Homework Help Needed!!

O R I G I N A L P A P E R

Walking the talk: Value importance, value enactment, and well-being

Kennon M. Sheldon • Lawrence S. Krieger

Published online: 9 August 2014

� Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Abstract Prior research on intrinsic versus extrinsic

values has focused on the comparative importance subjects

assign to the two types of values, showing that relative

intrinsic versus extrinsic value orientation (RIEVO) pre-

dicts higher or increased well-being. In two studies, we

show that rated action taken regarding the two types of

values is just as essential to study. Support was found for

four hypotheses: (1) there was a significant behavior/

importance gap, such that participants ‘‘walked’’ (acted on

values) less than they ‘‘talked’’ (endorsed those values); (2)

this was especially true for intrinsic values, an interaction

suggesting that the intrinsic ideals of personal growth,

community, and connection often receive only lip service;

(3) the ‘‘walk’’ (behavior ratings) measure of RIEVO

subsumed the ‘‘talk’’ (importance ratings) RIEVO mea-

sure’s effects on well-being outcomes, suggesting that

researchers interested in predicting well-being from values

should perhaps focus on rated value enactment, not value

importance; and (4) participants with higher meaning in

life, lower search for meaning, more self-concordance at

work, and greater chronological age evidenced more con-

sistency between their talking and their walking.

Keywords Values � Self-determination theory � Well-being

Introduction

Values are the guiding principles that people use in orga-

nizing their lives (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992)—the

ultimate ends that people think are important. In recent

decades self-determination theory (SDT; Deci and Ryan

1985, 2000) researchers have proposed a model of values

(Kasser 2002; Kasser and Ryan 1993, 1996) which relies

on a distinction between ‘‘intrinsic’’ values such as per-

sonal growth, serving one’s community, and having ful-

filling relationships with others, and ‘‘extrinsic’’ values,

such as achieving monetary success, having status and

fame, and being beautiful or attractive (Kasser and Ryan

1993, 1996; Kasser et al. 2004; Sheldon and Kasser 2008).

Factor analyses (Kasser and Ryan 1993, 1996) have sup-

ported the basic distinction between the two types of value,

and Grouzet et al. (2005) showed that an ‘‘intrinsic versus

extrinsic’’ distinction formed one axis of a circumplex

model of values, the other axis being formed by a ‘‘self-

transcendent versus physical’’ axis (not considered in the

current studies). To compare peoples’ value systems as a

whole, researchers commonly compute a ‘‘relative intrinsic

versus extrinsic value orientation’’ (RIEVO) score by

subtracting extrinsic from intrinsic value scores (Kasser

and Ryan 1993; Kasser 2002). This summative approach is

employed because extrinsic values are not considered

negative in themselves, but are thought to become prob-

lematic when they become more prominent than intrinsic

values in a person’s overall value system.

The RIEVO construct has been a mainstay within the

SDT literature for more than 20 years (Kasser and Ryan

1993), and remains actively researched to this day. For

example, Sebire et al. (2009) recently examined the effects

of RIEVO in the domain of sports and exercise; Vans-

teenkiste et al. (2007) applied RIEVO in the work domain;

K. M. Sheldon (&) University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, USA

e-mail: [email protected]

L. S. Krieger

Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA

123

Motiv Emot (2014) 38:609–619

DOI 10.1007/s11031-014-9424-3

and Thøgersen-Ntoumani et al. (2010) examined RIEVO in

the health domain. Given this activity, researchers have

begun to identify ‘‘goal content theory’’ as a fifth mini-

theory within SDT, along with the four prior mini-theories

of cognitive evaluation theory, organismic integration

theory, causality orientations theory, and basic needs the-

ory (Gunnell et al. 2014).

The research to date shows that RIEVO predicts a host

of positive mental health outcomes including greater

positive affect, higher observer-rated adjustment, greater

life-satisfaction, lower depression and anxiety, and more;

conversely, people who attach too much importance to

extrinsic values exhibit a host of mental health decrements

(for an earlier review, see Kasser 2002). Such effects also

emerge longitudinally. For example, Niemiec et al. (2009)

and Sheldon et al. (2004) showed that a strong extrinsic

value orientation at the time of college graduation pre-

dicted mental health decrements a year later.

These studies show that what people say (or believe) is

important to them (called ‘‘talking’’ herein) matters for

their mental health. But what about what people actually

do—the values they actually act upon (‘‘walking’’)? Pre-

sumably these are related; people should tend to take action

in order to approach what they believe is important. This

would exemplify a top-down regulatory process in which

higher-level goal-principles and ideal self-images give rise

to lower-level plans and sequences designed to reduce

discrepancies and move the person towards those higher-

level ideals (Carver and Scheier 1981, 1998). However, it

is easy to think of reasons why such action may not occur.

These reasons might include social desirability and

impression management motives, which inflate or other-

wise bias endorsements of specific values or types of val-

ues (Paulhus 1984), relative to actual behavior; situational

or socio-cultural forces that discourage or disrupt a per-

son’s ability to pursue volitions and intentions (Deci and

Ryan 1987); the gap between explicit and implicit moti-

vations, i.e. the fact that the motives people attribute to

themselves may not be the same ones they behaviorally

prefer (Schultheiss 2008); and the well-known phenome-

non of attitude/behavior inconsistency (Aronson 1999), in

which people do not follow through to take action in

support of their stated attitudes.

A few studies have examined other dimensions of intrinsic

versus extrinsic values besides their rated importance. Kasser

and Ryan (1993, 1996) focused on the subjective likelihood of

attaining aspirations, in addition to the rated importance of

attaining aspirations. They found that RIEVO for likelihood

ratings was associated with well-being with effect sizes

approximately equivalent to the effect sizes of RIEVO for

importance ratings. However, these investigators did not

directly compare these two types of effects, to establish which

values measure was the stronger or more proximal predictor of

well-being. Kasser and Ryan (2000) examined the degree to

which aspirations were already attained, as well as examining

their rated importance in the future. They found RIEVO

attainment was a somewhat stronger predictor of well-being

than RIEVO importance. Similarly, Van Hiel and Vans-

teenkiste (2009) examined the relative past attainment of

intrinsic versus extrinsic values, finding that RIEVO predicted

well-being and ego-integrity in the very old. Sheldon and

Kasser (1998) and Sheldon et al. (2010b) examined the effects

of retrospective ratings of recent progress in pursuing intrinsic

versus extrinsic personal goals, finding that goal progress

predicted enhanced well-being, especially in the case of

intrinsic goals.

However as previously stated, the current research

addresses a different dimension of aspirations; namely, the

degree to which the person reports taking action to pursue

different values. Taking action (‘‘walking’’) is logically

related to the other dimensions of aspirations that were

discussed above: positive expectancies (i.e. a high per-

ceived likelihood of succeeding in action) doubtless affects

the taking of action, and taking action very likely affects

one’s ability to make progress towards, or to attain, the

aspiration. However we believed that value-relevant action

is a crucial missing piece of the puzzle to study because it

represents the actual behavior that presumably must occur

in the time between saying X is an important goal, and

achieving X. Assessing value-relevant action (in addition

to value importance) allows researchers to address the

issues of attitude/behavior inconsistency and self-deception

that were discussed above. To what extent do people

actually take action to bring about what they say is

important? Assessing value-relevant action also allows

researchers to compare the effects of walking versus talk-

ing upon well-being. Is it more important to aspire to the

good, or act for the good? Finally, assessing value-relevant

action allows researchers to examine what happens when

there are discrepancies—when ‘‘walking’’ does not match

‘‘talking,’’ do people suffer? Are some types of people less

discrepant or more consistent than others?

In the current studies we therefore endeavored to assess

both the rated importance of different values to partici-

pants, and, the extent to which participants viewed them-

selves as actually working towards each value. Notably,

Bardi and Schwartz (2003) also studied the degree of

consistency between values and behavior. However, they

focused on a different model of values (namely, the Sch-

wartz circumplex model; 1992), and used different sets of

items to assess values and to assess behaviors. In contrast,

we used the same set of items to assess both walking and

talking, merely varying the stem of the questions. Thus, our

research aims and methods were somewhat different.

We tested four primary hypotheses. Our first hypothesis

was that there would be a mean difference such that

610 Motiv Emot (2014) 38:609–619

123

‘‘talking’’ scores would be greater than ‘‘walking’’ scores,

regardless of the type of value (intrinsic or extrinsic).

Importance ratings are aspirations, and people might well

aspire to more than they can objectively do in the present.

It may also be the case that people talk a better game than

they walk, inflating their importance ratings while being

more honest or accurate in their action ratings.

Our second hypothesis was that there would be an inter-

action between value type (intrinsic or extrinsic) and type of

rating (walking or talking), such that the gap between walking

and talking would be significantly larger for intrinsic values

than for extrinsic values. Such a finding would support the

notion that importance ratings might be inflated in a socially

desirable direction. However, this finding might simply sug-

gest that people’s ideal aspirations, unconstrained by reality,

legitimately tend to be more intrinsic than the person can

actually manage at present. In either case, such an interaction

would suggest that reality intrudes to a greater extent on the

pursuit of intrinsic than extrinsic values. Apportioning one’s

time is a zero-sum game (Sheldon et al. 2010a), and intrinsic

pursuits can be readily displaced, or ‘‘crowded out,’’ by

extrinsic pursuits (Frey 2008).

Our third hypothesis was that the RIEVO of rated action

will better predict well-being than the RIEVO of rated

importance. It is now well-established that the type of values

people endorse matters for their well-being, although these

effects are not always strong. But if intrinsic values are

indeed healthier and more happiness-promoting than

extrinsic values because of the ongoing need-satisfying

experiences their enactment provides (Kasser 2002; Niemiec

et al. 2009), then the values people work toward should be

more impactful than the values they merely talk about. Of

course, an alternative interpretation of the same finding

would be that a mediational relationship exists, a top-down

regulatory process wherein endorsed values produce greater

value action, which in turn produces well-being. However,

because the items are the same for the ‘‘walking’’ and

‘‘talking’’ measures, we do not believe that such a media-

tional interpretation would be very informative from a causal

process perspective. Still, finding support for Hypothesis 3

would suggest that researchers seeking the strongest pre-

dictor of well-being should perhaps measure values enact-

ment instead of values endorsement.

Our fourth hypothesis addressed consistency (or lack of

it) between talking and walking. What psychological con-

structs are associated with greater consistency, or with

greater inconsistency? We focused on the two aggregate

RIEVO measures because RIEVO is the summary variable

that has received the most research attention in the past. Our

general hypothesis was that walking/talking consistency

should be associated with indicators of greater maturity and

positive functioning, construed in many possible ways. In

Study 1 we examined the Meaning in Life scale (MIL;

Steger et al. 2006). The MIL has two subscales: presence of

meaning (POM) and search for meaning (SFM). We

hypothesized that POM would predict consistency between

walking and talking, whereas SFM might predict inconsis-

tency between walking and talking. Those who feel their life

is already meaningful are likely motivated to turn their

values into action, or perhaps, are already turning their

values into action. In contrast, those searching for meaning

may feel less committed to their current stated values, or

may be trying out behaviors inconsistent with those values,

perhaps in a search for more satisfaction or better values.

In sum, in this research we asked participants to rate

how much they act upon various intrinsic and extrinsic and

intrinsic values (a novel assessment approach), as well as

how important those different values are to them (the tra-

ditional assessment approach). In two studies, involving

two student samples and one working adult sample, we

tested four hypotheses concerning the differences between,

and the different effects of, these two types of ratings. Our

hypotheses were that (1) Talking scores would be higher

than Walking scores; that (2) Talking scores would be

greater than Walking scores especially in the case of

intrinsic values; that (3) Walking RIEVO would better

predict well-being than Talking RIEVO; and that (4)

measures of personality maturity and positive functioning

would be associated with greater consistency between

walking and talking.

Study 1

Method

Participants and procedure

Participants were 1992 introductory psychology students at

the University of Missouri (828 Men, 1,164 Women; 84 %

Caucasian) who participated in order to help fulfill a

research participation requirement. They completed the

study measures via an on-line, password-protected survey.

Measures

During the survey participants read, ‘‘The questions below

ask you about aspirations you may have for the future. For

each question, select a response that indicates how

important it is to you that the goal be attained in the

future.’’ A 1 (not at all) to 3 (somewhat) to 5 (very) scale

was provided for the six-item short form (Sheldon et al.

2003; Sheldon and Kasser 2008; Sheldon et al. 2011) of the

Aspirations Index (Kasser and Ryan 1993, 1996, 2000).

The three extrinsic value items were ‘‘projecting an

appealing and attractive image,’’ ‘‘achieving affluence and

Motiv Emot (2014) 38:609–619 611

123

financial success,’’ and ‘‘being known and admired by

many people.’’ The three intrinsic value items were

‘‘helping those who need help,’’ ‘‘having close personal

relationships’’; ‘‘feeling close to various people’’ and

‘‘attaining self-understanding and personal growth.’’ A

principal components analysis revealed the expected two

component structure, with each item loading at least .67 on

the expected factor and no more than .25 on the other

factor. Aggregate three-item intrinsic and extrinsic valuing

(‘‘talking’’) scores were computed to test hypotheses 1 and

2 (alphas = .62 and .63, respectively), and an aggregate

‘‘talking RIEVO’’ score was computed to test Hypothesis

3, by subtracting the extrinsic ratings from the intrinsic

ratings (alpha = .78, computed after subtracting the mean

of the six items from all six items and reversing the

extrinsic ratings).

Next participants read, ‘‘The questions below again ask

you about various goals or aspirations. For each question,

select a response that indicates how much you actually

work on that goal in your life. Regardless of how important

you said the goals were, to what extent do you find yourself

trying to make each goal occur?’’ Thus, we asked partici-

pants to try to ignore their prior importance ratings to tell

us what they actually do. The same six value items were

presented, with a rating scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to

3 (somewhat) to 5 (very). Once again a two component

structure emerged for these ratings (no expected loadings

\.60, no cross-loadings [.28), and aggregate intrinsic and extrinsic action (‘‘walking’’ or action) scores and an

aggregate ‘‘walking RIEVO’’ were computed as above

(alphas = .57, .63, and .72, respectively). Notably, the two

RIEVO scores correlated .70 (p \ .001), indicating con- siderable agreement between walking and talking, overall.

Later in the survey participants completed the 12 item

depression subscale and the 13 item anxiety subscale from

the short form of the Mood and Anxiety Symptoms

Questionnaire (MASQ; Watson et al. 1995). Participants

were asked to rate ‘‘how much you have felt or experienced

things this way during the past week, including today,’’

using a 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) scale. Aggregate

depression (alpha = .92) and anxiety (alpha = .86) scores

were formed by averaging the relevant items. Participants

also completed the ten item Meaning in Life scale (MIL;

Steger et al. 2006), from which five item POM

(alpha = .86) and SFM (alpha = .87) subscales were

computed (example items: ‘‘my life has a clear sense of

purpose’’ and ‘‘I am always looking to find my life’s pur-

pose,’’ respectively).

Results

We conducted a 2 (Type of value: Intrinsic vs. Extrin-

sic) 9 2 (Frame: Walking vs. Talking) MANOVA with

repeated measures on both factors. Table 1 presents the

means by condition. Consistent with much past research

(Kasser 2002), there was a significant main effect of value

type, with intrinsic values being more strongly endorsed

overall [F(1,1991) = 955.6, p \ .001, g2 = .62]. More importantly, and supporting Hypothesis 1, there was also a

significant main effect of Talking versus Walking

[F(1,1991) = 789.6, p \ .001, g2 = .26]; ratings of acting upon values were generally lower than ratings of value

importance. Supporting Hypothesis 2, there was a small but

significant interaction between the two factors

[F(1,1991) = 86.5, p \ .001, g2 = .01]. This emerged because the shortfall between endorsing intrinsic values

and actually working on intrinsic values (-.41) was larger

than the gap between endorsing extrinsic values and actu-

ally working on extrinsic values (-.27). For the reader’s

information, women gave greater mean value ratings

overall [F(1,1979) = 40.86, p \ .01], qualified by a gender by content interaction [F(1,1979) = 50.20, p \ .01], such that mainly, women especially endorsed intrinsic values

more than men. However, there was no gender by walking/

talking interaction and no three-way interaction, thus the

theoretically salient patterns were unaffected by gender.

To test Hypothesis 3 we conducted two regressions, one

for anxiety and one for depression, in which the Talking

RIEVO variable was entered at Step 1, the Walking RI-

EVO variable was entered at Step 2, and the multiplicative

product of the two (standardized) variables was entered at

Step 3. These analyses allowed us to first test for the typical

effect of the Talking RIEVO predictor upon the well-being

indicators, and then to examine to what extent the Walking

RIEVO predictor supercedes, or accounts for, these effects.

The interaction test at Step 3 was exploratory, suggested by

an earlier reviewer of this article. This test sought to

examine whether well-being is especially impacted if the

two RIEVO scores match. Might participants benefit most

if they both walk and talk intrinsic (relative to extrinsic)

values?

At Step 1 Talking RIEVO was a significant predictor of

lower depression (b = -.08, p \ .01) and anxiety (b = -.05, p \ .05). At Step 2 Walking RIEVO was significant

Table 1 Study 1: mean value scores split by value type (intrinsic vs. extrinsic) and frame (talking vs. walking)

Value type

Extrinsic Intrinsic

Frame

Talking 3.89 4.49

Walking 3.62 4.08

All means significantly different from each other at p \ .01. See text for description of MANOVA results

612 Motiv Emot (2014) 38:609–619

123

in both analyses (b = -.08, p \ .01, in both cases) and Talking RIEVO became non-significant (both ps [ .40). At Step 3 the interaction between the two variables was sig-

nificant and negative for depression (b = -.06, p \ .05; R

2 = .012) but not for anxiety (b = -.02, ns; R2 = .008).

Figure 1 plots the interaction for depression for partici-

pants who were one standard deviation above or below the

mean. As can be seen, significantly lower depression scores

were observed for participants who both walked and talked

intrinsic (relative to extrinsic) values. This was essentially

the only point that differed from the other three points,

suggesting that it takes a combination of both walking and

talking intrinsic values to get benefit. We will evaluate the

replicability of this unpredicted pattern in Study 2.

Hypothesis 4 concerned POM and SFM as predictors of

consistency between walking and talking (Steger et al.

2006). To test this we standardized the variables and

computed two product interaction terms: POM 9 Talk

RIEVO and SFM 9 Talk RIEVO. We then conducted two

regressions predicting Walk RIEVO from one or the other

meaning variable, Talk RIEVO, and the relevant interac-

tion product term, entered in two steps. A significant

positive interaction indicates that more of the moderator

variable is associated with greater consistency between

walking and talking, and a significant negative interaction

indicates that the more of the moderator is associated with

greater inconsistency between walking and talking. For the

POM analysis, at step 1 POM significantly predicted Walk

RIEVO (b = .06, p \ .01) as did Talk RIEVO (b = .70, p \ .01); at step 2, the interaction was significant and positive as hypothesized (b = .04, p \ .001; DR2 = .01, total R

2 = .496). For the SFM analysis, at step 1 SFM had

no main effect on Walk RIEVO (b = -.01, p \ .001), although Talk RIEVO did (b = .70, p \ .01); more

importantly, the interaction was significant and negative at

step 2, as expected (b = -.06, DR2 = .04; total R

2 = .497). The two effects both remained significant

when they were both included within a single model.

Figures 2 and 3 provide graphs of the two interactions,

derived from the separate analyses just described.

Discussion

In Study 1 we administered the short aspirations measure

twice, once in the usual way (measuring subjects’ beliefs

about what is important—‘‘talking’’), and also adding a

new measure of what participants actually work on—

‘‘walking.’’ The study provided initial support for our four

hypotheses. We found that participants generally walked

less than they talked (Hypothesis 1) and that this gap was

larger for intrinsic than for extrinsic values (Hypothesis 2).

Fig. 1 Study 1: depression as a function of both Walking and Talking RIEVO measures

Fig. 2 Study 1: walking RIEVO as a function of Talking RIEVO and POM

Fig. 3 Study 1: walking RIEVO as a function of Talking RIEVO and SFM

Motiv Emot (2014) 38:609–619 613

123

This suggests a relative failure, whether for lack of time,

aspirational overreach, a touch of hypocrisy, or other rea-

sons, to pursue what participants believe to be most

important.

We also found support for Hypothesis 3, in that the

walking RIEVO measure subsumed the effects of the

talking RIEVO measure on anxiety and depression. This is

consistent with self-regulation research (Carver and Sche-

ier 1990), as those taking action to make progress towards

their goals typically derive well-being benefits (Brunstein

1993). The current findings go further, however, in sug-

gesting that value-action may account for the traditional

association between value importance and well-being.

However we did not test mediation because the data were

only cross-sectional and because the ‘‘walking’’ measure

was not a true measure of behaviors separate from values,

but rather, a restatement of values themselves. We also

found, in an exploratory analysis, that the combination of

high talking RIEVO and high walking RIEVO was asso-

ciated with the lowest depression scores. We evaluate the

robustness of this finding in later studies. A final finding of

Study 1, supporting Hypothesis 4, was that ‘‘walking’’ was

more consistent with ‘‘talking’’ if participants were high in

‘‘presence of meaning’’ (Steger et al. 2006) and less con-

sistent if participants were high in ‘‘search for meaning.’’

Those who already feel life is meaningful are actually

doing what they think is important; those searching for

meaning evidence less such consistency, perhaps because

they are unsatisfied with their current values, or are trying

out different behaviors.

Study 2

In Study 2 we sought to replicate the Study 1 findings using

a large sample of working adults. This would test whether

the effects were specific to students, or if they might

generalize to adults of many different ages. Specifically,

we examined a sample of 2,975 working lawyers with

widely diverse ages and income levels. We used the same

value measures in this sample, expecting Hypotheses 1 and

2 to again receive support. In addition to measuring

depression in this sample (as in Study 1), we also added

positive affect as a positive well-being indicator. We

expected these measures to support Hypothesis 3, with the

walking RIEVO measure predicting higher positive affect

as well as lower depression. We also tested whether the

walking RIEVO 9 talking RIEVO interaction effect on

depression would replicate and whether it would extend, in

a reverse direction, to positive affect.

In Study 2 we also explored further predictors for the

size of the discrepancy between talking and walking

(Hypothesis 4). We thought that participant age might play

a role, as more mature participants, through normative

personality development (Costa et al. 2000; Roberts et al.

2013), may well achieve greater consistency between their

goals and their behaviors (Sheldon and Kasser 2001;

Sheldon 2009). We also examined participant job motiva-

tion. If a lawyer works at her job for self-concordant

(Sheldon and Elliot 1999; Sheldon 2004) or internalized

(Deci and Ryan 2000) reasons, is she better able to ‘‘walk,’’

as well as ‘‘talk,’’ intrinsic (vs. extrinsic) values? The self-

concordance construct is presumed to address the ‘‘fit’’ or

integration between a people’s goals and their deeper needs

and personality characteristics (Sheldon 2004), and thus

people higher in self-concordance should be able to evi-

dence a smaller gap between what they say is important

and what they actually do.

Method

Participants and procedure

Participants were 2,975 working lawyers from a mid-

western and a northeastern state in the U.S. They were

contacted through their respective bar associations, invited

to participate in the study, and offered continuing educa-

tion credit as an incentive. After completing the on-line

survey participants could go to a web-site to register for

Continuing Legal Education credit; most participants

availed themselves of this opportunity. The sample con-

sisted of 1,634 men and 1,235 women (106 did not supply

gender data), who were working in a wide variety of legal

settings and substantive practice areas. Eighty-three per-

cent of the sample was Caucasian; the mean age of the

sample was 47.3 years (SD = 13.3; range 23–96). The

mean yearly income, measured on a scale ranging from 1

(less than $30,000 per year) to 16 (more than $2,000,000

per year) was 6.5, corresponding to about $90,000 per year.

Measures

The same 12 value items were administered in Study 2 as

in Study 1, with the same instructions and rating scales.

Once again a clean two-component structure emerged for

each set of six ratings, and the same summary variables

were computed as in Study 1 (alphas ranging from .54 to

.84). The walking and talking RIEVO scores correlated .71

(p \ .001) in this dataset, again indicating considerable agreement between walking and talking, but also, some

room for divergence.

We measured positive affect using the 10 item scale

from the Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule

(PANAS; Watson et al. 1988); participants rated how much

each item (e.g. interested, enthusiastic, proud) character-

ized their experience ‘‘in the past 2 months or so,’’ using a

614 Motiv Emot (2014) 38:609–619

123

1 (not at all) to 5 (very much) scale. The ten ratings were

averaged (alpha = .91). We measured depression using the

six item Depression subscale of the Brief Symptom

Inventory (Derogatis and Melisaratos 1983), also with

respect to the last 2 months (alpha = .88). Example items

include ‘‘feeling blue’’ and ‘‘feeling no interest in things;’’

the six items were averaged.

To measure self-concordant job motivation we used four

items designed to assess the ‘‘perceived locus of causality’’

of behavior (Ryan and Connell 1989; Sheldon and Elliot

1999; Sheldon 2004). Participants read, ‘‘People do things

for many different reasons. For your job in the law, please

indicate how strongly each of the following reasons

describes your motivation for performing this job.’’

External motivation was assessed by the item ‘‘You are in

this job because somebody else wants you to, or thinks you

should do this;’’ introjected motivation was assessed by the

item, ‘‘You are in this job because you would feel ashamed,

guilty, or anxious if you weren’t;’’ identified motivation

was assessed by the item, ‘‘You are in this job because you

really believe that it’s an important thing to do;’’ and

intrinsic motivation was assessed by the item, ‘‘You are in

this job because of the enjoyment or stimulation it provides

you.’’ Following much other research with these items and

this construct, and based on the notion of a continuum of

motivational internalization (Ryan and Connell 1989), a

self-concordant job motivation score was computed by

summing the intrinsic and identified ratings and subtracting

the external and introjected ratings (Sheldon 2004;

alpha = .68). This measure thus reflects the level of felt

autonomy, rather than felt external imposition, of partici-

pants’ job motivation.

Results

Table 2 presents the means from a 2 (Type of value:

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic) 9 2 (Frame: Walking vs. Talking)

MANOVA with repeated measures on both factors. Again

consistent with past research (Kasser 2002), there was a

significant main effect of value type, with intrinsic values

more strongly endorsed overall [F (1,2974) = 2,801.8,

p \ .001; g2 = .795]. Supporting Hypothesis 1, the ana- lysis also revealed a significant main effect of Walking

versus Talking [F(1,2974) = 1,923.5, p \ .001, g2 = .19]; participants again reported less effort towards values

compared to their endorsement of values. Supporting

Hypothesis 2, there was a significant interaction between

the two factors [F(1,2974) = 187.1, p \ .001, g2 = .012]. This emerged because the gap between endorsing intrinsic

values and working on intrinsic values (-.48) was again

larger than the gap between endorsing extrinsic values and

working on extrinsic values (-.30). For the reader’s

information, and replicating Study 1 findings, women gave

higher value ratings overall [F(1,2,365) = 23.16, p \ .01], qualified by a gender by content interaction

[F(1,2365) = 100.75, p \ .01], such that mainly, women especially endorsed intrinsic values more than men. Again,

there was no significant gender 9 Walking/talking inter-

action, and no three way interaction involving gender.

To test Hypothesis 3 we conducted two regressions

paralleling those of Study 1, one for positive affect and one

for depression, in which the Talking RIEVO variable was

entered at Step 1, the Walking RIEVO variable was entered

at Step 2, and the multiplicative product of the two stan-

dardized variables was entered at Step 3. At Step 1 Talking

RIEVO was a significant predictor of higher positive affect

(b = .04, p \ .05) and lower depression (b = -.03, p \ .08), although the effects were weaker than usually observed with this measure. At Step 2 Walking RIEVO

was significant in both analyses (b = .11, p \ .01, and -.07, p \ .01, respectively) and Talking RIEVO became non-significant. At Step 3 the interaction between the two

RIEVO scores was significant and positive for positive

affect (b = .10, p \ .01; DR2 = .01) and significant and negative for depression (b = -.06, p \ .05; DR2 = .01). The form of the interaction for depression was very similar

to that depicted in Fig. 1. The form of the interaction for

positive affect is depicted in Fig. 4. As can be seen, the

greatest positive affect scores occurred for participants

high in both the walking and talking RIEVO measures.

Thus, it again appears that the combination of high scores

on both RIEVO variables is most salubrious, presumably

because of a more harmonious mode of personality func-

tioning that is enabled by both ‘‘congruence’’ (orienting

towards intrinsic values) and ‘‘coherence’’ (having con-

sistency between values and goals; Sheldon and Kasser

1995).

Finally, we investigated the consistency between the

walking RIEVO and talking RIEVO measures, as a func-

tion of participant age and self-concordant job motivation

(Hypothesis 4). We conducted regression analyses similar

to those conducted in Study 1, in which Walk RIEVO was

predicted from Talk RIEVO, participant self-concordant

motivation or participant age, and a product variable

Table 2 Study 2: mean value scores split by value type (intrinsic vs. extrinsic) and frame (talking vs. walking)

Value type

Extrinsic Intrinsic

Frame

Talking 3.22 4.12

Walking 2.92 3.63

All means significantly different from each other at p \ .01. See text for description of MANOVA results

Motiv Emot (2014) 38:609–619 615

123

computed by multiplying Talk RIEVO by the relevant

standardized moderator variable (self-concordant motiva-

tion or age). We predicted two significant positive inter-

actions, such that Talk RIEVO is more highly associated

with Walk RIEVO for older, self-concordant individuals.

For the self-concordant motivation analysis, at step 1 self-

concordant motivation significantly predicted Walk RI-

EVO (b = .077, p \ .01) as did Talk RIEVO (b = .70, p \ .01); at step 2, the interaction was significant and positive (b = .047, p \ .001; DR2 = .002, total R

2 = .508). For the age analysis, at step 1 age had a sig-

nificant main effect on Walk RIEVO (b = .062, p \ .01), as did Talk RIEVO (b = .70, p \ .01); more importantly, the interaction was significant and positive at step 2, as

expected (b = .072, DR2 = .005; total R2 = .509). These analyses suggest that older people are and self-concordant

people are better able to be consistent in how much they

walk, as well as talk, intrinsic (vs. extrinsic) values.

Brief discussion

Study 2 replicated all of the findings of Study 1, showing

that the same patterns appear in a sample of working adults

as appeared in a sample of college students. Once again,

‘‘walking’’ was weaker than ‘‘talking’’ (Hypothesis 1), and

this discrepancy was more pronounced for intrinsic than for

extrinsic values (Hypothesis 2). Also, despite their large

inter-correlation, the walking RIEVO measure subsumed

the associations of the talking RIEVO measure with both

depression and positive affect (Hypothesis 3). Replicating

and extending the supplementary analysis of Study 1, sig-

nificant interactions emerged such that participants high in

both RIEVO measures were highest in positive affect and

lowest in depression, and vice versa for participants low in

both RIEVO measures. Again supporting Hypothesis 4,

that consistency was associated with greater maturity and

positive functioning, those with the greatest consistency

between ‘‘talking’’ and ‘‘walking’’ intrinsic versus extrinsic

values were the older lawyers, with more self-concordant

work motivation.

General discussion

In this research we have introduced a new way of con-

ceptualizing and measuring value-endorsement, to test our

hypothesis that ‘‘walking’’ (claiming to take action to

enact) intrinsic rather than extrinsic values may be more

powerful than ‘‘talking’’ (merely claiming to endorse)

intrinsic rather than extrinsic values. Our focus on whether

people are acting to move towards values fills a gap in the

extant literature, which has so far examined only the rated

importance, likelihood, and attainment of aspirations.

When taken in conjunction with conventional value-

importance data, value-action data also provide a poten-

tially useful window into issues as diverse as attitude/

behavior consistency, integrity versus hypocrisy, implicit

versus explicit motivational congruence, and the effec-

tiveness of top-down self-regulation.

We found consistent support for four primary hypothe-

ses. First, people tended to ‘‘talk’’ a stronger game than

they ‘‘walked,’’ in that their importance ratings were con-

sistently higher than their action ratings. This might be

viewed as evidence of hypocrisy, in which people do not

actually follow through on their stated commitments. More

likely, this difference simply reflects the difference

between the energy and opportunities one has to act in the

present, versus the things one believes are ultimately

important even if one cannot work on all of those things

now. Time and energy are limited resources, and aspiring

for more in the future than what one is currently doing is

not necessarily a bad thing—it may even be an engine of

growth and progress.

More suggestive of hypocrisy, perhaps, is the support we

found for our second hypothesis: namely, the gap between

‘‘talking’’ and ‘‘walking’’ was larger for intrinsic values

than it was for extrinsic values. When people fall short of

their ideal aspirations, it apparently occurs to a greater

extent for the healthiest and most growth-promoting types

of values, namely, intrinsic aspirations (Kasser 2002).

However even this finding may not reflect true hypocrisy—

aspiring to a more intrinsic future than one is currently

working towards may not be a bad thing. Again, intrinsic

pursuits may often get ‘‘crowded out’’ by the exigencies of

everyday living (Frey 2008; Deci and Ryan 2000), but as

long as the person at least remembers them as future pri-

orities, this may be beneficial and desirable.

Fig. 4 Study 2: positive affect as a function of both Walking and Talking RIEVO measures

616 Motiv Emot (2014) 38:609–619

123

We also had further data relevant to these perplexing

questions; namely, our findings on the predictors of con-

sistency between talking and walking (Hypothesis 4).

Study 1 found that participants higher in meaning in life

were more consistent, and that participants higher in SFM

were less consistent. Study 2 found that older and more

self-concordant lawyers were more consistent. These

findings suggest that greater consistency between ‘‘walk-

ing’’ and ‘‘talking’’ may reflect greater self-insight on the

part of some respondents; individuals who were more

mature, motivationally self-congruent, and whose lives felt

more meaningful, evidenced greater consistency between

talking and walking. Such individuals may be more

attentive both to the desires they have and the behaviors

they enact, and thus may be better able to align their

behaviors with their desires.

Our third hypothesis addressed the question: ‘‘which

measure of RIEVO—the conventional one based on talking,

or the new one based on walking—would best predict well-

being?’’ Here, the results were clear: The ‘‘walking’’ mea-

sure consistently subsumed the effects of the ‘‘talking’’

measure, indicating that the walking measure is the more

reliable or robust predictor of well-being. However, a dif-

ferent interpretation of these findings is that behavior simply

carries the effects of aspirations to outcomes; from this

perspective, ‘‘walking’’ may simply explain the effects of

‘‘talking,’’ just as we would expect from a control-theory or

self-regulatory perspective (Carver and Scheier 1981, 1998;

Baumeister and Vohs 2012), in which future goals prompt

present action in service of those goals. We recommend that

researchers collect both value-importance data and value-

action data if they can, but if they are primarily interested in

predicting well-being with one measurement approach, they

may prefer the ‘‘walking’’ version. Apparently, happiness is

more strongly associated with doing the ‘‘right’’ things than

just saying the right things are important.

A final, unpredicted finding, but one which emerged in

both Study 1 and Study 2, was that RIEVO ‘‘talking’’ and

‘‘walking’’ interacted with each other to predict some forms

of well-being. Specifically, when a participant both strongly

endorsed intrinsic versus extrinsic values, and strongly acted

upon intrinsic versus extrinsic values, that participant evi-

denced the highest level of positive affect and lowest level

of depression. In fact, as illustrated in Figs. 1 and 4, this

‘‘consistently intrinsic’’ cell stood out from the other three

cells. One interpretation of this finding is that special ben-

efits accrue to those who both espouse intrinsic values, and

actually follow through with them. These participants are

both ‘‘congruent’’ (in espousing organismically beneficial

values) and ‘‘coherent’’ (in having a top-down action system

that is regulated by those values; Sheldon and Kasser 1995).

The findings also show, in a new way, that value/behavior

consistency is beneficial to mental health, or at least,

symptomatic of an integrated state of functioning which is

related to mental health (Sheldon 2004).

These studies have a number of limitations, including

reliance on Western samples and self-report methodolo-

gies, the absence of longitudinal data concerning the

effects of walking and talking values upon well-being

(Niemiec et al. 2009), and the relatively weak effects of

values upon well-being (bs \ .10), which may be due to the shortened six-item values measures used. Future studies

could rectify these limitations. Furthermore, future studies

could more carefully examine the specific behaviors asso-

ciated with various values. For example, Bardi and Sch-

wartz (2003), working with the Schwartz (1992)

circumplex model of values, developed a separate measure

of concrete value-relevant behaviors use, and found lower

general correspondence between ‘‘talking’’ and ‘‘walking’’

than was found in the current studies. This is likely because

our walk and talk items were identical, except for the

substitution of ‘‘what do you actually work on?’’ for ‘‘what

do you think is important?’’ Bardi and Schwartz (2003)

also found greater convergence between walking and

talking for some values than for others. They suggested that

the degree of convergence was sometimes obscured by

stronger social norms for some value-relevant behaviors

compared other value-relevant behaviors. These normative

issues need to be addressed from the perspective of SDT’s

goal-contents mini-theory as well.

In conclusion, we hope that readers agree that despite

the considerable overlap between peoples’ estimations of

how much they ‘‘walk’’ versus ‘‘talk’’ healthy values, there

can be important variations in this overlap, which are

meaningful both within-subjects and between-subjects. We

have argued that such data can inform researchers regard-

ing the meaning of integrated personality functioning, and

also, what it means to function with personal integrity.

References

Aronson, E. (1999). Dissonance, hypocrisy, and the self-concept. In

E. Harmon-Jones & J. Mills (Eds.), Cognitive dissonance:

Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology (pp. 103–126).

Washington, DC: APA.

Bardi, A., & Schwartz, S. H. (2003). Values and behavior: Strength

and structure of relations. Personality and Social Psychology

Bulletin, 10, 1207–1220.

Baumeister, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (2012). Self-regulation and the

executive function of the self. In M. Leary & J. Tangney (Eds.),

Handbook of self and identity (2nd ed., pp. 180–197). New York:

Guilford.

Brunstein, J. (1993). Personal goals and subjective well-being: A

longitudinal study. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-

ogy, 65, 1061–1070.

Carver, C., & Scheier, M. (1981). Attention and self-regulation: A

control theory approach to human behavior. New York:

Springer.

Motiv Emot (2014) 38:609–619 617

123

Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1990). Origins and functions of

positive and negative affect: A control-process view. Psycho-

logical Review, 97, 19–35.

Carver, C., & Scheier, M. (1998). On the self-regulation of behavior.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Costa, P. T., Jr., McCrae, R. R., Martin, T. A., Oryol, V. E., Senin, I.

G., Rukavishnikov, A. A., et al. (2000). Personality development

from adolescence through adulthood: Further cross-cultural

comparisons of age differences. In V. Molfese & D. Molfese

(Eds.), Temperament and personality development across the life

span (pp. 235–252). Mahwah, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates.

Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-

determination in human behavior. New York: Plenum.

Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1987). The support of autonomy and the

control of behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-

ogy, 53, 1024–1037.

Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The ‘‘what’’ and ‘‘why’’ of goal

pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior.

Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227–268.

Derogatis, L., & Melisaratos, N. (1983). The Brief Symptom

Inventory: An introductory report. Psychological Medicine, 13,

595–605.

Frey, Bruno. S. (2008). Happiness: A revolution in economics.

Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Grouzet, F., Kasser, T., Ahuvia, A., Dols, J., Kim, Y., Lau, S., et al.

(2005). The structure of goal contents across 15 cultures. Journal

of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 800–816.

Gunnell, K. E., Crocker, P. E., Mack, D. E., Wilson, P. M., & Zumbo,

B. D. (2014). Goal contents, motivation, psychological need

satisfaction, well-being and physical activity: A test of self-

determination theory over 6 months. Psychology of Sport and

Exercise, 15(1), 19–29.

Kasser, T. (2002). The high price of materialism. Cambridge, MA:

MIT Press.

Kasser, T., & Ryan, R. M. (1993). A dark side of the American

dream: Correlates of financial success as a central life aspiration.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 410–422.

Kasser, T., & Ryan, R. M. (1996). Further examining the American

dream: Differential correlates of intrinsic and extrinsic goals.

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 280–287.

Kasser, T., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). Be careful what you wish for:

Optimal functioning and the relative attainment of intrinsic and

extrinsic goals. In P. Schmuck & K. M. Sheldon (Eds.), Life

goals and well-being: Towards a positive psychology of human

striving (pp. 116–131). Seattle, WA: Hogrefe & Huber.

Kasser, T., Ryan, R. M., Couchman, C., & Sheldon, K. M. (2004).

Materialistic values: Their causes and consequences. In T.

Kasser & A. Kanner (Eds.), Psychology and consumer culture:

The struggle for a good life in a materialistic world (pp. 11–28).

Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Niemiec, C. P., Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2009). The path taken:

Consequences of attaining intrinsic and extrinsic aspirations in

post-college life. Journal of Research in Personality, 43,

291–306.

Paulhus, D. L. (1984). Two-component models of socially desirable

responding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,

46(3), 598–609.

Roberts, B., Donnelan, B., & Hill, P. L. (2013). Personality trait

development in adulthood. In H. Tennen, J. Suls, & E. B. Weiner

(Eds.), Handbook of psychology, Vol. 5: Personality and social

psychology (2nd ed., pp. 183–196). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values. New York: Free

Press.

Ryan, R. M., & Connell, J. P. (1989). Perceived locus of causality and

internalization: Examining reasons for acting in two domains.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 749–761.

Schultheiss, O. C. (2008). Implicit motives. In O. P. John, R.

W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), Handbook of personality:

Theory and research (3rd ed., pp. 603–633). New York:

Guilford.

Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the context and structure of

values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20

countries. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental

social psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 1–65). Orlando, FL: Academic

Press.

Sebire, S. J., Standage, M., & Vansteenkiste, M. (2009). Examining

intrinsic versus extrinsic exercise goals: Cognitive, affective, and

behavioral outcomes. Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology,

31, 189–210.

Sheldon, K. M. (2004). Optimal human being: An integrated multi-

level perspective. New Jersey: Erlbaum.

Sheldon, K. M. (2009). Goal-striving across the life-span: Do people

learn to select more self-concordant goals as they age? In M.

C. Smith & T. G. Reio (Eds.), The handbook of research on adult

development and learning (pp. 553–569). New York: Routledge.

Sheldon, K. M., Arndt, J., & Houser-Marko, L. (2003). In search of

the organismic valuing process: The human tendency to move

towards beneficial goal choices. Journal of Personality, 71,

835–869.

Sheldon, K. M., Cummins, R., & Khamble, S. (2010a). Life-balance

and well-being: Testing a two-pronged conceptual and measure-

ment approach. Journal of Personality, 78, 1093–1134.

Sheldon, K. M., & Elliot, A. J. (1999). Goal striving, need-

satisfaction, and longitudinal well-being: The self-concordance

model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76,

482–497.

Sheldon, K. M., Gunz, A., Nichols, C., & Ferguson, Y. (2010b).

Extrinsic value orientation and affective forecasting: Over-

estimating the rewards, under-estimating the costs. Journal of

Personality, 78, 149–178.

Sheldon, K. M., & Kasser, T. (1995). Coherence and congruence:

Two aspects of personality integration. Journal of Personality

and Social Psychology, 68, 531–543.

Sheldon, K. M., & Kasser, T. (1998). Pursuing personal goals: Skills

enable progress, but not all progress is beneficial. Personality

and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 1319–1331.

Sheldon, K. M., & Kasser, T. (2001). Getting older, getting better?

Personal strivings and personality development across the life-

course. Developmental Psychology, 37, 491–501.

Sheldon, K. M., & Kasser, T. (2008). Psychological threat and goal

striving. Motivation and Emotion, 32, 37–45.

Sheldon, K. M., Nichols, C. P., & Kasser, T. (2011). Americans

recommend smaller ecological footprints when reminded of

traditional American values. Ecopsychology, 3, 97–104.

Steger, M. F., Frazier, P., Oishi, S., & Kaler, M. (2006). The Meaning

in Life Questionnaire: Assessing the presence of and search for

meaning in life. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 53, 80–93.

Thøgersen-Ntoumani, C., Ntoumanis, N., & Nikitaras, N. (2010).

Unhealthy weight control behaviours in adolescent girls: A

process model based on self-determination theory. Psychology &

Health, 25(5), 535–550.

Van Hiel, A., & Vansteenkiste, M. (2009). Ambitions fulfilled? The

effects of intrinsic and extrinsic goal attainment on older adults’

ego-integrity and death attitudes. The International Journal of

Aging & Human Development, 68(1), 27–51.

Vansteenkiste, M., Neyrinck, B., Niemiec, C. P., Soenens, B., De

Witte, H., & Van den Broeck, A. (2007). On the relations among

work value orientations, psychological need satisfaction and job

outcomes: A self-determination theory approach. Journal Of

Occupational And Organizational Psychology, 80(2), 251–277.

Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and

validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: The

618 Motiv Emot (2014) 38:609–619

123

PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,

54, 1063–1070.

Watson, D., Clark, L. A., Weber, K., Assenheimer, J. S., Strauss, M.

E., & McCormick, R. A. (1995). Testing a tripartite model: II.

Exploring the symptom structure of anxiety and depression in

student, adult, and patient samples. Journal of Abnormal

Psychology, 104, 15–25.

Motiv Emot (2014) 38:609–619 619

123

Copyright of Motivation & Emotion is the property of Springer Science & Business Media B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.