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Methods of Policy Communication

PA R T

III

Policy Analysis

Materials Development

Knowledge Utilization

Interactive Communication

KNOWLEDGE

PRESENTATIONS

DOCUMENTSSTAKEHOLDERS POLICY

ANALYST

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338

8 CHAPTER

By studying this chapter, you should be able to

Developing Policy Arguments

� Describe the structure of a policy argument.

� Compare and contrast four types of policy claims.

� Describe relations among different elements of an argument.

� Explain how objections and rebuttals affect the strength of an argument.

� Demonstrate how qualifiers change in response to objections and rebuttals.

� Distinguish and illustrate different modes of policy argumentation.

� Explain why formal and informal fallacies diminish the strength of claims.

� Use argument mapping techniques to represent cases of foreign policy argumentation.

W hat policy makers understand and analysts often forget is that policy argumentation is central to policy making.1 Policy arguments are among the major vehicles for communicating policy-relevant information and an

important source of knowledge about the ways policies are made and put into effect. Because policy arguments are carriers of policy-relevant information, they are also important for understanding the use and misuse of policy analysis by policy makers.

1One of the landmark books on policy argumentation was Giandomenico Majone, Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).

O B J E C T I V E S

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The Structure of Policy Arguments 339

The ability to organize, structure, and evaluate a policy argument is central to critical analytical thinking. In contexts of practice, argumentation is not limited to the kinds of reasoning employed in formal logic or in the social sciences, for example, reasoning based on quantitative models designed to explain political behavior or on formal mathematical models of rational choice used in economics. Many other modes of argumentation—from ethical and political reasoning to reasoning by analogy and metaphor—coexist and compete for the attention of policy makers. Competent analysts should be able to compare and contrast different modes of reasoning and express technical arguments in a language that is comprehensible to policy makers.

THE STRUCTURE OF POLICY ARGUMENTS A policy argument is the product of argumentation, which is the process. In real-life policy settings, arguments are complex and prone to misunderstanding. For this reason, conceptual models or maps are useful in identifying and relating the elements of policy arguments. One such model is the structural model of argument originated by the English-born philosopher Stephen Toulmin and extended by others.2 Another structural model of argument called Rationale, developed by Tim van Gelder and associates, is what we use here to map policy arguments (see Figure 8.1).3

Structural models are designed to investigate the organization of practical reasoning. Arguments based on practical reasoning, as distinguished from those based on the formal reasoning of mathematics and deductive logic, lack the certainty of formally valid logical arguments, for example, if A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then A is preferred to C. Practical arguments are always uncertain, as are the reasons and evidence employed to justify conclusions. Reasons are not always stated explicitly, and in some cases they are not stated at all. Even when they are stated, they are seldom complete or conclusive. In Toulmin’s words, practical reasoning yields conclusions “about which we are not entirely confident by relating them back to other information about which we have greater assurance.”4 Policy arguments rarely if ever have the certainty of deductive logic.

2Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958); and Toulmin, Robert Rieke, and Alan Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning, 2d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1984). Other models of reasoning and argument are Hayward Alker Jr., “The Dialectical Logic of Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue,” American Political Science Review 82, no. 3 (1988): 805–20; Michael Scriven, Reasoning (New York: McGraw Hill, 1977); D. R. Des Gasper, “Structures and Meanings: A Way to Introduce Argumentation Analysis in Policy Studies Education,” Africanus (University of South Africa) 30, no. 1 (2000): 49–72; and D. R. Des Gasper, “Analyzing Policy Arguments,” European Journal of Development Research 8, no. 1 (1996): 36–62. 3See Tim van Gelder, “The Rationale for Rationale.” Law, Probability, and Risk 6 (2007): 23-42. The computer application called Rationale is available at www.austhink.com. 4Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 127.

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A policy claim is the conclusion of a policy argument. There are four types of claims: definitional, designative, evaluative, and advocative. Arguments may include subordinate claims and arguments.

CLAIM

Policy-relevant information provides the grounds for supporting a policy claim. Policy-relevant information may be statistical data, experimental findings, expert testimony, common sense, or political judgments. The information begins with the words “Given that ...”

INFORMATION A qualifier expresses the degree of confidence in a claim. Qualifiers may be stated statistically (p = 0.01) or in everyday language (“probably” or “not at all”). Qualifiers answer the question “Is the claim approximately true?”

QUALIFIER A warrant is a reason to support a claim. Warrants may be economic theories, ethical principles, political ideas, religious authority, and so forth. Warrants begin with the word “Because...”

WARRANT

A rebuttal is an objection to an objection. Rebuttals challenge objections by identifying special conditions or exceptions that reduce confidence in the objection. Rebuttals begin with the word “However...”

REBUTTAL

A backing is a reason to support the warrant. Backings begin with the word “Since...”

An objection challenges information by identifying special conditions or exceptions that reduce confidence in the information. Objections begin with the word “But...”

BACKINGOBJECTION

An objection challenges a warrant or backing by identifying special conditions or exceptions that reduce confidence in the warrant or backing. Objections begin with “But...”

OBJECTION

The qualifier may change as a result of objections and rebuttals. A second qualifier may replace the first.

Five types of policy- relevant information are created and transformed by employing policy- analytic methods (Fig 1.1).

340 C H A P T E R 8 Developing Policy Arguments

FIGURE 8.1 Structure of a policy argument

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Types of Knowledge Claims A knowledge claim or contention is the conclusion of an argument. There are four types of knowledge claims: definitive, designative, evaluative, and advocative.

� Definitive. If a claim asserts that a policy has a particular definition, then the claim is definitive. Look for words such as is, is not, constituted by, represented by, similar to, and different from. A definitive claim states what something is or is not, what it is like or not like, or whether it belongs in one class or category rather than another. One type of definitive claim with particular relevance to policy is the metaphor. Policies have been defined metaphorically in terms of “war,” “contagion,” “epidemic,” and “quarantine.”

� Designative. If a claim asserts that some aspect of a policy has been or can be observed, or if observations are used to infer causes, then the claim is designa- tive. Look for words that describe observed or observable characteristics: became, originated, linked, caused, effected, consequence, prediction. Some terms that seem to be designative are really evaluative, for example, “He is a good liberal” or “The evil empire (or axis of evil) is the problem.” Claims using these and other “appraising” descriptions are not questions of fact; they are evaluative. At the same time, it is also possible to study values empirically by making observations relevant to appraising descriptions. Good examples are measures of democracy, ethical behavior, conservatism, and liberalism included in questionnaires and interview schedules.5

� Evaluative. If a claim asserts that some aspect of a policy has or does not have value or worth, it is evaluative. Look for words such as good, bad, right, wrong, beneficial, costly, efficient, responsive, equitable, just, fair, and secure. Examples: “The policy will bring about a living wage, thus moving society toward equity and responsiveness.” “The program is less efficient than expected.” “The policy will build a healthy economy.” Some evaluative claims refer to states or conditions (e.g., a just society) and some to procedural processes (e.g., a fair trial). Evaluative claims rest on warrants that involve values, ethics, and meta-ethics.

� Advocative. If a claim asserts that a government or division within it should take action, the claim is advocative. Look for words such as should, needs to, and must. Examples: “The World Bank should terminate its structural adjustment program.” “Congress should pass the Equal Rights Amendment.” “The United States should sign the Kyoto Treaty.” “Auto manufacturers should produce more fuel efficient vehicles.” Advocative claims rest on warrants that simultaneously involve facts and values.

Policy Maps Policy maps are useful in representing complex arguments. Arguments have seven elements: claim, information, warrant, backing, objection, rebuttal, and qualifier,

The Structure of Policy Arguments 341

5See Delbert C. Miller and Neil J. Salkind, Handbook of Research Design and Social Measurement, 6th ed. (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 2002).

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342 C H A P T E R 8 Developing Policy Arguments

(see Figure 8.1). The claim is the conclusion or contention of an argument. It is supported by policy-relevant information, which is usually the starting point of an argument. The warrant is a reason for making the claim on the basis of the informa- tion supplied. The qualifier expresses the approximate truth, plausibility, or confi- dence in the claim. Consider the following example:

The senator supports the privatization of the federal highway system, which will bring gains in efficiency and reduced taxes. Considering that the privatization of public services has been successful in other areas, this is definitely a “no brainer.” This same conclusion was reached by a panel of experts on privatization.

The senator’s argument may be broken down into its basic elements (Figure 8.2): “The senator supports the privatization of the federal highway system (INFORMA- TION), which will bring significant gains in efficiency and a reduction in taxes (CLAIM). Considering the WARRANT that the privatization of public services has

Privatization will bring significant gains in efficiency and a reduction in taxes.

CLAIM

The Senator supports the privatization of the federal highway system.

INFORMATION This is definitely a “no brainer.”

QUALIFIER I The Senator believes that the privatization of public services has been successful in other areas.

WARRANT

The Senator’s beliefs about privatization are based on the conclusions of an expert panel.

But these areas involved mass rapid transit, which is different from the federal highway system.

BACKING OBJECTION Considering the objections, the claim seems doubtful.

QUALIFIER II

But the experts are consultants to the Senator’s political party. The conclusions are biased, or at least have the appearance of being so.

OBJECTION

However, the experts are distinguished economists.

REBUTTAL

FIGURE 8.2 Argument map—privatizing transportation

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The Structure of Policy Arguments 343

been successful in other areas, QUALIFIER 1 states that “this is definitely a ‘no brainer.’” Additional elements are then introduced to strengthen the argument. For instance, a BACKING has been added (“This is the conclusion of an expert panel on privatization.”). Finally, an OBJECTION to the backing states that the experts are consultants to the senator’s party. A weak REBUTTAL then states that the experts are distinguished economists. The rebuttal is weak because it is not a plausible chal- lenge to the objection, which is about political bias and not academic standing. A second OBJECTION states that the management of urban mass transit is different from managing the federal highway system. This appears to be a plausible challenge. Finally, QUALIFIER 1 was that the claim is a “no brainer.” In QUALIFIER 2, this is reduced to “perhaps,” considering the strength of the objections and rebuttal. This considerably weakens the CLAIM that “Privatization will bring significant gains in efficiency and a reduction in taxes.”

BOX 8.1

Mapping a Policy Argument 6. Repeat the same procedure with the backing.

If there is a question whether a statement is a backing or a warrant, look for the one that is more general. This is the backing.

7. Remember that a warrant or backing may be implicit and unstated—do not expect arguments to be entirely transparent.

8. Look to the arguments of other stakeholders to find objections and rebuttals. If possible, obtain objections and rebuttals from someone who actually believes them.

9. Remember that elements may contain rules, principles, or entire arguments.

10. An uncontested argument is static; argumentation, which involves at least two parties, is dynamic and usually contested.

11. The initial qualifier usually changes when objections and rebuttals are advanced to challenge the claim.

12. Most qualifiers become weaker, although some stay the same. Some can grow stronger (a fortiori) by withstanding challenges.

13. Argumentation produces “trees” and “chains” involving dynamic processes of argumentation that change over time.

Policy arguments have seven elements: information, claim, qualifier, warrant, backing, objection, and rebuttal. The following guidelines are useful in identifying and arranging these elements:

1. If possible, identify arguments by performing a stakeholder analysis (see Chapter 3). Stakeholders are the main source of policy arguments.

2. Start by locating the claim, which is the endpoint or output of the argument. A claim is always more general than the information on which it is based. Claims involve an “inferential leap” beyond information.

3. Look for language that indicates the degree of credibility the arguer attaches to the claim—this is the qualifier.

4. Look for the information that supports the claim. The information answers two questions: What does the arguer have to go on? Is it relevant to the case at hand?

5. Look for the warrant, which in conjunction with the information supports the claim. The warrant answers the question: Why is the arguer justified in making the claim on the basis of the information?

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344 C H A P T E R 8 Developing Policy Arguments

MODES OF POLICY ARGUMENTATION Distinct modes of argumentation are used to justify policy claims. Modes of argumen- tation, which are specific patterns of reasoning include reasoning from authority, method, generalization, classification, cause, sign, motivation, intuition, analogy, parallel case, and ethics.6 Each of these modes of argumentation and its characteristic reasoning pattern is described in Table 8.1. Note that more than one mode may be used in a policy argument.

6Some of the modes presented here draw from Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger, “Toulmin or Argument: An Interpretation and Application,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 1006 (1960): 45–53; and Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning, pp. 213–37. I have added several additional modes.

TABLE 8.1

Modes of Policy Argumentation with Reasoning Patterns

Mode Reasoning Pattern

Authority Reasoning from authority is based on warrants having to do with the achieved or ascribed statuses of producers of policy-relevant information, for example, experts, insiders, scientists, specialists, gurus, power brokers. Footnotes and references are disguised authoritative arguments.

Method Reasoning from method is based on warrants about the approved status of methods or techniques used to produce information. The focus is on the achieved or ascribed status or “power” of procedures. Examples include approved statistical, econometric, qualitative, ethnographic, and hermeneutic methods.

Generalization Reasoning from generalization is based on similarities between samples and populations from which samples are selected. Although samples can be random, generalizations can also be based on qualitative comparisons. In either case, the assumption is that what is true of members of a sample is also true of members of the population not included in the sample. For example, random samples of n � 30 are taken to be representative of the (unobserved and often unobservable) population of elements from which the sample is drawn.

Classification Reasoning from classification has to do with membership in a defined class. The reasoning is that what is true of the class of persons or events described in the warrant is also true of individuals or groups described in the information. An example is the untenable ideological argument that because a country has a socialist economy it must be undemocratic, because all socialist systems are undemocratic.

Cause Reasoning from cause is about generative powers (“causes”) and their consequences (“effects”). A claim may be made based on general propositions, or laws, that state invariant relations between cause and effect for example, the law of diminishing utility of money. Other kinds of causal claims are based on observing the effects of some policy intervention on one or more policy outcomes. Almost all argumentation in the social and natural sciences is based on reasoning from cause.

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Modes of Policy Argumentation 345

Mode Reasoning Pattern

Sign Reasoning from sign is based on signs, or indicators, and their referents. The presence of a sign or indicator is believed to justify the expectation that some other sign or indicator will occur as well. Examples are indicators of institutional performance such as “organizational report cards” and “benchmarks” or indicators of economic performance such as “leading economic indicators.” Signs are not causes, because causality must satisfy temporal precedence and other requirements not expected of signs.

Motivation Reasoning from motivation is based on the motivating power of goals, values, and intentions in shaping individual and collective behavior. For example, a claim that citizens will support the strict enforcement of pollution standards might be based on reasoning that since citizens are motivated by the desire to achieve the goal of clean air and water, they will support strict enforcement.

Intuition Reasoning from intuition is based on the conscious or preconscious cognitive, emotional, or spiritual states of producers of policy-relevant information. For example, the belief that an advisor has some special insight, feeling, or “tacit knowledge” may serve as a reason to accept his or her judgment.

Analogy Reasoning from analogies is based on similarities between relations found in a given case and relations characteristic of a metaphor or analogy. For example, the claim that government should “quarantine” a country by interdicting illegal drugs—with the illegal drugs seen as an “infectious disease”—is based on reasoning that since quarantine has been effective in cases of infectious diseases, interdiction will be effective in the case of illegal drugs.

Parallel Case Reasoning from parallel case is based on similarities among two or more cases of policy making. For example, the claim that a local government will be successful in enforcing pollution standards is based on information that a parallel policy was successfully implemented in a similar local government elsewhere.

Ethics Reasoning from ethics is based on judgments about the rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness, of policies or their consequences. For example, policy claims are frequently based on moral principles stating the conditions of a “just” or “good” society, or on ethical norms prohibiting lying in public life. Moral principles and ethical norms go beyond the values and norms of particular individuals or groups. In public policy, many arguments about economic benefits and costs involve unstated or implicit moral and ethical reasoning.

Argumentation from Authority Here claims are based on authority. Whereas information consists of factual reports or expressions of opinion, the warrant affirms the reliability or trustworthiness of the source of the information. Depending on the social context, authorities may be kings, magicians, or religious leaders, or they may be scientists, professors, or news reporters.

In an authoritative argument, the claim reiterates the policy-relevant infor- mation that has been provided by the authority, whose reliability, status, or

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sagacity has been underwritten by the warrant. To illustrate (Figure 8.3), let us imagine that a policy analyst advising the National Security Council at the height of the 1999 U.S.-NATO attack on Yugoslavia made the designative claim,

346 C H A P T E R 8 Developing Policy Arguments

Though Western officials continue to deny it, there can be little doubt that the bombing campaign has provided both motive and opportunity for a wider and more savage Serbian operation than what was first envisioned.

CLAIM

Carnes Lord, a professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and former Bush Administration national security advisor, states that “Though Western officials continue to deny it, there can be little doubt that the bombing campaign has provided both motive and opportunity for a wider and more savage Serbian operation than what was first envisioned.”

INFORMATION The claim is almost certainly true.

QUALIFIER Mr. Lord has had a distinguished career in government and academia and wide practical experience. He is considered by many to be an honest, reliable, and perceptive analyst,

WARRANT

Lord’s judgment is consistent with that of US-NATO Commander Wesley Clark, who stated that the outcome of the bombing was “entirely predictable.”

BACKING

Another reliable source, State Department spokesman James Rubin, evades the question by stating that “the United States is extremely alarmed by reports of an escalating pattern of Serbian attacks on Kosovar Albanian citizens.”

OBJECTION

Rubin’s alarm merely reflects the Clinton Administration’s effort to deny responsibility for the consequences of the US-led bombing campaign.

REBUTTAL

FIGURE 8.3 Argumentation from authority—unintended consequences of the U.S.-NATO attack on Yugoslavia

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C: “Though Western leaders continue to deny it, there can be little doubt that the bombing campaign has provided both motive and opportunity for a wider and more savage Serbian operation than what was first envisioned.”7 The informa- tion, I, is from a statement by Carnes Lord, a professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and former Bush administration national security advisor. The warrant, W, affirms Lord’s reliability and is backed, B, by an additional authoritative argument intended to add to the persuasiveness of the argument. The objection, O, challenges the initial warrant, but without weakening the claim’s credibility, which is stated in the qualifier, Q. The rebuttal, R, has virtually no effect on Q, which does not change in response to the challenge by a rival authority, State Department spokesman James Rubin.

Method Argumentation from method is based on warrants about the approved status of methods used to produce information. Policy-relevant information may consist of factual statements or reports. The role of the warrant is to provide a reason for accepting the claim by associating the information with the use of an approved method, rule, or principle. Usually, the claim is that the condition described in the information should be regarded as valuable (or worthless), because of the method used to produce it. Consider the following public investment problem: An analyst has information I, that the production of energy per dollar is greater in nuclear power plants than in hydroelectric plants, which in turn produce more energy then solar plants. The claim, C, is that

The government should invest in nuclear energy. The warrant, W, associates the information, I, with claim, C, by invoking the transitivity rule of mathematical economics.8 The warrant is backed, B, by the presumption that transitivity is a “universal selection rule” that guarantees the rationality of choice.

The rebuttal, R, challenges the presumption about the universal validity of transitivity by pointing to the presence of cyclical preferences. The original qualifier Q1 is reduced from “very likely” to the new qualifier Q2, which is now stated as “quite uncertain” (Figure 8.4).

In argumentation from method, claims are assessed in terms of the achieved or ascribed status of methods or the rules guiding their use. Those who accept the authority of analytic methods such as econometrics, benefit-cost analysis, a or decision analysis falsely believe that the use of such methods actually “sets the policy agenda and its directions, that useful analysis will be used analysis.”9

The authority of methods need not be derived from rules of formal logic or mathematics, as the history of qualitative methods shows. Many qualitative methods originate in the hermeneutic tradition, which evolved from the interpretation of

Modes of Policy Argumentation 347

7Boston Globe, April 4, 1999. Quoted in Noam Chomsky, Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000), p. 35. 8On rules expressing transitive and cyclical preferences, see, for example, Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer, Modern Political Economy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1978), pp. 6–13. 9Allen Schick, “Beyond Analysis,” Public Administration Review 37, no. 3 (1977): 259.

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348 C H A P T E R 8 Developing Policy Arguments

biblical texts. The authority of qualitative methods, like any other, stems from the professional and scientific communities that create definitions of the purpose, scope, and proper application of approved methods.10 These communities are extra-scien- tific sources of authority.

The transitivity rule and other axioms of mathematics have also arisen from extra-scientific sources:

Consider the axiom which asserts the transitivity of preference: if A is preferred to B, and B to C, then A is (or rationally must be) preferred to C. The intuitive appeal of this assertion is so great that few if any economists feel the urge to build formal economic systems in which the axiom fails. Geometry . . . is the classic example; the intuitive strength of Euclid’s

The government should invest in nuclear energy.

CLAIM

The production of energy per dollar is greater in nuclear (N) power plants than hydroelectric (H) plants, which in turn produce more energy than solar (S) plants.

INFORMATION Absolutely. This is a universal selection rule.

QUALIFIER I The transitivity rule states that if N is preferred to H, and H is preferred to S, then N is preferred to S.

WARRANT

But the dangers of nuclear power outweigh the monetary benefits.

OBJECTION BACKING

But universality cannot be guaranteed. When groups make choices, preferences are cyclical, so that S is actually preferred to N.

OBJECTION However, the dangers of nuclear power are minimal in new plants as compared with old ones.

REBUTTAL

Transitivity is a universal selection rule necessary for making rational choices. The rule is supported by rational choice theorists.

Probably not, considering the strength of the objections.

QUALIFIER II

FIGURE 8.4 Argumentation from method—intransitivity of preferences for nuclear power

10Approved methods are part of Kuhn’s disciplinary matrix. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 103.

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“postulates” was so great that for two thousand years geometers played their games strictly within the domain . . . which Euclid had laid down. Even when non-Euclidean geometries were discovered in the early nineteenth century, most mathematicians never thought of them as valid.11

Adherence to approved methods is wrongly believed to make policy decisions more “rational.” A rational choice is thought to be possible if the analyst can order all consequences associated with action, if the ordering of consequences is transitive, and if the analyst can consistently and in a transitive fashion choose the alternative that will bring the greatest benefit in relation to cost.12 Challenges to this argument may be made on empirical, authoritative, intuitive, and ethical grounds.13 New schools of analysis may serve as a source of approved methods, new axioms providing for nontransitive preferences may come to be accepted on intuitive grounds, and rules that run counter to moral principles and ethical norms may be replaced with new ones.14 Challenges may also be made on prag- matic grounds, for example, by arguing that the transitivity rule does not actually promote better decisions in policy settings characterized by incomplete information, value conflicts, multiple competing objectives, partisan mutual adjustment, and “organized anarchy.”15 In the last analysis, a successful argument from method is a pragmatic matter. An argument from method must demonstrate only that the results of using particular rules are superior to those that occur without them and that the observed improvement is a consequence of using the rule or procedure.16

Generalization Arguments from generalization involve samples. Policy-relevant information consists of sampled elements—events, persons, groups, organizations, countries— that are taken to be representative of a larger population of the same elements. The function of the warrant is to affirm that what is true of the sampled elements is also true of the unobserved (and often unobservable) elements in the population. The policy claim rests on the argument that the sample is a satisfactory representation of the population.

Modes of Policy Argumentation 349

11C. West Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems: Basic Concepts of Systems and Organization (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 25. 12Joseph L. Bower, “Descriptive Decision Theory from the ‘Administrative’ Viewpoint,” in The Study of Policy Formation, ed. Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gergen (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 104–6. 13Good examples of these challenges may be found in Jeffrey Friedman, ed., The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996). 14See the discussion of the evolution of welfare economics in public policy analysis by Duncan MacRae Jr., The Social Function of Social Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 107–57. 15See Chapter 2. 16Bower, “Descriptive Decision Theory from the ‘Administrative’ Viewpoint,” p. 106. See Nicholas Rescher’s essays on methodological pragmatism, for example, Induction (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980).

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350 C H A P T E R 8 Developing Policy Arguments

To illustrate, consider the director of a community food bank who wants to know whether persons receiving food are getting an adequate daily allowance of calcium, one of the most important minerals in the body (Figure 8.5). The director, who is attentive to reasons that might justify additional funding for the food bank, makes the claim, C, that it is “pretty likely” that food bank clients are receiving sufficient calcium—specifically, given that the sampled amount of 755 milligrams (mg) of calcium could have occurred by chance 9 times out of 100, it is not reliably different from the recommended daily allowance (RDA) of 800 mg, an amount prescribed by the Food and Nutrition Board of the National Academy of Sciences.

In this case, the information, I, describes the average daily intake of calcium (755 mg) measured in a random sample (sometimes inappropriately called a “scientific sample” in policy circles) of fifty clients. The information, I, indicates that the difference between 755 mg and 800 mg could occur by chance 9 times out of 100, a conclusion reached on the basis of a statistical test (a “two-sample test”). The probability value (p � 0.09) is included in the qualifier, Q, with the ordinary words “probably true.” The warrant, W, which provides the reason for moving from I to C, has two parts: The rule that a random sample of at least 30 is adequate in such cases to generalize to the population from which the sample is selected; and the practice of accepting a level of statistical significance of p � 0.05 (5 times out of 100) as an “acceptable” level of risk. When pressed for additional justification, the director checks her statistics text to find the appropriate theoretical backing, B, for the rule n � 30. The B is the Central Limit Theorem of probability theory.

A member of the director’s staff believes that clients served by the food bank may have a calcium deficiency. He therefore challenges the claim with several rebuttals: the data on calcium intake are unreliable because of the way they were collected; and the sample is biased because it is not a random sample. The rebuttals are plausible, and the director’s qualifier, Q1, changed from “probably true” to Q2 “not likely” that clients are receiving their minimum RDA of calcium. The director’s original claim—that calcium intake is probably adequate—is diminished by the objections of the well-meaning and critical staff member.

Arguments from generalization are not always statistical, in the specific sense that statistics are estimates of population values (called parameters). Nonrandom samples—for example, purposive samples, theoretical samples, and sociometric (snowball) samples—do not permit statistical estimation. They are nevertheless useful in making claims about populations.17 Even case studies (where n � 1) may be used to generalize to wider populations by means of various pattern-matching methods.18

17Generalizability (external validity) in experimental research is essentially nonstatistical. Among other reasons this is why Campbell called it “proximal similarity.” See William R. Shadish, Thomas D. Cook, and Donald T. Campbell, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2002). 18See William N. Dunn, “Pattern Matching: Methodology,” International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (New York: Elsevier, 2002).

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Modes of Policy Argumentation 351

Food Bank clients are receiving sufficient calcium in their diet. There is no statistically significant difference between their daily intake of 800 mg of calcium and the recommended daily allowance (RDA) of 755 mg approved by the Food and Drug Administration.

CLAIM

The average daily intake of calcium in a sample of 50 Food Bank clients is 755 mg. The recommended daily allowance (RDA) is 800 mg.

INFORMATION The claim is probably true.

QUALIFIER I

No, it is probably untrue

QUALIFIER II

A random sample of 30 or more persons is usually acceptable as a basis for generalizing from the sample to the population. Given a sample of 30, a test was performed to determine the statistical significance of a difference in calcium intake of 45 mg (800–755). The test indicates that the difference is not statistically significant at the p = 0.05 level.

WARRANT

The Central Limit Theorem justifies a sample size of 30 and a statistical test based on the normal distribution, also known as the bell- shaped curve.

BACKING

The sample was not drawn randomly, but was based on clients who visited the Food Bank on the week- ends, when dieticians seemed to be available to interview clients. Tests of significance are not valid without a random sample.

OBJECTION

An evaluation of records showing the intake of calcium indicated that some clients were asked to estimate their calcium intake, while other were required to provide evidence of what foods they ate. Data on calcium intake are unreliable and should not be used for statistical tests.

OBJECTION

However, the weekend visitors were selected randomly by means of an interval sample of every 5th client who entered the Food Bank.

REBUTTAL

FIGURE 8.5 Argumentation from generalization—statistical inference as a basis for success in community nutrition

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Classification Argumentation from classification focuses on membership in a defined class. The reasoning is that what is true of the class of persons or events described in the warrant is also true of individuals or events that are members of the class, as they are described in the information. To illustrate, consider the following argument about the relationship between regime type and the control of terrorism (Figure 8.6). The information, I, is that Iran, Iraq, and the Palestinian Authority are authoritarian dictatorships. The claim, C, is that Middle Eastern states can control terrorism within their borders. The warrant, W, is that authoritarian dictatorships exercise firm control of terrorists and other armed groups within their territories. The backing, B, has two parts. The first is that firm control exercised by authoritarian dictatorships is possible because such regimes do not permit the private use of weapons without the express approval of the government. The objections, O, are that one or more of the Middle Eastern regimes lack such control because they permit the private use of weapons; and that the definition of “authoritarian regime” may be inappro- priate. The original qualifier Q1 (“virtually certain”) is reduced to Q2 (“not . . . certain at all”).

Middle Eastern states are authoritarian dictatorship.

INFORMATION This is virtually certain.

QUALIFIER I A key characteristic of authoritarian dictator- ships is that they exercise firm control over armed groups within their borders.

WARRANT

Firm control is possible because the private use of weapons is prohibited without the express approval of state authorities.

BACKING Considering the objections, the claim does not seem certain at all.

QUALIFIER II Unless the definition of authoritarian dictatorship, which was developed to characterize communist regimes, is not useful as a way to understand Middle Eastern states.

OBJECTION

But some states lack such control because they do not prohibit the private use of weapons. This is not be an important characteristic of authoritarian dictatorships after all.

OBJECTION

Middle Eastern states can control terrorist activities within their borders if they wish to do so.

CLAIM

FIGURE 8.6 Argumentation from classification—challenging claims about authoritarian rule and terrorism

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The plausibility of classification arguments depends on the completeness and internal consistency of the definition of the class. Various classes of political regimes—authoritarian dictatorships, totalitarian democracies, socialist democra- cies, capitalist democracies—are less homogeneous and internally consistent than popular classifications suggest. The same is true for classes of policies (e.g., “privatization”), organizations (e.g., “bureaucracy”), political doctrines (e.g., “liberal” and “conservative”), and groups (e.g., “lower class,” “middle class,” “upper class”). Many apparently simple classifications may turn out to be ideologies in disguise.

Cause Argumentation from cause focuses on the causes and effects of policies.19 In causal arguments, information consists of one or more evidently factual statements or reports about a policy. The warrant transforms these statements or reports by relat- ing them to generative powers (causes) and their results (effects). The claim relates these causes and effects back to the information supplied.

The role of causal arguments in transforming policy-relevant information into policy claims may be illustrated by Allison’s well-known causal explana- tions of foreign policy behavior during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962.20 Showing how different models yield alternative explanations of foreign policy, Allison argues that (1) government policy analysts think about problems of foreign policy in terms of implicit conceptual models that shape their thought; (2) most analysts explain the behavior of governments in terms of one basic model, one that assumes the rationality of political choices (rational policy model); and (3) alternative models, including those that emphasize organiza- tional processes (organizational process model) and bureaucratic politics (bureaucratic politics model), provide bases for improved explanations of foreign policy behavior.

19Causal argumentation dominates efforts of political scientists to explain policy making. Recent examples include contributors to Sabatier, Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd ed.(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007). Other examples are James E. Anderson, Public Policy-Making (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975); Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 3d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1978); Robert Eyestone, The Threads of Public Policy: A Study in Policy Leadership (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971); Jerald Hage and J. Rogers Hollingsworth, “The First Steps toward the Integration of Social Theory and Public Policy,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 434 (1977): 1–23; Richard I. Hofferbert, The Study of Public Policy (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974); Charles O. Jones, An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy, 2d ed. (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1977); Robert L. Lineberry, American Public Policy: What Government Does and What Difference It Makes (New York: Harper & Row, 1977); Austin Ranney, ed., Political Science and Public Policy (Chicago: Markham, 1968); Richard Rose, ed., The Dynamics of Public Policy: A Comparative Analysis (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1976); Ira Sharkansky, ed., Policy Analysis in Political Science (Cambridge, MA: Markham, 1970); and Peter Woll, Public Policy (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop Publishers, 1974). 20Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” American Political Science Review 3002, no. 3 (1969): 689–718.

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In contrasting alternative models, Allison examines explanatory arguments derived from the three conceptual models. In 1962, the policy alternatives open to the United States ranged from no action and diplomatic pressures to secret negotiations, invasion, surgical air strike, and blockade. The alternatives are assessed in terms of rival explanations of foreign policy behavior. The expla- nations conform to a type of causal explanation that philosophers call deductive- nomological (D-N), which holds that valid explanations are possible only when general theoretical propositions or laws link prior circumstances with subsequent events.21

Among the several advocative claims made at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, let us consider the policy recommendation actually adopted by the United States: “The United States should blockade Cuba.” In this case, the policy-relevant informa- tion, I, is “The Soviet Union is placing offensive missiles in Cuba.” The warrant, W, is since “the blockade will force the withdrawal of missiles by showing the Russians that the United States is determined to use force.” In providing additional reasons to accept the claim, the backing, B, states because “[a]n increase in the cost of an alternative reduces the likelihood of that alternative being chosen.”22 B represents a general theo- retical proposition, or law, within the rational policy model (Figure 8.7). In this case, Q1 (probably) changes to Q2 (probably not) after the objection, O, has successfully challenged the backing B.

The purpose of Allison’s account is not to demonstrate the inherent superiority of one or another of the three explanatory models. It is rather to show that the use of multiple competing models can result in improved explanations of foreign policy behavior. The use of multiple models moves analysis from a self-contained and static single argument about the relation between information and claim to a new stage of dynamic debate. In this context, the organizational, process model provides an objection, O, with its own backing, B, in the form of a competing causal argument. The objection, O, states that Soviet leaders may be unable to force their own orga- nizational units to depart from assigned tasks and routines. This can be expected to occur because “[m]ajor lines of organizational behavior are straight, that is, behavior at one time is marginally different from that same behavior at t � 1.”23

The backing, B, for the objection, O, is again a general proposition or law within the organizational process model.

The case of the Cuban missile crisis illustrates some of the limitations of causal argumentation based on D-N explanation. First, several competing causal arguments are equally compatible as general propositions or laws. These argu- ments, each backed by social science theories, cannot be confirmed or refuted solely on the basis of this or any other information or data.24 Second, a given causal argument, however persuasive, cannot directly lead to an advocative claim

21See Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: Free Press, 1965). 22Allison, “Conceptual Models,” p. 694. 23Ibid. p. 702. 24Georg H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca, NY: Comell University Press, 1970), p. 145; and Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

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or recommendation, because traditional causal explanations do not themselves contain value premises.25 Indeed, there is a suppressed value premise, which is that U.S. leaders are motivated by the value of security from the Soviet military presence in the Western Hemisphere. If some other value had motivated policy makers, either of the two competing causal explanations would have supported altogether different claims, for example, that the United States should invade and occupy Cuba.

The United States should force the Soviet Union to withdraw the missiles by blockading Cuba.

CLAIM

Reliable intelligence reports confirm that the Soviet Union is placing offensive missiles in Cuba.

INFORMATION A blockade will show Soviet leaders that the United States means business because it is prepared to use force.

WARRANT Probably QUALIFIER I

An increase in the cost of an action reduces the likelihood that it will be taken.

BACKING

But Soviet leaders may not convince their naval units to depart from standard operating procedures which permit only marginal changes in behavior.

OBJECTION

Research on organizations shows that major lines of behavior are straight: Behavior at time t+1 is almost always marginally different from behavior at time t.

WARRANT

Considering the objections, probably not.

QUALIFIER II

FIGURE 8.7 Argumentation from theoretical cause—competing deductive-nomological explanations of the cuban missile crisis

25This is not to say that they do not imply values, because empirical theories in the social and natural sciences rest on unstated value premises. See, for example, M. Gunther and K. Reshaur, “Science and Values in Political ‘Science,’ ” Philosophy of Social Sciences 1 (1971): 113–21; J. W. Sutherland, “Axiological Predicates in Scientific Enterprise,” General Systems 19 (1974): 3–14; and Ian I. Mitroff, The Subjective Side of Science: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Psychology of the Apollo Moon Scientists (New York: American Elsevier Publishing, 1974).

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Causal argumentation based on the D-N model of scientific explanation attempts to develop and test general propositions about causes and effects.26 Carl Hempel has elaborated D-N explanation as follows:

We divide explanation into two major constituents, the explanandum and the explanans. By the explanandum, we understand the sentence describing the phenomenon to be explained (not that phenomenon itself); by the explanans the class of those sentences which are adduced to account for the phenomenon. . . . [Scientific explanation] answers the question, “Why did the explanandum-phenomenon occur?” by showing that the phenomenon resulted from particular circumstances, specified in C1, C2, . . . , Ck, in accordance with laws L1, L2, . . . , Lr. By pointing this out, the argument shows that, given the particular circumstances and the laws in question, the occurrence of the phenomenon was to be expected; and it is in this sense that the explanation enables us to understand why the phenomenon occurred.27

A simple example illustrates traditional causal (D-N) explanation.28 If I leave my car outside overnight and the temperature drops below freezing, my full radiator (without antifreeze) will burst. Why will this happen? “My radiator burst” (explanandum). “My radiator was full of water, the cap was tightly fastened, and the temperature outside dropped below freezing” (circumstances, or Ck, in the explanans). And, “the volume of water expands when it freezes” (general proposition or law, Lr, in the explanans).

29 In this example, knowledge of prior circumstances and the appropriate law permits a prediction of the resultant event.

Questions have been raised about the suitability of D-N explanation in history and the social sciences.30 These questions arise, among other reasons, because policy analysis and other social sciences are partly evaluative and advocative (normative) in character. Every advocative claim contains both factual and value premises, whereas in traditional causal explanations, we evidently find only factual premises. Traditional causal explana- tions also require that the explanans precede (or accompany) the explanandum. Yet many advocative claims reverse this sequence, insofar as circumstances that explain action are situated in the future. Future circumstances, including intentions, goals, and desires, explain present actions to the extent that actions cannot occur without the motivation provided by such intentions, goals, and desires.31 Finally, any correspon- dence between the results of acting on an advocative claim and the conclusions of a causal argument may be purely coincidental. In policy making, predictions based on D-N explanations will fail if policy actors employ intelligent reflection to change their behavior or if unpredictable factors deriving from creative thought intervene.32

26Allison, “Conceptual Models,” p. 690 (note 4) tells us that Hempel’s D-N (deductive-nomological) explanation is the basis (backing) for his three models. 27Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, pp. 247–58. 28See von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, p. 12. 29Ibid., p. 12. 30Ibid., p. 11. 31Ibid., pp. 74–124; G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (London: Basil Blackwell, 1957); and W. H. Dray, Laws and Explanation in History (London: Oxford University Press, 1957). 32Alasdair Maclntyre, “Ideology, Social Science, and Revolution,” Comparative Politics 5, no. 3 (1973): 334.

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D-N explanation is not the sole legitimate form of causal argumentation in public policy. Another form is hypothetico-deductive (H-D) explanation, which involves the deduction of hypotheses from theories that do not involve propositions about invariant causal relations or laws. Often the hypotheses of interest are those dealing with policy or program actions designed to achieve some practical outcome.33 The relation between action and outcome, however, is not certain. If it were, it would conform to the following requirements, usually called the “essentialist” view of causation:

� The policy, x, must precede the outcome, y, in time. � The occurrence of the policy, x, must be necessary for the occurrence of y, the

outcome, which must not occur in the absence of the policy, x. � The occurrence of the policy, x, must be sufficient for the occurrence of y, the

outcome, which must occur when the policy, x, is present.

If these requirements were met, the relation between a policy action and an outcome would be certain. These requirements are virtually never satisfied in real-life policy settings. Instead, what occurs is that other conditions—uncontrolled contingencies that lie beyond the control of policy makers—make it impossible to know definitely whether a policy is necessary or sufficient for the occurrence of an outcome. The uncontrolled contingencies are plausible rival hypotheses that must be taken into account and, when possible, eliminated as competing explanations of a policy outcome. Here the best that may be expected is an optimally plausible claim, that is, an approximately valid causal inference.34 Figure 8.8 displays causal argumentation in the quasi-experimental tradition founded by Donald T. Campbell, a tradition based on the fundamental premise that causal argumentation in real-life policy settings requires the formulation, testing, and elimination of rival hypotheses.35

Figure 8.8 shows that rival hypotheses used to challenge the warrant change the initial qualifier from “definitely worthwhile” (QI) to “perhaps” (QII).

Sign Reasoning from sign is based on indicators and their referents. The presence of a sign indicates the presence of an event, condition, or process, because the sign and what it refers to occur together. Examples are indicators of institutional perform- ance such as “organizational report cards,” “benchmarks,” and “best practices.”36

Another example is the widely used set of indicators (actually indices) of economic performance—“leading,” “lagging,” and “coincident” economic indicators—published periodically by the Conference Board. Signs are not causes. As we saw earlier,

33See the discussion of the “activity theory of causation” in Thomas D. Cook and Donald T. Campbell, Quasi-Experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), ch. 1. 34The preeminent source on validity questions in the social and behavioral sciences is Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference. 35Rival hypotheses are also known as “threats to validity.” See Donald T. Campbell, Methodology and Epistemology for Social Science: Collected Papers, ed. E. S. Overman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). The example is from Campbell’s “Reforms as Experiments,” in the Overman edition. 36For example, William T. Gormley Jr. and David L. Weimer, Organizational Report Cards (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

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causality must satisfy additional requirements not expected of signs. Figure 8.9 displays argumentation from sign based on a correlation coefficient and probability value (p-value).

Figure 8.9 makes an important distinction between signs and causes. In modern statistical analysis, measures of correlation, regression, and statistical

Moreover, the statistical phenomenon of regression toward the mean is often found in time series of this kind.

WARRANT

Connecticut Governor Abraham Ribicoff contended that the crackdown on speeding is responsible for saving 40 lives in 1956, a reduction of 12.3 percent from the 1955 death toll. The program is “definitely worthwhile,” said Ribicoff.

CLAIM

Data on Connecticut traffic fatalities between 1955 and 1956 show a 12.3 percent decline.

INFORMATION “definitely worthwhile...”

QUALIFIER I

Considering the objection, a better word is “perhaps.”

QUALIFIER II

We reduced fatalities “by enforcing the law, something the safety experts said couldn’t be done because the people wouldn’t be behind it,” said Ribicoff.

WARRANT

But fatalities in 1955 were at an all time high. In 1956, fatalities regressed toward the average (mean) number of fatalities in the time series. This and not the policy was the real cause of the decline.

OBJECTION

FIGURE 8.8 Argumentation from practical cause—rival explanations of the effects of the connecticut crackdown on speeding

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significance (e.g., chi-square, t, and F values) are signs that refer to covariation. Covariation is a necessary but not sufficient condition of causation. In Figure 8.9, the rebuttal, R, states a causal relation between participation in Head Start programs and increased graduation rates. It is a causal relation because students who participated had higher graduation rates; those who did not had lower grad- uation rates; the program came before the graduation in time; and there was, in addition, a positive correlation between participation and graduation. It is positive, moderate in strength (r � 0.61), and statistically significant (p � 0.05). The objection, O, successfully challenges the argument from sign, which mistak- enly infers that Head Start is ineffective. The initial qualifier QI (“probably”) becomes QII (“probably not”).

Arguments from sign—whether presented as organizational report cards, benchmarks, or correlation coefficients—are at best statements of covariation or coincidence. Although covariation must be present for a causal relation to exist, causation requires that we fulfill certain conditions. John Stuart Mill,

Head Start programs are not effective in preparing disadvantaged students for graduation.

CLAIM

According to the expert, the larger the number of students enrolled in Head Start programs, the smaller the percentage of graduates. The correlation between number of students enrolled and number of graduates is negative (r = – 0.14) and statistically significant (p < 0.01).

INFORMATION This is probably true.

QUALIFIER I An expert in a cable news show reported that participation in Head Start programs causes students to fail. The larger the number of participants in these programs, the lower the graduation rate.

WARRANT

But participants should be compared to non-participants. A peer-reviewed study compared participants and non- participants in Head Start programs. Participants were 3 times more likely to graduate than non-participants (r = 0.57, p < 0.01).

OBJECTION No, it is probably untrue, considering the strong objection and weak rebuttal.

QUALIFIER II

However, this does not “prove” causation. REBUTTAL

Causation is more or less plausible, not perfect. OBJECTION

FIGURE 8.9 Argumentation from sign—quantitative indicators such as correlation coefficients and P-values do not “prove” causation

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the nineteenth-century English philosopher, presented a set of methods (some- times called “canons”) of inductive inference designed to discover causal relations. Mills’s methods are broadly employed today in the social and behav- ioral sciences, policy analysis, and program evaluation.37 The methods are those of agreement, difference, agreement and difference (the so-called “joint method”), concomitant variation, and residues. The basic idea of the first three methods is as follows:

� If on two or more occasions a presumed effect has only one antecedent condition in common, then that condition is probably the cause of the presumed effect. If on the first occasion, presumed effect Y is preceded by conditions X1, X3, and X5, and on the second occasion the presumed effect Y is preceded by conditions X2, X3, and X6, then X3 is probably the cause of Y.

� If a presumed effect and a presumed noneffect share every antecedent condition except one, which occurs along with the presumed effect, then that condition is probably the cause of the presumed effect. If the presumed effect Y and the presumed noneffect ~ Y share antecedent conditions X1, X2, X5, and X6, but do not share condition X3, which occurs along with presumed effect Y, then X3 is probably the cause of Y.

� If two or more occasions when a presumed effect occurs have only one antecedent in common, whereas two or more occasions when a presumed effect does not occur have nothing in common except the absence of that antecedent condition, then the antecedent condition in which the presumed effects and presumed noneffects differ is probably the cause. If on two or more occasions when presumed effect Y occurs it is accompanied solely by antecedent condition X3, whereas two or more occasions when presumed effect Y does not occur have nothing in common except the absence of antecedent condition X3, then X3 is probably the cause of Y.

The method of concomitant variation, which we know today as correlation (covariation, association), does not require additional comment here, except to say that it is a necessary condition of causation. The method of residues is similar to what we now call the analysis of residual (error) variance in econometrics. The logic is that what is “left over” when we have explained the effects of all the (presumed) causes of a phenomenon are the “residues” of other possible (and usually unknown) causes. To know whether we are analyzing causation or correla- tion, however, requires that we first employ the first three methods, because no statistical analyses, however advanced, are sufficient to establish causation. Statistics provides signs, not causes.

37Quasi-experimental design in program evaluation is based very largely on Mills’s methods. The best example is Cook and Campbell, Quasi-Experimentation, ch. 1, who critique and go beyond Mills’s methods. For another critique and reformulation, see William N. Dunn, “Pragmatic Eliminative Induction,” Philosophica 60, no. 2 (1997), Special issue honoring Donald T. Campbell. Comparative political science, comparative sociology, comparative public policy, and experimental psychology have also drawn on Mills’s methods.

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Motivation In motivational arguments, claims assert that an action should be adopted because of the motivating power of intentions, goals, or values. Motivational arguments seek to demonstrate that the intentions, goals, or values underlying a recommended course of action are such as to warrant its acceptance, adoption, or performance. It is often sufficient to know that large or important groups actually desire to follow the course of action stated in the claim.

Argumentation from motivation represents a form of reasoning that philoso- phers since Aristotle have called the practical syllogism, or practical inference. In practical inference, the major premise or warrant, W, describes some desired state or end of action, whereas the minor premise or information, I, relates a course of action to this desired state as a means to an end. The conclusion or claim, C, consists of a recommendation to act in a certain way to secure the desired state or end. Whereas in theoretical inference acceptance of a general proposition or law leads to the conclusion or claim, in practical inference acceptance of a premise about goals, values, or intentions leads to a conclusion or claim about actions that are in accordance with the premises.38 Claims in practical inference are usually designed to understand actions, whereas claims in theoretical inference seek to explain events.39

Practical reasoning is of great importance to policy analysis, a field in which one of the chief problems is to explain actions in terms of goals, values, and intentions:

The practical syllogism provides the sciences of man with something long missing from their methodology: an explanation model in its own right which is a definite alternative to the subsumption-theoretic covering law model [i.e., deductive- nomological explanation—author]. Broadly speaking, what the subsumption- theoretical model is to causal explanation and explanation in the natural sciences, the practical syllogism is to teleological explanation and explanation in history and the social sciences.40

Motivational argumentation not only provides an alternative explanatory model for policy analysis but also compels us to conceptualize policy making as a politi- cal process. Arguments from motivation force analysts to think in terms of the goals, values, and intentions of policy actors and to “enter the phenomenological world of the policy maker.”41 Motivational arguments also bring us closer to questions of values and ethics, which in other modes of policy argumentation are frequently and regrettably separated from “factual” matters. Figure 8.10 presents an argument from motivation that is challenged by another argument from motivation and an argument from classification. In this example, QI, (“definitely”) becomes QII (“probably”) after the rebuttal.

38von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, pp. 22–27. 39Ibid., pp. 22–24. See also Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy, eds., Understanding and Social Inquiry (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977); and Rein, Social Science and Public Policy (Baltimore, MD: Penguin 1976), pp. 14–15, 139–70. 40von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, p. 27. 41R. A. Bauer, Study of Policy Formation (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 4.

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Intuition In reasoning from intuition, policy claims are based on assumptions about the insight of participants in the policy-making process. Policy-relevant information consists of factual reports or expressions of opinion. The function of the warrant is to affirm that inner mental states (insight, judgment, understanding) of producers of information make them specially qualified to offer opinions or advice. The policy claim may simply reiterate the report or opinion supplied in the information. Consider this example of early military policy:

When in 1334 the Duchess of Tyrol, Margareta Maultasch, encircled the castle of Hochosterwitz in the province of Carinthia, she knew only too well that the fortress, situated on an incredibly steep rock rising high above the valley floor, was impregnable to direct attack and would yield only to a long siege. In due course, the situation of the defenders became critical: they were down to their last ox and had only two bags of barley corn left. Margareta’s situation was becoming equally pressing, albeit for different reasons: her troops were beginning to be unruly, there seemed to be no end to the siege in sight, and she had similarly urgent military business elsewhere. At this point the commandant of the castle decided on a desperate course of action, which to his men must have seemed sheer folly; he had the last ox slaughtered, had its abdominal cavity filled with the remaining barley, and ordered the carcass

Congress should pass the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).

CLAIM

A recent survey shows that the majority of citizens are motivated by the desire to prevent discrimination against women.

INFORMATION Definitely QUALIFIER I

If not definitely, probably, given the weak but important objection.

QUALIFIER II

The ERA is needed to prevent discrimination against women.

WARRANT

However, gender equality is a precondition of all other values including representative government.

REBUTTAL

But our system of government is a republic, where representatives of the people make policy. Most members of Congress are against the ERA.

OBJECTION

FIGURE 8.10 Argumentation from motivation—support for the equal rights amendment

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thrown down the steep cliff onto a meadow in front of the enemy camp. Upon receiving this scornful message from above, the discouraged duchess abandoned the siege and moved on.42

Figure 8.11 serves to emphasize some of the unique advantages of insight, judg- ment, and tacit knowledge in developing creative solutions to problems. However, it also points to difficulties. Although policy scholars urge that intuition, judgment, and tacit knowledge be incorporated into policy analysis,43 it is seldom possible

42Quoted in Paul Watzlawick, John Weakland, and Richard Fisch, Change: Principles of Problem Formation and Problem Resolution (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1974), p. xi.

The men should throw down the last ox.

CLAIM

The commandant believes that throwing down the last slaughtered ox will cause the duchess to abandon the siege.

INFORMATION Probably QUALIFIER

The commandant has proved to be capable of sound intuitive judgments.

WARRANT

However, the Commandant has never communicated with the Duchess, directly or through an intermediary.

REBUTTAL

The commandant understands (tacitly knows) that the duchess will abandon the siege if there is no longer any opposition.

BACKING

But the commandant has a secret deal with the Duchess.

OBJECTION

FIGURE 8.11 Argumentation from intuition—a counterintuitive solution avoids certain death

43For example, Yehezkel Dror, Ventures in Policy Sciences (New York: American Elsevier Publishing, 1971), p. 52; Sir Geoffrey Vickers, The Art of Judgment: A Study of Policy Making (New York: Basic Books, 1965); and Edgar S. Quade, Analysis for Public Decisions (New York: American Elsevier, 1975), pp. 4–5. Some observers have also commented favorably on the possibility of drug-induced changes in the mental states of policy makers. See Kenneth B. Clark, “The Pathos of Power: A Psychological Perspective,” American Psychologist 26, no. 12 (1971): 1047–57.

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364 C H A P T E R 8 Developing Policy Arguments

to identify in advance the methods of reasoning that are likely to yield insight or creativity. A creative act, observes Churchman, “is an act that cannot be designed beforehand, although it may be analyzable in retrospect. If this is the correct meaning of creativity, then no intelligent technician can be creative.”44

Analogy Reasoning from analogies and metaphors is based on similarities between relationships found in a given case and relationships found in a metaphor, analogy, or allegory (Figure 8.12). For example, the claim that government should “quarantine” a country by interdicting illegal drugs—with the illegal drugs presented as an “infectious disease”—is based on reasoning that because quarantine has been effective in cases of infectious diseases, interdiction will be effective in the case of illegal drugs. In arguments from analogy, claims are based on assumptions that relationships among two or more cases (not the cases themselves) are essentially

Congress should pass the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).

CLAIM

The ERA is analogous to the prevention of discrimination against women.

WARRANT Public opinion polls show that most citizens are against discrimination against women.

INFORMATION Certainly QUALIFIER I

Because both types of legislation demonstrates the general relationship between legislation and the prevention of discrimination.

BACKING

But this is a false analogy. Legislation against racial discrimination was accomplished through an Executive Order, not an amendment to the constitution. The latter is not politically feasible at present.

OBJECTION

Considering the strong objection, this is not feasible.

QUALIFIER II

FIGURE 8.12 Argumentation from analogy—the equal rights amendment and false analogy

44Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems, p. 17.

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similar. For example, claims about ways to reduce employment discrimination against women are sometimes based on assumptions about the success of policies designed to reduce discrimination against ethnic minorities.45

Parallel Case Reasoning from parallel case focuses on similarities among two or more cases of policy making (Figure 8.13). For example, a reason that a local government should strictly enforce pollution standards is that a parallel policy was successfully imple- mented in a similar local government elsewhere. Here, the claim is based on the assumption that the results of policies adopted in similar circumstances are worth- while or successful. Government agencies in the United States and abroad often face similar problems, and policy claims may be based on their common experiences. The British experiences with comprehensive medical care and city planning

45Lineberry, American Public Policy, p. 28.

The United States should adopt the Dutch model and decriminalize the use of illegal drugs.

CLAIM

The Netherlands has been successful in decriminalizing the use of illegal drugs.

INFORMATION This seems plausible.

QUALIFIER I

The proposal lacks merit, considering the strength of the objection.

QUALIFIER II

Because the United States and the Netherlands have similar problems with drug addicts in urban centers. Both countries are industrial democracies in which there is broad public support for policies to deal with the use of illegal drugs.

WARRANT

But this is a false parallel. Dutch political culture is tolerant and oriented toward rehabilitation, whereas American political culture is less tolerant and oriented toward punishment. Two-thirds of inmates in United States federal prisons are there for offenses which include the use of illegal drugs.

OBJECTION

FIGURE 8.13 Argumentation from parallel case—the dutch model and false parallel

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366 C H A P T E R 8 Developing Policy Arguments

(“new towns”), and the Dutch and Swiss approaches to the decriminalization of illegal drugs, have influenced debates about urban policy and drug policy in the United States. The experience of some states in adopting taxation, open housing, and equal employment opportunity policies has been used as a basis for policy at the federal level.46 A variation of argumentation from parallel case is an argument based on the experience of the same agency over time. Past policies in the same agency are used to support claims that the agency should adopt particular courses of action, usually those that are marginally different from the status quo. Claims about federal and state budgetary policies are typically based on assumptions about simi- larities with past policies adopted in the same agency.47

Ethics Reasoning from ethics is based on the rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness, of policies or their consequences (Figure 8.14). For example, policy claims are frequently based on moral principles stating the conditions of a “just” or “good” society, or on ethical norms prohibiting lying in public life. Moral principles and ethical norms go beyond the values and norms of particular individ- uals or groups. In public policy, many arguments about economic benefits and costs involve unstated or implicit moral and ethical reasoning. The warrant in an argument from ethics provides reasons for accepting a claim by associating it with some moral principle or ethical rule. The claim is that the person, situation, or condition referred to in the information should be regarded as valuable or worthless, or that a policy described in the information should or should not be adopted.

To illustrate ethical argumentation, consider Figure 8.14. Here, the evaluative claim, C, is that “the existing distribution of income in the United States is unjust.” The information, I, is the following:

In 1975, the top 20 percent of American families received 41 percent of all income, whereas the bottom 20 percent received 5.4 percent. In 1989, the top and bottom percentages were 46.0 and 3.8 percent; in 2007 they were 49.0 and 3.4 percent. From 1975 to 2007, average incomes increased by about 3 percent, and winners compensated losers through social service and welfare programs. But the United States has the greatest income equality of any indus- trialized state.

The warrant, W, is the Pareto rule, named after the Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923). The Pareto rule is a simple ethical principle supported by many policy economists.48 The rule states that “an optimum distribution of income in society is one in which some individuals benefit without others losing.” The backing, B,

46Ibid. 47See, for example, Aaron Wildavsky’s now classic treatment of incremental policy making in The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964). See also the discussion of models of policy change in Chapter 2. 48See Peter G. Brown, “Ethics and Policy Research,” Policy Analysis 2 (1976): 332–35.

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Modes of Policy Argumentation 367

for the warrant is “Since income is earned through ability, hard work, and one’s own labor.” The objection, O, is “But many of the winners receive income through fraud, discrimination, and unearned inheritance.” The partial rebuttal, R, is “However, persons have a right to their own family’s property” (Figure 8.14).

Figure 8.14 shows how an important contending moral principle, John Rawls’s principle of “justice as fairness,” can also serve as an objection to the Pareto principle. The example of Pareto optimality demonstrates that a widely accepted ethical rule, although it supports claims about a just society, does not

The existing distribution of income in the United States is just.

CLAIM

In 1975, the top 20 percent American households received 41 percent of all income, while the bottom 20 percent received 5.4 percent. In 1989, the top and bottom percentages were 46.7 percent and 3.8 percent, while in 2007 they were 49 percent and 3.4 percent. But from 1975 to 2007, average incomes increased while losers were compensated through social service and welfare programs. However, the U.S has the greatest income inequality of any industrialized country.

INFORMATION Evidently, the distribution is just.

QUALIFIER I Because a just distribution of income is one where at least one person benefits without others losing (Pareto Optimality). If there are losers, they can be compensated by winners, creating a state of “Virtual Pareto Optimality” (also known as the Kaldor–Hicks corollary.)

WARRANT

Since income is received through ability, hard work, and one’s own labor.

But the losers are becoming worse off without adequate compensation. Between 1975 and 2007, the income of the bottom 20 percent declined from 5.4 percent to 3.4 percent, a decline of nearly 60 percent. This is not just.

BACKING OBJECTION This is not evident, considering the strength of the objections.

QUALIFIER II

But the winners receive income through fraud, discrimination, and family inheritance.

OBJECTION

However, families have a right to their own property.

REBUTTAL

Because a just distribution of income is one where those worse off are made better off. This is John Rawls’s principle of justice as fairness.

WARRANT

FIGURE 8.14 Argumentation from ethics—income distribution and justice as fairness

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368 C H A P T E R 8 Developing Policy Arguments

apply to situations involving fraud, discrimination, and inheritance. By engaging in the systematic analysis of underlying ethical and moral reasoning, parties to a debate are also compelled to clarify the meaning of key concepts such as entitlement, which are more complex than may be apparent at first glance. Parties making a claim also may be compelled to consider whether particular ethical rules, such as Pareto and Rawlsian optimality, violate their own moral convictions. Proponents of the Pareto rule may see that its application violates moral convictions about the necessity of basing principles of entitlement on ability and work. If this is done for welfare recipients, why not for heirs to estates? In short, the analysis of ethical argumentation can help us probe ethical rules and moral principles to determine whether they are general in their applicability and internally consistent.49

Ethical argumentation, it should be emphasized, differs from each of the other modes of reasoning in one essential respect: Whereas each of the other modes takes values as “given”—for example, values that are described in public opinion surveys are a basis for arguments from motivation (Figure 8.10)—the process of ethical argumentation attempts to discover whether there are good reasons to make ethical claims.

EVALUATING POLICY ARGUMENTS The evaluation of policy arguments facilitates critical thinking in public policy analysis. So far, we have looked at the structure of arguments, the process of argu- mentation, and modes of reasoning employed in making policy claims. This enables the identification of hidden or tacit assumptions and shows how the plausibility of a claim, as expressed in its qualifier, changes as a result of objections and rebuttals introduced in the course of policy argumentation.

We now turn to specific criteria for evaluating arguments. Some of these criteria come from propositional logic, a discipline that offers criteria for determining— without qualification and with deductive certainty—the formal validity of arguments.50 Other criteria originate in a continuously evolving body of standards for assessing the informal validity of arguments.51 Still other criteria come from procedures employed by methodologists who work in the hermeneutics and inter- pretationist (Verstehende) traditions. These traditions have long been concerned with discovering and accurately representing the meaning of human actions, whether expressed in the form of written texts or as spoken language.52 Finally, some criteria originate in philosophical pragmatism, an epistemology and method- ology that is useful for evaluating entire systems of argumentation.53

49MacRae, Social Function of Social Science, pp. 92–94. 50Classic sources on formal logic include Irving M. Copi, An Introduction to Logic (New York: Macmillan, 1953). 51See Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning, Part V: Fallacies: How Arguments Go Wrong, pp. 129–97. 52The classic treatise on hermeneutics, originally published in 1960, is Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury, 1975). 53See Rescher, Induction.

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Evaluating Policy Arguments 369

Some Hermeneutic Guidelines Hermeneutics investigates the meanings of human texts. It is perhaps the most com- prehensive and systematic of the qualitative methodologies. The term qualitative, contrary to a common misunderstanding in the social sciences,54 is not simply the logical complement of “quantitative,” in the sense that qualitative refers to that which is not quantitative or statistical. For this reason, it is inappropriate to employ the term qualitative to small-n case study research or the discrete (versus continu- ous) level of measurement. Rather, qualitative methods—also known as hermeneu- tic, interpretive, ethnographic, or constructivist methods—are expressly designed to investigate the meanings of individual and collective action.55 Statistical and other forms of quantitative analysis are not appropriate for this purpose.

Human texts refer not only to written documents that are products of human action, for example, legislative transcripts and laws that originate as policy debates; they also refer to the actions themselves, whether or not they have been expressed in written form. Among various ways to demonstrate the importance of hermeneutic guidelines to the evaluation of policy arguments, a focus on ethical argumentation is most revealing. Consider alternative ethical arguments about a prisoner captured by soldiers from the opposing army:

� Argument A. The prisoner is not a member of a regular fighting force. He is a common criminal, a terrorist who lies when interrogated about terrorist plots and other military secrets. Because he does not qualify formally as a prisoner of war, he should not be protected against “inhumane treatment” and torture.

� Argument B. The prisoner is a freedom fighter who is combating the terror and oppression inflicted by the enemy. He is a loyal soldier who has a moral duty to mislead interrogators about military secrets. He should be protected as a prisoner of war.

� Argument C. The prisoner is a member of a fighting force constituted by a standing army. He is a prisoner of war whose loyalty demands that he mislead interrogators about military secrets. As such, he should receive the protections against inhumane treatment afforded any prisoner of war.

The evaluation of these arguments can benefit from guidelines for the interpretation of written or oral argumentation (Procedural Guide 8.2).

The main function of arguments A and B is rhetorical, not dialectical or logical- empirical. Although the use of A and B as rebuttals to each other would contribute to the dialectical function, this is not the main purpose of A and B. A and B do present evidently factual statements, some of which appear to be empirically sound and uncon- troversial. A prisoner was captured, he was involved as a combatant, and he was not telling the truth. What is disputed are two main issues: Is it is morally and legally right to lie under the circumstances? Does the soldier qualify as a prisoner of war?

54See, for example, a widely used text by Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: The Logic of Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). 55For an extended critical essay on the meaning of qualitative see John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1995).

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370 C H A P T E R 8 Developing Policy Arguments

Other guidelines also apply. The quotation marks around some of the words (“prisoner of war” and “inhumane treatment”) conceal or obscure meanings. The contexts of A and B are also important for understanding the arguments. Given the history of many conflicts, it is not surprising that both sides regard opponents as terrorists. The principle of hermeneutic charity encourages giving the benefit of the doubt to each party, for example, by trying to understand that both seek to be treated equally. The one side contests the moral and legal acceptability of attacks on their troops (and on civilians) by out-of-uniform combatants, arguing that such practices are unfair. The other side affirms the moral and legal acceptability of such acts, on grounds that such acts are fair when one side has a preponderance of mod- ern weaponry. Finally, both arguments make liberal use of pejoratives—“extremist,” “criminal,” “terrorist,” “propagandists,” “freedom fighter,” “oppression”—that obscure rather than clarify moral and legal issues.

If we were to rephrase the arguments, introducing rebuttals and replacing absolute with qualified claims, it would look something like argument C. Argument C has the

BOX 8.2

Guidelines for Interpreting Arguments

� Policy argumentation has three major functions: to generate debate that improves the validity, soundness, and efficacy of policies (dialectical function); to present optimally valid and empirically sound conclusions (logical-empirical function); and to persuade others to accept policy arguments (rhetorical function), apart from the validity, soundness, or usefulness of the arguments.

� Look for concealed meanings in words, sentences, and entire arguments. A word or sentence may not mean what it says on the surface. Example: “He is a good socialist” may not mean that the person described performs well as a socialist; it rather may mean that the person’s identity as a socialist is associated with some kind of weakness or flaw.

� Distinguish between the surface meaning of a word, sentence, or argument and its meaning in the context of the arguer. Try to identify any differences in your understanding from that of the arguer. Example: “The mayor should not have publicly acquiesced to the demonstrators’ demands.” Several potential misinterpretations

are possible: Someone other than the mayor should have acquiesced; the mayor should not have acquiesced in public; the mayor should not have acquiesced at all.

� Observe the principle of hermeneutic charity, which requires that disagreements about meaning be resolved by accepting, or trying to understand, what the arguer is trying to say. Example: Critics of arguments presented in quantitative language often label such arguments (and the arguers) as “logical positivists,” notwithstanding the fact that quantification, per se, has little to do with logical positivism. A charitable effort to understand what the arguer actually believes can solve this problem.

� Look for terms that are used pejoratively to discredit a person or policy. On the surface, these terms can be neutral; but in context, they are often pejorative. Examples: “This is just another new bureaucracy.” “These are the arguments of typical ‘tree-huggers.’ ” “The report, written by a bunch of ‘qualitative’ researchers, is unacceptable.”

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Evaluating Policy Arguments 371

advantage of isolating the contested issue, which is one of conflicting obligation: In the ethics of war, there has been a widespread understanding that prisoners who mislead interrogators about military secrets are displaying courage, honor, patriotism, and other virtues. Here, the same understanding would presumably apply to both sides.

Guidelines from Informal and Formal Logic Hermeneutic guidelines are designed to enhance the understanding of meanings. Questions concerning the soundness, credibility, or plausibility of arguments do not arise, because the aim is to achieve an accurate interpretation of what arguers mean. By contrast, the fields of informal and formal logic provide guidelines for recognizing and assessing the significance of informal fallacies.56 Here as elsewhere the term guideline is used in place of “rule,” because there is no way to determine with certainty whether an argument is fallacious. Hence the analysis of informal fallacies does not permit all or none conclusions.

As we saw in the first part of this chapter, numerous modes of argumentation are generally recognized as appropriate to policy discourse. Arguments of the following kind are formally valid:

� Hypothetical syllogism. If p implies q, and q implies r, then p implies r. Or: p)q, q ); r, ∴ p ) r () � implies). Example: A transitive preference ordering is one form of the hypothetical syllogism. Given three projects, A, B, and C, if A p B, and B p C, then A p C (p � preferred to). This formally valid argument can be empirically unsound.

� Modus ponens. Modus ponens (method of affirming) asserts that if p implies q, and p occurs, then q will occur. If p ) q, and p, then q. Example: If invest- ment I in a project produces outcome O, and investment I is made, then outcome O will result. Although this argument is formally valid, the conclusion assumes that no causally relevant factor other than I is present, a situation that almost never exists. This formally valid argument can be empirically unsound.

� Modus tollens. Modus tollens (method of denying) asserts that if p implies q, and q does not occur, then p is not a cause . If p ) q, and q does not occur (~ q), then p is not a cause (~ p). Example: If investment I in a program produces outcome O, and O does not occur, then I is not a cause. This formally valid argument can be empirically unsound.

We now turn to modes of argumentation that are generally recognized as formally invalid, inappropriate, or unsound—however persuasive they may appear on first glance. These modes of argumentation are called fallacies. A fallacy is an argument that is weakened or seriously flawed because it uses irrelevant or inadequate information, erroneous or unsound reasoning, or inappropriate and misleading language. Table 8.2 provides a listing of fallacies and guidelines that are helpful in recognizing them.

56The terms informal logic and informal fallacy are used in the discipline of logic, in which formal logic and formal fallacy are also distinguished.

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372 C H A P T E R 8 Developing Policy Arguments

TABLE 8.2

Guidelines for Identifying Invalid Arguments and Fallacies

Fallacy Guideline

Affirming the Consequent

A matter of formal (propositional) logic. A logically invalid argument is the following: If p then q, and q, then p (p ) q, q, therefore p). “The paradigm of ‘proof through prediction,’ ” notes Merton, “is, of course, logically fallacious: If A (hypothesis), then B (prediction). B is observed. Therefore, A is true.”* If the strict enforcement of speeding causes traffic accidents to decline, and traffic accidents decline, then strict enforcement was the cause. In scientific research, this form of argument, although formally invalid, can be useful because a hypothesis may be improved by testing conditions other than B, that is, rival hypotheses.

Denying the Antecedent

Again, a matter of formal logical validity. If p then q, and not-p, then not-q (p ) q, ~ p, therefore ~ q) is fallacious. Example: Because market economies are democracies, and country X is not a market economy, it is not a democracy.

False Analogy The comparison of two relationships believed to be similar disregards important differences that make the comparison relatively unsound. Example: Because drug addiction is like an infectious disease, quarantining addicts is the only policy that will work.

False Parallel The comparison of two cases believed to be similar disregards important differences that make the comparison unsound. The acquiescence of the United States in World War II led to genocide and ethnic cleansing. The United States cannot acquiesce in ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.

Hasty Generalization

In making a generalization from particular instances of a case, a failure to recognize that there are too few instances of the case, or that the instances are exceptional rather than typical. In conducting opinion surveys, an inadequate sample size will yield too few instances, and a failure to use random sampling— with which every element or instance has an equal chance of being selected—is likely to yield exceptional conclusions rather than those typical of the population. Example: “Focus group” interviews with fifteen typical voters conducted before the election show that there is greater support for candidate A than candidate B.

False Cause In making a claim about cause and effect, arguing that a single cause is responsible for an effect, but without examining other plausible causes. False causes also stem from confusing statistical correlation or covariance with causality and inferring cause from temporal sequence alone (post hoc fallacy). Examples: Excessive government spending is responsible for the slow growth of GDP (single false cause). That economic conditions affect social well-being is evident from the statistically significant positive correlation (r � 0.74, p � 0.05) between suicide and unemployment (false cause based on correlation). After the Reagan (or Clinton) administration took office, we had the highest unemployment (or government spending) in twenty years (post hoc fallacy).

Fallacy of Composition

Concluding that something is true of the whole because it is true of its parts. The fallacy of composition (also called the aggregative or holistic fallacy) involves all parts, not just a sample, so it differs from the fallacy of hasty generalization (see earlier entry). Example: Vehicle safety studies of the severity

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Evaluating Policy Arguments 373

Fallacy Guideline

of damage suffered by test robots riding at different speeds in automobiles show that speed and severity of damage are strongly and positively correlated. This is striking evidence that “speed kills!” But studies of fatal accidents show that approximately 20 percent of fatal accidents are related to speeding.

Fallacy of Division Concluding that something is true of the parts because it is true of the whole (also called the individualistic fallacy). Example: Because the per capita income of a country has increased, everyone is better off. In many countries, however, this is false. Persons who are better off become even better off, whereas those worse off become even worse off. Another example is using the arithmetic mean and other averages to describe a group, without examining differences among the group’s members (e.g., outliers in a scatter plot).

Fallacy of the Slippery Slope

Concluding on the basis of insufficient or inadequate evidence that if one event occurs, then others will follow in an inevitable or uncontrollable sequence. Example: If the legislature passes a new law requiring stricter registration of handguns, it will lead to government confiscation of all guns.

Begging the Question

A claim is assumed as a reason or evidence. Example: With a force of 500,000 troops we will be able to invade Iraq and topple President Saddam Hussein. It will take this many troops to do the job.

Ad Hominem An individual’s personal characteristics are used as part of an argument, when such characteristics are irrelevant to an issue. Examples: (1) An eminent natural scientist concludes that welfare reform is unsound. (2) The argument of the environmentalists is deeply flawed. After all, these “tree huggers” are just socialists in disguise. and (3) Theories of economic development are products of Western thinking. Obviously, they are inapplicable to the non-Western world. Note that when personal characteristics are relevant, no ad hominem fallacy is involved. For example, “expert witnesses” in court cases should have appropriate expertise.

Ad Populum The characteristics or beliefs of a group or community are used as part of an argument, when the characteristics or beliefs are irrelevant to the issue. Example: The majority of the community believes that fluoride causes cancer.

Appeal to Tradition A claim is based on conformity to tradition, when tradition is largely or entirely irrelevant to the issue. Examples: (1) We have always done it this way. (2) The Founding Fathers would be appalled by the senator’s proposal. and (3) The successful disciplines have succeeded because they have emulated physics. This should be the model the social sciences, if they want to succeed.

Accent A misplaced emphasis on a word, phrase, or portion of an argument results in misunderstanding or misinterpretation. The use of italics, boldface print, variable fonts, photos, clip art, and colors can accentuate the importance of relatively sound or plausible, as well as relatively unsound or implausible, arguments or parts of arguments. A leading example of the fallacy of accent is quoting or extracting information, reasons, or arguments out of context.

* Robert K. Merton Social Theory and Social Structure, rev. ed. (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957), p. 99n. The same point is made by Donald T. Campbell, Epistemology and Methodology for Social Science: Selected Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 168.

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CHAPTER SUMMARY This chapter has examined in detail the structure and process of policy argumentation, focusing on contrasts among types of claims, the identifi- cation and arrangement of elements of policy arguments, and the effects of objections and rebuttals on the dynamics of argumentation.

The chapter also contrasted different modes of policy reasoning and offered guidelines for the identification and assessment of common fallacies that weaken or seriously flaw policy arguments. Policy argumentation is central to policy analysis and the policy-making process.

REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. Use three (3) of the following terms to con-

struct definitive, designative, evaluative, and advocative claims. There should be twelve (12) claims in all.

crime fiscal crisis pollution human rights terrorism ethnic cleansing quality of life unemployment global warming poverty

2. Develop a policy argument on the basis of one or more of the terms in question 1.

3. Convert the argument in question 2 into a policy debate by providing an objection and a rebuttal.

4. Explain why the qualifier changed (if it did) after introducing the objection and rebuttal. If the qualifier did not change, why not?

5. Define the term fallacy. Does the commission of a formal fallacy such as affirming the conse- quent invalidate an argument? Is the same true for informal fallacies, for example, false analogy or ad populum?

DEMONSTRATION EXERCISES 1. Obtain an online or hard copy of the interna-

tional affairs section of a newspaper. Identify and describe as many modes of argument as you can. Would you expect to find different modes of argument in academic journals than in newspapers? Explain.

2. Read the letters to the editor in a newspaper, magazine, or online bulletin board or blog. Find as many examples of formal and informal falla- cies as you can. A variation of this exercise is to break into groups to complete the assignment.

3. Read Case 8.1 (Pros and Cons of Balkan Intervention), which is drawn from an editorial in the Los Angeles Times. Use the argument- mapping procedures presented in this chapter to analyze the pros and cons (or strengths and weaknesses) of the recommendation that the

United States should not intervene in the Balkans. In doing this exercise, either display the elements of argument with Microsoft Draw or use Rationale, the special computer program for mapping the structure of policy arguments.

4. Write a one-page analysis in which you assess the overall plausibility of the claim “The con- flict in Bosnia is somebody else’s trouble. The United States should not intervene militarily.” Prepare an argument map and hand it in with your one-page analysis.

5. Following is an argument map in which the warrants, backings, objections, rebuttals, and qualifiers have been scrambled.57 Rearrange the elements to make a persuasive argument and counterargument. Study Case 8.2 as an example.

57This was done with a sub-program in Rationale.

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Bibliography 375

BIBLIOGRAPHY Alker, H. R., Jr. “The Dialectical Logic of Thucydides’

Melian Dialogue.” American Political Science Review 82, no. 3 (1988): 805–20.

Anderson, C. W. “Political Philosophy, Practical Reason, and Policy Analysis.” In Confronting Values in Policy Analysis. Edited by F. Fischer and J. Forester. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1987.

Apthorpe, R., and D. Gasper, eds. Arguing Development Policy: Frames and Discourses. London: Frank Cass, 1996.

Dunn, W. N. “Policy Reforms as Arguments.” In The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning. Edited by F. Fischer and J. Forester. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993.

Fischer, D. H. Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought. New York: Random House, 1970.

Fischer, F. Evaluating Public Policy. Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1995.

Fischer, F., and J. Forester, eds. The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993.

Gasper, D., and R. V. George. “Analyzing Argumen- tation in Planning and Public Policy: Improving and Transcending the Toulmin- Dunn Model.” Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 25 (1998): 367–90.

Majone, G. Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989.

McCloskey, D. N. The Rhetoric of Economics. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988.

Mitroff, I. I., R. O. Mason, and V. Barabba. The 1980 Census: Policy Making Amid Turbulence. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1985.

The Senate should not authorize the use of force in Libya.

Risky and uncertain

The U.S. has an obligation to intervene.

Without a doubt.

The leader is a brutal dictator who has no interest except his own

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is reported to be a supporter of terrorism.

Economic sanctions are a better alternative. They have worked in the past in Asia.

An intervention is unwarranted. It is an artificial creation of the President and no vital interests are at stake.

The actions of the Libyan Army are a clear violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

There is no assurance the dissident groups will not oppose the U.S. later.

The museum holds ancient treasures and historical artifacts.

Diplomatic options have not been exhausted.

This is a civil war and the U.S. should not intervene in the internal affairs of a state.

The war may not be winnable unless the U.S. puts “boots on the ground.”

Dissident groups are engaged in armed conflict with the Libyan Army, which is winning.

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Roe, E. Narrative Policy Analysis. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994.

Scriven, M. Reasoning. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976. Stone, D. Policy Paradox: The Art of Political

Decision Making. Rev Ed. New York: W. W. Norton, 2002.

Toulmin, S., R. Rieke, and A. Janik. An Introduction to Reasoning. 2d ed. New York: Macmillan, 1984.

Van Gelder, Tim. “The Rationale for Rationale.” Law, Probability & Risk 6, nos. 1–4 (2007): 23–42.

CASE 8.1 PROS AND CONS OF BALKAN INTERVENTION58

“Must the agony of Bosnia-Herzegovina be regarded, with whatever regrets, as somebody else’s trouble? We don’t think so, but the arguments on behalf of that view deserve an answer. Among them are the following:

� The Balkan conflict is a civil war and unlikely to spread beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia. Wrong. Belgrade has missiles trained on Vienna. Tito’s Yugoslavia claimed, by way of Macedonia, that northern Greece as far south as Thessaloniki belonged under its sovereignty. Those claims may return. “Civil” war pitting non-Slavic Albanians against Serbs could spread to Albania, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece.

� The United States has no strategic interest in the Balkans. Wrong. No peace, no peace dividend. Unless the West can impose the view that ethnic purity can no longer be the basis for national sovereignty, then endless national wars will replace the Cold War. This threat has appeared in genocidal form in Bosnia. If it cannot be contained here, it will erupt elsewhere, and the Clinton administration’s domestic agenda will be an early casualty.

� If the West intervenes on behalf of the Bosnians, the Russians will do so on behalf of the Serbs,

and the Cold War will be reborn. Wrong. The Russians have more to fear from “ethnic cleansing” than any people on Earth. Nothing would reassure them better than a new, post-Cold War Western policy of massive, early response against the persecution of national minorities, including the Russian minorities found in every post-Soviet republic. The Russian right may favor the Serbs, but Russian self-interest lies elsewhere.

� The Serbs also have their grievances. Wrong. They do, but their way of responding to these grievances, according to the State Department’s annual human rights report, issued this past week, “dwarfs anything seen in Europe since Nazi times.” Via the Genocide Convention, armed intervention is legal as well as justified.

� The UN peace plan is the only alternative. Wrong. Incredibly, the plan proposes the reorganization of Bosnia-Herzegovina followed by a cease-fire. A better first step would be a UN declaration that any nation or ethnic group proceeding to statehood on the principle of ethnic purity is an outlaw state and will be treated as such. As now drafted, the UN peace plan, with a map of provinces that not one party to the conflict accepts, is really a plan for continued ‘ethnic cleansing.’” �

58From the Los Angeles Times, January 24, 1993, p. A7.

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CASE 8.2 IMAGES, ARGUMENTS, AND THE SECOND PERSIAN GULF CRISIS, 1990–91

The analysis of policy arguments can be employed to investigate the ways that policy makers represent or structure problems (Chapter 3). We can thereby identify the images, or problem representations, that shape processes of making and justifying decisions. For example, during times of crisis, the images that U.S. policy makers have of another country affect deliberations about the use of peacekeeping and negotiation, the imposition of economic sanctions, or the use of deadly force. This case looks at the deliberations surrounding the U.S. decision to use military force to produce an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait during the Second Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990–91.

It is important to recognize that there have been three Persian Gulf crises since 1980. The First Persian Gulf Crisis, which involved eight years of war between Iraq and Iran, lasted from September 1980 to August1988. An estimated half-million civilians and military combatants died in the conflict.

The Third Gulf Crisis began in 2003 and appeared to be coming to a conclusion in 2011, as occupying U.S. and coalition troops continued a steady withdrawal from Iraq. Between 2003 and 2010, it is estimated that between 700,000 and 1.5 million Iraqi civilians died as a direct and indirect result of the war, and some 11,800 members of the Iraqi security forces and police were killed.59 There were nearly 4,500 U.S.

military deaths and another 220 among coalition forces, about one-half of whom were British.

The Second Persian Gulf Crisis may be conveniently dated to August 2, 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Seven months later, on March 3, 1991, a cease-fire was signed.60 When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the United States began sending troops and Patriot missiles to defend Saudi Arabia and Israel. The purpose was to defend against Iraqi SCUD missile attacks on Riyadh, Tel Aviv, and Haifa. An economic embargo was also put in place along with a U.S.-UN Security Council demand for an immediate withdrawal from Kuwait. Over the next five months, Saddam Hussein failed to comply. At that point, a Security Council resolution was passed giving Iraq until January 15, 1991, to withdraw. The resolution authorized intervention by a U.S.-led coalition after that date.

Prior to the deadline for the withdrawal from Kuwait, the U.S. Senate debated the merits of U.S. intervention. Two policy alternatives were presented. One of these, the Dole-Warner resolution, supported the Bush administration and the United Nations by authorizing the use of military force to compel a withdrawal. The other resolution, the Mitchell-Nunn resolution, called for the continued use of sanctions. The vote in favor of the Dole-Warner resolution was 52–47.

Political scientist Richard Cottam and cognitive political psychologist James Voss show how the images

59Hannah Fischer, “Iraq Casualties: U.S. Military Forces and Iraqi Civilians, Police, and Security Forces.” U.S. Congressional Research Service Report (June 11, 2010). 60Earlier, on February 15, the Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr led a revolt against Saddam Hussein’s regime, partly in response to President George H. W. Bush’s earlier call on February 2 for Iraqis to over- throw Hussein’s government. In the same month, the Kurds in Northern Iraq also rose up in an attempt to overthrow Saddam’s regime.

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378 C H A P T E R 8 Developing Policy Arguments

of another state can be investigated by focusing on indicators of the perceived motivation, capability, culture, and decision processes of that state:61

� Ally Image. The image of the ally is known by finding in foreign policy discourse indicators referring to the mutually beneficial goals of the ally, to the ally’s adequate but often less than possible military and economic capabilities, the ally’s comparably civilized culture, and the ally’s well-managed and popularly supported process of governmental decision making.

� Enemy Image. The image of the enemy state is known by finding in foreign policy discourse indicators referring to the aggressive, evil, and expansionistic motivations of the enemy; to the enemy’s comparable but penetrable military and economic capabilities; to the enemy’s comparably civilized culture; and to the enemy’s monolithic and undemocratic process of governmental decision making.

� Radical Image. The image of the radical state is known by finding in foreign policy discourse indicators referring to fanatic or extremist motivations, to the radical state’s use of terror to compensate for its inferior military and economic capabilities, to the radical state’s less than civilized culture, and to a decision process that is well organized and clever.

� Degenerate Image. The image of the degenerate state is known by finding in foreign policy discourse indicators referring to leaders motivated by the accumulation and preservation of personal power, to the degenerate state’s inferior and declining military and economic capabilities, to the degenerate state’s less than civilized culture, and to a confused and disorganized decision process.

� Imperial Image. The image of the imperial state is known by finding in foreign policy discourse indicators referring to motivations based on nationalism and modernization in the interests of the people, to the imperial state’s need for external help because of inferior military and economic capabilities, to the imperial state’s less than civilized culture, and to poorly managed decision processes that require military and economic assistance.

In the Second Persian Gulf Crisis, Senate debates were held on January 10, 11, and 12 of 1991.The arguments put forth in the debates contain indicators of the images just described.62 For example, one supporter of the Dole-Warner resolution, whose position was nearly identical to that of the White House, was Senator Bryan (D-Nebraska). He argued in terms indicating a traditional enemy image of Iraq: “Hussein now has under arms more men than Hitler when the German Army marched into the Rhineland . . . more tanks than when the Panzer Divisions crushed France . . . and most chilling of all, much closer to having a nuclear weapon than Adolf Hitler ever was.”

This is not the image of a radical or terrorist state, but that of a traditional aggressive and expansionistic state. Senator Roth (D-Delaware) reinforced this image: “Hussein has demonstrated that with the Cold War fading, the real threat to freedom-loving nations is the proliferation of arms in the hands of despotic dictators. Intercontinental missiles, chemical, biological, and nuclear arms can turn unstable Third World nations into first-rate military powers.” By contrast, Senator Cohen (R-Maine), another supporter of Dole-Warner, used an argument suggesting the image of a radical or terroristic state: “Not one of us . . . is safe from the violence currently being inflicted in Kuwait . . . Our

61The images are based on Richard W. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press, 1977). The descriptions of images and use of quotations are based on Voss et al., “Representations of the Gulf Crisis as Derived from the U.S. Senate Debate,” pp. 279–302 in Donald A. Sylvan and James F. Voss, eds. Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 62All statements were extracted from The Congressional Record (January 9, 10,11) by Voss et al., “Representations of the Gulf Crisis as Derived from the U.S. Senate Debate.”

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Case 8.2 379

The Senate should authorize the use of force under the Dole- Warner resolution.

CLAIM (52)

The Dole-Warner resolution supports U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990 authorizing U.S. military intervention to force an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

INFORMATION (98)

Since Iraq has a large military (37), regional political aspirations (32), and petroleum reserves that give economic control (16).

Because Iraq is a threat to the security of the region and the world.

WARRANT (51) Because the U.S. has an obligation to intervene.

WARRANT (16) Immediately and without hesitation.

BACKING (16-37) Since the U.S. is a member of the U.N., committed to Israel and moderate Arab states, and opposed to human rights violations.

BACKING (16)

QUALIFIER (30)

But the authorization is unwarranted. It is an artificial creation of the President and no vital interests are at stake.

OBJECTION (37)

But sanctions are working. GNP is cut in half and imports and exports have been reduced by 90−97%.

OBJECTION (47) But available diplomatic options have not been pursued.

OBJECTION (33)

However, sanctions have not produced a withdrawal. They will cause economic problems for allies and cause the suffering of innocent persons.

REBUTTAL (34) However, diplomacy has not worked in the past and will not work now.

REBUTTAL (9)

FIGURE C8.2 Senate arguments supporting and opposing U.S. involvement under security council resolution 678 authorizing military intervention to force the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait (November 29, 1990)

security is only a Pan Am 103 away at any moment.” Senator Hatch (R-Utah) used similar language: “We have a major political interest in preventing Hussein from radicalizing the Arab world.”

Among the supporters of the Mitchell-Nunn resolution were Senator Joseph Biden (D-Delaware), who argued: “Yes, we have interests in the Middle East. We wish to support the free flow of oil. We wish to promote stability, including the securing of Israel. But we have not heard one cogent argument that any vital American interest is at stake in a way that impels us to war.” As for military capability, Senator Patrick Moynihan (D-New York) argued that “The Iraqis do not (even) have the technology to print their own paper money.” In support of the continued use of economic sanctions, Senator Frank

Lautenberg (D-New Jersey) argued: “Historical analysis of the use of economic sanctions suggests that they can be effective over time in forcing the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.”

Figure C8.1 maps the arguments supporting the resolution sponsored by Bob Dole (R-Kansas) and John Warner (R-Virginia).The figure also maps the objections of senators favoring the counter-resolution sponsored by George Mitchell (D-Maine) and Sam Nunn (D-Georgia). Rebuttals to objections are also displayed. The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of votes for the different parts of the argument supporting military intervention. The votes were along party lines, except for two Democrats who voted for the Dole-Warner Resolution. Because two senators were not present for the vote, the total number is 98 votes.

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The Senate debate includes arguments that appear to be the consequence of at least three images of Iraq. Arguments supporting the Dole- Warner Resolution authorizing a military attack appear to be a consequence of images of Iraq as a radical-terrorist state, or a degenerate state. In turn, arguments offered in support of the

continuation of economic sanctions appear to originate in an image of Iraq as a conventional enemy state such as Germany during World War II. The main point is that images drive problem representations, which in turn drive processes of argumentation surrounding critical issues of foreign and domestic policy. �

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