Paraphrasing

Activity 2: (The Krushchev Letters)

1. The relative strengths of both the United States and the Soviet Union at the time were their vast amounts of resources, territory, and military power. The fact that they both had nuclear weaponry is both a strength and a weakness, since nuclear power is an effective way to get what you want in the international system, but it also assures destruction when two nuclear nations threaten to launch them at each other. A weakness is that each was at the ideological forefront, both of Capitalism and Communism. This meant that each one was willing to do anything to trump the other, including total destruction.

2. The first letter was definitely redacted by Khrushchev, at it had a general air of desperation, where he was willing remove the nuclear weaponry if the United States didn’t invade Cuba. The second letter, sent the following day, was definitely redacted by his advisors, and was more aggressive, stating that if they invaded Cuba, they would go on a full-out nuclear war against them. Khrushchev sent two letters because the original letter, sent on the 26th, was probably seen as too submissive to Khrushchev’s advisors, so they sent another one the next day, planting their foot down and assuring that they were going all the way. I would have responded to the first letter, being Kennedy. Since it is more defensive, it is a much easier letter to respond to diplomatically.

3. I think that President Kennedy addressed the October 26 letter instead of the one sent the next day because it was much more open towards reaching an agreement compared to the latter. The second letter is much more firm in its stance of going nuclear compared to the first, which is more ‘interested in reducing tension and halting the arms race’ as Kennedy stated. I can imagine Kennedy’s difficulty for removing the missiles from Turkey was that they faced the possibility of the Soviets threatening to use nuclear weapons again in the near future, and those missiles in Turkey were a check on their power. The removal of those missiles would make them much more prone to a preemptive strike. They concluded that the first letter resonated with Khrushchev’s personal desires because it presented a much more reasonable solution to the whole situation, while the second was clearly more aggressive, and resonated with their foreign policy, which culminates in the Soviet Union and the Communist ideology on never backing down to a foreign threat, much less the Capitalist United States.

4. I think that Khrushchev should have accepted Kennedy’s offer, for the simple reason that Soviet supplies for an attack wouldn’t have made it to Cuba in time after the initial nuclear attack. Also, nuclear war would have led to the destruction of the United States, Cuba, and the Soviet Union.

5. I find the decision making process in the Kennedy administration very rational. According to the documentary, they all get together in a room, and analyze all of the factors of the situation, and what are the viable options, taking into account the potential consequences of what could happen if they take that particular route. There is also an open floor for everyone, where the Ambassador of Russia has the confidence to tell the President that his logic is wrong.

6. I think they would have invaded Cuba, for the following reason. They saw how ready to attack Cuba and the Soviets were, and they would have answered the Khrushchev letters more firmly, which would have escalated the whole situation a bit further. Given what Castro said to McNamara decades later, there would have been an attack.

7. I think there is always a shred of doubt whether there actually were nuclear missiles on Cuba at the time of the crisis. I think that what surprised McNamara the most was not them being there, or their amounts, but the frankness of Castro in telling him how close they were to an actual nuclear war. That same shred of doubt clouded the ExComm’s judgment, where they overlooked the fact that tactical nuclear weapons were on the island.

8. Luck prevented nuclear war according to McNamara because the conflict involved fully rational heads of state like Kennedy and Khrushchev, almost leading to total state destruction.

9. I think he still maintains the same rationality and the position that one has to consider the consequences of their actions. However, in the heat of the moment, one obviously is going to have a more clouded judgement in the sense that one may act a bit more instinctively.

Activity 3: Belief and seeing are both often wrong.

1. What President Johnson meant was that the resolution sent to Congress was so complete, that it was like “grandma’s nightshirt”. The resolution not only states what the United States should do during what would become the Vietnam War, but also after the conclusion of the war, as stated in Section 3. Section 2 covers the United States’ position on the conflict, where their primary intention is maintaining international stability in the Southeast Asian region.

2. I think the administration would have definitely changed the way they got legal authority to go into the war, given how long and costly it was. They would have made it easier for the United States to pull out from the conflict, in order to avoid losing so many men and so much money.

3. Some comparisons I can make with the passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and the issues and events shown is that there were some that included naval attacks, such as the attack by a German submarine on the Greer, and the sinking of the Maine in Havana harbor. Also, some were based on suppositions, such as the current WMD controversy in Iraq where the United States decided to intervene, and in Iran/North Korea as well.

Activity 4: Proportionality should be a guideline in war.

I think that morals have a place in war. While some may argue it cloud’s a soldier’s judgement and makes him question what he is doing, it also sets ground rules, such as proportionality and avoiding collateral damage (civilian deaths or damage to un-strategic infrastructure). Proportionality is the concept where you only retaliate damage that you have been dealt, and not to abuse the use of force. For example, if a nation were to attack one of your ships, it is immoral to retaliate and send 5 nuclear bombs towards their capital city. One has to take into account the other nation’s capabilities and to respond in an adequate way during a conflict. I think that proportionality matters more when you are winning. When the war is almost done, with a sure victory in sight, it is important to give the appropriate force necessary for the other nations to declare defeat, or surrender the war, while not being completely hindered by an abuse of force. However, it is also true that the one who wins the war tells the story, and can justify their actions during the conflict much easier than the opponent, so the use of force can also be exaggerated, outside of the boundaries of proportionality.

1. Enemy troops on the field: 10, because the troops on the field of battle are engaging battle with you, and are openly trying to kill you and your compatriots.

2. Military training camps: 8, while they are not in battle, they are still in the development of becoming soldiers and may kill people.

3. Factories (in cities) producing military supplies: 4, while they are still contributing to the opponent’s military cause, those are innocent people who are building all of those supplies, plus it may hinder the infrastructure of the city, which may affect the innocent. Any miscalculation of the bombing may also generate collateral damage.

4. Homes of civilians working in military factories: 2, they are creating the supplies that may kill you. However, they are innocent given the fact that working in a military factory during war time is the most available job around. They are practically forced to produce those weapons.

5. Food supplies for the military: 8, while it may be a bit immoral to starve your opponent to death, they are still consenting to go to war with you, therefore you can deplete their food supplies to weaken them.

6. Food supplies for civilians: 3, the civilian population of a warring nation must not be affected, much less their food supply.