Alkhobar) people living in about 330 small huts made of palm fronds. Growth and development remained slow until the discovery of the first oil field in 1938 (Fig. 3).
When the first oil field (Dammam No. 7) was discovered, the drilling and oil exploration work accelerated and oil workers immigrated to the area, but there was no housing in Dammam and Alkhobar except for the fishing huts. Therefore, Dhahran became a campsite for the oil workers, drilling equipment, and other supplies brought from abroad. Alkhobar was selected as the port for loading and unloading cargo (ARAMCO., 1968, p. 31). Thus, Alkhobar briefly served as the exit point of the Saudi Arabian crude oil being transported to the refinery in Bahrain. Urban Dammam and Alkhobar of this period can be characterized as compact; the buildings in the old town sections were unplanned and closely proximate and the streets were inconsistent in width with few open spaces (Candilis-Metra, 1974, p. 23).
After 1950, the urban boundaries began to dramatically expand outward. Two primary driving forces were behind the expansion: (1) the transition of the administrative capital of the Eastern Province from Hofuf to Dammam city in 1953 and (2) the con- structions of the King Abdulaziz Seaport in 1955 and the rail line to
Riyadh city in 1951. The port was a major boost to the DMA econ- omy and governmental employment opportunities and industrial growth further intensified the area's development. The built-up area of the DMA increased from about 34.2 ha in 1934 to more than 883 ha in 1954, indicating that the urban area doubled its size more than 24 times during that 20-year period (Table 1). Further- more, the population increased from about 5000 inhabitants in 1934 to about 98,000 in 1956. The annual growth rate was esti- mated at about 16.4 percent, which was the highest growth rate in the DMA's history (Essawi, 1993, p. 112).
In 1934, about 94 percent of the DMA population was Saudi. A mere 10 years later, the proportion of Saudis had declined to 80 percent because of the immigration of foreign workers, particularly oil workers (see Table 2). According to Alsubai (1989, p. 153), employment was concentrated in two economic sectors: govern- ment and oil (and its related activities). Of secondary importance were agriculture, services, and trade. The majority of Saudi em- ployees worked for the government, whereas non-Saudis domi- nated the oil sector.
Because of the continual expansion of oil operations, Arab American Oil Company (ARAMCO) decided that a comprehensive plan was needed to facilitate orderly growth for the future. In 1945, it contracted the American architectural firm of Caudill Rowlett Scott (CRS) to prepare master plans for its towns (Al-Mubarak, 1999, p. 45). CRS devised master plans for Dhahran and three other ARAMCO towns modeled on American lifestyles for Ameri- cans and other non-Saudi workers (Caudill Rowlett Scott, 1975). Al- Hathloul (1981) and Al-Mubarak (1999) argued that ARAMCO's urban development left indelible marks on the Eastern Province's
Fig. 2. Historical growth of the Dammam Metropolitan area. Source: Ministry of Municipality and Rural Affairs (2008).
Fig. 3. The three towns of the future Dammam Metropolitan area in 1940. Source: Saudi Embassy (1997).
A.K. Alhowaish / Habitat International 50 (2015) 90e9892
urban landscape, which were beneficial in that there were modern, fully equipped, gated communities yet had negative effects from ignoring local culture and heritage. Two years later, despite the negative downside, the Saudi government requested ARAMCO's planning help for the towns of Dammam and Alkhobar. The resultant extensions of the old organically built towns were grid
Table 1 DMA urban area size and population, 1934e2030.
Year Urban area (hectares)
Population Population density ratio (person/hectare)
1934 34.2 5000 146 1956 883.6 98,000 117 1980 5023.7 360,000 72 2000 19,532.1 1.02 million 52 2014 38,760.3 1.66 million 43 2030 57,130.0 2.10 million 37
Sources: ARAMCO Handbook (1968); Candilis-Metra (1974); CH2M HILL (1978, 1982); Ministry of Municipality and Rural Affairs (2008); and Central Department of Statistics and Information (1980, 2000, 2014).
patterns of 150- by 300-foot rectangular lots serviced by a system of north-south roads ranging from 40- to 60-feet wide (Al-Mubarak, 1999, p. 44). The two towns' road networks were connected to a major transportation corridor adjacent to their shorelines.
During this period, the first municipal council of Dammam city was elected in 1954, with a clear role to accelerate the process of urbanization in Dammam city and in Alkhobar and Dhahran. New housing regulations prohibited huts and mud-and-brick dwellings and limited construction materials to stone. The owners of the existing dwellings were given some time to refurbish their houses with stone and eliminate the palm fronds and mud bricks. Concrete buildings, modern housing, open space, landscaped streets, and many other elements of modern urban structure slowly emerged during this time.
4. Stage II: the formative stage (1956e1980)
During Stage II, the Dammam-Alkhobar highway was completed, the first public park (King Saudi Garden) was created,
Table 2 Dammam Metropolitan Area Saudi and Non-Saudi Population (N) with Proportions (in parentheses) and Employment, 1934e2030.
Year Population (N) (proportion) Employment (in millions)
Saudis Non-Saudis Total Saudis Non-Saudis Total
1934 4700 (0.94) 400 (0.06) 5000 1956 80,000 (0.82) 20,000 (0.18) 98,000 0.07 1980 200,000 (0.56) 160,000 (0.44) 360,000 0.04 0.15 0.19 2000 690,000 (0.68) 330,000 (0.32) 1.02 million 0.15 0.27 0.43 2014 1.16 million (0.70) 500,000 (0.30) 1.66 million 0.33 0.45 0.78 2030 1.68 million (0.80) 420,000 (0.20) 2.10 million 0.54 0.38 0.92
Sources: CH2M HILL (1978, 1982), Alsubai (1989), Essawi (1993), Daghistani (1993), Ministry of Municipality and Rural Affairs (2008), and Central Department of Statistics and Information (1980, 2000, 2014).
A.K. Alhowaish / Habitat International 50 (2015) 90e98 93
and many major roads inside the three cities’ boundaries were paved, lighted, and landscaped (CH2M HILL, 1978). New industrial, commercial, and residential development projects were accompa- nied by public services, such as schools, hospitals, and modern shopping centers along the Dammam-Alkhobar highway. These developments supported connections between the cities of Dam- mam and Alkhobar on the one side and between Alkhobar and Dhahran on the other side of the DMA.
Immigration from different areas of the Kingdom continued to influence the population and a large number of oil industry experts living in the DMA needed housing, hospitals, schools for their children, and other amenities. Thus, the area witnessed a new type of construction (high-rise residential and mixed-use buildings). According to Essawi (1993, p. 121), two public housing projects were completed by 1979. The Dammam housing project was completed first, in 1979, with 37 buildings on 32 ha. This was fol- lowed by the Alkhobar housing project, consisting of 219 buildings on more than 133 ha (see Fig. 4).
Because oil revenues increased in 1975, the area's industrial development and number of workers in the industry accelerated apace. Two major industrial cities were established during this period. The first industrial city was located between the three cities, covering an area of about 380 ha. At present, this city is home to more than 124 factories, which are completely engulfed by an ur- ban mass. The second industrial city was established in 1978. It is relatively far from the DMA, located along the highway to Riyadh. It comprises about 960 ha and includes more than 179 factories (Saudiindustri, 2012).
The additions of high-quality medical care in top-rated hospitals and schools provided additional incentives to people considering relocation to the DMA. Service industries emerged to support the needs of the oil industry and the people living in the DMA. Consequently, the DMA population dramatically increased, princi- pally driven by immigration of non-Saudis. The population doubled
Fig. 4. Large-scale urban development projects in the DMA. Source: Waqas (2012).
almost 3.7 times during this period, increasing from 98,000 in 1956 to about 360,000 in 1980. The proportion of Saudis to the total population declined from slightly more than 80 percent in 1956 to about 55 percent in 1980, whereas the non-Saudi proportion increased from less than 20 percent in 1956 to about 44 percent in 1980 (Essawi, 1993, p. 125).
The DMA dominated commerce, technology, governmental services, and industrial development expansion during this period and captured most of the employment growth in the region. As shown in Table 2, employment increased from 70,000 jobs in 1956 to more than 190,000 jobs in 1980. Foreign workers filled more than 77 percent of all jobs created during this period (Alsubai,1989; Essawi, 1993). Although the population doubled 3.7 times, the geographic urban area doubled more than six times during this time, from about 883 ha in 1954 to about 5023 ha in 1980.
5. Stage III: the emerging stage (1980e2000)
Stage III covers the period from 1980 to 2000. The simultaneous growth of Dammam, Alkhobar, and Dhahran ultimately merged them into one large urban area, known for the first time as the Dammam Metropolitan Area, which means (and is often referred to as) the greater Dammam area. Each town retained (and still retains) its unique character and some local administrative functions; but, in terms of its place in the Kingdom, the DMA is a single admin- istrative entity (Saudi Embassy, 1997).
Rapid urban growth throughout the DMA was the prevalent feature of this period, and, in many areas in north and northeast of DMA, vast stretches of the shallow Arabian Gulf waters were filled to create land. The Dammam-Alkhobar Corniche (waterfront), which runs several kilometers along the two cities’ seashores, was completed in 1990, adding more than 4500 ha to the built-up area (Abou-Korin, 2011, p. 10). The rapid growth necessitated the con- struction of a larger and more modern airport to replace the
A.K. Alhowaish / Habitat International 50 (2015) 90e9894
Dhahran International Airport, which was then transformed into a military airbase. The new King Fahd International Airport opened its doors to commercial traffic in 1999 and serves the DMA and Jubail, an industrial city about 64 km to the north.
At the end of 1978, the Town Planning Office of the Ministry of Interior for Municipalities contracted a new master plan for the DMA with CH2M HILL and CEG & Associates (Daghistani,1993). The Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA) instituted the plan in 1983. Designed to establish an urban growth strategy to guide and enable DMA expansion and development until 2005, it had two stages of urban growth and development. The first stage covered the existing DMA area and developed new areas until 1995, when the population was expected to reach 1.0 million. The second stage covered future development areas until 2005, when the population was expected to reach 1.5 million (CH2M HILL & CEG Associates, 1982). The master plan had several goals, among which were controlling expansion and supporting the existing ur- ban structures. For example:
� Control the growth of the Dammam city urban area and its adjacent cities of Alkhobar and Dhahran to the extent necessary to maximize benefits to all residents and minimum inconveniences;
� Enforce development controls to ensure that city growth is beneficial, balanced, and sustainable;
� Encourage and support public transit systems and networks to strengthen the corridors between Dammam and Alkhobar and between Dammam and Dhahran.
� Support business development, commerce, and tourism in the north and northeast along the shoreline.
The master plan provided a foundation for modern city growth and development, established the elements for future city struc- tures, and provided guidelines for growth in the preferred direc- tion. According to CH2M HILL and CEG Associates (1982, p. 54), residential areas would be separated from the commercial and industrial sections, roads would be wider and straighter, and building architecture would be conformed to a Westernized urban design. Rectangular grid street systems replaced the intricate curvilinear and irregular patterns of the old towns and outward- oriented building structures became the norm, replacing the inward-facing Islamic structures.
However, by the middle of the 1990s, the DMA encompassed an area of approximately 14,300 ha with a total population of about 0.84 million. According to the Ministry of Municipality and Rural Affairs (2000, p. 78), the proportion of urban land use that was residential (including services and utilities) was about 30 percent of the total land. Industrial land used about eight percent, commercial uses were at four percent, recreational and open space used about nine percent, and special uses, such as military, governmental, airport, and port land uses, garnered 43 percent of overall land use; vacant land accounted for six percent of the total DMA area.
In Stage III, the population increase continued, but the rate was slower than in the previous stages. With an annual growth rate of 5.3 percent, the total population of the DMA increased from about 0.36 million in 1980 to just under 1.02 million in 2000 (Central Department of Statistics and Information, 1980, 2000). The popu- lation doubled more than 2.8 times during this period. The pro- portion of the Saudi population increased by 12 percent (68 percent in 2000 compared to 56 percent in 1980).
Additionally, employment doubled 2.3 times during this period. Job opportunities increased from 0.19 million jobs in 1980 to more than 0.43 million jobs in 2000. Saudi workers accounted for about 44 percent and non-Saudi workers accounted for about 52 percent of total jobs created during this period. Construction,
manufacturing, and trade combined to add more than 0.24 million jobs to the DMA economy. These three sectors accounted for more than 45 percent of the total job creation during this period. Governmental service activities, real estate, and educational ac- tivities together contributed about 0.11 million jobs and accounted for more than 27 percent of total job creation in the DMA (see Table 3).
Spatially, the DMA urban area increased from about 5023 ha in 1980 to more than 19,532 ha in 2000, doubling its size almost four times. However, by 2000, urban growth in the DMA slowed. Many factors contributed to this change, among which was the “Saud- ization” policy requiring replacement of expatriate with Saudi workers, particularly in the oil industry and the governmental sector (Ramady, 2005). In addition, the development of other urban areas in the Kingdom created competition that influenced the extent of immigration to the DMA, which sharply dropped because people were able to find work closer to their homes. Moreover, new industrial cities with huge buildings and construction development began emerging all over the Kingdom (Khan & Bashir, 2004). These and other factors affect the DMA's growth pattern.
6. Stage 4: the maturity stage (2000ePresent)
In the early years of the 21st century, the urban growth rate of the DMA declined (until late in 2007) and then stabilized. One reason for this was the Global Financial Crisis, which affected the Saudi stock market. The attractiveness of the Saudi stock market between 2003 and early in 2006 had encouraged many investors to move their investments from real estate and construction to Saudi stocks. Some people (particularly middle-class Saudis) sold their lands and houses, sold their cars, or borrowed money from banks to invest in the stock market (Ramady, 2007). It was estimated that the DMA real estate market experienced a severe 20 percent to 30 percent decline in some parts of the DMA (Alsutan, 2006; Al- Nwaisir, 2012).
This situation continued until February of 2006 when the Saudi stock market collapsed. Full recovery of the building and con- struction industry was not realized until late in 2009, when it apparently returned to its former peak, spurred by the Saudi gov- ernment's decision to build 500,000 new homes in the near future as an affordable housing program for Saudis. Moreover, the gov- ernment implemented new flexible mortgage rules so that Saudi nationals would be encouraged to take out loans to invest in real estate.
According to housing data provided by the Central Department of Statistics and Information (2007, 2014), DMA household ownership was 40 percent in 2007 and about 43 percent in 2014. The government's affordable housing program and new mortgage policy, coupled with increasing demand (due to the ever-growing population), further drove demand. A large-scale residential sub- division with an area of about 9400 ha was approved by MOMRA in 2008. According to Abou-Korin (2011, p. 17), this urban develop- ment project is proposed on infill land of the Arabian Gulf in the eastern part of Dammam city, the southern part of Alkhobar city (the Alziziyah area), and near the King Fahd International Airport (Fig. 5). These large-scale residential subdivision projects are ex- pected to provide housing for more than 600,000 residents.
Since the turn of the 21st century, the spatial size of the urban area doubled almost twice, from 19,532 ha in 2000 to more than 38,760 ha in 2014. Moreover, population and employment doubled their sizes by 1.6 and 1.8, respectively. Due to “Saudization” pro- grams, the proportion of Saudis in the workforce increased from 35 percent in 2000 to more than 42 percent in 2014, whereas the proportion of non-Saudis declined by about five percent. Addi- tionally, more than 0.35 million jobs were created. The trade,
Table 3 Employment by sector and proportional changes between 1980e2000 and 2000e2014.
Economic sector Employment (in thousands) by Sector with percentages Percentage change
1980 2000 2014 1980e2000 2000e2014
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 4.2 (2.2)
4.6 (1.1)
5.6 (0.7)
8 23
Mining and quarrying 13.8 (7.3)
24.4 (5.7)
31.9 (4.1)
77 30
Manufacturing 18.4 (9.7)
48.1 (11.2)
92.5 (11.8)
162 92
Electricity, gas and water supply 1.9 (1.0)
5.3 (1.2)
10.5 (1.3)
176 96
Construction 30.9 (16.3)
77.0 (18.0)
106.0 (13.6)
149 38
Wholesale and retail trade 25.2 (13.3)
57.7 (13.5)
123.5 (15.8)
129 114
Tourism service activities 4.2 (2.2)
10.5 (2.5)
34.4 (4.4)
151 228
Transportation and storage 9.9 (5.2)
23.9 (5.6)
49.7 (6.4)
141 108
Financial and insurance activities 1.7 (0.9)
4.0 (0.9)
12.4 (1.6)
140 208
Real estate activities 10.5 (5.5)
28.6 (6.7)
44.5 (5.7)
174 56
Public Administrative 36.5 (19.2)
67.1 (15.7)
82.5 (10.6)
84 23
Education 10.3 (5.4)
25.3 (5.9)
59.0 (7.6)
146 133
Health and social work activities 6.1 (3.2)
14.0 (3.3)
54.8 (7.0)
130 293
Private household activities 12.4 (6.5)
28.8 (6.7)
61.0 (7.8)
133 112
Other services activities 4.1 (2.2)
9.1 (2.1)
12.7 (1.6)
122 38
Total 190.0 428.3 780.8 125 82
Sources: Central Department of Statistics and Information (1980, 2000, 2014) and Ministry of Municipality and Rural Affairs (2000), as calculated by the author
A.K. Alhowaish / Habitat International 50 (2015) 90e98 95
manufacturing, health, and educational sectors accounted for nearly 52 percent of total job creation, followed by construction, tourism, and transportation, which together accounted for another 15 percent of total job creation (see Table 3).
On February 2, 2014, the high commission for the development of Eastern Province (and its executive branch, Dammam develop- ment authority) was established by the Council of Ministries' de- cree (Batyour & Almalki, 2014). The commission was established to fully develop the entire region (urban and rural) economically, socially, culturally, architecturally, and environmentally, and it was given responsibility for drawing up policies and procedures to raise the efficiency of services and facilities to improve citizens’ stan- dards of living and welfare. The commission has the further re- sponsibility of developing comprehensive development projects in the DMA and the major urban regional centers as well as con- ducting planning and feasibility studies for development projects and programs.
7. Current and future challenges
The historically rapid pace of DMA urban growth and develop- ment created a web of serious environmental and socioeconomic challenges, including the problem of lack of fit between the size of the DMA urban space and the needs of its population. Specifically, the increases in built environment are far beyond the needs of the present and projected urban population sizes. On the one hand, the population doubled 17 times over the past 60 years, increasing from 0.098 million in 1956 to 0.36 million in 1980 to almost 1.66 million in 2014. According to the Ministry of Municipality and Rural Affairs (2008, p. 101), the DMA population is expected to reach 2.1 million by 2030, an increase of about 0.44 million over the next 16 years. On the other hand, the urban space increased from 834 ha in 1954
to about 5023 ha in 1980 to more than 38,760 ha in 2014, doubling 46 times over the past 60 years. The DMA is expected to reach 57,130 ha by 2030, which is an increase of about 18,370 ha over the next 16 years (Ministry of Municipality and Rural Affairs, 2008, p. 66).
Urban sprawl and large-scale urban development projects are the most pressing urban challenges associated with rapid urban growth and development in the DMA. Urban growth, in terms of land approved for urban purposes, spread over a vast area of the DMA, consequently resulting in low levels of development in most of these areas. In 2014, the built-up area was about 52 percent of the total area inside the urban boundaries, where the built-up area is about 20,150 of the 38,760 ha allocated for urban purposes (Eamana, 2015, p. 20). Thus, more than 18,600 ha of city land are undeveloped.
The most striking evidence of this rapid urban sprawl is the low and declining population density in the DMA. The overall popula- tion density in the DMA was only 43 persons per hectare in 2014, which is very low compared to cities, developing or developed, in the modern world. During the past forty years, despite overall population gains, the urban population density in the DMA declined by more than 60 percent. The trend of overall urban population density in the DMA is expected to continue declining to about 37 persons per hectare in 2030 (Ministry of Municipality and Rural Affairs, 2008). Continuing urban sprawl, coupled with the remarkable decline in overall population density will negatively affect current and future developmental processes in the DMA.
The DMA faces another problem caused by the rapid urban growth and development of the past 60 years, which is a signifi- cantly changed regional environment and ecosystem. One example is the land filling of Gulf water that initially covered an area larger than 8400 ha (Abou-Korin, 2011). Further major land-filling
Fig. 5. Large-scale residential subdivision. Sources: Ministry of Municipality and Rural Affairs (2008) and Abou-Korin (2011).
A.K. Alhowaish / Habitat International 50 (2015) 90e9896
activities have recently occurred along the entire Alkhobar and Dammam coastlines, particularly at the King Abdulaziz Seaport, where the new coastline is as much as 6 km out from the original shore. These filled areas are costly activities in terms of foundation and construction relative to the cost of desert reclamation.
In addition, and perhaps more significantly, are the effects of coastal reclamation on the coastal environment and marine ecol- ogy of the Arabian Gulf. Past activities muddied the seawater close to the shore due to hill cutting, dredging, filling activities, and the overflow of materials into the sea. Low water quality influenced seawater circulation in the area where the oxygen penetration of the water was degraded, creating a situation that negatively influenced many coastal habitats. According to Dammam Municipal Council (2013, p. 8), almost 90 percent of the mangrove forest along
the coastline disappeared in the past 30 years and the remaining areas of mangrove, sea grass, and coral reef are vulnerable to urban development and industrial pollution, including air pollution and pesticide overuse. Furthermore, it is estimated that, to date, more than 4650 ha of coastal habitats have been dredged along the Gulf Coast and further dredging operations are daily occurring. The coastal reclamation activities severely influenced the Saudi fishing industry, which is estimated as having experienced a 70 percent decline over the past 10 years (Dammam Municipal Council, 2013, p. 12).
In addition to the land-filling activities’ effects on the environ- ment and ecosystems of the DMA, wastewater poses a major problem, caused mainly by urban sprawl. A high volume of wastewater is being directly discharged into coastal creeks (Abou-
Fig. 6. Wastewater discharge into coastal creeks. Sources: Environmental Consulting Bureau (2004) and Abou-Korin (2011).
A.K. Alhowaish / Habitat International 50 (2015) 90e98 97
Korin, 2011, p. 8). Incompatible land uses are emerging and large- scale residential and commercial activities along the shoreline are not in the sewage network and are, instead, dependent on septic tanks. These urban activities, particularly those that are on the coast, produce high volumes of wastewater that they tend to discharge directly into coastal creeks (Fig. 6). This activity likely has an adverse effect on the immediate and long-term environmental viability of the area. It was estimated that 57 percent of urban area in the DMA is not adequately linked to a sewage network system (Eamana, 2015, p. 22). Similar major challenges to environmental viability of the DMA are waste management, air quality, pollution, traffic congestion, and land contamination.
A secondary problem is the suitability of land for future spatial development. Urban sprawl has already consumed most of the land suitable to urban development in the DMA. Most of that land has been allocated to residential purposes, resulting in two serious problems. First, there is not enough land left to meet projected development needs. Second, the approved subdivisions, although presently vacant, place major development constraints on formu- lating future urban development plans in the DMA. More than 50% of the land allocated to urban activities in the DMA is vacant (Eamana, 2015, p. 25). Development of these sparsely populated subdivisions, particularly regarding creation of infrastructure and public services, is costly.
8. Conclusion
This study presents the pattern of urban growth and socioeco- nomic trends of the Dammam Metropolitan Area over the past 80 years. The area experienced rapid and extended growth throughout its historyas it transitioned froma group of small fishing towns and a
port to a nationally and internationally renowned urban center. The DMA is expected to continue growing at a rapid pace. Its growth has been associated with problems in urban planning and urban growth management that mostly relate to increasing demands for housing, public services, effective responses to urban sprawl, and the need to control and guide present and future development. Moreover, its rapid urban growth is associated with some serious unsustainable development practices linked to the rapid destruction of marine life along the shores of the Arabian Gulf due to land infill.
This historical assessment of the past and current urban and socioeconomic growth patterns in the DMA demonstrates that these patterns are primarily driven by the private and public sec- tors' desires for economic benefits. Little attention has been paid to the public good regarding environmental and development prac- tices in terms of the quality of urban life and the needs of the area's future generations. Thus, a more comprehensive approach to managing current and future growth of the DMA is urgently needed. A comprehensive approach should focus on protecting the marine environment and ecosystem by revising relevant legal regulations and environmental protection legislation and by pre- serving urban land for future development by halting urban sprawl. Improving the urban environment can be accomplished by reach- ing out to the public through community awareness programs and redirecting investments to sectors other than housing, such as tourism, commerce, and agriculture.
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- Eighty years of urban growth and socioeconomic trends in Dammam Metropolitan Area, Saudi Arabia
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Historical growth and development
- 3. Stage I: the initial stage (1932–1956)
- 4. Stage II: the formative stage (1956–1980)
- 5. Stage III: the emerging stage (1980–2000)
- 6. Stage 4: the maturity stage (2000–Present)
- 7. Current and future challenges
- 8. Conclusion
- References
resource/2 dammam Metro and large project.pdf
lable at ScienceDirect
Habitat International 56 (2016) 201e211
Contents lists avai
Habitat International
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/habitatint
Impacts of large-scale residential projects on urban sustainability in Dammam Metropolitan Area, Saudi Arabia
Faez Saad Al-Shihri Department of Urban & Regional Planning, College of Architecture & Planning, University of Dammam, P.O. Box: 2397, Dammam, 31451, Saudi Arabia
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history: Received 22 March 2016 Received in revised form 16 May 2016 Accepted 2 June 2016 Available online 10 June 2016
Keywords: Urbanization Residential development Urban sustainability Sprawl Dammam Metropolitan Area Saudi Arabia
E-mail address: [email protected].
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2016.06.001 0197-3975/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
a b s t r a c t
Developing countries have been experiencing phenomenal urban growth within the last five decades, especially in urban areas. In fact, out of the anticipated 2.5 billion increase in world population by 2050, about 90% is expected to take place in just Asia and Africa. In Saudi Arabia, with urbanization rate of 83%, major cities are increasingly sprawling to carter for their increasing population. Dammam Metropolitan Area (DMA) is one of such cities that is witnessing the emergence of many large-scale residential development projects within the built-up areas and at the periphery. However, these projects have many implications on the sustainability of the built environmental. Based on review of official documents, maps and previous studies, this paper explores the nature, scale and unsustainable impacts of these projects. The present study found that there are 45 such projects covering about 32,807 ha of land in the study area, out of which about 11,740 hactares (or 35.8%) are infill into the Arabian Gulf. Other unsus- tainable features of these projects are exclusiveness, low density, single housing type and poor con- nectivity with the surroundings. The paper concludes with some recommendations towards sustainable urbanization in DMA.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
More than half of the World population are currently living in urban areas and the proportion is expected to reach two-third by 2050, and the majority of the global increase in urban population is expected to take place in developing countries (UN, 2014). By 2050, about 2.5 billion people will be added to the global population out of which about 90% is expected to take place in just Asian and Af- rican continents (UN, 2014 p. 2). In Saudi Arabia, with current of 30.77 million people (citizens and foreign residents), the propor- tion of urban dwellers is expected to reach 89% of the population from the current 83% (UN, 2014 p. 22). The number of people in urban areas in Saudi Arabia have been growing at the rate of about 6% annually, compared with the average national population growth rate of 2.6% (http://www.stats.gov.sa/en [18 March 2016]). According to Abubakar and Aina (2016), over half of the population of Saudi Arabia are living in just seven major cities of Riyadh, Jed- dah, Dammam, Makkah, Madinah, Buraydah and Hofuf-Mubarraz. Apart from natural population increase, other reasons for rapid population growth in these major cities is the concentration of
economic, industrial and administrative activities that provide many jobs opportunities and the presence of better health, educational and other basic services, which are increasingly attracting large domestic and foreign population (Abubakar, 2013).
As such, in order to carter for the growing population and due to the interest of real estate company in more land speculation and housing constructions (Aboukorin, 2011), large-scale housing pro- jects are continuously being planned and implemented in these cities. So far, there have been too little studies that explore the environmental or sustainability impacts of these projects. As such, the present study presents a quantitative analysis of the large-scale residential projects in DMA and their impacts on urban sustain- ability. The analysis is based on review of recent data from Saudi Ministry of Municipalities and Rural Affairs (MOMRA-KSA., 2008), and the Saudi Department of Statistics and other relevant agencies. Then the paper proposes some approaches to achieve sustainable urbanization in DMA. In the next section, literature review covers the concepts of sustainable cities and urbanization and the benefits of urban sustainability principles. Then section three explains the methodology of the study after which section five presents with results and discussion. The paper in section five offers some rec- ommendations on how to mitigate the unsustainable impacts of large-scale residential projects in DMA, and to prevent the
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emergence of such large-scale projects in the future. The paper concludes in section six.
2. Literature review
Sustainable cities are urban areas that have been able to inte- grate social and economic development with environmental management and urban governance (UN, 2013; UN-Habitat,, 2009 2002). Paul James in his book, “Urban Sustainability in Theory and Practice”, proposes what he calls the “circles of sustainability” for assessing urban sustainability on four domains: a) Ecology, b) Economics, c) Culture, and d) Politics (James, 2015). The ecology domain refers to sustainable management of the environment: land uses, materials and energy, water and air, plants and animals, utilities and waste management. The economic domain on the other hand, entails production and resourcing, consumption, la- bour, technology and industrialization, wealth and distribution. While the book refers to social aspects under the cultural domain (including well-being, health, equity, identity), the politics domain underlines governance and organization; communication and accountability; representation and negotiation; dialogue and reconciliation (James, 2015).
Similarly, the UN-Habitat (2014) has identified five planning principles necessary to foster urban sustainability: (1) an efficient street network that encourage walkable neighbourhoods and reduce car dependency; (2) high density urban growth to alleviate urban sprawl and maximize land efficiency; (3) mixed land-use and functionally diversified urban environment to foster local employment, local production and local consumption; (4) social- mix, supporting socially equal and thriving communities in economically viable ways; and (5) limited land-use specialization, allowing economically and socially diversified communities (UN Habitat, 2014).
Sustainable cities can only be achieved when the urbanization process is sustainable as well. Sustainable urbanization is a dy- namic process that aims at achieving better life quality in the urban environment for both present and future generations by addressing environmental, economic, social and governance concerns (James, 2015; Roy, 2009; Shene, 2011; Ziegler, 2009). This shows that the ultimate goal of sustainable urbanization is to achieve sustainable cities. Indeed, for cities to be sustainable the constituting districts and residential neighbourhoods must also be designed and managed based on the principles of sustainably. The concept of sustainable neighbourhood refers to a locality that is socially, environmentally and economically healthy, safe, well planned and built to last (UNESCO, 2014). Sustainable neighbourhoods are so- cially cohesive and diverse, have a mix of residential and economic activities, a diversity of housing types and employment opportu- nities, prioritize walking, cycling and transit, encourage energy efficiency and promote efficient use of resources (Abdellatif & Othman, 2006; City of Pickering, 2015). In order to foster sustain- able urban development, the following sustainability concepts should be highly considered.
2.1. Small-size subdivisions and balanced hierarchal structure
The relationship between settlement size and sustainability has been an issue of continuous debate during the last two decades. There is a growing opinion among urban theorists and pro- fessionals that large cities and urban developments of the Indus- trial Age are not appropriate in this Information Age. There is an argument that “bigger isn’t always better”, especially for the developing countries (Barista, 2015). Doxiadis (1965) argued that small-size developments provide shelter, employment and com- munity life of a quality that is not available in large developments
and that the first preserve human values which are gradually being lost in the latter. Other advantages of small-size communities lie in promoting pedestrian movement, the possibility of developing in them a sense of identity, a feeling of belonging and participation among usually homogenous residents, a corporate spirit and outlook covering the whole population, which could make gov- erning easier and encourage civic development initiatives (Camagnie, 2002; Dix, 1986; Speare & White, 1990). Along this line of argument, Doxiadis made three key recommendations in resi- dential development: creating small communities with human scale, keeping natural resources intact, minimizing motor mobility. From the environmental point of view, small communities have less concentration of pollutants and have an architectural scale that improves their esthetical values (Aboukorin, 2014).
Conversely, large settlements usually have higher per capita cost for maintaining clean water and safe removal of garbage, and air quality is difficult to maintain in high population areas. Indeed some large cities, such as Los Angeles, have difficulties dealing with air quality because air is often trapped (Camagnie, 2002; Speare & White, 1990; UNEP, 2007). Trafficproblems are also associated with large-scale development, as the size of residential development increases, so also traffic congestion and car parking problems in- crease. This is particularly true in Saudi Arabia where car ownership rate is very high with no, or a very limited, role of public trans- portation (Abubakar & Aina, 2016).
Many studies about residential preferences have consistently shown that people who live in large cities would prefer to live in small cities, towns or rural areas. However, most of those wishing to live in rural areas preferred them to be within 30 miles of a city of over 50,000 inhabitants (Fuguitt & Zuiches, 1975). What seems to be preferred is a relatively small scale for one’s immediate resi- dential surroundings, but, at the same time, with good accessibility to shopping, services, cultural and recreational opportunities associated with a metropolitan area (Aboukorin, 2014; Filion, Bunting, & Warriner, 1999; Speare & White, 1990). Recommend- ing small-size developments does not mean promoting low resi- dential densities.
2.2. High residential density: functional efficiency and combating sprawl
Many recent researches recommend high residential densities to achieve urban sustainability and argue that communities operate more efficiently when residents live in denser urban surroundings. Although higher densities tend to increase traffic congestion; communities of high densities tend to have greater transportation options and encourage the residents to adopt more active mobility modes: walking and bicycling (Berggren, 2014; Burge & Trosper, 2013). Moreover, high density is seen to prevent urban sprawl and promote sustainable urban extension and as such, it is regarded as a necessary tool to achieve land-use efficiency (Abubakar, 2013). In its recent publication, the UN Habitat recommended high pop- ulation density as one of the fundamental principles of sustainable neighbourhood planning (UN Habitat, 2014).
According to a Lincoln Institute of Land Policy report, cities in developing countries had an average built-up area density of 129 p/ ha in 2000 (Angel, Parent, Civco, & Blei, 2010). In fact, the UN Habitat (2014) recommends a minimum density of 150 p/ha for a sustainable neighbourhood, which is feasible albeit slightly above the average urban density in developing countries. The UN Habitat argues that high density has many benefits including: slowing down urban sprawl; reducing public service costs, car dependency and parking demand; increasing support for active mobility and public transportation; increasing energy efficiency and decreases pollution; and supporting social equity, better community services,
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and better public open space (UN Habitat, 2014). Although some people perceived a connection between high
density and social problems, such as crime, poverty and depression, the UN Habitat (2014) maintained that these perceptions are not valid as studies show no such correlation when factors such as income are accounted for. Thus, a properly designed high density neighbourhood could provide a safe and comfortable living envi- ronment. Thus, high density as a smart choice that has been placed at the core of sustainable urban planning principles.
2.3. Mixed land-use: functional sustainability
Mixed use zoning is generally linked to increased compact design. Mixed urban fabrics could contribute in saving energy needed for motorised means of transportation as it reduces the need to travel between the different parts of a city or a metropolitan area, since various activities and services are easily accessible. Thus, this type of urbanisation would potentially reduce the congestion in the city or the metropolitan major arteries (Smith, 2006). Also, mixed land-use would ideally create local jobs, promote the local economy, reduce urban fabric fragmentation and support mixed communities (UN Habitat 2014).
There is a wide range of studies that view mixed-use as a principle element to achieve neighbourhood sustainability (Evans & Foord, 2007). The UN-Habitat report entitled “A new strategy of sustainable neighbourhood planning” in 2014, is one of these studies. According to UN-Habitat report, mixed land-use policy aims to develop a range of compatible activities and land uses close together in appropriate locations and flexible enough to adapt over time to the changing market. However, mixed-use practice couldn’t be generalized, aspects of local context need to be taken into ac- count (Evans & Foord, 2007). Thus, for each project we have to ask ourselves what constitutes a sustainable mix, at what scale and which combination of activities (Evans & Foord, 2007).
Regarding the scale, mixed land-use policy can be applied at city, district, neighbourhood, block and building levels (UN Habitat, 2014). Regarding the combination of activities, compatibility of different land uses depends mainly on the noise and pollution levels; that should be kept to the minimum to protect the com- munity wellbeing and area liveability. Mixed land-use requires some combination of residential, commercial, light industrial, or other appropriate land-use. When different functions are mixed in one neighbourhood, economic and residential activities should be made compatible and well balanced by careful design and man- agement (UN Habitat, 2014). According to the UN-Habitat report, the suggested floor area distribution for a sustainable neighbour- hood is: 40e60% for economic use, 30e50% for residential use and 10% for public services. The set of recommended standards is a range to allow for flexibility so that different cities can adapt them to their own situations. Mixed land-use is an inherent part of the nature of cities and is a pillar of sustainable urban development (UN Habitat, 2014).
To take into consideration the local context, some key variables to be considered while planning a mixed-use project have been suggested. Such variables include the local socio-cultural context and the history and age of the area, existing local uses and activities their relation with other uses, site characteristics such as devel- opment grains and urban fabric density and layout, as well as local real-estate market dynamics: trends and regulations (Evans & Foord, 2007). Smith (2006) advises that it is indispensable to raise the awareness of the different actors of the benefits of mixed land-use in order to favour its successful implementation.
2.4. Social mix: social sustainability
Numerous researchers recommend social mix as a strategy to achieve sustainable residential environment. It aims to promote the cohesion and interaction between different social classes in the same community and to ensure accessibility to equitable urban opportunities by providing different housing types. Social mix is supposed to provide the basis for healthy social networks, which, in turn are the driving force of city life. In a mixed land-use neigh- bourhood, job opportunities are, theoretically, generated for resi- dents from different backgrounds and with different income levels. People live and work in the same neighbourhood and form a diverse social network (UN Habitat, 2014). Another positive effect of social mixing might be the aesthetic diversity due to the variety of housing types. This could avoid having a boring streetscape with similar types of housing. Achieving equality in opportunities among various social classes could be one of the positive effects of social mixing (Sarkissian, 1976).
Some researchers have argued that concentrating inhabitants from low income social class in the same neighbourhood have several negative effects. For example, concentrating unemployed residents in the same neighbourhood may encourage the in- dividuals to stay unemployed or to have casual work habits. In- dividuals might suffer from difficulty to access job market due to the lack of access to job networks. Moreover, the similarity in working habits and low income profile might encourage isolation of social groups in ghettos with all its negative aspects such as concentrated poverty and deviant behaviours, which could lead to increasing crime rates and other social problems (Manley, Van Ham, & Doherty, 2011; Wilson, 1991).
However, many researchers and policy makers question the benefits of social mixing and its efficiency in curing neighbourhood problems. They argue that people self-select themselves to live in neighbourhoods according to their income and services they can afford, and that a poor household will not become rich by mere living in rich neighbourhoods (Manley et al., 2011). Thus, it is not enough to provide different types of housing to implement social mix and to avoid social discrimination. People with high income, especially in middle-eastern cultures, would probably avoid living in neighbourhoods with low income neighbours. It is indispensable to consider local cultural aspects to come up with effective plan- ning policies, otherwise, concepts like the social mixing might not give the expected positive outcomes.
Theoretically, mixing social groups in the same neighbourhood might lead to ‘role-model effect’, when poor and delinquent youth imitate the behaviours of individuals of higher social class (Manley et al., 2011; Sarkissian, 1976). However, this positive effect cannot be guaranteed or generalized, as some researches showed that the effect is sometimes insignificant even in the case of very small communities (Allen, Camina, Casey, Coward, & Wood, 2005; Manley et al., 2011). Groups from different social backgrounds would rarely interact together. Thus, social mixing must be paired with real strategies to encourage interactions between different social groups. Otherwise, it could aggravate the social issues and new issues could emerge.
Although social mix is a socio-spatial concept that is difficult to analyse quantitatively, it is still possible to set a general numerical standard from the empirical evidence based on good practice. The UN-Habitat recommends 20e50% of the residential floor to be allocated to affordable housing, and that one single tenure type should not exceed 50% of the residential floor area (UN-Habitat, 2014). This recommendation has a wide range to enable urban planners and city management to follow the national or regional owned-to-rented ratio. In Europe for example, the percentage of public affordable housing in new housing developments is about
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30% in Holland, 20% in Ireland, 25% in the UK (raised to 30e50% in London).
To ensure the smooth implementation of the above suggestions on achieving social mix, UN-Habitat recommends providing plots in different sizes and with different regulations, to increase the diversity of housing options. It also recommends investing in and improving public housing, promoting multi-level employment within the community, and working with private developers to increase public housing supply (UN Habitat, 2014). In addition, Sarkissian (1976) mentioned three questions that might help to achieve positive effects of social mix: “what is the unit that the mixers propose to mix? Which groups tolerate mix best? Under what conditions can people mix safely and happily?”
3. Methodology
3.1. Study area
Dammam Metropolitan Area (DMA), the capital of the Eastern Province, has a total land area of 380,000 ha, and housing about 1.8 million inhabitants. It is the heart of Saudi oil production, which makes the economy and the physical development of DMA reliant heavily on mainly the petroleum industry. During the last three decades, DMA has experienced unprecedented rapid and massive urbanization, from three separated small fishing villages of Dam- mam, Khobar and Dhahran, to become the third largest metropolis in Saudi Arabia (Alhowaish, 2015). The Greater Dammam Region includes the DMA and the neighboring governorates of Qatif and Ras-Tanura (Fig. 1).
DMA is connected to other cities in the Kingdom and the outside world with King Fahd International Airport and King Abdulaziz Port seaport, located on the Arabian Gulf. Another port at nearby Ras Tanura is used exclusively for exporting petroleum products. DMA is also directly connected to the Kingdom of Bahrain by the 25 km long King Fahd Causeway and to Jubail Industrial City by 80 km highway. DMA is linked with Riyadh by a 400 km highway and railways and it is linked by a highway to the neighbouring states of Kuwait, UAE and Oman.
The population of DMA has increased from 0.365 million in- habitants in 1974 to 1.3 million in 1993, and to about 1.8 million in 2010 (Aboukorin & Al-Shihri, 2015). Based on the current regional growth rate of 3.0%, the population of DMA is expected to more than double in the next 25 years, reaching about 3.63 million in 2040, an increase of about 2 million people.
3.2. Methods
To explore the nature, scale and unsustainable impacts of large- scale residential development projects in DMA, the following three methods were utilized.
a) Desk study
The study starts with a broad desktop study to identify and compile relevant literature, plans maps and other relevant docu- ments about the subject and the study area. Then literature review of textbooks, articles, reports and websites was conducted. Con- cepts related to and elements of urban sustainability, impacts of large-scale residential development projects and ways of ensuring sustainable urbanization, among others were reviewed. Selected references, in hard and soft copies, were obtained from sources such as MOMRA, KSA, Saudi Central Department of Statistics and Information, UN-Habitat, and UN Population Division.
b) GIS analyses
This involves using ArcGIS software to map out the location and extent of the large-scale residential development projects in DMA. The current map of the study area, obtained from Google Earth Pro©, was imputed into the GIS-based land use map of DMA ob- tained from Dammam Municipality. The current map was geore- ferenced and then a polygon layer of the projects under study was developed.
c) Analyses and synthesis
Lastly, land use map and structure plan of DMA were used to compile the list and sizes of the approved large-scale residential projects (those around 200 ha), as well as those projects that are located on land reclaimed from the Gulf. Similarly layout plans of some of the projects were used for the analyses. Lastly, findings from the literature review and GIS analyses were synthesized and analysed. This involves analysing the extent to which the projects conforms to the UN-Habitat’s (2014) five principles required to foster urban sustainability: walkable neighbourhoods; (2) high density; (3) mixed land-use (4) social-mix, (5) limited land-use specialization.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Large-scale residential projects in DMA
This study found that there are forty five proposed or ongoing large-scale residential developments in DMA covering about 32,807 ha of land (Table 1 and Fig. 2). They are considered large- scale because, except in the case of three projects, their sizes are more than 300 ha of land (average is 730 ha). These projects can be categorized into two:
(a) Suburban development built on low-price desert land at the outskirts of the metropolitan area and covering an area of about 21,067 ha or 64.2% of the total development.
(b) Infill development into the Arabian Gulf water, covering about 11,740 hactares or 35.8% of the total land area of the development
The rapid urbanization has driven the expansion of DMA much beyond the managing capacity of Dammam Urban Planning Department (DUPD). Thus, there were no strict regulations regarding the size of these subdivisions, residential density, and its environmental and traffic impacts. In many cases, many of these large-scale projects have been approved outside the urban limit, and in some cases into the gulf water (Fig. 3). The most important of these massive large-scale residential subdivisions are King Fahd suburban area (3613 ha), Al-Naseem (3339 ha), subdivision no.1156 (2440 ha) on the western suburb of DMA and Azizziah and the Half- Moon bay districts (3061 ha) built on lands reclaimed from the Arabian Gulf.
These large-scale residential subdivisions are located along the coast in the east, on the desert fringe, and along the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Countries) road in the western part of DMA. Because the built-up central area of DMA is high density, none of these large-scale residential projects is located there. However, there are two major high-rise public housing projects in the build-up area.
4.2. Unsustainable impacts of large-scale residential subdivisions in DMA
These massive residential subdivisions have started creating many environmental and urban sustainability problems. These problems, highlighted below, are expected to further worsen with
Fig. 1. Dammam metropolitan area (MOMRA-KSA., 2008).
Table 1 Size of large-scale residential subdivisions in DMA (compiled from MOMRA-KSA., 2008; Google Earth Pro©, 2016).
District Area (ha) District Area (ha)
1 Eastern Shatia 411.6 24 Al Foursan, 478.2 2 Western Shatia 358.5 25 Al Shourok, 54.6 3 Al Naseem, Dammam 3339.0 26 West Dhahran 2151.8 4 Al Fanar, Khobar 414.2 27 Al-Tragi, Dhahran 363.6 5 King Faisal University Town 305.9 28 Al Sheail 192.0 6 Al Sodra e Dammam 581.5 29 Al Kour 122.1 7 Al Nouras, 721.9 30 Al Hamr, Khobar 325.9 8 Al Seif, 805.6 31 Ashbelaa, 315.7 9 Al Safa, Dammam 339.8 32 Al Taauyn, 325.9 10 Al Hossam, 353.0 33 Al Kozama, Azizia 383.0 11 Al Nahda, Dammam 305.2 34 Al Tahelia, 604.0 12 Al Mountza, Dammam 205.1 35 Behera, 189.6 13 Al Fordous, Dammam 136.7 36 Al Sawari - Azizia 671.7 14 Al Nozha, 388.0 37 Al Maha, 197.8 15 Al Fayhaa, Dammam 252.5 38 Sheraa, 664.3 16 Al Nour, Dammam 486.6 39 Al Ragaa, 409.0 17 Al Faisaliah 777.5 40 Al Amwag, 757.3 18 Al Manar, Dammam 1019.6 41 Al Kawthar, Azizia 500.6 19 Al Nada, 474.8 42 Al Lowalowaa, Azizia 765.0 20 Tebaa, 734.6 43 Al Morgane, Azizia 1070.4 21 King Fahd Suburb, Dammam 3613.0 44 Al Aqeq, Azizia 725.0 22 Airport, Dammam 1085.5 45 Outer districts, Dammam 4086.1 23 Al Amana, Dammam 343.2 Total 32,806.9
F.S. Al-Shihri / Habitat International 56 (2016) 201e211 205
Fig. 2. Large-scale residential subdivisions in DMA (based on maps from MOMRA-KSA., 2008 and Google Earth Pro).
F.S. Al-Shihri / Habitat International 56 (2016) 201e211206
population density getting higher in these subdivisions.
a) Unsustainable landfill into the Arabian Gulf water
Despite the fact that land-filling is one of the most disruptive activities to coastal and marine resources, reclamation of inter-tidal areas continues in DMA and on a large-scale. Land speculation in general and the premium prices available for seafront property in particular appear to be the key drivers behind the environmentally destructive land-filling that has devastated much of the coastline. By comparing DMA satellite images of 1982 and 2015, it is seen that land-filling during this period has covered an area of about 6832 ha in Arabian Gulf waters (Fig. 3 and Table 2). Moreover, there are other approved subdivision plans with a total area of about 4908 ha to be built on land reclaimed from the Gulf.
As Fig. 4 shows, this land infilling practice is severely deterio- rating the quality of marine environment along the coast. This area around Tarout Island was known as the main mangrove habitat in
the region. Due mainly to land-filling activities by the countries surrounding the Arabian Gulf, the quantity of fish caught from the Arabian Gulf declined from 26,000 tons in 1998e21,000 in 1999, and the problem is more acute for shrimps, declining from 6000 to 2000 tons from 1998 to 1999 (Ministry of Agriculture, KSA, 1999).
In many cases, landfilling for these large-scale projects extend deep into the gulf (about 8.0 km), which thus severely obstructs water circulation. In Tarut Island, for example, land infill has linked Tarut with the coast and prevented water circulation around the island (Fig. 4). In an effort to improve the environmental condition of this deteriorated area, the Municipality of Dammam tried to dig a canal to allow water circulation. But, as can be seen on the right image in Fig. 4, the environmental deterioration is getting worse.
The striking unsustainable feature of these large-scale de- velopments is their very low residential density of an average of 120 p/ha. Indeed three of these major subdivisions (King Fahd Suburb, Al-Naseem subdivision and Subdivision no. 1156) have overall population density of 64 persons per hectare, which is very
Fig. 3. Some completed and ongoing land-filling activities in DMA, 1982e2015 (Space Surveying Department, KSA 1982).
Table 2 Areas and distribution of current and expected land infill in DMA 1982e2015 (hectares) Aboukorin (2011) and MOMRA-KSA. (2008).
Dammam Qatif Total
Land infill during 1982ae2015b 3910 2922 6832 Expected land infill (approved subdivisions) 4500 408 4908 Total 8410 3330 11,740
a (Space Surveying Department, KSA, 1982). b (Digital Globe, 2003), Google Earth image, 2015.
F.S. Al-Shihri / Habitat International 56 (2016) 201e211 207
low compared with other districts in DMA that are about 180e250 p/ha, as well as other cities in developing countries. Moreover, this low density is rapidly declining as the rate of urban development is much faster than that of population increase. Over the three de- cades from 1972 to 2003, the population density of Dammam, decreased by 46% and if this trend continues, the density is ex- pected to continue to reach only 35 persons/ha by 2030 (MOMRA- KSA., 2008). Declining density means that DMA is suffering increasing urban sprawl, which is a serious urban problem in developing countries that goes against urban sustainability.
These massive residential subdivisions are low density mainly because of two main reasons. First, to attract the affluent people to these large developments built on low-price desert land on city outskirts, or to offer the affluent residents a good view of the water
body in the case of those developments on the land reclaimed from the Gulf water. Second, because of their large size, they take a long time to be fully developed, and thus remain at a very low level of density for a long period of time (Kotkin, 2013; SCMP., 2013). Low density residential developments are believed to be functionally and socially less sustainable than high density developments.
c) Exclusively residential uses with single housing type
Despite their huge size, these subdivisions are only for resi- dential purpose and serve no other purpose to the greater com- munity, such as economic activities and services for employment and public services. Those already developed turned out to be ‘commuter districts’, creating traffic jams at peak hours as large numbers of employees leave these districts and pour into the congested part of the metropolis. Moreover, some of the new large- scale subdivisions, especially those on the coast, are designed as gated communities, of a single type of housing, usually detached villas. This goes against sustainability principles, especially regarding achieving socially mixed and diversified communities.
Similar to many new residential developments, these large- scale developments are mono-functional. This is against sustain- ability principles that promote mixed uses that could create local jobs; promote the local economy; reduce car dependency; encourage active mobility; reduce landscape fragmentation;
Fig. 4. Environmental Impacts of massive land infill around Tarut island.
b) Extremely low density leading to sprawl
F.S. Al-Shihri / Habitat International 56 (2016) 201e211208
provide closer public services and support mixed communities. When new subdivision include commerce, business and other ac- tivities they tend to be self-contained thus residents do not need to go as often to the greater community.
Similarly, because of their location on the outskirts of the city, these residential developments are usually planned for the high income social class. Despite the debate in the literature concerning the efficiency of the social mixing in terms of sustainability, single type of housing, the villa, is being proposed. This would not create sustainable residential environment that promote cohesion and interaction between different social classes in the same commu- nity. According to a 2015 survey of housing preference based on socio-economic characteristics of DMA residents, about 74 per cent of respondents indicated that they can only afford living in apart- ments, while only 26 per cent prefer living in villas (Aljarbua, Alghamdy, Alsharkh, Bafjaish, & Almutairi, 2015). These results highly coincide with Dammam Urban Observatory survey results that indicated that 90% of houses in DMA are villas (Dammam Urban Observatory, 2015).
d) “Cities within the city” - structural deformation
Due to the large size of most of these residential developments, they can be considered as mini cities within a city. For example, the King Fahd Suburb subdivision (3613 ha), Al-Naseem (3339 ha) and Subdivision 1156 (2440 ha), are expected to house very large populations of about 230,000, 213,000 and 156,000 respectively. These population sizes are very much beyond any planning or sustainability standards for neighbourhood size (5000e8000 in- habitants) or district size (20,000e30000 inhabitants). It is even larger than several Saudi cities. Therefore, these large-scale projects represent the so called “cities within the city” and are likely going to physically disrupt the metropolitan structure and to alter the long
established balance between DMA’s districts and neighbourhoods. Also, they are expected to exert considerable pressure on the sur- rounding urban environment, infrastructure, and public services.
Moreover, the expected problems of these large-scale de- velopments are much beyond the management capacity of Dam- mam municipality and its planning department. While most of the city units are small, of an area around 100e250 ha, these large-scale developments that are averagely 730 ha (seven of them are over 1000 ha) are beginning to seriously deform the hierarchal structure of 3e5 neighborhoods under a district and districts under a sector. This is because these subdivisions are planned as single entities, without any hierarchal structure of neighbourhoods and residential sites. This adversely affects the ability of these developments to create a sense of neighbourhood in a socially sustainable residential environment. It also adversely affects the efficient provision of educational and health services in these and could aggravate traffic flow and safety inside these developments and at their few exit points.
Similarly, these large-scale residential projects along the coast have deprived the residents of the central area of DMA the benefit of viewing and enjoying the site of the Gulf water. More impor- tantly, despite DMA being on the Arabian Gulf coast, it has a very short and narrow public sea-front, as these large-scale projects are private properties without any public beach. This is makes this projects socially unsustainable.
Another unsustainability feature of these residential projects is their poor and limited connectivity with the surrounding areas (Fig. 5). As marked with arrows in Fig. 5, the entries/exits to these areas would eventually result in high traffic congestion at these points and in the surrounding neighbourhoods. Also, the location of these large-scale residential subdivisions along the eastern and western edges of the metropolis has locked and confined its central area, thus creating urban edges and visual barriers. This is expected
Fig. 5. Large-scale residential developments with limited connectivity with surrounding road network.
F.S. Al-Shihri / Habitat International 56 (2016) 201e211 209
to further deteriorate the urban environment of this area, as it is highly populated and houses most of the commercial and admin- istration services.
5. Recommendations towards sustainable urbanization in DMA
Based on the above analysis of the unsustainable features of the ongoing and completed large-scale residential projects in DMA, and taking into account the reviewed UN-Habitat’s five principles necessary to foster sustainable urban development (UN-Habitat 2014), the following key recommendations could help towards sustainable urbanization in DMA:
a) Small-size subdivisions and balanced hierarchal structure
Instead of large-scale residential subdivisions of an area up to 3000 ha and housing about 300,000 persons, this paper recom- mends dividing the approved, but not yet developed subdivisions, into a number of neighbourhoods of about 8000e10,000 popula- tion size. This is to avoid traffic congestion at the centres of these large scale subdivisions and at their limited exit points. Each of the proposed neighbourhood should be self-sufficient and properly connected to the main roads of DMA. To prevent further structural deformation, the area of any new subdivision should not exceed 100e150 ha. This is to ensure efficient management, limited envi- ronmental and traffic impacts, and to prevent conflict with other sections of DMA, especially the city centre.
b) High residential density e functional efficiency and combating sprawl
For DMA, where the overall density is low (only 64 persons/ha in 2003) and further declining, expected to reach only 35 persons/ha
by 2030, due to proposed very low density developments (Aboukorin, 2011), it is necessary to increase the density up to the UN-Habitat’s recommended density of 150 p/ha. To do so entails revising planning regulations in DMA to minimize the percentage of the two-story villa-type housing. Currently about 90 per cent of the undeveloped residential area in DMA is villa-type housing. This recommendation is especially important as this type of housing does not suit the socio-economic characteristics of the community, where about 80 per cent of the population cannot afford such type of housing (Dammam Urban Observatory, 2015). This requires no more urban expansion in the next 10 years. In addition, and in order to help in combating sprawl, taxes must be imposed on vacant lands within the urban limit, and on unoccupied housing units.
c) Mixed land-use, not just residential
In DMA, these large-scale residential projects are mainly resi- dential with very limited mixing with commercial and office uses. Economic activities in most of these large-scale subdivisions are just about 15e20 per cent of total area. These economic activities are usually grouped in a single location at the edge of the site or along the main roads, leaving the whole district without economic activities. In order to improve sustainability in these districts, the paper recommends revising the plans of those yet to build layout designs as well as the planning and building regulations to increase the floor area percentage of economic activities up to the UN- Habitat’s recommended 40 to 60 per cent.
d) Social mix: housing for different income levels in each neighborhood
In DMA, lack of social mix between high and low income classes is the most obvious feature of unsustainability. According to Dammam Urban Observatory (2015), about 90 per cent of the area
F.S. Al-Shihri / Habitat International 56 (2016) 201e211210
of approved and not yet developed residential subdivisions in DMA is allocated for a single type of housing, which is the villa type, although, there is an acute shortage of affordable apartment housing that is highly needed by about 80% DMA residents. Thus, the social mix approach of different housing types is necessary not only for achieving urban sustainability but also to ensure housing provision meet the economic characteristics of the local population. More specifically, the paper suggests that for some of the yet to build large-scale residential projects and for any new subdivision to be approved, housing type must be low percentage of villas and higher percentage of apartments (e.g. 30:70 respectively), given that apartments meet the residents0 housing preference of the majority of DMA residents, according to their income levels. This will allow social-mix of low and high income residents in each neighbourhood.
6. Conclusion
Based on the above analyses, the paper concludes that large- scale residential developments in DMA do not properly adhere to sustainability principles, and thus, a number environmental and urban problems have arisen. From environmental point of view, as some of these subdivisions are built on sites resulting from land reclamation on the Gulf water, this action severely deteriorated the marine environment. In order to minimize these unsustainable impacts, strict prohibition of further land reclamation on the Arabian Gulf should be completely imposed. The shoreline of DMA must be accurately delineated and officially approved, and any further development beyond that line must not be approved. Future urban expansion should be directed to desert areas on the west.
Large-size developments usually create large-scale environ- mental impacts, and put immense pressure on existing infra- structure, services and road network. Also, it creates severe deformation in city structure; and thus they alter the existing functional balance between city components. As the size of a resi- dential development or subdivision gets bigger, it loses the sense of neighbourhood, and its management becomes more complicated. The paper recommends that any new large-scale subdivision in DMA must be divided into a number of manageable, compact, and pedestrian-friendly districts, and must be balanced with other districts in the city. Thus, their size should not exceed the average size of districts in the city. Each of these districts must be internally divided to a number of self-contained neighbourhoods.
In order to favour successful planning and implementation of small-size, mixed-use, compact, socially-mixed projects, it is indispensable to educate developers, stakeholders and the popu- lation in general by raising their awareness of the benefits of sus- tainable urbanization. Similarly, public participation sessions could help in customizing the mixed-use strategies to the community needs. Future research should assess other impacts of large scale subdivisions such as energy and water demand and traffic congestion.
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- Impacts of large-scale residential projects on urban sustainability in Dammam Metropolitan Area, Saudi Arabia
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Literature review
- 2.1. Small-size subdivisions and balanced hierarchal structure
- 2.2. High residential density: functional efficiency and combating sprawl
- 2.3. Mixed land-use: functional sustainability
- 2.4. Social mix: social sustainability
- 3. Methodology
- 3.1. Study area
- 3.2. Methods
- 4. Results and discussion
- 4.1. Large-scale residential projects in DMA
- 4.2. Unsustainable impacts of large-scale residential subdivisions in DMA
- 5. Recommendations towards sustainable urbanization in DMA
- 6. Conclusion
- References
resource/3 urban growth and saudi cities.pdf
Habitat International 28 (2004) 609–623
Urban growth management-the Saudi experience
Saleh Al-Hathloul*, Muhammad Aslam Mughal
Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, P.O. Box 86217, Riyadh 11622, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Received 31 May 2003; received in revised form 12 June 2003; accepted 1 October 2003
Abstract
Saudi Arabia experienced a high rate of urbanization during the period 1970–1986 resulting in accelerated annual growth rates for Saudi cities averaging more than 6.4%. Higher than usual growth rates created demand for the opening up of huge areas to meet housing, commercial, industrial and other land uses. Government’s land grant policy and liberal interest free loans resulted in massive expansion of cities and towns all over the country with major cities of Riyadh, Jeddah, and Dammam having the biggest share. Lack of planning frameworks and weak city institutions could not direct the growth properly leading to sprawl and lop-sided development. This meant rapid extension of road network and utilities with high financial outlays. The slow-down in the economy and ever-increasing demand for infrastructure provision forced the government to initiate growth boundaries to tackle these problems in 1986. The paper discusses the methodology adopted and the process of devising urban limits and evaluates their impact on urban structures of Saudi cities. The paper draws some conclusions in the realization of objectives of the exercise with respect to, (a) control urban sprawl by encouraging infill development where utilities were generally available; (b) reduce cost of provision of infrastructure through better coordination tied to commonly agreed phasing; (c) maintain natural environment around the cities. r 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Urbanization; Urban planning; Density controls; Infrastructure; Urban environment; Saudi Arabia
1. Introduction: establishing the national context
Saudi Arabia has a population of 16.9 millions living in settlements ranging from metropolitan areas of over 2 millions to villages consisting of few houses (Ministry of Finance, 1992). Except for the Nafud desert in the north and big Empty Quarter of Rub-al-Khali in the southeast, the rest of
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*Corresponding author. Tel.: +966-1-456-4803; fax: +966-1-456-4330.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (S. Al-Hathloul), [email protected] (M.A. Mughal).
0197-3975/$- see front matter r 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.habitatint.2003.10.009
the national space has fairly scattered settlement pattern with highest village density in the southwest (Fig. 1). Gross density for the whole country is 8 persons/km
2 indicating a thinly
populated pattern. In 1983, there were 10,365 rural settlements in the country. Out of a total of 343 urban settlements only two; Riyadh and Jeddah, have populations of more than 2 millions, while 294 have populations of less than 25,000 and the population of remaining 47 ranges between 25,000 an d 1.5 millions (Ministry of Finance, 1992). The growth rates of some selected cities are given below that indicate the resulting pressure for housing and other services (Table 1). Gross density of Saudi cities is, generally, low. It ranges between 12 persons/ha in the small
town of Al Khabra to 29 persons/ha in Riyadh (MOMRA, Deputy Ministry for Town Planning, 2001). This, in physical configuration, means spread-out settlements with leapfrog developments thereby making the provision and maintenance of utilities and services quite expensive. The urban percentage of national population increased from 48.7 in 1970 to 77.3 in 1990 (Al-Hathloul & Abdel Rahman, 2003a). The urban sprawl is the direct result of massive urbanization creating demand for housing and commercial facilities. Hundreds of thousands of residential plots were distributed free of cost to the general public through land grant policy of the government. The
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Fig. 1. Spatial distribution of urban centers.
S. Al-Hathloul, M.A. Mughal / Habitat International 28 (2004) 609–623610
construction component of housing was largely funded through the advance of interest free loans by the government and a total of 550,532 were financed under the programe up to December, 1996 (Real Estate Development Fund, 1998). The issues of lop-sided urban growth have been addressed through the preparation of the National Spatial Strategy. The overall objective of this Strategy is to achieve, over the long run, a balanced development between regions on one hand, and within regions on the other (Al-Hathloul & Abdel Rahman, 2003b; Al-Hathloul, 1996). Saudi Arabia is one of the few countries in the world that has no housing shortage. Large tracts
of land, both developed and undeveloped, are a common scene in major urban centers. This indicates the realization of an important national objective: housing the rapidly growing urban population in a short span of time. However, the rapid urban growth could have been guided more rationally by employing effective planning and management tools. The pace of development was so rapid that the limited planning efforts were rendered ineffective. These included the master plans prepared for a number of rapidly growing cities that became outdated in a short period of time. The problem was further compounded by the lack of institutional support in the country, particularly at the local level, to manage urban growth. This was also an important factor in the non-implementation of master plans of some cities (Al-Hathloul, 2003). Saudi Arabia has a strong centralized system of government whereby federal ministries/
agencies directly provide services through their field offices. These include arterial roads, water, electricity, sewerage, drainage, telecommunication, schools, health facilities, and other services. Municipalities are responsible for providing municipal services and appointed mayors head these. The municipalities are under the administrative control of Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA). There are 13 regions in the country that have appointed governors who are basically responsible for law and order, and coordination of development activities. The municipalities have no authority to levy direct taxes, such as a property tax. Even the provision and maintenance of services and utilities is heavily subsidized by the federal government. The municipalities get their budgets from the federal government on the basis of population and specific projects. Unlike the case in many other countries, this gives the government a strong tool to intervene in the planning and development of all settlements (Al-Khedheiri, 2002). It was with this background that the MOMRA felt the need to initiate delineation of urban
growth boundaries in 1984. After a thorough review of the situation in consultation with the mayors of five major cities, the Ministry made a recommendation to the Council of Ministers
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Table 1
Growth rates of selected Saudi Arabian cities
City Population % Annual growth rate
1940 1974 1986 1940–1974 1974–1986
Riyadh 30,000 672,382 1,310,624 9.57 5.75
Jeddah 30,000 568,046 1,032,855 9.03 5.11
Dammam — 127,844 260,048 6.1
Makkah 80,000 366,801 666,940 4.58 5.1
Buraidah 20,000 76,442 208,152 9.02 8.70
Abha — 31,359 160,290 14.60
Source: Population Censuses, Ministry of Finance, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1992.
S. Al-Hathloul, M.A. Mughal / Habitat International 28 (2004) 609–623 611
regarding the urgency of the matter and requested approval to undertake an urban growth boundaries study. The issuance of a royal decree set the stage to initiate the study in a comprehensive manner. The delineation of urban boundaries was intended to: (a) control urban sprawl by encouraging infill development; (b) reduce cost of provision of infrastructure for new development through better coordination between its provision and economic development plans; and (c) ensure the maintenance of natural environment particularly around the cities through preservation measures (Al-Hathloul & Abdel Rahman, 1989).
2. Delineation of urban growth boundaries
2.1. Concept and scope
The 1984 decree issued by the Council of Ministers encompassed the delineation of zones of Saudi towns and cities for the next 20 years until 2005 (Zahid, 1995). It was in response to (a) ever increasing demand for the extension of services and public utilities beyond the periphery of existing blocks of settlements, which led to the exhaustion of budgets; (b) the non-adherence, by the citizens, to the limited stages of urban growth in certain planned urban centers; and (c) the urgent need to support the infrastructure and make the best possible exploitation of utilities and services. Various urban growth management approaches were studied to determine their suitability to the Saudi situation and a careful consideration of all factors led to the adoption of the growth boundary approach. It aimed at regulating the supply of land for development. Local growth management programs often determine how, when and for what purpose developed-land should be used (Chinitz, 1990). The selected approaches consisted of a combination of urban boundaries and some elements of public improvement techniques which made it more suitable for the local situation. It was also decided to extend the scope of the study to the 100 largest municipalities. As the municipalities had institutional deficiencies it was considered imperative that the central government, as represented through the Deputy Ministry for Town Planning (DMTP), MOMRA, played an important role in initiating, organizing, undertaking, approving and implementing urban growth boundaries. Hence, a central pool of experts in the DMTP was established to initiate the massive exercise in the light of the direction given by the Council of Ministers.
2.2. Methodology
Most of the municipalities did not have even single planner or architect and the reliance was to be on surveyors and draftsmen. The problem was further compounded as there was severe lack, and in certain cases complete absence, of data, particularly base maps. In light of this situation, a number of options were considered and the following three were identified for detailed scrutiny: (1) a number of consultants could be hired and assigned on regional basis to cover a group of settlements; (2) a huge central pool of experts could be created in the DMPT and charged with the responsibility of actually undertaking the exercise; and (3) a limited technical staff could be made available to assist the municipalities in carrying out studies under the direction and supervision of the DMPT experts.
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The first option, the engagement of consultants would have taken a long time due to procedural problems and non-availability of sufficient number of qualified firms in the country. Engagement of foreign firms usually requires a much longer time period. In addition, it would have required a huge financial outlay for which allocation in the national budget would have been difficult to obtain. In the second option, it would have been necessary to expand the small pool of experts available in the DMTP considerably through fresh recruitment, which would have been time consuming, particularly when experts were not available locally. Also, dealing with a large number of settlements spread all over the vast country from the center would have been logistically difficult. This would have required a much longer time span than that fixed by the Council of Ministers and a substantial financial allocation. In the third option, the work was to be carried out by the limited municipal staff located in each municipality with strong support from the DMTP at every stage of the work. This option allowed for the simultaneous start of work in all the selected settlements; hence, taking less time and costing less in required financial resources. It also meant active local participation for injecting pragmatism in the study outputs and greater acceptability by all concerned authorities facilitating implementation at a later stage. However, in this option, some compromise on quality was inevitable, as the reliance was to be on the municipalities’ staff, which were mostly unqualified and inexperienced. The pros and cons of the three options were debated and finally the third option was selected
in view of the technical know-how, on-the-ground realities, financial aspects and the emphasis on the active involvement of the local staff. Once this approach was chosen, the central group in the DMPT undertook the preparation of a detailed and comprehensive manual laying down the objectives, scope, methodology, and outputs of the study. As the manual was intended for the unqualified and inexperienced staff of the municipalities, it was made very simple using examples wherever possible. The central group of professionals was divided into two-man teams consisting of one expert and one DMTP counterpart and assigned on a regional basis to work with the staff of the municipalities. These teams continued to work closely with the municipal staff and provided step-by-step guidance throughout the study period. This arrangement also provided an opportunity to the DMTP teams to get first hand knowledge of the prevailing conditions in the settlements, which proved extremely useful at various stages of the study particularly at the time of defining the urban growth boundaries. In terms of outputs each town was to produce a report and an atlas presenting the basic data, projections, analysis and recommendations. This was considered necessary so that each municipality would have all the information available to them to implement the urban growth boundaries.
2.3. Data collection and analysis
The most urgent problem to overcome was the non-availability of updated maps. The available maps were 10–20 years old and had been prepared at varying scales. A proper updating of the maps for the 100 towns through aerial photography, spread as they were around the country, would have taken years and considerable financial expenditure. In view of the urgency of completing the work, all available maps and aerial photographs of the towns were collected from different sources and the municipal surveyors were guided to record additions and major changes on the old maps. In addition, the approved subdivisions not covered by the available maps were also located on those maps. The end result was updated maps, which, although sometimes of
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questionable accuracy, were considered good enough to carry out various surveys and indicate the urban growth boundaries. As the focus was on the delineation of big zones, the level of accuracy of the resulting maps was thought to be acceptable. A detailed land use survey was carried out to obtain a reasonably accurate picture of the
situation on the ground. The rest of the data, collected from concerned ministries and organizations, included health and education facilities, water supply, sewerage, drainage, electricity, telephones, recreational and cultural facilities, mosques, transportation network and other features special to a particular town. A considerable effort was spent on cleaning the data and filling in the essential gaps. All these data were presented in the form of tables and maps which constituted the base-line information to precede the next stage of analysis. Estimation of the current populations (as of 1987), in the absence of any recent data, was a big
challenge as the last population census had been undertaken in 1974. Hence, a number of sources were used for estimating current populations, including 1974 national census, primary school enrollments, land use survey data and the number of domestic electric connections. Population estimates were derived from the last three sources and 1974 census figure was projected to the base year. The four figures obtained by various methods were then compared and analyzed to estimate a 1987 base population figure for each town. The next stage was to project the current population to the end of the study period, i.e. 2005,
with an estimate for the year 1995 which was the date selected to mark the first phase of the study, assuming growth rates based on the previous trends and agreed through extensive discussions among the experts and city officials. However no functional analysis of the economic potential of the towns was carried out in view of the paucity of resources. Sectoral information from various government institutions, research investigations and some local knowledge and information provided the general bases for the determination of the functional role of various urban centers on the regional, sub-regional and national levels (Zahid, 1995). The amount of land required for the planning period up to 2005 (1425 AH) and for Phase 1
(1995) was calculated on the basis of the projected population for target years and the gross density derived from the existing pattern of settlements. To this was added the land required for public services, public utilities, major roads and other infrastructure by using the planning standards. Land needed for the study period constituted the main basis for growth boundaries, hence these calculations received special attention. There were some other considerations also in defining the growth boundaries, which will be discussed in the following sections. Data on existing and proposed public utilities was collected from the concerned agencies by
providing them the copies of base maps and requesting them to indicate the networks on them, in addition to providing data in the form of tables and charts. Analysis of each utility was carried out with respect to their existing networks; future plans of the administering agencies and the possibility of extensions to cater to the future requirements. The analysis indicated the logical sites for future growth, indicating some clues about the directions of settlement growth from the point of view of the utilities. Data on the existing and proposed road network was plotted on the base maps and the analysis
was carried out at three levels, i.e. inter city movements, connections to serve the surrounding villages and the intra-city movements. All these were seen at important in determining the degree of accessibility, thereby indicating the need for up-grading or the provision of new linkages. The
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intra-city analysis had to be carried out along with the existing and proposed land uses. Also, all the three levels play a significant role in determining the future directions and patterns of growth. Assessment of the existing public facilities was undertaken to determine deficiencies in the
systems with particular reference to space requirements. The future requirements were calculated by using planning standards to cater to the population increase. A special importance of this analysis was to assess the land requirement so that it could be provided while delineating the urban growth boundaries. The public facilities included education. health, religious, cultural, recreational, governmental and others. Growth trends of the towns for possible future growth scenarios were studied taking into
consideration the topography, existing built-up area, approved subdivisions, infrastructure networks, committed projects/sites and future land requirements. This analysis consisted essentially of combining the analytical maps of various utilities, public services, road networks and topographical features to obtain a composite picture of the projection of growth trends at the settlement level. Potentials and constraints were built into the scenario through discussions among the experts and the local officials. The availability of government lands in the vicinity of the builtup areas was an important factor in visualizing the future growth trends of the settlements under study. All of this was fine-tuned to provide a basis for the next important stage of the study.
2.4. Devising urban growth boundaries
All these analyses led to the delineation of the urban growth boundaries for the year 2005 (1425 AH) with the first phase covering the period to the year 1995 (1415 AH). The underlying factor was to provide enough land to cater to the needs of the present and projected populations for the two phases. Then the designated lands were to be earmarked with the provision of utilities and services to promote compact and contiguous development. However, local realities had to be taken into consideration, as there existed plenty of subdivided land in almost all the towns, particularly the big ones. Hence, the boundary delineation was not based on future requirement of land alone but the judicious use of subdivided land became a crucial factor. The end result was a liberal delineation of the boundaries, particularly in the big cities. However, in smaller towns due to the non-existence or limited number of subdivisions the boundaries established were much tighter. A number of alternatives were prepared to arrive at the best possible one. Evaluation criteria
were developed for the selection of the most suitable alternative. The main elements of the criteria, among others, included (a) spatial integration of built up areas; (b) economical provision and maintenance of infrastructure and services; (c) development and utilization of approved subdivisions, and (d) efficient utilization of the idle capacity of the existing infrastructure. The basic determinants of development phases for the optimum alternative have been defined by availability of infrastructure in areas designated for urban expansion, integration of the existing builtup areas, growth and development of builtup areas along existing axes and arterial roads, and approved land subdivisions in which roads were paved and asphalted (Zahid, 1995). The alternatives with the application of the criteria were subjected to detailed discussions at the local level and the municipalities closely collaborated with the representatives of all sectoral ministers and agencies responsible for the provision of infrastructure and services in the urban areas. At the regional level, governors were involved in the final stages of the study. It was, however, the central
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level represented by the DMTP, which was intensively involved in technical discussions, and a series of meetings were held for each town attended by the Deputy Minister, DMTP officials and experts, mayors and their staff. The extensive discussions proved extremely useful in selecting the best alternative and in fine-tuning the details. An effort was made to devise boundaries along the identifiable natural or man-made landmarks
but it was not possible everywhere. Within the urban growth boundaries established, Phase-I was delineated pertaining to the year 1995, which included the existing builtup and partially builtup areas to meet the requirements of population growth and the capacities of the government departments/agencies to service these areas with utilities and public facilities. The emphasis was on the intensive utilization of the serviced vacant areas and the vacant areas contiguous to the existing built up areas. Phase-II relates to the areas lying between boundaries pertaining to the year 1995 and 2005. The area included in the second phase was based essentially on the area calculations done earlier but with adjustments to include approved land subdivisions. Outside the urban boundary (Phase II) ‘‘urban protection zones’’ have been designated to serve as reserve land for future extension beyond the year 2005, which can be termed as Phase III. Thus in fact there are three boundaries, pertaining to the years 1995, 2005 and beyond 2005. Intensive discussions were held and written agreements reached with the representatives of departments/ organizations responsible for provision of services and utilities with respect to the areas included within the two boundaries, i.e. 1995 and 2005 (see Fig. 2).
2.5. Review and approval procedure
As the municipalities did the basic analysis, their technical staff were fully involved in all the stages and the mayors were partners with DMTP officials in directing and supervising the work. An extensive review process was followed in the DMTP whereby each town’s proposal was discussed, on average, three times. The Deputy Minister, DMTP officials, mayors, experts and the municipal staff attended these discussions. At least 300 such meetings were held in a short period of 20–24 months. The local and regional emirates were also actively involved in the process leading to the approval of boundaries. These were then presented to the High Planning Committees of each region, which are headed by Governors with the Deputy Minister for Town Planning and Regional Mayors or Director Generals of MOMRA as members. On the recommendation of these committees, the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs submitted them to the Council of Ministers and these were approved in 1989 (Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, 1989). As per the approval order, all government authorities and public institutions as well as other
sectors were directed to coordinate with MOMRA in the setting up of execution programs necessary for development within the phasing of urban growth boundaries in accordance with the actual needs of the towns. A set of general regulations, which lays down the procedure for implementation of the boundaries, is an integral part of the approval of urban boundaries. According to these regulations, white lands (large tracts of vacant lands) within Phase I can be planned by the municipalities without waiting for landowners to apply for their subdivision approval. This was considered necessary to ensure rights-of-way of primary roads and land for public utilities projects to encourage infill development. To discourage growth in Phase II, the regulations lay the onus of providing roads and utilities on the landowners if they are interested in
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obtaining approval of land subdivisions before the start of Phase II. The Minister of MOMRA has been authorized to issue directives and ordinances for the operationalization of these regulations. MOMRA has been directed to study areas in the urban protection zone and propose control measures for these areas. A system for revisions/modifications of urban growth boundaries was also specified by the
Council of Ministers. MOMRA was directed to undertake a full study of such a town and present its findings to a committee formed by representatives of MOMRA and the Ministries of Interior, Finance and National Economy, PTT, Industry and Electricity and Communication. Recommendations of this committee were to be forwarded to the Council of Ministers for final decision, thus making the procedure for changing the urban boundaries quite difficult (The Council of Ministers, 1989).
3. Implementation issues
The implementation of urban growth boundaries started immediately after their approval by the Council of Ministers as the developers and the municipalities had been facing a freeze on new
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Fig. 2. Urban growth boundaries phasing.
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land subdivisions for more than 2 years. As the highest legislative body of the country approved the boundaries, all municipalities and the concerned agencies were obliged for their strict adherence. Thus, the first requirement to ensure implementation was fully met through legal approval by the competent authority. As the authority for any subsequent modifications was also retained by the Council of Ministers, it became very difficult for the interested parties to exert pressure on the municipalities for any exemption. The result has been the obligatory acceptance of the boundaries with focus of disputes being on their interpretation and application on the ground. The municipalities are the main local authorities responsible for the implementation of the
urban growth boundaries as they undertake the initial scrutiny of the land subdivisions both in public and private sectors before forwarding them to the DMTP for final approval. The municipalities, with the approved urban growth boundaries and regulations, became equipped with the necessary framework to process land subdivision applications. As the municipalities are not well staffed, the problems relating to specific issues are referred to MOMRA, where DMTP examines them from the technical, legal and administrative points-of-view and takes appropriate action. Since the approval of urban growth boundaries, almost all-new land subdivisions in cities other
than the three metropolitan areas of Riyadh, Jeddah and Makkah, have been located within Phase I of the boundaries. In case of the three metropolitan areas, the adherence to Phase I has not been very strict, for which there are many reasons. In Unaziah, a major urban center of Al- Qassim region, a subdivision was approved in Phase II but the developer provided the entire infrastructure as required by the regulations. As far as building plans are concerned, the major activity has been concentrated in Phase I of all cities, which can be attributed to the priority of servicing the areas in Phase I. This is true even in case of the three metropolitan areas, as is clear from the case of Riyadh. According to a study carried out by Arriyadh Development Authority it was concluded that a major portion of development has taken place on serviced vacant lots in Phase I of urban growth boundaries of Riyadh city. Between 1986 and 1993, the rate at which serviced vacant land has been brought to use has been very encouraging. An average of 11.5km
2
of vacant serviced land was brought to full use annually and vacant land serviced with infrastructure has declined from 329 to 248 km
2 (Arriyadh Development Authority, 1993).
Probably some percentage of this land might have been used anyway but the process was accelerated with the approval of urban growth boundaries. The concerned sectoral ministries and agencies have focused on providing public utilities and
services within Phase I of urban growth boundaries as directed by the Council of Ministers. As these are generally high-density residential and commercial areas, there is much more efficient utilization of the utilities and infrastructure. This has meant higher investment-service/return ratios, hence larger numbers of households are being served. Thus, the strong role of the government in the provision of free infrastructure is being used as an effective tool in shaping the growth patterns. However the coordination of the agencies/ministries providing utilities and services, on an area basis, still remains to be made more effective for which the municipalities have to play an active role. The private developers in Phase II have to provide infrastructure on their own, which has become a strong discouraging factor outside Phase I. The maintenance of natural environment has been ensured through the designation of urban
protection zones beyond Phase II where no development is allowed until the preparation of detailed plans are made by MOMRA, as directed by the Council of Ministers. However there
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have been some jurisdictional problems whereby the Ministry of Agriculture and Water started granting approval for agricultural subdivisions in urban protection zones without going into the present and future implications for the environment as well as the cities. These subdivisions, located on the fringes of the cities, are primarily for building rest houses, which are used to spend evenings or weekends. Normally these homes have agricultural lots attached to them. If the lot size is big and agricultural character is maintained then there is no problem but if the lot size is small and there is no proper infrastructure it can create serious problems for the municipal authorities. The problem of rest houses is limited to some selected areas in the country but it has to be addressed in view of future implications when these areas will integrate with urban structures necessitating provision of higher level of services and utilities. Growth controls tend to raise the value of existing housing and sites on which development is
still allowed and lower the value of undeveloped land and properties that might be profitably redeveloped (Fischel, 1990). This has been a major concern in respect of growth management systems. Restricting water extensions and setting urban limit lines may affect land values (Gleason et al., 1990). To date there has been no proper study in Saudi Arabia to measure the impact of urban growth boundaries on land prices and property rentals. The indications are that there has been no impact during the period 1990–1995. However, after 1995, when speculators came to know that lands in Phase II would not automatically become eligible for servicing, the prices of land in the second phase came down. The reason for this was that, at the time of devising urban growth boundaries, there was surplus housing in major cities and abundant subdivided land, both developed and undeveloped, in almost all the cities, but particularly in the five metropolitan areas. In view of surplus housing and subdivided lands it can be said that the Kingdom was in a unique situation to undertake the study and implement it without fear of price escalation. As 100 settlements were covered simultaneously there was also no danger of spill over effect. There have been some questions regarding the arbitrariness of the boundaries particularly from
those landowners whose lands were either fully or partially excluded by being on the boundary. This problem is related to the adjustment of boundary alignment with respect to land ownership. As the land ownership information was not available at the time of delineation of the boundaries this problem had to arise. On the other hand, the absence of land ownership information probably eliminated potential biases and pressures for the inclusion or exclusion of certain areas. These problems are now being resolved on a case-to-case basis by the municipalities in consultation with the DMTP. In some small towns, it is already being realized that the boundaries are too tight, resulting in
limited space for growth. This can be attributed to the absence of functional and economic base analysis, which was not undertaken due to time limitations and a lack of resources. This problem can be resolved through the revision of boundaries for which a procedure has been laid down. According to this, a technical committee located in MOMRA with representatives from various ministers may study the problems and make recommendations to the Council of Ministers through the Minister of MOMRA. The responsibility of technical solutions in the form of structure plans for much larger areas than that covered by the urban growth boundaries was also given to the MOMRA and these plans have since been prepared. The technical and institutional capability of the majority of the municipalities is very weak,
thereby creating difficulties with respect to the interpretation and implementation of the urban boundaries. The active involvement of the staff of the municipalities has been very useful for the
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implementation stage but it is not a substitute for adequate and qualified professionals. The result has been a much greater reliance on DMTP, thereby causing delays in the resolution of disputes between the municipalities and the developers. An important by-product of the study has been the collection of a very large amount of data.
With this in mind, DMTP has developed a format for a PC-based storage and retrieval system titled ‘‘Land Information System’’ (LIS), to be located in each municipality. Training of municipal staff was carried out to handle the system at the local level and it has been installed in a large number of municipalities while others are in the process of achieving it. An integral component of the system is updating procedure of the data on a regular basis. LIS has also been converted into GIS for selected settlements for the purposes of testing as well as demonstration. It is anticipated that the bulk of future growth will be directed within the two phases of the boundaries, therefore, the cities have to prepare themselves with respect to vacant areas within the boundaries to cope in a better manner with the pressure of development. Preparation of structure plans for all these settlements has been initiated and the program is nearing completion. Structure plans are essentially based on urban growth boundaries but covering much larger areas, thereby resolving the problems being faced in the implementation of boundaries. These plans are to be followed by local plans focusing on the resolution of specific issues of zoning, land use, urban design, traffic and others so a comprehensive planning system will be in place.
4. Evaluating the urban boundary project
The delineation of urban growth boundaries of 100 cities simultaneously is a major comprehensive attempt at the national level to control urban sprawl and promote efficiency in the urban system. This gigantic task was undertaken in a very short period of time with reliance on limited and unqualified staff of the municipalities. The non-availability of base maps and serious data gaps appeared to have further compounded the situation. In view of all the problems, some compromise on quality was inevitable. However, the final output, in the form of atlases and reports, was a significant contribution to Saudi planning system. The weakness on the technical side appears to have been more than compensated by the strong
backing of a centralized system of government. The approval of the study by the Council of Ministers sent a strong signal to all the national, regional and local authorities for extending an effective cooperation to MOMRA in carrying out the work. Similarly the approval of urban growth boundaries by the Council of Ministers gives a strong administrative and legal basis to the proposals, which is so essential for implementation. Furthermore, the government’s power for budgetary allocations to all the national, regional and local authorities strengthened the position of the central government in the effectuation of urban growth boundaries. The Saudi situation becomes unique for planning and implementation, whereby the administrative, legal, and financial authority has been effectively used in aid of the planning system. Although local authorities were actively involved in the process, there was no direct public
participation in devising urban growth boundaries that would have increased the acceptability at the level of the public, thereby eliminating some of the problems being faced by the municipalities in the implementation stage. This probably can be attributed to the absence of such institutions
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when the study was undertaken, even though they are now available through the introduction of the Provincial System. However there appears to have been active involvement of a large number of concerned functionaries at all the three levels of government. Even this extent of involvement was the first of its kind in the country and created an impact on the planning process in many ways. The evaluation of urban growth boundaries will be assessed against the stated objectives of (a)
control urban sprawl by encouraging infill development within the planned areas; (b) reduce cost of the provision of infrastructure through better coordination between its provision and urban development plan; and (c) maintain natural environment particularly around the cities through preservation measures. It appears that urban sprawl has been influenced through the urban growth boundaries in
number of direct and indirect ways. Firstly, the imposition of a moratorium for a 2-year period on the approval of new land subdivisions eliminated the prospective commitment of more lands for urban use irrespective of their locations. Experience in other places has shown detrimental effects if proper measures are not taken for the interim period during planning studies. Secondly, the introduction of urban protection zones around the cities was an effective check on the urban sprawl beyond Phase II. It also meant preservation of agricultural lands and the reservation of other vacant lands for future expansion. Thirdly, the approval of land subdivisions in Phase II, being tied to the provision of roads and public utilities by the developers, has been a big discouraging factor contributing to the control of sprawl. Wherever land subdivisions have been approved, as in case of Unaizah, a major town in Al Qassim region, the burden on the municipality for the provision of infrastructure has been shifted to the developer. Fourthly, the assigning of priority to the provision of public utilities and infrastructure to Phase I increased the attraction to subdivide and build in this phase as pointed out in case of Riyadh where utilization of serviced land, within Phase I, was accelerated. The success story of the three metropolitan areas Riyadh, Jeddah and Makkah is, however, questionable with respect to the approval and location of some new land subdivisions in Phase II without conditional ties. The boundaries could not be strictly enforced in the three metropolitan areas mainly due to ineffective local administration, which could not withstand the pressure from influential people having vested interests. But this does not mean that the boundaries have not had an impact on the development of these three metropolitan areas and the study of utilization of serviced land in Riyadh bears testimony to this effect. Certainly a more strict enforcement would have created much better results. One area of concern, in this regard appears to be the indiscriminate approval of agricultural subdivisions by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water on the fringes of some urban settlements. This problem is now being solved through the enforcement of the structure plans. Urban growth boundaries do provide a technical basis for the programming and
implementation of public utilities and services by all concerned agencies operating in the urban areas. These agencies have been directed by the Council of Ministers to focus on Phase I for the concentration of their programs. Thus, for the first time, provision of infrastructure has been effectively tied to the planning and multi-sectoral development in a coordinated manner. As the density is usually higher in the central areas of the cities, which are all covered by Phase I of urban growth boundaries, the utilization per unit length of public utilities is of much higher intensity, thereby increasing the efficiency. This approach, compared to the common scenes of lopsided extensions of utilities and road network in Saudi cities, is bound to yield better returns on
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investment. In addition, a more compact system of utilities and road networks is cheaper to maintain, implying long-term financial implications. The preservation of the natural environment has been attempted through the creation of the
urban protection zone after Phase II. It is not possible to leave huge areas vacant in the name of preservation, as there has to be economic use of land. However, efforts should be made to emphasize preservation of natural resources with particular focus on mountains, valleys, forests, agricultural areas and coastal zones. Even the type and intensity of development should be compatible with the natural environment. This has been an important consideration in the structure plans developed for all the cities covered by the urban growth boundaries. It can be seen from the preceding discussion that there has been realization of the three stated
objectives, although probably in varying degrees. Urban growth boundaries are not substitutes for comprehensive plans due to the difference in their objectives, but the boundaries do provide a basis for the provision of utilities and services by the public agencies. The provision of utilities by the government on a no-cost basis and the facility of interest-free loans for house building are two powerful tools available to Saudi authorities that if effectively used can bring a desirable change in the national urban landscape. Attention also needs to be focused on the accelerated utilization of vacant serviced areas within Phase I for which additional fiscal and legal measures may be required to force the landowners for early use instead of holding them for speculation purposes for indefinite periods of time. Such measures are being practiced in some other countries with positive results.
5. In conclusion, longer run benefits of the effort
In addition to the realization of intended objectives, the undertaking of the study and its implementation has made very significant contribution in some other areas relating to the planning process in the country. The intensive and extensive involvement of national, regional and local authorities, from the Council of ministers to the mayor of a small municipality, has created a wide spread planning awareness in the country. This has laid a good foundation for the planning profession in the country. The awareness of spatial planning, particularly at the decision-making level, will go a long way in promoting the profession and ensuring its sustainability. The DMTP as well as the municipal staff has gained very useful on-the-job training by doing
and being involved in all stages of the exercise. The experience gained in the process is also helping in the interpretation and implementation of the boundaries. It should also be quite beneficial in the preparation of spatial plans in the future and in carrying out of day-to-day activities of the municipalities. The generation of large amounts of data pertaining to 100 settlements is another significant
outcome of the study and these data have been used by many agencies in the country. Proper storage of the data under LIS, at the municipality level, will play a very important role not only in daily activities of the municipalities but will also be a crucial input in all the future spatial planning studies. Furthermore municipalities can use LIS as a tool for collaboration and co- ordination with other agencies operating in the urban areas. The establishment of LIS should be followed vigorously in view of its wider use. LIS converted into GIS will strengthen the planning process in the country and help streamline decision-making relating to urban development.
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- Urban growth management-the Saudi experience
- Introduction: establishing the national context
- Delineation of urban growth boundaries
- Concept and scope
- Methodology
- Data collection and analysis
- Devising urban growth boundaries
- Review and approval procedure
- Implementation issues
- Evaluating the urban boundary project
- In conclusion, longer run benefits of the effort
- References
resource/4 control urban sprawl.pdf
Cities, Vol. 23, No. 5, p. 353–363, 2006
� 2006 Elsevier Ltd.
*Correspo ch@livjm.
All rights reserved.
0264-2751/$ - see front matter
www.elsev
doi:10.1016/j.cities.2006.05.003
Controlling urban sprawl: Some experiences from Liverpool Chris Couch * and Jay Karecha School of the Built Environment, Liverpool John Moores University, Peter Jost Centre, Byrom Street, Liverpool L3 3AF, UK
Received 10 August 2005; received in revised form 28 February 2006; accepted 22 May 2006
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The control of urban sprawl is one of the key issues challenging planners in many countries. Whilst a substantial discourse has developed in North America, it is also a matter of key con- cern for British and European planners, although here the debate is often expressed in terms of urban containment and the search for compact cities. This article considers the develop- ment of policies for the control of urban sprawl within the British planning system and exam- ines their implementation and effectiveness within one city region: the Liverpool conurbation. Despite the considerable achievements of British policy in controlling urban sprawl and encouraging urban regeneration over the last two decades, there remain some doubts as to how much further market forces can be directed towards the production of more compact cit- ies. In particular, a number of commentators, notably Breheny [Urban compaction: feasible and acceptable? Cities 14 (1997) 209–217], have raised doubts about the feasibility and accept- ability of urban compaction to populations whose main housing location aspiration is for sub- urban living. Evidence in this paper is drawn from the analysis of secondary data for the Liverpool conurbation as well as the results of surveys of recently moving households carried out by the authors. This evidence suggests that despite recent progress, these market forces continue to represent a major challenge to policy makers in promoting the compact city. � 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Urban sprawl, compact city, Liverpool
Introduction
This paper considers the success of contemporary English policies for the control of urban sprawl and the extent to which further urban containment may be possible or desirable without detrimental so- cial impacts. After a brief discussion of the evolution of policy, the success of policies to control urban sprawl within England and the Liverpool conurba- tion in particular is considered. This is followed by presentation and discussion of findings from a study of the Liverpool conurbation, which suggests that the scope for further urban containment may be lim- ited and with more social consequences than have so far been acknowledged by policy makers.
nding author. Tel.: +44-151-231-2810. e-mail: c.r.cou ac.uk.
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Much of the literature and debate on urban sprawl has been based upon experience in the United States (Galster et al., 2001; Peiser, 2001; Squires, 2002; for example). In this debate urban sprawl has been de- fined as:
‘‘a pattern of land use in an urbanised area that exhibits low levels of some combination of eight dis- tinct dimensions: density, continuity, concentration,
clustering, centrality, nuclearity, mixed uses and proximity’’ (Galster et al., 2001, p. 685).
Or as Peiser (2001, p. 278) suggests:
‘‘the term is used variously to mean the gluttonous use of land, uninterrupted monotonous development,
leapfrog discontinuous development and inefficient use of land’’.
However, urban sprawl is not exclusively a North American phenomenon. As Richardson and Bae (2004) suggest, many of the trends observed in the
Controlling urban sprawl: Some experiences from Liverpool: C Couch and J Karecha
USA, such as the growth of suburban lifestyles, can also be seen in Europe. Furthermore, many North American policies, such as the renaissance of city centres, mixed-use urban regeneration programmes in the inner cities and growth boundaries to control sprawl, find their equivalents in European, and par- ticularly, British planning policy. Notions of the compact city and the control of urban sprawl are the subject of a substantial and growing discourse amongst British and European commentators on planning. Much of this debate is summarised in the work of Williams et al. (2000), Adams and Watkins (2002), Houghton and Counsell (2004), Dieleman and Wegener (2004) and Couch et al. (2005). But ur- ban sprawl may be regarded not simply as a pattern of urbanisation, but as the process of urban change through which the urban area is extended and den- sity gradients reduced (Couch et al., 2005). Diel- eman and Wegener suggest that causes of urban sprawl can be grouped into two categories: the gen- eral drift of socio-economic change in developed societies and government spatial planning policies and conclude that in the absence of strong planning intervention at the regional and local level further urban deconcentration is likely (Dieleman and We- gener, 2004, pp. 316–320).
Controlling this process of urban sprawl has been a major concern of town planning in Britain throughout the 20th century (Williams, 2004). How- ever, the success of early legislation was limited as between 1922 and 1939 there was a 40% increase in the total urban area of the country (Ward, 1994, p. 49). In the post-war period urban sprawl contin- ued: urban populations fell as cleared areas were re- built at lower densities and many cleared households were moved out to new peripheral council estates, expanded towns and new towns. At the same time economic growth combined with low interest rates supported a boom in speculative building for owner occupied suburban development.
By the 1970s urban sprawl was not only seen as an inefficient pattern of urbanisation but also as a phe- nomenon that damaged the inner cities and there- fore needing to be brought under stronger control (DOE, 1977). This new tougher policy linking the control of urban sprawl with urban regeneration was typified by Merseyside County Council, then responsible for strategic planning of the Liverpool conurbation, who proposed to:
Concentrate investment and development within the urban county and particularly in those areas with the most acute problems, enhancing the environment and encouraging housing and economic expansion
on derelict and disused sites. It would restrict devel- opment on the edge of the built-up areas to a mini- mum. There would be a reciprocal effort to
enhance and conserve the natural features of the county’s open land. . . (Merseyside County Council, 1975, p. 8, quoted in Couch, 2003).
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Despite its commitment to urban regeneration, throughout the 1980s, the Government continued to require local planning authorities to ensure a five-year supply of developable housing land. This ‘predict and provide’ method of determining the amount of land for housing had the effect of requir- ing constant additions to the amount of rural land zoned for future urbanisation on the periphery of cities whilst putting no pressure on developers to consider previously developed urban sites: it encour- aged urban sprawl, particularly in areas without ‘green belt’ protection (DOE, 1980 and 1984).
In response to the emerging environmental agen- da, by the end of the 1980s policy began to change (Cabinet Office, 1990). The Government published a series of Planning Policy Guidance Notes (PPGs). One of the most important affecting urban sprawl was PPG3 ‘Housing’. First published in 1988 and modified in 1992 this document retained the ‘predict and provide’ approach in order to ensure ‘a contin- uous supply of housing land which addressed market demand’ but in a concession to the environmental agenda there was the ‘encouragement of local authorities to make optimum use of brownfield sites’. By the mid-1990s this policy was strengthened when the Government declared a target of at least 50% of all new housing being built on previously developed urban land.
But it was the ‘new’ Labour Government, elected in 1997, that was to go furthest in strengthening pol- icy. The Government commissioned a report, ‘To- wards an Urban Renaissance’ (Urban Task Force, 1999) which called for the development of ‘compact cities’ characterised by higher density, more mixed use, development. Many of these ideas were taken up in the ‘Urban White Paper’ (DETR, 2000a). A revised PPG3 ‘Housing’ published in 2000 moved away from ‘predict and provide’ to a more sophisti- cated approach to housing land allocations and re- lease known as ‘plan, monitor and manage’. The new policy called for a ‘sequential’ approach to the release of housing land in which local planning authorities were provided with housing supply tar- gets and asked only to ‘provide sufficient land, giving priority to re-using previously developed land within urban areas. . .. in preference to the development of greenfield sites’. New housing schemes were also ex- pected to achieve higher net residential densities than hitherto and by 2008, 60% of additional hous- ing should be provided on previously-developed land (DETR, 2000b).
However, there are regional differences that affect the feasibility of meeting this target. In the northern regions, including the Liverpool conurbation, there is a legacy of industrial decline that has provided a large amount of previously developed urban land capable of redevelopment for housing. At the same time the anticipated growth in households is modest. In contrast, the South East of England, outside Lon- don, has not experienced significant urban decline
Controlling urban sprawl: Some experiences from Liverpool: C Couch and J Karecha
and has relatively little previously developed land available, whilst population is expected to increase by 12.8% between 1996 and 2021 (ODPM, 2006).
Success in controlling urban sprawl?
So, how successful have been recent Government policies to control urban sprawl and create more compact cities in conurbations such as Liverpool? The Liverpool (Merseyside) conurbation in North West England was, at the beginning of the 20th cen- tury, the second most important port in England. Population reached a zenith of around 1.8 million in mid-century but from the 1960s economic decline and urban restructuring brought about a dramatic reversal of fortune and a fall in the population of the conurbation to a low point of around 1.4 million in 2001. Despite these economic changes, the urban area continued to sprawl until, in the 1980s, a com- bination of stronger restrictions on peripheral devel- opment (see the changes in national policy above) and the implementation of vigorous policies for ur- ban regeneration, brought this decline under control (Couch, 2003; Munck, 2003). Since the millennium there have been some signs of recovery in the local economy, and some stabilisation in population change (Liverpool City Council, 2005a; Office for National Statistics, 2005). Today virtually all housing developments occur within the existing urban area and in this sense urban sprawl is under control.
Figure 1 The Liverpool conurbation.
The conurbation therefore provides an interesting case study of urban sprawl.
Three indicators are helpful in measuring success in controlling urban sprawl. Green Belts have been an important planning policy instrument since the mid- 1950s. Where they have been applied they seem to have been quite effective in limiting urban sprawl (DOE, 1993). Retention of land in Green Belts gives an indication of commitment to maintaining urban boundaries. Measuring the proportion of new dwell- ings built on previously developed land (i.e. within existing urban areas) indicates the success of policy in achieving a ‘sequential’ approach to the release of land for development. The third indicator – the den- sity and type of new dwellings – provides a measure of success in achieving more compact urban areas.
Data for the Liverpool conurbation are presented by local authority area, divided into a core area, comprising those authorities contained within the former Merseyside County area, and an outer ring of adjoining authorities (see Figure 1).
Historically, the inner areas of Liverpool, south Sefton and east Wirral have been those most af- fected by economic restructuring and population loss. North Sefton, Knowsley, St. Helens, west Wir- ral, Ellesmere Port & Neston, Halton and West Lan- cashire all saw substantial population growth and urban sprawl during the second half of the 20th cen- tury, although more recently this has been brought under tighter control.
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Table 1 The size and loss of land from Green Belts
Area Green Belt 1997 (ha) Green Belt 2003 (ha) Gain or loss of land (ha)
Liverpool conurbation (core) Liverpool 540 540 Knowsley 4660 4660 St. Helens 8880 8880 Sefton 8110 8110 Wirral 7490 7330 �160 Outer ring Ellesmere Port & Neston 3450 3450 Halton 2500 2500 West Lancashire 32,100 32,090 �10 North West Region 255,760 260,610 +4850 England 1,652,300 1,671,600 +19,300
Source: ODPM (2003, Table 2), ODPM (2005).
Table 2 The percentage of new dwellings on previously devel- oped land
Area 1996–99 (%) 2000–03 (%)
Liverpool conurbation (core) Liverpool 89 92 Knowsley 77 74 St. Helens 73 80 Sefton 89 97 Wirral 87 85
Outer ring Ellesmere Port & Neston 29 66 Halton 38 51 West Lancashire 59 70
North West Region 61 70 England 55 65
Source: ODPM (2005, Tables 2 and 3).
Table 3 Density of dwellings built per hectare (dph) (Net residential density)
Area 1996–99 (dph) 2000–03 (dph)
Liverpool conurbation (core) Knowsley 26 29 Liverpool 35 44 St. Helens 26 25 Sefton 28 29 Wirral 31 31
Outer ring Ellesmere Port & Neston 17 26 Halton 23 22 West Lancashire 18 24
North West Region 25 29 England 25 28
Source: ODPM (2005, Tables 6 and 8).
Controlling urban sprawl: Some experiences from Liverpool: C Couch and J Karecha
Table 1 shows national and local trends in the maintenance of Green Belt land. Nationally, the area of land included in Green Belts has increased slightly as local planning authorities have strength- ened the protection of open land when reviewing their development plans in line with advice con- tained in Planning Policy Guidance Note 2. ‘Green Belts’. This guidance states that the essential charac- teristic of Green Belts is their permanence and that once the general extent of a Green Belt has been ap- proved it should be altered only in exceptional cir-
Table 4 Proportion of new dwellings by size (no. of bedrooms) and y
1997/98 1998/99 199
% of all dwellings built as houses 88 85 84 % of all dwellings built with 1 bedroom 5 6 8 2 bedrooms 22 23 26 3 bedrooms 49 43 39 4 or more bedrooms 24 28 28
Source: ODPM Housing Statistics, Table 252, 2005. NB: The data refers to housing completions in all housing tenures. Numb in England. Unlike many other European countries, in England no co available.
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cumstances (ODPM, 2001). Despite minor local variations within the Liverpool conurbation, most local authorities have taken a strong line in main- taining the amount of land designated as Green Belt. However, the picture is not quite a simple as might appear, for despite strong control, some land within Green Belts has been developed. Between 1998 and 2001 in the North West Region and in England, respectively, 15% and 11% of all development of previously undeveloped land occurred within Green Belts (ODPM, 2003, Table E.4). Furthermore, be-
ear, North West England 1997–2004
9/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05
80 75 80 73 61 7 6 3 5 6
26 24 21 26 38 39 28 36 34 30 28 42 39 36 27
er of bedrooms represents the best proxy indicator of dwelling size mprehensive data on dwelling floorspace or plot area are easily
Controlling urban sprawl: Some experiences from Liverpool: C Couch and J Karecha
tween 2000 and 2003 in England around 270 ha of Green Belt land was developed for residential pur- poses each year (ODPM, 2005, Table 6). The seem- ing incompatibility between these two pieces of data is explained partly by the fact that some develop- ment has occurred within existing buildings within Green Belts, e.g. conversion of farm buildings to res- idential use; and in some other cases mitigation has occurred whereby land lost to development has been replaced by other land added to the Green Belt.
Table 2 provides an indication of the success of policy in encouraging the re-use of urban land. Many urban areas in the North West Region have experi- enced industrial restructuring that has left a legacy of vacant urban land. As indicated above the poten- tial for the control of urban sprawl is greater in the northern regions than in the South and South East of the country. Hence, the performance of the North West region is significantly better than the national average. The Liverpool conurbation illustrates one of the most extreme cases where the availability of large amounts of vacant and derelict land has coin- cided with a relatively weak housing demand to en- able a very high proportion of new residential development to be directed to previously developed land (Couch, 1988).
The third indicator of the effectiveness of compac- tion policy is the density of development. PPG3 sets out density targets for new housing development of between 30 and 50 dwellings per hectare net (DETR, 2000b, para 58).
Table 3 shows good progress in raising densities both locally and nationally. There has also been a change in the type of dwellings built as many devel- opers are building a lower proportion of houses and an increasing proportion of flats. Table 4 shows trends in the North West region.
Recent years have seen a steady decline in the production of traditional 3-bedroomed houses as developers have moved in two directions. Some pro- duction has moved ‘upmarket’, increasing the pro- portion of houses built with 4 or more bedrooms, in response to consumer demand for ‘trading up’ within the housing market to bigger and more expensive dwellings. The second trend has been an increase in the proportion of flats being built as households continue to get smaller (from 3.42 per- sons per household in 1961 to 2.34 pph in 2001 in Liverpool (Census of Population)), with a growing number of single and two person adult households. A significant proportion of this change has been cre- ated through a growing demand amongst some smal- ler households for ‘living in the city’. Since the mid 1990s this trend has seen the population of Liverpool City Centre rise from 2340 in 1991 to around 12,000 today, mainly accommodated in new one or two bedroomed flats (Liverpool City Council, 2005a,b).
In combination these indicators show good pro- gress, both nationally and especially within the Liv- erpool conurbation. Today the rate at which urban
sprawl is occurring in Britain is more constrained by policy than at any time over the last century. However, an important issue is whether these poli- cies can remain effective into the future and whether they should be strengthened to reduce urban sprawl still further and encourage more of the compact ur- ban development that the Government now favour. This issue is explored in the next section.
Can and should urban sprawl be restricted further?
Despite the apparent acceptance of a prima facie relationship between more compact cities and sus- tainable development, there are some who have raised doubts. Adams and Watkins (2002) summa- rise the arguments of those such as Lock (1991), Troy (1996) and the Town and Country Planning Association (1997) who are sceptical about the robustness of the arguments in favour of more com- pact cities, the feasibility of their achievement and their acceptability. Breheny (1997) in particular has raised doubts about the feasibility and accept- ability of urban compaction. Using evidence from Hedges and Clemens (1994) and Green et al. (1996) he suggests that in relation to housing loca- tion and form: ‘people aspire to the very opposite of the compact city. . . there is a clear clash between the high-density aspirations of the compactionists and the desires of local communities to protect their quality of life’ (Breheny, 1997, p. 216). Williams (2004, pp. 45–51) provides further evidence of a lim- ited demand for urban renaissance: a gap in attitudes to urban living between planners and households. Not only does the presence of such attitudes make compaction difficult to achieve, it also raises ques- tions about the validity of a government policy that ‘forces’ a particular urban form on a reluctant pub- lic. On the other hand, Jenks (2000, pp. 242–250) suggests that intensification can be acceptable but only in certain situations and with solutions that are responsive to local circumstances and stake- holder concerns.
Burton (2001) has concluded that higher density urban form (the compact city) could have negative impacts on four aspects of social equity including less domestic space, lack of affordable housing, in- creased crime levels and lower levels of walking and cycling, but can offer benefits in improved pub- lic transport use, reduced social segregation and bet- ter access to facilities. Using a very different approach, our own analysis below also considers, in- ter alia, the impact of sprawl or compaction on many of these same issues.
This section provides some further evidence on these issues. A survey was carried out in a sector of the Liverpool conurbation, stretching from the in- ner urban core to the periphery of the conurbation. The objective of this survey was to find out whether there were any differences in the influences on housing
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Table 5 The reasons for moving from the previous address
All movers to/within the urban core
All movers to/within the suburbs/periphery
Home too small 15.3% 24.4% Home too large 4.8% 13.2% No garden/garden too small
10.5% 13.2%
Crime levels 22.6% 15.6% Quality of schools 10.5% 9.3% Noise or air pollution 16.9% 10.7% Traffic intrusion 16.1% 9.3% Lack of greenery 10.5% 7.3% Neighbours/social problems 26.6% 14.6% Change in place of work 14.5% 8.8% Wish to change tenure 16.9% 6.8% Wish to ‘trade-up’ in the housing market
10.5% 27.8%
Wish to set up first home 22.6% 12.2% Relationship breakdown 20.2% 5.4% Change in household size 11.3% 21.5%
n = 124 n = 203
Source: Author’s survey. NB: For clarity the table only shows the percentage of times a factor was ‘very important’ or ‘crucial’. The top three factors in each column are in bold.
Controlling urban sprawl: Some experiences from Liverpool: C Couch and J Karecha
location decisions, and the housing satisfaction ob- tained, between people moving to the higher density urban core (or ‘compact city’) and those moving to the lower density suburban and peripheral areas (or ‘urban sprawl’).
Within the Liverpool conurbation the Borough of Wirral was selected as the research location because both higher density inner areas and lower density areas of sprawl could be found within the same local authority, thereby removing from the location deci- sion any potential influence of differences in local taxation, public spending policies or regulations. A secondary reason was the availability, from the local authority, of robust data on residential devel- opment in recent years. The Borough of Wirral has a population of 312,000 (Census of Population, 2001). The east side of the Borough facing the river Mersey and including the older industrial towns of Birkenhead and Wallasey (the ‘urban core’) can be contrasted with the west side that faces the Dee estuary and comprises a number of attractive com- muter settlements such as Heswall, Hoylake and West Kirby (the ‘suburbs and periphery’).
The survey covered a stratified sample of all households that had moved into newly constructed dwellings in selected wards over the period 1997– 2001. The wards selected form a continuous sector from the inner core of the conurbation to the periph- ery. A postal questionnaire was addressed to all heads of household in the 1195 new dwellings that had been completed between 1997 and 2001. In all 327 completed questionnaires were returned: a re- sponse rate of 27.4%.
Social influences on urban sprawl
Table 5 summarises the reasons for moving: why householders left their previous address. Respon- dents were asked to weight the importance of each factor on a scale: 1 = irrelevant, 2 = of slight impor- tance, 3 = fairly important, 4 = very important, 5 = crucial. The table shows the percentage of times a factor was weighted very important or crucial to the location decision.
Table 6 summarises the factors influencing the choice of location. Respondents were asked to weight the importance of each factor on a scale: 1 = irrelevant, 2 = of slight importance, 3 = fairly important, 4 = very important, 5 = crucial. The table shows the percentage of times a factor was weighted very important or crucial to the location decision.
In combination these two tables illustrate the emergence of two quite different pictures. House- holds are tending to move into or within the urban core in order to move away from bad neighbours, so- cial problems or crime. There is also a tendency to move at a time of setting up a first home or on the breakdown of a relationship. On the other hand households moving into or within the suburbs and periphery have a greater tendency to cite changing
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household size, the inadequate size of the existing home or garden and a desire to ‘trade-up’ to a more expensive home as reasons for moving. This presents a different picture of more affluent households mak- ing housing life-cycle decisions in which the dwelling is, in part, perceived as an investment good.
It can be seen that most movers in both areas re- gard a low crime and quiet neighbourhood as being one of the key influences on their location decision. Proximity of friends or family is also an important influence, as are good road connections. Movers to the suburbs and periphery also point to the proxim- ity of the countryside or coast as an important influ- ence, whereas movers to the inner areas place more importance on the affordability of housing and the proximity of convenience shopping.
Life cycle also has an important influence on choice of location. Whilst all age groups sought quiet and low crime neighbourhoods, movers under 34 years showed more concern for housing affordabil- ity, whereas many of those over 60 years identified good road connections, the proximity of shops, countryside/coast, friends or family, as important considerations.
These findings have consequences for the process of urban sprawl. If the suburbs and urban periphery are perceived as being lower in crime and quieter than the urban core, this suggests that housing demand in the Liverpool conurbation contains a locational preference for the outer areas. The impor- tance of the investment motive suggests that purchasers are likely to have a preference for prop- erties with the most potential for future price in-
Table 6 Factors influencing the choice of location
Factor All movers to/within the urban core
All movers to/within the suburbs/periphery
Movers aged under 34 years: all areas
Movers aged over 60 years: all areas
Near place of work 28.2% 12.2% 31.3% 6.6% Near food shopping places 41.9% 29.3% 22.5% 56.0% Near other shopping places 26.6% 18.5% 18.8% 34.1% Near to leisure places 17.7% 14.1% 20.0% 16.5% Near to areas of countryside/coast 18.5% 53.2% 23.8% 52.7% Having good road connections 41.1% 43.4% 31.3% 57.1% Near a railway station 30.6% 33.7% 26.3% 42.9% In an area with good bus links 39.5% 32.7% 22.5% 54.9% In a low crime neighbourhood 58.1% 72.2% 60.0% 70.3% In an area with good schools 23.4% 27.8% 28.8% 9.9% Near to friends or family 43.5% 40.5% 37.5% 51.6% In a quiet neighbourhood 54.8% 69.3% 52.5% 68.1% In an affordable housing area 58.1% 41.0% 52.5% 42.9% Near to a park 16.9% 14.1% 15.0% 18.7%
n = 124 n = 203 n = 80 n = 91
Source: Authors’ survey. NB: For clarity the table only shows the percentage of times a factor was ‘very important’ or ‘crucial’. The top three factors in each column are in bold.
Controlling urban sprawl: Some experiences from Liverpool: C Couch and J Karecha
creases and profit. There is evidence to suggest that such properties are more likely to be found in the outer areas (see below). Contrasting pressures can be found in changes to the traditional family life-cy- cle. With falling average household size and a growth in single adult households there is an emerg- ing counter-trend towards re-urbanisation. Our sur- vey found over 40% of movers to the inner areas were single adult households compared with only 16% of movers to the suburbs and urban periphery.
As the conurbation sprawled through the 20th century, so the spatial segregation of social classes increased. Despite some counteracting policies this trend towards increased segregation seems to be continuing. The proportion of social housing (allo- cated according to need) is in long term decline,
Table 7 House price changes: percentage increase in the average prices of semi-detached houses in Wirral wards, 1995–2004
Postcode district 1995 2004 % Increase 1995–2004
Urban core CH41 Birkenhead £30,378 £74,851 +146% CH42 Tranmere/Prenton £37,892 £107,743 +184% CH43 Noctorum £53,540 £147,285 +175% CH44 Wallasey £41,174 £106,482 +159% CH45 New Brighton £53,852 £142,628 +165%
Suburbs/periphery CH46 Moreton £42,544 £118,044 +177% CH47 Hoylake £66,509 £214,092 +222% CH48 West Kirby £63,145 £191,780 +204% CH49 Greasby/Upton £46,819 £128,322 +174% CH60 Heswall £70,048 £193,486 +176% CH61 Irby/Pensby £52,044 £150,164 +189% CH62 Bromborough £45,692 £118,938 +160% CH63 Bebington £53,369 £149,687 +180%
Source: Land Registry Data.
whilst the proportion of housing allocated through the market, particularly for sale to owner occupiers, has steadily increased. Owner occupation in the Liv- erpool conurbation [former County of Merseyside] increased from 52% of all households in 1981 to 65% of all households in 2001 (Census of Popula- tion, 2001). Furthermore, it is in the sprawling subur- ban and perpheral wards of west Wirral, such as Thurstaston (87.3%), Royden (90.2%) and Heswall (90.4%) where owner occupation is at its highest, and in some parts of the urban core, such as Birken- head (33.2%) and Tranmere (44.9%), where owner occupation is at its lowest. In consequence, over the last thirty years, the ability to pay has gradually become a more important determinant of household location.
Using data from the Land Registry and taking a standardised dwelling type (semi-detached houses1), an analysis of variations in the increase in value of housing between postcode districts (neighbour- hoods) is given in Table 7.
Even at the beginning of the period the highest house prices were found in the peripheral postcode districts of CH47 Hoylake, CH48 West Kirby and CH60 Heswall, making it difficult for those on the lowest incomes to access private housing in these locations. Looking at the last decade, the lowest price rises are found in the heart of the urban core in CH41 Birkenhead and Ch44 Wallasey. The some- what higher prices rises in CH42 Tranmere/Prenton and CH43 Noctorum probably reflect the fact that the boundaries of these districts include mature
1Using a standardised dwelling type enables comparisons to be made between districts. Median prices across the whole stock would give a distorted picture as the mix of dwelling types varies between districts and changes over time.
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Table 9 Social contact and social life
Urban core
Suburbs/ periphery
Proportion of respondents who could name a next-door or same-floor neighbour
87.2% 94.8%
Controlling urban sprawl: Some experiences from Liverpool: C Couch and J Karecha
sought-after inner-suburbs. Price rises in the major- ity of the suburbs and periphery are higher than those found in the urban core. The notable excep- tion is CH62 Bromborough. The explanation for the low rise shown here may be connected to the large numbers of semi-detached houses available in the district and the high proportion of former social housing within that market sector. The general con- clusion from this data is that over the period 1995– 2004 those on lower incomes are likely to have become more excluded from those postcode districts with high initial prices and higher than average price rises, particularly CH47 Hoylake and CH48 West Kirby.
Having established that neighbourhood character- istics (quietude, environmental quality and low lev- els of crime) were an important influence on the choice of location, a second survey was undertaken to find out what these recent movers felt about their new environment, i.e. whether it met their expecta- tions. This survey covered the same stratified sample and yielded 290 completed questionnaires: a re- sponse rate of 24.3%.
The first issue to be considered was the extent to which living in the urban core might be less pleasant than the suburbs and periphery. Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which certain matters were problematic. Table 8 gives the results.
None of these social or environmental problems appear to be very serious problems for residents anywhere in the survey area. Nevertheless, suburban and peripheral residents reported a lower level of problems than those in the urban core in every cat- egory. It is notable that the most problematic fea- tures of living in the urban core are drug abuse (the most serious), the other ‘crime’ categories and traffic noise. This confirms the logic of households justifying their moves to the suburbs and periphery on the basis that ‘peace and quiet’ and a ‘low crime area’ were important criteria.
The second issue was whether the lower density suburbs and periphery would be ‘less friendly’ and
Table 8 Local social and environmental problems
Problem or intrusion Urban core Suburbs/periphery
Noise from traffic 2.0 1.6 Noise from industry 1.3 1.1 Noise from neighbours 1.8 1.3 Car crime 1.9 1.4 Burglary 2.1 1.4 Vandalism 2.0 1.5 Personal safety 2.3 1.3 Drug abuse 2.7 1.4 Poor air quality 1.9 1.5 Light pollution 1.7 1.2 Neighbour disputes 1.5 1.2
Source: Authors’ survey. NB: The data record the mean response for the area on a five- point scale. 1 = no problem, 2 = minor problem, 3 = moderate problem, 4 = serious problem, 5 = very serious problem.
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more socially isolating than the higher density inner area. It has been suggested that areas of urban sprawl do not foster a sense of community. It is ar- gued that here there is less opportunity for social contact and interaction. Power suggests that at cur- rent suburban densities car use becomes essential, thereby minimizing social contact (Power, 2001, p. 735). Respondents were asked whether they could name their neighbours, how many acquaintances they had in the neighbourhood and the extent to which their social life was based upon their neigh- bourhood, work, personal interests or family (see Table 9).
The overwhelming majority of respondents from all areas knew at least one neighbour by name. Regarding the question of knowing people within the wider neighbourhood the difference between the urban core and suburbs is greater with stronger evidence of community coming from the suburban and peripheral area. The data also show that in both the urban core and suburban areas family and per- sonal interests are more important bases for social life than are work or the neighbourhood. This sug- gests that the neighbourhood, its location, density and form do not appear to be the most important determinants of community or social life.
Finally, residents were asked if they thought that their neighbourhood was improving, staying the same or getting worse. The answers are given in Table 10.
Urban core residents were more likely than resi- dents in the suburbs and periphery to say that their neighbourhood was changing but were quite divided as to whether the area was improving or getting
Respondents knowing less than 10 acquaintances within approximately 200 m of their home
67.5% 49.7%
Respondents knowing between 11 and 20 acquaintances within approximately 200 m of their home
26.5% 33.9%
Respondents knowing more than 20 acquaintances within approximately 200 m of their home
6.0% 16.4%
Social life mainly based around the neighbourhood
2.0 2.4
Social life mainly based around work 2.1 1.9 Social life mainly based around personal interests
2.9 3.0
Social life mainly based around the family 3.8 3.6
Source: authors’ survey. NB: Responses were on a five-point scale with 5 being the most positive response and 1 being the most negative. Hence the response of 3.8 is the strongest response shown here and 1.9 the weakest.
Table 10 Perceptions of future prospects for neighbourhoods
Proportion of residents saying their neighbourhood is:
Urban core Suburbs/periphery
Improving 28.2% 17.2% Staying the same 53.0% 74.6% Getting worse 18.8% 8.3%
Source: Authors’ survey.
Controlling urban sprawl: Some experiences from Liverpool: C Couch and J Karecha
worse. This may have been influenced by the more heterogeneous range of neighbourhoods in the ur- ban core. It may be that whilst regeneration policies and investments are having a positive effect on some neighbourhoods, other are feeling negative conse- quences or are simply being by-passed by improve- ments. Confidence in the future stability or improvement of an area is a vital underpinning to the market for housing as an investment good. The evidence here is that the suburbs and periphery are perceived as a more secure place than the urban core in which to make a housing investment.
Conclusions
There is little doubt that urban sprawl in Britain is being brought under strong planning control and that this has been particularly effective in the large northern conurbations such as Liverpool. Whether policy can go much further in promoting compact and contained cities without adverse social conse- quences depends in part upon the extent to which this ambition coincides with changes in housing demand.
The problem is that much housing demand seems to favour urban sprawl. Our research suggests that being in a low crime and quiet neighbourhood were amongst the most frequently cited influences on household location decisions in all areas and across all age groups. So long as the suburbs and periphery are perceived as lower in crime, quieter and nearer the countryside than other areas, demand for sprawl will continue. Age and household structure clearly have implications for urban sprawl. The elderly identified many more very important or crucial influ- ences on household location decisions than younger age groups. Only smaller adult households seem likely to favour the urban core.
Housing cost appears to be a key influence on the demand for urban sprawl in two ways. Firstly, partic- ularly in the urban core, being in an area of afford- able housing was a frequently cited influence on choice. On the other hand, amongst movers to the suburbs and periphery, ‘trading-up’ was the most fre- quently cited reason for moving. This conforms with the notion of owner occupied housing being, at least in part, an investment good and suggests that the expectation of future price rises may well stimulate demand in the suburbs and urban periphery. Whilst
we acknowledge that this finding might, in part, be influenced by the changing economic status or size of some households and that the situation in Liver- pool might be different from elsewhere, we would nevertheless argue that it is a sufficiently strong point that it justifies further research.
Many suburban and peripheral areas, and espe- cially some of the most sought after areas of sprawl, have become more dominated by private housing allocated through market mechanisms rather than housing need. According to our analysis, house prices have risen faster in these areas. Thus, in the face of continuing strong demand, contemporary Government policies that limit housing supply in these most favoured peripheral locations are likely to have the effect of accelerating dwelling price in- creases in those areas ahead of those in the rest of the conurbation. The natural consequence of these trends, if they continue, will be increased spatial so- cial segregation. Burton (2001, p. 1986) found that where there was a large proportion of high density housing, segregation tended to be low. Density seemed to be a key factor in limiting segregation, i.e. segregation would be less across the whole of a more compact city. Our point is slightly different: what we are suggesting is that, if present trends con- tinue, in the Liverpool conurbation at least, there could be growing social segregation between the compact urban core and the sprawling suburbs/ periphery.
Although we found no serious social or environ- mental problems identified by residents in any loca- tion, there were some problematic features of living in the urban core, notably traffic intrusion and cer- tain types of crime. This confirms the logic of households justifying their moves to the suburbs on the basis that ‘peace and quiet’ and a ‘low crime area’ were important criteria. This is compatible with Burton (2001, p. 1985) who also found that de- spite arguments that higher population densities in- crease surveillance and reduce vulnerability to crime, home contents insurance rates (a powerful indicator of risk of crime) were higher in more compact cities.
The overwhelming majority of suburban residents thought their neighbourhood would stay the same or improve in the future. Residents of the urban core were more divided in their opinions about the fu- ture, which may reflect the more heterogeneous nat- ure of the urban core. There is no evidence from our surveys to suggest that urban sprawl or the location, density, or form of the neighbourhood, are the most important determinants of community or social life in the Liverpool conurbation. This presents a some- what different perspective to that expressed by Power (2001, p. 735) who suggests that current den- sities minimise social contact and undermine social institutions. The impact of sprawl upon social segre- gation and social life is clearly an area where further exploration would be useful.
361
Controlling urban sprawl: Some experiences from Liverpool: C Couch and J Karecha
Policy implications
Our findings support the views of Breheny (1997) and others that many households find it very attrac- tive to live in lower density sprawling peripheral locations and are unlikely to find many of the fea- tures that they value within the inner urban core. However, in addition to this we would argue that the perception of owner occupied housing as both a consumption good and an investment good adds another dimension to the equation that has yet to be adequately considered in national and regional planning policy.
This view of owner-occupied housing partially as an investment good and the greater financial gains to be made from the purchase of housing in sought-after peripheral locations is also likely to lead to continued increases in housing demand and further price rises in those locations and encourage developers to increase supply. This puts pressure on the planning system and makes implementation of restraint policies more difficult to achieve. How- ever, as we have indicated, the Government is very strongly committed to the restriction of urban sprawl. In consequence this increasing demand for house purchase at the periphery is more likely to lead to further price rises within the existing stock than to any significant increase in that stock. This can only further fuel the processes of spatial social segregation as these locations become home to an ever narrower social elite at the top end of the income scale.
If the Government wishes to continue promoting the compact city, policies will have to come to terms with the fact that many sections of the population have a clear preference for the type of living experi- ence and neighbourhood satisfaction that is found in suburbs rather than the inner areas. Furthermore, these preferences will be reinforced if it transpires that the profits from owner occupation remain higher in the suburbs than the urban core. Thus, not only will policies have to provide residents of the urban core with living experiences as good as those found in the suburbs but policies will also have to ensure a level of individual profit from home ownership in the urban core equivalent to that obtainable in the suburbs.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful for the assistance of Andy Wallis and Richard Lewis of Wirral Metropolitan Borough Council for providing various data used in this paper.
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- Controlling urban sprawl: Some experiences from Liverpool
- Introduction
- Success in controlling urban sprawl?
- Can and should urban sprawl be restricted further?
- Social influences on urban sprawl
- Conclusions
- Policy implications
- Acknowledgements
- References��
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Does Sprawl Cost Us All?: Isolating the Effects of Housing Patterns on Public Water and Sewer Costs
Cameron Speir & Kurt Stephenson
To cite this article: Cameron Speir & Kurt Stephenson (2002) Does Sprawl Cost Us All?: Isolating the Effects of Housing Patterns on Public Water and Sewer Costs , Journal of the American Planning Association, 68:1, 56-70, DOI: 10.1080/01944360208977191
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Does Sprawl Cost Us All? Isolating the Effects of Housing Patterns on Public Water and Sewer Costs Cameron Speir and Kurt Stephenson
Sprawl is a term frequently used to describe the spatial pattern of con-temporary residential development. Many proposed definitions char-acterize a spread-out, low-density housing pattern as the primary char- acteristic of sprawl. Critics of sprawl express concern on many levels about this housing pattern. They assert that sprawl housing patterns may degrade air and water quality, destroy open space and prime farmland, and contrib- ute to the deterioration of urban centers (Burchell & Listokin, 1995).
One particular concern is the effect of sprawl on the fiscal costs to local governments (Esseks & Sullivan, 1999). Researchers in economics and plan- ning assert that sprawl costs local governments more for infrastructure and public services than more compact forms of growth (Burchell et al., 1992; Downing & Gusteley, 1977; Frank, 1989). The effects of spatial pattern on public costs have been analyzed for many services, including roads, water, sewers, parks, education, solid waste disposal, fire protection, and police pro- tection (Transportation Research Board, 1998). Despite the continuing con- cern, many studies report that the costs of providing some of these services are relatively insensitive to spatial pattern. Schools, by far the largest com- ponent of local government costs, are one such service (Burchell et al., 1992; Frank, 1989). Others include solid waste collection and fire and police pro- tection (Burchell & Listokin, 1995).
In contrast, a number of studies have found that the costs of providing infrastructure-intensive services, such as roads, water, and sewers, are much more sensitive to spatial pattern (Burchell & Listokin, 1995; Downing & Gusteley, 1977; Duncan et al., 1989; Peiser, 1984). Water and sewer services are of particular interest to local governments, since these governments bear the vast majority of these costs. Duncan et al. (1989) and Frank (1989) found that water and sewer costs for compact, contiguous housing patterns are 60 and 66%, respectively, of those for spread-out patterns.
56 APA Journal u Winter 2002 u Vol. 68, No. 1
This article assesses the public water and sewer costs associated with alter- native housing patterns. These pat- terns are defined in terms of lot size, tract dispersion, and distance from ex- isting water and sewer service centers. The engineering cost model presented here gives empirical evidence of how sensitive local government service costs are to the spatial pattern of sin- gle-family residential development. The results show that more spread out housing patterns are more costly to supply with public water and sewer services, but that shifting a majority of these costs to the private sector may be a relatively simple matter.
Speir is a regulatory pricing analyst at Paci- fiCorp. He completed this work as a re- search associate in the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics at Vir- ginia Tech. Stephenson is an associate pro- fessor in the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics at Virginia Tech.
Journal of the American Planning Association, Vol. 68, No. 1, Winter 2002. © American Planning Association, Chicago, IL.
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While the literature indicates that water and sewer costs are sensitive to spatial pattern, previous cost stud- ies have been limited in two ways. First, sprawl itself is not always precisely defined. In fact, “even the most cur- rent literature on sprawl tends to describe its attributes rather than quantify them [emphasis in original]” (Trans- portation Research Board, 1998, p. 17). Often spatial patterns are described in general terms such as trend or unplanned versus planned (Burchell et al., 1992; Peiser, 1984). If spatial patterns are quantified, they include only one or two spatial attributes, such as density or dis- tance (Downing & Gusteley, 1977; Frank, 1989). Second, the influence of spatial pattern on costs is not always clearly separated from other factors such as population, service standards, and demographic characteristics. Windsor (1979), for example, suggests that much of the cost savings attributed to higher density is in fact due to differences in the number of people, types of housing, construction standards, and demographic assumptions. In particular, the water and sewer literature frequently fails to isolate the relationship between total water use and spatial pattern.
The present study aims to extend and refine the re- lationship between the costs of providing water and sewer services and housing patterns by isolating three specific spatial attributes of these patterns. In the fol- lowing section, these attributes are described in terms of three types of separation:
1. lot size (separation between houses); 2. tract dispersion (separation between
development tracts; sometimes called non- contiguous or “skipped-over” development); and
3. distance (separation from existing water and sewer centers).
This article aims to identify the relative contribu- tions of these three spatial attributes to the cost of pro- viding water and sewer services while holding all other cost-influencing factors constant. The methods section describes the cost simulation model that was used. It also describes alternative development scenarios that were used to isolate the relative contributions of the three spatial attributes. The following section presents the results. The article concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of the results.
Methods The capital and energy costs of providing water and
sewer services to different housing patterns were calcu- lated using a cost simulation model. The simulation began by assuming existing water and sewer services would be expanded to 3,000 new single-family detached
houses in a hypothetical medium-size town of 30,000 people.1 Each house is assumed to be occupied by an av- erage of 3.5 people. The area is assumed to have basically flat topography. Given these initial conditions, 60 dif- ferent development scenarios were identified. Each de- velopment scenario settles the new population in a par- ticular spatial pattern based on different combinations of values for each of the three spatial attributes, where the value of that attribute was allowed to vary across all scenarios while the other two were held constant.
A spreadsheet-based cost model was then used to calculate the cost of providing public water and sewer services for each scenario. First, the total water and sewer system infrastructure requirements of each scenario were estimated. Length of pipe; number of valves, hy- drants, and manholes; number of booster pumps2; and pump energy requirements were determined according to the pattern of each scenario. Second, these system re- quirements were used in conjunction with unit cost data from generally accepted industry sources to calculate costs. These costs include primarily the capital and en- ergy costs associated with water distribution, but not storage.3 Some scenarios assumed higher per-capita water use for larger lots. In these scenarios, the addi- tional water treatment costs were calculated. Costs for water storage and wastewater treatment were not esti- mated because they are thought to be relatively insensi- tive to spatial pattern.4 System dimensions for all sce- narios and sources of cost information are more fully explained in the Appendix.
By examining how the total cost of providing water and sewer services to this new population changes across scenarios, the cost consequences of each spatial attribute can be isolated. For instance, one set of development sce- narios varies lot size, while holding tract dispersion and distance constant. Any differences in costs among these scenarios can then be attributed to changes in lot size.
Development Scenarios: Definitions and Values
The following section describes the development scenarios for which costs were estimated. First, we define the values used to quantify each of the three spatial at- tributes. Second, we identify the specific combinations of these values in each development scenario.
The smallest development tract consists of 750 housing lots arranged in a grid 27 lots long by 28 lots wide.5 This pattern applies regardless of the lot size. Fig- ure 1 is a diagram of the arrangement of housing lots and the water and sewer service grid within a small de- velopment tract. The triple solid line running lengthwise through the middle of the grid represents large-diameter water transmission and sewer interceptor pipes that con-
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nect the tract to the service center. The single solid lines represent the water distribution and sewer collector mains that connect individual houses to the larger trans- mission and interceptor pipes.
Lot size measures the separation between housing lots in a development tract. In this analysis, lot size may take any of four different values: 0.25 acre, 0.5 acre, 0.75 acre, or 1 acre. For discussion purposes, the term small lot is used to describe tracts with 0.25-acre lots, while large lot refers to 1-acre lots. Lot size determines the length of frontage for each lot, which in turn affects the length of water distribution and sewer collector mains needed to serve the development tract. For example, a square- shaped 1-acre lot has a 210-foot frontage. It is more likely, however, that lots are rectangular, typically with a 1:3 ratio, meaning that every foot of frontage corre- sponds to 3 feet of depth (New Jersey Office of State Planning, 1996).6 This ratio was used for each of the four lot-size values.
Tract dispersion measures how far development tracts are located from each other. They may be clustered to- gether to form a single large tract of as many as 3,000 lots or they may be smaller tracts arranged in separate locations. In this model, tract dispersion can take any of four different values: 1, 2, 3, or 4 tracts, as shown in Fig- ure 2. The term high tract dispersion describes four tracts, while low tract dispersion refers to one tract. The black rec- tangle in each tract pattern represents the existing the water and sewer service center. The white rectangles rep- resent the development tracts, with the number of hous- ing lots in each. Moving from left to right, the develop- ment tracts become more dispersed as their number increases from one to four. Note that the tracts in each development are separated by enough space so that each tract requires its own water transmission and sewer in- terceptor pipes.
Distance measures the separation between develop- ment tracts and existing water and sewer service centers. In all scenarios, the service center contains water and wastewater treatment plants. The distance from the cen- ter, therefore, is the length of water transmission and sewer interceptor pipes required to serve the new devel- opment. For example, tracts located 5 miles from the center require 5-mile water transmission and sewer in- terceptor pipe extensions. Distance may take any of seven different values: 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 miles. The term near distance refers to tracts 0.25 mile from the cen- ter, while far distance refers to 5 miles.
Development scenario sets. A total of 60 development scenarios were examined. The scenarios were grouped into sets based on the spatial attributes of the housing patterns. Lot size, tract dispersion, and distance were each analyzed by comparing four sets of scenarios, for a total of 12 sets. Within a set of scenarios, one attribute was changed, while the other two were held constant. When the cost of each lot-size scenario was calculated, for example, differences in the total cost of providing water and sewer services could be attributed to different capital and operating costs that result only from chang- ing the lot size.
Lot size. In all four sets of scenarios, lot size varies from 0.25 acre to 1 acre. In sets 1 and 2, tract dispersion is 1 (low), and respective distances from the existing water and sewer service centers are 0.25 miles (near) and 5 miles (far). In sets 3 and 4, tract dispersion is 4 (high), and respective distances are 0.25 miles (near) and 5 miles (far).
Tract dispersion. In all four sets of scenarios, tract dis- persion varies from 1 to 4. In sets 1 and 2, distance is 0.25 mile (near), and respective lot sizes are 0.25 acre (small) and 1 acre (large). In sets 3 and 4, distance is 5 miles (far),
CAMERON SPEIR AND KURT STEPHENSON
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FIGURE 1. Diagram of water and sewer utilities in a small development tract.
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and respective lot sizes are 0.25 acre (small) and 1 acre (large).
Distance. In all four sets of scenarios, distance to the existing service center varies from 0.25 mile to 5 miles. In sets 1 and 2, tract dispersion is 1 (low), and respective lot sizes are 0.25 acre (small) and 1 acre (large). In sets 3 and 4, tract dispersion is 4 (high), and respective lot sizes are 0.25 acre (small) and 1 acre (large).
Water Use Total water use for each household was initially held
constant across all scenarios. All 3,000 houses are as- sumed to be single-family detached residences. Each res- idence is assumed to house 3.5 people, and each person is assumed to consume 100 gallons of water per day (gpd). This figure is based on several recent estimates. The U.S. Geological Survey (2001) estimates that the average person uses 80–100 gpd in the home. Virginia’s Blacksburg-Christiansburg-VPI Water Authority (1999) reports that the average person uses 125 gallons per day, and other estimates range from 60 to 200 gpd (J. Reilly,
personal communication, August 17, 1999). Consump- tion of 100 gpd per person implies a need for 1.05 mil- lion gallons per day under each scenario.
We also considered a situation in which water de- mand increases for larger lots because of landscape watering. We conducted a limited number of tests to de- termine the effects of this increase on costs. In these tests, water use per capita is increased 25% to 125 gpd for 1-acre lots. The magnitude of the relationship between lot size and water use is difficult to isolate, but the 25% increase may be considered conservative (Hammer, 1996). The effects of this increase will be reflected in higher costs due to additional infrastructure (larger pipes), higher pumping costs, and higher water treat- ment costs.
Results The following results report the total annualized
costs to provide water and sewer services and the relative contribution of each spatial attribute.
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FIGURE 2. Diagram of tract dispersion types.
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Effect of Lot Size on Cost The results presented in Tables 1 and 2 clearly show
that increasing lot size can have a pronounced effect on the cost of providing water and sewer services. Table 1 gives the annualized water and sewer costs for each sce- nario set. Across all sets, smaller lots cost less to serve than larger lots when distance and tract dispersion are held constant. In lot-size scenario set 1 (low tract disper- sion and near distance), when lot size increases from 0.25 to 1 acre, costs nearly double, a $560,000 increase. An- nual costs per household increase from $204 to $392. The higher costs are due to the longer distribution mains required for larger lots. Friction head losses are also higher with longer lengths of pipe, which increase pumping costs.
Table 2 shows how costs change as lot size increases in 0.25-acre increments. In sets 1, 2, and 3, the size and rate of the increases in costs decreases as the lots become larger. This relationship is an artifact of the geometry of the rectangular lots with a 1:3 frontage-to-depth ratio: The increase in the length of frontage is proportionally less than the increase in acreage. Table 2 also shows that the increase in costs is fairly constant among sets for the same increase in lot size.7 For example, as lot size in- creases from 0.25 to 0.5 acre, the increase in costs is be- tween $233,046 and $235,414 across all four sets of sce- narios. These small differences in the rate of increase are explained by differences in sewer interceptor pipe diam- eters and small differences in pump energy costs.
Effect of Tract Dispersion on Cost Table 3 shows the annualized costs of providing
water and sewer services when tract dispersion is varied. Within each scenario set, differences in costs from changes in tract dispersion are modest, but among the sets of scenarios, costs are significantly different. This indicates that the other spatial attributes have more pro- nounced influences on costs than tract dispersion. In all cases, costs increase as tract dispersion increases due to increases in pipe length and pump capital costs.
Table 4 shows how costs change as tract dispersion increases. These results show that more development tracts increase the cost of providing water and sewer ser- vices, but the increases are not as large (in absolute or percentage terms) as increases due to lot size. Not sur- prisingly, the additional cost of serving more tracts in- creases with distance from the existing service center. For far distant tracts, as in sets 3 and 4, the increase in costs as tract dispersion increases is between 6 and 14%. For near distant tracts, as in sets 1 and 2, these costs increase only 1 to 2%. Cost differences among scenarios are at- tributed to changes in the length of pipes, the diameter
of water transmission and sewer interceptor pipes, the number and size of water pump stations, and energy costs.
Effect of Distance on Cost Table 5 presents the annualized costs of providing
water and sewer services when development is located at various distances from existing service centers. These re- sults show that increasing these distances can increase costs substantially. For example, in set 1, increasing the distance of the development tract from 0.25 mile to 4 miles from the service center increases costs $186,500, from $613,000 to $799,500. This 16-fold increase in dis- tance increases costs by 30%.
Table 6 shows how costs change as distance in- creases. The absolute change for increases of 1 mile is nearly the same within each set of scenarios. For exam- ple, in set 1, each 1-mile increase in distance between 1 and 4 miles increases costs approximately $50,000.8 In set 4, each 1-mile increase between 1 and 5 miles in- creases costs approximately $122,000.
Summary of the Effects of Spatial Attributes
Using the results in Tables 1 through 5, Figure 3 summarizes how the total cost of providing water and sewer services changes when each spatial attribute is doubled and quadrupled while the others are held con- stant. The change in cost is calculated by averaging the percent change in costs across the different sets of sce- narios for lot size, tract dispersion, and distance. For in- stance, doubling lot size from 0.25 to 0.5 acre increases total water and sewer costs 38, 27, 36, and 20%, respec- tively (see Table 2). Thus, the average increase in cost for the set of lot-size scenarios is 30% (see Figure 3). By com- parison, doubling tract dispersion from 1 to 2 tracts and distance from 0.25 to 0.5 mile increases costs an average of 6% and 3%, respectively. Quadrupling lot size from 0.25 to 1 acre, tract dispersion from 1 to 4 tracts, and dis- tance from 0.25 to 1 mile supports the conclusion that the costs of providing water and sewer services are most sensitive to changes in lot size.
Composition of Costs The primary reason total costs are most sensitive to
changes in lot size is that infrastructure within the de- velopment tract—water distribution mains and sewer collector mains—are the two largest components of total cost. Table 7 shows each infrastructure component as a proportion of total cost for selected sets of scenarios. For example, in lot-size scenario set 1 with 0.25-acre lots (the
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TABLE 1. Lot size: Effect on annual water and sewer costs.*
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Low tract Low tract High tract High tract
dispersion, dispersion, disperson, dispersion, Costs by lot size near distance far distance near distance far distance
0.25 acre Total $613,383 $878,158 $650,171 $1,179,836 Per household 204.46 292.72 216.72 393.28
0.5 acre Total 848,797 1,112,120 883,218 1,412,882 Per household 282.93 370.71 294.41 470.96
0.75 acre Total 1,035,967 1,299,290 1,069,655 1,653,783 Per household 345.32 433.10 356.55 551.26
1 acre Total 1,176,344 1,447,390 1,212,206 1,793,611 Per household 392.11 482.46 404.07 597.87
*All costs are annualized over 30 years using a 7% discount rate.
TABLE 2. Lot size: Effect of changes on total water and sewer costs.*
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Low tract Low tract High tract High tract
Cost changes by dispersion, dispersion, disperson, dispersion, change in lot size near distance far distance near distance far distance
0.25 to 0.5 acre Absolute $235,414 $233,962 $233,047 $233,046 Per household $74.47 $77.99 $77.68 $77.68 Percentage 38% 27% 36% 20%
0.5 to 0.75 acre Absolute $187,170 $187,170 $186,437 $240,901 Per household $62.39 $62.39 $65.15 $80.30 Percentage 22% 17% 21% 17%
0.75 to 1 acre Absolute $140,377 $148,100 $142,551 $139,828 Per household $46.79 449.37 $47.52 $46.61 Percentage 14% 11% 13% 8%
*All costs are annualized over 30 years using a 7% discount rate.
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TABLE 3. Tract dispersion: Effect on annual water and sewer costs.*
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Costs by Near distance, Near distance, Far distance, Far distance, number of tracts small lot large lot small lot large lot
1 tract Total $613,383 $1,176,344 $878,158 $1,447,390 Per household 204.46 392.11 292.72 482.46
2 tracts Total 623,753 1,184,168 1,004,707 1,565,121 Per household 207.92 394.72 334.90 521.71
3 tracts Total 636,053 1,197,685 1,099,452 1,659,040 Per household 212.02 399.23 366.48 553.01
4 tracts Total 650,171 1,212,206 1,179,836 1,793,611 Per household 216.72 404.07 393.28 597.87
*All costs are annualized over 30 years using a 7% discount rate.
TABLE 4. Tract dispersion: Effect on changes in total water and sewer costs.*
Cost changes Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 by change in Near distance, Near distance, Far distance, Far distance, number of tracts small lot large lot small lot large lot
1 to 2 tract Absolute $10,370 $7,824 $126,549 $117,731 Per household $3.46 $2.61 $42.18 $39.24 Percentage 2% 1% 14% 8%
2 to 3 tracts Absolute $12,300 $13,517 $94,745 $93,919 Per household $4.10 $4.51 $31.58 $31.31 Percentage 2% 1% 9% 6%
3 to 4 tracts Absolute $14,118 $14,521 $80,384 $134,571 Per household $4.71 $4.84 $26.79 $44.86 Percentage 2% 1% 7% 8%
*All costs are annualized over 30 years using a 7% discount rate.
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most compact pattern, low tract dispersion, and near distance), the distribution and collector mains make up 64% and 29%, respectively, of the total annualized cost of $613,383 (see Table 1). In other words, 93% of all costs are attributable to internal tract infrastructure. By com- parison, the same infrastructure components in lot-size scenario set 4 for 1-acre lots comprise 44 and 19%, re- spectively, or 63% of the total cost of $1,793,611 (see Table 1).
These results show that the proportion of internal tract infrastructure costs to total cost can vary widely ac- cording to spatial pattern. The proportion of costs for internal distribution and collector mains are lowest when lot sizes are small, distance and tract dispersion is high, and distance is far (lot-size scenario set 4 at 0.25 acre). In this case, total internal infrastructure costs are
48% of the total cost of $1,179,836 (see Table 1). On av- erage, the results presented in Table 7 show that to- gether, water distribution and sewer collector mains within the development tracts make up 78% of costs across all scenarios (54% and 24% on average of all costs, respectively). Table 7 also shows that water distribution makes up a much greater proportion than wastewater collection. This is mainly because higher grade, more ex- pensive piping is used for water distribution.
Effect of Higher Water Use It is possible that households on larger lots will con-
sume more water, primarily for landscaping. The effect of increased water use on distribution costs was exam- ined by recalculating the cost of delivering water to four scenarios with large (1-acre) lots. These recalculations
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FIGURE 3. Summary of the sensitivity of water and sewer costs to changes in spatial attributes.
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assume that water use is 125 gpd per person, instead of 100 gpd. Higher daily water use should increase both the size of certain components of the distribution system and the total cost of water treatment. Transmission pipes and associated valves must be larger to accommo- date higher flow rates. Pump stations must be sized to pump larger quantities of water, thus increasing capital costs, and energy costs will be higher. Collection costs in the sewer system should not be affected, as the increased water will be returned as groundwater. Changes in in- frastructure needed as water use increases were calcu- lated under the different assumptions about per-capita water use.
An increase in treatment costs was also included in these calculations. If large lots use 125 gpd per person instead of 100, an additional 262,500 gpd must be treated. It is assumed that the water treatment facilities have sufficient capacity to treat this water with no new capital investment. Therefore, only the variable opera-
tion costs of treating the additional quantity of water were considered. We assumed these costs of treatment to be $0.75 per 1,000 gallons (B&B Consultants, Inc., 1997).
Table 8 presents the additional costs of treating and delivering more water to larger-lot developments. The last column shows the percent increases of total water costs, which include both water distribution and treat- ment. Total cost increased from $95,000 to almost $128,00 per year. This represents an 11 to 12% increase, which is primarily due to higher water treatment costs rather than higher distribution costs.
Implications and Conclusions The results show that smaller lots, shorter distances
between existing centers, and lower tract dispersions re- duce water and sewer costs. These results confirm previ- ous work on the costs of alternative housing patterns
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TABLE 5. Distance from existing service centers: Effect on annual water and sewer costs.*
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Low tract Low tract High tract High tract
dispersion, dispersion, disperson, dispersion, Costs by distance small lot large lot small lot large lot
0.25 mile Total $613,383 $1,176,344 $650,171 $1,212,206 Per household 204.46 392.11 216.72 404.07
0.5 mile Total 625,790 1,190,203 678,048 1,242,806 Per household 208.60 396.73 226.02 414.27
1 mile Total 650,604 1,217,921 733,802 1,304,007 Per household 216.87 405.97 244.60 434.67
2 miles Total 700,233 1,273,358 845,311 1,426,408 Per household 233.41 424.45 281.77 475.47
3 miles Total 749,861 1,333,428 956,819 1,548,809 Per household 249.95 444.48 318.94 516.27
4 miles Total 799,489 1,390,409 1,068,327 1,671,210 Per household 266.50 463.47 356.11 557.07
5 miles Total 878,158 1,447,390 1,179,836 1,793,611 Per household 292.72 482.46 393.28 597.87
*All costs are annualized over 30 years using a 7% discount rate.
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(including Burchell et al., 1992; Duncan et al., 1989; Es- seks et al., 1999; Frank, 1989). The present study, how- ever, extends these works by explicitly isolating the ef- fects of three spatial attributes on water and sewer costs. While the term sprawl may be used to describe a variety of spatial patterns of housing developments, this analysis suggests that the lot-size aspect of sprawl is its most cost- sensitive spatial attribute (see Figure 3).
One public policy concern about differences in costs is who pays. Depending on the particular financing ar- rangements, residents in denser, more contiguous de- velopments could end up subsiding water and sewer ser- vices for those in more sprawling patterns. For example, some public utilities install and pay for all infrastruc- ture. Many are also self-financing entities that are re- quired—legally, in some cases—to recover their costs of service through fees. Most utilities charge a flat rate or
base fees on water usage using average cost methods. If average cost pricing for water and sewer services is used to recover costs, users in less compact spatial patterns will pay less than their true cost of service, while users in more compact patterns will pay more. In these instances, sprawl may indeed “cost us all” by subsidizing residents in dispersed development patterns and driving up the total cost of providing water and sewer services.
The results presented here show that lot size (or den- sity) is the spatial attribute that has the most impact on water and sewer costs. Costs related to lot size, includ- ing water and sewer lines, are easily attributable to specific housing units and development tracts. This sug- gests that the most simple policy solution for overcom- ing a “sprawl subsidy” may also be the most effective. The results of this study indicate that on average 78% of the costs associated with spatial pattern are for infra-
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TABLE 6. Distance from existing service centers: Effect on changes in total water and sewer costs.*
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Low tract Low tract High tract High tract
Cost changes by dispersion, dispersion, disperson, dispersion, change in distance small lot large lot small lot large lot
0.25 to 0.5 mile Absolute $12,407 $13,859 $27,877 $30,600 Per household $4.14 $2.61 $9.29 $10.20 Percentage 2% 1% 4% 3%
0.5 to 1 mile Absolute $24,814 $27,718 $55,754 $61,201 Per household $8.27 $9.24 $18.58 $20.40 Percentage 4% 2% 8% 5%
1 to 2 miles Absolute $49,628 $55,437 $111,509 $122,401 Per household $16.54 $18.48 $37.17 $40.80 Percentage 8% 5% 15% 9%
2 to 3 miles Absolute $49,628 $60,070 $111,508 $122,401 Per household $16.54 $20.02 $37.17 $40.80 Percentage 7% 5% 13% 9%
3 to 4 miles Absolute $49,628 $56,981 $111,508 $122,401 Per household $16.54 $18.99 $37.17 $40.80 Percentage 7% 4% 12% 8%
4 to 5 miles Absolute $78,669 $56,981 $111,508 $122,401 Per household $26.22 $18.99 $37.17 $40.80 Percentage 10% 4% 10% 7%
*All costs are annualized over 30 years using a 7% discount rate.
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TABLE 7. Contribution of infrastructure components to annual water and sewer costs.
% of water costs % of sewer costs
Distribution Transmission Pump Pump Collector Interceptor main mains capital energy mains mains
Scenario set (internal) (external) costs costs (internal) (external)
Lot size
0.25 acre Set 1 64 1 4 1 29 1 Set 4 33 28 4 <1< 15 19
1 acre Set 1 66 1 2 1 30 <1< Set 4 44 18 3 <1< 19 16
Tract dispersion
1 tract Set 1 64 1 4 1 29 1 Set 4 54 12 2 1 24 8
4 tracts Set 1 61 3 7 1 27 2 Set 4 44 18 3 <1< 19 16
Distance
0.25 mile Set 1 64 1 4 1 29 1 Set 4 64 1 4 <1< 29 1
5 miles Set 1 45 19 3 1 20 12 Set 4 44 18 3 <1< 19 16
Average 54 11 3 1 24 7
TABLE 8. Effect of increased water use on annual water distribution system costs.*
Lot size Distance No. Distribution Treatment Total % of total (acres) (miles) tracts cost cost water cost water cost
1 0.25 1 $23,649 $71,859 $95,508 %12% 1 0.25 4 42,888 71,859 114,747 12 1 50.2 1 22,379 71,859 94,238 11 1 50.2 4 56,072 71,859 127,931 11
*Daily water use increased from 100 gpd to 125 gpd per person.
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structure associated with installing water distribution and sewer collector mains. Requiring developers to in- stall and pay for water and sewer lines located within a tract during its construction would therefore shift a large percentage of these spatially sensitive costs to those settling there. Most public utilities currently use such strategies. In Roanoke County, Virginia, for example, de- velopers must install and pay for any infrastructure oc- curring within a development tract (G. Robertson, per- sonal communication, November 1999). In other cases, however, local government may pay for most water and sewer infrastructure required by new development, per- haps as an economic growth strategy (Esseks et al., 1999).9
The remaining infrastructure costs associated with tract dispersion and distance could be also paid for by use of proffers and variable impact fees. The results pre- sented here disaggregate the spatial patterns of housing developments into discrete attributes. This type of dis- aggregation should be considered when developing var- iable impact fees to recover the costs of capital facilities. Variable impact fees, or system development charges, are one-time charges designed to recover capital costs asso- ciated with water or sewer system expansion. More im- portantly, they are structured to reflect differences in ser- vice costs by charging higher fees to users in areas that are more costly to serve. This study has identified as higher cost those areas with larger housing lots and more dispersed development tracts farther from exist- ing service centers. The differences in costs reported here could also be used to compute appropriate impact fees according to the spatial attributes of a new development.
In practice, widespread adoption of these subsidy- reducing policy reforms has proven difficult. Yet, this analysis suggests that once internal infrastructure costs are paid for by those creating these costs, the gains from instituting proffer and impact fee systems are more modest because external infrastructure (water transmis- sion pipes, pump stations, and sewer interceptor pipes) accounts for a relatively small proportion of total costs (5 to 52%, or 22% on average).
If costs external to the tract (pipes and pumps) can- not be shifted, that part of the sprawl subsidy is relatively small and should produce only a modest impact on housing choices. For example, Table 7 shows that costs for external infrastructure comprise 7% of all costs for the most compact development pattern and 37% of costs in the most dispersed one. These percentages translate into monthly costs of $1.19 and $18.43 per household, respectively. The present value of these monthly pay- ments over a 30-year period would be $178 and $2,745. While these figures show that residents in compact developments would be subsidizing residents in more
sprawling developments (a maximum of $17.24 per month or $2,567 over 30 years), reducing the subsidy would be unlikely to have a large impact on housing choices. Given the relative insensitivity of other local government services (primarily education) to spatial pat- terns, this analysis also suggests that the most signifi- cant consequences of housing patterns may not be local fiscal outcomes, but rather environmental and social ones. Further research on the environmental and social impacts of sprawl should pay closer attention to which spatial attributes of housing patterns may be responsible for any negative impacts.
Finally, the analysis presented here suggests a num- ber of possible extensions and research needs. This anal- ysis assumed an existing medium-size public water and sewer system serving 3,000 new households. How in- creasing the dimensions of the system (scale economies) will change the relative influence of spatial pattern is un- clear. This seems to be a particularly pressing issue in some fast-growing counties where annual noncom- pounded growth rates exceed 7 or 8%. Another interest- ing question that is not addressed is how costs for re- placement and maintenance can be equitably financed once initial facilities outlive their useful lives. Typically, all users in the system share these costs, regardless of whether lower-density development is responsible for a higher portion of the replacement costs. Methods of pre- dicting and policy mechanisms for allocating future re- placement and maintenance costs to users based on their marginal contribution, however, could be further devel- oped. Additional research could also investigate the sen- sitivity of costs to different housing patterns within a de- velopment tract. Better quantitative measures of the spatial attribute we label tract dispersion would also ap- pear warranted. Such a measure (perhaps developed using graph theoretic tools) would prove useful in con- ducting statistical analyses that attempt to isolate the impact of spatial patterns on fiscal, social, and environ- mental indicators.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank the three anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Funding and support for this research was provided by the Virginia Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Department and the Virginia Water Resources Re- search Center.
NOTES
1. The new residents would settle the area over a 30-year pe- riod. This represents 100 new households per year, or an annual growth rate of over 1.1% (not compounded) and is
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not an unreasonable forecast for such a town (Town of Blacksburg, 1996). This rate of growth is relatively modest compared to the national rate of 0.9% in 1998–1999 and to the fastest growing counties in the nation, such as Loudon County, Virginia, which grew by 8.1% (U.S. Cen- sus Bureau, 2000). It should also be noted that costs were calculated as if all development costs are incurred in year one and planners have perfect foresight about which spatial patterns and how much development will occur. Holding the timing of development constant in this way allows for the effects of spatial pattern on costs to be bet- ter isolated.
2. Sewage pumping costs are not considered in this general- ized model because their placement is mainly a function of topography.
3. Maintenance costs are also excluded from this model. Ide- ally, these costs would be included; however, they are dif- ficult to estimate and derive. Estimates of maintenance costs by spatial attributes could not be found in the exist- ing literature, engineering cost studies, or local govern- ment budgets. Local government maintenance costs for water and sewer services are typically embedded in salaries and general overhead. Also, attributing maintenance ac- tivities to specific spatial attributes would add another complication.
4. Water storage costs, however, could increase if one spatial pattern generates higher water use than another. The magnitudes of the potential increases in water use from different patterns are fairly small relative to total water use, so we assumed that there was enough excess storage in the system to deal with these changes.
5. Changing the layout of houses within a development tract will certainly affect the cost of frontage facilities such as water and sewer pipe. The grid pattern described here gen- erates a conservative estimate of internal infrastructure requirements. Conventional cul-de-sac layouts may in- crease these costs, while clustered layouts may reduce them (Zielinski, 2000).
6. A 1-acre lot, therefore, has 120 feet of frontage. Recall that the area of a rectangle is equal to its length times its width: A = L × W. In the case of a 1:3 ratio, 43,560 feet = 3L × L. Solving for L gives 120.5 feet.
7. Set 4 shows a similar pattern, except that as lot size in- creases from 0.5 to 0.75 acre, the rate of change increases slightly. This occurs because the sewer interceptor diam- eter (and unit cost) must increase as a result of increased infiltration and inflow into the sewer system.
8. The increase in costs between 4 and 5 miles in distance scenario set 1 is attributed to a necessary increase in sewer interceptor pipe diameter from 21 to 24 inches.
9. The local government may also pay the cost to connect existing houses to the existing water and sewer systems because of failing wells and septic tanks. Many recent ex- amples are available, but the cost consequences of this possibility are beyond the scope of this article.
REFERENCES
Blacksburg-Christiansburg-VPI Water Authority. (1999). Fas- cinating water facts [On-line]. Available: <http://www. h2o4u.org/facts.html>.
B&B Consultants, Inc. (1997). Comprehensive water and sewer study for Brunswick County, Virginia. South Hill, VA: Author.
Bouthillier, P. H. (1981). Hydraulic tables for water supply and drainage. Ann Arbor, MI: Ann Arbor Science Publishers, Inc.
Burchell, R.W., & Listokin, D. (1995). Land, infrastructure, hous- ing costs and fiscal impacts associated with growth: The literature on the impacts of sprawl versus managed growth. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Downing, P. B., & Gustely, R. D. (1977). The public service costs of alternative development patterns: A review of the evidence. In P. B. Downing (Ed.), Local service pricing poli- cies and their effect on urban spatial structure (pp. 63–86). Van- couver: University of British Columbia Press.
Duncan, J., and Associates; Van Horn–Gray Associates; Ivey, Bennett, Harris, and Walls, Inc.; & Wade-Trim, Inc. (1989). The search for efficient urban growth patterns: A study of the im- pacts of development in Florida. Tallahassee: Florida Depart- ment of Community Affairs.
Engineering News-Record. (1999). ENR’s cost indexes [On-line]. Available: <http://www.enr.com/cost/cost1.asp>.
Esseks, J. D., & Sullivan, K. L. (1999). Scattered development. Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy, 14(3), 24–28.
Esseks, J. D., Schmidt, H. E., & Sullivan, K. (1999). Fiscal costs and public safety risks of low density residential development on farmland: Findings from three diverse locations on the urban fringe of the Chicago metropolitan area (CAE/WP 98-1). Wash- ington, DC: American Farmland Trust, Center for Agri- culture and the Environment.
Frank, J. E. (1989). The costs of alternative development patterns: A review of the literature. Washington, DC: Urban Land Institute.
Hammer, M. J. (1996). Water and waste-water technology (3rd ed.). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Hauser, B. A. (1996). Practical hydraulics handbook (2nd ed.). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Lewis.
New Jersey Office of State Planning. (1996). Projecting municipal road costs under various growth scenarios: The relationship be- tween municipal residential density, municipal road density and density change (Document #109). Trenton: Author.
New Jersey Office of State Planning. (1990). Estimating costs for wastewater collection under various growth scenarios (OSP Technical Report). Trenton: Author.
Peiser, R. B. (1984). Does it pay to plan suburban growth? Jour- nal of the American Planning Association, 50, 419–433.
R. S. Means Company, Inc. (1999). Site work and landscape cost data 1999 (18th annual ed.). Kingston, MA: Author.
Rutgers University Center for Urban Policy Research. (1992). Impact assessment of the New Jersey interim state development and redevelopment plan, Report II: Research findings. Trenton: New Jersey Office of State Planning.
Sanks, R. L. (Ed.). (1998). Pumping station design (2nd ed.). Bos- ton: Butterworth-Heinemann.
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Town of Blacksburg. (1996). Town of Blacksburg 1996 compre- hensive plan. Blacksburg, VA: Author.
Transportation Research Board. (1998). The costs of sprawl— revisited (TCRP Report 39). Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
U.S. Census Bureau. (2000). County population estimates for July 1, 1999 and population change for July 1, 1998 to July 1, 1999 (CO- 99-1, Population Estimates Program, Population Divi- sion). Washington, DC: Author.
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Windsor, D. (1979). A critique of the costs of sprawl. Journal of the American Planning Association,45, 279–292.
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The length of pipe inside a development tract is de- termined by its grid dimensions. In our simulation, a tract with 750 housing lots has 28 smaller-diameter lateral water mains and sewer mains on either side of the larger water transmission and sewer interceptor pipes (see Fig- ure 1). Each pipe runs underneath a 30-foot wide road- way. The dimensions of the pipe grid differ depending on the size of the lots. For this study, they are as follows:
Lot size Grid dimensions (acres) (L × W in feet)
0.25 4860 × 1680 0.50 6885 × 2380 0.75 8505 × 2940 1 9720 × 3360
Table A-1 shows the lengths of pipe used in the four lot-size scenarios. For water distribution, class 50, ce- ment-lined ductile iron pipe using push-on joints and purchased in 18-foot sections was assumed. Pipe diame- ter is always 8 inches for distribution mains, a generally accepted standard. Note that there is more water pipe than sewer pipe within each development tract, because only the water grid includes two pipes that run the length of the tract to complete loops in the water distri- bution system. Wastewater flows toward the larger in- terceptor pipe (middle of the grid). Schedule 35 PVC
pipe 8 inches in diameter is used for collector mains. All capital, materials, and labor costs per foot are taken from Means’ Site Work and Landscape Cost Data 1999 (R. S. Means Company, Inc., 1999).
The length of water transmission and sewer inter- ceptor pipes is the distance between the service center and the development tract. Diameters for water trans- mission mains change across scenarios, as shown in Table A-2, and are approximated from a table equating daily average flow to appropriate pipe size (New Jersey Office of State Planning, 1990). Diameters for intercep- tor pipes are based on flow, using Table 14 in Bouthillier (1981), which is based on the Manning formula for pipe flow. Diameter size may vary slightly among scenarios because of different stormwater runoff volumes associ- ated with different lot sizes.
Individual communities have their own standards for locating fire hydrants. This simulation places hy- drants as is done in Blacksburg, Virginia, according to interviews with public officials. All hydrants are assumed to be three-way units with a 4.5-inch valve, located 4 feet deep. Valves are placed every 800 feet along transmission mains, a generally accepted engineering practice accord- ing to manuals and interviews with engineers. Per unit costs for hydrants and valves are reported in R. S. Means Company, Inc. (1999).
Table A-2 shows the number of pumps and flows used to size the pump for the four degrees of tract dis-
APPENDIX
TABLE A-1. Pipe length specifications that vary with lot size.
Length (feet) per lot size (acres)
Type of pipe 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Water distribution main 134,520 189,920 234,240 267,480 Sewer collector main 94,200 133,400 164,760 188,280 Internal water transmission pipe 20,880 28,980 35,460 40,320 Internal sewer interceptor pipe 20,880 28,980 35,460 40,320
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persion. One pump is used for each development tract. To size the pumps, average flow in gallons per minute (gpm) is multiplied by a peaking factor of 2.5 to find the flow per minute under peak demand conditions. To en- sure that the pump is able to provide adequate water to fight fire, a minimum fire flow of 500 gpm is added to the peak flow. The sum is used to determine pump ca- pacity. Capital costs (equipment and installation) for water pumping stations are obtained from cost curves by Sanks (1998) and updated to September 1999 price levels using the Engineering News-Record Construction Cost Index (Engineering News-Record, 1999).
Pump energy requirements are calculated by deriv- ing power requirements using the average flow and the total discharge head (TDH) for each pump station. Total discharge head consists of the pressure required to over- come friction in the distribution system, as computed
by the Hazen-Williams formula (see Hauser, 1996), and pressure added to the system to maintain adequate ser- vice (30 pounds per square inch or 69.3 feet of head). It is assumed that in-line booster pumps operate 18 hours per day, and energy costs are assumed to be $0.039 per kilowatt-hour, the average electricity rate paid by the Roanoke County (Virginia) Utility Department (G. Robertson, personal communication, November 1999). This model places a manhole every 400 feet along distri- bution mains, a common rule for municipalities (G. Robertson, personal communication, November 1999). Manholes with a 4-foot inside diameter are used on sew- ers with pipes up to 24 inches in diameter. Manholes with a 5-foot inside diameter are used on sewers larger than 24 inches. Unit costs for manholes are reported in R. S. Means Company, Inc. (1999).
TABLE A-2. System component dimensions that vary with tract dispersion.
Number of tracts
System component 1 2 3 4
Water transmission pipe diameter 18 in. 14 in. 12 in. 10 in. Sewer interceptor pipe diameter 21-27 in. 18 in. 12-15 in. 12-15 in. Number of pump stations 1 2 3 4 Capacity in gallons per minute 2322 gpm 1413 gpm 1108 gpm 955 gpm
Sources: New Jersey Office of State Planning (1990), Bouthillier (1981), and Sanks (1998).
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resource/housing sprawl.pdf
1 Introduction `̀ Something happens, and then it goes on happening forever. It can never be changed, can never be otherwise.''
P Auster (2004)
Since the early 2000s the tidings had been promising: flight from the major cities in Flanders, a Belgian region, seemed to have stopped. Their numbers of inhabitants had grown and the satisfaction of city dwellers had risen. For the first time in history, comprehensive spatial development plans at different governmental levels (municipal- ities, provinces and regions) were made and new developments, both public and private initiatives, were under construction or in the pipeline. Not only had the developers rediscovered the cities, but private households were putting their shoulders to the wheel: they started to purchase and renovate old dwellings. This c̀an-do' feeling was best expressed in a White Book commissioned by the Flemish government when the authors declared the 21st century to be an urban one (Boudry et al, 2003). This renewed optimism contrasts sharply with the picture sketched by Flanders' first min- ister for the city some ten years earlier. According to Peeters (1995), in his policy memorandum, the cities had lost their glory.
Both images are biased. Where Peeters sees only doom and gloom, the glossy magazines hail the cities as bright and shining places, attracting tourists and recrea- tional visitors. But the big cities in particular still have large poor neighbourhoods (Vandermotten et al, 2006), and outward migration is as selective as ever. Affluent households with children are channelled to the suburban and exurban areas; the younger, alien, and poorer elements to the city centres.
It is the scattered nature of housing location in Flanders, or rather the continuous housing sprawl, that this paper is about. If there is one concept that can capture the
Understanding housing sprawl: the case of Flanders, Belgium
Pascal De Decker Sint-Lucas School of Architecture Ghent/Brussels, University College Ghent, Sint-Denijslaan 293, 9000 Gent, Belgium; e-mail: [email protected] Received 11 June 2010; in revised form 17 January 2011
Environment and Planning A 2011, volume 43, pages 1634 ^ 1654
Abstract. Between 1995 and 1999 the Flemish government succeeded in approving pieces of legisla- tion intended to counter the spatial developments that had characterised the preceding periods, namely suburbanisation and urban decay. It passed a law to combat vacancy and slum housing (1995), a law to invest in social urban renewal (1996), a housing law (1997), a new law on spatial planning (1999), and the first comprehensive spatial plan (1997). Unfortunately, recent information and an evaluation of the spatial planning effort reveal that these initiatives have not been successful. The suburbanisation of native Belgians did not stop: on the contrary, it is accelerating again. And the population growth in the cities is due to people coming from abroad (through family reunification or formation or as asylum seekers). In this contribution I investigate suburbanisation and deurbanisa- tion, asking why housing sprawl in Flanders is so persistent. I examine the structures behind sprawl, viewing them as the consequence of a longstanding dialectical process whereby physical artefacts interact with political choices and actions, cultural convictions, and economic possibilities that have reinforced each other in daily practice over and over again in one predominant direction. The basic argument is that Flanders' spatial planning and urban policies are locked into historical choices, making it difficult to implement new options successfully.
doi:10.1068/a43242
spatial dimension of housing in Flanders it is indeed `sprawl'. Years ago, the architecture critic Nairn (1967, cited by De Decker et al, 1987) wrote that Belgium had managed to create an architecture of such splendid and full-blooded chaos that the visitor suspends all normal judgment. And Braem (1968), a modernist architect and pupil of Le Corbusier, stated that, seen from an aeroplane, Belgium must look like a patchwork quilt sewn together by a lunatic out of God-knows-what garbage, and then spurned with disdain by an invisible giant who strews about the contents of boxes of bricks, creating the ugliest country in the world. Or as Verhoeven (2006) more recently put it:
`̀ The Fleming wants to dwell wild and free, his ideal became a small villa in the countryside, where he hides behind his hedges ignoring the others'' (page 18, own translation).
With his reference to `wild housing', Verhoeven echoes the Dutch architect Carl Weeber (1998), who expressed a preference for the `Belgian model' over the Dutch (see figure 1). He approved of what seemed to be an unruly urge to build whatever, wherever.
Undoubtedly, the sprawl of well-equipped, often large, detached dwellings on the fringes of the cities and further out in the countryside, juxtaposed with clusters of poor housing in old inner-city neighbourhoods, is an essential feature of Flemish housing patterns, one that will come to the fore in any investigation. A second important feature is the lack of sustainable alternatives on the housing market. Belgium is, to paraphrase Saunders (1990), a long-standing nation of homeowners. Yet, whereas many countries have only recently become nations of homeowners (Doling and Ford, 2007), Belgium has been one for quite a while. By 1960 half of all Belgian households owned their homes (Goossens et al, 1991). In addition, Flemish levels of owner- occupation are unlike those in most of the new-homeownership nations. Rather than the outcome of a steep rise, Flemish owner-occupation is the result of a slow growth that is still on-going. Basically, homeownershipöfrom the perspective of the occupantsöis the sole sustainable housing alternative. Legislation on private renting lacks everything that would make it a reliable alternative: rent levels for new leases are unrestricted; codes for dwelling quality are not only basic, but the tenants have difficulty getting them enforced. And since there are no rent allowances, getting value for money is often doubtful; tenants often end up poor after paying their housing costs
(a) (b)
Figure 1. Built-up areas in (a) in Randstad, The Netherlands and (b) the Flemish Diamond, Flanders, Belgium. Both areas have approximately the same numbers of people and have the same hierarchical position as core regions in their country. The black areas are the built-up areas, which show a far greater concentration in the Netherlands than in Flanders, Belgium (source: De Geyter Architecten, 2002).
Understanding housing sprawl: the case of Flanders 1635
(De Decker et al, 2008).(1) Moreover, leases are insecure. As a consequence, the inhabitants of private rental units areöexcept for a minor group of households who prefer to rentöno-choice households and starters.
Nor is social renting an alternative: with shares between only 6% (Flanders) and 9.5% (the Brussels Capital Region) the sector hardly covers need.(2) Consequently, long waitlists and long waiting times exclude social renting as a realistic alternative. No wonder the former Flemish housing minister compared the allocation of a social rental dwelling to winning the lottery. Nevertheless, according to the minister, `̀ The possibility of renting a good house, a good flat for a price that is a third to half of elsewhere, makes a difference in the purse'' (Keulen, 2006, page 12, own translation).
Already in 1948 a survey had revealed that 95% of the Belgian households aspire to own a house with a garden.(3) And the past is an indelible legacy. Its persistence is linked to physical reality: the houses stand where they are. There is little reason to believe they will disappear (on the contrary, there is a consistent tendency to legalize illegal structures). In Flanders, at least, huge tracts of land are legally available for further construction of suburban housing (De Decker et al, 2010; Loris, 2011). But bricks and mortar are not the only force to contend with: wild housing is highly coveted. According to a recent survey among 12-to-24-year-olds, the majority aspire to own a large house [Studio Brussel (2008); see, for analogous results, AXA (2004), De Decker (2005), Elchardus and Smits (2005), Heylen et al (2007), and Verhetsel et al (2003)]. Moreover, they want it as soon as possible, preferably before they reach the age of 25 (Elchardus and Roggemans, 2010).
Both ownership and sprawl are deeply embedded in the Flemish institutions and the minds of households. This housing dream has, according to Mougenot (1988), grown into a model. It is the result of a long-standing dialectical process of political choices and actions, cultural convictions, and economic possibilities, which have rein- forced each other over and over again through and in daily practice. In what follows I illustrate the development of the nonurban (Loeckx, 2004)öor, worse, the antiurban (Kesteloot, 2003)öattitude and the predomination of the (semi)detached single-family house. Together with weak institutions for spatial planning and housing and the dominance of private (land) property, they are intractable structures underpinning wild housing. The core argument is that, even though the model only became mature in the shape of mass ownership after World War 2öwhen, nourished by economic prosperity, the Belgian welfare state grew to adulthoodöits roots lie in the evolving political economy of the 19th century, particularly in the ways in which past elites had dealt with the consequences of the twin forces of industrialisation and urbanisation.
It is high time to look back, since the ambitious legislation and the plans that the Flemish government set forth during the second half of the 1990s seem to be failing. Pressured by political circumstances linked to urban problems (De Decker et al, 2005) and induced by field conditions such as urban decay, congestion, and ecological destruction, the Flemish legislature passed various measures. Some of them were supposed to tackle urban decay: for example, the 1995 law to combat vacancy and
(1) Illustrative is that during the 1980s, when a severe economic and housing crisis (De Decker, 2002) hit the country, the private rented legislationöbeing based on the Napoleonic Code (Lancksweerdt and Lavrysen, 1988)öbecame even more liberal (De Decker, 2001). (2) According to recent indicators, approximately 14% of the Belgian population is poor (Dierckx et al, 2010); and more concretely, in Flanders the number of social rental dwellings should be more than doubled in order to cover the need (Winters and De Decker, 2009). (3) Jacquemijns C, 1949, ``La maison heureuse. Prëfërence des Belges en matie© re d'habitation et de rapports de voisinage'' [Happy housing. Preferences of the Belgians with respect to housing and neighbourhood], quoted by Van der Poel (1958).
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slum housing; the 1997 housing act; and the 1997 law on social urban renewal. Others, like the 1977 comprehensive spatial plan for Flanders (RSV) and the 1999 spatial planning law, were intended to reverse the spatial development trends. The ambitions were high: among other things, to stop socially selective suburbanisation, to protect the countryside and landscapes, to decrease congestion by promoting public transport, and to enhance cities.
But these plans have failed, as Voets et al (2010) conclude in a recent evaluation. Although the urban population has increased, due to a positive external migration balance (Moortgat and Vandekerkchove, 2007; Willems, 2008), the targets for new dwellings have not been reached, and the suburbanisation of the native-Belgian popu- lace remains unabated and is even accelerating. The poor, dilapidated districts are still there: except for a small number of gentrifying neighbourhoods, hardly any progress is being made. Congestion has never been worse. And new construction is to a large extent still being located on nonurban sites. One reason why the implementation of the aforementioned measures has failed is that the necessary funding was not forthcoming. Another reason is that nonurban politicians kept luring city dwellers with new develop- ments. But it was also partly because the procedures were too bureaucratic and thus sluggish. The implementation also failed because the ambitions were too high and their execution was not really feasible.
But it also failed because these new plans left history out of the picture. They ignored the fact that Belgium and its regionsöcertainly with respect to urban, hous- ing, and spatial planning policiesöare locked in to past choices (Kleinman, 1996). The origins of the Belgian housing model go back to the reactions to the social conditions of the 19th century, thereby making its development path dependent. According to Bengtsson and Ruonavaara (2010), the concept of path dependency means that if, at a certain point in time, the historical development takes one direction instead of another, some otherwise feasible alternative paths will be closedöor at least difficult to reachöat a later point. The argument we advance here is that, following Bengtsson and Ruonavaara (2010), the material, mental, and social characteristics of housing and its spatial appearance tend to create strong elements of inertia that later policies will have to deal with.
In what follows I use this path-dependency approach as a stance from which to review the evolution of relevant policies. The argumentation is structured around policies forged in three domains that are crucial to an understanding of the growth of sprawl in Flanders. In section 2 I describe the inception and promotion of social commuting and consider its persistence. The reasons to sustain and continuously renew this policyöfrom its introduction in the 19th century until todayöwere to avoid a concentration of workers in the cities. Section 3 deals with early policies that strongly promoted homeownership as a means to discipline the masses. In the words of De Caigny (2007), housing was a central theme in creating a mentality of modesty, rationality, and discipline among the workersöincluding values that were attached to the single-family home like order, neatness, cosiness, being a full-time housewife, and regular cleaning, washing, and cooking. Intertwined with the successful promotion of social commuting, these policies anchored households to nonurban locations. In sec- tion 5 I deal briefly with the consequences of the absence of a spatial planning policy. In between, section 4 offers an overview of housing and living conditions in the cities. Although, as the argument goes, the conglomerate of antiurban policies was successful, people still moved to the cities. But, due to the absence of planning or renewal policies, cities in general and their popular neighbourhoods in particular developed, as is briefly
Understanding housing sprawl: the case of Flanders 1637
shown, into an antimodel. They became places for housing people who have no alternatives.(4)
2 The creation of social commuting `̀ Belgium commuted, Belgium commutes, Belgium keeps on commuting.''
G Van Istendael (1989, pages 192 ^ 193, own translation)
In order to understand the development of `wild housing', we have to go back to the Industrial Revolution, which started earlier in Belgium than in most other countries on the Continent. In conjunction with urbanisation, the industrialisation of the country fostered what Kesteloot (2003) calls an `antiurban' attitude. Characteristic of the time, starting with the takeoff of industrialisation, workers started to concentrate in the coal- mining regions of Wallonia (the axis Liege ^ Charleroi ^ Mons ^ North of France), in Brussels, and in a small number of towns in Flanders [such as Ghent, at one point the most important industrial town on the Continent (Deneckere, 2010)]. This concentra- tion threatened the Catholic and Liberal elites in at least two ways. First, it affected their health. Exacerbated by the smoke from the factories, the very high density of the slumsöwith their small, often back-to-back hovels and open sewersöwas inhumane and lethal (Lis, 1969; Van Isacker, 1978). Epidemics broke out on several occasions, notably cholera in 1832, 1845, and 1866. But besides this threatöwhich would lead to the first wave of suburbanisation of the wealthyöthere was also a moral undercurrent (a rising tide of secularisation) and a fear of social unrest and rebellion.(5) The cities were not only dirty and unhealthy: they were also hotbeds of revolt, eventually culminating in riots in which people were killed in 1886.
Under such circumstances, the elites were confronted with a paradox: in order to keep the populace obedient and humble, the workers should be kept in their villages; but in order to keep the economy going, they had to work in the cities (Verleyen, 2007). A two-pronged strategy was devised to prevent the migration of more and more people to the cities during the 19th century, aimed at tempering the mobility of workers. On the one hand, the work centres were made more accessible; on the other hand, transportation to and from workplaces was made affordable. Both tactics would come to form a twin policy, in force from the mid-19th century and which persists today.
Starting with the 1834 law on the foundation of a national railway corporation, a very dense network of regular railway connections was constructed, using public as well as private investment.(6) The rail system allowed workersöespecially the Flemish who went to work in the Walloon industrial areasöto come home every evening. The idea was for them to return to the small villages where they were protected from bad city influences and where the clergymen could keep them under the influence
(4) I have chosen to organise this paper around these major policy domains rather than around the chronological sequence of crucial policy decisions. In order to prevent the reader from getting lost, I have brought the major policy decisions together with some relevant events or a critical juncture (Bengtsson and Ruonavaara, 2010) (eg strikes, riots, wars, or political turmoil) in chronological order in appendix A. In broad terms, this timeline shows that the policies underpinning social commuting started in the 19th century; that policies to promote homeownership started at the end of the 19th century; that the first relevant spatial planning law would not see the light until 1962; and that policies to strengthen the cities would only break through during the 1990s (De Decker, 2004). (5) In Ghent there was even an economic threat: at the end of the 19th century a cooperative socialist organisation (Vooruit) would become the largest employer in the city (Deneckere, 2010). (6) In 1870 the state owned 860 km of railway, while private companies were responsible for 2300 km. These railroads were nationalised in 1870 and 1912, respectively.
1638 P De Decker
of the church. Although this policy was relatively successful, it could not stop rural flight and migration. In an attempt to formulate an adequate response, the regular railway system was complemented from 1884 onwards with a fine-meshed light-rail system. Together, the two railway systems would form the densest system in any of the industrialising countries by the end of the 19th century (Rowntree, 1910; see figure 2).
In order to make the journey to work not only accessible but also afford- able, a social tariff was, simply and brilliantly (Verleyen, 2007), introduced in 1869.
Figure 2. Length of the ordinary and light railway per surface unit in different countries around 1900 (source: Rowntree, 1910).
Understanding housing sprawl: the case of Flanders 1639
And it met with success: by the 1890s, more than two million workers commuted to work every day.(7)
The swelling antiurban attitude was fostered and reinforced over and over again. In the first place, it was given impetus by the bourgeoisie, who had started to leave the city by the end of the 19th century and move into detached houses and mansions on the fringes. In so doing, they generated a housing model that went hand in hand with the rising wealth and the development of the welfare state in the 20th century and especially after the Second World War. That model would be copied by more and ever-larger segments of the population and would come to dominate housing construc- tion from the 1960s onwards. In addition, commuting became, as Pottë (2003) phrased it, `socialised' and was continuously sustained by the government. On the accessibility side, the modernisation of the network proceeded; the early horse-drawn trams were replaced by buses during the first half of the 20th century; and when the railway systems fell into decline after the Second World War, their routes were replaced and expanded by a dense road network. Thus, countless small towns, villages, and hamlets became well connected with the centres of work, education, and leisure. As a consequence, no urban workplace or school site was far enough away to justify a move, since moving would save neither time nor money. The social tariffs for commuting to work were also made available for commuting to school. Both tariff schemes have existed ever since. Even today, the financial incentives for social com- muting seem to be extending further. For some people (eg civil servants), commuting by public transport was made free of charge. And nearly all other commuters (even car users) can deduct at least part of their transport costs from their taxable income or enjoy a company car. So commuting to work or school has remained fairly cheap. As a consequence, and according to the 2001 Census, 58.2% of the active Belgian populationönearly two million peopleöcan be classified as commuters (Verhetsel et al, 2007).
3 Promotion of homeownership `̀ ... because for many the deepest sense of existence on Belgian earth: his own house.''
G Van Istendael (1989, page 189, own translation)
Although the measures to stimulate commuting were successful, they could not stop urbanisation entirely. So a second strategy to counter the twin forces of industrialisa- tion and urbanisation was launched: the stimulation of homeownership. As an offshoot of the deadly riots of 1886, path-breaking housing legislation was passed in 1889 as a chapter of the first labour law. This put an end to the noninterventionist approach of the Belgian government (De Meulder et al, 1999; Goossens, 1982; Mougenot, 1988; Smets, 1977; Steensels, 1977a; Witte, 2005). The Belgian government wanted to com- pensate for the lack of initiative by the local authorities concerning the dilapidated housing circumstances of the workers. But the main objective of the law was to promote homeownership by means of easy financing (social loans), tax exemptions, and cheap social dwellings (Goossens, 1982; Smets, 1977). As a bonus, owners and families who were saving for a house of their own were allowed an extra vote by the 1893 law on the plural voting right for men (see Terhorst and Van de Ven, 1997; Witte, 2005).
It is hard to overestimate the impact of this law on private housing construction and wild building. In theory at least, the law made it possible to establish social housing companies, whose task would be to construct social rental dwellings. Yet its success lay in the generation of private house construction underpinned by fiscal
(7) The number of `workman's tickets' sold grew from 14 233 in 1870 to over 2 204 613 in 1896 and then to 78304104 in 1911 (Polasky, 2001).
1640 P De Decker
instruments and cheap (social) financing. According to a Belgian representative at an international conference in Du« sseldorf in 1902, this was linked to the fact that `̀ the Belgian worker preferred to construct a new house on a parcel of his own and according to his own inspiration. In order to realise that, he opts to collect enough savings in order to bargain with a credit provider, rather than to move into an existing building'' (quoted by Smets, 1977, page 51, own translation).
Fundamental to the 1889 law is that it tried to prevent the construction of large quarters for workers and fostered the dispersal of the working class (Lis, 1977; Smets, 1977). Through the individualisation of support and by linking social loans to house- hold savings, housing became a matter of individual initiative and do-it-yourself implementation (De Decker, 1996). As a consequence, living in low densities, priva- tised housing, and a spatially chaotic setting gradually became the norm. Since the beginning of the 20th century, a house of one's own has been part of the grammar of living (Flint and Rowlands, 2003) of a Belgian household.
The antiurban attitude that had been growing during the 19th century reached a peak around 1900 (De Caigny, 2007; Goossens, 1982; Smets, 1977). Afterwards, accord- ing to Mougenot (1988), a broad consensus on the solution to the housing problem arose: individual homeownership, preferably single-family dwellings.
Different features would reinforce this, and the role of policy makers and the government cannot be overestimated. At every moment in the past, and even today, there have been instruments, subsidies, and institutions to promote homeownership. By far the biggest subsidy has been in the form of tax exemptions, and these still exist (De Decker, 2000; 2010). Besides tax exemptions, there are cheap/social loans and, in ever-changing proportions, grants, premiums, social dwellings for purchase, and cheap/ social building parcels. The purpose was generally to stimulate new construction, not renovation. After the introduction of a grant for new construction in 1922, it was the construction grant of 1948 that was to have a tremendous impact on the Belgian landscape. Between 1948 and 1961, between 350 000 and 400 000 grants were allocated (Buyst, 1992).
Not only did the policies targeting individual households sustain the model: the initiatives taken by the main housing institutions also reinforced its foundation. The actions of the Housing Fund for Large Families (Woningfonds), which is still in operation, are classic examples. Observing that large families had to live under deplor- able conditions, in 1928 this private company obtained government permission to extend cheaper loans at a regressive interest rateölinked to the number of childrenöto large families. The government hoped that this discounted rate would help solve the housing problems of large families by forcing them into homeownership. Just as influential as the other initiatives were the construction activities of another housing institution founded in 1935, the National Housing Company for Small Rural Houses (NMKL), and its recognised local housing companies. Their activities con- cerned the construction of dwellings for sale and the purchase of cheap building plotsölinked to a cheap/social loanöin the countryside or on the urban fringe. Here, the workers, the unemployed, and other asset-poor households would be able to supplement their income though produce from their garden (growing vegetables, fruit, and raising small animals) (Goossens, 1982). The foundation of the NMKL was linked to the crisis of the 1930s and the steep drop in employment, which left the unemployed wandering through the cities. In order to compensate for the risks posed by these vagrants, the government wanted the jobless workers to leave the cities for the countrysideöwhere they could live in their own house with a garden.
Understanding housing sprawl: the case of Flanders 1641
The model has another important facet. The Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church, as set forth in the Papal encyclicals Rerum Novarum (1891)(8) and Quadragesimo Anno (1931) had a fundamental impact in this Catholic country. The influence of these letters was two-fold. First, the ideas strongly advocate ownership of single-family houses by workers. This was deemed to guarantee the well-being of the individual in the family setting (see Goossens, 1982; Werkgroep Alternatieve Economie, 1977). The implication that, because of its cost, ownership would discipline the workers was tacitly accepted, and it coincided with the ideology of the Liberal Party (Witte, 1990). In addition, during the construction and consolidation phase of the model (before 1940), the Catholic parties, who were the guardians of the model, were always members of the government and dominant political forces (sustained by the Christian Workers Movementöstill the largest trade union in Belgium and the main exponent of the model). Taken as a whole, since the violent 1886 strikes which were the stimulus for the first social and housing law, there were only twelve non-successive years in which the Catholic (later Christian) parties were not in government. The ultimate consequence of this power position was that changing the path was never on the agenda.
The promotion of homeownership was also sustained by the Liberal Party. Indeed, ownership is a core tenet of their ideology [see, for example, former Prime Minister Verhofstadt's (2002) pleas for 100% ownership]. And even more recently, the Flemish Socialist Party made an about-turn and joined the pro-ownership club when its chairman declared that his ideal society has as many homeowners as possible and as few tenants as possible (Stevaert, 2003).(9) In its declaration of principles in 2007 the Socialist Party wrote:
`̀ Everybody has the right to a comfortable, qualitative and affordable dwelling. We want as many people as possible to own their house. This is the best guarantee for living well and it is the best way for pension saving'' (http://www.s-p-a.be, own translation).
4 The reality of the urban field The construction of the model was, and is, also underpinned by the experience of urban housing and living conditions. For a very long timeöand to some extent even todayö the reality of the city has been that of an antimodel, a model of negative publicity.
(8) Although the Pope still preferred a corporate organisation, in the open letter he formulated the acceptance of `other' formulas, such as trade unions grouping only workers, because these could fight the antisocialist struggle more efficiently. But the trade unions have to be faithful to basic capitalistic principles and advocate loyal and harmonious cooperation with the employers; thus, they avoid conflicts and strikes (Witte, 2005). (9) Deslë (1990) points to the fact that, although the Socialist Party historically fought the private ownership of production means and advocated more collective housing and urbanisation models, the party never condemned the private ownership of houses. Moreover, we cannot speak of a clear antagonism between the view of the socialists (pro-rent, pro-planning) and the others (pro-individualised initiative, pro-ownership), since the socialists scarcely developed a coherent view. Important is that in its early days (leaders and members of) the Socialist Party took an anti-urban attitude since the capitalist city, with its horrible living conditions, was seen as a place of oppression. We can also see reconciliation between worker and farmer in the work of the socialist leader E Vandervelde (1903) `̀ L'exode rural et le retour aux champs'' [``The rural exodus and the return to the fields'']. For him, the influx of workers into the city was evil. He advocated a policy to keep the workers in the countryside (so that they could fall back on agriculture when unemployed) and social commuting. The support of the socialists for the garden district should be interested in the same way, since it concerns a reconciliation of the rural and urban ways of life. Altogether, the socialist attitude was ambiguous since it simultaneously stressed that if any political fraction in Belgium were to plead for more planning and social rental housing, it would be the socialists (see De Caigny, 2007; Goossens, 1982; Notteboom, 2006; Smets, 1977).
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Cover of an album with type plans for social housing, published by the ASLK, a savings and loans bank appointed to finance social housing, in 1922.
Model for a social dwelling presented by the ASLK at the Brussels World Exhibition in 1910.
Garden neighbourhood Le Logis Florëal near Brussels.
The design of a rural bungalow by the NMKL, accompanied by the slogan ``A house on the country site is a happy house''.
Figure 3. Housing model types developed between the wars.
Understanding housing sprawl: the case of Flanders 1643
Lots of reports, policy memoranda, and popular media reportages have illustrated the lack of any alternative position for large-city neighbourhoods because of the densely built, poor-quality housing in areas with little greenery and open space. A statement by the journalist De Stoop made in the year 2000 is striking:
`̀ I now live on the other side of Antwerp, in between the fields, where I raise tomatoes and cucumbers. I farm in my conservatory. I lived in the city between my 20th and 40th year of age. I'm happy about that, but now I have two children and I cannot imagine how I can raise them in the city, I grew up in the fields (in Ghijs, 2000, page 11, own translation).
On the conditions in a Ghent neighbourhood in 1980, Pehlivan, a former senator and the first alderman in Ghent with Turkish roots, wrote:
`̀ I was confronted with inhuman conditions. In the Ox street people lived in medi- eval conditions without the most elementary hygienic amenities: no running water, no bathroom, common toilets in the streets, walls with water running down on them. It was like living in a Turkish mountain village moved to a backward neighbourhood in the city'' (Pehlivan, 2003, page 70, own translation).
And some twenty to thirty years earlier, the famous novelist L P Boon (1988) referred to the Ghent quarters where the workers lived in c̀orpses of streets', where the streets have names of flowers and trees, but where `̀ you don't see a twig, a leaf or a flower'' (page 125) and where the people living there never saw the tree that gave its name to the street.
So, fostered by rising wealth and welfare-state arrangements, the model really took off in the 1960s in the form of mass housing. The cities were still dirty places then, their factories and densely packed dwellings evoking disgust. In the meantime, to compete with the cities for residents (Goossens, 1983), the adjacent local authorities offered ample building plots for new construction, and that is where the single-family houses were built. It is via social imitation (Mougenot, 1988; Smets, 1977; Steensels, 1977b) that the model has been consolidated over and over again.
The ongoing absence of a real urban renewal policy to ameliorate housing condi- tions in the poor neighbourhoods (De Decker, 2004) was not the only factor. It should be stressed that the examples of good housing produced by housing institutions in the past also refer to nonurban, rural housing, as illustrated in figure 3. And even the few collectivised initiatives in the early days of social rental housing were inspired by an idyllic rural vision (Smets, 1977). The legacy is that even 54% of today's social rental dwellings are single-family houses (Heylen et al, 2007).
5 The absence of alternatives `̀ The Belgian wants to put his castle where it suits him.''
Perceval and Kruismans (2004, page 110)
In order to appreciate the robustness of the housing-sprawl model, we must take more features into consideration. It is not enough to look at what was and is; we also have to look at what was and is notöat reasonable alternatives.
Since the start of housing policy in Belgium, all governments have promoted one model and neglected or ignored the alternatives. In view of its low proportion of the stock, social rental housingöwith a market share of 6% and 75 000 households on the waitlist for one of the 140 000 dwellingsöis hardly a suitable safety net. Private renting was never properly regulated (De Decker, 2001) and periods of steep rent increases were never compensated by rent allowances. Add to this the fact that no serious housing-renewal programme was ever set up. As a consequence, in one of the
1644 P De Decker
most prosperous regions of the world, about 10% of the housing stock is still of poor quality (Vanneste et al, 2007).
So far, I have covered the strategies designed to keep the workers out of the cities. The main thrust of my argument is that a robust antiurban housing model, promoting ownership of single-family dwellings outside the cities was created whereby the cities came to serve as anti-models: places where people would not live if they could afford the suburban and exurban models. The absence of a reasonable alternative forced, and still forces, households into this tenure. But to understand dispersal and sprawl, we have to bring in yet another feature, since nonurban ownership does not necessarily amount to dispersal and sprawl. To put this in context, we have to take a third strategy into account: namely, the absence of spatial planning policy.
In order to understand the social construction of `dwelling wild', we need to examine another piece of its foundationöspatial planning or, rather, the lack of it. Fundamentally, until 1962, Belgium had no spatial planning policy.(10) It was only with the 1962 Law on Spatial Planning (Janssens, 1985) that an arsenal of planning instru- mentsöamong which building permission, allotment permission, and spatial plans at different levelsöwas introduced. Crucial is that the first district plansöin practice, the nonlocal plans with a direct impact on the use of landöwere only adopted at the end of the 1970s. This meant, de facto, that the postwar private housing construction boom
Allotment permits Built-up areas Main roads
0 1 2 km
Figure 4. Sprawl of allotment schemes approved in the period 1962 ^ 66. The grey plots are the built-up areas; the black spots are the approved allotment in the period 1962 ^ 66 (source: Van Havre, 1967).
(10) The 1946 law had little impact.
Understanding housing sprawl: the case of Flanders 1645
occurred almost without any spatial planning. The local authorities, which had not excelled in spatial planning policy before, had no framework with which to evaluate the applications for permission to build or to develop land. In practice, this led to dis- persed building of private dwellings and to ribbon development along access roads to villages and cities. It also led to an unplanned, dispersed realisation of allotment schemesöthese being the most common way to free up land for new housing construc- tion. Figure 4 shows the location of allotment schemes just after passage of the 1962 law and through the period 1962 ^ 67. The grey spots are built-up areas, and the black ones are the accepted allotment schemes; their distribution perfectly illustrates Braem's patchwork image mentioned in the introduction. What this implies for the whole of Flanders today is illustrated in figure 5, which shows the spread of legally available land for housing development as planned in the wake of the 1962 law.
The location of the early allotment schemes not only fostered the development of sprawl but, in a subsequent phase, also had a strong impact on the district plans in which the housing-development areas are legally defined. The spread of the allotments was to determine the generous perimeters of these housing-development areas.(11) By the end of the 1970s in Flanders, and dependent on the prevailing hypothesis on the evolution of the size of the plots of land, between 715 000 and 914 000 plots for house construction had been reserved on the plans (De Decker, 1993). Under the current planning criteria of 25 dwellings per ha in urban areas and 15 in nonurban areas, the black spots on figure 5 would add up to more than 600 000 units.(12)
In this regard it is interesting that the minister responsible for the approval of the 1962 law underpinning the district plans insisted on reserving a large area for housing development, assuming that a land policy would/could not emerge (Saey, 1988). Befit- ting a Christian Democrat, he welcomed the idea of a single-family house for every household, so he had to prevent land prices from rising. In order to accomplish this, the market would have to be large enough. This, along with the location of the early allot- ment plans, explain why the district zoning plans reserved such a huge amount of space.
Figure 5. Location of vacant building plots on destination plans in Flanders, potential supply at the end of 2009 (source: Loris, 2011).
(11) In addition to the political choices to provide for large housing-development areas, the fear of having to pay planning losses is in play. Allotment plans are development instruments creating huge value increases covered by the law (eg by turning agricultural land into housing land). When the government reverses its decision, there is a risk that the court will find the state liable for the (potential) financial losses. (12) For the sake of comparison, the Brussels Capital Region at the end of 2008 housed 507455 households (source: ADSEI).
1646 P De Decker
In retrospect, the district plans came too late. They even fostered a further dispersal once they were operational since they left enough space within the perimeters of the housing areas for wild development. Intriguing in this respect is that the amount of land reserved for housing had grown between the planning phase and the legal adop- tion of the plans. This followed from the participation process: local agents (mayors, councillors, developers, owners) did not agree with the spatial restriction on land available for housing development, so grassroots pressure encouraged the government to expand the planned areas (Cabus, 1983; see also figure 5).(13)
As it turned out, the aforementioned minister was right: no land policy has been developed so far, which explains the typical sustained pyramidal structure of land prices (figure 6).(14) Urban land is expensive while nonurban land is cheap, and becomes cheaper the farther away from the centres it lies. Nonurban land is the roof over the Belgian `wild dwelling house'. Given the easy and cheap accessibility of non- urban areas and the nature of the housing subsidies fostering new construction by individual families, families looked for a housing plot ever farther away from the cities. But note that not only private developers and households sought distant land: social housing companies did as well (eg see Dessouroux, 2008; Dumont, 1951).
6 Conclusion and discussion In this paper I have looked into the causes of `sprawled' housing in Flandersö `sprawled' connoting `unplanned' and c̀haotic'. I have argued that beneath the visibly chaotic, behind the unplanned, lie structures of reinforced concrete. Like the existing artefacts and the dense railway and motorway system, these structures not only have a physical appearance, but are also embedded in legislation and institutions. But above all, the compulsion to possess a nonurban single-family house is engraved in the minds of the people.
P ri c e
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
A al te r
N ev el e
G en t
M er el b ek e
W et te re n
E rp e- m er e
A al st
A ff li ge m
T er n at
B H G
Z av en te m
B er te m
D eu ve n
B ie rb ee k
B o u te rs em
1985 1997 2010
Figure 6. Prices per m2 of building plots along the E40ö1985, 1997, and 2010 (at 2010 rates). BHG (Brussels Capital Region), Gent, and Leuven are the major cities (source: national statistical office ADSEI%; own calculations).
(13) These `extensions' were accompanied by accusations of corruption and legal procedures. A collaborator of the minister ended up in jail for a while. (14) Figure 4 is illustrative. Similar illustrations can be given for nearly all other periods in time.
Understanding housing sprawl: the case of Flanders 1647
The weight of this model is well illustrated by the failed attempts of the 1990s to alter urban housing policies and to foster more planned and compact development. I reasoned that to understand this we have to look back. The weight of the past is an impediment, since the policies mentioned here are strongly path dependent. Looking back is important because the present prefers to forget or mythologise the past, whereby it also loses insight into the complexity that is the result of a historical development (Reynebeau, 2010).
One could argue that the above argument is premised on a deterministic reading of the past, as it suggests that the model that emerged in the 19th century had developed without serious competition. Of course there was, as briefly illustrated, ongoing urbani- sation. And of course there were, as also briefly described, counterfactual propositions and models. For instance, the Socialist Party stood at different times for modernistic housing (Smets, 1977; Van Herck and Avermaete, 2006) and the regulation of private renting. But it is undeniable that, since the 1889 housing law, the promotion of nonurban sprawled homeownership has been overwhelmingly predominant. The alter- natives either could not break through (eg private rental regulation) or remained marginal (eg social rental housing and urban renewal). This brings us back to the ideologies and the power relations of the 19th century and the way politics moved forward in the 20th century.
Leaving the lethal strikes and riots of 1886 aside for a moment, the history of Belgian and Flemish housing policy did have some critical junctures, all of which were tied to major societal and/or political crises. Two critical junctures are linked to the Worlds Wars. The third occurred within the autonomous Flemish politico-institutional framework after the devolution of the state; it is related to the emergence of an extremist political party, which would become one of the largest factions in the Flemish Parlia- ment and the largest in the Council of Antwerp (De Decker et al, 2005). These crises led to legislation that could foster the construction of social rental housing. In 1919 the umbrella organisation for social rental housing was founded; in 1949 its financing was broadened; and in the early 1990s the Flemish government decided to construct an additional 10 000 social rental dwellings. These measures reflect the presence of the socialists in the government. But in hindsight these deeds were not very effective since the laws were not followed up with planned targets or substantial budgets. In partic- ular, the 1919 and 1949 decisions were largely limited to institutional frames and did not generate much construction activity. And the extra 10 000 social dwellings built during the 1990s did not increase the share of the social rental housing stock substan- tially. The picture that emerges when we also take the noninterventionist policies in the private rental sector into account aptly illustrates either the limited power or the limited willingness of the Socialist Party to develop alternative housing paths. The interpre- tation of `limited power' is based on the fact that if leftist parties like the socialists, the communists, and recently the Green Party, are in government, they are part of a coalition. The interpretation of `limited willingness' is based on the fact that housing and spatial planning had never been at the heart of the Socialist Party's ideology.
I contend that the Belgian and Flemish policies on housing, as well as on urban and spatial planning, have remained on the 19th-century path, which brings us back to the importance of the 1889 law. This legislation was passed in reaction to the ongoing quarrels accompanying the twin developments of industrialisation and urbanisation. In its discourse and implementation, this law fostered the emergence of the sprawled- homeownership model and is linked with the powers that were already established as well as with the ensuing practical politics. Some explanation is useful here. In the years preceding the 1889 law, Belgian politics had already shown a strong preference for private ownership. This was grounded in, first, the Napoleonic Code (1804), which specifies civil rights, including a nearly absolute protection of private property.
1648 P De Decker
Second, it is based on the Constitution, which made Belgium a liberal state. And third, it is aligned with the growing power of the (bourgeois) Liberal Party, which sees private property as an essential part of its ideology. Together these powers became the guard- ians of private property. The second important political faction with considerable weight, the Catholics, did not develop an alternative option: on the contrary, its views also evolved in the direction of private homeownership, which was seen as an efficient tool by which to discipline the workers. As a consequence, by 1864, 82% of the land was privately ownedö and not by large landowners, but cut up in bits and pieces (Vanhaute, 1996). A final feature of the pre-1889 period is that the forces of opposition (the Socialist Party and the trade unions) were still either very dispersed (trade unions) or inexperienced (the Socialist Party). In parliament they had no power (the socialists would only enter parliament after the 1893 law).
So in 1886, when the strikes and riots forced the homogeneous Catholic government to give up its noninterventionist stanceöa stance also supported by the liberalsöthe private property ideology was already deeply embedded in Belgian society. That it was to be consolidated and even reinforced is linked to two other tendencies. The first is the thrust of the two papal encyclicals, especially Rerum Novarum (1891), which declared ownership to be a right. Since then, the whole Catholic movement, but especially the Catholic (later Christian) trade union, founded in 1912, became a pro-homeownership bloc. Since the Catholic trade union was by far the most important trade union (especially in Flanders), its vision became the norm for housing policy. The second tendency is that since the end of the First World War, governments in Belgium (at all levels) have mostly been coalitions in which the Catholic portion has been the largest. This has two consequences: one is that the Catholic vision on housing could never be set aside; the other is that alternative visions could easily be blocked.
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zekerheid'' [Housing in Flanders: on quality, affordability and security], in De Staat van Vlaanderen 2009 [The condition of Flanders 2009], Eds L Vanderleyden, M Callens, J Noppe, Studiedienst van de Vlaamse regering, Brussels, pp 199 ^ 234
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1652 P De Decker
Appendix Table A1. Market points relevant for understanding housing sprawl in Flanders.
Date Categorya Description Meaning/inheritance
1804 E Code Napoleon Civil Rights Law which has influenced, until the present day, the Belgian private rental legislation. Its concerns are a strong defence of property rights, and the contractual freedom and a supposed equality among landlords and tenants.
1830 E Belgium becomes an independent state
1831 E Constitution Creating a liberal state ± weight on private ownership [candidature for elections and voting rights are linked to private (land)ownership].
1834 M Foundation of the national railway company
Dense regular railway network.
1869 M Introduction of the social railway tariff
Introduction of cheap public transport so that workers could stay in their villages; it was to be the start of a policy lasting until today (including free commuting and fiscal deduction for commuters).
1884 M Foundation of the national light- railway company
Leading to the densification of the public transport network (first with trams, later buses).
1885 E Foundation of the Socialist Party
1886 E Strikes and lethal riots Fostered the first social law and housing law.
1889 H First Housing Law Promotion of homeownership (legal base for the financing of social loans and the construction of social purchase dwellingsÐfiscal rebates for owners).
1891 E Papal Letter Rerum Novarum First declaration of the head of the Catholic Church on the workers' problem; frame for the foundation of Catholic organisations (eg trade unions); landownership and homeownership are also workers rightsÐwould become the ideological line of the Belgian Christian Workers Movement (CWM). The CWM encompasses, under the heading of antisocialism, the largest trade union, the most important health-insurance company; numerous midfield organisations (for youngsters, women, etc); represented in parliaments through the Catholic/Christian political parties.
1893 E Law on General Plural Voting rights for men
Broadening of voting rights to owners of small houses and those who have savings for obtaining their own house.
1914 ± 1918 E First World War Severe war damagesÐno coordinated and planned reconstruction; rebuilding house by house was underpinned by an individual grants.
U n d erstan
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g sp raw
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o f F lan
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Table A1 (continued).
Date Categorya Description Meaning/inheritance
1919 H Foundation of the National Housing Company (NMGWW)
Umbrella organisation founded to organise the construction of social rental dwellingsÐ little success in the field.
1922 H Introduction of individual grant system Free grant for households that become owners of a house.
1928 H Recognition of the organisation of large families as a housing institution (Woningfonds)
Government allows a private organisation to give cheap loans to large families; the rent is regressive with the number of childrenÐthe organisation still has the same role today.
1935 H Foundation of the National Land Company (NMKL)
Umbrella organisation appointed to construct social purchase dwellings and to give social loans on rural land.
1940 ± 1944 E Second World War
1944 E Social Pact Pact drawing the contours of the postwar social policy underpinning Belgium's welfare state.
1948 H Introduction of the De Taeye grant system
Free grants for households that become owners of a house through purchase or self- build of a new home.
1949 H Introduction of the Brunfaut law Frame for the financing of social housing (as well social renting, social purchase, and social plots of land for house construction)Ðthis would not lead to an increase in the market share of social rental housing.
1962 SP Spatial Planning Law Frame for a spatial planning policy; relevant implementation only occurred in the second half of the 1970s.
1980 E Devolution of the state Restructuring of the state, splitting up housing and planning responsibilities.
1988 H Merge of housing umbrella organisations
This concerns the descendants of the NMGWW and NMKL; this has no effect on the numbers of houses constructed.
1955 H Law to combat vacancy and slum housing
First attempt to introduce policy to combat these issues.
1997 H Flanders Housing Law Consolidates the historical options and opens up possibilities to recognise new housing organisations and introduce new measures; effect marginal.
1997 SP Global Spatial Plan for Flanders First comprehensive spatial planning plan for Flanders.
1999 SP Spatial Planning Law Renewed frame for a spatial planning policy.
2001 M Law on basic mobility Every household should have a public transport stop within 750 m. a EÐrelevant event (eg change of constitution, strike, riots, war); MÐpolicies promoting social commuting; HÐhousing policies; SPÐspatial planning policies.
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ß 2011 Pion Ltd and its Licensors
Conditions of use. This article may be downloaded from the E&P website for personal research by members of subscribing organisations. This PDF may not be placed on any website (or other online distribution system) without permission of the publisher.
- Abstract
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The creation of social commuting
- 3 Promotion of homeownership
- 4 The reality of the urban field
- 5 The absence of alternatives
- 6 Conclusion and discussion
- References
- CrossRef-enabled references
- Appendix
resource/housing. sprawl.pdf
HOUSING, SPRAWL, AND THE USE OF DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES: THE CASE OF THE INLAND EMPIRE
RANDY BLUFFSTONE, MATT BRAMAN, LINDA FERNANDEZ, TOM SCOTT and PEI-YI LEE*
This article is concerned with the economics of excessively large and socially costly suburban expansion and attempts to summarize and organize the main economic argu- ments associated with sprawl due to single-family residential home construction. We also apply standard welfare economics and price policy instruments to the issue of suburban sprawl in order to suggest ways in which economics can participate in and inform the debate over sprawl. The article uses the Inland Empire, which includes the valley regions of San Bernardino and Riverside Counties in Southern California east of Los Angeles, as a case study. (JEL R11, R14, Q24)
I. INTRODUCTION
This article is concerned with the economics of excessively large and socially costly subur- ban expansion and attempts to summarize and organize the main economic arguments associ- ated with sprawl due to single-family residen- tial home construction. The topic is of interest not only because the social costs of sprawl may be high but also because what seem like fairly clear economic issues have been at least par- tially obscured by the debate over sprawl. This has led to obfuscation to the point that well- accepted economic notions have not been able to fulfill their clarifying potential and stand- ard economic instruments to internalize exter- nalities remain on the sidelines.
This article presents some of these confu- sions and debates for review. We also apply standard welfare economics and price instru-
ments to the issue of suburban sprawl in order to suggest ways in which economics can par- ticipate in and inform the debate. The article uses the Inland Empire, which includes the valley regions of San Bernardino and River- side Counties in Southern California east of Los Angeles, as a case study.
TheInlandEmpireisverylarge,witha popu- lation of about 3.8 million. Indeed, though dwarfed by Los Angeles County if the region were a state, it would be larger than exactly half the U.S. states (California Department of Finance Web site; Husing, 2005). The region is a good one for the purpose because key policy issues related to property rights, housing affordability, and externalities closely associated with housing choices that are of nationwide interest are being debated particu- larly actively in the region. Part of the reason sprawl and its effects are so much in the fore- front in the Inland Empire is that the region has experienced an enormous building boom during the past 10 yr. In 2004, there were
*We would like to thank the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation for financial support that lead to this article and to the Center for Sustainable Sub- urban Development at the University of California, Riv- erside, and Portland State University for providing homes for the research. We would also like to thank one anon- ymous reviewer for particularly helpful comments.
Bluffstone: Department of Economics, Portland State University Portland, OR 97201. Phone 503-725-3938; E-mail [email protected]
Braman: Department of Economics, Portland State Univer- sity Portland, OR 97201. Phone 503-725-3915; E-mail [email protected]
Fernandez: Department of Environmental Sciences, Uni- versity of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA 92521. Phone 951-827-2955; E-mail [email protected]
Scott: Department of Earth Sciences, University of Califor- nia, Riverside, Riverside, CA 92521. Phone 951-827- 5115; E-mail [email protected]
Lee: Department of Earth Sciences, University of Califor- nia, Riverside, Riverside, CA 92521. Phone 951-827- 5115; E-mail [email protected]
ABBREVIATIONS
APA: American Planning Association
CARB: California Air Resources Board
MB: Marginal Benefits
MC: Marginal Costs
MSC: Marginal Social Cost
PEMS: Performance Measurement System
PM: Particulate Matter
SCAG: Southern California Association of
Governments
SCAQMD: South Coast Air Quality Management
District
SMSA: Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
Contemporary Economic Policy (ISSN 1074-3529) Vol. 26, No. 3, July 2008, 433–447 doi:10.1111/j.1465-7287.2008.00098.x Online Early publication April 8, 2008 � 2008 Western Economic Association International
433
36,000 single-family housing building permits issued in the two-county region, which repre- sented 25% of the total new permits in the State of California and placed the Inland Empire third in the nation (behind Atlanta and Phoenix) in terms of number of building permits issued by a standard metropolitan sta- tistical area (SMSA) (Berkman, 2004; Wilson and Kelley, 2003). In the first 9 mo of 2005, a whopping 52% of all new homes constructed in California were built in the Inland Empire (Husing, 2005).
The next section presents various defini- tions of sprawl that have been used in the literature. Section 3 lays out a standard eco- nomic definition of sprawl and discusses crit- ical measurement issues. Section 4 delves more deeply into the three main negative externali- ties associated with sprawl—road congestion/ air pollution, loss of open space, and demands on public infrastructure—using the Inland Empire as a case study. The argument has been made that these externalities should be given lower weight than housing construction because there exists a housing shortage in California. Section 5 therefore examines this notion from a theoretical and empirical per- spective and concludes that such claims should be viewed with caution. Section 6 moves the article into the policy arena through an exam- ination of price instruments such as fees, which are often used for controlling pollution externalities and in some cases also sprawl. The section also presents some key barriers to using these instruments in the United States. The final section concludes the article.
II. DEFINING SPRAWL
For many reasons, sprawl has proven to be a difficult issue to define, much less examine from an economic perspective as we attempt to do in the following section. Wassmer (2000) and Burchell, Downs, and Mukherji (2005) note that the term ‘‘sprawl’’ has been used by urban planners, environmentalists, and others with contempt and disapproval, but also note that sprawl is not synonymous with metropolitan growth. Instead, it is a dys- functional style of growth. Hess (2001) simply notes that ‘‘sprawl has become the term people use to describe anything they do not like about American cities.’’
Going beyond general notions has been dif- ficult at least since 1965 (Harvey and Clark,
1965). More currently, Burchell, Downs, and Mukherji (2005) and Galster et al. (2001) find that there is still no common def- inition of sprawl. In addition, both these articles conclude that there are limited means to determine levels of sprawl or compare sprawl across different areas. Downs (1998) and others therefore describe sprawl by ob- servable traits, such as low densities, strip commercial, and leapfrog development pat- terns. Ewing (1997) defines sprawl as ‘‘non- compact development.’’ Ewing, Pendall, Chen (2001) note that ‘‘people living in more sprawl- ing regions tend to drive greater distances, own more cars, breathe more polluted air, face greater risks of traffic fatalities and walk and use transit less.’’ Burchell, Downs, and Mukherji (2005) define sprawl as ‘‘low density, rapidly spreading urban development that leapfrogs out from an urban center.’’
Galster et al. (2001) provide an interesting review of definitions of sprawl that have been used in the literature and group them into sev- eral categories. First, sprawl can be defined by its characteristics (e.g., scattered or low- density development). Sprawl can also be an aesthetic judgment (e.g., ugliness), an uninter- nalized externality (e.g., traffic congestion), or defined in terms of linkages to something else. Downs (1998) and Black (1996), for example, suggest that sprawl is indicated by fragmented local or regional planning, but it is also fre- quently described as conforming to specific patterns of development (e.g., ribbon develop- ment, leapfrog development). Finally, Ewing (1997) and Harvey and Clark (1965) see sprawl as organically linked with develop- ment, suggesting perhaps that areas may pass through sprawl stages in the process of becom- ing more compact. The problem, of course, is that in the process, irreversible losses of public goods such as open space, habitat, and biodi- versity may occur.
It is hard to find consensus on a definition of sprawl because precisely defining and mea- suring the negative externalities participants in housing markets impose on existing residents and each other is difficult. Brueckner (2001) and Wassmer (2000) break the costs into four categories. Perhaps, the most often noted are losses of farmland and open space amenities. Urban expansion may also lead to longer com- mutes, generating excessive congestion, and air pollution. Third, growth at the fringe pulls development away from the city center and
434 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY
can lead to deterioration of city centers. Finally, some claim that low-density suburban development reduces the social bonds that hold societies together.
Song and Knaap (2004) particularly high- light the effects of homogeneous land uses, low density, and poor connectivity. They point to the winding streets, cul-de-sacs, and large blocks that are typical of suburban areas and argue that low-density development with poor connectivity increases dependency on automobiles, consumes farmland and open space, and raises the cost of public infrastruc- ture. The American Planning Association (APA) suggests that less mixing of land uses leads to less walking and bike riding, more vehicle miles traveled, worse air quality, and reduced aesthetic beauty.
Brueckner (2001) identifies three key mar- ket failures associated with sprawl that lead to excessive spatial growth, generating social costs. The first is the failure to account for the social value of open space near metropol- itan areas. Second, individuals fail to take into account the full social costs of commuting when they choose to locate their homes away from work and other destinations. Third, real estate developers may not pay the full costs of infrastructure needed to service new develop- ment, leading to an overestimation of net ben- efits. He and other authors note that spread out development close to the fringe of urban areas increases infrastructure costs per house- hold compared with closer in, higher density neighborhoods (Burchell et al., 2002; Harvey and Clark, 1965). Sprawl therefore causes urban land to be used inefficiently because land that is closer to the center of a metropol- itan area where infrastructure already exists is passed up for cheaper land further from the city center. This increases burden on local gov- ernments (Heim, 2001).
All three of these failures distort the forces that drive the spatial expansion of cities. Cor- recting these failures would alter the spatial pattern and potentially also the level of devel- opment, increasing social welfare. As Brueck- ner (2001) points out, however, the key challenge is to choose the right instruments for internalizing these externalities.
III. THE SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF SPRAWL
Although the term sprawl can be used in a variety of ways, from an economic perspec-
tive, the meaning is fairly clear. It is obvious, for example, that sprawl exists when public re- sources
1 are converted to private goods (e.g.,
houses, yards, and shopping centers) such that overall social welfare is reduced. This would be a very conservative notion, however, because in a Pareto economic sense, the bar for defining optimal sets of outcomes would be set much higher. For example, with the usual caveats, basic microeconomic theory supports the development of competitive mar- kets not because we lose nothing but because they are believed to add the maximum to social welfare. With market failures, such as exces- sive loss of public resources, the goal should remain to maximize social welfare rather than assure it is nondecreasing. This focus on the optimum is consistent with Brueckner (2001) and Wassmer (2000) who define urban sprawl as spatial growth, that is, ‘‘excessive’’ relative to what is socially desired.
2
This situation is presented in Figure 1. On the horizontal axis is an index of public resour- ces reduced, which is some positive function of new housing construction choices. On the vertical axis are the benefits received by
FIGURE 1
A Graphical Depiction of Sprawl
$
MSC
MB
0 B C A
Public Resources Lost = f (new construction choices)
c
Sprawl
1. Because not all the goods lost due to sprawl are pure public goods, we use the more general term ‘‘public resour- ces,’’ which may include pure and partial public goods. We thank a reviewer for this suggestion. In general, goods lost due to sprawl have significant public good aspects.
2. Adding weights to cost-benefit analyses that over- emphasize the welfare of some members of society over others could potentially alter simple Pareto-based conclusions.
BLUFFSTONE ET AL.: HOUSING, SPRAWL, AND THE USE OF DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES 435
developers and migrants from reducing those public resources. These might be profits to developers and enjoyment of living on larger lots outside city centers for buyers, both of which are captured by market prices. Also on the vertical axis are the external costs asso- ciated with lost public resources. These might be lost enjoyment of open space, health effects from air pollution, time lost due to congestion, reduced utility from knowing natural land- scapes have been altered, orange groves bulldozed, and species lost. Simply for conve- nience, these are measured in dollars.
The functions depicted are the marginal benefits (MBs) and costs (MCs) of allowing public resources to be degraded. The costs are the marginal losses of utility to those who enjoy those goods and the benefits are the marginal net benefits of housing (i.e., the private good) made possible by degrading public resources. Marginal social cost slopes upward, reflecting increasing marginal dam- ages (e.g., conversion of increasingly sensitive lands for housing and higher marginal health costs due to air pollution), and MB declines indicating that early migrants are likely to get higher net benefits (e.g., access to good views, lower land prices) than those who come later. This is a standard analytical framework in economics that can be readily applied to the question of sprawl.
Without any policy, welfare maximizing buyers and sellers of houses degrade public resources until there are no more net benefits from degrading them or where MB 5 0; with- out public subsidies, further degradation should not be observed. Is this optimal? The answer is typically no because when MB 5 0, the extra social cost of development exceeds the benefit.
3 Indeed, anything past the in-
tersection of the two curves (Point B) has this feature.
Development should occur in a Pareto eco- nomic sense in a fashion and magnitude such that the MB of degradation equals the MC because this level maximizes social welfare. This point brings us to a rigorous notion of sprawl because any set of development choices that cause degradation of public resources beyond Point B is excessive. Sprawling devel- opment can therefore be defined as any pat- tern of development that causes degradation
of public resources greater than B. 4 Suppose
Point C represents the level and pattern of development such that the total benefits of development (i.e., consumer plus producer surplus) equal the total costs (i.e., the loss of public resources). Often, in conventional par- lance, development to the right of Point C defines sprawl, but we would like to note this view is at odds with standard welfare econom- ics. Indeed, Point C corresponds to an open access equilibrium occurring when only private benefits and costs are considered.
Key challenges in analyzing sprawl are to meaningfully identify the public costs of var- ious patterns of new construction and measure excessive when (a) preferences are heteroge- neous (i.e., not everyone cares about open space, clean air, or the loss of the endangered kangaroo rat) and (b) the costs of develop- ment are often in terms of lost public goods, which are typically difficult to identify pre- cisely, quantify, and incorporate into public policies. For example, if one aspect of sprawl is architectural homogeneity that bothers some but not others, measuring these costs, much less incorporating them into public pol- icies, becomes a very contentious issue.
A number of researchers have attempted to measure sprawl, but to date, only simple met- rics have been used. Wassmer (2000) looks at the percentage change in the population that lived and worked in city centers between 1950 and the mid-1990s and notes that the per- centage of people in city centers fell from 57%– 35% and those working in the city centers declined from 70% to 45%. Based on these def- initions, he concludes that sprawl increased over time. This approach is also roughly that of Brueckner (2001) who notes that in many cities, growth of urban areas outpaced popu- lation growth. For example, the Chicago met- ropolitan area increased by 46% between 1970 and 1990 while the population only grew 4%. In an even more dramatic example, the size of the Cleveland metropolitan area grew 33% while the population declined by 8%.
Galster et al. (2001) suggest eight quantifi- able dimensions of sprawl: density, continuity, concentration, clustering, centrality, nuclear- ity, mixed uses, and proximity. The exact def- inition of each of these dimensions is not
3. Unless by chance, MC is everywhere below MB or if at Point A, MB 5 MC 5 0.
4. This conclusion presumes that markets maximize the MB per lost public resource (rather unlikely) and pol- icies minimize the marginal social costs of lost public resources (rather more likely).
436 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY
needed for this article. What is of interest is their focus on patterns of land development to identify sprawl rather than the outcomes of development. Using these eight measures, Galster et al. (2001) find that Atlanta, Detroit, Miami, and Denver ranked high on the sprawl index and New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Chicago ranked low. The Los Angeles SMSA ranked low on the sprawl index for many measures.
Song and Knaap (2004) suggest that quan- tifying urban sprawl by focusing on growth of suburbs relative to central cities provides information about population growth but says little about the form of growth. They assert that studies such as Fulton et al. (2001) and Sierra Club (1998) that rely on den- sity may therefore add little to the sprawl debate.
Since there is a variety of generally simple ways to measure sprawl, studies frequently produce conflicting results and depending on the measures used, the Inland Empire ranges from the worst in the country to not so bad. Ewing, Pendall, Chen (2001) ranked the Inland Empire very badly using 22 different measures of residential proximity to city cen- ters, degree of mixed uses in neighborhoods, strength of activity centers and downtown, residential density, and connectivity of street networks. They find that the region has few areas that serve as focal points for communi- ties and that more than 66% of the population lives over 10 miles from a business district. In addition, the area has little mix of land uses and residential density is below average, with less than 1% of Riverside County’s population living in communities with enough density to be effectively served by transit. They therefore conclude that the Inland Empire is the most sprawling region in the country.
A nationwide study by Rutgers and Cornell University researchers agreed and concluded that the Inland Empire by a wide margin tops the nation with regard to sprawl. The region is worse than 82 other metropol- itan areas in terms of road function and safety, proximity of homes to business dis- tricts, jobs and services, and identifiability of downtown activity centers (Gold and Ritsch, 2002). In 2001, however, USA Today published results of a study (http://www. usatoday.com/news/sprawl/main.htm) measur- ing sprawl in 271 cities in the country. The results were based on the percentage of the
population that lived outside urban areas and the change in that proportion over time. Using this approach, the Los Angeles—Riverside— Orange County region was rated as one of the least sprawling areas in the country, exhib- iting far less sprawl than Portland, Oregon, and Boston, Massachusetts.
IV. THE THREE KEY COSTS OF SPRAWL: A VIEW FROM THE INLAND EMPIRE
This section focuses on the costs of sprawl in terms of the three market failures discussed earlier: the failure to account for road conges- tion/air pollution, the opportunity cost of lost open space, and public infrastructure used by those who buy new homes. One of the most cited costs of sprawl in the Inland Empire is excessive freeway congestion leading to air pollution and time losses for drivers (Burchell, Downs, and Mukherji, 2005). Brueckner (2001) and Wassmer (2000) explain that there is an important market failure associated with commuting because the social costs are greater than the private costs. The private costs of commuting include the costs of vehicle opera- tion and the value of the time during the com- mute, but the presence of each additional driver on the road—though individually small—imposes a nonzero cost on society. Particularly, during peak hours, these costs may be quite large, resulting in delays.
Brueckner (2001) concludes that because these congestion costs are born by other than commuters, individuals generally would not take them into account when making driving decisions, resulting in overuse of publicly available road capacity. Further, Brueckner (2001) and Wassmer (2000) point out that most highways and other road infrastructure are unpriced, which provides no incentives for commuters to consider their use of infra- structure when making driving decisions. Commuting therefore appears artificially cheap and as long as demand slopes down- ward, the result is that roads are overused from a social perspective. As a result of these distortions, housing location choices that incorporate the full costs of commuting may be very different from choices when those costs are ignored. This creates the need for public policies to internalize externalities.
There are also other views of congestion, however. Burchell, Downs, and Mukherji (2005) say that ‘‘ . . . the most optimistic
BLUFFSTONE ET AL.: HOUSING, SPRAWL, AND THE USE OF DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES 437
way to look at the inability to eliminate traffic congestion is to see it as a sign of success: it indicates economic activity and serves as a nec- essary balancing mechanism for a transporta- tion system that could never be built to accommodate all peak-hour travel without delays.’’ In fact, Burchell, Downs, and Mukherji (2005) come to the conclusion that even compact development would not reduce peak hour traffic congestion, though it would provide other benefits like lower fuel con- sumption and less air pollution. Cervero (2001) concurs with this conclusion, finding that across metropolitan areas congested free- ways tend to be a consequence of strong eco- nomic performance. He not only finds an inverse statistical relationship between aver- age travel speeds and productivity but also finds that metropolitan areas with better high- way and road infrastructure perform better.
Two congestion measures used by the Texas Transport Institute are the average annual delay experienced per person due to congested roads and the ratio of time to make a given trip to the time under free-flow condi- tions. These measures are used by the South- ern California Association of Governments (SCAG). Congestion can also be measured as the average speed of cars on a given section of freeway at a point in time, which is the approach taken by the Performance Measure- ment System (PEMS) used by the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) to analyze the performance of freeways in Cali- fornia. PEMS data presented in Table 1 sug- gest that since 2001, in most areas, Inland Empire commute times have lengthened, in some cases very significantly.
The issue of congestion is especially import- ant for the Inland Empire. SCAG estimates
TABLE 1
Commute Times in Select Inland Empire Municipalities 2001–2004
All Times and Distances to and from Route 710 in Los Angeles via the most Direct Freeway
Municipality Total Distance
(Miles)
2001 2002 2003 2004
Time (a.m.)
Time (p.m.)
Time (a.m.)
Time (p.m.)
Time (a.m.)
Time (p.m.)
Time (a.m.)
Time (p.m.)
Banning 78.42 82.34 82.06 86.11 85.76 85.21 86.43 83.37 92.03
Beaumont 73.13 77.80 77.12 81.57 80.69 80.68 81.41 78.84 86.88
Calimesa 66.44 72.07 70.87 75.84 74.27 74.94 75.07 73.10 80.37
Chino 28.92 36.78 44.94 38.38 44.44 40.53 45.97 37.69 45.53
Colton 49.06 57.10 54.50 60.86 57.43 60.03 58.51 58.14 63.28
Corona 42.74 63.08 64.82 54.30 59.33 53.71 58.87 51.27 61.54
Fontana 42.66 51.22 48.37 54.97 51.10 54.45 52.69 52.31 57.09
Grand Terrace 53.97 61.38 60.11 65.15 63.69 64.25 64.39 62.42 69.96
Hemet 80.48 86.66 96.96 88.08 99.86 88.59 100.02 87.31 99.03
Hesperia 74.02 80.01 79.20 81.26 80.80 89.69 88.79 84.49 85.96
Highland 59.92 66.48 64.77 70.25 68.02 69.35 68.89 67.52 74.02
Lake Elsinore 62.7 80.51 82.31 71.70 76.82 70.98 76.36 68.50 79.02
Loma Linda 51.96 59.66 57.54 63.43 60.70 62.53 61.60 60.69 66.66
Montclair 27.73 35.47 33.66 37.50 35.17 38.39 38.55 38.16 41.04
Moreno Valley 55.07 60.84 71.13 62.26 74.04 62.76 74.20 61.48 73.21
Norco 43.2 49.91 59.33 51.23 61.02 52.41 60.98 50.15 60.94
Ontario 30.26 37.97 36.13 39.96 37.69 40.70 40.93 40.70 43.51
Perris 64.37 68.81 79.11 70.23 82.01 70.73 82.17 69.45 81.18
Rancho Cucamonga 34.9 43.58 40.77 45.45 43.06 45.06 45.31 45.27 48.39
Rialto 44.94 53.17 50.71 56.92 53.58 56.40 55.11 54.26 59.66
Riverside 48.35 55.00 65.21 56.42 68.13 56.96 68.29 54.97 67.30
San Bernardino 53.71 61.16 60.57 64.93 64.55 64.06 65.15 62.18 71.23
Upland 30.26 37.97 36.13 39.96 37.69 40.70 40.93 40.70 43.51
Yucaipa 61.93 68.20 66.65 71.97 69.95 71.08 70.79 69.24 75.97
Source: Author calculations using PEMS data.
438 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY
that 2002 road congestion cost Southern Cal- ifornia $12 billion, which is the most of any metropolitan area in the United States. Using data from the San Diego I-15 congestion pric- ing project, Brownstone et al. (2003) estimate that the median willingness to pay to reduce commute times is roughly $30/h, suggesting that traffic is a significant disamenity. Texas Transportation Institute (2005) ranked the Inland Empire as one of the most congested areas in the country and one that experienced large increases since 1980. Only Dallas, Wash- ington, DC, and Atlanta had greater increases in hours of delay and of metropolitan areas classified as large (1–3 million residents); in 2005, the Inland Empire had the highest aver- age delay (55 h). In comparison, Boston, San Diego, and San Jose averaged 51, 52, and 53 h, respectively. Leading the nation with an aver- age 95 h was Los Angeles, followed by the San Francisco SMSA with 72 h. SCAG reports the 31 min average work commute time for Riv- erside County residents is the highest in South- ern California. The average for Southern California is 28 min and the national average is 24 min (SCAG, 2001).
Economic theory suggests that increases in commute times inflate costs, reducing dispos- able income and utility. Because houses offer a bundle of characteristics (including trans- portation access), housing prices should be negatively affected by congestion. Among others, Boarnet and Chalermpong (2001) con- firm this hypothesis and suggest that highway conditions influence development patterns through land prices. Reducing accessibility should therefore show up in lower equilibrium land prices for less accessible plots.
Associated with increased driving and traf- fic congestion is air pollution. It is particularly unfortunate that road traffic is so significant in Southern California because the air basin is especially prone to high concentrations of ground level ozone. High summer tempera- tures and westerly winds create particular problems for the Inland Empire, which expe- riences some of the highest average hourly and daily ozone concentrations in the country. Though air quality has improved dramatically over the past 20 yr, the South Coast Air Qual- ity Management District (SCAQMD) reports that during 99 d in 2002, at least one monitor- ing station in the air basin exceeded the federal 8-h concentration standard of 0.085 ppm. In 2003, there were 120 violations. Valley and
mountain areas of Riverside and San Bernar- dino Counties were responsible for over three- quarters of those exceedences (SCAQMD, 2004).
In 2003, Riverside and San Bernardino Counties also ranked first and second in the nation for total particulate pollution (California Air Resources Board [CARB] and American Lung Association of California, 2004). For example, at the Rubidoux monitoring station in Riverside, during the period 2000–2002, the average annual particulate matter (PM)2.5 concentration was 28.9 lg/m3, which is about 1.75 times the federal limit and more than twice the state standard. Maximum PM2.5 concentra- tions at monitoring stations have been 80–100 lg/m3, which are about 1.5 times the federal limit (CARB, 2003). Such concentrations are very common throughout the Inland Empire and have been constant since the late 1990s.
In terms of acute ozone exposures, which are known to significantly contribute to respi- ratory illness, the region has particularly seri- ous and increasing problems. During 33 d in 2000, the federal hourly ozone concentration standard of 0.12 ppm was exceeded some- where in the SCAQMD area. In 2001 and 2002, there were 38 and 40 overlimit days and in 2003, the region had 68 d above the fed- eral hourly ozone standard.
5 The east San Ber-
nardino valley exceeded acute exposure limits at least 21 d in 2001 and had a similar number of violations in 2002 and 2003 (Schexnayder, 2003; SCAQMD, 2004).
Such high concentrations are associated with inflated asthma rates (www.epa.gov), and in 1997, ozone was responsible for as many as 6 million asthma attacks nationwide and 159,000 emergency room visits (Jackson and Kochtitzky, n.d.). Pope et al. (2002) estimate that increases in PM2.5 of 1.0 lg/m
3 increase
mortality 0.4%–0.6%. For the case of diesel exhaust due to logistics industry expansion in the eastern Inland Empire, this translated into increased mortality of 25–35 persons per year (Bluffstone and Ouderkirk, 2007).
The second major potential failure is under- valuing open space. It is well known that open
5. Recently, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency announced that in response to research showing that ozone is more hazardous to human health than originally thought, it would tighten the hourly standard to corre- spond with the 8-h standard. If this standard had been in effect in 2003, the region would have been out of com- pliance for approximately 135 d (www.epa.gov).
BLUFFSTONE ET AL.: HOUSING, SPRAWL, AND THE USE OF DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES 439
space, whether public or private, is highly val- ued (Irwin, 2002; Thorsnes, 2002). In the Inland Empire, protected areas and parks are less than in surrounding areas, and as development has accelerated, valuations have risen and more public open space has been cre- ated. For example, San Bernardino County recently established a 200-acre multiuse park in an attempt to preserve open space. This park was the first regional park established in 20 yr (Martin, 2003). Bluffstone and Fazeli (2002) found that residents of the City of Redlands were willing to pay approximately $54.00 per household per year to establish a state park in the San Timoteo Canyon. Even with the high land prices in Southern Califor- nia, this willingness to pay was sufficient to fund the proposed 15,000-acre multiuse park, suggesting that the marginal value of open space may exceed the value of land for housing in some areas. In 2002, the core of this park was established.
At least partly responding to these valua- tions, in 2003, Riverside County approved $1 billion to purchase 153,000 acres of open space before it is engulfed by housing. This area will be added to about 350,000 acres of National Forest to create a series of wildlife corridors and natural preserves (Wilson, 2003a). This initiative is part of the county’s multiple species habitat and conservation plan for protecting 146 species under the Endan- gered Species Act.
Finally, in order for housing development to occur, a variety of publicly provided infra- structure is required. Roads are needed to link developments with other parts of municipali- ties, sewage and water services must be pro- vided, plus new residents require a variety of lumpy services, such as police and fire protec- tion, parks, libraries, and schools. New devel- opment therefore imposes costs on local governments. Some of these costs would occur regardless of the spatial pattern of develop- ment, but dispersed development can also inflate costs. For example, developments that are far away from urban centers require more water and sewer piping and single-family houses need more piping than multifamily housing units, which share connections (Burchell, Downs, and Mukherji, 2005).
Somewhat surprisingly, in many cases, the tax and fee revenues generated by new devel- opment are insufficient to fund the public serv- ices they require. (Benfield, Raimi, and Chen,
2001). As Carrigg (2002) summarized the sit- uation in California:
City governments are being forced to play a game of fiscal ‘‘Twister’’ using mismatched revenue sources and strategies in an attempt to provide services for their residents. The result is a local finance system where there are insuf- ficient revenues from new housing units to pro- vide the additional services required by new residents.
In the past, some have argued that developing an area can increase the tax base. Studies done by the American Farmland Trust, however, suggest that farm and ranch lands require just 36 cents in services for every dollar of revenue raised. On the other hand, every dollar from residential development requires $1.15 in serv- ices. Inexpensive single-family homes use the most services for the least amount of tax dol- lars and as development spreads out costs rise. More compact development lowers the cost per housing unit (Burchell, Downs, and Mukherji, 2005).
V. HOUSING SHORTAGES AND AFFORDABILITY
The population of Southern California is forecast to increase from the current 16.7–23 million in 2025 (SCAG, 2001) and the Inland Empire is expected to absorb a significant share of that increase, with the population of Riverside County doubling by 2030 (Wilson, 2003b). This predicted population pressure begs the question of under what con- ditions those migrants will be housed, parti- cularly in areas that have high social costs of additional development. Some argue that combating sprawl places restrictions on hous- ing that will create or worsen housing short- ages (Husing, 2005). Others, however, suggest that curbing sprawl means neither reductions in housing nor welfare. Much of this debate focuses on notions of ‘‘insufficient supply’’ and ‘‘shortage.’’
Critics of placing controls on growth in the Inland Empire point to the steep decline in new housing construction in California that started in 1986 and continued through most of the 1990s as a reason to reduce regulations despite likely increasing marginal external costs. In the 1980s, for example, Southern California produced approximately 1 million housing units, but during the 1990s, construc- tion totaled only about 400,000 units. Most of the drop came from multifamily housing,
440 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY
which declined from 470,000 units to only 120,000 units in 2000. California housing con- struction is now about 150,000 units/year, which is half the 1986 peak and 50,000 less than in the 1970s when the population was 10 million fewer. Single-family home construc- tion in the 1990s was 27% lower than the 1980s (Kotkin, 2002).
The Inland Empire is bucking this state- wide trend, partly relieving pressure in Los Angeles, Orange, and San Diego Counties, and as shown in Table 2, in most municipali- ties, substantially more building permits have been issued over time. Some argue that this
building trend should be supported rather than curbed because land costs are lower than further west and the state as a whole is expe- riencing a housing shortage (Husing, 2005). The key question is whether controls that may slow down construction should be used to avoid even higher levels of public re- source loss.
But it turns out that as is true for sprawl, the notion of a housing shortage is very poorly defined. In economics, we know that as long as prices are allowed to freely adjust, equilibria should be established in housing markets and no shortages should exist. The real concern is
TABLE 2 Building Permits Issued in Select Inland Empire Jurisdictions 2001–2004
City
2001 2002 2003 2004
Single- Family Units Multifamily
Single- Family Units Multifamily
Single- Family Units Multifamily
Single- Family Units Multifamily
Banning 319 0 388 166 548 0 310 2
Beaumont 447 0 522 0 1,137 0 1,206 0
Cathedral City 426 116 641 34 386 347 333 143
Chino 212 0 290 6 213 0 463 52
Chino Hills 422 0 250 240 294 450 191 0
Colton 146 0 65 0 42 0 77 0
Corona 1,090 0 699 0 366 422 620 0
Fontana 1,083 0 1,798 110 1,340 0 1,359 186
Hemet 451 8 338 44 798 4 804 68
Hesperia 540 13 469 0 965 123 1,478 129
Highland 265 0 289 0 366 0 297 0
Lake Elsinore 301 0 844 0 550 62 766 10
La Quinta 916 0 657 192 1,118 277 1,392 72
Moreno Valley 602 0 1,152 70 2,011 448 2,109 1,505
Murrieta 1,145 584 1,690 292 1,540 883 2,540 594
Ontario 151 144 76 86 90 102 133 851
Palm Springs 94 17 85 50 481 200 536 109
Perris 145 0 491 186 1,269 0 1,573 0
Rancho Cucamonga 980 1,256 1,410 692 1,175 779 1,059 2,508
Redlands 216 84 162 0 337 59 154 16
Rialto 90 4 99 0 121 4 63 33
Riverside 1,237 40 1,113 0 689 1,377 820 283
San Bernardino 144 75 310 75 185 0 318 6
San Jacinto 205 0 343 0 453 0 943 52
Temecula 944 0 651 0 1,087 326 888 408
Upland 41 0 96 0 233 0 98 0
Victorville 655 0 986 102 2,102 176 2,699 82
Unincorporated Riverside County
6,460 649 8,782 575 8,894 640 8,532 743
Unincorporated San Bernardino County
836 24 993 0 1,370 5 2,116 20
Source: Author calculations using data from SCAG.
BLUFFSTONE ET AL.: HOUSING, SPRAWL, AND THE USE OF DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES 441
therefore that people of modest means would not be able to afford to buy houses or, worse yet, could not rent accommodations. A stand- ard way to approach this problem is therefore from the perspective of affordability (Johnson, Moller, Dardia, 2004), and generally, afford- ability is measured as the percentage of families that can afford the median priced single-family home. Alternative measures are the percentages of renters who face high rents and homeowners who face high mortgage burdens. Johnson, Moller, Dardia (2004) and Feldman (2002) note that paying more than 30% of income for housing is considered unaffordable. South- ern California has some of the highest housing prices in the country (Southern California Studies Center, University of Southern Califor- nia, and The Brookings Institution, 2001) and potentially as a result of these high prices, in 2002, metropolitan Los Angeles had the second lowest home ownership rate in the nation (49%), behind only New York City (Kotkin, 2002).
Feldman (2002), Downs (1992), Glaeser and Gyourko (2002), and Gellen (1982) sug- gest, however, that so-called housing short- ages are not supply issues but instead are income problems. Growth advocates have, the argument goes, confused unaffordable housing with poverty and therefore mistak- enly conclude that increasing housing supply is the solution. Looking at the United States and the Minneapolis/Saint Paul SMSA (a metro area believed to have a housing short- age), Feldman (2002), for example, finds that low incomes are the reason people live in unaf- fordable housing. Downs (1992) suggests that when looked at as an income issue, provision of rental vouchers would be the best way to attack the problem.
Glaeser and Gyourko (2002) remind us that housing supply restrictions can be identified when excess profits exist in housing markets, which would be indicated when housing is expensive relative to new construction costs. In such cases, barriers to entry must exist and a housing supply problem is indicated. Using 2000 Census data, the authors find that the average home price in the United States ($120,000) is very close to the cost of produc- tion. The authors conclude that housing short- ages are not as bad as some would argue.
And since the 1980s real California house prices have declined. Adjusting for inflation, average home prices in California peaked in
1989, declined until 1996, and have since increased. The Public Policy Institute of California reports that despite rising nominal home prices in 2000, median prices in San Bernardino and Riverside Counties when adjusted for inflation decreased throughout the 1990s and were below the national aver- age. In real terms, between 1980 and 2000, home prices in San Bernardino County decreased by 2% ($134,494–$131,500) and in Riverside County, prices only increased by 2% ($143,616–$146,500). From 1980 to 2000, only the San Francisco Bay area saw significant real increases in housing prices (Johnson, Moller, Dardia, 2004).
Also in terms of affordability, little has changed. The percent of San Bernardino and Riverside County residents spending more than 30% of income on rent fell margin- ally from 50% in 1990 to about 46% in 2000. San Diego and Los Angeles experienced sim- ilar declines. Rental vacancy rates in the Inland Empire (7.2% for Riverside and 7.3% for San Bernardino in 2000) were above the national average of 6.8%. On the other hand, Los Angeles (3.3%), Orange (3.0%), Ventura (3.6%), Imperial (4.9%), and San Diego (3.1%) Counties all had lower rental vacancy rates in 2000 (Johnson, Moller, Dardia, 2004). In year 2000, single-family vacancy rates in San Bernardino and Riverside Counties were 2.5% and 3.1%, respectively, which were above the national average
It turns out that even focusing on the sup- ply of housing, the picture is quite murky. Johnson, Moller, Dardia (2004) test the hypothesis that macroeconomic factors, such as interest rates, growth and unemployment, and demographic factors, such as age, gender, and ethnicity, play significant roles in explain- ing annual changes in new housing construc- tion. Unlike other studies dealing with the housing sector (e.g., Somerville, 1996), they look at both supply and demand factors that influence the housing market. They find that almost 80% of variation in new housing con- struction in California and 77% in the Inland Empire can be explained by macroeconomic and demographic variables. Adjusting for these factors, they conclude that housing availability today is probably better than in 1990.
Also of importance is that the California population grew more slowly in the 1990s than in the 1980s and household sizes increased.
442 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY
While in the United States, average household size decreased from 2.75 people per household in 1980 to 2.59 in 2000, household size increased in California from 2.68 to 2.87 peo- ple. The Inland Empire also saw increases and average household sizes are larger than the national average. Most of this trend can be explained by factors such as age and ethnicity (Johnson, Moller, Dardia, 2004).
These results cast doubt on the notion that housing supply is somehow ‘‘insufficient’’ in California and probably weaken arguments that the social costs of new housing construction should be given less or no weight to ‘‘accommo- date’’ growth. Indeed, demographic drivers could indicate different housing preferences than were previously observed or the problem could be low incomes. Further, there is little sense in attempting to overcome the effects of interest rates and unemployment by reducing key public resources in areas where those goods are already at low levels.
Russell (2003) indeed sees few fundamental conflicts between open space preservation and supply of affordable housing and notes that sprawl typically results from sources other than affordable housing construction. As already noted, in California and the Inland Empire, the huge majority of the decline in housing construction during the past decade was in terms of multifamily rather than single- family dwellings. Talbot and Costa (2003) point out that numerous California municipal- ities have used inclusionary housing policies that require fixed portions of new development to be affordable. They note that these policies have withstood court challenges by developers viewing such policies as illegal takings.
VI. THE USE OF PRICE INSTRUMENTS
The above discussion leads us to the issue of choosing instruments for internalizing the externalities associated with sprawling pat- terns of single-family home development. We do not attempt a comprehensive evalua- tion of instruments, but instead focus on the use of fees, which is a class of instruments that uses incentives to reduce negative exter- nalities. Fees have been particularly used to control pollution (Bluffstone, 2003), and when applied to housing development are commonly called development impact fees (Brueckner, 1997).
Fees applied directly to environmental problems (e.g., air pollution, congestion, open space loss) are known to reduce social costs as long as the demand for the right to degrade those environmental services is not vertical. They are also known to allocate the burden for reducing those social problems at least cost (Bluffstone, 2003; Bluffstone and Larson, 1997; Kolstad, 2000). For example, a charge on individual tailpipe emissions could be set to reduce overall emissions by 25% and would distribute the economic burden of that reduc- tion cost effectively across all drivers. The problem, of course, is that applying fees on emissions from such a diverse and mobile set of pollution sources would be difficult. As a result, less targeted fees that focus on goods closely related to tailpipe emissions tend to be used instead. For example, in Europe, gasoline taxes substitute for tailpipe emissions fees using the logic that such taxes will reduce driving and create incentives for more fuel- efficient vehicles, both of which are associated with lower tailpipe emissions.
Development fees could operate in a similar manner, targeting the social costs of sprawling development indirectly through fees on devel- opment itself. Figure 2 shows how this would work. With a charge rate of C*, development markets find it in their interests to pay the fee and develop houses as long as the MB of hous- ing construction (net of any direct costs) exceeds the fee per house. This equilibrium is reached at Point B. If policymakers had a well-defined construction goal, they could use the fee to help achieve that goal. To max- imize efficiency, development fees should be differentiated according to the marginal social
FIGURE 2
Development Fees and Single Family
Home Construction
$
MB
0 B A Single Family Houses
C* Development Fee
BLUFFSTONE ET AL.: HOUSING, SPRAWL, AND THE USE OF DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES 443
costs of each development rather than being the same for all classes of development.
Ihlanfeldt (2004a, 2004b) defines develop- ment fees as one-time levies charged for the provision of infrastructure services such as water and sewer, schools, and other municipal amenities, such as roads, police and fire pro- tection, and parks. Public infrastructure costs of new development have traditionally been financed using property taxes, which as dis- cussed by Brueckner (2001) imply a marginal price of zero for the right to use public infra- structure. This causes development to appear artificially cheap and results in overdevelop- ment and sprawl. Tax revolts such as Propo- sition 13 in California increased interest in the use of development fees (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004), and California was one of the first states to adopt development fees (Clarke and Evans, 1999).
In the Inland Empire, fees are charged for water/sewer, schools, and municipal services such as libraries, street trees, and parks. Addi- tional fees are levied for engineering reviews, inspections, etc., that are not considered here. In the Inland Empire, development fees aver- aged $15,174 per house in 2002 but were as high as $25,854 in the town of Fontana and as low as $5,646 in Yucca Valley. School and water/sewer fees were approximately equal and on average totaled $12,694 of the total fee. So-called ‘‘impact’’ fees focusing on other municipal services were just more than 16% of the average fee (Bluffstone, 2005).
It is notable that Ihlanfeldt and Shaugh- nessy (2004) define development fees as apply- ing exclusively to the infrastructure costs of development rather than all external costs of development. This is not an omission, but instead reflects the reality that applying devel- opment fees to noninfrastructure social costs is generally considered an illegal taking. Dur- ing the 1990s, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down 11 rulings that supported the property rights of developers over the rights of municipalities to restrict growth. As Patterson (1999) notes:
A well-financed movement has emerged that is dedicated to expanding the scope of the takings clause of the US Constitution from a ‘‘physical taking’’ of property to ‘‘over-regulation’’ of property that diminishes its value.
Due to state and federal court rulings and leg- islation, a so-called ‘‘rational nexus’’ test of
development fee legality is generally used. This test requires that fees be proportional to the costs of providing services and migrants must benefit from the infrastructure financed (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004). Though in principle, all costs can be charged—and the economics literature is very clear they should be charged—in practice only direct infrastructure costs associated with new devel- opment can be considered.
6 The effect of this
widely accepted, but from a standard eco- nomic perspective, restrictive interpretation of development fees is to make municipalities very wary. Development fee ordinances are regularly disputed in court and often suits are successful. For example, in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, the Supreme Court of Califor- nia ruled the city failed to show proportional- ity and a $280,000 impact fee was disallowed (Daily Journal, 1996). This meant that despite generating social costs, developers may have not paid Culver City for development rights.
The potential for court challenges is also perhaps the main reason municipalities in Southern California often end up covering substantial portions of the direct public sector costs of development. Indeed, with property taxes capped by Proposition 13, which was approved by voters in 1978, in the Inland Empire, houses costing less than $250,000 are net drains on municipal budgets.
7 Far
from internalizing all external costs of devel- opment, in reality fees may not even cover the total direct costs of serving developments.
Much of the empirical research on develop- ment fees has focused on incidence and effects on real estate markets. The traditional view is that they are like other taxes and therefore generate deadweight losses due to depressed prices of undeveloped land, inflated new hous- ing prices, and lower consumer and producer surpluses (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004). Underlying this view presented by Delaney and Smith (1989a, 1989b) among others is
6. The APA policy guide on fees notes that the Asso- ciation supports the use of fees, but only insofar as they relate to direct infrastructure costs, and where a rational nexus can be demonstrated. The guide also specifies that ‘‘a fee cannot be imposed to address existing deficiencies except where they are exacerbated by development.’’ They also ‘‘cannot exceed the cost of the improvements’’ and ‘‘cannot cover normal operation and maintenance or per- sonnel costs, but must be used for capital improvements . . .’’ (www.planning.org/policyguides/).
7. We gratefully acknowledge former City of Red- lands Mayor pro tem and council member, Gary George, for providing this and other insights.
444 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY
the assumption that the demand for housing is downward sloping. This implies that in the short-run developers and new home buyers share the burden of any fee and the decline in the prices received by developers is less than the fee. In addition, some home buyers who would have bought a new home will instead buy an existing one, driving up prices.
An alternative hypothesis presented by Yinger (1998) and supported empirically by Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy (2004) supposes that fees are used to improve infrastructure serving houses. We can also think of them as potentially improving public goods that generate a variety of amenity values (e.g., bet- ter policy, open space, air quality) that are capitalized into house prices. Further, with mobile households and closely substitutable communities available, development fees are not shifted to new home buyers as would be the case with other taxes and indeed have no effect on house prices. Only the benefits from the new and better municipal infrastruc- ture (and in principle reduced congestion, bet- ter air quality, and increased open space) affect new home prices. Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy (2004) find that in Dade County, Florida, a $1.00 increase in fees spurred an increase in housing prices of $1.60. This sug- gests that home buyers value the public serv- ices and resources bought with fees more than their costs. Effects on land prices may be pos- itive or negative and depend on the value home buyers place on infrastructure improve- ments bought with development fees. Yinger (1998) finds, though, that landowners are most likely to bear any burden of development fees.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The literature indicates that sprawling pat- terns of development, such as those observed in many parts of the Inland Empire, generate serious external costs, but these costs may be poorly defined and difficult to quantify. Prob- ably, partly because of these difficulties, sprawl itself is poorly defined. Yet, certain costs are well established and therefore should provide a well-defined focus for policy changes. The literature, for example, suggests that air pollution and congestion linked to sprawling development patterns impose enormous time and human health costs, and standard eco- nomic theory is very clear that to not internal- ize those costs using public policies will result
in social losses. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the loss of open space, which is the second well-defined cost of sprawl, particu- larly in regions like the Inland Empire where it is quite scarce. Needless to say, housing markets should cover the costs of the public infrastructure and services needed by new res- idents, as well as any infrastructure costs im- posed on the rest of society, but this is a bare minimum step toward efficiency. Unfortu- nately, at present, only the most direct infra- structure costs can be charged to housing and land markets.
These negative externalities from housing development leading to sprawl should be internalized through policies regardless of conditions in housing markets and we should be particularly careful not to confuse housing supply issues with other social problems, such as low incomes. Evidence on the existence of housing supply problems and shortages is very weak and such concerns should not be used as excuses to avoid the use of public policies that would cause new single-family home buyers and sellers to face the full social costs of their actions. Multifamily dwelling construction— which has seen a precipitous decline in Califor- nia during the past 20 yr but is in general unrelated to sprawl—would in any case be the most appropriate way to address inade- quate housing for poorer people; more afflu- ent residents and migrants are certainly not seriously in need of housing support.
The costs of sprawl could be internalized using development fees and such instruments have been widely applied to pollution. For example, it is very standard to estimate that a proposed development would generate X vehicle trips per day, which would increase ozone concentrations by y lg/m3. Given the enormous epidemiological and valuation liter- atures on mortality and morbidity due to air pollution, the external costs associated with these increased concentrations can be esti- mated. Based on these estimates, fees could be charged that internalize those costs. Such estimates, for example, have been made for PM2.5 pollution due to logistics industry growth in the Inland Empire leading to specific recommendations for fees on warehouse facil- ities (Bluffstone and Ouderkirk, 2007).
Price policies are potentially powerful instruments for controlling sprawl but legal barriers obstruct anything close to optimal fee implementation. Municipalities seeking
BLUFFSTONE ET AL.: HOUSING, SPRAWL, AND THE USE OF DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES 445
to defend themselves from sprawl and force development markets to pay their way may find themselves defending their actions in court. Small jurisdictions may find such bur- dens too onerous and could be forced to allow development markets a relatively free pass. This is perhaps one of the key policy problems associated with sprawl today. Ways to over- come the legal barriers to getting the price of development right should therefore be sought.
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THE IMPACT OF URBAN SPRAWL ON SOCIAL SEGREGATION IN BEIJING AND A LIMITED ROLE FOR SPATIAL PLANNING
PENGJUN ZHAO
Department of Urban and Regional Planning, College of Urban and Environmental Sciences, Peking University, Beijing,100871, China. E-mail: [email protected]
Received: October 2011; accepted February 2013
ABSTRACT Exploring the links between urban sprawl and social segregation is an important theme in urban research. Although many studies are available, conclusions are still mixed. This paper contributes to our existing understanding of the impact of sprawl on social segregation, looking at the case of Beijing. The results of the analysis show that sprawling development, characterised by scattered gated communities, low-density luxury villas, informal development and uneven distributions of public services and transport infrastructures in the peri-urban regions, have increased residential segregation between low-income and high-income residents and between local residents and migrants. Planning policies designed to control urban sprawl and encourage a compact city could have a positive role in reducing social segregation. However, the role of spatial planning is limited as there are still other institutional factors influencing social segregation in China’s cities, two of the most relevant here being the remaining hukou system and dual land system.
Key words: Social segregation, urban sprawl, spatial planning, Beijing
INTRODUCTION
Social segregation in cities has been a central theme of planning and geography studies for some time (Peach 1975; Peach et al. 1981; Massey and Denton 1993). Planning research on social segregation has been concerned with at least two questions: How does the pattern of urban growth affect social segregation? Can planning reduce this segregation? (Frieden & Morris 1968; Kaitz & Hyman 1970; Gaffikin & Morrissey 2011; Arthurson 2012). Although there is a large body of research on the impact of urban sprawl on social segregation, conclu- sions are still mixed. Many studies have argued that urban sprawl may promote social segrega- tion in North American cities (Massey & Denton 1993; Power 2001; Powell 2002), Euro- pean cities (Kazepov 2005; Maloutas 2007;
Arapoglou 2009) and Australian cities (Murphy & Watson 1994). Consequently, policies de- signed to control urban sprawl would play a positive role in reducing social segregation. However, some empirical findings suggested that there are only weak links between urban sprawl and social segregation, when controlling for other factors, for example, demographic characteristics (e.g. Brueckner & Largey 2008) and institutional context (Zhao & Howden-Chapman 2010).
Moreover, the existing empirical research is dominated by cases from developed countries, while cases from developing countries are scarce. Since both urban form and social segre- gation are affected by the social, economic and institutional contexts, there is a strong need to examine the relationships between urban form and social segregation using cases from
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different countries. While there are a few empirical studies about the effects of urban sprawl on social segregation in developing countries, for example in Latin America (Caldeira 2000; Coy & Pöhler 2002), Indonesia (Connell 1999) and China (Gu & Kesteloot 2002), more empirical evidence is still required in order to generalise findings reported by these studies.
The purpose of this study is to fill this gap in the current literature by looking at the case of Beijing. China’s large cities, including Beijing, have been in a process of rapid urbanisation since the 1980s. Urban population increased by 10 million annually on average during the period from 1985 to 2010. Most of this increase of people in cities was rural migrants. China also has been in a process of transition from a centrally planned to a market system since the 1980s (Lin 2000; Wei 2001; Chow 2007). These two processes are combined with a process of globalisation (Chow 2007). In the past decades although China’s cities have gained a proud achievement in economic growth, many social problems have occurred, for example, urban poverty, polarisation, social inequity, etc. In particular, residential segregation has grown in China’s cities (Dollar 2007; Wang 2008). For example, in Beijing, social segregation has since appeared in the form of the separation of high-quality gated communities from margina- lised communities such as urban villages and migrant enclaves (Gu & Liu 2002).
Since the 1980s, spatial distribution of houses, urban public services and transport infrastructures in China’s large cities has been dominated by a form of urban sprawl (Deng & Huang 2004, Jiang et al. 2007). It is character- ised by scattered gated communities, dispersal low-density luxury villas, informal (illegal) developments in rural villages, low accessibility to basic urban services and rapid development of highways. Urban sprawl has been continu- ously increasing recently due to the booming property market and roaring housing price. The negative effects of urban sprawl on the loss of farmland and deterioration of the environ- ment have already been widely discussed by previous studies (e.g. Deng & Huang 2004, Jiang et al. 2007). However, the social effects of urban sprawl were neglected. In particular, many studies have acknowledged that urban
sprawl could increase social segregation (Gu & Kesteloot 2002; Fan & Taubmann 2002; Chen et al. 2006). However, a clear empirical analysis of the impact of urban sprawl on social segre- gation for China’s cities is still lacking.
The contributes fresh evidence regarding the impact of sprawl on social segregation. It does this in several ways. First, the existing lit- erature about the impacts of urban sprawl on social segregation has been dominated by cases from Europe and the US, while cases from China are still scarce. Social segregation in China’s cities has different features from those of Europe and the US. For example, social segregation in Europe and the US is mainly characterised by residential segregation between racial groups. However, in China’s cities there is no segregation based on race because the population of China’s cities is monoracial. Residential segregation is strongly defined between the poor and the rich and between the local and the migrants. Second, the poor often live in the urban core in the US, while the wealthy live in the suburbs (Downs 1999). However, in China’s cities most wealthy people prefer to live in the city centre due to a traditional cultural factor. Even though some wealthy people choose to live in the suburbs, they usually live in high-quality gated communities or villas which are sepa- rated from other suburban areas. That implies that urban sprawl in the suburbs of China’s cities may have a more obvious effect on the low-income people than in Western countries as most low-income population live in the suburbs in China’s cities. Third, in practice, the role of spatial planning, which is a major tool of intervening distribution of houses and controlling urban sprawl, is often criticised regarding its implications for the reduction of social segregation. The findings of the study would provide new evidence about how spatial planning can reduce social segregation.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: SPRAWL AND SOCIAL SEGREGATION
Urban sprawl is broadly understood as a process of the spreading of the city into rural areas, or a type of development characterised by low density, spatial segregation of land use, and a lack of public services and activity centres
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(Gillham 2002). Ewing (1994) defined four characteristics of sprawling urban develop- ment: leapfrog development, commercial strip development, low-density development, and single-use development. Apart from environ- mental effects, urban sprawl also affects social segregation (Massey & Denton 1993; Power 2001; Powell 2002; Kazepov 2005; Maloutas 2007; Arapoglou 2009).
Residential segregation is a type of social seg- regation. Residential segregation refers to the degree to which two or more groups live sepa- rately from one another in different parts of the urban environment (Massey & Denton 1988). It has five dimensions: evenness, expo- sure, concentration, centralisation and cluster- ing. There are many factors influencing residential segregation (Massey & Denton 1988; Wu 2004). These factors can be classified as three categories. One is supply factors, which includes distributions of houses, urban public services, transport infrastructures and design of communities. These factors are largely influ- enced by spatial planning. Another is demand factors, which includes household’s income, desire for house ownership and preferences for residential location. These factors are mainly determined by personal socio-economic fea- tures. The other is institutional factors, such as housing allocation and management, popula- tion management, land use system and so on. Residential segregation is a result of interac- tions between these factors.
In the process of urban sprawl, residential segregation is characterised by the concentra- tion of poverty in some areas and the wealthy in other areas (Jargowsky 2001). Residential seg- regation in the suburbs mainly involves the separation of rich gated communities from marginalised communities (Vesselinov 2012). In particular, the development of gated com- munities in the suburbs is blamed for the cre- ation of a ‘city of walls’, and they are seen as a typical extension of residential segregation (Caldeira 2000; Le Goix 2005). Gated commu- nities are often referred to using different terms, reflecting their negative effects on social segregation (Low 2003); for example, ‘gated enclaves’ (Vesselinov 2012), ‘city fortress’ (Blakely & Snyder 1997) and ‘fortified enclaves’ (Marcuse 1997). In the city centre, urban sprawl usually leaves low-income and
minority groups concentrated, while the middle classes retreat to the suburbs. Spatial mismatch is often used to describe the results of residential segregation in the inner city (Kain 1968, 1992).
Sprawling development, which is character- ised by low density, the segregation of land use and a lack of public services and spaces, usually results in low accessibility to public services, which are vital to social segregation. Many studies suggest that lower accessibility to public parks, public libraries and community centres due to urban sprawl is associated with more social segregation (e.g. Calthorpe 1993; Duany et al. 2000; Leyden 2003). In particular, urban sprawl often causes public services to be unevenly distributed (De Hoog et al. 1991). Some neighbourhoods have higher quality public services, for example, schools, shops, clinics, clubs, swimming pools, etc. than the others. Poor public services often cause a neigh- bourhood to be disadvantaged in attracting the rich to reside, and even low-income people tend to move out of the neighbourhood because of a shortage of public services and facilities.
Urban sprawl favours the development of roads and highways, while decreasing public transit services which segregated groups rely on (Ewing 1994). This happens in two ways. One is that more investments in suburb highways and roads would result in fewer investments in public transit services in the city centre, where many low-income people live, for example, in the US. The other is that in the sprawl process highways and public transport services are usually distributed unevenly. Uneven distribu- tions of transport make some communities hardly accessed by both public transit services and highways. In particular, it is very difficult for local governments to supply and maintain a high quality of public transport services in sprawling suburbs. As a result, these communi- ties may be at a high risk of being segregated. For example, in China, informal houses for urban residents in rural villages are badly ser- viced by both public transport and road network. A severe shortage of transport services is one of the most important reasons why these communities are social segregated from the rest of cities.
Spatial planning designed to control urban sprawl is believed to reduce social segregation
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since urban sprawl is associated with social seg- regation. In Europe recent interests have been given to compact city (Burton 2000a, b). There are at least three approaches to reducing social segregation: satisfying the needs of the worst off (for example, low-income earners) (Rawls 1972), eliminating poverty and distributing urban resources according to need (Durning 1989; Khan 1995), and redistributing wealth from the rich to the poor (Blowers 1992). Compact city is claimed to reduce social segre- gation through distributing social costs and benefits: ‘greater urban compactness is associ- ated with benefits for the conditions or life chances of the disadvantaged (for example, low-incomes), so reducing the gap between the advantaged and disadvantaged’ (Burton 2001).
However, not all studies agree that spatial planning could reduce social segregation. One of major reasons for this is that urban sprawl may be weakly linked with social segregation. For example, using a nationwide survey dataset, Brueckner and Largey (2008) found that higher population density at the census-tract level is related to lower social interaction in the US when the socio-economic features of resi- dents are taken into account. They argued that ‘social-interaction effects cannot be credibly included in the panoply of criticisms directed toward urban sprawl’ (Brueckner & Largey 2008, p. 33). Some studies have reported that crowding and extreme high density tends to reduce rather than increase social interaction and thus decrease social segregation (e.g. Keane 1991).
Another reason is that, excepting urban sprawl, other factors in relation to households’ accessibility to houses and development man- agement of houses also have influences on resi- dential segregation. That means when these factors are taken into account, the effects of urban sprawl on social segregation may not be as significant as what the previous studies found. However, this point has often been ignored by previous literature.
SOCIAL TRANSITION AND SEGREGATION IN BEIJING
Since the 1980s, China’s economy has been undergoing a process of marketisation (Lin 2000; Wei 2001; Chow 2007). However, after
several decades of market-oriented reform, social inequity with respect to wealth has grown in China’s cities, including Beijing (Dollar 2007; Wang 2008). The socialist welfare- oriented housing system has been transformed into a market-oriented system in which housing must be bought or rented on an open market (Dowall 1993). Individual household residen- tial location choice has begun to be mainly determined by a household’s wealth. As a result, residents, and in particular disadvan- taged groups, are spatially distributed across the city largely according to their financial ability to afford housing. There are three main disadvantaged groups: local low-income resi- dents, rural migrants and workers laid-off from state-owned enterprises. In the process of urban sprawl, marginalised communities inhabited by disadvantaged groups have now emerged in Beijing. These marginalised com- munities consist of dilapidated inner-city neigh- bourhoods, workers’ villages and rural migrant enclaves (Wu 2004). The latter two are often called urban villages and are located in the peri-urban regions. As a result, social segrega- tion has since appeared in Beijing in the form of the separation of high-quality gated commu- nities from marginalised communities (Gu & Liu 2002).
Social segregation in Beijing is obvious in the peri-urban regions, where there is a high level of diversity in social features. The urban fringe is composed of residents who have relocated from the central urban area, migrants from outside Beijing and local rural people. The people relocated from the central urban area can be divided into two groups. The first is those residents who were forced to move out of the central area due to urban redevelopment. The second is those who moved in pursuit of improved living conditions, including larger housing spaces as well as a better environment in the suburban community. The second group residents are middle class, and tend to live in high-quality housing, dominated by villas and low-density townhouses with higher housing prices, more space and better services.
In contrast, the migrants from outside Beijing are usually concentrated in urban vil- lages (cheng zhong cun) in the peri-urban region (Ma & Xiang 1998). Urban villages developed from rural villages. The landscapes
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of urban villages are dominated by informal village housing, illegal construction, insuffi- cient urban facilities and a poor quality of life (Zheng et al. 2009). House rents in these urban villages are much lower than in other urban communities. The residents are generally farmers who have become landlords, while the remainder are poor unemployed people or low-income migrant workers. Urban villages account for a large part of the urban poor in the suburbs and are centres of crime (Yang 1996). Compared with other communities in the peri-urban region, urban villages can be considered ‘China’s slums’ (Ma 2007).
Since 2000 some new trends in social segrega- tion in China’s cities have arisen. The number of young (around 25 years old), highly educated migrants has increased quickly in villages in the peri-urban region. These new migrants are called ‘yi zu’ (‘the ant group’) as they often live in groups, sharing small living spaces. They have low incomes despite the fact that most are uni- versity educated. Most are not covered by health insurance and rely on casual jobs such as sales- men, waiters or receptionists. According to China’s Human Resource Blue Book 2010, there were more than three million yi zu migrants in China’s cities in 2010 (Pan 2010). In Beijing, there were 150,000 yi zu migrants. They belong to the migrants from outside Beijing. Members of ‘the ant group’ often choose to concentrate in urban villages, where housing rents are low but the quality of life is poor. As a result, a new type of urban ‘slum’ has emerged.
Most of local rural people are low-income people compared to local urban people. In China, a strict urban-rural dichotomy system was built in the 1950s. According to the system, cities were given priorities to using resources and pursing economic development, while rural areas were unfairly treated as areas which only supply foods to cities (Walder 1996). As a result, rural development is largely behind development in urban areas. In Beijing, living quality is poor, and basic facilities and public services are scarce in the rural villages. The annual income of rural people was only one fifth of the annual income of urban people in 2009 (BSB, various years). In the rapid process of urban sprawl, most of municipal investments and policy attentions have been given to gated urban communities. However, only a small
portion of municipal investments was left to the rural villages. The rural villages have much worse facilities, services and housing quality than the gated communities.
URBAN SPRAWL ON THE URBAN FRINGE OF BEIJING
The city of Beijing has a land area of 16,410 square kilometres and had a population of 16.95 million in 2008. The Beijing Urban Master Plan (2004–2020) shows that the entire city is divided into four zones: a central urban area, an inter-suburban area, an outer subur- ban area and an ecological conservation area (Figure 1). The outer suburban area includes some rural areas associated with Beijing. Most of these rural areas are located in the ecological conservation area. The analysis in this paper focuses on the inter-suburban and outer subur- ban areas because they are the major regions in which urban sprawl has occurred in Beijing. In this paper, the urban fringe refers to the tran- sition zones between the inter-suburban and outer suburban areas.
In Beijing, urban sprawl has become one of the main forms of suburban land development since the 1980s (Deng & Huang 2004; Jiang et al. 2007). According to Ewing (1997), there are two kinds of urban sprawl: density-based sprawl and spatial-structure-based sprawl. Urban sprawl in Beijing is also characterised by these two forms. Density-based sprawl is clearly evidenced by decreases in density. Between 1990 and 2005, during which there was radical urban expansion, residential net density decreased from about 261 persons per hectare in 1990 to 130 persons per hectare in 2005 (see Table 1). In particular, many low-density gated communities and villas were developed on the urban fringe. The total floor area of low-density housing, including villas, reached more than 5 million square metres in 2001, which was equivalent to 36 per cent of the total housing developed in the suburban areas of Beijing (Wan Fang Co. 2001).
Urban sprawl is also characterised by the segregation of land use, in particular, the segregation of residential land from land for public facilities such as schools, post offices, clinics, community centres, etc. This is typically seen in the large number of single-use land
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developments on the urban fringe. Accessibility to public facilities in areas of sprawling develop- ment is low. This low accessibility to public urban services is one of the major characteristics of segregated communities in Beijing.
The growth of informal development in the peri-urban regions is another major feature of urban sprawl in Beijing (see Figure 2). The number of urban villages increased rapidly after 2000 due to uncontained urban sprawl
and reached 364 in 2005. These urban villages occupied a land area of 19,000 hectares and had a floor area of 74.9 million square metres in 2005 (Mei & Bao 2006).
THE IMPACT OF SPRAWL ON SOCIAL SEGREGATION IN BEIJING
Method and data – This section examines the potential impact of urban sprawl on social
Figure 1. Administrative range of Beijing.
Table 1. Changes in social segregation and urban sprawl in Beijing, 1990–2005.
1990 2000 2005 Growth (1990–2005)
(%)
Social segregation index The index of dissimilarity 0.1693 0.2065 0.2371 40.04 The index of residential exposure 0.3258 0.2991 0.2544 –21.92 Urban sprawl index Average residents net density (persons per km2) 26,105 22,492 13,008 –50.97 Mixed use of land 0.6613 0.6182 0.4157 –37.14 Number of urban villages (units) – 193 364 88.60* Primary schools (units per 10,000 residents) 3.33 1.59 0.91 –72.67 Development of highways (km per km2) 71.61 104.22 185.49 159.03
Sources: the author, edited from population data from the Beijing fourth and fifth censuses, and BSB (2005); land use data from BLHB (various years); 3) *data from Mei and Bao (2006).
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segregation in Beijing. Two indexes are employed to measure social segregation. The first is an index of dissimilarity (for measures of social segregation see Stearns & Logan 1986; Massey & Denton 1988). The second is an index of residential exposure. The formula for the index of dissimilarity (ID) is:
ID = −⎛ ⎝ ⎜
⎞ ⎠ ⎟∑12
g G
h H
i i
i
N
where (comparing a low-income and middle- and high-income population, for example): gi is the size of the low-income population of the ith area; G is the total low-income population in an entire region; hi is the size of the middle- and high-income population of the ith area; H is the total middle- and high-income popu- lation in the entire region. The value of the ID is between 1 and 0, where 1 indicates there is a complete separation between the two populations and 0 indicates there is no
(a)
(b)
Note : (a) shows a street with houses along it; (b) shows the illegal village houses built by local villagers.
Figure 2. Village house and street in Tujing, Beijing.
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segregation between the two populations. The index of dissimilarity measures the evenness with which two groups are distributed across the component geographic areas.
The index of residential exposure indicates how the different groups are ‘exposed’ to each other. It can also be interpreted as the probabil- ity that one population group shares an area with another group. The formula for the index of residential exposure (RE) is:
RE x P
y p
i i
ii
N
= ×⎛ ⎝ ⎜
⎞ ⎠ ⎟
= ∑
1
where (the extent to which the low-income population is exposed to the middle- and high-income population, for example): xi is the size of the low-income population of the ith area; yi is the size of the middle- and high-income population of the ith area; pi is the total population of the ith area; and P is the total low-income population in the entire region.
This study uses census data (1990, 2000) to measure the indexes of social segregation before 2000 and in 2000. The latest census data in Beijing was gathered for the Sixth Census Survey, which commenced in November 2010. However, the details of this data have not yet been released. Therefore, the paper uses the most recent population survey instead of census data to measure the indexes of social segregation after 2000. The population survey comes from a population survey conducted in 2005. In the survey, the probability proportion- ate to size (PPS) sampling method was applied. The sampling size was 1.89 per cent of the total city population, namely, 290,000 respondents. Generally, the data has a high reliability.
According to the Beijing Statistical Yearbook (Beijing Statistic Bureau (BSB), various years), those who make up the low-income population had an annual income of less than RMB 1,636 in 1990, less than RMB 7,916 in 2000, and less than RMB 12,485 in 2005. Members of the middle- and high-income population earned an annual income above these figures, respectively.
In the analysis, the urban sprawl of Beijing will be quantitatively indicated by measures of the net density of residents, the land use mix, the number of urban villages and the number
of schools and development of highways. The net density of residents was measured in terms of the density of residents in the sub-district, omitting non-built-up areas such as public green space and farmland. Mixed land use for different housing types is indicated by an entropy value. Housing types include low- density villa or townhouse, low-density apart- ment or flat, high-density tower and village house or flat. The higher the entropy, the higher degree of mixed use of land. The number of schools per 10,000 residents is used to indicate the level of public services at local. In Beijing, primary school is usually seen as one of the most important elements of public ser- vices supplied by the municipal government. Development of highways is measured by the length of highways per km2 of the built-up area. The local spatial unit of analysis for the degree of sprawl and residential segregation is the sub- district, which includes the Jiedao (street area) and the Xiang zhen (township). The sub-districts are not only the basic census units, but also the primary administrative units in Beijing.
Analysis – Table 1 presents changes in the values of the social segregation indexes and the urban sprawl indexes for Beijing during the period from 1990 to 2005. The value of the index of dissimilarity has continuously increased, from 0.1693 in 1990 to 0.2371 in 2005, which means the degree of social segre- gation between the low-income population and the middle- and high-income population grew. The growth rate of the dissimilarity index shows that there was 40 per cent growth in social segregation during a twenty-six-year period (1990–2005). During the same period, the index of residential exposure decreased from 0.3258 to 0.2544, which indicates that the degree to which the low-income population is exposed to the middle- and high-income popu- lation has decreased. This means that the low- income population was more segregated from the middle- and high-income population in 2005 than in 1990.
There are many factors influencing residen- tial segregation, for example, growing differ- ences in household income, changes in the labour market, the growth of the middle class, etc. However, urban sprawl would be a primary factor influencing residential segregation.
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Table 1 provides evidence for this, with the urban sprawl indexes reflecting similar changes to the social segregation indexes. The average residential net density decreased by nearly 60 per cent from 1990 to 2005. One of the major reasons for this is the rapid growth of low- density gated communities and villas on the urban fringe. The mixed use of land decreased by 37 per cent during the same period. It is attributed to the appearance of a large amount of communities with a single house type for land use on the urban fringe. The number of schools per 10,000 residents decreased by over 70 per cent from 1990 to 2005. However, the length of highway per the built-up area reached 185 km per km2 in 2005 which was 1.5 times in 1990. In the meantime, the number of urban villages increased by 88.6 per cent. This reflects an obvious increase in informal development in the suburbs of Beijing.
The following provides an in-depth analysis to answer the question of how urban sprawl affects residential segregation, focusing on 2005. Table 2 shows that in 2005 the value of the index of dissimilarity was 0.1318 in the central city areas and 0.2278 in the urban fringe areas. The figures reveal that there is social segregation between the low-income population and the middle- and high-income population in Beijing in both the central city areas and the urban fringe areas. However, social segregation on the urban fringe areas is higher than in the central city areas. This means that communities on the urban fringe have a higher degree of residential segrega- tion. Among other potential factors, urban
sprawl would be of significance with respect to residential segregation. Table 2 shows that the urban fringe areas were of lower density and had a lower level of mixed land use than the central city areas. Low-density and dispersal developments would physically increase the degree of segregation between communities. A lower level of mixed land use for houses means communities are dominated by one single type of house rather than by a combination of several house types. However, a community with a variety of house types would attract more different groups in terms of income than a community with only one single house type in Beijing (Zhao & Howden-Chapman 2010). The number of primary schools on the urban fringe is much smaller than in the city central areas. Actually, low accessibility to public ser- vices in some communities has become a main reason why these communities are disadvan- taged and unattractive to the high-income people.
Table 2 shows that urban villages were mainly concentrated on the urban fringe. The sprawl- ing development of urban villages has seriously increased residential segregation in Beijing. These villages have developed from pre- existing farming villages, with a large number of illegal constructions. Facilities and urban ser- vices in these urban villages are also inad- equate. Recently, the number of residents who live in the urban villages has increased because soaring housing prices in the central urban areas have forced low-income groups, which mainly include migrants, to move to the urban fringe (Yang 2004).
Table 2. Social segregation and urban sprawl in Beijing, 2005.
The city central areas The urban fringe areas
Social segregation indexes The index of dissimilarity 0.1318 0.2278 The index of residential exposure 0.3557 0.2724 Urban sprawl indexes Average residents net density (persons/km2) 27369 5347 Mixed use of land 0.7751 0.6504 Number of urban villages (units)* 33 331 Primary schools (units per 10,000 residents) 1.52 0.34 Development of highways (km per km2) 96.41 274.26
Source : the author, edited from BSB (2006); *data from Mei and Bao (2006).
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Table 2 also shows that the value of the index of residential exposure in the central city areas is 0.3557, which is higher than that of 0.2724 in the urban fringe areas. This means that the low-income population in the central city areas is more exposed to the middle- and high- income population than in the urban fringe areas. This is consistent with Figures 3 and 4 which show that the low-income population is more widely distributed across the urban fringes, while the middle- and high-income population tends to be concentrated in the central city areas. The results reveal the effects of urban sprawl on the gentrification of the city
centre. Since the 1980s, there has been rapid urban redevelopment in the city centre, with the existing industry and residents being relo- cated to the suburbs. In the process of urban development, most of the original residents could not afford the new housing being built in their original neighbourhoods, with their old houses replaced by high-priced commodity housing destined for the open market (Huang & Xu 2005). As a result, most had to move to suburban areas where housing prices were rela- tively low, while middle- and high-income earners took the opportunity to move into the city centre.
Figure 3. Proportion of low–income population in a local unit (%), Beijing 2005.
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Figures 3 and 4 also show that the proportion of the middle- and high-income population has also obviously increased on the urban fringe. This is mainly due to a large number of high- quality gated communities being developed in these areas. In particular, many low-density gated communities (less than 80 households per hectare), including villas, have been devel- oped (Wan Fang Co. 2001). These communi- ties often have large-sized houses and are gated and separated from surrounding communities. A recent report by VillasChina Co. Ltd. (2006) claims that 176 villa projects with a total area of 19 million square metres delivered 40,000 villas to the luxury residential market in Beijing in
2005. These single-family and detached villas had an average living space of 300–500 square metres, ten times the average living space of rental housing in these areas. The luxury villas were bought by high-income earners such as managers of foreign firms, leaders of state- owned enterprises and owners of large private businesses. These villas are gated and walled, separating them from other houses in the peri- urban region. They are often surrounded by a large green space, which plays a further buffer- ing role (Figure 5).
Figure 4 shows that there is a higher degree of spatial concentration of middle- and high- income population along several highway
Figure 4. Proportion of middle – and high–income population in a local unit (%), Beijing 2005.
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corridors than in other areas in the suburbs. These highway corridors include Jing-Jin Highway corridor, Jin-Mi Highway corridor, Jing-Shun Highway corridor and Jing-Cheng Highway corridor. One of major reasons for this is that middle- and high-income popula- tion have cars and prefer to live in the areas which have a better access to highways. Com- munities in these corridors have high living quality. Housing prices are also generally higher in these corridors than in other areas of the suburbs.
It needs to be acknowledged that excepting urban sprawl, there are other factors influenc-
ing residential segregation in Beijing. For example, the hukou system has increased the effects of sprawl on urban villages. The hukou system is a resident registration system which is unique to China. According to hukou policy, the population of the whole nation was classified into two categories: people with urban hukou and people with rural hukou. In the pre-reform era, rural residents with rural hukou were not allowed to migrate freely to the city. Under the hukou system, the rural population were often denied many of the basic privileges enjoyed by urban residents with urban hukou. Further- more, a household’s hukou has always served as
(a)
(b)
Note : (a) shows a gated luxury villa from outside; (b) shows the gate of the villa and the extent of the security.
Figure 5. Gated luxury villas in the peri–urban regions of Beijing.
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the basis for the allocation of many goods and services, such as basic foodstuffs, housing and jobs, as those with urban hukou consumed more goods and services than those with rural hukou. Since the 1980s, many reforms have been implemented in relation hukou system, for example, relaxing the control of movement of rural population to city. However, rural migrants in cities are still denied to access many public services, such as social housing, public schools, etc. (Yang 1993). As a result, thousands of low-income rural migrants without local urban hukou have to reside in urban villages where housing rent is low, even though quality of living is also low. More than 450,000 people lived in the urban villages of Beijing in 2005 (Mei & Bao 2006).
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SPATIAL PLANNING
Recently planning studies have focused on the impact of urban sprawl on social segregation, as sprawl has become a dominant form of urban development (e.g. Arthurson 2012; Gaffikin & Morrissey 2011). Although great efforts have been made by previous studies, conclusions are still mixed. For example, some researchers argue that spatial planning cannot be used to reduce social segregation, as sprawling develop- ment has weak links with social segregation (e.g. Brueckner & Largey 2008). The results of this study would add fresh evidence to genera- lise our existing knowledge of the effects of sprawl on social segregation by looking at Beijing as a case.
The results of analysis in this study suggest that urban sprawl has influences on social seg- regation. Gated communities have increased the degree of residential segregation in Beijing. In particular, gated low-density com- munities and villa areas have led to the fortifi- cation of suburbia in Beijing. This is consistent with findings by some previous studies (Caldeira 2000; Le Goix 2005). In Western countries, particularly in the US, the sprawling development of gated communities in the suburbs is seen as one of the major reasons for the increase in social segregation (Blakely & Snyder 1997; Marcuse 1997). High-income households tend to retreat from the city centre into suburban gated communities in the
pursuit of security from crime and social diver- sity, higher property values and a better sense of community (Arthurson 2012). The growth of gated communities has resulted in an increase in social segregation between groups with respect to their background, incomes, etc. Some rich people are in effect ‘impris- oned’ by walls built to keep ‘the others’ out (Low 2003). As a result, paralleling with the growth of gated communities, many immi- grant enclaves and ethnically distinct commu- nities have appeared in cities (Logan et al. 2002). The results of the above analysis suggest that in the urban sprawl process gated commu- nities emerged in Beijing, and have increased residential segregation. The effects of gated communities on social segregation in Beijing seem to be more serious than in Western coun- tries because the speed and scale of urban sprawl in Beijing goes far beyond that which occurred in Western cities.
The results of analysis suggest that uneven distribution of urban public services, for example, primary schools, in the process of urban sprawl are a major factor influencing residential segregation. Communities with good public services are mainly occupied by the rich people and middle class. However, the other communities are short of urban public services. They become unattractive not only to the rich but also to the low-income people.
Unbalanced investment between highways and public transport in the suburbs is another factor increasing residential segregation in the process of urban sprawl. The results of above analysis suggest that high-income residents tend to specially reside in highway corridors which are very well serviced by highway and road network in Beijing. One of main reasons for this is that high-income workers have cars, and a good service of highways helps them to easily access to jobs and public services. However, low-income residents mainly rely on public transport. Their residential location is largely determined by housing price and supply public transport services. In recent decades, in Beijing, investments in public transport in the suburbs lagged behind highway and roads. For example, investments in highway and roads were 2.7 times the invest- ments in public transport during the period from 2001 to 2005 in Beijing (BSB, various
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years). The unbalanced investment between highways and public transport in the suburbs has become a major factor worsening residen- tial segregation.
The above discussions imply that spatial plan- ning can be used to reduce residential segrega- tion. Spatial planning may reduce residential segregation through controlling urban sprawl, in particular, dispersal and scattered develop- ments in the suburbs; encouraging highly mixed land use for residential buildings; pro- moting urban services to be distributed evenly; and favouring compact city to make physical distances between different residential areas shorter. Spatial planning also would help to reduce residential segregation by encouraging a balance investment in transport infrastruc- ture between highways and public transport. In particular, in Beijing, spatial planning would play an important role in reducing social segre- gation if it pays more attention to enhance living quality in disadvantaged communities, for example, dilapidated inner-city neighbour- hoods, workers’ villages and rural migrant enclaves.
In addition, it seems that spatial planning may have a higher potential contribution to the reduction of social segregation in China than in Western countries. In China, the supply of various types of housing and residen- tial land use is still more centrally planned and tightly regulated in the present reform era than in Western countries (Zhao et al. 2009). For example, the central government has issued a new national planning regulation to increase the delivery of social housing in China’s cities. According to the new planning regulation, any development of commodity housing must designate five per cent of its total floor area to the development of social housing for low-income people. One of the most important benefits of this new policy is that it would increase residential mix in such communities and reduce residential segregation.
However, it needs to be recognised that the role of spatial planning in reducing residential segregation may be limited because there are many other factors influencing residential seg- regation in Beijing. For example, gated com- munities in the suburbs may not be the first choice for many high-income households in
China’s cities including Beijing. In the US, the poor often live in the urban core, while the wealthy live in the suburbs (Downs 1999). However, in China, most high-income house- holds prefer to live in the central areas of the city, even though some wealthy people choose to live in the suburbs. One reason is that the city centre has better access to high-salary jobs and public urban services. Another important reason is a traditional cultural factor. Living in the city centre, where the ‘privilegentsia’ tradi- tionally lived, usually indicates higher social status in China (Gaubatz 1999). Another example is that the remnants of the hukou system has an influence on residential segrega- tion. The analysis here shows that migrant resi- dents without local hukou often have no choice except to live in the marginalised communities, in particular in rural villages on the urban fringe. Recently, this trend tends to increase due to increasing housing prices in the central areas.
Another example is the dual land system in China, which is an important factor influencing residential segregation. China has a dual land system, with an urban land system and a rural land system coexisting on the urban fringe (Deng & Huang 2004). Two land systems meet each other on the urban fringe of China’s metropolises. Urban land is usually strictly managed through municipal planning and regulations, while land development manage- ment in rural villages is much less controlled (Deng & Huang 2004). In the process of urban expansion, villagers’ farmlands are expropriated as urban land. However, they maintain ownership of their housing plots according to the rural land system. Thus, after losing their farmland, most villagers in these new ‘urban villages’ choose to rent housing to maintain their livestyles. Stimulated by the potential for rental income, villagers build a large number of illegal houses on their housing plots (Wang 2000). The quality of these houses is very low and these rural communities lack access to public services, facilities and infra- structure (Zhang et al. 2003). However, the rent of this illegal and informal housing is much lower than that in urban communities, attract- ing low-income migrants to live there. As a result, new slums are appearing in these urban villages.
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CONCLUSION
Spatial planning is seen as one of primary tools through which resources and opportunities are distributed to social groups in terms of their income. A central topic in the field of both planning theory has been how to reduce the effects of urban growth on social segregation. This study found that in Beijing since the 1990s there has been an increase in residential segre- gation between the low-income population and the middle- and high-income population and between local residents and migrants. Sprawl- ing development, characterised by scattered gated communities, low-density luxury villas, informal development, or single-use land devel- opment in the peri-urban regions, tend to increase the residential segregation. In particu- lar, urban sprawl has increased the number of urban villages, created new urban slums and promoted gentrification of the city centre. Resi- dential segregation has also been increased by unevenly distributed public services and unbal- anced investments between highways and public transport in the suburbs in the process of urban sprawl.
Spatial planning designed to control urban sprawl would assist in reducing residential seg- regation in several ways, for example, control- ling dispersal developments in the suburbs, encouraging a compact city, promoting mixed land use and different types of houses in a community, distributing urban services evenly in terms of population, encouraging a balance investment between highways and public trans- port across the suburbs, or enhancing living quality in disadvantaged communities. In par- ticular, in China’s cities, spatial planning would be an efficient tool of reducing residential seg- regation because land use in China is still more centrally planned and tightly regulated in the current transition process.
However, it must be realised that the role of spatial planning is limited. Rather than being primarily affected by urban sprawl, social segre- gation in China’s cities is also greatly affected by institutional factors related to the remnants of the centrally planned system, for example the hukou system (residential registration system) and dual land systems. The positive role of plan- ning in promoting social integration may be limited unless more deep reforms are imple-
mented to change the existing social welfare system in relation to hukou and land manage- ment system.
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Do Mexican Cities Sprawl? Housing-Finance Reform and Changing Patterns of Urban Growth
Paavo Monkkonen
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406
DO MEXICAN CITIES SPRAWL? HOUSING-FINANCE REFORM AND CHANGING PATTERNS OF URBAN GROWTH1
Paavo Monkkonen2
Department of Urban Planning and Design The University of Hong Kong
Abstract: This study documents a recent, dramatic change in urban growth patterns in Mexico. Using information from housing developers, satellite imagery, census archives, and administra- tive records on mortgage lending, it contrasts the growth patterns generated by new large-scale developments of tract housing built under an expanding housing-finance system with those of incrementally built, “self-help” housing. In a series of regression models, the growing areas of cities with a larger share of new housing purchased through mortgage financing are shown to have a higher housing density and better access to basic urban infrastructure, yet are not found to be located farther from the city center than traditional neighborhoods. Although the new urban growth patterns in Mexico might visually resemble urban sprawl in the United States, they differ on several important dimensions and therefore will not have the same impacts on environmental and transportation efficiency. [Key words: housing, Mexico, urban spatial structure.]
Reform of government housing finance agencies in Mexico in the early 1990s led to an explosion of credit for housing later in the decade, a trend that continues to this day. The number of mortgages issued annually almost tripled between 1995 and 2005, from fewer than 200,000 to roughly 550,000. Government provident funds,3 previously directly involved in housing construction, have become purely financial institutions, acting as mortgage banks for formally employed workers. The increase in mortgage lending and the reform of lending practices led to a transformation in the way housing is built and acquired in Mexico: a majority of houses are now built by private companies on speculation and purchased with mortgages, rather than through the incremental process that previously governed urban development (Monkkonen, 2011).
Recent attention has been drawn to the most visible outcome of the housing transi- tion in Mexico—high-density, suburban housing developments being built in cities across the country (Maya and Cervantes, 1999; Garcia and Hoffer, 2006; Harner et al., 2009). Although the sizes and prices of the housing produced in these new developments vary, most houses are relatively inexpensive and most developments are quite large and include several thousand houses. Other than their size, the most visually striking characteristic of new suburban developments is their homogeneity. The identical, small row houses make
1Special thanks are due to Susana Hinojosa and Harrison Dekker at the library of the University of California, Berkeley for facilitating access to the census data used in this research. I also benefitted from dissertation funding from UC MEXUS, Fulbright-Hays, and the North American Regional Science Council as well as from comments by reviewers and editors at Urban Geography. 2Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Paavo Monkkonen, Department of Urban Plan- ning and Design, the University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong; telephone: +852-6013-4822; fax: +852-2559-0468; email: [email protected] 3Provident funds are mandatory, long-term savings schemes that generally function as pension funds. Due to the long-term nature of provident funds, they are often involved in lending for housing, for example, in Singapore, China, and Nigeria. More information on housing provident funds can be found in Chiquier and Lea (2009).
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the developments appear to be the epitome of suburban sprawl. In many cases, their sales marketing is also reminiscent of U.S. suburban developments, with an emphasis on life- style packages and living close to nature (Harner et al., 2009).
This study evaluates the changes in urban growth patterns in Mexico engendered by the transformation of housing production. It first describes these changes by using some extreme examples and then tests a series of hypotheses about the connection between lev- els of lending and the evolving structure of cities. Scholars have long argued that the nature of financing dictates the form of urban development (Renaud, 1987). Quantitative analyses of this association are relatively rare, however, because of the complexity of urban devel- opment and the limited availability of data for countries undergoing the transition to a finance-based housing acquisition system.
Statistical analysis is conducted using census and administrative data for more than 100 Mexican cities. It shows a strong association between the share of housing built under the new finance system and both housing density and quality of housing stock in the growth areas of cities. Although there is no association between housing finance and overall den- sity or density gradients, this is probably due to the time frame of the available data. At present, data are only available from the 2000 census, a year in which the new production system had only been operating for half a decade. It is likely that similar analyses in the future will yield more solid results at the city level, inasmuch as the association between the share of housing development that is finance-led and characteristics of recently built areas of cities is strong.
New housing developments in Mexico differ in several ways from the previously domi- nant form of such development, involving the quality of housing stock, access to infrastruc- ture, the length of time it takes to complete the development process, and homogeneity of neighborhoods as well as their density. Because of their initially high housing-unit density when compared to incrementally developed neighborhoods, the new housing develop- ments will not exacerbate the negative environmental impacts of urbanization in the same way as urban sprawl does in the United States. Yet the location of new developments at the metropolitan periphery and their lack of access to a viable transport network mean that their impacts on congestion and automobile travel in cities—and therefore greenhouse gas emissions—could be substantial.
This study is organized as follows. The next (second) section describes the density patterns of Mexican cities in an international context. The third section describes the new housing developments using data from developers, satellite imagery, and the census. The fourth section develops a series of hypotheses concerning the impact of new housing devel- opments on urban density patterns and housing characteristics; the fifth section tests those hypotheses with geographic, administrative, and census data obtained for the 128 urban areas of Mexico. The conclusion assesses the environmental and urban efficiency impacts of this new form of Mexican urban growth.
DENSITY PATTERNS IN MEXICAN CITIES
Urban areas in Mexico display relatively low levels of population density, similar to those of larger metropolitan regions in the United States. However, this similarity in density belies very different urban development processes and conditions. The developed areas of Mexican cities with more than 1 million residents had an average density of 13
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housing units per hectare in 2000, and those with populations between 200,000 and 1 mil- lion had an average density of 10 houses per hectare (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Geografía, 2000a). The average housing unit density of U.S. cities in 2000 with more than 200,000 people was also 10 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002). It should be noted this refers to incorporated cities, not MSAs, which often exhibit lower densities because they include undeveloped surrounding land. For reference, the cities of Los Angeles and Detroit had roughly 11 houses per hectare in the year 2000, while San Antonio and Phoenix had only 4 houses per hectare in that same year (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002).
Furthermore, despite low income levels, poor quality housing stock, and limited infra- structure, cities in Mexico also display population- and housing-density gradients that are considered low by international standards and are comparable to those in the United States (Mills and Tan, 1980; Ingram and Carroll, 1981). Density gradients measure the rate at which density decreases as one moves away from the center of the city, and a relatively low density gradient means that densities in the city center are not markedly different from those at the urban periphery.
The underlying urban development process in Mexico is quite different from that of the United States, however. Cities in Mexico are characterized by a historic city center, which generally remains as a vibrant commercial area surrounded by older incrementally built neighborhoods4 that have been consolidated, an upper-income residential area that begins near the historic center and extends outward, and a periphery dominated by incrementally developed neighborhoods in an early stage of development (Griffin and Ford, 1980; Ford, 1996; Ward, 1993). Since the 1990s these patterns have changed with an increasing diver- sity of land uses, especially more formal developments, in the urban periphery (Bosdorf, 2003).
Several factors underlie these density patterns in Latin America. First, the majority of urban consolidations in Latin America occurred during the latter half of the 20th century, when transportation costs were much less influential in urban development than they were in the 19th and early 20th centuries (Ingram and Carroll, 1981; Glaeser and Kohlhase, 2003). Second, although car ownership rates are lower in Latin America than in the U.S., informal and public transportation systems are generally quite efficient and flexible, as is the case in many developing countries (Cervero, 2000). Finally and most importantly, the incremental urban development process means neighborhoods are founded at a low density that increases over time, so more peripheral neighborhoods exhibit lower densities because many lots are not built on, not because they are larger.
NEW HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS AND URBAN GROWTH PATTERNS
Beginning in the early 1990s, the federal government of Mexico, with help from the World Bank, undertook a series of reforms aimed at channeling private investment into the housing-finance system, including the creation of a group of mortgage thrifts (SOFOLES)
4Under the incremental housing production system, households acquire a plot of land, through formal or non- formal channels, and manage the construction of the house, adding rooms and replacing temporary materials with permanent ones over time. Incrementally built neighborhoods usually receive infrastructure as time goes by, but this can take many years (Ward, 1976). The technical definition of consolidated housing can be found in note nine.
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HOUSING FINANCE AND URBAN GROWTH IN MEXICO 409
and a secondary mortgage market (Puebla, 2002). However, the most important change in the country’s housing-finance system during those years was the reform of the National Worker’s Housing Fund (INFONAVIT). INFONAVIT is a provident fund, financed by a 5% salary contribution by employers on behalf of all full-time private-sector employees. It had been involved in the construction and financing of housing since the 1970s, but had never had a major impact on the housing stock of the country. By the early 1990s, this organization became a purely financial institution and drastically changed its loan admin- istration system (Pardo and Sanchez, 2006), rapidly expanding into making large numbers of loans for relatively low-cost housing. Between 1995 and 2005, it issued 65% of the housing loans in the country (Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda, nd).
In addition to INFONAVIT, several other government lenders, including provident funds for public-sector workers, employees of the national petroleum and electricity com- panies, and a government-supported low-income housing fund, are active in the mortgage market. However, the allocation of most loans in Mexico is not market based. Not only is access to loans restricted, but there are tight restrictions on the type of housing that can be purchased with them. These structural restrictions in the mortgage system and the close relationship between government lenders and home builders have resulted in the rise of the new housing developments described in this article (Coulomb and Schteingart, 2006).
The new housing developments, which contrast sharply with the existing residential landscape of the rural-urban fringe, are described here through a combination of informa- tion about a typical housing project from the website of the developer Casas GEO and satellite imagery from Google EarthTM. Casas GEO is one of the largest homebuilders in Mexico; it is publicly traded on the Mexican stock exchange, and has built housing in more than 30 Mexican cities. The housing projects built by GEO range widely in size and cost. At the low end, the company builds houses that sell for as little as 130,000 Mexican pesos5 in developments of up to 5,000 houses, whereas at the high end it builds smaller developments of several hundred houses that sell for up to 1 million Mexican pesos each. The heterogeneity of new housing developments in Mexico should be acknowledged, but interviews with representatives of INFONAVIT, site visits in cities across Mexico, and examination of data from developers suggest that the majority of lending is for relatively low cost housing for the middle and upper-middle class.
As of May 2009, the Los Encinos development in the city of Ensenada, in Baja California State, contained 1,500 houses, but upon completion it will have 5,000.6 The development includes a range of housing units that cost between 300,000 and 600,000 Mexican pesos. It was chosen because it is representative of the housing stock built by Casas GEO, although its location in Ensenada is an extreme example of the trends that mark the new housing system. Ensenada is not a prototypical Mexican city, yet the contrast between the density and land use characteristics of Los Encinos vs. the surrounding area is found widely throughout urban Mexico according to a recent review of metropolitan growth trends (Monkkonen, 2008).
Figure 1 shows one type of house in Los Encinos, the Monteolivo, which is the mid- priced model. These have lots of 130 square meters with 55 square meters of construction, and cost roughly 400,000 Mexican pesos in 2009 (Casas GEO, nd). As with many large
5According to the Bank of Mexico, the peso traded at 13.2 to the U.S. dollar in September 2009. 6Interview with Casas GEO sales agent, May 14, 2009.
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housing developments in Mexico, Los Encinos advertises features such as a park with picnic facilities, bike paths, commercial areas, and its own water treatment plant.
Figure 2 shows the floor plan of the Monteolivo houses. They are single-story homes with a small backyard and parking pad in front. Though slightly less than half the lot is built on initially, most households expand the constructed area soon after moving in.
In order to secure parcels of land of sufficient size for developments of several thousand houses, the majority of new housing developments are located on the urban periphery. In fact, some are located outside the existing urban area, leapfrogging over vacant land. The Los Encinos development is located at the northernmost periphery of Ensenada. Figure 3 shows two satellite images of the city in 2007. The image on the left shows the entire urban
Fig. 1. Houses in Los Encinos, Ensenada, Baja California. Source: Casas GEO (n.d.).
Fig. 2. Floor plan of the Monteolivo house in Los Encinos, Ensenada, Baja California. Source: Casas GEO (n.d.).
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HOUSING FINANCE AND URBAN GROWTH IN MEXICO 411
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area with Los Encinos highlighted. The image on the right shows a closer view of the area inside the box, illustrating the difference between the urban form and density of Los Encinos in the upper part of the image and the incrementally developed neighborhood below. Note that higher-density development (about 20 units per hectare) is located adjacent to land cur- rently developed at a very low density (roughly 2 housing units per hectare).
The housing developments being built across Mexico are altering the way its cities grow, but data limitations make a more detailed description of housing characteristics dif- ficult. The only comprehensive source of georeferenced data on housing in Mexico is the general census of population and housing (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Geografía, 1990, 2000a). Even though the census contains spatial data that enable a comparison of changes in housing density, it does not allow for the isolation of housing by development type or age. Thus the change in the number of houses in census tracts is used to identify growing areas of cities. We now turn to a demonstration of how census tract data7 and satellite imagery can be combined to reveal the way that new housing developments are changing urban growth patterns.
The city of Chihuahua is used as an example. Chihuahua had a 2000 population of 700,000. When compared to other similarly sized cities with a population between 500,000 and 900,000 in 2000,8 Chihuahua had a slightly lower population growth rate during the 1990s (45% vs. 50% for other medium-sized cities) and a higher share of new houses built and purchased under the new financing system (60% vs. 40% in the other medium-sized cities) (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Geografía, 1990 and 2000a). Nonetheless, even with a large share of housing developed under the new system, Chihuahua continues to have a large number of new neighborhoods in the process of incremental development.
Figure 4 shows the housing unit density in Chihuahua in 1990 and 2000, which reveals three urban growth trends in the city that were first identified by site visits and examina- tions of satellite imagery. First, there is a clear tendency toward housing development under the new financing system in the north of the city, evident in the new tracts of high housing-unit density as well as those tracts whose density increased sharply in the north- ern sector of the map. At the same time, continued development of incremental housing in the southern part of the city is evident in the new tracts of low housing-unit density in the southeast. Finally, there is continued consolidation and densification of incrementally built neighborhoods in the southwest, evidenced by the increasing housing-unit density in that sector of the map.
The census tract maps of Chihuahua in Figure 4 provide a useful visualization of the different types of urban growth in the city. Although tract-level data do not indicate the share of housing that has been purchased with mortgage financing, growth areas of the city can be identified by observing changes in the number of houses. Satellite imagery also is helpful to contrast the two types of urban growth. Figure 5 shows satellite images of two city blocks in Chihuahua, with both images from 2003 viewed from an altitude of 1.7 kilo- meters. The upper block is located in the northern part of the city and is 160 meters long
7Census tracts in Mexico contain bout 2,500 people on average, but they can range up to 10,000. Unlike the census tract geography of the United States, tracts in Mexico are only delimited for areas considered urban, and thus new tracts are drawn every five years. 8Seventeen cities in Mexico had between 500,000 and 900,000 residents in the year 2000.
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HOUSING FINANCE AND URBAN GROWTH IN MEXICO 413
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and 36 meters wide. The lower block is located in the southeastern part of the city. It is 270 meters long, 46 meters wide, and has roughly the same number of lots as the first block.
Comparison of the two city blocks reveals several differences between the two catego- ries of urban development. The first is homogeneity. Housing built under the new financ- ing system in a given development is generally uniform, and only one or two house models deviate slightly. In fact, even developments built by different developers in different cities share similar architectural styles, construction techniques, and materials. This homogene- ity, unfortunately, cannot be explored with the data available.
Second, though the quality of materials and finishing of new houses varies by price, they are generally superior to incrementally built structures. More importantly, all new developments have paved roads and connections to running water, electricity, and sewage systems. Some large developments even have their own water treatment plants. In contrast, many incrementally built neighborhoods exist for decades before receiving such basic urban infrastructure (Gilbert and Ward, 1985).
The third major difference between the two production systems is the length of time it takes to complete the development of a neighborhood. Under the new system, all lots in a subdivision are built out at the same time. Thus the initial housing-unit density is far greater than in a neighborhood being built incrementally, in which only some lots are built on during early years. Although some lots in the incremental block shown in Figure 5 have more than one structure in place, the housing-unit density is clearly lower. The difference in the length of time development takes has ramifications for the building of and access to urban amenities like schools, parks, shops, or public buildings. In theory, new develop- ments will have access to these facilities sooner, as planning regulations in most cities stipulate their construction along with large developments. However, case studies in the State of Mexico show that developers do not always build these installations as required,
Fig. 5. Satellite image of two city blocks in Chihuahua, 2003. Source: Google EarthTM.
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HOUSING FINANCE AND URBAN GROWTH IN MEXICO 415
and municipalities struggle to provide them quickly (Maya and Cervantes, 1999). More research in this area is sorely needed.
Fourth, although anecdotal evidence suggests that the new suburban housing develop- ments are located on the outermost edge of urban areas, it is not clear that they are located any differently than incrementally built neighborhoods, found in the urban periphery (Griffin and Ford, 1980).
Finally, it is also unclear whether the stereotype of suburban housing developments as strictly residential applies to new housing developments in Mexico. Incrementally built neighborhoods are replete with small businesses (Ward, 1976), yet a similar phenomenon can be found in the new housing developments. In site visits to tract housing developments in the cities of Tijuana, Ensenada, Chihuahua, Mexico City, and Mérida between 2006 and 2009, it was apparent that many households had converted front rooms to small businesses such as internet cafés, restaurants, or laundries only a few years after the development had been opened. Therefore, while the land use is initially homogeneous, the eventual mix of uses is not necessarily lower.
Thus far urban growth trends have only been presented for two cities. And it should be kept in mind that both formal and incremental housing developments are heterogeneous— i.e., not all areas developed under the new system will have a higher density than incre- mentally developed neighborhoods. In order to provide generalizations for urban Mexico as a whole, data on a large number of cities is analyzed using two sets of statistical models to test four hypotheses. First, is that the share of housing consolidated will be higher in cit- ies with more lending activity. Second, the housing unit density will also be higher in cities with a greater share of new houses built under the new system. Third, because mortgage financing enables housing development, cities with more lending will have larger areas of urban growth. And fourth, urban growth in cities with more lending will occur further from the city center because of lower land prices.
LENDING AND URBAN GROWTH TRENDS ACROSS MEXICO
This section examines the influence of the housing-finance system on urban growth in Mexico with two sets of regression models, one using indicators of city density and housing characteristics and the other using data on urban growth areas. Urban growth and change are measured in several ways. The simplest measures are the expansion of the city—hectares urbanized between 1990 and 2000—and concomitant change in housing- unit density. The density gradient and the share of consolidated housing (housing built of permanent materials and with access to basic services)9 are also considered. The average distance of the urban growth areas from the city center is also used in the second set of models. Even though the models clearly are not causal, the fact that strong associations persist when controlling for potentially confounding variables is indicative of the impor- tant role of finance in changing urban growth in Mexico.
The models use data from 128 urban areas in Mexico. These areas are analogous to metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the United States, as they have an urban core
9Permanent materials are defined as walls of brick, block, stone, cement, metal, or asbestos sheeting; floors of cement or tile; and roofs of masonry, concrete, tile, metal, or asbestos. Access to infrastructure is defined as elec- trical power, a sewage system or septic tank, and a water supply piped exclusively to the household.
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population of more than 50,000. This definition is used because the official designation of metropolitan areas in Mexico includes only those urban areas that encompass more than one municipality, and excludes many large urban areas (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social et al., 2004). The MSAs defined for this study do include the areas officially designated by the Mexican government.
Isolating areas of new growth using tract data is somewhat challenging because the year a house is built is not reported. Fortunately, the change in the number of houses in a census tract can be calculated simply by subtracting the number of houses in 1990 from the number in 2000. Although many tracts changed between the two years, these changes are accounted for using a matching table provided by the Mexican Census Bureau. These tables list all of the tracts that changed between every five-year census and by-census period. For the most part, changes are limited to the creation of new tracts, tracts split- ting in two, and merging of existing tracts. Additionally, it must be assumed that vacancy does not bias the calculation, as only occupied housing units are reported in the tract-level census data.
An area of urban growth, however, should not include tracts in which only one or two houses were added. Tracts are therefore not classified as growing if there are fewer new houses in them than the median number of houses in all tracts. In order not to exclude small tracts during this process, and because tract size correlates with density, tracts with less than the median number of new houses are classified as growing if the housing-unit density of new houses in a tract is greater than the median tract housing-unit density.
Table 1 reports the mean values of selected indicators of density and urban growth. Cit- ies are grouped into three categories based on the relative importance of the new housing- finance system as measured by the share of houses built between 1990 and 2000 that were purchased with a loan. Fifteen cities are considered to have high levels of lending (more than 50% of new houses were built with mortgages), 53 cities have medium levels of lend- ing (25–50%), and 60 cities have low levels of lending (less than 25%). The density gradi- ent is calculated using the standard negative exponential model (Clark, 1951).
There does not seem to be a correlation between city size, density, the density gradient in 1990 and 2000, or the percent change in these values during the 1990s and the share of lending in a city. Housing consolidation and lending is correlated, however. Cities with more new houses purchased with mortgages had a larger share of consolidated housing in 1990, and that share grew by a greater amount during the 1990s (Spearman correlation coefficients of 0.35 and 0.19, both significant at the 0.05 level). Income is also positively associated with the share of lending, as is the change in income (Spearman correlation coefficients of 0.60 and 0.25, both significant at the 0.05 level).
Table 2 reports summary data for the areas of new urban growth—size, density, share of consolidated housing, these values relative to overall city characteristics, and average distance that growth areas are located from the city center. The high relative value of the density of areas of growth reflects both the new, dense form of urban development as well as the importance of incremental growth in the established parts of cities. There is clearly a positive relationship between density, housing consolidation, and lending (all Spearman correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the .05 level), but not between lend- ing and the area or distance of growth.
The first four regression models assess the determinants of change in cities’ urban structure: area, density, density gradient, and housing/infrastructure conditions between
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1990 and 2000. The four measures of urban structure in 2000 are regressed on their value in 1990, household income in 1990, the change in median household income during the 1990s, and new houses built during the 1990s as a share of houses in 1990. The share of the houses built with financing during the 1990s is included on the left-hand side to test the central hypothesis.
Table 3 reports the results of OLS regressions of city-level density and housing charac- teristics. Clearly, in 2000 the changes in urban-growth patterns associated with increased housing finance have not affected overall indicators of urban form. Housing-unit density
Table 1. Selected city characteristics by lending category, 1990–2000
Variables
High-lending citiesa
(N = 15)
Medium-lending citiesb
(N = 53)
Low-lending citiesc
(N = 60)
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Median HH inc.,d 1990 4.06 0.86 4.06 0.94 3.22 0.77
Median HH inc.,d 2000 3.56 0.77 3.49 0.80 2.60 0.65
Pct. change, 1990–2000 –0.12 0.11 –0.13 0.11 –0.19 0.11
Housing growth (%)1990– 2000
0.64 0.12 0.69 0.23 0.71 0.23
Area (thous. ha), 1990 8.94 6.18 7.46 9.70 8.77 25.22
Area (thous. ha), 2000 10.28 6.79 9.01 11.69 9.94 27.63
Pct. change, 1990–2000 0.17 0.08 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.17
Density, 1990e 6.93 2.26 7.84 2.83 6.31 2.56
Density, 2000e 8.73 2.73 9.69 3.28 7.89 3.44
Pct. change, 1990–2000 0.35 0.19 0.35 0.34 0.47 0.30
Pct. housing consolidatedf, 1990
0.58 0.15 0.52 0.16 0.38 0.12
Pct. housing consolidatedf, 2000
0.69 0.15 0.59 0.18 0.42 0.15
Pct. change, 1990–2000 0.21 0.13 0.17 0.24 0.14 0.42
Density gradient, 1990d –0.27 0.45 –0.34 0.40 –0.27 0.34
Density gradient, 2000d –0.22 0.35 –0.23 0.32 –0.19 0.22
Pct. change, 1990–2000 –0.69 2.54 –0.18 0.49 –0.25 1.31
aIn high-lending cities more than 50% of new houses were purchased with mortgages. bIn medium-lending cities between 25 % and 50 % of new houses were purchased with mortgages. cIn low-lending cities less than 25 % of new houses were purchased with a mortgages. dIncome is measured in year-2000 pesos. The exchange rate in 2000 was 7.9 for one U.S. dollar. eIn all cases, density is measured by housing units per hectare (ha). fConsolidated housing is housing built of permanent materials (floors of cement or other permanent material, and a roof of masonry, concrete, clay tile, tiles of unspecified type, metal, or asbestos) and basic infrastructure (water piped to the household, connection to a sewage network or septic tank, and electrical power). Sources: Compiled by author from Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Geografía 1990, 2000a, and 2000b, and Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda, n.d.
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418 PAAVO MONKKONEN
and the density gradient in 2000 seem only to be associated with the level of the same indicator in 1990, while median household income seems to have a small positive asso- ciation with the increase in city size during the 1990s. The share of new housing finance did significantly impact the change in the share of consolidated housing, which is logical given that housing purchased with a mortgage must be consolidated, while incrementally developed housing is not.
The second set of models takes a similar form, except that dependent variables measure characteristics of the new growth areas. Three of the dependent variables are the same, but instead of the density gradient, the average distance of the new growth areas is used. The variables describing the structure of growing areas in a city are regressed on the same set of control variables, and, as before, a variable that measures the share of the houses built during the 1990s under the new housing-finance system is included to test the central hypothesis.
Table 4 reports the results of OLS regressions of characteristics of urban growth areas. Unlike the previous set of models, the share of new housing purchased with mortgages is a significant determinant of the size and density of the growing areas of cities. For every additional 10% of new housing that was purchased with a mortgage, the size of the grow- ing area was 2% greater, the density of that area was 7% greater, and the share of consoli- dated housing was 4% greater. These results are as expected.
The coefficient measuring the impact of the share of housing purchased with mortgages on the average distance of areas of urban growth is not significant. Despite stereotypes of suburban development, it does not seem to be the case that neighborhoods developed under
Table 2. Selected indicators of urban growth patterns in Mexican cities by lending category, 1990–2000
Variables
High-lending citiesa
(N = 15)
Medium-lending citiesb
(N = 53)
Low-lending citiesc
(N = 60)
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Area of growth (thous. ha) 2.00 1.33 1.79 2.10 2.11 5.04
Growth area/total area 0.25 0.14 0.26 0.16 0.23 0.17
Density of growthd 14.12 7.00 13.07 4.91 9.11 4.88
Growth density/density 1.61 0.51 1.38 0.39 1.17 0.55
Pct. growth housing consolidated
0.75 0.24 0.60 0.27 0.33 0.26
Pct. growth consolidated/ pct. city consolidated
1.21 0.51 1.07 0.46 0.82 0.73
Avg. growth distance (km) 3.97 2.75 3.91 1.18 4.30 2.68
aIn high-lending cities more than 50% of new houses were purchased with mortgages. bIn medium-lending cities between 25% and 50% of new houses were purchased with mortgages. cIn low-lending cities less than 25% of new houses were purchased with mortgages. dDensity is measured by housing units per hectare. Source: Compiled by author from Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Geografía 1990, 2000a, and 2000b, and Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda, n.d.
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HOUSING FINANCE AND URBAN GROWTH IN MEXICO 419
the new financing system are built further from the city center than neighborhoods devel- oped incrementally. This provides an important piece of evidence for the assessment of the environmental and urban efficiency impacts of the new housing-development system.
DO MEXICAN CITIES SPRAWL?
This study provides evidence that reform and expansion of the housing-finance system in Mexico has led to a change in the structure of the country’s urban growth. The incremental process of building houses and neighborhoods has given way to mass-produced develop- ments of tract housing, which have a higher quality but more uniform housing stock, more access to infrastructure, and higher housing-unit density at an early stage of development. Yet the question posed in the title remains unanswered: Do Mexican cities sprawl?
Urban sprawl is generally characterized by the extreme decentralization of urban activ- ity and low-density residential development (Brueckner, 2000; Glaeser and Kahn, 2003). Thus, while the new suburban developments in Mexico “look” like suburban sprawl—
Table 3. OLS regression results: determinants of growth, density and housing characteristics, 1990–2000a
Explanatory variables ln(Area, 2000)
ln(Density, 2000)b
Density gradient, 2000b
Pct. consolidated, 2000
ln(Median HH income, 1990)
0.13 [0.078]
–0.118 [0.103]
–0.064 [0.070]
–0.067 [0.040]
Pct. change in HH income, 1990–2000
–0.061 [0.119]
0.310 [0.241]
0.141 [0.168]
0.123 [0.076]
Pct. growth in housing units, 1990–2000
0.08 [0.069]
0.098 [0.123]
0.050 [0.043]
0.036 [0.042]
Pct. new housing financed, 1990–2000
0.064 [0.081]
–0.100 [0.134]
–0.022 [0.109]
0.202 [0.070]**
ln(Area, 1990) 0.963 [0.016]**
ln(Density, 1990)b 0.820 [0.045]**
Density gradient, 1990b 0.653 [0.084]**
Pct. consolidated, 1990 0.860 [0.067]**
Constant –0.666 [0.543]
2.008 [0.723]**
0.543 [0.547]
0.668 [0.302]*
Observations 128 128 128 128
F 800.67 62.22 11.71 91.56
R-squared 0.99 0.83 0.76 0.83
Adj. R-squared 0.98 0.82 0.74 0.82
aWhite robust standard errors in brackets; * and ** = significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. bDensity is measured by housing units per hectare.
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homogenous tract housing with individual parking pads—their relatively high housing- unit density means they do not fit one of the most important criteria of sprawled urban growth. Yet rather than debating whether these new patterns of urban growth should be classified as sprawl, it seems more useful to briefly compare their environmental and urban efficiency impacts to earlier patterns of urban growth.
Scholars have demonstrated that urban sprawl has a number of negative environmental impacts, including loss of farmland and damage to local ecosystems (Johnson, 2001); but the most important is the rise in carbon emissions associated with increased automobile usage (Kahn, 2006). The increase in auto use stems from the peripheral location of hous- ing and the low densities that force cities to expand horizontally. Since new developments in Mexico do not use more land per person than previous patterns of urban growth, and since they are not being built further away from the city center than incremental-housing developments, it seems clear that their long-term environmental impact will not be greater than the earlier form of urban growth. Only in the short term might these dense peripheral housing developments increase overall automobile use by allowing more people to move to a dense urban periphery.
Table 4. OLS regression results: determinants of urban growth characteristics, 1990–2000a
Explanatory variables ln(area) ln(density)b Pct. consolidated
ln(distance of growth)
ln(Median HH income, 1990)
0.117 [0.056]*
0.650 [0.275]*
–0.101 [0.113]
0.229 [0.197]
Pct. change in HH income, 1990-2000
–0.07 [0.095]
0.247 [0.441]
0.234 [0.228]
–0.402 [0.340]
Pct. growth in housing, 1990–2000
0.121 [0.060]*
0.078 [0.137]
–0.076 [0.152]
–0.054 [0.137]
Pct. new housing financed, 1990–2000
0.202 [0.063]**
0.689 [0.317]*
0.401 [0.167]*
–0.117 [0.204]
ln(Area, 1990) 0.093 [0.010]**
0.396 [0.042]**
ln(Density, 1990)b 0.717 [0.109]**
Pct. consolidated, 1990 1.056 [0.172]**
Constant –1.267 [0.416]**
–5.854 [2.025]**
0.826 [0.836]
–3.914 [1.430]**
Observations 127 127 127 126
F 36.81 14.58 36.95 15.51
R-squared 0.71 0.49 0.57 0.56
Adj. R-squared 0.69 0.45 0.54 0.52
aWhite robust standard errors in brackets; * and ** = significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. bDensity is measured by housing units per hectare.
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HOUSING FINANCE AND URBAN GROWTH IN MEXICO 421
In terms of urban efficiency, travel times and congestion are generally considered to be exacerbated by sprawl, due primarily to the increase in travel times caused by the horizon- tal expansion of the city. Although Glaeser and Kahn (2003) argue that in the case of the United States more sprawling cities actually have less congestion because of lower densi- ties, it is probable that the high-density urban-fringe developments in Mexico will generate less overall pollution from auto travel by keeping cities compact. One limitation, however, is that land use planning is generally not integrated with transportation planning in Mexico so the transport connectivity of new developments is generally not considered when they are being permitted. Moreover, because these are mostly gated developments (Garcia and Hoffer, 2006), they generally have only one or two access roads, which can become very congested at peak hours. The large superblock layout can also exacerbate distances driven by residents. A closer examination of the congestion and consequent pollution impacts of the new developments is needed.
The “3Ds” framework developed by Cervero and Kockelman (1997) provides an addi- tional framework for assessing the transportation impacts of change in Mexican urban growth patterns. The central idea of the 3Ds—which refer to density, diversity, and design—is that higher-density neighborhoods with a mixture of commercial and residen- tial land use and streets designed for pedestrian traffic lead to greater public transit use and reduce overall vehicle miles traveled. The comparison in this study of neighborhoods developed under the new system and those developed incrementally has shown that the new neighborhoods have higher density. In terms of land use diversity, anecdotal evidence suggests that these neighborhoods are similar to incrementally developed neighborhoods in terms of informal businesses, though clearly a more rigorous analysis of this question needs to be undertaken.
In terms of pedestrian-friendly design, the images of the new neighborhoods presented above show that these places do not have many of the elements referred to by Cervero and Kockelman (1997), such as shade trees, planter beds, or buildings with parking in the rear. Nonetheless, it could be argued that they provide a better pedestrian environment than incrementally built neighborhoods because they have uninterrupted sidewalks and paved roads. In many incrementally built neighborhoods at an early or middle stage of development, roads merely consist of compressed earth, which can create loose dust and reduce walkability, especially in Mexico’s widespread dry environments. In later stages of consolidation, paving is often uneven, skipping houses whose owners did not contribute to the improvement.
In the final analysis, the environmental and urban efficiency impacts of changing patterns of urban growth in Mexico depend heavily on whether they are compared to the previously dominant pattern of urban development or some ideally efficient urban form. Although more detailed research is needed on the travel habits associated with the two types of development, it seems that the new suburbs, although they appear to be similar to sprawled communities, are not necessarily more environmentally harmful or inefficient than what they are replacing. In fact, they seem superior to previous forms of urban devel- opment in many ways. Moreover, the change in the urban development process opens a great potential for improvement of urban efficiency in Mexican cities, if developers can be convinced to adapt the designs of new neighborhoods appropriately. Yet it remains to be seen whether planners in Mexico will seize this opportunity. High priorities include coor- dinating the transportation connectivity of new neighborhoods, perhaps with transit hubs
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422 PAAVO MONKKONEN
and surrounding high-density housing. A shift toward a new town development model rather than simple suburban housing developments would be a fruitful direction for poli- cymakers to pursue.
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Some realities about sprawl and urban decline
Anthony Downs
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Housing Policy Debate • Volume 10, Issue 4 955 q Fannie Mae Foundation 1999. All Rights Reserved.
Some Realities about Sprawl and Urban Decline
Anthony Downs The Brookings Institution
Abstract
Many urban analysts believe suburban sprawl has become an important issue be- cause it helps generate two types of problems: growth-related difficulties like rising traffic congestion, and high concentrations of poor minority households in core-area neighborhoods. However, a careful regression analysis of measures of both sprawl and urban decline shows no statistically significant relation between these two conditions.
The basic nature of the American urban development process would cause core- area poverty concentrations even if sprawl were replaced by more compact growth forms. But sprawl does aggravate growth-related problems. Those problems could be attacked through either alternative overall growth strategies—such as high- density, tightly bounded growth—or specific anti-sprawl tactics, such as regional tax-base sharing and regional coordination of land uses. But no feasible policies are likely either to alleviate traffic congestion much or cause most American regions to abandon sprawl.
Keywords: Discrimination; Land use/zoning; Urban planning
Introduction
Suburban sprawl has become a hot topic across the United States and is affecting even such federal policies as Vice President Gore’s open spaces initiative. I examined this topic about five years ago in New Visions for Metropolitan America (1994), and I am now work- ing with several other analysts on a comprehensive federally funded study called The Costs of Sprawl—Revisited (Burchell 1998).1 This article presents my overall perspective on this topic, which is much more complex than most commentators recognize.
Differences between sprawl and the basic U.S. urban growth process
At the outset, suburban sprawl must be clearly defined. Sprawl is not any form of suburban growth, but a particular form. In The
1 This first volume is a review and analysis of the existing literature.
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Costs of Sprawl—Revisited, we did not create the definition deduc- tively from some internally coherent concept of “sprawlness” (Bur- chell 1998). Rather, we looked inductively at all the criticisms of sprawl in the literature and derived traits that would cause them. There are 10: (1) unlimited outward extension of development, (2) low-density residential and commercial settlements, (3) leapfrog development, (4) fragmentation of powers over land use among many small localities, (5) dominance of transportation by private automotive vehicles, (6) lack of centralized planning or control of land uses, (7) widespread strip commercial development, (8) great fiscal disparities among localities, (9) segregation of types of land use in different zones, and (10) reliance mainly on the trickle-down or filtering process to provide housing to low-income households. These traits have dominated American metropolitan growth for 50 years. Most analyses of sprawl focus on only one or a few of them, thereby oversimplifying the problem.
In theory, the U.S. metropolitan growth and development process is not identical to sprawl, which is a particular form of that process. However, sprawl has been so dominant in U.S. metropolitan areas that most people think that the growth process and sprawl are the same thing. This analysis will attempt to distinguish between them.
Key problems allegedly caused or aggravated by sprawl
Why should we be concerned about continued suburban sprawl? The answer is that sprawl causes, or contributes to, two sets of seri- ous economic and social problems.
The first occurs mainly in fast-growing areas, but it spreads to oth- ers as well. It includes traffic congestion, air pollution, large-scale absorption of open space, extensive use of energy for movement, in- ability to provide adequate infrastructure, inability to locate region- serving facilities that produce negative local impacts (such as air- ports), shortages of affordable housing near where new jobs are being created, and suburban labor shortages. These problems mainly harm people who benefit from other aspects of sprawl.
The second set of problems occurs mainly in big cities, inner-ring suburbs, and a few outer-ring suburbs. These problems arise be- cause our development process, not sprawl per se, concentrates poor households—especially poor minority households—in certain high- poverty neighborhoods that become sites for high crime rates, poor- quality public schools, dysfunctional big-city bureaucracies, and lack of fiscal resources. These poverty-related problems soon spread to inner-ring suburbs. Also, many outer-ring suburbs with low com- mercial tax bases but much moderate-cost housing do not have
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Some Realities about Sprawl and Urban Decline 957
enough taxable resources to pay for decent schools and other services.
The first set of problems has received the most attention during the current national discussion of sprawl because it directly affects the wealthiest and most influential of metropolitan residents. The sec- ond set has received much less attention, even though I believe it is far more important to the nation’s long-term well-being. It is less well publicized because it directly affects a much smaller group of people, who are also among the poorest and least influential resi- dents of our society. Yet the degree to which concentrated poverty reduces the ability of these citizens to acquire the skills and income needed to live well in, and contribute fruitfully to, a high-technology society will have an immense impact on the social, political, and economic well-being of the nation as a whole.
Some axioms about metropolitan growth patterns and problems
A basic but rarely mentioned component of the thinking of the most ardent critics of sprawl, such as the Sierra Club, is the desire to halt further population growth altogether in many regions of the United States—if not the whole nation. These opponents of sprawl rightly recognize that rapid population growth at least initially al- most inevitably brings certain undesirable conditions wherever it occurs. (Growth also brings important benefits, but antigrowth ad- vocates deemphasize these.2) These disadvantages include increases in traffic congestion, in school enrollments and sometimes in over- crowding, in needs for public spending on infrastructure of all types, and in pressures to develop open space. Antigrowth advo- cates hope that slowing or stopping future population growth will minimize these negative effects.
However, a fundamental reality about life in America is that the current residents of a metropolitan area cannot effectively control the total amount of future population growth their region will expe- rience, no matter what policies they adopt. Total population growth is determined by the basic traits of a particular region: climate, to- pography, position on the continent, demographic composition, cur- rent industrial and institutional base, and general economic condi- tions. True, individual local governments can stop growth within
2 Such benefits include a larger and more diverse labor force; greater demands for nearly all types of goods and services, including more urban development; econo- mies of scale in certain types of activities; a larger tax base; and more young work- ers to help support the elderly when they retire (since most immigrants from abroad are relatively young).
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their own boundaries by limiting new development there, but they cannot affect their region’s overall growth. Even if all the local gov- ernments within a metropolitan area simultaneously adopted strin- gent zero-growth limits (which has never happened), that would not prevent new babies from being born there or new immigrants from entering the area from abroad or from the rest of the United States. It is unconstitutional for any region to prohibit entry to newcomers. Even laws halting housing construction would not necessarily stop immigration, because many poor immigrants are willing to live ille- gally by doubling and tripling up in dwellings meant for a single household. So the hope that growth at the regional level might be completely stopped by public policies inhibiting it is a delusion, al- though at the local level it may be possible under some circum- stances.
This fundamental fact has two crucial corollaries. First, each local- ity’s success in reducing future growth within its own boundaries (usually by decreasing allowable development densities) merely shifts that growth to some other part of the region. In other words, if growth is considered “bad,” then local growth-limiting policies are essentially a “beggar-thy-neighbor” strategy, shifting the badness somewhere else without regard to its consequences there.
A second corollary is that the more localities within a region adopt- ing policies that reduce their own future population growth, the more likely that growth will shift outward toward the edge of the region and, thus, the greater the degree of future sprawl there. This corollary assumes that the region has no stringent urban growth boundary prohibiting growth at its outer edges—a condition com- mon to over 99 percent of U.S. metropolitan areas. Therefore, local antisprawl policies are likely to aggravate sprawl at the regional level.
Another fundamental reality is that nearly all major problems di- rectly related to growth are regional, not local, in nature. This is most obvious for air pollution and traffic congestion. Both involve conditions that arise throughout a region and flow freely from one part to many others. The same conclusion applies to all of the other growth-related problems described above. So policies adopted by in- dividual localities cannot effectively cope with these problems un- less they are coordinated in some way.
Nevertheless, most elected officials at all levels want to place con- trol over growth-related public policies in the hands of individual lo- cal governments, acting independently. Politicians adopt this atti- tude because it is highly popular with both local officials and most suburban residents, all of whom want to retain maximum control over who lives in their communities. In a democracy, politicians are
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motivated to adopt policies popular with voters, regardless of whether those policies have any chance of actually achieving their stated goals. Therefore, in most U.S. metropolitan areas, nearly all growth management powers are entirely controlled by local offi- cials, even though this means that resulting policies cannot effec- tively solve most growth-related problems, which are regional in nature.
U.S. growth and development and concentrated core-area poverty
It is obvious how sprawl generates the first set of growth-related problems. But the U.S. development process also inherently under- mines the fiscal strength of many large cities and inner-ring sub- urbs in what I believe is a socially unjust and undesirable manner.
Some form of peripheral growth around metropolitan areas has been and still is inevitable, because they have grown greatly in population and will grow more. Purely vertical growth would have been inconsistent with the rising real incomes and transport inno- vations that have occurred since 1950. Both of those strong trends have caused households to want to live in lower densities with more land area and internal space per unit.
But the particular form our peripheral growth has taken has re- sulted in an intensive concentration of very poor households, espe- cially minorities, in the older, more central portions of our metropol- itan areas. This concentration is not an inevitable result of outward expansion, but rather is caused by several specific policies that have not been adopted in most of the rest of the world.
The first such policy has two parts: One requires all new housing to meet very high standards—standards too costly for most poor households to afford. Therefore, most poor households can afford to live in new housing only if it is somehow subsidized. (Such subsi- dies need not involve public funds, as is discussed later.) The other is that the United States has chosen not to subsidize housing for many poor people in suburban areas. Since at any given moment, new housing is naturally concentrated on the outer edge of each metropolitan area, this means that very poor people are concen- trated in older areas closer to the historic center.
The second policy that generates core-area poverty zones combines fragmented control over land uses in many small outlying munici- palities with their adoption of exclusionary zoning and other poli- cies designed to raise local housing costs and keep poor people
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out. So suburban behavior is partly responsible for the core-area concentration of the poor.
The third policy is tying the fiscal support of local governments to the wealth of their own residents, as expressed in property values and sales taxes. When the residents move out, so do many of the resources the government can tap. This means that many high- and middle-income suburbs have a much greater tax base per household than low-income suburbs and most large cities, so the former can provide higher-quality public services such as education than the latter. This policy also creates strong incentives for many localities to minimize the amount of low-cost and multifamily housing within their boundaries. The local government spending generated by such housing is greater than the tax revenues it produces, so most locali- ties have a fiscal motive for being exclusionary, in addition to the social motive.
The fourth cause of inner-core concentration of poverty is racial seg- regation in housing markets. Racial discrimination by owners, real estate agents, and lenders is still widespread. And the unwilling- ness of most whites to move into neighborhoods where more than about 25 to 33 percent of households are African American is a key factor. Reducing residential racial segregation is hard, because even if both whites and African Americans desire integrated living, the different ways they define it cause almost total segregation to emerge from free choices (Downs 1981; Massey and Denton 1993; Schelling 1978).
The concentration of poverty resulting from these policies contrib- utes to adverse neighborhood traits in many core areas. These in- clude high crime rates and high rates of drug abuse, broken fami- lies, unemployment, gang violence, and nonsupportive attitudes toward education. Those negative conditions push many middle- and upper-income households of all races—mainly those with chil- dren—and many businesses out of the central cities into the sub- urbs (Jargowsky 1996). When these middle- and upper-income households and viable business firms leave core areas because of such conditions, they take their fiscal resources with them. Conse- quently, because of the concentration of poverty, many core areas are left with a disproportionate burden of providing costly services to poor households. This creates a self-aggravating downward fiscal spiral that weakens the ability of core-area governments to provide quality public services and results in grossly unequal environments in which children are reared.
In theory, sprawl’s specific traits help produce core-area concentra- tions of poverty. For example, unlimited extension of new develop- ment into peripheral space makes new jobs inaccessible to inner-
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Some Realities about Sprawl and Urban Decline 961
core residents, and fragmented controls over land uses permit exclusionary policies.
Links between urban decline and sprawl
I have attempted to test statistically whether urban decline is re- lated to the specific traits we have defined as comprising suburban sprawl by using 1980 and 1990 data on the 162 urbanized areas with over 150,000 residents in 1990 (Downs 1998).3
To measure sprawl, I defined nine different specific sprawl-related variables, such as the overall geographic size of the urbanized area, the gross population density in the urbanized fringe, and the ratio of central city density to outlying fringe density. To measure urban decline, I used both the percentage population change in the central city from 1980 to 1990 and an index of urban decline based on nine variables such as poverty rates, crime rates, per capita income, per- centage of older housing, and so on. Using various combinations of over 150 independent variables, I ran hundreds of regressions relat- ing these two measures of urban decline to both the individual mea- sures of sprawl and a sprawl index constructed by combining those measures.
I came to the conclusion that there is no meaningful and significant statistical relationship between any of the specific traits of sprawl, or a sprawl index, and either measure of urban decline. This was very surprising to me and went against my belief that sprawl had contributed to concentrated poverty and therefore to urban decline.
This outcome forced me to reexamine the likely causes of concen- trated poverty. I now believe that they lie in the four basic traits of the general growth process, which would produce concentrated mi- nority-group poverty in many large cities even if sprawl did not ex- ist (this could happen only if some more compact form of urban de- velopment were prevalent). And from concentrated minority poverty come the inner-core problems that I believe are the most serious of all long-term threats to our political stability and economic prosper- ity. So it is the basic traits of our growth and development process themselves that produce our most serious urban problems, not sprawl. Even compact growth would produce the same problems.
3 This article summarizes my research findings (Downs 1998). Those interested in the full report should contact me.
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Ways to cope with the problems associated with sprawl
However, sprawl probably does contribute to many of the growth- related problems associated with it, such as traffic congestion and large-scale absorption of open space. But most of these problems produce costs borne mainly by the people who also benefit from sprawl, which does have many significant benefits. They include more private open space, cheaper housing on peripheral land, shorter commuting times for people both working and living in the suburbs, easier access to open space, creation of high-quality subur- ban school districts free from concentrated poverty, and a broad choice of combinations of local services and local tax rates. These benefits are clearly valued highly by millions of U.S. households, or sprawl would not have become so dominant.
Many urban economists see these growth-related problems as caused mainly by market failures, that is, failing to charge people who benefit from sprawl the true costs of the decisions they make that contribute to it. This underprices those decisions and thereby encourages overexpansion into low-density settlements. Three ex- amples are (1) failing to charge enough for land for new low-density peripheral subdivisions to compensate for the real costs of adding the infrastructure required to service them, (2) failing to charge commuters a money toll for driving during peak hours to offset the time-loss burdens they impose on others in the form of congestion, and (3) failing to charge residents of low-density suburbs the full so- cial costs of removing land from open space and agricultural uses (Brueckner, no date).
The remedies proposed by these economists all involve charging households specific additional prices to discourage such behavior: (1) impact fees on all new developments, (2) peak-hour road tolls on major commuting arteries, and (3) a development tax on land con- verted from agricultural to urban use. In theory, if people had to pay higher fees to live in distant new subdivisions, fewer would be willing to do so, and future sprawl would be reduced.
There is much truth in this analysis, but there are several practical reasons why I doubt that the remedies it proposes would greatly in- hibit future sprawl. High impact fees per new housing unit have long been used throughout California, but they have not stopped huge regional population growth there. In the 1990s, most of Cali- fornia’s growth was caused by natural increase and by the immigra- tion of poor people from abroad who are not deterred by high hous- ing prices, since they are willing to live in overcrowded slums. Peak-hour road tolls are both very difficult to implement on a met- ropolitan scale (they have never even been tried) and politically im- possible to pass. Most Americans regard them as just another tax
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Some Realities about Sprawl and Urban Decline 963
and believe they would benefit only other households wealthy enough to pay daily. No one knows what the social value of open space is, so it would be hard to determine what an open-land devel- opment tax ought to be. Thus, these suggested remedies have se- vere practical difficulties or might not work well if adopted, or both, though they might be worth trying in at least some regions.
Moreover, the belief that sprawl is caused primarily by market fail- ures is based on the false assumption that there is a freely operat- ing land use market in U.S. metropolitan areas. No metropolitan area has anything remotely approaching a free land use market be- cause of local regulations adopted for parochial political, social, and fiscal purposes. Most suburban land use markets are dominated by local zoning and other regulations that are aimed at excluding low- income households and that distort what would occur in a truly free market (Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing 1990). A universal example in U.S. urban areas is prohibit- ing the construction of new low-quality housing, including shacks, in new-growth suburbs, even though such units are all many poor households can afford. In most of the world, such low-quality new construction is the main source of urban housing for the poor. This prohibition contributes to concentration of poverty in older, closer-in neighborhoods where deteriorated or overcrowded and therefore low-cost, older units can be found. It also encourages sprawl by lim- iting residential densities in many individual suburbs, thus pushing regional growth, which is beyond the control of individual localities, farther outward. This analysis does not imply that new shoddy con- struction should be legalized, but simply that poverty will remain concentrated in inner-core areas until housing subsidies for subur- ban communities are widely available to poor households.4
Thus, as noted earlier, it is mainly the basic political and legal structure of U.S. land use markets, in addition to racial discrimina- tion, that causes concentration of poverty, not market failures.
Excess costs of growing through sprawl
Robert Burchell, one of the principal authors of The Costs of Sprawl—Revisited, has conducted extensive studies of the relative costs of continuing future growth through sprawl versus adopting
4 Housing subsidies for affordable units need not be financed by public funds. A community or county can require developers of new subdivisions to include some percentage of affordable units—say 15 to 20 percent—in return for which the com- munity permits higher densities than were originally zoned for the entire project. The developer finances the affordable units at below-market prices by being able to build more units. This policy has worked well in Montgomery County, MD, and in many New Jersey communities.
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more compact growth patterns. His studies cover New Jersey, South Carolina, parts of Kentucky and Michigan, and several other com- munities (Burchell 1992, 1999). He has consistently estimated that continuing to grow via sprawl, as opposed to more compact forms of growth, will cost about 20 percent more for roads and land, and lesser additional percentages for schools, housing, and public ser- vices. The main reason for these differences is that more compact growth puts higher percentages of future population on in-fill sites in existing built-up areas, thereby using less open land and saving on the construction of new roads, sewer and water systems, schools, and other public facilities. Over long periods, the resulting savings in just one state can amount to many billions of dollars. Achieving these savings in public outlays creates a potentially strong incen- tive to substitute more compact growth for future sprawl. In fact, state and local officials confronted with the estimated cost of the in- frastructure required to continue sprawl-type growth just to accom- modate the future populations they are now projecting are appalled by the amounts involved. They do not believe they can raise the money required without drastic undermaintenance of existing street and highway systems in older areas for decades to come—if then.5
Nevertheless, Burchell’s studies do not quantify any of the benefits that millions of Americans believe they receive from sprawl—and for which many may be willing to pay notable additional costs. At present, households receiving such benefits are probably not paying the full social costs of doing so, but they might very well be willing to pay some or all of the higher costs that Burchell has estimated are associated with continued sprawl just to keep receiving these benefits. Thus, even if Burchell’s cost estimates are correct, they do not necessarily imply that more compact forms of growth should be substituted for sprawl in the future. Rather, they might imply that different means of charging for the benefits of sprawl should be em- ployed. That implication resembles arguments by urban economists that markets should be adjusted to make households pay more of the marginal social costs their decisions create.
Moreover, adopting more compact forms of growth throughout a metropolitan area would almost surely require new regional land
5 However, the total additional cost of sprawl development for the entire nation, in- stead of more compact development, (preliminarily estimated by Burchell [1999]) is about $250 billion over the next 25 years, or $10 billion per year. The gross domes- tic product of the United States in 1998 was $8.5 trillion. Thus, the extra costs of sprawl development amounted to only 0.12 percent of the gross domestic product as of 1998 and would be only 0.06 percent at the end of 25 years if the gross do- mestic product expanded 2.5 percent per year, on the average. In relation to na- tional wealth or incomes, these are relatively small amounts that U.S. beneficiaries of sprawl might be quite willing to pay to continue enjoying its benefits.
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Some Realities about Sprawl and Urban Decline 965
use–planning and decision-making agencies with considerable au- thority, as in Portland, OR, or the Twin Cities. This raises the issue of what alternatives to sprawl might be adopted.
Alternatives to continuing sprawl
If suburban sprawl generates or aggravates some or all the prob- lems I have mentioned, what alternatives might avoid such prob- lems? These alternatives can be stated in two ways: One consists of major alternative development strategies involving quite different overall development patterns. The other way sets forth specific tac- tics to overcome sprawl’s deficiencies. In this analysis, sprawl can be considered as spatially unlimited low-density development.
Alternative overall development strategies
There are three main alternative development strategies (Downs 1994). The first is tightly bounded higher-density development, as in many Western European areas. It features close-in urban growth boundaries, prohibition of almost all urban development outside of them, relatively high-density residential growth within the bound- aries (though high-rise dwellings are not required), great stress on public transit, centralized coordination of land use plans, and widely scattered subsidized new housing (or housing vouchers) for low-income households. I do not believe this alternative will be given serious consideration in many (if any) U.S. metropolitan ar- eas. It departs too far from our long-established development pat- terns, greatly restricts local government sovereignty, means radical changes in cherished means of movement, and requires large-scale housing subsidies to the poor (though not necessarily involving pub- lic funds).
The second overall strategy is loosely bounded moderate-density de- velopment, which lies between sprawl and tightly bounded higher- density development. It has a more loosely drawn growth boundary, permits some development outside of it, raises densities somewhat above sprawl levels, involves some increase in public transit and car pooling, has centralized coordination of local land use planning, and provides some new subsidized low-income housing in growth areas. This is similar to what has been done in Portland, OR. So far, very few other areas show much inclination to adopt this ap- proach, but more might in the future.
The third strategy is new outlying communities and green spaces. It has a tightly drawn urban growth boundary and can incorporate the other features of either of the two preceding strategies, but per-
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mits substantial growth outside the boundary only within desig- nated new communities centered on existing outlying towns. This is similar to what has been established in the Lexington, KY, region. When this was suggested for the Portland region, residents of the outlying towns around which new communities would be built strongly objected, since this strategy would greatly alter the present rural character of those towns.
Will any of these strategies become widespread in the United States? On the one hand, it is clear that continuing sprawl will surely not solve the problems I described earlier. Yet it is not even theoretically obvious, nor has it been proven in practice, that any of these strategies will largely solve these problems either. Thus, the advantages of these strategies have not been demonstrated well enough to the American people to persuade most of them to give up the benefits they perceive in sprawl. Until such demonstrations are made, these alternative strategies are not likely to be adopted in many metropolitan areas unless conditions there get bad enough to constitute what is widely perceived as a “crisis,” as discussed in later sections.
Specific antisprawl tactics
Therefore, another way to attack those problems is with specific tactics aimed at them. However, some of these tactics are aimed at the basic growth process, not just at sprawl.
The first tactic is an antisprawl policy, that is, some type of urban growth boundary to limit the outward draining of resources from core areas. It need not be airtight to produce benefits. But it should be linked to public provision of key infrastructure, which should not be publicly provided outside the boundary. But no boundary will have a big impact unless strong controls limit growth outside of it. Moreover, an urban growth boundary that is the accidental sum of many separate boundaries adopted by individual communities is not likely to work.
The second tactic is regional coordination and rationalization of lo- cal land use planning, done by some regional planning body such as the Metropolitan Council in the Twin Cities. This is a policy aimed at the basic metropolitan growth process, not just at sprawl. All lo- cal government officials resist this tactic. They want to retain con- trol over growth management efforts and policies that affect them. Experience suggests that individual communities will nearly always adopt growth-management plans that lock in low density, rather than trying to raise densities to achieve more compact development in the region as a whole. Each locality will seek to shift multifamily
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Some Realities about Sprawl and Urban Decline 967
housing elsewhere and will adopt exclusionary policies aimed at protecting home values and keeping poorer people out. This will force growth either to more outlying areas or into inner-city areas through illegal overcrowding of older dwelling units. As a result, purely localized growth management will cause sprawl to increase.
The third tactic is some form of regional tax-base sharing (Orfield 1997). This is also aimed at the basic growth process, not at sprawl itself. Some percentage of all additions to commercial and industrial tax bases would be shared among all communities in the region, not just captured by the places where those developments are built. This would reduce fiscal disparities and provide more equal oppor- tunities, as it has in the Twin Cities region, the only large area to adopt this approach.
The fourth tactic is regional development of subsidized housing for low-income households. This is also aimed at the basic growth pro- cess, not mainly at sprawl. It would be designed to reduce the con- centration of poor minority households in inner-core areas through their voluntary movement into suburban communities. This could be done through regional vouchers or regional new subsidies, or by requiring all residential developers to build a share of affordable housing in each new project, as has been done in Montgomery County, MD. Requiring developers to provide affordable housing as a certain percentage (say 10 to 20 percent) of all the new units they build creates subsidies for the occupants of such housing without the use of direct public funding. This tactic is controversial, but it is vital to begin deconcentrating poverty in some way.
David Rusk has shown that focusing on improving core-area pov- erty neighborhoods themselves through community development has almost universally failed to prevent them from falling farther and farther behind the region (Rusk 1999). Therefore, in the long run, some type of voluntary deconcentration is probably necessary to improve those communities.
A fifth tactic is regional operation of public transit systems and highways, including new facility construction, and another is vigor- ous regional enforcement of racial discrimination laws. This entails a reform of the growth process.
It is likely that effectively adopting all these tactics, or even most of them, would require a strong regional body. Very few U.S. metropol- itan areas have been willing to consider this, especially where rug- ged individualism is dominant. Most of the few that have adopted such bodies have done so in response to some condition perceived as a crisis by state leaders, such as the threat to develop the Willam- ette River Valley in Oregon, threats to develop the Everglades in
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Florida, the threat that federal highway funds would be withdrawn because of air pollution in Atlanta, and the threat of state court– ordered suspension of zoning in New Jersey to encourage more sub- urban low-cost housing. Unless leaders in other areas also perceive such crises, they are not likely to adopt regional authorities strong enough to implement most of these tactics. Up to now, traffic con- gestion in itself has not been considered a serious enough crisis to generate support for strong regional planning, nor would such plan- ning cure congestion.
In some metropolitan areas where large counties act as the main lo- cal governing bodies (as in parts of the South, such as the Washing- ton, DC, area), it might be possible for voluntary cooperation among these bodies to create effective regional land use planning.6 For ex- ample, each of the counties surrounding a central city could adopt a rural preservation zone on its outer perimeters where growth was very limited and create strong incentives for developers to concen- trate new projects in closer-in portions where financing for public infrastructure was provided. (Montgomery County, MD, has done this.) The boundaries of these separate rural preservation zones taken together might form an effective urban growth boundary for the entire region, without any formal adoption of a regional bound- ary. But this approach will not work well where a central city is surrounded by dozens or even hundreds of small localities, each controlling its own land use, even if each adopts a local urban growth boundary of its own. It is unlikely that so many separate, parochially adopted boundaries would together form a regional pat- tern that would lead to rational land use development across the entire region.
Even if all the tactics described above were adopted, it is not certain that they would overcome the ill effects of core-area concentration of poverty, nor is it certain that they would overcome growth-related problems. But unlike continued sprawl, they at least have a chance of doing so if they are carried out at a large enough scale over a long period.
Traffic congestion
The single most aggravating problem associated with sprawl is ris- ing traffic congestion—particularly in suburban communities. Citi- zens across the land are strongly fighting additional population growth and development in their communities in the belief that do- ing so will limit future traffic congestion there, or at least stop it
6 I am indebted to Bruce Katz of The Brookings Institution for suggesting this possibility.
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Some Realities about Sprawl and Urban Decline 969
from getting worse. Unfortunately, this belief is based on failure to understand the nature and true causes of traffic congestion (Downs 1992).
True, future growth will cause more congestion. From 2000 to 2020, the nation will add 47 million more people. From 1980 to 1995, 1.29 more automobiles were added to the vehicle population for each 1.0 person added to the human population. That means millions more vehicles will be with us over the next two decades. As explained earlier, local governments cannot stop this from happening. Each may limit growth within its own boundaries but cannot notably af- fect the overall future growth of an entire region.
Adopting more compact forms of growth will not help much either. About 85 percent of the total urban development that will exist in 2020 is already here. So even if future growth occurs in very dense forms (which is not likely), we will still have a very spread-out na- tion in 2020, and transportation will still be greatly dominated by private automotive vehicles.
The most important thing to understand about peak-hour traffic congestion is that once it has appeared in a region, it cannot be eliminated or even substantially reduced. There is no effective rem- edy for traffic congestion because it is essentially a balancing mech- anism that enables firms and people to pursue key objectives other than minimizing commuting time. Business firms have two such ob- jectives: One is having most people work during the same hours so they can interact efficiently. That means they have to travel to and from work at about the same time each day. The second is locating firms on relatively low-density sites spread out through each region for easier movement, more space, and better access to suburban workers and markets.
Most households have five key objectives: First, they want a wide range of choices of where to live and work in different types of com- munities, especially if they have more than one worker in the household. Second, to be efficient, they want to be able to combine different purposes on each individual trip. Third, most want to live in relatively low-density communities. Fourth, most want to travel by private car because it is faster, more comfortable, more flexible and convenient and often cheaper than public transit. Fifth, most households want to separate their own family dwellings—and par- ticularly public schools—spatially from other households with much lower incomes and social status, and often from people of different racial groups.
It is not possible to pursue all of these objectives effectively without generating a lot of traffic congestion, especially during peak hours.
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In reality, waiting in traffic jams is the balancing force we use to ration road space as we pursue all of these objectives, because most Americans are unwilling to use price rationing for that purpose. Yet Americans do not want to give up any of these objectives enough to change their behavior. They prefer to endure a certain amount of traffic congestion, even as they complain about it. If congestion be- comes unacceptable, they can move closer to where they work or change jobs, which many people in fact do. But this means that there is no such thing as an easy solution to the traffic congestion problem. It not a disease that can be completely cured. Rather, it is a condition inherent in the quality of modern metropolitan life based on our pursuit of those cherished objectives. Congestion is not confined to the United States; in fact, it is worse in most of the rest of the world and will become even more so. Consequently, neither sprawl nor any of its alternatives will alleviate traffic congestion much in the future.
This analysis does not mean that no reductions in future traffic con- gestion will ever be possible. Under many conditions, it is quite sen- sible to build additional roads or widen existing ones, and creating high-density settlement nodes around transit stops may also be worthwhile. But these tactics will not fully offset future increases in vehicle use rooted both in the behavior of the existing population and in additions to that population.7 Once significant peak-hour traffic congestion has arisen in a metropolitan region, it is there to stay.
Some practical conclusions
In the long run, the most important social problems now connected with sprawl arise from the concentration of the poor, especially poor minorities, in older core areas. Educating children in schools with such high concentrations of poor students is the most serious diffi- culty. But resolving those problems probably requires some signifi-
7 Widening existing roads congested during peak hours may produce initial reduc- tions in congestion. But as soon as the community perceives that movement on those improved roads has speeded up, people will start shifting onto those faster roads from other routes, from the earlier or later times they have been using to avoid congestion, and even from buses or rail transit. This triple convergence will soon cause the improved roads to be just as congested during peak hours as before. True, the peak hours on those roads may be shorter, and more vehicles may move on them during peak periods, but an automatic process of commuter adjustments producing traffic equilibrium in the entire region will prevent any complete re- moval of peak-hour congestion once it has arisen. This equilibrium process will also act in the same way to prevent other additions to peak-hour capacity from ending congestion, including more transit facilities, light rail systems, staggered work hours, telecommuting, and even new expressways. For a detailed discussion of this equilibrium process, see Downs 1992, 27–31.
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cant deconcentration of poor people out of those areas into subsi- dized suburban housing—preferably in ways that do not cause suburban resegregation, either economic or racial. Such deconcen- tration is highly controversial and is opposed by most central-city politicians and by nearly all suburban residents and politicians.
Their negative attitudes are strongly influenced by the fact that high percentages of the poor people who might be so deconcentrated are minorities, especially African Americans. Many suburban whites oppose having these people enter their neighborhoods, and central city minority politicians oppose the resulting loss of their political support. An example of such deconcentration is the Depart- ment of Housing and Urban Development’s suggested policy of “moving to opportunity” just a few poor residents from the central city into the suburbs. This policy has worked well in the Chicago area under the court-ordered Gautreaux program, though on a rela- tively small scale (Rosenbaum 1991), but it has been bitterly op- posed by elected officials everywhere else it has been suggested. So there is little chance of solving these problems directly, even though it is strongly in the national interest.
Moreover, these inner-core problems are not really caused by the specific traits of sprawl, but by the underlying nature of the growth process. Hence policies specifically aimed at sprawl, such as setting aside a lot of open space bought with federal money, will not affect inner-core problems at all. But setting aside open space can raise land prices in low-income communities near the center of the re- gion, which in turn can spark gentrification and produce mixed- income communities, thus breaking up concentrations of poverty.
The most politically powerful problems connected with sprawl arise from increasing traffic congestion and other largely suburban ail- ments that affect middle- and upper-income households with politi- cal influence. I believe these problems are not as important to the long-term well-being of the nation as concentrated poverty, but the former have a much better chance of having major resources allo- cated to them. Those resources are most likely to be applied to tac- tics that do not attack the concentration of the poor, however. Nor are those tactics likely to remedy the growth-related problems asso- ciated with sprawl, especially traffic congestion.
A challenge facing those interested in solving our most important urban problems is how to take advantage of current suburban rage against sprawl to shift more resources into redeveloping core areas and into opening up more opportunities for affordable housing in exclusionary suburbs. It is impossible and undesirable to halt all further outward expansion, because metropolitan populations are going to keep growing. But peripheral densities could be raised, and
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the outward extension slowed down, by deflecting more growth into in-fill development and generating higher average densities in built-up areas. This would not require really high densities any- where, but it would probably require much stronger regional au- thorities to influence land use patterns. If more growth were shifted into in-fill and inner-core areas, land and housing prices there would rise. Demands for housing in closer-in neighborhoods would also rise, helping invigorate those areas.
But the resulting gentrification would compel many low-income households now living there (and future poor immigrants) to live elsewhere. If no provisions were made to create subsidized housing for them in the suburbs, they would start overcrowding existing units in older areas or older suburbs and generate large-scale slums there. This is already happening in California because housing costs are so high and many immigrants from abroad are very poor. Both the advocates and opponents of suburban sprawl are unwilling to face this huge need for low-cost housing, which has traditionally been met in part by inner-core slums.
A strong economic and moral argument for changing sprawl is that many households moving into distant subdivisions are not being re- quired to pay the full social cost of gaining the benefits of living there, including infrastructure trunk lines and increased social costs in inner-city areas. Charging them more fully for the costs they generate might encourage more of them to locate in closer-in areas. The most persuasive part of this cost-based argument is that merely continuing current sprawl densities for future growth will require massive additional spending on infrastructure that is not consistent with adequately maintaining existing roads, sewer and water systems, and other infrastructure.
Altogether, there are no simple remedies or solutions to the prob- lems associated with sprawl because they are generated by the fun- damental legal, political, and social structure and growth processes of U.S. metropolitan areas. Moreover, that structure and those pro- cesses provide most metropolitan-area residents with what they perceive as major benefits. They do not want to attack these prob- lems in ways that would work effectively because doing so might jeopardize their continued receipt of such benefits. Hence they prob- ably will not do so, despite the rhetoric to the contrary. There will be numerous studies of sprawl and a lot of thrashing around about sprawl-related policies, but when all is said and done, vastly more will be said passionately than will be done effectively.
This does not mean that those who want to reduce the ill effects of concentrated poverty should give up. Fundamental social change oc- curs through persistent, steady efforts over long periods, but it of-
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Some Realities about Sprawl and Urban Decline 973
ten does occur, sometimes to a surprising degree. So we should con- tinue, but base our persistence on a realistic understanding of the basic forces involved.
Author
Anthony Downs is Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution in Washington, DC. The views in this article are solely those of the author and not necessarily those of The Brookings Institution, its trustees, or its other staff members.
References
Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing. 1990. Not in My Back Yard. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Brueckner, Jan K. n.d. Urban Sprawl: Diagnosis and Remedies. Unpublished paper. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Burchell, Robert W. 1992. Impact Assessment of the New Jersey Interim State Development and Redevelopment Plan B Report II: Research Findings. New Brunswick, NJ: New Jersey Office of State Planning.
Burchell, Robert. 1998. The Costs of Sprawl—Revisited. Transportation Cooperative Research Program Report 39. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Burchell, Robert W. 1999. The Impacts of Continued Sprawl: Growing Another Way and Its National Cost Savings. Speech delivered at the Colorado Forum, August 4. Available from Rutgers University, Center for Urban Policy Research.
Downs, Anthony. 1981. Neighborhoods and Urban Development. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Downs, Anthony. 1992. Stuck in Traffic. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Downs, Anthony. 1994. New Visions for Metropolitan America. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Downs, Anthony. April 1, 1998. Relating Suburban Sprawl to Urban Decline. Unpublished manuscript.
Jargowsky, Paul. 1996. Poverty and Place: Ghettos, Barrios, and the American City. New York: Russell Sage.
Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. 1993. American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Orfield, Myron. 1997. Metropolitics. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
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Rosenbaum, James E. 1991. Black Pioneers—Do Their Moves to the Suburbs Increase Economic Opportunity for Mothers and Children? Housing Policy Debate 2(4):1179–1213.
Rusk, David. 1999. Inside Game, Outside Game. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Schelling, Thomas C. 1978. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: Norton.
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resource/urban sprawl in Bulgaria.pdf
EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH AND POLICY
Volume 21 2014 Number 2 10.1515/esrp-2015-0010
review ArTiCLeS
Aleksandar D. SLAev*, Atanas KovAChev**1
SpeCifiC iSSueS of urbAn SprAwL in buLgAriA
1. inTroDuCTion
The issues of urban growth and urban sprawl are both topical and interconnected. Besides, a major aspect of their connection is related to the issues of sustainability. While the growth of the cities is generally considered to be an important positive factor for efficient social and economic development with many implications for urban and environmental sustainability, sprawl is believed to be one of the main threats to sustainable development at the regional and local level.
The growth of the capital cities of the post-socialist countries has added new strokes to this ‘growth-versus-sprawl’ dilemma as nearly all of these cities had experienced considerable increase in the number of their population during the last couple of decades. Sofia was no exception to this rule – between 2001 and 2011 – in just ten years its population increased by 10.3% (NSI, 2012b). Eventu- ally, it is not strange that many authors were interested in this development and studied the processes of urban growth in the former socialist countries. Most such studies have, generally, observed processes of urban sprawl around many large post-socialist cities and, in particular, around the capital cities of the Central-Eu- ropean countries and those in the Baltic region (Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the
* Aleksandar D. SLAEV, Varna Free University, Faculty of Architecture, Department of Architecture and Urbanism, KK ‘Chaika’, 9007 Varna, Bulgaria, e-mail: [email protected] ** Atanas KOVACHEV, The Bulgarian Academy of Science, University of Forestry, Faculty of Ecology and Landscape Architecture, 10 Kl. Ohridski Boul, 1797 Sofia, Bulgaria,, e-mail: atanas_ [email protected]
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156 Aleksandar D. Slaev, Atanas Kovachev
Czech Republic etc.) (Kok and Kovács, 1999; Timar and Varadi, 2001; Tammaru et al., 2004; Sýkora and Novák, 2007 etc.). More or less similar urban processes had been identified in South-eastern Europe, too (Nedovic-Budic and Tsenkova, 2006; Hirt, 2007a). Still, in this part of the continent the issue seems to be less investigated.
The goal of the paper is to examine whether the cities in South-eastern Eu- rope and in Bulgaria, in particular, are facing problems of sprawl of the types already faced in Western and Central Europe. Indeed, local traditions in urban forms do cast some doubts whether Bulgarian cities would follow the sprawling Western model. Urban densities in Bulgaria are typical European, but the urban forms are very compact with clear and distinct city boundaries – similar to the Mediterranean cities (Leontidou, 1990). Distinct city boundaries were a main specific feature of the socialist city, too (Bertaud, 2004; Hirt, 2007a). Neverthe- less, Mediterranean cities in Greece, Italy and Spain have already experienced serious problems of sprawl, just like many former socialist cities in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet little research has been carried out on the identification of specific local reasons and features of sprawl in the countries in South-eastern Europe (Hirt, 2007a; Nedovic-Budic et al., 2012; Slaev, 2012b; Slaev et al., 2012). And local specifics are, no doubt, essential for the development of ad- equate urban policies to combat the negative effects of sprawl and to provide for sustainability.
2. reSeArCh QueSTionS AnD ApproACh
The first goal of this paper is to investigate whether the transition from central- ized socialist to democratic market society in Bulgaria has resulted in emer- gence of processes of urban sprawl. For this purpose the paper will study the structure and the development of the housing stock in the different types of dis- tricts in Sofia and will examine the current trends of demographic changes and intra-city migration.
Second, if processes of urban sprawl exist, the research should identify to what extent they follow the Western model and, also, in what specific areas and forms and to what extent they deviate from it. For this purpose the paper will examine the causes and the drivers of changes in suburban areas – i.e. the related housing preferences and other motives of the population of Sofia with respect to the his- torical background of their formation. Next, the impact of housing preferences on suburban forms will be investigated and the specific features of urban develop- ment of the city’s outskirts and the surrounding rural territories.
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157Specific Issues of Urban Sprawl in Bulgaria
3. urbAn eXpAnSion of SofiA During The LAST DeCADeS
This part of the study will examine the urban development of Sofia in order to answer the questions whether the processes on the urban fringe should be identi- fied as a form of sprawl. Since Sofia grew dramatically in the course of the 20th century this growth was inevitably associated with spectacular urban expansion. In 1879 when it was proclaimed a capital its population was only about 20,000, but a century later in 1985 the number of its residents was 60 times larger (NSI, 2012b).
The difference between urban growth and sprawl is usually presented by two alternative graphs of urban expansion depicting the density of occupation in a function of the distance from the city centre. While compact urban growth should retain approximately the same gradient of the density of occupation both in the city’s central and peripheral areas, sprawling expansion is relating to an obvi- ous decrease in the gradient. Thus, a suitable model of sprawling urban forms is a cone of sand that with time spills onto the surrounding terrain, as cited by Couch et al. (2007). Respectively, the changes of residential and housing densities in central city areas and on the urban fringe may be used as a relevant indicator to assess the type of urban growth in Sofia. So the first factor to be investigated will cover the shares of housing construction that had been attracted by different areas of the city in the course of the 20th century and during the last decades. Then the demographic processes in the central and suburban districts of Bulgarian capital will be examined.
In this analysis the districts of Sofia are classified in four main groups. This grouping in general follows the classification adopted by Hirt (2007a), though with some differences. The first comprised the three administrative districts that occupy the central areas. Nine districts form a kind of ring around the centre – re- ferred to as intermediate districts or historical, meaning that most of their territo- ries were urbanized in the first half of the 20th century. Next five districts occupy the peripheral territories of the city. They were urbanized in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Respectively, their housing stock comprises mainly prefab blocks of flats that formed the typical socialist housing estates. The last group of districts oc- cupies the suburban/ rural areas of the municipality of Sofia. It should be studied in three sub-groups because they vary substantially with regard to their trends of development.
The structure of the housing stock in Sofia is shown in table 1 and is depicted by the diagram in figure 1. Obviously, the largest part of the housing stock of the city as a whole had been built in the 1970s and 1980s and is located in the inter- mediate and the peripheral districts of the compact urban area. It is also evident that the share of the housing stock in the central districts is decreasing after the 1950s. After World War II and particularly from the 1960s most housing units
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158 Aleksandar D. Slaev, Atanas Kovachev
were constructed within the intermediate and the peripheral districts – i.e. within the compact city, but outside the central areas. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s the intermediate and peripheral districts accounted for 74% to 83% of the housing construction, while since the start of the transition period they accounted for about two thirds (table 1).
Table 1. Percentage of the housing built in different types of districts during each decade after 1970
Types of districts 1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–1999 2000–2011 Central districts 3,828 3.0% 6,067 3.8% 2,370 4.1% 6,699 6.5% Intermediate di- stricts
43,972 34.2% 56,748 35.8% 24,323 42.0% 45,302 44.1%
Peripheral districts 62,423 48.5% 59,939 37.8% 12,107 20.9% 23,591 23.0% Suburban/ rural A 5,547 4.3% 15,746 9.9% 9,622 16.6% 21,564 21.0% Suburban/ rural B&C
12,841 10.0% 20,080 12.7% 9,494 16.4% 5,467 5.3%
TOTAL 128,611 100.0% 158,580 100.0% 57,916 100.0% 102,623 100.0%
Source: NSI (2012a).
Fig. 1. Housing units in the districts of Sofia by periods of construction
Source: authors’ elaboration based on data from NSI (2012a)
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159Specific Issues of Urban Sprawl in Bulgaria
However, examining the rates of construction in the suburban areas of Sofia is most important for this research particularly in comparison with the central districts – see the diagram in figure 2 that illustrates the rates of construction of housing units only in the central and the suburban districts. Again, it indicates the fall of the rates of construction in the central areas during the second half of the 20th century, but parallel to that the rates in the suburban districts had been rising. The total share of the housing construction realized in all suburban/rural areas throughout the 20th century had varied, but it has always been about one fifth (between 14% and 23%). In the 1990s this share increased to 33%, but the next (the last) decade was marked by substantial differences between the districts in the outskirts of Vitosha to the south of Sofia and the districts in the plain to the north of the capital. Figure 2 illustrates two quite different trends in the rates of housing construction in the southern and the northern suburban districts. Until the 1970s the southern suburban territories (referred to in this study as Suburban A) had attracted only about 5% of housing construction in Sofia municipality, while the territories in the plain to the north (i.e. Suburban B) of the city ‘traditionally’ attracted 10% to 13% (16.4% in the 1990s). Since the start of the 1990s the rates of construction in all suburban areas slowed down similarly to the rates in all Sofia’s districts. However, during the first decade of the new century, the rates in
Fig. 2. Housing units in the central and the suburban districts of Sofia by periods of construction
Source: authors’ elaboration based on data from NSI (2012a)
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160 Aleksandar D. Slaev, Atanas Kovachev
the northern suburban districts continued to fall to only 5.3%, while those in the districts to the south of the city accelerated drastically to 21% of the total. Appar- ently the southern areas were subject to intensive processes of sprawl, while the northern were not.
Demographic data provide stronger evidence of processes of suburbanisation in Sofia. Table 2 displays the size of the population in the different types of dis- tricts by periods and respective changes.
Table 2. Percentage change in population levels in the different types of districts of Sofia in the period 1985–2011
Types of districts
1985 1992 Change 1985– 1992
2001 Change 1985– 2001
2011 Change 1985– 2011
Central districts 147,828 116,524 –21.2% 94,651 –36.0% 100,786 –31.8% Intermediate 502,311 454,425 –9.5% 468,174 –6.8% 512,772 2.1% Peripheral 362,615 399,651 10.2% 386,989 6.7% 420,826 16.1% Suburban A 67,352 83,724 24.3% 99,630 47.9% 128,020 90.1% Suburban B 23,585 23,056 –2.2% 24,342 3.2% 28,586 21.2% Suburban C 98,028 112,755 15.0% 97,056 –1.0% 100,601 2.6%
Source: NSI (2012b).
The decrease in the population of the central districts by 32% and the simul- taneous growth of the population of the suburban districts A by 90% is a direct proof of the decreasing gradient of population densities and obvious trends to suburbanization. At the same time, population of suburban districts C has virtu- ally not changed. Therefore, the conclusion is that the population flows from the city centre are directed to the south to suburban districts A and not to the northern districts of Sofia Municipality.
4. STuDY of The houSing preferenCeS of The popuLATion of SofiA AS The KeY fACTor of urbAn SprAwL
4.1. residents’ preferences and Motivations in various patterns of Suburbanisation
The nature of suburbanisation is determined by its drivers – the reasons, the preferences and the motives of those who settle in suburban areas. Different reasons and motives generate different types of suburbanisation. The type that
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161Specific Issues of Urban Sprawl in Bulgaria
is usually classified first – i.e. the ‘classical’ form (or, in fact, what is generally meant by sprawl) is typical mainly of the developed countries. It is associated with suburbs with high standard of housing and high level of environment, open spaces, greenery, and landscaping. As a rule, residents from the middle and higher social classes settle in such suburbs (Fielding, 1989; Fishman, 1987; Jackson, 1985). The new inhabitants of this type of suburbs come mainly from the urban core or from other urban areas. In contrast to this pattern, a differ- ent type of suburbanisation is typical of the developing countries where the prevalent urban processes are caused by rural-to-urban migration. Migrants are mostly poorer rural residents seeking better sources of livelihood (Korcelli, 1990). A third type of peri-urban growth, according to its driving forces and socio-economic reasons, is the stepwise migration to major urban centres (Hirt, 2007а). A fourth type is generated in result of mass relocations of residents due to political reasons, wars or ethnic tensions. It might be considered a form of suburbanization similar to rural-to-urban migration, because residents’ motives in such situations are similar.
While the patterns of urban expansion mentioned above are mostly typical of market societies, such processes were observed in socialist countries, too, though the reasons causing them were rather different. In these states the urbanisation of major peri-urban areas of almost all large cities was caused by large-scale indus- trialisation associated with rural-to-urban migration (Nikiforov, 2008). Whereas industrialisation was a powerful factor for urban sprawl in capitalist states as well, in socialist states it was a major goal of the socialist policies.
Eventually, it should be noted that the first two types of suburbanisation are most widely spread (Hirt, 2007а). Therefore, the following part of the study has to analyze the processes of urbanisation of territories on the urban fringe and around Sofia with respect to whether sprawl of the typical Western style is ob- served or whether these processes are caused by rural-to-urban migration. In the first case newcomers to peri-urban areas normally are people of higher-social status, with higher income and, probably – with higher education. Their main motivation is obtaining a higher standard of living in an environment that is closer to nature and in lower densities. Suburbanites typical of the second type of suburbanisation are usually people of other, mainly rural areas of the region or other smaller towns and settlements of the country. Probably, most of them would be of lower social status and in this case the main reason for displacement is expected to be seeking of better job and higher pay. Another important point of research is the analysis of historical experience gained and traditions developed in different stages of development of Bulgarian society as far as this is a crucial factor for the formation of residents’ preferences and motivations and, hence, the patterns of urban sprawl.
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162 Aleksandar D. Slaev, Atanas Kovachev
4.2. Traditions in Sofia Residents’ Preferences Regarding Peri-urban Development
The hypothesis of this part of the study is that historical factors in the course of the 20th century have shaped Sofia residents’ preferences more in favour of compact urban forms. Though the ideal of owning a single-family house in a quiet location is and has always been appealing to Bulgarians in all historical periods, it should be stressed that this ideal seemed to have greater value in Western societies than in Bulgarian.
Probably one of the first occasions on which differences between Bulgarian and Western attitudes became obvious was the preparation of the first signifi- cant Master Plan of Sofia, after six other general plans (Kovachev, 2005). In the process of planning the approach of the leading planner, the German architect Adolf Muesmann, proved to be quite different from the views of the Bulgarian representatives involved with the process of planning – the Mayor’s office, the Chief Architect and other municipal officials, the professional guild etc. The po- sition of Bulgarian professionals and the community was highly predetermined by the experienced extreme growth of the capital over the last five decades. From 1880 to 1934 the city grew more than 15 times in population (NSI, 2009) and in size of its urban area (Hirt, 2007b; Hirt and Kovachev, 2006). Accord- ing to Lampe (1984), at that time Sofia was the fastest growing Balkan capital. A key factor was the accelerated industrial development – the city became the industrial centre of the country with 50% of the entire industrial workforce. It is clear, therefore, that the urban growth in this period was fuelled by rural-to- urban migration. Along with that, thousands of refugees from the Balkan wars settled in Sofia’s outskirts. For all these reasons the new suburbs were poor and shabby. Lampe (1984) noted that during this period the city became more and more crowded and polluted (by industrial plants). It is then no wonder that the middle-class and the wealthy citizens of the capital did not aspire to live in single family homes in the periphery and the local government had a criti- cal view on urban growth. Respectively, when the plan was commissioned one of its important tasks was to limit the expansion of the city (Nikiforov, 1982, 2008; Kovachev, 2003a) since it was perceived as already too expanded and the government could not afford to provide infrastructure in newly urbanized areas. On the contrary – Muesmann’s views concerning Sofia’s peri-urban areas were quite different. His professional perceptions were typical Western and he favoured the single-family home as the best form of dwelling. Even more – the German architect believed that single-family housing reflected the traditional national values – an idea that was in line with the official ideology of Germany at the time. Therefore, Muesmann envisaged city expansion by urbanizing new hinterland in the form of extensive territories with individual homes. However, since such a view, was not popular with the public and city authority. Muesmann
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163Specific Issues of Urban Sprawl in Bulgaria
had to revise his plan in important aspects (Hirt, 2007b), but still the planned expansion was probably the main cause for its failure.
Residents’ preferences were further shaped in favour of inner urban areas and the associated higher density housing forms during the socialist period. Despite that the two plans adopted during this period envisaged compact development and limited territorial enlargement, Sofia experienced a second, highly accelerated ex- pansion of its urbanized area. Socialist industrialisation was the main factor for the city’s rapid growth till the end of the 1980s. For thirty-nine years (from 1946 to 1985) its population has increased by 670,000 residents to reach 1,200,000 people (Nikiforov, 2008). It is clear that such an expansion could not happen within the original boundaries of the city and the main resources used were rural hinterlands. However, in the course of this development a second major factor had its impact – the wide-spread of the prefab construction technology (Kovachev, 2003b). The ‘Socialist suburbs’ – prefab housing estates, emerged. They, of course, were radi- cally different from those in Western countries. In capitalist states some similari- ties could be sought with French and Italian peripheral housing estates. The dif- ference is in the much lower quality of East-European residential buildings and landscaping. What is important with respect to housing traditions is the manner such a development affected the residents’ preferences. The end result was that despite the desire to settle in the big city or the capital, the residents considered the prefab buildings the lowest class housing. The entire mechanism proved to be a strong incentive for the majority of the residents of large cities and the capital to strengthen their idea for the central city areas as the most attractive to live in.
4.3. Analysis of Residents’ Preferences and Motivations Determining the Trends in the Development of City Areas and Intra-urban Migration
In this section the current preferences and motivations of Sofia residents will be examined based on conclusions already drawn with respect to historically formed traditions and preferences and the conclusions made in section 3 regarding the existing trends in demographic development. Also, research in the same area con- ducted by other authors will be used and compared to the results of research car- ried out for this study.
The main objective of the analysis of residents’ preferences and motivations is to establish the driving forces of the trends of intra-urban migration to the fringe. This can also be formulated in terms of determining the nature of urbanisation processes in the fringe according to the types explained in section 4.1 – Western type, rural-to-urban, or a third, specific type. In accordance with the objectives and scope of this analysis, special attention is to be paid to the research works of Hirt (2006, 2007a, b), which also addressed the southern outskirts of Sofia – Suburban districts Hirt (2007a, p. 757) identified three key characteristics to be
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164 Aleksandar D. Slaev, Atanas Kovachev
explored for the purpose: ‘(1) demographic (i.e., who moves to the urban fringe), (2) functional (i.e., how are the centre and the fringe economically linked and where do peri-urban residents work?); and perhaps most notably, (3) locational and motivational (i.e. where did the peri-urban residents come from and why did they move?)’. As a result of collected data and performed analysis of 54 in-depth interviews and a survey with 150 completed questionnaires, Hirt came to the fol- lowing conclusions. First, demographic characteristics supported the finding that suburbanization was mainly of Western type: 40% of newcomers that participated in the survey had incomes that were around four times Bulgaria’s average for 2006. Second, regarding economical links between the centre and the fringe, the survey found that nearly one third of the long-time residents worked either in the same peri-urban area or in a nearby peri-urban area, while for the newcomers this share was less than one tenth. Third, regarding motivations for settlement in the suburbs or continued living in the same area, Hirt found that 68% of the newcom- ers had moved from internal Sofia regions. Only 8% of the newcomers had moved from elsewhere in the country, which was a strong argument against any hypoth- esis that suburbanisation might be due to rural-to-urban migration. Motivations for settlement in this area were also characteristic for suburbanisation of type 1. In conclusion, the findings suggested that ‘the dominant processes along Sofia’s scenic southern edge was Western type urban sprawl’ (Hirt, 2007a, p. 775).
In several other studies in a similar socio-economic situation – i.e. in condi- tions of transition from socialism to a market society – the prevalent characteris- tics found most frequently by the researchers were very much the same (Sýkora, 1999; Kok and Kovács, 1999). Therefore, the most common findings of the au- thors are that these trends in post-communist states are similar to those in devel- oped capitalists states, but are realised with some delay due to the specifics of their socio-economic development – primarily, delay due to the socialist period. At the same time, in post-socialist states there are also a number of specific characteris- tics due to specific geographical and historical factors and, in this case too, mainly to the socialist legacy: the existing housing stock, economic processes, specific demographic trends and migration between urban, rural and mountain regions (Nedovic-Budic, 2001; Blinnikov et al., 2006, Slaev, 2012a).
5. CurrenT SuburbAniSATion TrenDS in SofiA in reSuLT of reSiDenTS’ preferenCeS AnD MoTivATionS
As noted earlier, research performed for the present study (analysis of the lat- est data from NSI, new information supplied by Sofia Municipality, the Registry Agency, the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture and an inquiry made among ten
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165Specific Issues of Urban Sprawl in Bulgaria
leading real estate agencies) generally confirms the findings of Hirt. At the same time, some of Hirt’s findings are further developed, and also some are interpreted in a different way mainly with regard to the significance of local specifics. In fact, Hirt also reported the presence of important specifics of the processes in the Bulgarian capital, such as: considerable deviations from the Western pattern in terms of social ‘homogeneity’ of suburban areas; specific preferences regarding the prevailing type of housing units and density of development, and the presence of certain characteristics typical of the pattern based on the rural-to-urban migra- tion. However, the present research attaches greater significance to the specifics relating to densities and social integration. By the time when Hirt undertook her research Sofia had experienced only about five or six years of growth after the crisis of the transition (it was not until 2000 that Bulgaria’s GDP reached its 1989 level). The urban trends in the capital are now much more obvious and realistic also because the property boom of 2005–2008 had been ‘tempered’ by five years of stagnation.
First of all, NSI data, statistics for the last decade and, especially the 2011 census results definitely support the findings for the presence of suburbanisa- tion processes. As it was established in section 3 – for twenty-six years the population of Sofia central areas has decreased by 47,000 people or 32%, while the population of the attractive peri-urban areas (Suburban Districts A) has in- creased by 61,000 people or 90%. However, the statistics for the recent years (NSI 2009, 2012b) and the complementary surveys – the inquiry among real estate agencies and the new data from Sofia Municipality, give grounds to con- clude that, as evident and explicit suburbanization may be, it is many times weaker than the similar trends in/around other former socialist capitals – Prague or Riga, for example (Stanilov and Sykora, 2012; Krisjane and Berzins, 2012). In Bulgaria the preferences of most customers (including many affluent buyers) are still towards central areas and the so-called ‘wide centre’ rather than the city peri-urban areas. The rates of new housing development in the intermediate dis- tricts are still accelerating (42% of the total for Sofia in the period 1990–1999 and 44% in 2000–2011) and higher than the rates in the suburban districts par- ticularly if the northern districts are also taken into account (33% of the to- tal for Sofia in the period 1990–1999 and 26.3% in 2000–2011) (see table 1). Especially in the northern districts the rate of suburbanisation should even be assessed as low – since the number of population in these areas is still at the level of 1985 (see table 2).
In order to clarify the residents’ preferences and motivations and their impact on urban processes, the findings from the statistics of the recent years and the in- quiry among the real estate agencies will be presented in the same order as those from Hirt’s works (2007a):
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166 Aleksandar D. Slaev, Atanas Kovachev
First, with respect to demographic characteristics of newcomers, data from the inquiry among the real estate agencies attach less importance to the high social status. Just under half (45.5%) of the realtors classify high income as a major characteristic of newcomers. About one third (36.4%) of the respondents believe that the typical buyers of peri-urban properties are intellectuals, and slightly more than one sixth (18.2%) put the locals in the group of buyers. An unexpected re- sult is that nearly four-fifths of the realtors put on the second and third place the low-income buyers – results similar to those of a study of the preferences and motivations in suburbanisation processes around Riga (Krisjane and Berzins, 2012). Most likely, the cause for this difference with the study of Hirt is because she analyzed only the settlers in the southern districts, while in the present study the realtors refer to all peri-urban areas, including northern ones, where property prices are twice lower.
The new research has shed more light on a specific feature mentioned by Hirt and, eventually, puts a bigger stress on it – the higher densities and the variety of housing types of Sofia’s sprawl. Data from Sofia Municipality show that new multi-family buildings in Vitosha District in the recent years comprise 28.5% of the total number of new residential developments, and according to NSI data, the average number of dwelling units in a multi-family building in the same area dur- ing the same period is 13.3. Consequently, dwelling units in multi-family apart- ment buildings comprise 83.8% of the total number of new units. The larger share of multi-family housing provides for higher residential densities and higher rates of cohabitation between households of different social status.
Finally, regarding functional characteristics: here again data provided by So- fia Municipality demonstrate deviations from the Western pattern. It is about the presence of higher integration of service and industrial activities in Sofia suburbs. Data by the municipality for the surveyed peri-urban areas testify that on average 13.7% of the new building permits are for service functions (for commercial, service and storage activities), and 4.4% – for production facili- ties. Though with some disparities in the figures, data provided by the Regional Directorate of Agriculture confirms that the trends towards mixing land-uses in these territories are substantial. In suburban districts A and B 19.5% of the for- mer rural lands converted to urban use were allocated for manufacture. Another 21.9% are allocated to commercial and service businesses– offices, retailing and all kinds of services, so that housing occupies the rest 58.6% of the territories. In suburban districts C 51.2% of the former rural lands converted to urban use were allocated to manufacture, 36.1% – to commercial and service businesses and only 12.7% – to housing. It is obvious that the level of the mix of different land-uses is much higher than the level typical for the ‘classical’ Western type suburbanisation, which is another important local ‘contribution’ of the Bulgar- ian model.
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167Specific Issues of Urban Sprawl in Bulgaria
6. ConCLuSionS
The first conclusion is, no doubt, that processes of urban sprawl have emerged in Bulgaria during the last couple of decades and already have changed the suburban patterns in the outskirts of Sofia. This is a simple, but critically important conclu- sion, because so far Bulgarian planners have underestimated this threat and, even, have failed to identify it. The main reasons for this omission were due to lack of experience with similar problems and, mainly, to specific traditions relating to comparatively high, though typical European densities and compact urban forms. Yet, due to its unplanned nature and scattered forms, sprawl always generates un- sustainable urban processes.
All facts and findings of previous studies and the present one confirm the sec- ond main conclusion that, undoubtedly, Sofia suburbanisation pattern is of West- ern type, so it is characterized by a number of associated problems and issues like overconsumption of land, inefficient use of infrastructure and other resources. At the same time, Bulgarian sprawl in many aspects is shaped by local traditions established in the course of centuries and (especially, the 20th century) by the specific historical development – both socio-economic and urban. Sofia’s new suburbs are more compact than typical Western suburbs and they are characterized by higher densities and higher levels of social mix and mix of uses.
Eventually, the third main conclusion is that suburbanisation around Sofia and around other big cities in the country is speeding up and, thus, Bulgarian sprawl turns closer to the Western patterns. This means that policy measures are already needed to avoid associated problems, especially in view of the insufficient land resources of Bulgaria. Apparently, all these issues should be subject to thorough and in depth studies as next steps of research in this area in order to elaborate ef- ficient instruments of relevant policies.
Acknowledgement. The authors acknowledge the financial support by the European Union FP7-ENV.2011.2.1.5-1 (TURAS Project) Grant Agreement No. 282834.
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resource/urban sprawl.pdf
American Economic Association
Urban Sprawl Author(s): Thomas J. Nechyba and Randall P. Walsh Source: The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Autumn, 2004), pp. 177-200 Published by: American Economic Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3216798 Accessed: 01-08-2016 10:09 UTC
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Journal of Economic Perspectives?Volume 18, Number 4?Fall 2004?Pages 177-200
Urban Sprawl
Thomas J. Nechyba and Randall P. Walsh
Modern usage of the term "sprawl" was coined in 1937 by Earle Draper? one of the first city planners in the southeastern United States (Black, 1996). By the end of World War II, the major themes that characterize
the current debate over sprawl and its connections to transportation and income had already emerged. These issues were summarized in the 1940s by the British advocate of city planning F. J. Osborn (1946 [1965], p. 15):
These new forms of transportation . . . were used . . . to facilitate the sprawl- ing of suburbs, a type of urban growth wasteful from the economic standpoint and disadvantageous socially. Coupled with the rise of real incomes, rapid transport has enabled the people moving out from the centers to find the open residential surroundings they desired. But they and the numerous immigrants from rural areas have obtained these surroundings at the expense of long and costly daily journeys to and from work. Local community life has been weakened or destroyed, and access to the country made more difficult for the large numbers of residents still left in the city centers.
In the years since Draper introduced the concept of urban sprawl, popular concern over the issue has continued and grown. In the 1998 elections alone, more than 150
? Thomas J. Nechyba is Fuchsberg-Levine Family Professor of Economics and Public Policy
Studies, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, and a Research Associate at the National
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Randall P. Walsh is Assistant
Professor of Economics and Research Associate Institute for Behavioral Studies, University of
Colorado, Boulder, Colorado. Their e-mail addresses are ([email protected]) and (walshr@colorado. edu), respectively.
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178 Journal of Economic Perspectives
ballot measures were introduced to combat urban sprawl in one way or another, and over 85 percent of them passed (Samuel, 1998).
We begin with an overview of the causes and consequences of urban sprawl in the twentieth century, focusing in particular on lower transportation costs and self-sorting of the population. By sprawl, we will mean the tendency toward lower city densities as city footprints expand. Overall, it seems clear to us that Americans
are better off than they were prior to the rise of sprawling cities, largely because urban sprawl has created opportunities for significantly higher levels of housing and land consumption for most households. These gains, however, have not come without associated costs. Following the overview, we focus on four issues that raise clear efficiency and equity concerns: unproductive congestion on roads, high levels of metropolitan car pollution, the loss of open space amenities, and unequal provision of public goods and services across sprawling metropolitan suburbs that give rise to residential segregation and pockets of poverty. Finally, we consider the trade-offs inherent in some policies commonly proposed to address urban sprawl. Throughout, a main theme of our discussion is that a full analysis of sprawl is made difficult by the lack of a usefully integrated economic model of urban economies. Along these lines, we conclude with some thoughts on possible future research agendas.
Changing Urban Landscapes in the United States: 1900-2000
The central theme of urban development over the past century is surely the increasing trend toward suburbanization, as central cities have struggled to hold onto households and jobs. In explaining this trend, the urban economics literature casts a primary focus on the role of declining transportation costs and rising incomes, with supporting forces emerging from various government tax, expendi? ture and zoning policies. The local public finance literature, on the other hand, emphasizes the desire of mobile households to segregate based on preferences for local taxes and amenities as well as the desire by such households to take advantage of peer externalities. After reviewing some basic facts, we discuss the potential causes for and consequences of sprawl that emerge from each of these two over? lapping literatures. Both these literatures then inform a brief discussion of the phenomenon of edge cities and the very different nature of sprawl in the United States and Europe.
Some Facts on Urban Sprawl and Suburbanization Urban sprawl can take different forms. It may involve low-density residential
developments or so-called "edge cities" (clusters of population and economic activity at the urban fringe) that give rise to business activity like office buildings, retail and even manufacturing. It can take the form of planned communities that have their own "downtown" or are aligned to a lake or park. Or it can occur as
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Thomas J. Nechyba and Randall P. Walsh 179
Figure 1
Rural and Urban Population: 1790-2000 300,000,000 -
250,000,000
200,000,000
150,000,000
100,000,000
50,000,000
I Rural population I Urban population
_. - '/>' 'f, WmmBi.....*^l^-...^^...'fe ~ .^Aa..^,./^.
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individual houses pop up across formerly rural landscapes. In any case, a common way to document the presence of urban sprawl over time is to look first at the evolution of rural and urban population levels and then to look within urban areas at the evolving relationship between suburbs and central cities.
Figure 1 documents the dramatic transformation of a primarily rural popula? tion in 1790 to one that became increasingly centered in cities over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Only slightly more than 5 percent of the U.S. population lived in urban areas in 1790, a figure that had tripled by 1850 and surpassed 50 percent by 1920. By the 2000 Census, 79 percent of all Americans lived in areas designated as "urban" by the Census Bureau. The nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century can thus broadly be characterized as a time during which the industrial revolution transformed an agrarian economy into one that became increasingly dominated by cities. Much of the remainder of the twentieth century, on the other hand, witnessed the accelerated growth of suburbs within urban areas?with seeds for that growth sown prior to World War II.
Data documenting the rise of suburbs become readily available only with the 1950 Census, when the Census Bureau first defined "urbanized areas" to include
only those areas that truly represent built-up urban or suburban census blocks (as opposed to "metropolitan statistical areas," which often include large areas of unused land) and divided populations within these areas into suburban and central city populations. Within the largest urbanized areas, central cities contained close to 65 percent of urbanized populations in 1950?suggesting that suburbs had already reached substantial sizes (35 percent of urbanized populations) by midcentury.
Combining data on urbanized areas with populations larger than 1 million, Figures 2 and 3 then paint a stark picture of how cities have evolved since 1950. Both in terms of population (Figure 2) and land area (Figure 3), central cities within the urbanized areas have remained relatively stagnant while suburbs have
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180 Journal of Economic Perspectives
Figure 2
Urban Area Population 100,000
90,000
o o o
3 Oh o
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000-
? Suburban population B Central city population
0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Figure 3 Urban Land Area
30,000
25,000
? Suburban land area
? Central city land area
1970 1980 1990
experienced and are continuing to experience enormous growth. Approxi? mately 65 percent of the urbanized population lived in central cities in 1950, with the remaining 35 percent residing in suburbs. By 1990, these percentages had flipped, with central city populations down to 35 percent of populations within these urbanized areas. The total land occupied by central cities has fallen from roughly 40 percent to 20 percent of urbanized areas during the same time. Finally, Figure 4 shows how population densities in both central cities and suburbs have declined over this period, suggesting that both increases in overall population as well as declines in city densities have contributed to expanding urban footprints.
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Urban Sprawl 181
Figure 4 Urban and Suburban Densities
12,000
10,000^
cr
8000 J
6000 ]
3 4000 - o
2000
A 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
The Monocentric City Model: Falling Transportation Costs, Rising Incomes and Expanding City Footprints
Much of our understanding of this urban growth can be derived from the "monocentric city model" (Alonso, 1964; Muth, 1969; Mills, 1967), which explains urban spatial structure as arising from the trade-off between commut? ing costs and land rents. In equilibrium, this trade-off requires lower land rents at the urban edge to offset increased commute costs?with the declining rent gradients leading to declining density gradients as one moves out from a metropolitan area's central business district to the urban boundary. While the model captures the basic fact that downtown real estate is typically more expensive than equivalent land in the suburbs, it does not offer large insights into the development ofthe microstructure ofthe urban landscape. The urban economics literature that uses this model highlights the role of declining transportation costs?primarily cars on the consumer side and trucks on the producer side, combined with public infrastructure investment in roads?to explain the general decline in city density and expansion of city footprints, or urban sprawl, experienced over the last century.1
In this view, the advent of the automobile and accompanying lower transpor? tation costs became the primary catalyst of sprawling cities through much of the twentieth century (Glaeser and Kahn, 2003). By 1910, the number of registered
1 The decline in transportation costs also plays an important role in recent urban economics models that include agglomeration economies. For a summary of the literature on spatial structure including agglomeration, see Anas, Arnott and Small (1998).
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182 Journal of Economic Perspectives
automobiles in the United States had passed the 500,000 mark, and in 1920, car registration reached eight million. In 1922, the first suburban, auto-oriented shop? ping center was constructed in Kansas City, Missouri (Williams, 2000), and by 1952, a majority of households in America owned at least one car (Glaeser and Kahn, 2003). The percentage of workers that drove to work stood at 64 percent in 1960 and
rose to 78 percent by 1970 and 84 percent in 1980. It is difficult to imagine large increases in suburbanization without this rise of the automobile, even if other
causes have contributed to the sprawling of cities in the presence of the automobile.
The monocentric city model also suggests that rising incomes have led to decreasing city densities to the extent that the income elasticity of demand for housing and land is sufficiently large relative to the income elasticity of commuting costs.2 Empirical evidence on the role of rising incomes in urban sprawl is provided by Margo (1992) and Brueckner (2000, 2001), with Margo's analysis suggesting that as much as half ofthe increase in suburbanization between 1950 and 1980 can be
explained by rising incomes. Thus, the monocentric city model ultimately relies on the combined effect of increasing income and lower transportation costs to explain the phenomenon of suburbanization and sprawl.
While a variety of public policies have been suggested as potentially important contributors to urban sprawl within the monocentric city model, the empirical evidence suggests that these played at best a minor role?at least to the extent to which they did not contribute directly to enabling the rise of the automobile (such as through the construction of roads). Urban development may have been affected by the New Deal's creation ofthe Home Owners Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) (Jackson, 1981) and by increased post-World War II support for mortgage insurance programs through the FHA and the Veterans Administration (Williams, 2000). The federal deductibility of mortgage interest lowers the price of housing disproportionately for higher income families in higher tax brackets (Voith, 1999), potentially reinforcing the tendency of higher income households to suburbanize and commute. However, the U.S. General Accounting Office (1999) provides a skeptical review of the evidence of the extent to which such federal policies have created urban sprawl, at least as compared to the impact of lower transportation costs and higher incomes. At a more local level, the use of property taxes, as opposed to pure land taxes that do not tax improvements of land, provides incentives for low-density development in a monocentric city model (Brueckner and Kim, 2003). Again, it seems unlikely that local property taxation has played anything other than a supporting role in generating sprawl, especially in
light of the fact that when interacted with minimum zoning rules, such taxes may in practice exhibit many ofthe features of land taxes (Fischel, 2001a).5
2 Wheaton (1974) provides an excellent early treatment of the comparative statics of the monocentric model.
3 When zoning requirements bind, property taxes cease to be taxes on capital improvements of land since the amount invested is fixed by the zoning regulation. It is in that sense that property taxes can take on the features of land taxes rather than taxes on mobile capital.
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Thomas J. Nechyba and Randall P. Walsh 183
The Tiebout Local Public Finance Model: Local Public Goods, Peer Externalities
and Segregation The monocentric model is a useful starting point for studying urban patterns
and almost certainly leads to the appropriate identification of the primary historical cause of urban sprawl, but the empirical evidence suggests strongly that residential location choices within metropolitan areas are made on the basis of many factors other than transportation and commuting costs, such as local schools, crime rates and other local public amenities. These local public finance considerations play an important role in the debate over the costs and benefits of urban sprawl, even if they themselves are not primary causes for the growing city footprints and declining
population densities attributed to sprawl. Awareness of such considerations in residential location choices arose from Tiebout's (1956) classic article that suggests how people may sort themselves into different local jurisdictions (potentially within the same metropolitan area) based on their tastes for local amenities.
These sorting effects can be separated into two broad categories for purposes of our discussion of sprawl: those that pull people out of central cities because of attractive features of suburbs and those that push people out of central cities because of inner city problems. The pull side of the Tiebout coin emphasizes how relatively mobile families form new cities in the suburbs in part to create commu? nities comprised of households with similar willingness to pay for the provision of public goods or with other characteristics considered "desirable." When combined with the ability to zone (Fischel, 2001a, b), such suburban jurisdictions provide the additional "advantage" of permitting residents to exclude those who are thought to bring with them either negative fiscal externalities (in the sense that they will free ride on tax payments by others) or negative peer externalities in forms like higher crime rates or lower school quality. The push (or "flight from blight") side of the Tiebout coin, on the other hand, refers to the hypothesized propensity of relatively
high-income residents to leave the central city in response to higher inner city crime rates, lower quality schools and general fiscal distress within the central business district. Thus, inner city residents may wish to leave central cities not because they seek to form or join a particular (more homogeneous) suburb, but rather to escape inner city problems. Cullen and Levitt (1999), for instance, find that a 10 percent increase in crime corresponds to a 1 percent decline in central city population. Other related recent work includes Leicknenko (2001), who looks at regional location and climate; Sigleman and Henig (2001), who investigate different preferences between races; and Adams, Fleeter, Kim, Freeman and Cho (1996), who focus on more general "central city hardship conditions." The research literature has paid less attention to the role of potential "pull" Tiebout forces within
sprawling cities. Tiebout sorting within metropolitan areas, whether of the push or pull variety,
is prevalent and empirically well documented. The extent to which sprawl is caused by such interurban and suburban sorting (made easier by lower transportation costs), however, seems very much an open question. Put differently, the empirical importance of local amenities (such as schools and low crime rates) in determining
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184 Journal of Economic Perspectives
household residential location decisions is beyond question. A long capitalization literature dating back to Oates (1969) has demonstrated the importance of such amenities in housing prices, as have more recent neighborhood discontinuity studies (Black, 1999) and discrete choice models (Nechyba and Strauss, 1998; Bayer, McMillan and Reuben, 2002). But little research to date has investigated to what extent this sorting has contributed to expanding city footprints rather than representing a consequence of such expansion as cars enable households to consider wider geographic areas in which to reside. Either way, Tiebout sorting remains an important component to the discussion of urban sprawl as it informs our understanding of how expanding cities develop within the shifting urban boundaries. We will have more to say on this in the next section as we discuss equity and efficiency concerns raised by the interaction of sprawl and Tiebout sorting.
The most studied empirical link between sorting and sprawl relates to the relationship between sprawl and racial segregation. In principle, sprawl may both aggravate and lessen racial segregation within urban areas. On the one hand, minorities?because of lower incomes as well as possible exclusionary suburban policies?may become increasingly segregated in central cities as suburbs grow, or they may live in segregated suburbs when they do move out of central cities. On the
other hand, fast-growing metropolitan areas may give rise to an emerging minority middle class that can afford to move into suburbs?potentially decreasing racial segregation, especially in the light of the fact that segregation within central cities
is often quite stark. The empirical evidence is mixed, although we interpret recent evidence to be more supportive of the hypothesis that greater Tiebout mobility leads, all else being equal, to greater segregation. Several authors, including Lewis (1973), Yinger (1993) and Powell (2000), have found a direct relationship between urban development and racial segregation, while others have found no link be? tween density and segregation (Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor, 1999), and yet others have found that fast-growing metro areas have experienced a sharper decline in racial segregation than slow-growth areas (Glaeser and Kahn, 2003). Bayer, McMil? lan and Rueben (2002) document a tendency of households to seek to reside near households of similar race/ethnicity?suggesting that, to the extent to which sprawl contributes to an increase in Tiebout sorting, it may contribute to an increase in racial segregation. Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (forthcoming) find evidence suggest? ing that greater racial heterogeneity leads to greater numbers of local governments within metropolitan areas?and greater segregation between these submetropoli- tan boundaries.
Edge Cities: Multiple Centers and Further Sorting As residential sprawling and suburbanization solidified over the course of the
twentieth century, the last few decades also witnessed a growing trend toward "edge
cities," with multiple employment centers located throughout many metropolitan areas. Edge cities pose difficulties for models of urban patterns based either on transportation or on sorting, and their increasing empirical importance has led to developments of alternative polycentric city models that endogenize the formation
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Urban Sprawl 185
of employment centers outside the central business district (Anas, Arnott and Small, 1998; Brueckner, 1979; McDonald and McMillan, 2000; Henderson and Mitra, 1999). While some researchers have focused on patterns of dense employ? ment subsectors at the outskirts of cities (Brueckner, 1979; Henderson and Mitra, 1999), Glaeser and Kahn (2003) suggest that edge cities typically represent rela? tively low-density employment areas that accompany low-density suburbanization. The formation of edge cities or decentralized employment centers raises efficiency and equity concerns that link to similar issues raised by the Tiebout literature below
and must be balanced against the potential for lost agglomeration opportunities at the urban core.
In addition, edge cities may contribute to the "spatial mismatch hypothesis" first analyzed by Kain (1968), which suggests that job suburbanization has led to a disconnect in locations between jobs and low-income residential developments that are inhabited by less mobile households. In cities with little public transportation (Raphael and Stoll, 2001), this spatial mismatch may suppress employment oppor? tunities for the poor who do not have access to the transportation technologies (cars) that drive the sprawling of cities and jobs. It remains difficult to determine whether jobs follow people or people follow jobs, although the evidence to date suggests that the former may be the case more than the latter (Steinnes, 1977; Glaeser and Kahn, 2003).
Comparative Study of Urban Sprawl: The United States and Europe The United States and the nations of western Europe have experienced
markedly different patterns of urban development, which suggests the complexity of attempting to explain urban sprawl. Both regions experienced strong growth in income levels over the twentieth century. But the U.S. urban landscape resulted from a combination of car purchases, large public investments in road infrastruc? ture, limited public investment in central cities, the existence of much population heterogeneity within cities and low cultural barriers to household mobility. Western Europe, on the other hand, may be viewed as investing relatively more in public transportation within cities, expending greater resources on maintaining central city amenities and developing within a culture that is less willing to consider residential mobility as an avenue to improve household welfare?all within cities that are more homogeneous in terms of population characteristics. Both as a cause and as a result of its European-style decisions, Germany, for example, took until 1970 to reach the same level of car ownership that the United States had reached in 1920 (Glaeser and Kahn, 2003).
While we seek in this paper to address only the issue of urban sprawl in the United States, we suspect that greater insight into the causes of urban sprawl within the United States could be obtained from a better understanding of why cities in other developed societies look very different. A notable beginning for such an exploration is offered by Brueckner, Thisse and Zenou (1999), who focus on amenity explanations for the difference between European and U.S. cities. A more general framework may yet explain the stereotypical European and U.S. city
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186 Journal of Economic Perspectives
outcomes as two possible urban equilibria resulting from different underlying primitives faced by different cities.
Urban Sprawl: Negative Externalities and Equity Issues
Those concerned about growing city footprints and lower city densities, or urban sprawl, associate these urban changes with a panoply of perceived ills in the urban and exurban landscape: the loss of open space, urban decay, unsightly strip mail developments, urban air and water pollution, traffic congestion, low-density housing developments, the loss of a sense of community, patchwork housing developments in the midst of agricultural land, increasing reliance on the auto? mobile, the separation of residential and work locations and a general spreading of urbanized development across the landscape. For economists, this range of objec? tions is difficult to evaluate. Certain topics in the list, like traffic congestion, are well-recognized as possibly involving market and policy failures. Other arguments seem more rhetorical than real. It seems unlikely, for instance, that advocates of antisprawl measures worry primarily about the encroachment of city footprints on
farm land, especially in the light of the fact that forests encroach significantly more
on farmland than do cities (Glaeser and Kahn, 2003). Other arguments like "reliance on the automobile" seem more like aesthetic judgments, favorable for some people and unfavorable for others, that do not enter an economist's social welfare calculation in an obvious way. Still other arguments, like a greater quantity of low-density housing, may point to potential environmental and other external? ities, but also suggest social benefits of urban sprawl since they involve a greater consumption of land and housing.
Our strategy here is not to attempt to compile an overall list of benefits and costs of urban sprawl, but rather to focus on those that emerge most directly from the monocentric city and Tiebout models discussed above. Within the context of the monocentric city model, Brueckner (2000, 2001) identifies three major poten? tial externalities that developers may fail to internalize: traffic congestion (includ? ing its implications for pollution), the loss of open space at the urban fringe, and unrecovered infrastructure costs associated with new low-density development. We forego a detailed discussion of unrecovered infrastructure costs given the ease with which policy can address this through appropriately set "impact fees" charged to land developers, and we begin with discussions of traffic congestion and pollution. Within this discussion, we point out that relationships that may appear clear-cut? between city densities, congestion and pollution as well as between policy prescrip? tions and consequences?become less clear as the analysis escapes the strict con- fines of the monocentric city model. This lesson remains important in our discussion of landscape amenities and open space that follows. We conclude this section with a discussion of externalities and equity concerns that do not arise in the monocentric city model, but appear when sprawl is viewed through the lens of the Tiebout model.
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Thomas J. Nechyba and Randall P. Walsh 187
Traffic Congestion and Sprawl Empirical estimates suggest that traffic congestion in the United States causes
substantial costs to urban residents. For instance, a recent study of 75 U.S. urban areas finds that the total increase in commuting costs from congestion in these areas is $69.5 billion, an average of $520 per person (Shrank and Lomax, 2003). Of these costs, $60 billion are attributed to the time costs associated with longer commute times, and $9.5 billion are attributed to increased fuel consumption resulting from congestion-induced drops in fuel efficiency.
Urban economists speak with a fairly unified voice on the issue of congestion? usually prescribing peak-load taxes and/or toll roads as the appropriate method for internalizing congestion externalities. We have two concerns regarding this con? ventional wisdom. First, we are concerned, as is suggested by Downs (1999), that Americans may not be willing to incur the levels of congestion taxes that would be required to make meaningful reductions in peak-hour traffic.4
Our second concern is related to the distinction between mobility and acces- sibility. When congestion is treated as "the problem," its inverse?ease of mobility within the metropolitan area?emerges as the societal goal. However, it is far from clear that congestion (or its inverse, ease of mobility) is the key argument in household utility functions?aside from the extent to which congestion relates directly to air pollution, which we turn to in the next section. Easier mobility (or declining congestion) is, after all, valuable only to the extent to which it is synonymous with easier access to the goods and services valued by households within
metropolitan areas. Ease of mobility and ease of access are thus far from synony? mous. Levine and Garb (2002) argue, for instance, that increased metropolitan mobility could actually be associated with more time and money spent in travel in the long run because greater mobility facilitates even more decentralized metro? politan development. The key insight here is that?ignoring pollution externali? ties?we should only value reduced congestion (increased ease of mobility) to the extent that it leads to an increase in accessibility over the long run. Spending the same amount of time driving longer distances on uncongested roads is a dubious social gain.
Replacing the congestion metric with an accessibility metric, however, high- lights the importance of understanding the impact of congestion policies on land use patterns. Policies that facilitate compactness of urban development, mixed land uses or development clustered around high quality public transportation could all increase access without reducing congestion per se. The impact of congestion taxes on urban structure, for instance, is not clear. Yinger (1993) argues that imposition of congestion pricing would lead to a denser urban area. Levine and Garb (2002), on the other hand, suggest that over time congestion pricing that reduces the number of trips into the urban core can lead to decreased accessibility as businesses
4 We are somewhat guarded in stating this concern, because similar concerns in some European cities (such as London) had been expressed prior to the imposition of congestion fees that were followed by surprisingly little controversy.
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188 Journal of Economic Perspectives
respond to decreased consumer traffic by relocating to more remote locations only accessible by car. Similarly, Rufolo and Bianco (1998) argue that the implementa? tion of congestion pricing will likely result in taxation of only the most congested roads?typically those connecting suburbs to the inner city. Because locations of businesses and commuters are endogenous in the long run, raising the cost of commuting to the inner city without raising the cost of commuting between suburban locations may induce a decentralization of activity?and an increase in sprawl.
City Density, Urban Sprawl and Pollution The link between urban sprawl and air pollution has two components: in?
creases in emissions per mile traveled related to traffic congestion and increases in vehicle miles traveled, which are linked to lower-density development. The link between vehicle traffic and air pollution is clear. In the United States in 2001, on-road vehicles accounted for 37 percent of total nitrogen oxides, which play a major role in the formation of ground-level ozone, particulate matter, haze and acid rain; 27 percent of volatile organic compounds, which react with nitrogen oxides to form ground-level ozone; and 62 percent of total emissions of carbon monoxide, which is a particular threat for individuals who suffer from cardiovas- cular disease (U.S. EPA National Emissions Inventory, (http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ chief/trends)). Between 1970 and 2001, total vehicle miles traveled increased 151 percent from 1.1 trillion miles to 2.8 trillion miles. Over the same period, miles
traveled by passenger cars and motorcycles increased by over 75 percent (from 920 billion miles to 1.63 trillion) (U.S. Department of Transportation National Highway Statistics, 2001).
While these numbers are striking, the links between sprawl and pollution are not as straightforward as they might seem. First, the impact of reduced highway congestion on air pollution is a function of the type of congestion. A U-shaped relationship exists between emissions such as nitrogen oxides per vehicle mile traveled and car speed, with average speeds of 30 MPH representing the trough of the U (Final Facility Specific Speed Correction Factors, USEPA EPA420-R-01-06, Novem?
ber, 2001). Second, the link between development density and car pollution is similarly unclear. As discussed above, density itself is not necessarily related to spatial accessibility?implying that vehicle miles traveled per individual within a metropolitan area depend as much on microfeatures of the area as on overall density. For instance, the appearance of edge cities, while leading to a less dense metropolitan area, may also result in a decline in commuting (and thus vehicle miles traveled per individual) as jobs are more decentralized within the urban area (Glaeser and Kahn, 2003).
It is therefore not surprising that the empirical literature on the link of air pollution and city density yields no strong results. The majority of the empirical studies claiming to document a clear link between density and pollution fail to account for other important variables such as income and household demograph? ics. Those studies that use micro-level data and attempt to control for these other
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Urban Sprawl 189
factors generally conclude that the relationship between density and travel behav? ior is weaker and less certain than is often claimed in the popular press (Pickrell, 1999; Crane, 2001). As pointed out by Glaeser and Kahn (2003), U.S. urban air pollution on the whole has been on the decline since the 1970s, with increasingly cleaner cars supplanting older, more polluting cars. Thus, even if there were a clearer link between sprawl and pollution, policies unrelated to sprawl seem to be more effective in addressing urban pollution problems.
Landscape Amenities and Open Space within Metropolitan Areas The rapid urbanization of open space is often identified as one of the key
problems associated with sprawl. Using satellite imagery data and aerial photogra- phy, Burchfield, Overman, Puga and Turner (2003) estimate that the urbanized percentage of the U.S. landscape increased by 47.7 percent between 1976 and 1992?an annualized rate of 2.48 percent. However, as the authors of the study point out, these numbers can be misleading. While urbanization is increasing rapidly, the actual percentage of the United States that is urbanized remains quite small?only accounting for 1.92 percent of the entire U.S. land area as of 1992. Given the very low percentage of the U.S. landscape that is urbanized, why is the loss of open space receiving such prominence in the debate over sprawl?
When monocentric city models are used to analyze questions of urban sprawl, they typically do not include an explicit specification of household tastes for open space and are thus not well-equipped to analyze welfare losses from sprawl-related loss of open space. In addition, the macronature of the monocentric city model limits the definition of open space to rural land at the urban fringe. However, evidence from the empirical literature suggests that open space within suburbs is significantly more important to households than open space at the urban fringe. A wide array of empirical work, aided greatly by the recent advent of Geographic Information System (GIS) technology, has investigated how housing prices are related to proximity to various uses?and thus how households value different types of land uses. The work on landscape amenities has identified positive values for proximity to public parks, privately owned open space, the natural land cover immediately surrounding household locations and access to natural views.5 But the relationship between open space and housing prices seems to be nonlinear. Geoghegan, Wainger and Bockstael (1997), for instance, find that housing prices are increasing in the percentage of open space within a 0.1 kilometer ring and decreasing in the percentage of open space within 1 kilometer ring surrounding the house. Acharya and Bennett (2001) find that house prices are increasing in the
5 See Weicher and Zerbst (1973), Correll, Lillydahl and Singell (1978), Lee and Linneman (1998) and Greenwood and Hunt (1989) on valuation of public parks; Halstead (1984), Ready, Berger and Blomquist (1997), Kline and Wichelns (1994), Bergstrom, Dillman and Stoll (1985), Bolitzer and Netusil (2000) and Mahan, Polasky and Adams (2000) on privately owned open space; Geoghegan, Wainger and Bockstael (1997) and Acharya and Bennett (2001) on the value of land cover surrounding housing; Tyrvainen and Miettinen (2000), Rodriguez and Sirmans (1994) and Benson, Hansen, Schwartz and Smersh (1998) on the value of natural views.
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190 Journal of Economic Perspectives
percentage of open space at a decreasing rate within both a 1/4 mile and a 1 mile radius, and Walsh (2003) finds open space to provide positive amenity flows at high levels of development and negative flows at low levels of development.
One obvious interpretation of these results is that there exists a trade-off between open space amenities and access to commercial services. In particular, if open space proximity is valued highly but decays very quickly with distance, while the value of accessibility to commercial areas decays more slowly, the pattern observed in the data would arise. The evidence then seems to suggest that house? holds value access to commercial activity (that is, not too much open space everywhere around them), but prefer open space in the immediate vicinity of their residence. There seems to be no particular reason to believe that households in general place great value on open space on the urban fringe.
While it is important to recognize that the studies cited above cannot identify amenity values that are shared equally across the land market (since such value would not appear in differential sales prices of land), the empirical analysis suggests
that open space is, at least to some extent, a quite local public good. As a result, the within-metropolitan area creation of open space can be studied within the context of Tiebout-type models in which developers have an incentive to create local public goods (such as parks, small lakes and recreation areas) to drive up prices for land they are developing near such spaces. The more local the nature of the open space amenities and the larger the scale of development, the stronger will be the incentives for private developers to provide efficient levels of open space.6 When the scale of individual developments is not large enough to capture spillovers associated with open space amenities (such as dense development in inner cities), local political processes may combine with citywide policies aimed at internalizing local externalities in the creation and maintenance of open spaces through land purchases (such as large central city parks). In other cases, institutions such as private land trusts and homeowners' associations may emerge and internalize the same local open space externalities.
Inclusion of different types of open space within models of the urban land? scape?and linkage of such open space to empirically well-grounded motivations for private land development?thus becomes important to a fuller treatment of the relationship between sprawl and welfare. An explicit introduction of preferences for open space into the urban literature is furthermore likely to alter the policy prescriptions beyond recommendations of impact fees and the use of land taxes. While such policy instruments may indeed be key to preserving open space at the urban fringe, it is unclear how they would address what appears to be the much
6 This insight relates closely to the well-known "Henry George Theorem" that implies, under some fairly restrictive assumptions, an efficient level of local amenities such as open space under land value maximization by developers (Rubinfeld, 1987, and references therein). Of course, developers will not take into account externalities associated with the increased public infrastructure needs and congestion that arise as open spaces within cities cause the urban fringe to expand, but such externalities can in principle be internalized through appropriately set impact fees.
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Thomas J. Nechyba and Randall P. Walsh 191
larger concern for the preservation and creation of smaller open spaces within sprawling city boundaries.
Walsh (2003) provides a glimpse at the complexity of urban land use policy in a spatially explicit general equilibrium model of land markets in North Carolina's Wake County. In this model, an urban growth boundary is shown to freeze development in a relatively low land price region and thus result in increased urban density. An alternative policy that freezes development in Wake County's fastest- growing suburb, on the other hand, decreases development density. Yet both types of policies are advocated by proponents of antisprawl measures as they seek to use policy to create denser cities. Walsh also points out that different land purchase policies?say, the choice between protecting forested wetlands, setting aside large undeveloped tracts and establishing urban parks?might have quite different ef? fects on the density and open space decisions of private land developers. These issues invite further research.
Tiebout Sorting, Peer Externalities and "Categorical Equity" The prevalence of Tiebout sorting as documented in the extensive empirical
local public finance literature alluded to earlier, and the greater scope for such sorting in sprawling cities, has both efficiency and equity implications for sprawling metropolitan areas. In our discussion of open space, for instance, we suggested that open space might be viewed as a local public good?and that land developers have incentives to provide such goods in various quantities across the urban landscape to meet different consumer demands. While such a market process may generate more efficient distributions of open space within the urban landscape, it would no doubt result in differential levels of open space consumption, correlated in part with household income, as consumers sort according to their demand for open space. Yet some might object that such differential consumption, while efficient, might carry with it the burden of an inequitable distribution of access to open space, with poorer households having less access than those with greater means.
Such distributional considerations take on particular importance when high moral or legal claim is given to the proposition that at least a high minimum level of certain local public goods has to be delivered to all. While access to open space may or may not qualify for such a claim, other goods clearly do, like schooling, protection from crime and environmental hazards, and access to neighborhoods that are broadly functional. Equity considerations that focus on such particular categories of local public goods will henceforth be referred to as "categorical equity" considerations.
Categorical equity concerns in sprawling cities arise in part because the ability to move out of central cities and into suburbs, and the ability to choose among suburbs, is not uniform across population and income groups. Within U.S. metro? politan areas, the poor generally live in central cities while middle-income individ? uals live in suburbs (Margo, 1992; Mieszkowski and Mills, 1993; Mills and Lubuele, 1997; Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport, 2000). While over 17 percent of central city residents are poor, the same is true for fewer than 7 percent of suburban residents.
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192 Journal of Economic Perspectives
Public transportation has been identified as an important explanatory variable (Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport, 2000; LeRoy and Sonstelie, 1983)?suggesting that for those using public transportation, the car-centered suburbs may simply not be an option. Furthermore, political boundaries within metropolitan areas correlate strongly with differences in poverty rates across those areas?suggesting politically created distortions through zoning, housing markets and local public finance considerations consistent with Tiebout's model (Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport, 2000). This documented geographic separation and lower mobility of poorer households is likely to give rise to a variety of social problems in poor areas and is of independent concern to the extent to which jobs are sprawling out of cities along with residences (Mills and Lubuele, 1997; Glaeser and Kahn, 2003).
When the quality of locally provided goods is primarily a function of public investment, categorical equity concerns from Tiebout sorting can be addressed straightforwardly through provision of public resources by state or federal govern?
ments to insure the desirable level of local public provision. However, the quality of local public goods may rely less on public financing than on nonfinancial inputs that derive directly from the composition of local populations. In the case of education, for instance, family and peer externalities may play a powerful role in producing school quality (Gaviria and Raphael, 2001; Hanushek, Kain, Markman and Rivkin, 2003; Vigdor and Nechyba, 2003). It is well-known that public school quality differs across neighborhoods and districts even when observable school inputs such as per pupil spending are equalized. Per pupil spending in California has, for instance, been largely equalized with no evidence for an appreciable narrowing of school quality differences across districts. Analogously, mere spending
on public safety does not lead to equal levels of protection from crime, nor does equal public investment in basic infrastructure result in uniformly functional neighborhoods. Similar insights on the potential importance of peer and family effects are emerging from the literature on local crime rates and other neighbor? hood characteristics (Katz, Kling and Liebman, 2001; Solon, Page and Duncan, 2000; Chase-Landsdale, Gordon, Brooks-Gunn and Klebanov, 1997). In each of these cases, the level of the public good depends critically on the characteristics of the local population that is being served by public expenditures on the good? giving rise to local peer and neighborhood externalities that shape the true levels of local public goods.
Models in which mobile households with such different school peer external? ities choose residences within existing housing markets that are divided into multiple school districts have been developed by Nechyba (1999, 2000, 2002, 2003a, b, c, e) and Ferreyra (2002). These models are then calibrated or estimated with data from various cities. For example, Nechyba (2002, 2003a) shows that when school attendance is linked to place of residence, the value of high-quality schools is capitalized into housing prices and considerable residential segregation occurs by income. High-quality schools within the model are in large part determined by family and peer effects, and as a result, segregation occurs even if all schools receive the same funding on a per student basis. Such frameworks could equally well model
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Urban Sprawl 193
other local public goods that depend on local population externalities?with much the same result.
One general policy conclusion from this work is that sorting effects are highly
dependent on institutional frameworks and the microstructure of urban hous? ing markets. Sorting can lead to increased segregation under certain institu? tional and policy environments, but these same forces can equally well support desegregation?and potential movement back into central cities?under other policies. For instance, Nechyba (2000, 2003a, b, c, e) and Ferreyra (2002) demon? strate the potential for policies aimed at weakening the link between residential and school choices to impact the incentives of different demographic groups to segregate within a metropolitan environment. Such policies may involve either a fostering of private school markets through vouchers or an increase in public school choice through charter and magnet schools. In each case, middle-income parents in residence-based public school systems have an incentive to locate in lower-income districts to take advantage of low housing prices while avoiding poor public schools by choosing alternatives. To the extent to which Tiebout forces have pushed middle-income families out of central cities and thus added to sprawl, these same forces can thus, under the right policies, lead to a reduction in sprawl.
Similarly, early efforts to create public housing tended to reinforce segregation
patterns, while later efforts to channel resources into more dispersed affordable housing opportunities reversed increasing poverty concentrations within cities in the last decade (Jargowsky, 2003). Experiments such as the "Moving to Opportu? nity" policies that give residents of low-income housing projects in inner cities the option of moving to middle-income neighborhoods can thus create more equitable distributions of all types of public services, as such policies attempt to shape peer and neighborhood characteristics directly away from concentrations that reinforce existing inequities within metropolitan areas.7 Housing policy, like school policy, can thus provide institutional frameworks for within-city development that lead to greater or less segregation?and with it greater or less categorical inequity.
Research that models the links between local public institutions and urban characteristics can clarify how current demographic distributions of populations in cities have emerged and persist. For instance, recent empirical structural work by Bayer, McMillan and Reuben (2002) can differentiate between the different channels through which racial sorting into schools and neighborhoods arises. In their work, housing markets, job locations and preferences for residential homogeneity?not differences in tastes for quality of education?represent the crucial explanatory forces for racial school segregation patterns observed in the data. This result emphasizes that urban economies arise from a blend of decisions about housing, jobs, schooling and neighborhoods?and of public and private institutions that shape each of these decisions. Much remains to be done as
7 For early evidence on the impact of such experiments on crime, education and other measures of economic success, see Ludwig, Duncan and Hirschfield (2001), Ludwig, Ladd and Duncan (2001) and Ludwig, Duncan and Pinkston (2000).
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194 Journal of Economic Perspectives
economists create better connections in their investigations of the impact of urban sprawl on neighborhoods within cities and as their models become more grounded in data and thus more policy relevant.
Some Policy Trade-Offs and a New Research Agenda
Urban sprawl is a multidimensional issue, with multiple causes and effects. Policy trade-offs emerge for three different reasons: First, a tension often emerges between the goal of limiting the expansion of cities (analyzed within the mono? centric city model) and the goal of not further disadvantaging the poor who are currently struggling within those cities (often viewed through the lens of the Tiebout model). Little progress can be made in better understanding these trade- offs without urban models that incorporate the possibility of tension between these
goals. Second, urban policymakers face the difficult challenge of operating in what economists refer to as a "second-best" world?a world in which multiple distortions, some arising from market failures and others from existing government policy? already exist. For instance, household location decisions in urban areas are dis- torted by the link of public schools to residential housing markets?and this existing distortion needs to be taken into account as policies to address sprawl are contemplated. Finally, various trade-offs emerge specifically from the micro aspects of particular social problems?such as, for instance, the trade-offs that emerge once one learns from environmental economists about the U-shaped relationship be? tween car speed and emissions of pollution.
Likely Policy Trade-Offs in Considering Antisprawl Measures Since the research integrating elements of the monocentric city model with
Tiebout models and models of edge cities is still in its infancy, since second-best considerations are often absent from urban models and since important structural relationships are not always carefully included in the analysis, it is difficult to make
firm policy recommendations based on present research. Nevertheless, we can begin to identify some examples of likely additional policy trade-offs that might emerge in a more thorough analysis for policies often advocated by those con? cerned with urban sprawl.
Consider, for instance, the common policy prescriptions arising from mono? centric city analysis of sprawl that focuses on suboptimal city densities causing cities to encroach on open space at the urban fringe and leading to excessive congestion. Developers could simply be charged appropriately set impact fees to internalize the cost of public infrastructure from loss of open space at the urban fringe, and congestion taxes could be imposed to internalize externalities from individual location and commuting decisions. However, policies aimed at raising the price of living at the urban fringe, such as impact fees and congestion taxes, may have unintended segregating consequences within the metropolitan area. Such policies might reduce the footprint of cities at the cost of making it relatively more difficult
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Thomas J. Nechyba and Randall P. Walsh 195
for lower-income households to move to the suburbs. The trade-off that might emerge then involves smaller urban distances to suburbs on the one hand and higher concentrations of the poor in central cities on the other?with predictable consequences for categorical equity within the city. A real analysis of this potential trade-off awaits more rigorous modeling of the relevant forces that generate such trade-offs.
Similarly, mass transit accessible to lower-income residents of inner cities is often advocated as a possible policy prescription to minimize the effects of sprawl, but mass transit also provides incentives for city footprints to expand along the rays ofthe mass transit system, with commuters driving to outer mass transit stations and
then commuting on the train or bus. Furthermore, stretching mass transit systems
into suburbs is likely to lead to residential income sorting, with the poor concen? trated along mass transit access points. This sorting may lead to lower concentra? tion of poverty in inner cities while increasing income segregation outside the central city. Alternative methods of addressing transportation costs for the poor, ranging from subsidized car purchases for the poor (Glaeser and Kahn, 2003) to subsidized van or taxi rides might help to open opportunities throughout cities. However, transportation costs are only one of the reasons for spatial sorting, and mass transit may have only a small effect on current levels of segregation. Again, it is difficult to say more without a better and economically more relevant model of cities and suburbs.
Urban growth boundaries have also become a popular proposal to limit sprawl over the past two decades, but while these boundaries can limit the footprint of cities, they simultaneously drive up housing costs and thus impose the largest burdens on lower income households (Quigley and Raphael, 2004). They could furthermore worsen the problems associated with sprawl if designed in such a way as to push sprawl beyond growth boundaries around cities. Similarly, while local zoning can create the types of neighborhood open spaces that seem to matter most to households, an extensive local public finance literature suggests that powerful local zoning boards may well be used as exclusionary tools to keep local populations segregated (Hamilton, 1975; Fischel, 2001a, b), and such boards are unlikely to internalize potential externalities from loss of open space at the urban fringe.
Toward a New Approach Ultimately, we believe that fully understanding the complex set of trade-offs
raised by these interconnected policy concerns will require a new integrated modeling approach to the urban problem. While the urban economics literature with its focus on the trade-off between transportation costs and land rents has succeeded in identifying the primary causes for the sprawling of cities in the twentieth century, its models often glance over the micro aspects of how city landscapes within expanding boundaries evolve. Environmental economists have identified the components of the neighborhood landscape that affect housing prices, but have provided less insight to the way that policy activities and land markets interact to give rise to these localized amenities. At the same time, a rich
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196 Journal of Economic Perspectives
local public finance literature can potentially yield worthwhile insights into the problems faced within sprawling cities, but few local public finance models have incorporated the insights from urban models that make them relevant for an informed discussion of urban sprawl.8
A more integrated approach, perhaps built upon recent advances in structural locational equilibrium modeling, could deal more fully with the details of how sprawl affects households and families. Recent innovations in the structural mod? eling of residential housing and land markets embodied by Epple and Sieg (1999, 2001), Bayer, McMillan and Reuban (2002), Walsh (2003), Nechyba (1999) and Ferreyra (2002) provide potentially fertile ground. What is unlikely to emerge from
such an approach, however, is a set of simple policy prescriptions to combat urban sprawl. Cities and suburbs are complicated economies, and most policies are likely to give rise to similarly complicated trade-offs. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how
appropriate policy responses to growing concerns about the sprawl of U.S. cities can be formulated without a clearer understanding of these underlying trade-offs.
? This work was supported in part by a grant from the Lincoln Institute for Land Policy,
Cambridge, Massachusetts. Research assistance from Dan Hungerman is gratefully acknowl-
edged, as are detailed comments from Timothy Taylor, Jan Brueckner, Ed Glaeser, Matt Kahn and Michael Waldman.
8 Inman and Rubinfeld (1979), Cheshire and Sheppard (2002) and DeBartolome and Ross (2003) represent promising early exceptions.
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Urban Sprawl 197
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- Contents
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- Issue Table of Contents
- Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Autumn, 2004), pp. 1-232+i-viii
- Volume Information [pp. 229-232]
- Front Matter [pp. 1-2]
- Symposium: The Transformation of Europe
- The Economic Future of Europe [pp. 3-26]
- The European Union: A Politically Incorrect View [pp. 27-48]
- Why Are European Countries Diverging in Their Unemployment Experience? [pp. 49-68]
- How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru [pp. 69-92]
- The Muddles over Outsourcing [pp. 93-114]
- Oil and the Macroeconomy since the 1970s [pp. 115-134]
- The Purchasing Power Parity Debate [pp. 135-158]
- On the (Ir)Relevance of Distribution and Labor Supply Distortion to Government Policy [pp. 159-175]
- Urban Sprawl [pp. 177-200]
- Features
- Policy Watch: Challenges for Terrorism Risk Insurance in the United States [pp. 201-214]
- Recommendations for Further Reading [pp. 215-222]
- Notes [pp. 223-228]
- Back Matter [pp. 176-viii]