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1. Suppose someone is trying to teach you the meaning of the term ‘equal’. Why is it implausible that you could achieve that using only what is given to you from perception, through repeated experience? (If you prefer, imagine that someone is trying to teach you the meaning of the term ‘bear’. Why is it implausible that you could achieve that using only what is given to you from perception?)
2. Give a clear example — using ‘equal’ or ‘half’ — of the kind of thought that Plato seems to be describing in the first paragraph here.
3. A similar thought process could apply to the concepts ‘fair’ or ‘right’. Briefly, how does that connect with what we are told elsewhere by Plato about the difference between philosophers and non-philosophers?
Phaedo 65
or anything of that kind, but something else beyond all these, the Equal
itself. Shall we say that this exists or not?
Indeed we shall, by Zeus, said Simmias, most definitely. b
And do we know what this is?—Certainly.
Whence have we acquired the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things
we mentioned just now, from seeing sticks or stones or some other things
that are equal we come to think of that other which is different from them?
Or doesn’t it seem to you to be different? Look at it also this way: do not
equal stones and sticks sometimes, while remaining the same, appear to
one to be equal and to another to be unequal?—Certainly they do.
But what of the equals themselves? Have they ever appeared unequal c
to you, or Equality to be Inequality?
Never, Socrates.
These equal things and the Equal itself are therefore not the same?
I do not think they are the same at all, Socrates.
But it is definitely from the equal things, though they are different from
that Equal, that you have derived and grasped the knowledge of equality?
Very true, Socrates.
Whether it be like them or unlike them?
Certainly.
It makes no difference. As long as the sight of one thing makes you
think of another, whether it be similar or dissimilar, this must of necessity
be recollection? d
Quite so.
Well then, he said, do we experience something like this in the case of
equal sticks and the other equal objects we just mentioned? Do they seem
to us to be equal in the same sense as what is Equal itself? Is there some
deficiency in their being such as the Equal, or is there not?
A considerable deficiency, he said.
Whenever someone, on seeing something, realizes that that which he
now sees wants to be like some other reality but falls short and cannot be e
like that other since it is inferior, do we agree that the one who thinks
this must have prior knowledge of that to which he says it is like, but
deficiently so?
Necessarily.
Well, do we also experience this about the equal objects and the Equal
itself, or do we not?
Very definitely.
We must then possess knowledge of the Equal before that time when
we first saw the equal objects and realized that all these objects strive to 75
be like the Equal but are deficient in this.
That is so.
Then surely we also agree that this conception of ours derives from
seeing or touching or some other sense perception, and cannot come into
our mind in any other way, for all these senses, I say, are the same.
Phaedo 65oranythingofthatkind,butsomethingelsebeyondallthese,theEqualitself.Shallwesaythatthisexistsornot?Indeedweshall,byZeus,saidSimmias,mostdefinitely. bAnddoweknowwhatthisis?—Certainly.Whencehaveweacquiredtheknowledgeofit?Isitnotfromthethingswementionedjustnow,fromseeingsticksorstonesorsomeotherthingsthatareequalwecometothinkofthatotherwhichisdifferentfromthem?Ordoesn’titseemtoyoutobedifferent?Lookatitalsothisway:donotequalstonesandstickssometimes,whileremainingthesame,appeartoonetobeequalandtoanothertobeunequal?—Certainlytheydo.Butwhatoftheequalsthemselves?Havetheyeverappearedunequalctoyou,orEqualitytobeInequality?Never,Socrates.TheseequalthingsandtheEqualitselfarethereforenotthesame?Idonotthinktheyarethesameatall,Socrates.Butitisdefinitelyfromtheequalthings,thoughtheyaredifferentfromthatEqual,thatyouhavederivedandgraspedtheknowledgeofequality?Verytrue,Socrates.Whetheritbelikethemorunlikethem?Certainly.Itmakesnodifference.Aslongasthesightofonethingmakesyouthinkofanother,whetheritbesimilarordissimilar,thismustofnecessityberecollection? dQuiteso.Wellthen,hesaid,doweexperiencesomethinglikethisinthecaseofequalsticksandtheotherequalobjectswejustmentioned?DotheyseemtoustobeequalinthesamesenseaswhatisEqualitself?IstheresomedeficiencyintheirbeingsuchastheEqual,oristherenot?Aconsiderabledeficiency,hesaid.Wheneversomeone,onseeingsomething,realizesthatthatwhichhe
nowseeswantstobelikesomeotherrealitybutfallsshortandcannotbee
likethatothersinceitisinferior,doweagreethattheonewhothinks
thismusthavepriorknowledgeofthattowhichhesaysitislike,but
deficientlyso?
Necessarily.
Well,dowealsoexperiencethisabouttheequalobjectsandtheEqual
itself,ordowenot?
Verydefinitely.
WemustthenpossessknowledgeoftheEqualbeforethattimewhen
wefirstsawtheequalobjectsandrealizedthatalltheseobjectsstriveto75
beliketheEqualbutaredeficientinthis.
Thatisso.
Thensurelywealsoagreethatthisconceptionofoursderivesfrom
seeingortouchingorsomeothersenseperception,andcannotcomeinto
ourmindinanyotherway,forallthesesenses,Isay,arethesame.
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