PAPER

A Case Study of the TSA’s Resource Allocation

Beyond the immediate death and destruction resulting from the 9/11 attacks, the fact that America’s own technology and equipment was instrumental in the execution thereof resonated so profoundly with private citizens and policymakers alike that drastic security measures were rapidly enacted on a national scale. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was one of the high-profile reactionary implementations to prevent future attacks. Over a decade later, the efficiency and utility of the TSA has been criticized by government officials, the press, and even security experts. An evaluation of the TSA’s established protocols in maintaining aviation security suggests the possibility that streamlining the system could simultaneously be more cost and time effective while achieving the desired results of preventing and mitigating terrorist attacks.

The Transportation Security Administration

Although the TSA oversees security for an excess of “9 billion passenger trips per year on the nation’s mass transit systems, more than 161,000 miles of interstate and national highways and their integrated bridges and tunnels, and nearly 800,000 shipments of hazardous materials” (Bullock, Haddow, and Coppola, 2013, p. 250), it is associated by the American public primarily with its role in airport security, particularly passenger screenings. Approximately 50,000 Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) are responsible for screening over two million passengers on a daily basis at more than 700 security checkpoints within 450 airports nationwide (Bullock et al. 2013). By the sheer nature of their duties, to establish and maintain security across all modes of transportation within the United States, the jurisdiction of the TSA is unparalleled by any other law enforcement agencies. Due to the nature of the 9/11 attacks, the vast majority of the organization’s resources are allocated toward aviation security. Approximately 68% of the TSA’s $8.16 billion budget is utilized to conduct inspections of both personnel and baggage intending to fly using Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT), maintain a high TSO and Behavior Detection Officer (BDO) presence within U.S. airports, monitor no-fly and watch lists, and develop innovative counterterrorism security measures (Homeland Security, 2012).

In addition to the commonly referenced inconveniences and potential indignities the TSA’s enforcement of airport security poses passengers, the organization has been the subject of criticisms from renowned security expert Bruce Schneier as well as Congress. Schneier (2012) maintained that the public mistrusts the TSA and that their ineffective procedures achieve very little in the way of security, while Congress was primarily concerned that the TSA’s budget allocation was poorly executed and necessitates drastic reform (112th Congress, 2012).

TSA’s Aviation Security

Prior to the 9/11 attacks, individual airports contracted their own security firms in the private sector, provided they met or exceeded standards established by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), at a cost of approximately $850 million annually (Frishling, 2010). The security primarily consisted of x-raying baggage, questioning passengers about baggage, and requiring that all boarding passengers walk through metal detectors.

The failure of airport security to prevent the plane hijackings resulted in the federal government appropriating that responsibility in an effort to restore confidence in public safety. Initially established as an organization within the Department of Transportation when President Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the TSA was ultimately absorbed after 2003 by the newly-instituted Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as an individual internal agency (Bullock et al. 2013). The ensuing changes to airport security have significantly altered the flying experiences for passengers; in addition to x-rays and metal detectors, they can now expect full body scans, pat-downs, baggage searches, and passenger profiling among other potentially invasive protocols. Shoes and belts must be removed prior to passing through security checkpoints, and there are stringent restrictions on food, liquids, and gels.

The TSA’s aviation budget commands over $5 billion per year (Homeland Security, 2012), and as of 2004, cost America an economic productivity loss of $10 billion annually resulting from the nearly 20 minute waiting period required of passengers prior passing through security (Schneir, 2012). The security steps necessary to board aircrafts evolved continuously since the TSA was instituted. In December 2001, passengers were required to remove their shoes prior to passing through security checkpoints, 2002 yielded a mass deployment of detection equipment to U.S. airports, all lighters were banned from carry-on baggage in 2005, all liquids in excess of 3oz. were banned in 2006, and additional cargo screening was implemented in 2010 (Rogers, 2012).

In accordance with a prioritized 9/11 Commission recommendation, the TSA reported a 100% screening rate for all passengers on U.S. flights in 2012 and asserted that the additional use of AIT units, scanners, explosive screening units, and x-rays will be instrumental in detecting future threats to airport security, regardless of how well potentially dangerous objects are concealed or whether they are metallic or nonmetallic in nature (Homeland Security, 2012).

Equipment management itself, however, has been a primary point of contention between TSA and its critics; the Congressional Joint Majority Staff Report indicated that in early 2012, approximately 5,700 pieces of security paraphernalia valued at approximately $184 million were stored at the Transportation Logistics Center (TLC) in warehouses, which cost an additional $3.5 million annually in maintenance alone (112th Congress).

The personnel charged monitoring active TSA equipment in airports are ostensibly afterthoughts. Zamir Eldar, the Chief Executive of a leading aviation securities provider worldwide, emphasized that even the most technologically advanced machines are only capable of following instructions, which in itself is useless without a capable security staff to analyze and process its results. Eldar elaborated that:

In the past as well as in the future, the real encounter, or one might say, the crucial encounter, is between two individuals: one who is determined and motivated to perpetrate an attack, and one who has chosen security as his profession (2010, par. 7)

The less favorable duties asked of a TSO—specifically those involving generously administered pat-downs and body searches—have not been downgraded, nor is there any evidence they have been reviewed for necessity as security equipment advances further, since they were originally implemented. A negative perception of the duties of TSOs adversely affects their morale, their retention rate, and their ability to effectively do their jobs (Eldar, 2010).

Results

Despite the fact that there has not been a successful terrorist attack since 2001, the 112th Congress is unconvinced that the aforementioned costs yield worthwhile results in proportion to the burden on taxpayers. Indeed, “the Subcommittee Staff believes TSA has failed to effectively implement its mandate because the agency maintains a reactive approach to security; does not adequately test new technologies and procedures; and ultimately is too bogged down in managing its bloated federal workforce” (Rogers, 2012, p. 3). All of the previously mentioned heightened security measures implemented by the TSA since 2001 have been direct results of attempted terrorist attacks, both domestic and worldwide.

The accusation of TSA relying on reactionary practices rather than taking initiative spans further than Congress, which by nature is skeptical of bureaucracy given that Republicans currently hold the majority of chairs. Indeed, condemning the TSA’s airport security measures, Former TSA administrator Kip Hawley noted the following:

The list of banned items has created an ‘Easter-egg hunt’ mentality at the TSA. Worse, banning certain items gives terrorists a complete list of what not to use in their next attack. Lighters are banned? The next attack will use an electric trigger. (Lapidos, 2012, par. 5)

Even the utility of the TSA’s widespread implementation of security screening devices has yet to be fully realized. Security screeners at Los Angeles International Airport failed to detect 75% of commonly used components of explosive materials carried through security by undercover agents, and screeners at Chicago O’Hare International Airport missed 60% of the materials carried through (Frank, 2011). By contrast, the security screeners employed by the private sector rather than the TSA at San Francisco International Airport failed to detect only 20% (Frank, 2011).

Lessons Learned

A reactive rather than proactive approach to counterterrorism is not without consequences; not only does an attack almost have to occur to result in a policy change, but a failure to streamline security protocols, such as analyzing when new technologies negate the need for certain practices, A list of prohibited materials, for example, can serve as an aid for potential terrorists who wish to successfully bypass airport security by detailing what will arouse suspicion. As Hawley indicated, it may behoove of the TSA to remove the list of banned substances altogether to simplify catching potential terrorists before they refine their methods.

If funding used on expensive machines of questionable reliability were redirected toward improving intelligence, the TSA would likely have greater chances of maintaining a proactive approach to terrorist threats rather than simply responding to what has already been unsuccessfully attempted. Adequately training TSOs is critical, as without dedicated personnel, innovative equipment and procedures are extremely limited. Emphasis should be placed on funding training programs that meet or exceed the bomb-detection results of the private sector. Existing procedures should be annually reviewed to ensure they are still relevant to security and have not been rendered obsolete by improved technology.

Conclusion

The aftermath of 9/11 necessitated so many changes in security organizations throughout the government that there is little tolerance for wasted taxpayer dollars. In the midst of an economic slump and ensuing budget cuts, every federal agency is experiencing shortages of both personnel and resources. While the TSA is undoubtedly no exception, it will continue to receive additional attention simply because of the prominent presence it has in any citizen’s life, should they wish to travel. It is only when the TSA can perform duties without squandering resources and without increasing fear among Americans that it will prevent terrorists from achieving their desired end state.

References

112th Congress. (2012, May 09). Airport insecurity: Tsa’s failure to cost-effectively procure, deploy and warehouse its screening technologies. Retrieved from Committee on Oversight & Government Reform website: http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/5-9-2012-Joint-TSA-Staff-Report-FINAL.pdf

Bullock, J., Haddow, G. & Coppola, D. (2013). Introduction to homeland security (4th ed.).  Waltham, MA: Elsevier.  

Eldar, Z. (2010). The human factor in aviation security. Journal of Airport Management, 5(1), 34-39. Retrieved from http://ehis.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.umuc.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=c64214c8-ede7-454b-839a-06b764313e3b%40sessionmgr10&vid=2&hid=116

Frank, T. (2011, March 31). Most fake bombs missed by screeners. Retrieved from USA Today website: http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20071018/1a_lede18_dom.art.htm

Frischling, S. (2010, June 30). What is the true cost of u.s. airport security? Retrieved from Flying With Fish website: http://boardingarea.com/blogs/flyingwithfish/2010/06/30/what-is-the-true-cost-of-u-s-airport-security/

Homeland Security. (2012). Budget-in-brief: Fiscal year 2012. Retrieved from Homeland Security website: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget-bib-fy2012.pdf

Lapidos, J. (2012, September 11). Is this the pose of a free man?. Retrieved from The Opinion Pages website: http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/is-this-the-pose-of-a-free-man/

Rogers, M. (2012, September). Rebuilding tsa into a stronger, leaner organization. Retrieved from Committee on Homeland Security website: http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/092012_TSA_Reform_Report.pdf

Schneier, B. (2012, March 29). Harms of post-9/11 airline security. Retrieved from Schneier on Security website: http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/03/harms_of_post-9.html