Early childhood developement

What is Special Education? 1

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Pre-Test

1. 1. You can use the terms disability and handicap interchangeably. T/F 2. 2. The history of special education began in Europe. T/F 3. 3. The first American legislation that protected students with disabilities was passed in the 1950s.

T/F 4. 4. All students with disabilities should be educated in special education classrooms. T/F 5. 5. Special education law is constantly reinterpreted. T/F

6. Answers can be found at the end of the chapter.

6 Theory of Mind

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Learning Objectives By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:

• Analyze how differences in assessment measurements can lead to different conclusions about whether young children are egocentric.

• Describe the competencies that indicate infants possess an implicit theory of mind.

• Explain why explicit false-belief understanding marks a significant development in comprehending different perspectives.

• Describe the relationship between theory of mind and autism.

• Evaluate how language and the executive functions contribute to theory of mind development.

• Connect second-order theory of mind development to grade school children’s social behavior.

• Outline how perspective taking remains a challenge for children even after they achieve false-belief mastery.

Introduction

Pretest Questions

1. Because mental states are invisible and abstract, young children do not talk or think much about thoughts and feelings before their fifth birthday. T/F

2. Even before infants and toddlers can talk about wants and desires, they can pick up information about mental states from others’ behavior. T/F

3. Three-year-old Billy opens a candy box and is surprised to discover pencils inside. After seeing the pencils, he does not seem to remember originally believing candy was in the box. This is typical for a 3-year-old. T/F

4. The rate at which children develop an understanding of mental states is essentially the same for all children between ages 2 and 5. T/F

5. Evidence conclusively indicates that bullies are deficient in their ability to identify others’ thoughts and feelings. T/F

6. Four-year-olds can readily detect sarcasm. T/F

As her students eat their snacks, Ms. Morgan walks around the preschool classroom. She opens a drawer, peers inside, closes the drawer, and then opens another one. After closing the second drawer, Morgan frowns, pauses, and briefly closes her eyes. After a few moments, she moves quickly to another side of the room, opens another drawer, and pulls out a crayon box. Opening the box, she finds it is empty. She frowns again and pauses. One of her 2-year-old preschoolers, Jayden, immediately moves to the opposite side of the room and hands her crayon to the teacher. Morgan smiles as the child returns to her seat.

Jayden was able to recognize Morgan’s needs and anticipate how she would feel if she was unable to find the crayon. It is likely that Jayden’s ability to understand another’s feelings—a concept referred to as theory of mind—will give her insight into others’ needs while she develops her social relationships. The period between infancy and age 5 is a time of rapid development in understanding mental states and experiences. Jayden’s helpfulness indicated that she might have a better grasp on other people’s perspectives, motives, and beliefs than the other preschool- ers. Her greater insight prompted her socially helpful behavior.

Questions to Think About

1. If a child has a delayed understanding of self and others, what are some ways he or she might be misunderstood by peers?

2. In turn, how might poor peer relationships limit or influence the child’s understand- ing of others’ thoughts and feelings over time?

3. What specific strategies could Ms. Morgan use to help facilitate children’s under- standing about what and how others feel and think? For instance, how might reading stories to the children facilitate their ability to understand the thoughts and feelings of others?

Introduction One of the fundamental challenges of cognitive development is learning to meaningfully interpret human action. Mental concepts such as wanting and thinking are useful—in fact, necessary—for instilling meaning into the everyday actions we witness. Consider how mental

Section 6.1Understanding Mental Experiences as Internal and Subjective

concepts underlie our understanding of the teacher’s behavior in the case study. Why is Ms. Morgan opening drawers? Because she believes crayons are in each drawer. Why is she frown- ing? Because she wants to find crayons, and that desire has not been satisfied. When the teacher retrieves the crayon box, she is satisfied, but her satisfaction is short-lived because she falsely believed the box contained crayons.

Thus, understanding how mental entities like thoughts and desires impact behavior is a foun- dation of cognitive development. Imagine failing to recognize when someone needs something or not anticipating how actions and words will make someone feel. It would certainly be dif- ficult to make friends and form relationships. Quality social interactions depend on the ability to understand and identify thoughts and feelings. Deficits in social understanding can impact school readiness (Blair & Razza, 2007), contribute to peer rejection (Banerjee, Watling, & Caputi, 2011), and are, in severe cases, linked to developmental pathologies (Korkmaz, 2011).

Core Themes and Theory of Mind The performance–competence theme of this text is relevant in this chapter. We will see exam- ples of measurements that are sensitive to detecting competencies of infants and young chil- dren. Recall from Chapter 1 that this theme has practical implications. Educators and other professionals require assessments that are developmentally appropriate when evaluating a child’s capabilities and limitations. We will encounter a variety of examples in this chapter in which researchers creatively attempt to develop assessments that are stringent but still child friendly.

The nature–nurture theme is also evident as we discuss evidence and theories that address whether mental-state reasoning is innate and how features in a child’s environment can facil- itate understanding of the mind.

We also address domain-specific and domain-general approaches that attempt to explain how children come to understand mental entities.

Finally, the continuity–discontinuity theme is particularly highlighted as we examine whether the ability to set aside one’s own perspective and appreciate that others have different thoughts and desires is a stage-like acquisition.

6.1 �Understanding�Mental�Experiences�as�Internal� and Subjective

Teresa looks across the playground and sees Alex pointing to someone. Consider the cognitive challenges posed by trying to interpret Alex’s pointing behavior. First, Teresa must infer that Alex is pointing for a reason. That is, Alex has thoughts and intentions he is trying to convey. These thoughts and intentions are subjective (they originate within Alex), which means Teresa does not immediately know them. She has to infer what Alex is thinking. Alex’s thoughts and intentions are internal and not literally visible—Teresa cannot see Alex’s thoughts the way she can see his shirt and shoes. In essence, because mental experiences are internal and sub- jective, children’s cognitive challenge is to infer them from the available evidence.

Section 6.1Understanding Mental Experiences as Internal and Subjective

Piaget’s theory was the first in modern developmental psychology to draw attention to the cognitive challenge of understanding mental concepts—concepts that are internal and sub- jective. In this section, we describe Piaget’s theory that young children have a relatively poor understanding of the mind. We then address follow-up research to investigate that claim.

Piaget’s Theory Piaget theorized that children in the preoperational stage of cognitive development (approxi- mately ages 2 to 6 or 7) are generally incapable of appreciating viewpoints different from their own. As introduced in Chapter 1, egocentrism is the assumption that one’s own percep- tion and understanding of the world are shared by others (Piaget, 1929).

If you have ever attempted to talk to a preschooler over the phone, you have probably expe- rienced egocentrism. The child’s ambiguity appears to reflect an assumption that you are already familiar with his or her viewpoint and experiences. Piaget’s claim that young children are egocentric was not intended to imply they are selfish. Instead, egocentrism means chil- dren genuinely assume their perspective is also held by others.

According to Piaget, a consequence of children’s egocentrism is an inability to distinguish between subjective and objective perspectives (Piaget, 1929). The child’s own (subjective) perspective is assumed to be a universally shared (objective) perspective. Realism is the term he used to describe this confusion of subjective and objective perspectives. Children’s realism, according to Piaget, leads them to blur the boundaries between personal experiences, such as having thoughts and feelings, and objective realities that are external and observable. Realism would profoundly limit young children’s ability to sort out what is imaginary and what is real.

If Piaget’s hypothesis is correct, then children would suppose that mental experiences such as “thinking” and “dreaming” have external and visible qualities. Based on his interviews with young children, Piaget theorized that preoperational children do, in fact, assume that internal experiences are material substances that are visible to others:

Barb (5½): Are dreams true ? — No, they are pictures (images) we see (!) — Where do they come from? — From God. — Are your eyes open or shut when you dream? — Shut. — Could I see your dream? — No, you would be too far away. — And your mother? — Yes, but she lights the light. — Is the dream in the room or inside you? — It isn’t in me or I shouldn’t see it (!). (Piaget, 1929, p. 94)

Note that the 5-year-old states dreams are pictures (physical objects) that can be viewed if one is close enough to see the dreams (as is the mother in this case).

Piaget’s interviews relied on children’s ability to verbally articulate responses to questions that were likely unfamiliar to them (such as, “Are dreams true?”). His methods remind us of the performance–competence theme. Although interviews can be a rich source of informa- tion, they can also underestimate children’s knowledge. Are children suggesting dreams are visible pictures because they are prone to realism or because they have limited vocabulary and conversational skills? In other words, the performance demands associated with articu- lating answers to interview questions could mask children’s underlying competence. Subse- quent research addresses this possibility by administering child-friendly tasks that involve familiar situations and minimal verbal demands.

Section 6.1Understanding Mental Experiences as Internal and Subjective

After�Piaget:�Egocentrism� Piaget identified egocentrism as a central challenge for children. Research in subsequent decades questioned whether egocentrism was a stage-like limitation for children ages 2 to 6. Follow-up research minimized performance demands and scrutinized whether young chil- dren could appreciate the existence of viewpoints different from their own. In this section and the following one, we discuss the impact of task simplification on our understanding of whether young children are in a stage that profoundly limits their ability to think about sub- jective, different perspectives.

Task�simplification involves (a) using materials and questions that are familiar to children, (b) minimizing the need for children to verbally articulate and explain their answers, and (c) removing extraneous performance demands. An extraneous demand is one that unneces- sarily complicates a task.

Ways to reduce performance demands when measuring infant competency were discussed in Chapter 2, and similar techniques apply with older children. For instance, consider the motor and attention demands of learning to write in cursive. If beginners are instructed to take a spelling test by writing the words in cursive, the difficulty they have writing in cur- sive is an extraneous demand that distracts them from the principal concern of spelling. The performance demands of writing in cursive may mask the child’s underlying competence for spelling.

If the researcher’s goal is to examine whether children pos- sess any ability to adopt someone else’s perspective, a task is unnecessarily complicated if the differences in perspec- tive are subtle. One straightforward, unsubtle distinction is that between seeing and not seeing. Many children play hide-and-seek games in which they may begin to appreci- ate that something can be seen by one person but not by another. Level�1�perspective�taking is recognizing when something visible to one person is not visible to a second person (Flavell, 1974). This is evident well before age 6.

For instance, when a card with a picture of a cat on one side and a dog on the other is held up, 3-year-olds correctly indi- cate that the picture they see differs from the picture some- one else sitting across the table sees (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981). Even 2-year-olds appear to possess level 1 perspective taking by recognizing that something visible to them can be hidden from another observer (Moll & Toma- sello, 2006).

Level�2�perspective�taking occurs when a child realizes two people may see the same thing but differ in how they see it (Flavell, 1974). The lowercase letter b, for instance, looks like the lowercase letter q when viewed upside down. Although children typically exhibit level 2 perspective tak- ing around age 4 (Flavell et al., 1981), 3-year-olds may also possess the capacity for this level of perspective taking (Moll & Meltzoff, 2011).

Paul Vasarhelyi/iStock/Thinkstock An�example�of�level�1� perspective�taking�is�playing� hide-and-seek.�The�people� hiding understand that the seeker cannot see them, but they can see the seeker. Preschoolers�understand� the�concept�that�two�people� can�have�opposite�visual� perspectives.

Section 6.1Understanding Mental Experiences as Internal and Subjective

Overall, perspective taking appears much earlier than Piaget’s theory predicts. For Piaget, overcoming egocentrism was a stage-like domain-general change. During the preoperational period, egocentrism limits children’s ability to take another’s perspective across a broad array of situations. However, as we have just seen, children are capable of overcoming egocentric biases under child-friendly testing situations even though they are within the age range of preoperational thought (ages 2 to 6 or 7).

Although young children can respond nonegocentrically, they do not completely outgrow all traces of egocentric thinking until much later. Indeed, as we will see later in this chapter, a tendency toward egocentrism persists in childhood and even into adulthood. Susceptibility toward egocentrism—in which one’s own knowledge impairs reasoning about different per- spectives—is a continuous feature of cognition (Birch & Bloom, 2007).

Real-World�Application:�Parents and Teachers Promote Perspective Taking http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-parents-we-mean-be/201007/ how-do-we-help-children-take-other-perspectives-conversation-elle

This article from a popular psychology website offers suggestions for how adults can help children develop perspective-taking skills at different ages. What are some perspective-taking challenges a child might face when interacting with teachers and peers upon entering pre- school or kindergarten?

After�Piaget:�Realism Recall that Piaget theorized that young children are realists who confuse internal and exter- nal states. Rather than relying on interviews, subsequent researchers presented simple sto- ries to children and posed forced-choice questions (that is, yes–no questions). In one study, preschoolers were presented with contrasting situations that involved either a real object or a thought-about object (Wellman & Estes, 1986). For instance, in one situation a story char- acter was “thinking about a kitty” and in another story the character was playing with a kitty her father had brought home. Children were asked questions such as “Can [the character] see the kitty with her eyes?” and “Can [the character] touch the kitty with her hands?” (Wellman & Estes, 1986, pp. 914–915).

Children as young as 3 consistently answered that physical entities could be seen and touched but mental ones could not. Similarly, preschoolers correctly judge that make-believe story characters are not real and cannot be literally seen or touched (Skolnick & Bloom, 2006). They understand, for instance, that objects they imagine (such as a purple frog) are not really visible (Woolley & Wellman, 1993).

Section 6.1Understanding Mental Experiences as Internal and Subjective

Young children’s ability to distinguish between external and mental phenomena is also evident in naturalistic observations of their use of internal-state�terms (see Table 6.1). Internal-state terms express mental states and experiences like desire (want) and belief (think, know). Naturalistic observations involve recording behaviors as they occur in familiar, everyday settings. This research method takes advantage of children’s high comfort level as they interact with family and friends in a familiar setting. Children’s knowledge may be more readily expressed in natural settings than when they are in less familiar, experimental ones (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995).

Two general observations can be made about children’s everyday use of internal-state terms (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). First, as we just noted, very young children talk about desires and beliefs in a manner that differentiates a mental state from external circumstances. That is, many of the utterances in Table 6.1 illustrate instances in which children are contrasting a mental state (“I don’t want it to leave”) with an external situation (“Momma why it leave?”). Second, young children generally begin talking about desires earlier than beliefs. We will see in the following sections that this lag is consistent with laboratory findings indicating that children explicitly reason about desires earlier than beliefs.

Table�6.1:�Examples�of�young�children’s�use�of�internal-state�terms

Child Age Internal-state�terms�expressing�desire

Adam 2 years 7 months “I don’t want it to leave. Momma why it leave?”

Ross 3 years 0 months “My cookie monster wants my mommy to make some cookies for him.”

Sarah 3 years 10 months “Turtle. Turtle. I want a turtle but I can’t have one.”

Child Age Internal-state�terms�expressing�belief

Mark 3 years 8 months “I think he’s gonna come back on Monday.”

Abe 3 years 9 months “I thought there wasn’t any socks but when I looked I saw them.”

Adam 3 years 11 months “It doesn’t talk. Does he think it talks?”

Source: Bartsch & Wellman, 1995.

Questions to Consider

1. In what everyday events and situations do you think a 4-year-old would be more likely to display egocentrism? In what situations might he or she be less likely to display egocentrism?

2. What are some ways that playing with peers might help a 4-year-old appreciate different perspectives?

Section 6.2Implicit Theory of Mind

6.2 Implicit�Theory�of�Mind As illustrated in the case study at the beginning of the chapter, understanding mental states and experiences is a foundation of social relationships. Understanding the mind also under- lies self-understanding. Whenever we reflect on our intentions, desires, and thoughts, we are engaging in cognitive activity that illuminates our motives, priorities, beliefs, and so forth.

The development of a theory of mind is the capacity to attribute mental concepts like beliefs and desires to oneself and others and to predict and explain your own and others’ behavior (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Wellman, 1990). As we will see, it can be implicit or explicit. This means there is a distinction between either using or knowingly using mental experiences as a basis for understanding self and other. The distinction, as we will see, is relevant for charting the developmental sequence of children’s theory of mind.

When we consider the nature–nurture theme in the context of a theory of mind, we ask whether the ability to infer what someone wants or thinks is innate or acquired gradually through teaching and experience. Because infants cannot yet talk, any knowledge they might have about others’ thoughts and desires must be conveyed nonverbally.

Nonverbal, or implicit, knowledge is held without conscious awareness (Broaders, Cook, Mitchell, & Goldin-Meadow, 2007). It can occur at all ages. For instance, a child might practice a piece of music without being aware of how much she actually learned by the end of the les- son. However, the next day when the child plays the music again, improvement is clear. The improvement indicates the child acquired knowledge during the previous lesson even though she was not explicitly conscious of it at the time. The knowledge acquired during the lesson was implicit.

Some theorists hypothesize that infants possess implicit knowledge about the mind (Baillar- geon et al., 2013). An implicit�theory�of�mind�is an innate, automatic cognitive system that uses mental concepts to interpret behavior (Low & Perner, 2012). It is nonverbal, which means it operates even though the infant is not explicitly using language to refer to mental states.

Recall that core knowledge theory hypothesizes that innate knowledge of principles is used to interpret the physical world. Consistent with core knowledge theory, infants are also believed to possess an innate ability to meaningfully interpret the social world (Martin & Santos, 2014). They do so by accounting for others’ mental states. In this view, infants implic- itly interpret actions as (a) goal-directed and (b) guided by the actor’s beliefs (Baillargeon et al., 2013; Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004). Doing so helps organize and give meaning to the vast array of actions that infants witness. In the next section, we discuss how an implicit theory of mind meaningfully underlies how action is interpreted.

Implicit�Theory�of�Mind�and�Goal�Perception Evidence indicates that when infants observe behavior, they are taking into account peo- ple’s goals and thoughts. Consider, for instance, the different ways to interpret the habitua- tion event in Figure 6.1. Rather than simply perceiving an arm moving toward an object, an implicit theory of mind leads to interpreting the movement as goal directed; that is, that the movement was intentional.

Section 6.2Implicit Theory of Mind

Figure�6.1:�Goal�perception�in�infants

Six-month-olds evidently understand others’ behavior as goal directed because they noticed when the goal changed in the test events.

Source: Adapted from Woodward, A. L. (1998). Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor’s reach. Cognition, 69(1), 1–34.

Consistent with holding an implicit theory of mind, 6-month-old infants were attentive to the goal in the habituation event (Woodward, 1998). This is evident because infants noticed the change in the actor’s goal when they viewed the Test Event. In comparison, infants did not show the same interest in a Test Event when only the arm movement (but not the goal) had changed. Subsequent research is generally consistent with this finding and indicates that even 3-month-olds may implicitly interpret action as goal-directed (Bíro & Leslie, 2007; Luo, 2011; Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005; Woodward, Sommerville, & Gua- jardo, 2001).

Interpreting Goals and Helping Behavior Imagine someone stretching his or her arm toward a book that is just out of reach on a library shelf. Another person then comes along and reaches the book. Does the person who reached the book turn around and walk away or instead hand the book to the individual who was trying to grasp it? The difference matters because it impacts our interpretation of whether the person was being helpful. Note that we determine someone’s helpfulness by taking into account goals; in this example, we recognize the goal of the person trying to reach the book. A “helper,” then, is one who detects another’s goal and works to help that person attain it.

Before their first birthday, infants appear to notice when someone is helping another attain a goal. For instance, in one study, 10-month-old infants watched a puppet (P) repeatedly reach for and grasp one of two toys (Hamlin, Ullman, Tenenbaum, Goodman, & Baker, 2013). Later, a door closed and prevented P from obtaining the preferred toy. Next, only one of two onlooker puppets lifted the door to help P obtain its goal.

Slightly later, both of the onlooker puppets were placed within infants’ reach. The infants were encouraged to choose one to play with. They chose the “helper” puppet significantly

Section 6.2Implicit Theory of Mind

more often than the “nonhelper.” This finding has been replicated with infants as young as 4½ months old in other experimental conditions (Hamlin, 2013). Their preference indicates they distinguished the helper from the nonhelper (recall the preference method used in infant research, Chapter 2).

Spotlight�on�Research:�Nonverbal Presentations of Helpers and Hinderers http://cic.psych.ubc.ca/Current_Directions_Media.html

As you watch these videos, notice how the perception of an actor’s goal is necessary to distin- guish between the actions of the helper and hinderer. Can you think of other ways to nonver- bally depict helping that would capture infants’ attention? Why do you think the researchers use puppets and geometric figures rather than real actors in the videos?

With development, infants and toddlers progress from recognizing helpfulness to becom- ing helpful themselves. In one study, infants watched as an adult grasped for an out-of-reach marker or tried to find an object located in a box (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). When wit- nessing an adult’s failed attempts at such goals, 18-month-old infants often helped the adult (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). For instance, 18-month-olds retrieved and handed the out- of-reach marker to the adult.

Evidence that infants are cooperative and help others is far removed from our earlier discus- sion of Piaget’s theory. Recall that Piaget theorized that young children in the preoperational stage (ages 2 to about 6) were largely incapable of taking different perspectives. In contrast, more recent evidence indicates that infants are sensitive observers of others and can detect what someone else wants. Indeed, infants and toddlers can be helpful even when someone else’s desire is very different from their own.

To illustrate, an experimenter expressed disgust when tasting crackers and delight when sampling broccoli. The experimenter then placed her hand between the foods and asked the infant, “Can you give me some?” Nearly 75% of the 18-month-olds correctly handed the experi- menter the broccoli (doing so, perhaps, with some bewil- derment). Earlier, pretesting had confirmed that, as expected, infants preferred the crackers. Thus, by hand- ing over the broccoli, 18-month-olds appeared to appreci- ate that someone could want something the infants found undesirable. Fourteen-month-olds, in contrast, tended to offer the crackers despite the experimenter’s outward preference for broccoli (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997).

Implicit�Theory�of�Mind�and�False�Belief The previous section indicates that infants can acknowledge a perspective different from their own. Examples focused on infants’ detection of what someone wants or is trying to do.

Questions to Consider

1. How might the back-and-forth exchange of nonverbal expressions between an infant and a caregiver form a foundation for the development of later social skills in childhood?

2. What does your answer say about whether development is continuous or discontinuous?

Section 6.2Implicit Theory of Mind

Researchers have also investigated whether infants implicitly recognize that someone can believe something that is different from what the infant believes. For instance, imagine that an infant sees Dad place an apple in the cupboard, and then sees Mom place the apple in a refrigerator while Dad is away. The infant’s perspective (apple is in the refrigerator) differs from Dad’s perspective (apple is in the cupboard). At issue is whether infants display some sort of recognition of the false belief that Dad holds—a belief opposite of the infant’s belief.

Researchers have used looking behavior to assess whether infants are surprised when some- one with a false belief unexpectedly behaves in ways consistent with a true belief (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). To illustrate, 15-month-old infants were seated in front of a stage where an actor saw a ball in one of two boxes (Träuble, Marinović, & Pauen, 2010). The actor turned away from the stage, and the ball was then moved (see Figure 6.2). Infants were surprised when the actor searched for the ball in its new location.

The search is surprising because the actor last saw the ball in the old location. Infants appar- ently attributed a false belief to the actor based on where the actor last saw the ball. Conse- quently, they were surprised when his behavior was instead consistent with holding a true belief (see Ruffman, 2014, for a different interpretation of these findings). Their surprise indi- cates that they recognize that someone can hold a belief different from their own.

Figure�6.2:�Nonverbal�false-belief�task

An actor with his back turned does not witness a change in location. Infants are more surprised when the actor reaches for the object in its actual location (left) than in the location consistent with his false belief (right).

Source: Adapted from Träuble, B., Marinović, V., & Pauen, S. (2010). Early theory of mind competencies: Do infants understand others’ beliefs? Infancy, 15(4), 434–444.

Section 6.2Implicit Theory of Mind

Earlier we discussed how infants can cooperate and help a person attain a desired goal. We also see evidence of helpfulness when infants and toddlers witness someone who holds a false belief. Children aged 18 to 24 months helpfully corrected someone about to look in the wrong location for an object. That is, when an adult held a mistaken belief about an object’s location, infants and toddlers helpfully pointed to the correct location in anticipation of the adult’s mistaken search (Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2012).

Implicit�Theory�of�Mind�and�Early�Warning�Signs�of�Autism The rich social understanding infants evidently possess is impressive. For instance, their sur- prise at viewing unexpected action indicates they can anticipate what someone will do. Fur- thermore, these expectancies are based on paying close attention to where others are looking. In the false-belief task, infants expect an actor to retrieve an object in a location where the actor last saw it—this tells us that infants appreciate, to some extent, the significance of eye direction and gaze.

In fact, by 10 to 11 months, infants will follow the gaze of someone whose eyes are open when that person turns to look at something. In contrast, when the person’s eyes are closed, infants do not follow the head turn (Meltzoff & Brooks, 2007). Infants are demonstrating a beginning understanding that where someone is looking is interesting—the infant wants to see what someone else is seeing (Meltzoff & Brooks, 2007). They are, in this sense, just like adults. After all, when we see someone pointing or staring intently at something, our curiosity compels us to take a look for ourselves.

In some instances infants show declines in the social behaviors associated with an implicit theory of mind. These declines may be an early sign of autism. Recall from Chapter 5 that autism is a developmental disorder characterized by deficits in social communicative behav- iors. Diagnoses generally occur at age 2 or later when a child shows limited interest and/or ability to communicate (Elsabbagh & Johnson, 2010). Precursors of the disorder, however, can be evident much earlier for some children.

Typically, researchers examine infant siblings of children with ASD for early warning signs of the disorder. These infants are at risk for the disorder because it is influenced by genetic fac- tors; indeed, estimates indicate that about 20% of infant siblings will also be diagnosed with ASD (Elsabbagh & Johnson, 2010). Researchers observe the infant sibling for deviations from the typical social behaviors and theory of mind insights we have just described. In some cases the infant siblings do, in fact, show early warning signs that are precursors to being diagnosed with the disorder.

To illustrate, in one study, when researchers closely observed infant siblings over time, they noticed regressions (declines) in social behaviors for a subset of infants who were subse-

quently diagnosed with ASD (Ozonoff et al., 2010). For instance, gazing at the faces of others or engaging with others through shared eye contact and emotional expression began to regress as early as 6 months. For these infants, declines in social engagement were a warning sign for ASD. As researchers identify warning signs of ASD, screening will become increasingly effec- tive and hopefully provide opportunities for early intervention.

Question to Consider

After reading this section, how do you think infants’ and toddlers’ theory of mind might support their ability to learn from others?

Section 6.3Explicit Theory of Mind

6.3 Explicit�Theory�of�Mind� Concealing information and surprising someone requires understanding how beliefs are formed and manipulated. When young children play a game of Go Fish, they can be careless in revealing the cards they are holding. When they play hide-and-seek, they might crawl under a bed, unconcerned that their legs are protruding outward and obviously visible to an observer. Young children’s behavior suggests indifference, or perhaps unawareness, of how beliefs are formed. That is, young children do not seem to fully appreciate that others will know a secret if information is not concealed. Although infants’ theory of mind abilities are impressive, there still appears to be much young children need to learn about the mind.

As we noted in Section 6.1, children begin talking about mental concepts between their sec- ond and third birthdays. These outward expressions are evidence that their theory of mind is becoming explicit. An explicit�theory�of�mind is a conscious interpretation of behavior that involves outwardly attributing mental concepts like goals, desires, and beliefs to others (Low & Perner, 2012; San Juan & Astington, 2012). Throughout the remainder of the chapter, we are referring to an explicit theory of mind (rather than an implicit one) unless we note otherwise.

An explicit theory of mind is measured by using verbal tasks that require children to reflect on what they or someone else thinks or wants. The list below presents five theory of mind con- cepts that develop between ages 3 and 5. Researchers have found that mastery of concepts occurred in the following sequence for children in the United States (Wellman & Liu, 2004). Although there is some variability among children in the ages at which each step is mastered, some age generalizations are possible (Wellman & Liu, 2004). The first two steps are often mastered by 3-year-olds. The next two, involving knowledge and false belief, are typically passed by 4-year-olds. Finally, 5-year-olds generally demonstrate an understanding of hidden emotions.

The sequence of theory of mind development between ages 2 and 5 includes the following concepts:

1. Diverse desires. Children understand that something undesirable to them can be desirable to someone else and then, accordingly, predict that person’s actions. For example, a child who prefers to play with puzzles rather than sand can nevertheless grasp that someone else finds playing with sand more enjoyable. The child can then predict the other person will go to a sandbox rather than a table with puzzles.

2. Diverse beliefs. A child can understand that two individuals can have different beliefs about something as long as the child does not know which belief is true. For instance, if the child does not know where kitty is hiding, he or she can grasp that one person thinks kitty is in the garage while another believes kitty is in the alley.

3. Knowledge access. Children understand that something they know may not be known by another person. For instance, if a child peeks inside a container and knows what is in it, he or she can judge that someone who has not peeked in the container does not yet know the contents.

4. False beliefs. When a child is aware of a fact, he or she understands that someone else can hold a belief that conflicts with the factual reality.

5. Hidden emotions. Children understand that a person can express an emotion that differs from the emotion that person is actually experiencing. For instance, a person can look happy while actually feeling sad (Wellman, 2014; Wellman & Liu, 2004).

Section 6.3Explicit Theory of Mind

Notice that children explicitly understand and reason about desires before doing so about beliefs. This finding reflects the earlier emergence of expressions of desire (want) in chil- dren’s vocabulary (see again Table 6.1). The developmental sequence in the preceding list also indicates that young children comprehend that people can have different beliefs and dif- fer in knowledge before further comprehending that people can have false beliefs. We will discuss the relatively late emergence of false-belief competence in the next section.

The same sequence occurs in Australian children, but not in children from Iran and China (Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter, & Wellman, 2011; Wellman, Fang, Liu, Zhu, & Liu, 2006). Chinese and Iranian children instead master knowledge access ahead of diverse beliefs. Researchers in one of these studies speculate that Iranian and Chinese children grow up in cultures emphasizing tradition, respect for more knowledgeable elders, and interdependence (Shahaeian et al., 2011). This cultural orientation may deemphasize individual differences in beliefs and opinions (diverse beliefs) while emphasizing acceptance of knowledge from authoritative figures (knowledge access).

Spotlight�on�Research:�Theory of Mind and Detecting Deception Young children are highly reliant on parents, siblings, peers, teachers, and unfamiliar adults as sources of information. Although these various sources are typically trustworthy, occasionally the child may encounter someone who is not. When do children develop the cognitive capacity to identify a deceptive individual?

In an experiment, 3- to 5-year-old children watched as a sticker was hidden in one of two boxes (Vanderbilt, Liu, & Heyman, 2011). In the helper condition, children first watched as an adult pointed to the correct box on two trials to assist another adult looking for the sticker. In contrast, an adult pointed to the wrong box on two occasions in the tricker condition. In both conditions, the pointer smiled when the sticker was found (helper) or not found (tricker). The smile served as a cue to the intent, helpful or deceptive, of the pointing adult.

During subsequent test trials, it was the child’s turn to find a sticker. The question of interest was whether children would exhibit any skepticism when the tricker pointed to one of the two boxes. The answer, for most 3- and 4-year-olds, was no. In fact, 3-year-olds trusted the tricker in more than 90% of the trials, roughly equivalent to the percentage of trials in which they fol- lowed the suggestion of the helper. By age 5, however, children trusted the helper significantly more than the tricker. Selective trust of the helper was correlated to children’s theory of mind knowledge.

How, specifically, might theory of mind be related to understand deception? It may be that a relatively poor understanding of the mind limits the extent to which children can grasp why and how someone would make deceptive statements (Vanderbilt et al., 2011). Fully under- standing deception presumably involves understanding how knowledge forms, that appear- ances can mislead, and how false statements lead to the establishment of false beliefs (Koenig & Harris, 2005; Talwar & Crossman, 2011). Three- and 4-year-olds are, in sum, particularly vulnerable to deception because of their conceptual limitations.

Critical-Thinking�Questions

1. How might 3- and 4-year-olds’ gullibility place them at risk with older siblings and peers?

2. How might a trusting, responsive relationship between a caregiver and child help the child learn about selective trust?

Section 6.3Explicit Theory of Mind

Explicit�False�Belief In this section we look more specifically at the development of children’s understanding of false belief between ages 3 and 5. False-belief understanding is heavily researched because it marks an ability to appreciate how thoughts can differ from the child’s own understanding of reality. Also, as we will see, false-belief understanding is associated with a number of other features of cognitive development.

Three-year-olds’ difficulty in explicitly rea- soning about beliefs is evident in their per- formance on false-belief tasks like the one shown in Figure 6.3. Note that the false- belief task requires children to suppress their own knowledge of where an object is located and adopt someone else’s perspec- tive. In other words, children have to inhibit what they know and instead reflect on a belief that is different from their own (Fizke, Barthel, Peters, & Rakoczy, 2014). As we know from Chapter 3, young children have difficulty inhibiting habitual, practiced ways of responding. Later in the chapter, we will discuss the relationship between executive functions (EFs) and theory of mind develop- ment (Carlson & Moses, 2001).

A comprehensive analysis of numerous false-belief studies from around the world concluded that children younger than age 4 routinely struggle with false-belief tasks like the one described in Figure 6.3 (Well- man, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Generally speaking, 3-year-olds’ false-belief perfor- mance was equally poor whether the test question asked about someone else’s belief or the child’s own belief.

For instance, when a surprising event occurs, such as opening a crayon box to find only paper clips inside, 3-year-olds typi- cally do not recognize they originally held a mistaken belief about the contents of the crayon box (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). When asked, they indicate that they originally believed paper clips were in the crayon box. In this example, we that see 3-year-olds have trouble explicitly attributing a false belief to themselves.

Figure�6.3:�Unexpected�locations�false- belief�task

In this unexpected locations task, children must attribute a false belief to Mario, who is unaware that Maria transferred an object to a new location.

Source: Adapted from Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”? Cognition, 21(1), 37–46.

Section 6.3Explicit Theory of Mind

Many 4-year-olds understand false belief, and by age 5 mastery of explicit false-belief tasks is the norm. Indeed, by age 5 children pass false-belief tasks in a diverse array of nations, includ- ing India, Peru, Korea, China, and Thailand (Callaghan et al., 2005; Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & Sabbagh, 2008; Oh & Lewis, 2008). What 5-year-olds accomplish is remarkable. Humans may be the only primate to understand false beliefs, since other primate species show no evidence of passing nonverbal false-belief tasks (Martin & Santos, 2014; Rosati, Santos, & Hare, 2010; Shettleworth, 2012).

Real-World�Application:�False Belief and Rhyme Rhyming in stories and games (“one, two, buckle my shoe”) is common in homes and in early childhood classrooms. Rhyming draws a child’s attention to the sounds of words and is a pre- cursor to learning to read (Anthony et al., 2002). For this reason, rhyming can be used as an educational tool. It may come as a surprise to learn that false-belief understanding and rhym- ing are related. What do false beliefs and rhymes have in common?

Rhyming involves suppressing the tendency to think about a word’s meaning and instead think about its sound. For instance, the words train and truck go together because they refer to similar objects of transportation. When rhyming, however, truck goes with duck instead of train. In rhyming tasks, children are presented with three words and asked which two sound alike. Four-year-olds who can classify words together based on their rhyming sounds while overlooking the very different meanings of the words are also more likely to pass false-belief tasks (Farrar & Ashwell, 2012).

One explanation is that in both cases a child has to understand how something—a word or a fact—can be thought of in two different ways (Farrar & Ashwell, 2012). One needs to overlook the typical way to think about a word or a belief and instead focus on a second, less familiar consideration. Rhyming involves overlooking a word’s meaning and instead thinking about its sound. Similarly, a false-belief task involves overlooking an object’s real location and instead thinking about someone’s conflicting belief about the location.

Critical-Thinking�Questions

1. Do you think false-belief understanding improves understanding rhyming or vice versa?

2. How could an experiment help you answer this question?

3. How might the answer to this question inf luence the curriculum a teacher designs in a preschool classroom?

Impact of False-Belief Understanding Individual differences in 3- to 5-year-olds’ understanding of false belief are moderately related to measurements of popularity and acceptance by peers (Wellman, 2014). Presumably, this is because false-belief tasks are measures of perspective taking (Harwood & Farrar, 2006). When children are explicitly asked to indicate whether someone has a false belief, they must switch from their own perspective (true belief ) to another perspective. To illustrate perspec- tive taking among 4-year-olds, false-belief understanding is associated with feeling sympathy for others, such as feeling sorry for a peer who is being teased (Eggum et al., 2011).

Section 6.3Explicit Theory of Mind

False-belief understanding around age 4 or 5 also marks an explicit understanding of how exposure to information impacts what one believes. Misleading or incomplete information can lead to false beliefs, whereas complete information can lead to accurate ones. Being aware of the link between information and belief presumably informs children’s understanding of communication. Effective communication accounts for the listener’s belief; that is, the type of information included in a message should account for what the listener thinks and feels (Beal, 1988).

To illustrate, consider the relevance of taking into account a listener’s belief when trying to persuade the listener to do something. If Sarah is reluctant to play a particular game, then knowing why Sarah thinks the game is not fun would inform persuasive attempts to change her mind. Maybe Sarah thinks the game is too difficult to learn. Being aware of that belief would guide persuasive attempts to convince Sarah that the game is relatively easy to master. From age 3 to 7, children increasingly understand that arguments are more persuasive when accounting for the listener’s beliefs (Bartsch, Wade, & Estes, 2011; Wellman, 2014).

Understanding false beliefs also relates to general insight into how minds work. We saw an example of this insight in Chapter 4 when discussing metamemory (knowledge about mem- ory). Children’s metamemory is evident when they articulate things they can do to help them remember information. Children’s false-belief understanding appears to serve as a precursor to their understanding of the way memory works (Lockl & Schneider, 2007).

For instance, giving 4- and 5-year-olds practice and feedback on false-belief tasks improved false-belief understanding and increased their metamemory knowledge compared to a control group (Lecce, Bianco, Demicheli, & Cavallini, 2014). As children learn to think about thinking, we can reasonably expect them to gain a greater understanding of their own cognitive processes, such as how memories, beliefs, and knowledge form (Kuhn, 2000).

False�Belief�and�Information-Processing�Biases As we noted earlier, mastery of the false-belief task is considered a significant milestone in theory of mind development because it demonstrates the ability to understand that some- one’s belief about an event is different from one’s own knowledge of the event (Birch & Bloom, 2007). If children do not understand false beliefs, they lack a fundamental insight into the way beliefs and other mental experiences conflict with their own viewpoint.

However, although children often begin passing explicit false-belief tasks around age 4 or 5, they still experience a tendency to overlook or ignore beliefs that conflict with their own knowledge (Apperly, 2013). For instance, IP biases increase the likelihood that children (and even adults) find it more effortful to accurately detect false beliefs compared to true beliefs.

In IP theory, events are encoded, interpreted during processing, and stored in memory (see Chapter 1). Biases in the way information is processed and interpreted can distort our under- standing of the world. For instance, a positivity�bias is a tendency to selectively attend to

Question to Consider

How might theory of mind in children impact their ability to distinguish between an advertisement (an act of persuasion) and other forms of communication (such as news presentations)?

Section 6.3Explicit Theory of Mind

information that leads to a favorable evaluation of the self and others (Boseovski, 2010). The bias is associated with children’s tendency to misremember their previous mental states.

To illustrate, imagine a child intends to share her carrot sticks at lunch. The intent to share will go unfulfilled if carrot sticks are not packed in her lunchbox. Perhaps a parent instead packed cupcakes. Now imagine the child’s friend prefers cupcakes over carrot sticks. Pre- schoolers generally say that such accidental but happy outcomes were intended all along (Liao, Li, & Deák, 2011; Sato & Wakebe, 2014). When positive, unintended outcomes occur, 4- and 5-year-olds tend to misremember their original belief (Liao et al., 2011). In the example above, they would claim they had originally believed cupcakes were in their lunch box.

Hindsight bias occurs when “people who know the outcome of an event tend to overesti- mate their own prior knowledge or others’ naïve knowledge of it” (Bernstein, Wilson, Pernat, & Meilleur, 2012, p. 588). For instance, in one study, 3- to 5-year-olds were asked difficult questions that nearly all of them missed (such as, “Which of these shapes is a rhombus?”). Afterward, they were given the correct answers. Later, children were asked the same ques- tions a second time. Three- and 4-year-olds were significantly more likely to claim they origi- nally knew the answer than were 5-year-olds who missed the question (Bernstein, Atance, Meltzoff, & Loftus, 2007). The younger children, in other words, indicated they had “known it all along.”

The extent to which children exhibited the hindsight bias was modestly associated with their performance on a slew of theory of mind tasks (Bernstein et al., 2007). Notice the similarity of the hindsight bias to performance on the false-belief tasks described earlier. In false-belief tasks, when 3-year-olds claim to have believed (“known all along”) that paper clips were in the crayon box, we see their difficulty recalling their earlier, naive perspective.

Although the hindsight bias may decrease somewhat after the preschool years, it is still evi- dent throughout the life span (Bernstein, Erdfelder, Meltzoff, Peria, & Loftus, 2011). This is an example of continuity in development, whereby a cognitive feature is not outgrown but remains a stable component of the way information is processed.

Young children’s susceptibility to the hindsight bias has implications for learning. A tendency to assume that something was always known could lessen the likelihood of reflecting on mis- takes and learning from them. For instance, the importance of a teacher’s hints and prompts for learning are obscured when, in hindsight, children assume they knew the correct answer in the first place. Children would presumably be less likely to seek feedback explaining why they were incorrect if they tend to gloss over or misremember their earlier, incorrect response.

Explicit�Theory�of�Mind�and�Autism� Because of the social impairments associated with ASD, theory of mind understanding in chil- dren with the disorder is a heavily researched topic (Baron-Cohen, Lombardo, Tager-Fluse- berg, & Cohen, 2013). Earlier we discussed implicit theory of mind and declines in social behaviors in children younger than age 2 who were at risk for ASD. Research with older autistic children has found that they generally perform poorly on false-belief tasks well after the age when the task is passed by typically developing children (Baron-Cohen et al., 2013). These differences are not simply attributable to deficits in verbally communicating the correct

Section 6.3Explicit Theory of Mind

answer. For instance, poor performance has even been observed on false-belief tasks that do not require a verbal response (Senju et al., 2010).

A number of studies have found that children with ASD can be taught to pass false-belief tasks (Begeer et al., 2011; Wellman et al., 2002). To illustrate, children ages 4 to 12 with ASD received theory of mind training involving stories that featured thought bubbles to depict beliefs (Paynter & Peterson, 2013). As we mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, mental states are internal and subjective. Figuring out what someone thinks or feels is often a mat- ter of making an inference based on external cues—we can infer, for instance, that someone wants an object and believes it is behind the couch if he or she is reaching and searching in that location.

Presumably, thought bubbles simplify the process of inferring what someone thinks by con- cretely illustrating thoughts. For instance, if a drawing of a cat is placed inside a thought bub- ble, an adult can point to the picture and say, “This shows she is thinking about a cat.” When asked later what someone is thinking about, children can refer to the contents of the thought bubble to answer the question (Wellman, 2014). In this manner, children can be taught that the contents of thoughts are not directly tied to present, visible circumstances; for instance, someone can think about a cat even after the cat leaves the room and is no longer visible to the person doing the thinking.

In the training study, thought bubbles were used in the context of theory of mind stories that described thinking about objects that were out of sight (Paynter & Peterson, 2013). For instance, the children with ASD were familiarized with thought bubbles and then given a story about someone thinking about an object. When the object was then placed out of sight or when the person in the story moved to another room, the children were shown how the content of the thought remained the same. They were shown, concretely, how a person’s thoughts can be different from what others know or see. This is the basis of false-belief understanding.

Training continued, usually for about two sessions, until children mastered increasingly dif- ficult stories about thinking, seeing, and false belief. When retested immediately after train- ing, children with ASD exhibited superior theory of mind performance on false-belief tasks (administered without thought bubbles) compared to a control group that did not receive training. Improvement was still evident when a theory of mind assessment was administered 3 weeks later (after training had been completed).

If false-belief deficits are at least partly responsible for the social–behavioral deficits in ASD, then we should expect improvements in false-belief understanding to result in improved social–behavioral outcomes. However, although training can improve theory of mind task performance, there is not conclusive evidence it also positively impacts everyday social and communication skills (Hadwin & Kovshoff, 2013).

Two explanations have been offered for why successful training might have no bearing on everyday behaviors. One is that children with ASD are learning strategies to pass theory of mind tasks, but they are not acquiring a deeper understanding of how minds work. Second, it may be that theory of mind training needs to be part of a long-term educational curriculum in order for it to ultimately benefit children’s social skills (Hadwin & Kovshoff, 2013).

Section 6.3Explicit Theory of Mind

Real-World�Application:�Early Intervention There are a number of intervention programs for children with ASD (Howlin, 2014). The National Institute of Mental Health provides an overview here: http://www.nimh.nih.gov/ health/publications/a-parents-guide-to-autism-spectrum-disorder/index.shtml. How are theory of mind deficits addressed in the various curricula in the intervention programs?

Neural�Mechanisms�and�Theory�of�Mind� Technological advances in brain-imaging technology have allowed researchers to examine how specific areas of the brain may be involved in various aspects of explicit theory of mind reasoning (Mahy, Moses, & Pfeifer, 2014; Mar, 2011). Research in this area is very new. To illustrate what researchers are finding, we focus on one region of the brain that appears related to theory of mind. In particular, activity in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) of the brain is correlated with adults’ reasoning about others’ mental states (Carter & Huettel, 2013; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). The TPJ is more activated when adults think about mental entities like beliefs than when thinking about physical events (Young, Dodell-Feder, & Saxe, 2010).

Domain-specific theories of theory of mind development predict that particular neural mech- anisms are innately dedicated for processing information related to certain mental entities (Scholl & Leslie, 1999). To clarify, the claim by domain-specific theories is not that theory of mind reasoning is restricted to just one part of the brain. Instead, a particular region (or regions) of the brain is more active for theory of mind tasks than for non–theory of mind tasks.

This selective activity implies that injury to the part of the brain dedicated to theory of mind reasoning would impair theory of mind performance while sparing performance on non- theory of mind tasks (for example, reasoning about a math problem) (Apperly, Samson, & Humphreys, 2005). The specific association found between engagement of the TPJ and theory of mind reasoning in adults is consistent with domain-specific theories (Mahy et al., 2014).

However, if there were indeed an innate, dedicated “theory of mind network” in the brain, it should be evident very early in development (Mahy et al., 2014). This is not the case, because evidence indicates the TPJ is more selectively recruited by adults than by children ages 5 to 8 for theory of mind reasoning (Gweon, Dodell-Feder, Bedny, & Saxe, 2012). While activation of the neural region was associated with solving theory of mind problems, it was also similarly activated for processing other, nonmental types of information for the 5- to 8-year-olds in the study (Gweon et al., 2012). Thus, the region does not appear innately specified for theory of mind reasoning.

In addition, if there are distinct specific neural mechanisms underlying theory of mind perfor- mance, we might expect them to be impaired in individuals diagnosed with ASD (Saxe, 2010). Overall, however, the evidence for a relationship between ASD and specific deficits in the neural regions dedicated to theory of mind reasoning remains inconsistent and inconclusive

Section 6.4Development of an Explicit Theory of Mind

for adults and children (Lombardo, Chakrabarti, Bull- more, & Baron-Cohen, 2011; Dufour et al., 2013; Happé & Frith, 2014; Saxe, 2010).

Thus, to date, it appears that for typically developing children, neural specialization for theory of mind rea- soning may be a gradual, developmental process rather than hardwired and innate (Mahy et al., 2014). This implies that significant theory of mind development continues beyond age 5 (as we see later in this chapter). Generally speaking, relatively long periods of develop- ment mean there is an extended opportunity for the environment to influence developmental outcomes.

6.4 Development�of�an�Explicit�Theory�of�Mind� Theory of mind development is idiographic (see Chapter 1). This means the rate of develop- ment varies among children. In this section, we look at two factors that impact the develop- ment of an explicit theory of mind. We first examine how the EFs are associated with theory of mind development. As we discussed in the previous section, neural evidence suggests theory of mind knowledge in childhood is more than the product of domain-specific learning mecha- nisms. Consistent with this evidence, we will see how a domain-general process—executive functioning—impacts children’s theory of mind development.

Next, differences in children’s environment (nurture) play a role in the different rates with which theory of mind development occurs (Pillow, 2012). We focus on the specific role of lan- guage as a factor in the environment facilitating children’s understanding of the mind. Both factors—language and the EFs—have received substantial empirical support for their role in theory of mind development (Devine & Hughes, 2014; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007).

Recall our case study that opened the chapter. If one of the two children in the case study lagged behind the other in using mental concepts to interpret the teacher’s behavior, our follow-up question would be to ask why the children differ. The two possibilities we discuss in this section—differences in executive functioning and differences in the amount and quality of exposure to language about the mind—are two good candidates.

Executive�Function�and�Theory�of�Mind A current debate in the field asks whether the understanding of mental states depends on domain-specific learning mechanisms or broad, domain-general mechanisms (Cohen, Sasaki, & German, 2015; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006; Stone & Gerrans, 2006).

Recall from Chapter 1 that domain-general processes are learning mechanisms that operate in many areas of cognition. The EFs serve as broad learning mechanisms that impact devel- opment in a number of domains (see Chapter 3). In this section, we examine whether their influence extends to theory of mind reasoning. To the extent that theory of mind development

Questions to Consider

1. The foundations of theory of mind knowledge are in place by age 5. How can teachers use children’s rich knowl- edge base to enhance learning in the classroom?

2. Why do you think children find it more difficult to reason about false beliefs than to reason about diverse desires?

Section 6.4Development of an Explicit Theory of Mind

is reliant on general learning mechanisms rather than a mechanism that is specific to a the- ory of mind domain, we have evidence supporting domain-general views of theory of mind development.

As we saw in Chapter 3, the EFs are higher order cognitive processes that guide and regulate behavior. Individual differences in the development of the EFs are related to differences in theory of mind development (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Devine & Hughes, 2014). The emer- gence account hypothesizes that children’s ability to learn about mental states is substan- tially aided by EF processes like working memory and inhibition (Carlson, Claxton, & Moses, 2014). In support of this view, individual differences in EFs among 2- and 3-year-olds predict individual differences in children’s theory of mind 1 year later (Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 2004; Müller, Liebermann-Finestone, Carpendale, Hammond, & Bibok, 2012).

There are various ways the domain-general executive processes might impact children’s abil- ity to learn about the mind (Carlson & Moses, 2001). For instance, determining that some- one’s belief is inaccurate depends on working-memory skills that enable someone to keep track of what that person saw and when he or she saw it. If, for example, a young girl sees her mother place a wallet on a box, the memory of that event will be necessary to later infer what her mother knows about the wallet’s location. Imagine that a pet knocks the wallet behind the box while the mother’s back is turned. Awareness of her mother’s belief—and a prediction of her mother’s subsequent search behavior—will be helped by recalling where her mother last saw the wallet.

In a test of whether EFs help children learn about beliefs, researchers administered false- belief tasks over successive weeks and corrected 3-year-olds’ errors with explanations. Chil- dren with higher levels of executive functioning (such as inhibitory control) showed more improvement from the training than those with poorer skills, even after accounting for other cognitive differences (Benson, Sabbagh, Carlson, & Zelazo, 2013).

This evidence suggests the EFs contribute to learning about mental entities. Recall our discus- sion of the zone of proximal development (Chapter 1), in which cooperation between adult and child leads to higher levels of independent performance by the child. The EFs contribute to children’s readiness to learn within the zone of proximal development (Carlson & Moses, 2001). For instance, while learning about false beliefs, inhibition presumably helps children disengage attention from immediate events, such as where an object is really located, in order to account for internal mental states, such as where someone believes the object is located.

Language and Theory of Mind Language has many facets (as we will explore in more detail in Chapter 9), and there are also many proposals for how language acquisition could indirectly (Farrar & Maag, 2002) or directly facilitate false-belief understanding (Astington & Baird, 2005; Milligan et al., 2007; Montgomery, 2005). You may recall from Chapter 1 that the role of language and social interac- tion in promoting cognitive development is consistent with social-constructivist, Vygotskian theories. In this chapter, we focus on one widely studied and representative possibility for how language supports theory of mind development by describing children’s comprehension of and exposure to internal-state terms.

Section 6.4Development of an Explicit Theory of Mind

During infancy, verbal expressions from the caregiver can support theory of mind develop- ment. Mind mindedness refers to instances in which caregivers use internal-state terms to describe infants’ experiences in situations in which the internal state is likely experienced by the infant. For example, if an infant is smiling while looking at a toy, remarking “You want to play with it, don’t you?” would serve as a mind-minded comment (Meins & Fernyhough, 2010).

Mothers differ in the extent to which they exhibit mind mindedness (Meins, Fernyhough, Arnott, Leekam, & Turner, 2011). Differences in how frequently mothers’ use mind- mindedness comments when an infant is 12 months old predict later theory of mind task performance at age 4 (Laranjo, Bernier, Meins, & Carlson, 2014; Meins, 2012). Why is com- menting on an infant’s mental experience related to later understanding of others’ minds? Although the precise mechanisms are unclear, one possibility is that labeling infants’ mental states facilitates the realization that (a) people have internal experiences, and (b) these expe- riences can be discerned by others with different perspectives (Laranjo et al., 2014).

In general, the more parents use internal-state terms, especially in conversational dialogues with children, the earlier false-belief mastery occurs in many studies (Adrián, Clemente, & Villaneuva, 2007; Ensor & Hughes, 2008; Hughes, 2011; Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002). Thus, one strategy for facilitating children’s understanding of others’ thoughts and feelings could involve explicitly talking about mental concepts by using these terms.

Related, when 4-year-olds are trained to use internal-state terms in conversation, their com- prehension of the terms and their false-belief understanding both improve. Training included modeling the use of an internal-state term, like think, in a sentence and then encouraging the child to use the term in a conversation with the experimenter. It was found that internal- state terms used in conversations may draw children’s attention to mental states such as false beliefs (Ornaghi, Brockmeier, & Gavazzi, 2011).

As we mentioned, this caregiver use of internal-state terms to stimulate chil- dren’s theory of mind illustrates the Vygotskian, or social-constructivist, theoretical approach to cognitive development. Consider how theory of mind knowledge can be constructed through joint participation in an activ- ity like reading a story (Adrián et al., 2007). When mothers used phrases such as “The little girl looked in the satchel and do you know what she found?” or “she thinks that Snow White is dead” (Adrián et al., 2007, pp. 1057– 1058), they were familiarizing chil- dren with the use of internal-state terms and perhaps prompting the chil- dren to reflect on the meaning of those terms.

Fuse/Thinkstock Studies�have�shown�that�caregivers�can�help� children�understand�others’�thoughts�and�feelings� by�discussing�mental�concepts�with�them,�such� as�asking�children�what�a�character�in�a�book�is� thinking�or�feeling.

Section 6.5Theory of Mind After Age 5: Second-Order Theory of Mind

Whereas reading storybooks can promote theory of mind development, theory of mind devel- opment can also promote reading comprehension by helping children infer cause–effect sequences (Kleeck, 2008). Often, prompts that help children understand a story’s structure include references to mental states, which prods children to consider, “What did [the protago- nist] want?,” “How do you think [the protagonist] feels?,” and “Did [the protagonist] get what she wanted?” (Kleeck, 2008, p. 633). Such prompts can be more effective at promoting story comprehension than open-ended prompts (“What’s going to happen next?”) that do not focus on characters’ mental states (Strasser, Larraín, & Lissi, 2013).

During the school years, educators can capitalize on children’s interest in and understand- ing of mental states (Lieberman, 2012). A recent study observed teachers narrating picture books to kindergarten children and found significant differences among the teachers in their use of internal-state terms when telling the stories (Misailidi, Papoudi, & Brouzos, 2013).

Teaching educators about the benefits of using such terms could have positive implications for students’ cognitive development. Learning in social studies and history courses could be enriched by incorporating the drama associated with the motives, beliefs, deceptions, and emotions underlying important events. Instruction in writing might explore perspective tak- ing in-depth when explaining how knowing one’s audience informs effective writing.

Questions to Consider

Children with congenital deafness are delayed in passing false-belief and other theory of mind tasks (Korkmaz, 2011) even when they do not exhibit deficits in other areas of cognition (Peterson & Siegal, 2000). Deaf children who are born to deaf parents often begin learning sign language right away, and these native signers outperform late signers on theory of mind tasks (Woolfe, Want, & Siegal, 2002).

1. For children born deaf, why would very early exposure to sign language be posi- tively associated with theory of mind development?

2. What does your answer say about the nature–nurture theme of our text?

6.5 �Theory�of�Mind�After�Age�5:�Second-Order� Theory of Mind

Beliefs and thoughts are recursive, which means they can be infinitely repeated. We can think about another person thinking about another person, and so forth. To illustrate, when playing a game of checkers, Tommy might wonder which move his opponent Jasmine is con- sidering. Tommy might further realize that Jasmine is wondering the same thing; that is, he understands that Jasmine is thinking about her next move by thinking about how Tommy will respond to hers.

Section 6.5Theory of Mind After Age 5: Second-Order Theory of Mind

This example illustrates the difference between first- and second-order theories of mind (Miller, 2012b). First-order theory of mind is concerned with what someone is thinking and/ or feeling. Second-order theory of mind is concerned with how thoughts relate to other thoughts and/or feelings. A second-order theory of mind involves understanding that one thought can lead to another (that is, a chain of thoughts) and how two or more thoughts or feelings are associated (that is, “she thinks that I think…”).

In this section, we explore how a second-order theory of mind develops. Throughout, we consider the implications for children’s social understanding and behavior. As children real- ize that they, and others, can have thoughts about others’ thoughts, they become increasingly strategic and insightful in their social relationships.

Second-Order�False�Belief False-belief understanding after age 5 is assessed with second-order false-belief tasks. Second-order tasks measure children’s understanding of what someone believes another person believes (Perner & Wimmer, 1985). A method for assessing second-order false belief is presented in Table 6.2.

Table�6.2:�A�representative�second-order�false-belief�task

Scene Event

1 Grandfather hears grandmother tell Johnny that she is taking the baby for a walk in the park.

2 Later, grandmother returns and tells grandfather the park was closed and she is instead taking the baby to the beach. Johnny overhears the change in plans, but he is playing out of sight. Consequently, grandfather does not know Johnny is aware of the change in plans.

3 A little later, Johnny finds grandfather. Johnny tells grandfather, “I am going to play with grandmother and the baby.”

Test Question: Where does grandfather think Johnny will go? Correct Answer: Grandfather thinks (falsely) that Johnny thinks grandmother is at the park.

Source: Hughes et al., 2000.

Notice the second-order false-belief story requires children to consider grandfather’s false belief about Johnny’s belief. Children generally begin to solve these complex tasks around age 5 or 6 after they have mastered first-order false-belief tasks like those featured in Figure 6.3 (Miller, 2012b). The age of success depends on factors like the complexity of the stories and the experimenter’s use of prompts and reminders.

There is generally a moderate relationship between individual differences in first-order false- belief mastery and second-order mastery (Hughes, Ensor, & Marks, 2011; Lockl & Schnei- der, 2007). As with first-order false beliefs, individual differences in second-order false-belief mastery are related to language and EF development (Miller, 2009). The continued influence of these domain-general processes is evidence of continuity in theory of mind development (Apperly, Warren, Andrews, Grant, & Todd, 2011).

Section 6.5Theory of Mind After Age 5: Second-Order Theory of Mind

Literal�and�Intended�Meanings Consider how the ability to comprehend thoughts about thoughts supports a number of insights into social–communicative behaviors. To illustrate, imagine a situation in which one person remarks “This tastes great” when sampling a friend’s new cookie recipe. If the listener thinks the speaker really thinks the cookies taste good, the utterance will be interpreted as a compliment. If the listener thinks the speaker really thinks the cookies are not very good, the utterance could be viewed as sarcastic. A second-order theory of mind helps the child sort through these types of interpretations and possibilities.

False statements are similarly open to different interpretations if a child can account for the speaker’s thoughts about others’ thoughts. If a speaker says there is no candy in the cup- board when there really is candy in the cupboard, the utterance could simply be a mistake stemming from the speaker’s false belief. Alternatively, if the speaker knows there is candy in the cupboard but wants the listener to have a false belief, then the utterance is interpreted as a lie. Notice how this alternative interpretation draws on second-order theory of mind— the speaker thinks the candy is in the cupboard but wants the listener to think the candy is elsewhere.

In essence, both lying and sarcasm involve (a) distinguishing between the literal and intended meaning of a statement and (b) relating the intent behind the message to the speaker’s belief (Filippova & Astington, 2008). By age 9 or 10 children are capable of inferring that a speak- er’s belief behind a sarcastic comment is opposite of the literal meaning of the statement (Glenwright & Pexman, 2010). That is, they understand that when a speaker utters a sarcastic message (for example, “You were right”), the speaker really believes something else (that the listener was wrong).

The communication difficulties associated with ASD are evident in the tendency of children diagnosed with it to interpret nonliteral messages literally (Happé, 1994). In one study, chil- dren ages 7 to 16 with ASD listened to statements that could be interpreted sarcastically (Wang, Lee, Sigman, & Dapretto, 2006). For instance, in one scenario a person said “Way to go” to a person who received an F on an exam. Typically developing children were better than children with ASD at interpreting the message nonliterally.

Children are vulnerable to being tricked when they have difficulty comprehending the intent behind a message. A “suggestion” prompting a peer to approach a bully and ask the bully if he will share his lunch may actually be intended as a trick or practical joke. In this example an inability to detect the intent makes the child susceptible to manipulation.

Children ages 6 to 16 with ASD are rated by their parents as socially vulnerable to being taken advantage of by others (Sofronoff, Dark, & Stone, 2011). Examples include being tricked into taking blame, following a suggestion intended to lead to trouble, and a lack of discernment that results in being deceived by someone who has deceived the child on previous occasions (Sofronoff et al., 2011). As we will see in the next section, interpreting deceptive messages is associated with second-order theory of mind.

Deception Often beginning around ages 4 or 5, children correctly judge that someone who makes a deceptive statement intends for the listener to actually believe it (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009;

Section 6.5Theory of Mind After Age 5: Second-Order Theory of Mind

Winner & Leekam, 1991). Of course, children not only detect deception, they also engage in it. Second-order theory of mind underlies the ability to successfully conceal information by maintaining consistency between an initial lie and subsequent statements (Talwar & Lee, 2008). If a child lies and says his sister broke a vase, he must subsequently keep in mind that his parents think he thinks his sister broke the vase.

A study tested the link between deceptive concealment and second-order theory of mind in children between ages 6 and 11. Children played a trivia game in which questions were printed on one side of a test card and answers were written on the back. During one of the trials, the experimenter read a question and then left the room before the child answered. During the experimenter’s absence the test card was placed so that the child could find the answer by peeking. A hidden camera revealed that half of the children peeked. When the experimenter returned and asked, “When I was gone, did you peek at the answer?,” nearly all of the children who peeked lied to the experimenter.

Follow-up questions about the back of the card (for example, “What color is the writing on the back of the card?”) assessed whether children could con- ceal their deception. Recall that chil- dren who peeked at the back of the card needed to convey ignorance in order to maintain their deception. This realization requires a second-order theory of mind as the child reasons, “She thinks I do not know anything about the writing on the back.” This form of reasoning accounts for the experimenter’s thoughts about the child’s thoughts. As expected, children who performed better on second- order false-belief tasks were more likely to feign ignorance about details on the back of the card than children who also lied but scored lower on the false-belief tasks (Talwar, Gordon, & Lee, 2007).

Social Faux Pas Understanding the nature of a social faux pas also involves accounting for someone’s belief underlying a statement or action. A faux pas occurs when someone says or does something that is unintentionally embarrassing, often because it hurts or offends someone else. For instance, imagine a boy remarks to his friend that a drawing posted on the school bulletin board is really ugly. Imagine also that the comment is uttered without the child realizing that his friend is actually the one who made the drawing. Once again, insight into the nature of such utterances requires second-order theory of mind. That is, the child believes (falsely) that his friend thinks the picture was drawn by a third party.

Faux pas comprehension in children has been measured by presenting simple stories in which someone was unintentionally insulted (Banerjee et al., 2011). Children demonstrated their comprehension of the faux pas by correctly answering questions such as “Did someone

Jupiterimages/BananaStock/Thinkstock Lying�involves�second-order�theory�of�mind�because� it�requires�a�child�to�remember�the�lie�to�continue� the�deception.

Section 6.5Theory of Mind After Age 5: Second-Order Theory of Mind

say something they should not have said?” and “Did the speaker intentionally want to make the listener feel upset?” Nine-year-olds were significantly better than 6-year-olds at compre- hending the nature of a faux pas. In another study, Banerjee and Watling (2005) found a mod- erate correlation between second-order false belief and faux pas comprehension. Females tend to comprehend a faux pas better than males in some studies (Banerjee et al., 2011).

Second-Order�Theory�of�Mind�and�Peer�Relationships For grade school children, difficulty comprehending the nature of a faux pas may be pre- dictive of being disliked by peers. The link likely occurs because difficulty comprehending a faux pas serves as an index for other limitations in social understanding (Banerjee et al., 2011). Understanding a faux pas requires one to recognize how behaviors and interpreta- tions impact others’ feelings.

The quality of peer relationships can, in turn, impact theory of mind development. Being dis- liked by peers actually predicts lower faux pas comprehension at later ages in grade school (Banerjee et al., 2011). The authors posit that peer rejection limits children’s opportunities for social interactions. Positive social interactions can help children learn about social cues that are useful for interpreting situations and peer behavior (Lansford, Malone, Dodge, Pettit, & Bates, 2010).

It is also the case that a relatively advanced second-order theory of mind may positively con- tribute to peer relationships. One study found that children’s performance on a variety of theory of mind tasks at age 5 (including second-order false belief ) predicted the quality of their relationships with peers 2 years later. In particular, theory of mind understanding was associated with the frequency of engaging in prosocial behaviors (for example, cooperating with peers)—which in turn positively impacted the quality of peer relations (Caputi, Lecce, Pagnin, & Banerjee, 2012). Unfortunately, theory of mind knowledge lagging at age 5 is pre- dictive of poor peer relations at age 7 (Fink, Begeer, Peterson, Slaughter, & Rosnay, 2015).

Bullying One of the most disruptive and potentially damaging aspects of peer relationships is bullying behavior (Juvonen & Graham, 2014). Bullying is aggressive behavior often characterized by threatening or humiliating an individual. As many as 25% of children are involved in bullying, as either the perpetrator or victim (Juvonen & Graham, 2014). In one study, grade school bul- lies tended to be relatively advanced in theory of mind skills (Sutton, Smith, & Swettenham, 1999). Why would good theory of mind skills be useful to a bully? One explanation is that second-order theory of mind skills underlie manipulation and the ability to discern some- one’s vulnerabilities and weaknesses (Sutton et al., 1999).

This theoretical explanation has received a mixed degree of support in the literature. Gini (2006) found that bullies were neither deficient nor advanced in theory of mind knowledge. Others have found a positive link between bullying and theory of mind development in early adolescent boys but not girls (Caravita, Di Blasio, & Salmivalli, 2010). Poor theory of mind performance at age 5 was a risk factor for becoming a victim or bully–victim (children who have been both a victim and a bully) at age 12 (Shakoor et al., 2012). Although the overall pic- ture may be inconclusive, it is clear that the stereotype of the bully as socially incompetent is

Section 6.5Theory of Mind After Age 5: Second-Order Theory of Mind

misleading. Bullies may, in some cases, have sufficient social insight to very effectively manip- ulate others.

Research continues to clarify precisely how theory of mind development may impact bullying behavior. It seems evident from the findings to date, however, that we can usefully distinguish between a nice and a nasty theory of mind (Lonigro, Laghi, Baiocco, & Baumgartner, 2013). A nice theory of mind enables helpful, cooperative behaviors, whereas a nasty theory of mind is used for antisocial behaviors like lying, manipulating, and bullying (Lonigro et al., 2013; Ronald, Happé, Hughes, & Plomin, 2005).

Why do some children use their theory of mind abilities for antisocial ends? One explanation involves how children think about and justify antisocial behavior. In particular, bullies are more likely than their peers to exhibit moral�disengagement.

Moral disengagement is characterized by indifference to victims, blaming victims for their troubles, and minimizing the consequences of bad behavior when reasoning about moral issues and conduct. Theoretically, moral disengagement reduces a transgressor’s feelings of guilt (Bandura, 1999). One might feel less guilty if convinced the victim “deserved” poor treat- ment. Bullies exhibit relatively high levels of moral disengagement in grade school (Gasser & Keller, 2009; Obermann, 2011) and in adolescence (Perren, Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Malti, & Hymel, 2012). These findings remind us that although theory of mind is a cognitive founda- tion for social understanding, other cognitive factors can influence the manner in which it is deployed (for good or bad).

Advanced�Perspective�Taking:�After�Age�5 The ability to appreciate different points of view continues to develop past early childhood. However, as we noted earlier, egocentric-like thinking is a continuous characteristic of cogni- tion (Apperly, 2013). Thus, we will see in this section advances in perspective taking as well as a persistent tendency for making perspective-taking errors under some situations.

Interpretive Diversity In diverse cultures, peers come from a variety of backgrounds. Perspective taking is compli- cated when background differences lead to conflicting interpretations of messages and events. A word or phrase that one child finds funny may be considered offensive by another child.

Interpretive�diversity occurs when people perceive the same information yet form different beliefs or thoughts about it (Miller, 2012b). For instance, 4-year-olds sometimes judge that a message spoken in Spanish is interpreted (understood) regardless of whether the listener has previous knowledge of the language (Miller, Hardin, & Montgomery, 2003).

Interpretive diversity involves recognizing how two or more individuals can look at or hear the same information and differ in their understanding of it. Imagine two people with differ- ent background knowledge about art looking at the same painting in a museum and inter- preting it differently. The same information is understood in different ways. This differs from false-belief measures. Most false-belief tasks involve understanding how a person’s belief can be false because it is outdated (for example, due to a hidden change in the location of an

Section 6.5Theory of Mind After Age 5: Second-Order Theory of Mind

object). Generally, first-order false-belief understanding is mastered before children compre- hend the possibility of interpretive diversity (Miller, 2012b).

A typical method for assessing interpretive diversity involves showing children a drawing and then covering the drawing so only an ambiguous portion is visible (Chandler & Helm, 1984; Taylor, 1988). For instance, a picture of an elephant might be covered so that only a rectangle (the end of the elephant’s trunk) is visible (see Figure 6.4). Note that when the knowledgeable and naive observer look at the rectangle, they can both correctly report see- ing a rectangle. In this sense neither has a false belief. Beginning around age 6 or 7, children start to understand that the restricted view (the rectangle) will be interpreted differently depending on whether the viewer previously saw the full picture of the elephant (Myers & Liben, 2012; Taylor, 1988).

Figure�6.4:�Assessing�comprehension�of�interpretive�diversity

In tests of interpretive diversity, one person sees the full picture of the elephant and then the restricted view of the trunk. Another person only sees the restricted view. When shown the restricted view, they will each have different interpretations of what it depicts.

Source: Adapted from Chandler, M. J., & Helm, D. (1984). Developmental changes in the contribution of shared experience to social role-taking competence. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 7(2), 145-156.

Egocentrism Finally, recall that at the outset of this chapter we discussed evidence indicating young chil- dren can overcome egocentrism under child-friendly assessment conditions. Although those abilities are impressive, it would be misleading to imply that children (and even adults) com- pletely overcome egocentric biases (Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004).

To illustrate, grade school children, adolescents, and adults were presented with a comput- erized task that involved suppressing their own perspective and accounting for a speaker’s perspective (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010). As Figure 6.5 illustrates, participants viewed a shelf that partially hid objects from the speaker’s perspective. The speaker could only see the tennis ball. Participants were shown the speaker’s perspective to ensure that they knew which objects were hidden from the speaker’s view.

Section 6.5Theory of Mind After Age 5: Second-Order Theory of Mind

Figure�6.5:�Advanced�perspective�taking

Advanced perspective taking involves recognizing that the smallest ball (top right) is not visible to the speaker giving the instruction.

Source: Adapted from Dumontheil, I., Apperly, I. A., & Blakemore, S. J. (2010). Online usage of theory of mind continues to develop in late adolescence. Developmental Science, 13(2), 331–338.

Although there was some improvement from childhood to adulthood, all age groups made many perspective-taking errors on the task. They neglected to remember that the golf ball was not visible to the speaker. Even adults have a tendency toward egocentrism, which sup- ports views of cognitive development as continuous rather than discontinuous.

Cultural differences appear to impact how readily adults adopt the perspective of others. In a study similar to the one just described, Chinese adults exhibited better perspective taking than U.S. adults when following a speaker’s directions. One explanation is that Chinese cul- ture emphasizes interdependence, whereas U.S. culture is more individualistic (Wu & Keysar, 2007). In this theory, attention to others is more commonly emphasized in interdependent cultures. Thus, although a tendency toward egocentrism may be present throughout develop- ment, one’s culture may reduce or magnify that tendency. In this example, we see continuity in development as well as the influence of nurture (environment) on group differences.

One method of training that illustrates how one’s environment can impact theory of mind development involves taking acting lessons (Goldstein & Winner, 2012). High school students

Summary and Resources

received 10 months of acting training in school. At the end of training, they showed gains in detecting others’ mental states from facial cues. Presumably, training in acting involves put- ting oneself in the place of another “person” (a character). This role-playing involves reflect- ing on and enacting the thoughts and emotions of others, which may promote more nuanced insight into what others are thinking or feeling. Such findings illustrate that the importance of nurture—the environment—in theory of mind development extends throughout childhood.

Questions to Consider

1. In the case study at the outset of this chapter, we asked how deficiencies in theory of mind might impair social relationships and vice versa. How does your response to the question change for children younger than age 5, compared to children older than age 5?

2. In your opinion, should intervention efforts for children older than age 5 be aimed at improving social relationships, in the hope that theory of mind development will improve, or aimed at first improving theory of mind knowledge? Why?

Summary and Resources

Chapter�Summary

• Piaget predicted that children’s understanding of others is egocentric. In his theory, a consequence of egocentrism is realism—an inability to distinguish between sub- jective and objective perspectives.

• Under test settings that minimize the language requirements needed for responding, young children can explicitly indicate that their perspective is different from another person’s perspective even though they are in the age range of Piaget’s preopera- tional stage of cognitive development (2 to about 6).

• Evidence suggests that infants possess an implicit theory of mind. They appear to appreciate that others have goals and desires. They also appear to understand that others can hold desires and beliefs that differ from the infant’s own.

• Theory of mind deficits are characteristically found in children with autism. Some infants who regress in displaying social behaviors that might be associated with an implicit theory of mind are later diagnosed with ASD.

• Children’s explicit theory of mind develops between ages 2 and 5. During this period they articulate that beliefs can be false. False-belief understanding is related to social behaviors, metamemory, and IP biases.

• Domain-specific theories view theory of mind knowledge as (a) innate and (b) the product of specialized neural mechanisms. Evidence suggests neural specialization may occur, but not in early childhood (ages 5 to 8).

• Evidence indicates that children’s EF development contributes to the development of an explicit theory of mind.

• Differences in children’s exposure to language using internal-state terms relates to individual differences in the development of an explicit theory of mind.

Summary and Resources

• Developed after age 5, a second-order theory of mind involves reasoning about how one’s thoughts or feelings relate to another person’s thoughts or feelings.

• A second-order theory of mind enables children to gain insight into perspective tak- ing, deception, communication, and interpretive diversity.

Posttest Questions

1. Piaget assessed children’s understanding of mental phenomena with interviews. Subsequent methods simplified task demands by doing all of the following EXCEPT

.

a. minimizing verbal demands b. relying on children’s motor skills c. posing familiar problems d. eliminating extraneous demands

2. A child closes her eyes and realizes that although she cannot see the book on the table, her friend can see it. This is an example of .

a. egocentrism b. level 1 perspective taking c. level 2 perspective taking d. false-belief mastery

3. Fifteen-month-old infants watch a person place an object into a green box instead of a yellow box. When the person turns away from the boxes, the object is moved to the yellow box. The infants will most likely .

a. be surprised when the person searches in the green box b. be surprised when the person searches in the yellow box c. not be surprised by searches in either box d. be equally surprised by searches in either box

4. Which sequence depicts how 2- to 5-year-old children in the United States typically master the following theory of mind concepts?

a. false belief, knowledge access, diverse desires b. hidden emotions, diverse beliefs, knowledge access c. diverse desires, hidden emotions, diverse beliefs d. diverse desires, false belief, hidden emotions

5. Teresa believes her toy is in the garage, but it is really in her bedroom. will most likely predict Teresa will look in the for her toy.

a. Three-year-olds; garage b. Five-year-olds; bedroom c. Five-year-olds; garage d. Seven-year-olds; bedroom

Summary and Resources

6. Children exhibiting a hindsight bias .

a. claim they “knew it all along” after their error is corrected b. are skilled at deception c. claim that an accidental but fortunate outcome was intended d. are skilled at interpretive diversity

7. Caregivers using internal-state terms to describe an infant’s experiences are engag- ing in .

a. mind mindedness b. second-order theory of mind c. egocentrism d. realism

8. Domain-general theories are BEST supported by evidence that indicates that earlier individual differences in predict later individual differences in .

a. the timing of false-belief mastery; language skills b. the timing of false-belief mastery; EF skills c. level 1 perspective taking; EF skills d. EF skills; the timing of false-belief mastery

9. Which of the following requires a second-order theory of mind?

a. understanding that seeing leads to knowing b. understanding that people differ in the foods they prefer c. pretending not to know the answer to a question because others think you do not

know it d. pretending that a banana is a telephone

10. Childhood bullies .

a. developmentally lag behind peers in theory of mind understanding b. often exhibit moral disengagement c. do NOT often exhibit moral disengagement d. exhibit TPJ deficits beginning in infancy

Critical-Thinking�Questions

1. Consider a child with a developmental delay who does not understand false belief (or perhaps theory of mind concepts overall) at age 6. Describe at least two ways this delay could impact the child’s social and learning development. Then describe how you might help the child attain these concepts and/or minimize the impact of this delay.

2. If you were assigning one peer to tutor another peer on a classroom topic, what theory of mind developments would be most important for you to consider? How does your answer change if the child–tutor pairs are age 4 or age 8?

3. Many of the infant studies discussed in this chapter involve situations in which infants observe someone trying to find or obtain an object. What is it about those situations that make them most likely to evoke infants’ understanding of mental

Summary and Resources

Additional�Resources Web�Resources

Infants’ Understanding of False Belief http://frithmind.org/socialminds/2014/04/17/the-great-smurf-experiment/#more-47 This link provides an interview with a researcher who gives an insider’s view of the challenges and surprises that occur when testing infant theory of mind.

states? Does your answer suggest some stories and games caregivers might share to familiarize infants with thoughts and feelings?

4. How would children’s second-order theory of mind influence their understanding of memory and, more generally, their understanding of strategies for learning?

Key Terms

emergence�account A hypothesis predict- ing that EF skills are important for facilitat- ing children’s learning about mental states and experiences.

explicit�theory�of�mind A verbal, conscious understanding of mental states and their role underlying behavior.

hindsight�bias A bias in which one makes an incorrect response but later recalls hav- ing made a correct response.

implicit�theory�of�mind An automatic, nonverbal system that reasons about behavior in terms of underlying mental characteristics.

internal-state�terms Words expressing mental experiences such as thinking, know- ing, and wanting.

interpretive�diversity The understanding that two people who hear or see the same thing may comprehend it differently.

level�1�perspective�taking The recogni- tion that whether or not something is visible depends on one’s viewpoint.

level�2�perspective�taking The recognition that different viewpoints can result in differ- ences in how something is seen.

mind�mindedness Caregiver utterances using internal-state terms to describe an infant’s experiences.

moral�disengagement A cognitive process of justifying antisocial behavior and making it acceptable.

positivity�bias The selective encoding of information that leads to favorable judg- ments of self and/or others.

realism The confusion of subjective experi- ences with external, objective qualities.

recursive A property of mental states that forms a chain such that one state can be about another, which can be about another, and so forth.

second-order�theory�of�mind Reasoning about how someone’s thoughts or feel- ings relate to another person’s thoughts or feelings.

task�simplification A methodological pro- cess in which performance demands that are extraneous to the concept being assessed are minimized.

theory�of�mind Reasoning, either implicitly or explicitly, about what a person is thinking or feeling and about how those mental states relate to behavior.

Summary and Resources

Egocentrism and Theory of Mind http://www.projectlearnet.org/tutorials/cognitive_egocentrism_theory_of_mind.html This tutorial provides suggested strategies to support those with theory of mind deficits.

Further Reading

Miller, S. A. (2012). Theory of mind: Beyond the preschool years. New York: Psychology Press. The author provides a comprehensive overview of theory of mind development after age 5.

Wellman, H. M. (2014). Making minds: How theory of mind develops. Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press. The author provides an overview of theory of mind development mostly focusing on infancy and early childhood.

Woodward, A. L. (2013). Infant foundations of intentional understanding. In M. R. Banaji & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), Navigating the social world: A developmental perspective (pp. 75–80). Oxford: Oxford University Press. This source provides an examination of theory of mind in infancy with a focus on infants’ sensitivity to goal-directed action as a foundation of an implicit theory of mind.

Answers�and�Rejoinders�to�Chapter�Pretest

1. False. By age 3 children explicitly talk about thoughts and desires. They also recog- nize that mental states are internal and not visible to others.

2. True. Infants notice others’ goals before age 1. Infants and toddlers can also act cooperatively to help someone attain his or her goal.

3. True. Until around age 5, children have trouble explicitly attributing to themselves and to others a belief that conflicts with reality.

4. False. Among other factors, differences in children’s linguistic environment are associated with different rates of acquiring mental concepts. Variability in children’s exposure to language that expresses thoughts and desires are associated with these individual differences.

5. False. Children’s knowledge about mental states continues to develop throughout childhood. As children in the grade school years increasingly discern how others think and feel, such insights may be used to facilitate deceiving, manipulating, and bullying others.

6. False. Children younger than age 5 have trouble understanding that someone can say one thing but intend the message to be interpreted differently.

Answers�and�Rejoinders�to�Chapter�Posttest

1. b. relying on children’s motor skills Task simplification minimizes performance demands and uses familiar questions and materials.

2. b. level 1 perspective taking Level 1 perspective taking is recognizing that visibility is a matter of perspective.

Summary and Resources

3. b. be surprised when the person searches in the yellow box Infants are surprised when they witness an actor search in a location inconsistent with the actor’s false belief.

4. d. diverse desires, false belief, hidden emotions Children understand desires before beliefs. The concept of hidden emotions is rela- tively difficult for preschoolers.

5. c. Five-year-olds; garage A synthesis of a large number of false-belief studies indicates children typically pass false-belief tasks by age 5, whereas 3-year-olds generally have trouble with such tasks.

6. a. claim they “knew it all along” after their error is corrected The hindsight bias occurs when an earlier error is misremembered as a correct response.

7. a. mind mindedness Mind mindedness involves characterizing the infant with internal-state terms and is linked to individual differences in theory of mind development.

8. d. EF skills; the timing of false-belief mastery Domain-general theories predict that theory of mind development is dependent on general processes like EF skills.

9. c. pretending not to know the answer to a question because others think you do not know it Second-order theory of mind involves considering how someone is thinking about someone else’s beliefs.

10. b. often exhibit moral disengagement Bullies are often found to exhibit moral disengagement when thinking about antiso- cial behaviors and outcomes.