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Oakland Terrorist Attack Management Final

Name

Institutional Affiliation

Oakland Terrorist Attack Management Final

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to determine the appropriate steps needed in the effective management of emergency services during and after a terrorist attack. The United States is a major target for terrorist attacks since the September 9/11 attacks. Thus, all emergency services across the country need to be aptly prepared to handle a terrorist incident and reduce the potential mortality rates because of such and other similar incidences. This paper will provide a guide to the steps that should be followed in case of a terrorist attack as pertains to the details of the case study.

Summary of Scenario

The terrorist group BC has organized a large-scale terrorist attack on American soil. The target of the attack is the O.co Coliseum, which is located in Oakland, California. The terrorist attack takes place on August 18 during a home game for the Oakland Athletics. There are more than 35000 spectators and 5000 players in the coliseum on this day. Furthermore, there are hundreds of coliseum employees, support staff, and staff members in the grounds. In total, there are approximately 40,000 people in an area that spans approximately 157 acres.

The attack occurs during the third inning of the game. The terrorists load nineteen small boats with explosives, with each boat left tied to each of the nineteen bridges that connect the coliseum to the city of Oakland. The terrorists remotely detonate the bombs once they enter the parking lot of the coliseum. An additional twenty-four terrorists enter the parking lot using U-Haul trucks. They make their way in through the North Bridge Gate, which was partially destroyed by the bombs. There are now about 153 terrorists in the parking lot of the coliseum. They use cars to block off the entrance to the North Bridge. The terrorists also burnt several cars in the coliseum to block aerial surveillance by law enforcement agencies. Any civilian, security guard, or law enforcement official seen in the parking lot is shot down immediately. The coliseum is completely barricaded and the emergency services team has to ensure that as many people survive the incident.

Terrorist Attack Management

Having been put in charge of all fire department assets, EMS, and the coordination between the hospitals and the USNS comfort, it is my prerogative to ensure that the mortality rate remains low. This means that I have to conduct a seamless rescue operation that seeks to save as many lives as possible without endangering the lives of others including the rescue teams.

Oakland Terrorist Attack Management Draft

Name

Institutional Affiliation

Oakland Terrorist Attack Management Draft

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to determine the appropriate steps needed in the effective management of emergency services during and after a terrorist attack. The United States is a major target for terrorist attacks since the September 9/11 attacks. Thus, all emergency services across the country need to be aptly prepared to handle a terrorist incident and reduce the potential mortality rates because of such and other similar incidences. This paper will provide a guide to the steps that should be followed in case of a terrorist attack as pertains to the details of the case study.

Summary of Scenario

The terrorist group BC has organized a large-scale terrorist attack on American soil. The target of the attack is the O.co Coliseum, which is located in Oakland, California. The terrorist attack takes place on August 18th during a home game for the Oakland Athletics. There are more than 35,000 spectators and 5000 players in the coliseum on this day. Furthermore, there are hundreds of coliseum employees, support staff, and staff members in the grounds. In total, there are approximately 40,000 people in an area that spans approximately 157 acres.

The attack occurs during the third inning of the game. The terrorists load nineteen small boats with explosives, with each boat left tied to each of the nineteen bridges that connect the coliseum to the city of Oakland. The terrorists remotely detonate the bombs once they enter the parking lot of the coliseum. An additional twenty-four terrorists enter the parking lot using U-Haul trucks. They make their way in through the North Bridge Gate, which was partially destroyed by the bombs. There are now about 153 terrorists in the parking lot of the coliseum. They use cars to block off the entrance to the North Bridge. The terrorists also burnt several cars in the coliseum to block aerial surveillance by law enforcement agencies. Any civilian, security guard, or law enforcement official seen in the parking lot is shot down immediately. The coliseum is completely barricaded and the emergency services team has to ensure that as many people survive the incident.

Terrorist Attack Management

Having been put in charge of all fire department assets, EMS, and the coordination between the hospitals and the USNS comfort, it is my prerogative to ensure that the mortality rate remains low. This means that I have to conduct a seamless rescue operation that seeks to save as many lives as possible without endangering the lives of others including the rescue teams.

There are a number of considerations I have to make to ensure that the rescue operation is as effective as possible. For starters, I will have to determine where I will set up the EMS teams so that they can aid those who have escaped. We have managed to set up a 180- degree perimeter around the coliseum. The perimeter will be set up near the North Bridge Gate, which is located on the Northern side of the coliseum. The perimeter will allow us to set up EMS teams as close to the waterway as possible. A few hundred survivors have been able to escape through this waterway over the past two days. Once the EMS teams are set up near this waterway, they will be able to rescue the few survivors escaping. The perimeter will enable us to provide cover for the EMS teams as they attempt to rescue the swimming survivors. It is critical that the EMS teams maintain a safe distance from the hot zone to avoid their capture or worse, their deaths.

Triage will be performed on the survivors to determine who among them has the most severe injuries. The emergency responders will initially use the Patient Assist Method. The method will allow the responders to identify the less severely injured victims and those that need immediate help. A casualty collection point will be set up within the coliseum where anyone who requires assistance will gather to be assessed further. The basic triage method will help the responders identify the individuals who are unable to move to the CCP owing to their severe injuries. Furthermore, the method and the setting up of the CCP will help clear the scene faster.

The Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment will also be deployed on the scene after the PAM and the setting up of the CCP. The triage method allows the responders to evaluate victims and their injuries and assign them categories. The categories are immediate, delayed, walking but wounded, and deceased. Red, yellow, green, and black respectively will denote the categories above. The triage system will help identify the critically injured that need to be transported to the hospital immediately.

Those with more severe injuries will be taken to the nearest hospital immediately (Hogan, Waeckerle, Dire, and Lillibridge, 1999). The ambulances will transport these victims to the local hospitals and the USNS Comfort, which is located outside of the San Leandro Bay. The local hospitals identified include the Highland Hospital, Alameda Hospital, Alameda Emergency Care Center, Children’s Hospital Teen Clinic, and Hospital La Raza.

Those with less severe injuries will receive care at the CCP where qualified medical practitioners are awaiting to assess them and handle their injuries. These individuals should be given quick first aid (Raiter, Farfel, Lehavi, Goren, Shamiss, Priel, Koren, Davidson, Schwartz, Goldberg, & Bardayan, 2008) and assessment to determine whether their non-serious injuries have the potential to become concerns.

According to Aylwin, Konig, Brennan, Shirley, Davies, Walsh, & Brohi (2007), over-triage should be avoided at all costs. This is because it is a mis-use of precious time that could be used in saving the lives of many others. Effective triage at the scene of the incident will help contain the surge capacities in the nearby hospitals. Investigations should be kept to a minimum to allow for faster transference of severely injured patients to the nearest hospitals.

The media presence might be a hindrance to the effective management of the rescue team. Not only are the media outlets creating chaos on the scene because of their numbers, but they also run the risk of reporting crucial information about the rescue mission and the placements of law enforcement officials. The terrorists, who are obviously watching television, might pick out essential information that they can use to their advantage, which might lead to a continued standoff and the loss of more lives.

The members of the media will be assigned a position slightly farther out from where the emergency teams have set up. This will ensure that the media does not have any access to material that may jeopardize the rescue mission such as any escape routes or the plans the emergency services have formulated in their attempt to rescue more survivors. Furthermore, the communications director will be assigned to disperse information to the members of the press. This will guarantee that the media reports only what we want to become public news. The media will not be allowed to fly over the scene until the terrorists have been disarmed and the victims have been cleared off the grounds.

The media can also be used to our advantage. Since the terrorists are watching television to find clues about our operations, we can communicate with them using the media reporters. We can disseminate information through the media to the terrorists and we would be assured that they have received the information. Negotiations for the safe release of the victims inside the coliseum can begin using the media. The terrorists can also use the media to explain to us their demands as we negotiate for the safe release of the hostages.

Entry into the coliseum requires that the fire fighters break a huge hole into the coliseum. It would have been easier to use explosives in order to gain entry, but the explosion might injure the victims inside the coliseum. To avoid this, the firefighters will use a number of hydraulic and extrication equipment to drill through the entrance of the coliseum. Hydraulic tools will include rams, spreaders, and cutters, reciprocating saws, hi-lift jacks, and cribbing tools. The equipment will be brought to the scene using the Landing Craft Air Cushions that have been provided by the State of California.

The tools mentioned will ensure that the terrorists are not alerted by the impending entry of the rescue workers and law enforcement officials. Thirty-five SWAT members will be assigned to protect the fire fighters who are drilling the hole. They are the security assets that will guarantee the safety of the fire fighters as they breach the coliseum walls. Their purpose is to provide cover for the fire fighters who are sure to come under fire from the terrorists.

The terrorists set several cars that were in the parking lot ablaze in order to deter law enforcement and rescue crews from surveilling and entering the coliseum. The fire fighters will have to extinguish the fires in order to be able to breach the coliseum. Extinguishing the fires will also provide the law enforcement agencies with visibility over the coliseum so that they can assess the situation from an aerial view as well as provide tactical support to the crews on the ground. For these reasons, the firefighters will use fire extinguishers to extinguish the flames from the burning cars. Air support will also help bring the fires under control. Helicopters equipped with water hoses will spray water above the scene to help in controlling the fires. SWAT will also provide over-watch on the members of the fire-fighting squads and their nine trucks.

It is of the utmost importance that emergency medical services are deployed inside the coliseum as soon as it is safe to do so. The EMS will be able to provide urgent medical services to those who are critically injured inside the coliseum. I will send the EMS teams in with the SWAT team but in the second wave after the latter has taken control of the coliseum from the terrorists. For this reason, the SWAT teams will have to move in to neutralize the threat before the EMS can enter and take care of the injured.

The reasoning behind this strategy is to allow the SWAT teams to undertake their duty without having to worry about taking care of the EMS crews. They will be more focused at neutralizing the threat when they do not have to worry about additional casualties. It also reduces the number of potential hostages that the terrorists may use as leverage to escape (Perry & Lindell, 2003). The EMS teams will be on standby and will enter the premises once the SWAT teams give out the order for them to come in.

Once the coliseum is secure, the next prerogative is the victims of the terrorist attacks. The survivors have varying degrees of injuries with some having suffered from gunshot wounds, dehydration, and exposure. The number of casualties is approximately 38,000 and it is imperative that the critical mortality rates remain as low as possible. EMS teams will be divided according to the sections of the coliseum so that they can cover the entire 158 acres of the coliseum. The division will ensure that the survivors are reached on time and their injuries are addressed as quickly as possible.

Every EMS team is equipped with the necessary tools to deal with dehydration, exposure, and gunshot wounds. The teams are tasked with performing triage on their assigned patients and transporting the severely injured to the nearest hospital immediately. Individuals with gunshot wounds are the highest priority because many of them may require immediate surgery. Thus, it will be prudent to transfer these to the hospitals first.

Those with less severe injuries will be taken to the tents to have their injuries checked out. Here, they will be treated for exposure, dehydrations, and abrasions. Several professional medical practitioners have been stationed at the tents to cater to the needs of those survivors who were not seriously injured. Some EMS vehicles will be stationed near the tent to transport individuals who may have not presented with severe injuries during the rescue mission but their situation seems to have deteriorated over time. Many of the SWAT team members will be required to offer assistance to the EMS teams in transporting the injured to the EMS vehicles as well as carrying the less injured to the tent outside.

The temporary bridges will help ease the congestion on the North Bridge as the teams continue to evacuate survivors from the coliseum. With all these emergency response teams and law enforcement teams, chaos is bound to occur if there is no effective communication. Each team, whether emergency response or law enforcement, has a commander who reports directly to me. This communication is essential as it helps me develop tactical plans to evacuate the survivors as quickly as possible.

I will also be in constant communication with the hospitals where the survivors are being taken for treatment. Communicating with the local hospitals will help me direct the EMS vehicles where to take the survivors in order to avoid issues with surge capacities in the hospitals. This communication will also enable me to assign survivors with extreme injuries to the hospitals that can offer specialized care and treatment.

Survivors with life threatening injuries will be taken to the nearest hospitals using the helicopters. SWAT teams will help in carrying these survivors to the helicopters. There will also be a commander in charge of the movement of the helicopters so that confusion does not arise as to which helicopter should take patients to which hospital. The survivors who were taken to the tent at the scene will also be taken to farther hospitals for them to be assessed further. There is an abundance of ambulance vehicles, so it will be easy to transport these patients to the hospitals that are further out.

The USNS Comfort will also play a huge role in accommodating the injured. The Navy ship has the capacity and the medical services needed to cater to at least 100,000 patients. Survivors in need of immediate blood transfusions will be taken to the Comfort. The hospital ship is docked near the scene of the terror attack to make it easier to get victims on board. There are also surgeons on the Comfort who can perform emergency surgeries on critical gunshot wound patients. The presence of the Comfort will be effective in mitigating the surge capacities at the different local hospitals. Surge capacities are a common occurrence during terror attacks (Hick et al, 2004).

In addition, the members of my team that have been stationed at the Comfort will be able to liaise with their fellow team members in the local hospitals. If patients need to be transferred or if specialists need to be moved to and from the Comfort, then it will be easier to do so through the established communication channels. The members of my team at the Comfort will also be able to coordinate the EMS vehicles that are stationed to the Navy Ship. This will ensure effective transportation for the victims. Furthermore, this communication will help identify unused resources that could be channeled to other sections of the rescue and evacuation plan.

2,531 victims have been declared dead at the scene, some of whom are members of the fire departments, the National Guard, and law enforcement agencies. Emotions are very high at the scene owing to the huge number of deceased victims strewn across the arena. All of the rescue teams and law enforcement agencies have been advised about the situation before they entered the coliseum. This was done in order to keep emotions at bay for faster evacuation of the survivors.

A staging area will be set up away from the glare of the cameras and the throngs of people who have come to the scene of the terror attack. A tent at one of the available open parking lots will be used as the staging area. Members of the National Guard and SWAT teams will transport the bodies of the deceased to the staging area where the corpses will be identified. The members of the task force assigned to the identification and collection of the deceased victims will look through the personal belongings of the dead to determine their identity.

The names of the deceased who have been identified will be written down as well as their Social Security Numbers. The members of the task force will also need to indicate specific physical aspects of each of the deceased. The lists will be handed to the Public Communications Desk, which will be set up slightly farther from the scene of the attack.

The individuals working at this desk are mandated with the task of gathering information from the public regarding relatives and friends who might have been in the coliseum when the terror attack occurred. Members of the public who believe that one of their relatives or friends could have been in the coliseum during the attack write the names of their loved ones on a victims’ list. This list will be corroborated with the list from the staging area to hasten the process of identification as well as inform the family members of their loss.

Furthermore, similar lists will be produced at the nearby hospitals and the USNS Comfort. It is estimated that 253 people have died at the local hospitals and in the Navy ship. The copies of these lists will be sent to the Public Communications Desk for further corroboration with the information gathered from the members of the public.

There is the possibility that some terrorists may have escaped from the scene. The number of terrorists killed or captured is 140. There were 153 terrorists at the beginning of the terrorist attack, which means that 13 of them are still unaccounted for. To avert a situation whereby the escaped terrorists gain crucial information on how we carry out emergency rescue operations, I will provide the FBI with all the information I have gained throughout the incident. I will also release the bodies of the dead terrorists to the FBI so that they can figure out the identities of said terrorists. With the identities of the perpetrators, it will be easier to determine which terrorist cell they work for and their leaders. Furthermore, the captured terrorists should be able to provide a lot of information as to the identities and locations of the escaped terrorists.

The terrorist attack will serve as a learning tool for my department on how to prepare and plan for future terrorist attacks. Community emergency preparedness programs will be the main objective of the preparation strategy that we will come up with to deal with potential terrorist attacks. It is imperative that the surrounding communities know what to do in case of such an emergency.

Furthermore, I will insist on the constant training of current and future emergency medical services’ practitioners to ensure that they are always prepared. We will use the lessons from this attack to train the officials. In addition, I will request that EMS teams and the USNS Comfort be always on standby in readiness for a terrorist attack of this magnitude.

Once the bodies have been identified then they will be transported to the nearby mortuaries for further processing and preparation for burial.

References

Aylwin, C.J. Konig, T.C., Brennan, N.W., Shirley, P.J., Davies, G., Walsh, M.S., & Brohi, K. (2007). Reduction in critical mortality in urban mass casualty incidents: analysis of triage, surge, and resource use after the London bombings on July 7, 2005. The Lancet, 368 (9554), 2219-2225.

Hick, J. L., Hanfling, D., Burstein, J. L., DeAtley, C., Barbisch, D., Bogdan, G. M., & Cantrill, S. (2004). Health care facility and community strategies for patient care surge capacity. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 44(3), 253-261

Hogan, D. E., Waeckerle, J. F., Dire, D. J., & Lillibridge, S. R. (1999). Emergency department impact of the Oklahoma City terrorist bombing. Annals of emergency medicine, 34(2), 160-167

Perry, R. W., & Lindell, M. K. (2003). Preparedness for emergency response: guidelines for the emergency planning process. Disasters, 27(4), 336-350

Raiter, Y., Farfel, A., Lehavi, O., Goren, O.B., Shamiss, A., Priel, Z., Koren, I., Davidson, B., Schwartz, D., Goldberg, A., Bardayan, Y. (2008). Emerg Med J, 25 (4): 225-229