ecs reading

H u m a n Ecology, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1990

The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-Two Years Later

D a v i d F e e n y , 1 F i k r e t B e r k e s , 2 B o n n i e J. M c C a y , 3 a n d J a m e s M . A c h e s o n 4

H a r d i n ' s Tragedy o f the C o m m o n s m o d e l p r e d i c t s the e v e n t u a l overexploi- tation or degradation o f a l l resources u s e d in c o m m o n . Given this unambig- u o u s prediction, a surprising n u m b e r o f cases exist in which users h a v e been able to restrict access to the resource a n d establish rules a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s f o r its sustainable use. To assess the evidence, we f i r s t d e f i n e c o m m o n - p r o p e r t y resources a n d p r e s e n t a t a x o n o m y o f p r o p e r t y - r i g h t s regimes in which such resources m a y be held. Evidence accumulated over the last twenty- t w o y e a r s indicates that private, state, a n d c o m m u n a l p r o p e r t y are all p o t e n - tially viable resource m a n a g e m e n t options. A m o r e c o m p l e t e t h e o r y than H a r d i n ' s s h o u l d incorporate institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s a n d cultural f a c t o r s to p r o v i d e f o r b e t t e r analysis a n d p r e d i c t i o n .

KEY WORDS: co-management; common property; fisheries; forests; grazing lands; sustain- able development; water resources; wildlife.

It was twenty years ago today; Sgt. Pepper taught the band to play (John Lennon and Paul McCartney (1967). Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band. Northern Songs Ltd.).

I N T R O D U C T I O N

G a r r e t t H a r d i n ' s T h e Tragedy o f the C o m m o n s w a s p u b l i s h e d 2 2 y e a r s a g o ( H a r d i n , 1968).. A l t h o u g h i t f o c u s e d a t t e n t i o n o n o v e r p o p u l a t i o n , t h e

~Departments of Economics and Clinical Epidemiology and Biostatistics, McMaster Universi- ty, Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4M4 Canada.

ZInstitute of Urban and Environmental Studies, Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario L2S 3A1 Canada.

3Departments of Human Ecology and Anthropology, Rutgers University, P.O. Box 231, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903.

4Department of Anthropology, University of Maine, Orono, Maine 04460-0158. i

0300-7839/90/0300-0001506.00/0 9 1990 Plenum Publishing Corporation

2 Feeny, Berkes, McCay, and Acheson

d o m i n a n t legacy o f the p a p e r has been its m e t a p h o r o f c o m m o n - p r o p e r t y resource management. In the intervening years, the ideas t h at H a r d i n popula- rized have b e c o m e the m o s t widely accepted e x p l a n a t i o n f o r overexploita- tion o f resources that are c o m m o n l y held. The essential idea was t h at resources held in c o m m o n , such as oceans, rivers, air, a n d p ark l an d s, are subject t o massive d e g r a d a t i o n . H a r d i n was neither alone n o r novel in m a k i n g the ar- gument. H e n o t e d t h a t L l o y d h a d m a d e the same p o i n t in a series o f lectures in the 1830's (Lloyd, 1968). T w o m o d e r n resource economists, G o r d o n (1954) a n d Scott (1955), are usually credited with the first s t a t e m e n t o f the conven- tional t h e o r y o f t h e c o m m o n s , a l t h o u g h H a r d i n does n o t m e n t i o n t h e m . In this paper, we examine the a c c u m u l a t e d evidence pertaining t o c o m m o n - p r o p e r t y resource m a n a g e m e n t a n d p r o v i d e a critique o f the c o n v e n t i o n a l t h e o r y e x p o u n d e d b y H a r d i n .

A l t h o u g h H a r d i n was r e f e r r i n g to global concepts such as carrying capacity, his observations a b o u t resources held in c o m m o n are considered by m a n y as the definitive insight. T o make his points a b o u t the need fo r m a j o r social change t o deal with p r o b l e m s such as o v e r p o p u l a t i o n , resource deple- tion, a n d air a n d water p o u l l u t i o n , H a r d i n (1968) relied u p o n a t h o u g h t ex- periment. H e asked the reader t o imagine w h at would h a p p e n to a m e t a p h o r i c a l village c o m m o n s if each h e r d e r were t o ad d a few animals t o his herd. His m e t a p h o r highlighted the divergence b et w een individual an d collective rationality. I f each herdsman f o u n d it m o re profitable to graze m o r e animals t h a n the pasture could support, because each t o o k all the p ro fi t f r o m an extra animal b u t b o r e only a f r a c t i o n o f the cost o f overgrazing, the result would be a tragic loss o f the resource f o r the entire c o m m u n i t y o f herders. T h u s H a r d i n c o n c l u d e d t h a t " f r e e d o m in the c o m m o n s brings ruin t o all" ( H a r d i n , 1968, p. 1244).

This c o n c l u s i o n has been accorded~by some the status o f scientific law. T h e t r a g e d y o f the c o m m o n s has b e c o m e p a r t o f the c o n v e n t i o n a l w i sd o m in e n v i r o n m e n t a l studies, resource science and policy, economics, ecology, and political science ( M c E v o y , 1988, p. 214) a n d is f e a t u r e d in t e x t b o o k s (Nebel, 1987, pp. 484-485; Lineberry, 1983, pp. 579-580). J. A. Mo o re, a u t h o r o f a m a j o r environmental education project for the American Society o f Zool- ogists, states: " H a r d i n ' s T r a g e d y o f the C o m m o n s should b e req u i red read- ing f o r all students .... a n d if I had m y way, f o r all h u m a n beings" ( M o o r e , 1985, p. 602). It has also been used in formulating resource-management poli- cy, as recently s h o w n f o r Atlantic C a n a d a fisheries (Matthews, 1988).

T o avoid the tragedy, H a r d i n (1968; H a r d i n and Baden, 1977) concluded t h a t the c o m m o n s c o u l d be privatized or kept as public p r o p e r t y t o which rights to e n t r y a n d use could be allocated. H a r d i n has been widely cited as having said that resource degradation was inevitable unless c o m m o n p r o p e r t y was converted to private property, or government regulation o f uses and users

Tragedy of the Commons 3

was instituted. In a later paper, H a r d i n (1978) specifically recognized t w o general solutions, and p r e s u m a b l y n o others: private enterprise a n d social- ism (control b y g o v e r n m e n t ) . H a r d i n argued t h a t if we d o n o t act in one o f these two ways, we "acquiesce in the destruction o f the c o m m o n s " (Hardin, 1968, p. 1245).

W e examine the evidence o n f a c t o r s associated with successful vs. un- successful e x p l o i t a t i o n o f c o m m o n - p r o p e r t y resources, focusing in particu- lar o n c o m m u n a l l y - h e l d resources. Surprisingly little careful empirical w o r k o n c o m m o n p r o p e r t y followed Hardin's seminal publication. H o w ev er, sever- al recent volumes s u m m a r i z e a growing a n d rich b o d y o f evidence relevant to c o m m o n - p r o p e r t y resource management (National Research Council, 1986; M c E v o y , 1986, 1988; M a r c h a k et al., 1987; M c C a y a n d A ch eso n , 1987; Wade, 1987; F o r t m a n n and Bruce, 1988; Pinkert o n , 1989; Berkes, 1989; Cor- dell, 1989; O s t r o m , f o r t h c o m i n g ) . A few definitions will be presented be- f o r e examining this new evidence in the light o f the predictions o f H a r d i n ' s model.

D E F I N I T I O N S A N D C O N C E P T S

C o m m o n - p r o p e r t y resources include fisheries, wildlife, surface and g r o u n d w a t e r , range, a n d forests. It is i m p o r t a n t to delineate the characteris- tics shared b y these resources, and to distinguish between the resource an d the p r o p e r t y - r i g h t s regime in which the resource is held (National Research Council, 1986).

C o m m o n - p r o p e r t y resources share two i m p o r t a n t characteristics. T h e first is excludability (or c o n t r o l o f access). T h a t is, the physical n a t u r e o f the resource is such t h a t controlling access by p o t e n t i a l users m a y be costly and, in the extreme, virtually impossible. M i g r a t o r y resources such as fish, wildlife, and g r o u n d w a t e r pose obvious problems fo r regulating access. Simi- larly, range and forest lands typically pose probl em s o f exclusion. F o r large bodies o f water, the global a t m o s p h e r e , a n d r a d i o f r e q u e n c y b an d s, exclu- sion is even m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c .

T h e second basic characteristic o f c o m m o n - p r o p e r t y resources is sub- tractability, t h a t is, each user is capable o f subtracting f r o m the welfare o f o t h e r users. Even if users c o o p e r a t e to enhance the p r o d u c t i v i t y o f their resource, f o r instance b y replanting trees, the n a t u r e o f the resource is such t h a t the level o f e x p l o i t a t i o n by one user adversely affect s the ability o f a n o t h e r user to exploit the resource. Subtractab i l i t y (or rivalry) is the source o f the p o t e n t i a l divergence between individual an d collective rationality. I f one user p u m p s m o r e water f r o m an a q u i f e r , o t h e r users will experience an increase in p u m p i n g costs as aggregate use a p p r o a c h e s or exceeds recharge

4 Feeny, Berkes, McCay, and Acheson

capacity. I f one user harvests fish, the catch per unit o f fishing e f f o r t o f other fishermen declines. H e n c e , we define c o m m o n - p r o p e r t y resources as a class o f resources f o r which exclusion is difficult and j o i n t use involves subtracta- bility (Berkes et al., 1989, p. 91).

T h e definition here resembles one given b y Elinor O s t r o m (1986, p. 604; see also F o r t m a n n and Bruce, 1988, p. 2). O s t r o m u n d ersco res the i m p o r- tance o f the distinction between the intrinsic n a t u r e o f the resource an d the property-rights regime under which it is held, b y defining the class o f resources as " c o m m o n - p o o l resources." Because o f the widespread use o f the t erm com- m o n p r o p e r t y f o r certain kinds o f resources, we have ch o sen t o use this t e r m to refer to the resource a n d the t e r m c o m m u n a l p r o p e r t y t o refer to one o f the f o u r basic p r o p e r t y - r i g h t s regimes.

In o r d e r to facilitate analysis, we define f o u r categories o f p r o p e r t y rights within which c o m m o n - p r o p e r t y resources are held: o p e n access, pri- vate p r o p e r t y , c o m m u n a l p r o p e r t y , and state p r o p e r t y . These are ideal, ana- lytic types. In practice, m a n y resources are held in overlapping, and sometimes conflicting combinations o f these regimes, and there is v ari at i o n within each. It is nevertheless i m p o r t a n t to distinguish these f o u r basic p ro p ert y -ri g h t s regimes (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975; f o r similar distinctions see also Berkes et al., 1989, p. 91; B r o m l e y , 1986, 1989b, pp. 872-875; B r o m l e y and Cernea, 1989, pp. 3-5; Demsetz, 1967, p. 354; Gibbs a n d Bro m l ey , 1989, pp. 24-27; G o d w i n a n d Shepard, 1979, p. 267; J a c o b s a n d M u n r o , 1987, p. 442; Libecap, 1986, p. 33; M a r c h a k , 1987, pp. 4-5; O s t r o m , 1986).

Open access is the absence o f well-defined p r o p e r t y rights. Access t o the resource is u n r e g u l a t e d and is free a n d o p e n t o everyone. M a n y o f f s h o r e o c e a n fisheries b e f o r e the twentieth century, or the global a t m o s p h e r e pro- vide examples.

U n d e r private property, the rights to exclude others f r o m using the resource and to regulate the use o f the resource are vested in an individual (or g r o u p o f individuals such as a c o r p o r a t i o n ) . P r i v a t e - p r o p e r t y rights are generally recognized and e n f o r c e d b y the state. Unlike rights u n d e r o p e n ac- cess, p r i v a t e - p r o p e r t y rights usually are exclusive an d t r a n s f e r a b l e (Regier a n d G r i m a , 1985). Examples include forests an d rangelands t h a t are held privately.

U n d e r communalproperty, the resource is held b y an identifiable com- m u n i t y o f i n t e r d e p e n d e n t users. These users exclude outsiders while regulat- ing use b y m e m b e r s o f the local c o m m u n i t y . Wi t h i n the c o m m u n i t y , rights to the resource are unlikely to be either exclusive o r transferable; t h ey are o f t e n rights o f equal access a n d use. Some inshore fisheries, shellfish beds, range lands, and forests have been m a n a g e d as c o m m u n a l p r o p e r t y ; similar- ly, water-users associations for m a n y groundwat er and irrigation systems can be included in this category. T h e rights o f the g r o u p m a y be legally recog-

Tragedy o f ihe Commons 5

nized. In o t h e r cases the rights are de facto, depending o n the benign neglect o f the state. S o m e scholars use the t e r m c o m m o n p r o p e r t y , or simply a com- m o n , to r e f e r exclusively to the regime we classify as c o m m u n a l p r o p e r t y (Ostrom, 1986; B r o m l e y , 1986, 1989a,b; M a r c h a k , 1988-1989; Blaikie an d B r o o k f i e l d , 1987, pp. 186-187).

Finally, under state property, or state governance, rights to the resource are vested exclusively in g o v e r n m e n t which in t u r n makes decisions concern- ing access to the resource and the level and n a t u r e o f exploitation. Examples include forests and rangelands held by the g o v e r n m e n t or cro w n -o w n ed , and resources such as fish and wildlife that m a y be held in public trust f o r the citizenry. T h e c a t e g o r y o f state p r o p e r t y m a y refer t o p r o p e r t y to which the general public has equal access and use rights such as highways an d public parks. T h e n a t u r e o f the state p r o p e r t y regime also differs f r o m the o t h er regimes in that, in general, the state, unlike private parties, has coercive powers o f e n f o r c e m e n t .

A l t h o u g h the n a t u r e o f the p r o p e r t y - r i g h t s regime u n d e r which the resource is held is i m p o r t a n t , t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n is n o t sufficient to draw valid conclusions c o n c e r n i n g b e h a v i o r and o u t c o m e s . O n e t h e m e o f the p a p e r is that one must u n d e r s t a n d a whole host o f institutional arrangements govern- ing access to a n d use o f the resource. Knowledge o f the p r o p e r t y rights is necessary b u t n o t sufficient. M a n y o f the misunderstandings f o u n d in the literature m a y be traced to the assumption that c o m m o n p r o p e r t y is the same as o p e n access. H a r d i n ' s prediction o f the inevitability o f o v e r - e x p l o i t a t i o n follows f r o m this assumption. Yet the a s s u m p t i o n is inaccurate and it has led to a great deal o f c o n f u s i o n . Based o n o u r d efi n i t i o n o f c o m m o n p r o p e r t y , an a p p r o a c h to testing Hardin's hypothesis is to examine two b r o a d challenges in the m a n a g e m e n t o f c o m m o n - p r o p e r t y resources: (1) the exclu- sion o f o t h e r p o t e n t i a l users, and (2) the regulation o f use an d users to ameliorate the problems associated with subtractability. Evidence o n each will be examined f o r each o f the p r o p e r t y - r i g h t s regimes listed above.

In evaluating evidence to test Hardin's hypothesis, a criterion with which to classify the o u t c o m e as a success or failure is needed. T h e choice o f an y particular s t a n d a r d is a r b i t r a r y , but we will use ecological sustainability as the working criterion o f success, that is, whether the resource in question has been used " w i t h o u t c o m p r o m i s i n g the ability o f f u t u r e generations to meet their own needs" ( W o r l d C o m m i s s i o n o n E n v i r o n m e n t an d Develop- ment, 1987, p. 8). Sustainability is a r o u g h index o f m a n a g e m e n t success; it does n o t necessarily imply that resource utilization is o p t i m a l f r o m either ecological or e c o n o m i c points o f view (see W o r l d C o n s e r v a t i o n Strategy, 1980). N o t e that the criterion o f sustainability is b o t h h u m a n , and resource- centric regarding the source o f valuation, n o t exclusively o n e or the other.

6 Feeny, Berkes, McCay, and Acheson

EVIDENCE ON EXCLUSION

Open Access. The evidence supports Hardin's argument concerning degradation due to the inability to regulate access to resources held as open access. Examples are many, and include the classic case of the historical deple- tion of various whale stocks in the open ocean. Several examples, however, reveal a point not mentioned by Hardin. In many cases, the tragedy occurred only after open-access conditions were created, often as a consequence of the destruction of existing communal land-tenure and marine-tenure systems. A number of these cases involved the imposition of colonial rule, as in sub- Saharan Africa (Johnson and Anderson, 1988), the Pacific Islands (Johannes, 1978), and northwest North American salmon rivers (Berkes, 1985, and refer- ences therein).

Private Property. The establishment and enforcement of private property rights have frequently provided the institutional arrangements for successful exclusion. Private-property rights may not, however, be sufficiently precise for solving the exclusion problem. A classic example is the exploita- tion of oil pools in much of the United States. In an 1889 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, the doctrine of law o f capture was applied to oil. Private property rights in oil were assigned only upon extraction. In prac- tice, this means that each owner of surface rights has the incentive to ac- celerate their pumping of oil to the surface. The result is a duplication of drilling and other capital costs, substantial reduction in the overall rate of recovery, and dissipation of economic rents. A remedy to the problem has long been r e c o g n i z e d - t o define property rights in the underground pool as a unit (unitization) before extraction rather than after. In jurisdictions (such as Wyoming) in which unitization is required before drilling on land leased for oil exploration, greater efficiency has been achieved. In spite of the poten- tial gains for all users through unitization, this form of contract is uncom- mon in other jurisdictions (such as Texas and Oklahoma) because the high cost of private contracting inhibits its adoption. Private property rights and the incentives they afford are not always sufficient to achieve efficient ex- ploitation (Libecap and Wiggins, 1985; Wiggins and Libecap, 1985).

There is an enforcement problem with all types of property rights, in- cluding private property. For common-property resources, which by defini- tion pose exclusion problems, such enforcement can be costly. Well recognized de jure rights of the medieval lord, and even contemporary landlords, to fish and game have been routinely violated by poachers (McCay, 1987; Thomp- son, 1975). The extent to which the community regards private-property rights as legitimate affects the cost of enforcement. The difficulty of enforcing pri- vate claims to common-property resources is exacerbated by competing claims to communal rights in those resources. This is evident in the United States

Tragedy of the Commons 7

oyster industry, where a private property regime, including leasehold, is not politically acceptable in many areas (McCay, 1987) regardless of the fact that it is logical, feasible, and demonstrably more efficient (Agnello and Donnel- ley, 1984).

C o m m u n a l Property. Hardin did not consider the possibility of exclu- sion under communal-property regimes. By exclusion we mean the power to exclude people other than members of a defined community. Evidence suggests that successful exclusion under communal property is the rule rather than the exception. Well-documented contemporary cases include Amerin- dian community hunting and fishing lands in James Bay, eastern subarctic Canada (Berkes, 1977, 1987; Feit, 1987). Here, the communal-property re- gime collapsed as a result of incursions by outsiders and recovered with the re-establishment of exclusion at least twice since the nineteenth century (Felt, 1986). Other examples come from the Pacific islands where communal- property regimes have collapsed in some areas but continue to be viable in many others (Johannes, 1978, 1982; Ruddle and Akimichi, 1984; Ruddle and Johannes, 1985).

Communal property is not confined to remote and sparsely populated areas. Cooperative-based coastal fisheries in Japan provide many successful examples of communal-property systems. These fishing communities hold legally guaranteed exclusive fishing rights in coastal areas (Ruddle, 1987, 1989). One of the major conclusions o f the National Research Council con- ference (1986, p. 621) was that legal recognition of communal rights, as in Japanese coastal fisheries, was crucial for the success of communal-property regimes. Many of the island nation states in the Pacific are creating formal legal guarantees of traditional communal-property rights (Ruddle and Johan- nes, 1985; Baines, 1989). Even when there is no legal recognition of com- munal property, the exclusion of outsiders by local users through such means as threats and surreptitious violence is not uncommon (Acheson, 1975; McEvoy, 1988). The persistence of community-based lobster fishing territo- ries in Maine is merely one example, but an important one because it occurs in a country and culture in which the belief in right o f free access is deeply held (Acheson, 1987, 1988).

The examples given thus far are for fish and wildlife for which exclu- sion is particularly difficult because of the migratory nature of the resource. Successful exclusion can also be found for other resource types, including grazing lands, forests, and water resources (National Research Council, 1986; Fortmann and Bruce, 1988; Dani, et al., 1987; Maass and Anderson, 1978).

Pressure on the resource because of human population growth, tech- nological change, or economic change, including new market opportunities, may contribute to the breakdown of communal-property mechanisms for exclusion. The role of population growth is especially controversial. For ex-

8 Feeny, Berkes, McCay, and Acheson

ample, some argue that in the case of East Africa, the carrying capacity of rangelands under any management regime has been exceeded (Talbot, 1986). Other cases indicate that population is merely one of many interrelated so- cial and economic problems (Jodha, 1985; Johnson and Anderson, 1988; Peters, 1987; Fortmann and Roe, 1986).

Communal-property regimes fail to provide for exclusion for other rea- sons as well. Many of these failures are associated with the appropriation of the resource by politically or militarily powerful groups, or by other fac- tors such as land reform that disrupt existing communal management sys- tems (Jodha, 1987). Others are associated with problems of scale and internal organization. The social and political characteristics of the users of the resource and how they relate to the larger political system affect the ability of local groups to organize and manage communal property (Ostrom, 1987, 1988, forthcoming).

State Property. Exclusive state governance of the resource has in many cases been sufficient to provide for adequate exclusion. However, difficul- ties in exclusion are not necessarily overcome by declaring the resource to be state property. A vivid example comes from Nepal. Alarmed by deforesta- tion, the government nationalized forests in 1957, converting what were often communal forests into de jure state property. But the result more closely approximated the creation o f de facto open access. Villagers whose control of nearby forests had been removed often succumbed to the incentives of law of capture. Deforestation accelerated instead of decelerated. In the face of worsening conditions the government began to experiment in 1976 with the re-creation o f communal-property rights (Arnold and Campbell, 1986; Bromley and Chapagain, 1984).

Similar evidence on exclusion is found in the management of state forests in Niger and Thailand. In both countries state property has often been treated as open access. In response to the growing crisis of degradation in Niger, some farmers began in the 1980's to extend their private property rights in arable land to include the trees, which are de jure state property (Thom- son et al., 1986, 1989; Feeny, 1988a).

Another problem with state governance is that imperfections in the po- litical process will often be mirrored in resource management (McEvoy, 1988). In some cultures, free access to certain resources for citizens at large is viewed as a right. In other cases, the state is especially responsive to the interests of the elite (Feeny, 1982, 1988b; Jodha, 1985). Some instances of apparent tragedies of the commons are more accurately construed as examples of government failure (Anderson, 1987; Marchak, 1988-1989).

The logic of the argument of The Tragedy o f the Commons is that we should not observe sustainable management of common-property resources and the exclusion of some uses or users, under regimes other than private

Tragedy of the Commons 9

or state p r o p e r t y . But as we have illustrated, exclusion is feasible, if n o t al- ways successful, u n d e r private, state, and c o m m u n a l - p r o p e r t y regimes. F u r- t h e r m o r e , private or state ownership is not always sufficient t o p r o v i d e f o r exclusion.

E V I D E N C E O N R E G U L A T I O N S O F U S E A N D U S E R S

Open Access. Hardin's predictions that incentives fo r successful resource m a n a g e m e n t are absent f r o m or weak in o p e n access regimes are in general consistent with the evidence. In such regimes, u n d e r co n d i t i o n s in which de- m a n d exceeds the capacity o f the resource to sustain itself, an d where the t e c h n o l o g y is available to exploit the resource at a high level, m a n y species, including the N o r t h A m e r i c a n passenger pigeon an d the bison, have b e c o m e extinct, or virtually extinct. In the c o n t e x t o f the day, free an d u n r e g u l a t e d use o f resources such as the bison initially m a d e sense. T o illustrate the in- dividual rationality that lay behind ecological tragedy, H a r d i n (1978) invokes the image o f Kit C a r s o n shooting bison o n the plains, taking o n l y the t o n g u e and leaving the rest. This is n o t e c o n o m i c a l l y irrational i f o n e considers t h at the game was then a b u n d a n t b u t the hunter's time was scarce. Depletion occurred rapidly, before countervailing institutional arrangements or changing cultural values could p r e v e n t it.

Private Property. P r i v a t i z a t i o n usually provides incentives fo r ration- al exploitation o f the resource. If the owner has p ro p ert y rights in the resource and those rights are tradeable, b o t h the costs an d benefits will accrue to the same owner and will be reflected in the m a r k e t price o f the resource, giving the owner the p e c u n i a r y incentive to r e f r a i n f r o m destructive use. These in- centives, however, are n o t necessarily consistent with sustainable use. Sup- pose a r e d w o o d planted for $1 is worth $14,000 at m a t u r i t y - w h i c h m a y take 2000 years. T h e implied rate o f r e t u r n would be less t h a n 0.5%0, well below the rates o f r e t u r n generally available to investors. A l t h o u g h planting a red- w o o d m a y m a k e ecological sense, it does not m a k e e c o n o m i c sense u n d e r a p r i v a t e - p r o p e r t y regime ( H a r d i n , 1979).

M o r e realistically, Clark (1973) has show n t h a t f o r relatively slow- growing a n d late-maturing species such as whales, it m a y be eco n o m i cal l y optimal to deplete the resource rather t h a n to use it sustainably. F o r the Ant- arctic blue whale with a m a x i m u m sustainable yield level o f p r o b a b l y n o m o re t h a n 5 % a h u m a n - r a t e o f time p r e f e r e n c e (discount rate) o f greater t h a n this 5 % would be sufficient to lead to its extinction, even u n d e r exclusive and e n f o r c e a b l e p r i v a t e - p r o p e r t y rights. These rights p e r m i t the o w n e r to max- imize the present value o f the resource, yet the resource is n o t protected f r o m extinction.

10 Feeny, Berkes, McCay, and Acheson

Communal Property. There is abundant evidence, contrary to Hardin, on the ability o f social groups to design, utilize, and adapt often ingenious mechanisms to allocate use rights among members. The medieval English commons featured in Hardin's paper, like many other historic and contem- porary commons, were often subject to comprehensive systems o f regula- tion. For example, stinting was often practiced, that is, limiting the number o f head that each owner could graze. Not only was access exclusive to cer- tain members o f the village, but their rights were often closely regulated (McCloskey, 1976; Cox, 1985; Campbell and Godoy, 1986; Dahlman, 1980; Fenoaltea, 1988). A plethora o f scholars have noted in passing that the com- mons operated successfully for several hundred years in medieval England, and have questioned if a tragedy o f the sort described by Hardin (1968) ever occurred widely (Schumacher, 1979, p. 139; Repetto, 1985, p. 145; Potter, 1974, p. 813; Dasgupta, 1983, p. 13; Marchak, 1988-89, p. 9).

Forest and meadow commons in Japanese villages were also the sub- ject o f elaborate regulations. Village leaders set opening and closing dates for the harvest o f certain products. In some villages, thatch was harvested collectively; bundles were then randomly assigned to each household. This device permitted the aggregate level o f utilization to be controlled while giv- ing each household an incentive to be reasonably conscientious in its har- vesting effort. Guards patrolled the common lands to prevent poaching both by villagers and outsiders. Written rules provided a graduated schedule o f fines for violators. Harvesting tools were also regulated. Regulations legis- lated by villagers ensured sustainable use o f common lands for generations (McKean, 1982, 1986).

In the Japanese case, forest and meadow lands and irrigation works were held as communal property while crop lands were held privately. This is not an isolated example o f the co-existence o f two property-rights regimes. There are other cases indicating the ability o f users to match appropriately the resource with the regime (Netting, 1976). In some societies, the same resource may alternate back and forth between communal and private con- trol seasonally or over the long term (Bauer, 1987; Vondal, 1987; Acheson, 1989b; Wade, 1986, 1987).

Not all examples o f successful regulation are historic or based on long- standing tradition. In a study o f Turkish coastal fisheries, successful regula- tion was found to have evolved within 15 years in two cases (Alanya, Tasucu), and 9 years in one case (Berkes, 1986a). Alarmed by the increasing numbers o f users and escalating conflicts, fishermen in Alanya developed a system to regulate use: fishing sites were spaced sufficiently apart to avoid interfer- ence, and fisherman agreed among themselves to fish in rotation to ensure equitable access to best sites, with their starting position determined by draw- ing lots. Although only half o f the licensed fishermen belonged to the local

Tragedy of the Commons 11

marketing cooperative, the authority under which the system was operated, all participated in the process for creating and maintaining it (Berkes, 1986b).

Self-regulation of resource use to improve livelihood was also achieved by a local marketing cooperative o f New Jersey fishermen. Because large catches depressed prices on the New York fresh fish market, a cooperative was formed to enhance producers' bargaining power. This cooperative decided on total catch levels for the fleet, and provided for the sharing o f revenues regardless of the catch levels o f individual boats. The pooling o f revenues reduced the incentives to over-fish. Although the system was devised to raise prices, a spillover benefit may have been conservation (McCay, 1980).

A case from South India provides another example. In a village in Andhra Pradesh, villagers at the tail end o f a large government-run irriga- tion scheme found that they were particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in water supply after the end of the rainy season. Although the traditional prac- tice, in which households attempted to have plots at various locations through- out the village, reduced the variability in household agricultural production, villagers realized that careful management of village water resources could further increase and stabilize yields. A village water-user's association was formed and rules were developed. Irrigators were hired to manage the allo- cation of water; salaries were paid through taxes levied on landowners, based on the area irrigated. Along any particular irrigation ditch, fields closest to the source o f the water could only be watered after downstream fields had been adequately wetted. The fact that prominent village landowners owned plots throughout the village helped to ensure their assistance in organizing a village-wide system o f irrigation (Wade, 1986, 1987).

These case studies illustrate that people are not helpless but are able to organize, to monitor resource use by members, to allocate use rights among members, and to adjust aggregate utilization levels to maintain sustainable use o f the resource (McEvoy, 1988). These cases, and those detailed else- where, indicate that under the appropriate circumstances, voluntary collec- tive action is feasible and effective (McCay, 1978; National Research Council, 1986; McCay and Acheson, 1987; Ostrom, forthcoming; Wade, 1986, 1987).

State Property. Government ownership (state governance) permits the formulation o f appropriate regulations for resource use. It also provides for the expression o f public interest and for accountability. But state governance does not necessarily ensure sustainable use. Given that the officials who make decisions do not have the same time horizon or interests as private owners, the general public, or the government itself, this is not surprising.

One o f the oft-mentioned problems o f state ownership is the prolifera- tion of such regulations. Smith points out, for example, that in a New England regional fishery, the combination o f quotas, allocations, and trip limitations generated more than 100 different limits, with the result that there was

12 Feeny, Berkes, McCay, and Acheson

widespread violation o f the law (Smith, 1988). N o n c o m p l i a n c e o f users an d de facto o p e n access has led to an assertion b y some t h at better p r o t e c t i o n can be achieved u n d e r private- r a t h e r t h a n s t a t e - p r o p e r t y regimes.

State ownership is seldom associated with successful m a n a g e m e n t in less-developed countries. T h e professional reso u rce-m an ag em en t infrastruc- ture o f the state is usually p o o r l y developed an d e n f o r c e m e n t o f regulations p r o b l e m a t i c . In India, f o r example, c o m m u n a l l y - h e l d forests were national- ized before the state had developed the capacity fo r management. Local com- munities are, however, starting to re-assert their cultural traditions o f c o n s e r v a t i o n (Gadgil, 1985, 1987; Gadgil and Iyer, 1989). In m u c h o f S o u t h Asia, Africa, and elsewhere, p o o r l y - d e f e n d e d state p r o p e r t y , in c o n j u n c t i o n with p o p u l a t i o n pressure, has led to widespread p o a c h i n g o f g o v e r n m e n t forest a n d o t h e r resources. R e p e t t o argues t h a t "villagers w h o ruthlessly cut trees f o r f i r e w o o d and f o d d e r in g o v e r n m e n t forests will zealously n u r t u r e and p r o t e c t groves t h a t belong to t h e m o r - if their c o m m u n i t y is sufficient- ly s t r o n g - t o their village" (Repetto, 1986, pp. 30-31).

T h e logic o f the a r g u m e n t o f " T h e T r a g e d y o f the C o m m o n s " is t h a t private owners or state managers can and o f t e n d o m a n a g e resources suc- cessfully. T h a t is, these two p r o p e r t y - r i g h t s regimes w o u l d p r o v i d e the in- centives to regulate use in a fashion consistent with sustainability. Implicitly H a r d i n argues that these incentives would be absent or weak f o r o t h e r re- gimes. H o w e v e r , the evidence indicates that co m p l ex interactions a m o n g the characteristics o f the resource, the p r o p e r t y - r i g h t s regime an d o t h e r institu- tional a r r a n g e m e n t s , a n d the s o c i o - e c o n o m i c e n v i r o n m e n t c o n t r i b u t e to the degree o f m a n a g e m e n t success. Success in the regulation o f uses and users is n o t universally associated with any particular t y p e o f p r o p e r t y - r i g h t s re- gime. C o m m u n a l p r o p e r t y , private p r o p e r t y , an d g o v e r n m e n t p r o p e r t y have all been associated b o t h with success and failure.

C O N C L U S I O N S

Hardin's model is insightful but incomplete. His conclusion o f unavoid- able tragedy follows f r o m his assumptions o f open access, lack o f constraints o n individual b e h a v i o r , conditions in which d e m a n d exceeds supply, a n d resource users w h o are incapable o f altering the rules. A ct u al c o m m o n -~ p r o p e r t y situations o f t e n d o n o t c o n f o r m tO all f o u r o f these assumptions. This leads us to a m e n d H a r d i n ' s heuristic fable. T h e " t r a g e d y " m a y start as in H a r d i n (1968). But a f t e r several years o f declining yields, the h e r d s m e n are likely to get t o g e t h e r to seek ways to (1) c o n t r o l access t o the pasture, a n d (2) agree u p o n a set o f rules o f c o n d u c t , perh ap s including stinting, t h a t effectively limits exploitation. W h e t h e r or n o t the i n t e n d e d self-regulation

Tragedy of the Commons 13

works depends on a n u m b e r o f factors. H e r e the simple model breaks d o w n - no single m e t a p h o r can tell the full story. T h e medieval English com- mons usually were regulated by the c o m m u n i t y , sometimes effectively, some- times not. T h e o u t c o m e was never so clear and deterministically predictable as in H a r d i n ' s model.

Thus, a m a j o r conclusion o f the p a p e r is the rejection o f the simple o n e - t o - o n e relationship between p r o p e r t y - r i g h t s regime an d o u t c o m e postu- lated b y H a r d i n . T h e H a r d i n a r g u m e n t o v e r l o o k s the i m p o r t a n t role o f in- stitutional a r r a n g e m e n t s t h a t p r o v i d e f o r exclusion an d regulation o f use. It also o v e r l o o k s cultural factors (Feeny, 1988b; Charles, 1988). In o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d the o u t c o m e , one needs to k n o w the n a t u r e o f the resource, the whole a r r a y o f decision-making a r r a n g e m e n t s , including the p ro p ert y -ri g h t s regime, and the nature o f the interactions among users and regulators (Oaker- son, 1986; G o d w i n and Shepard, 1979, p. 266; M c E v o y , 1988, p. 229). C o m - plex interactions are an i m p o r t a n t characteristic o f c o m m o n s situations, and models o f the c o m m o n s must take these interactions into account (for a review o f the m a t h e m a t i c s o f describing c o m p l e x interactive systems, see West an d Shlesinger, 1990). Success m a y be f o u n d u n d e r three, n o t just t w o p r o p e r t y - rights regimes.

T h e original H a r d i n p a p e r did, however, allude to the p o t en t i al viabil- ity o f c o m m u n a l p r o p e r t y . H a r d i n ' s (1968, p. 1247) phrase, " m u t u a l coer- cion, m u t u a l l y agreed u p o n " is consistent with c o m m u n a l - p r o p e r t y a r r a n g e m e n t s , a l t h o u g h he appears to have m e a n t state institutions u n d e r representative g o v e r n m e n t . Societies have the capacity to c o n s t r u c t an d en- f o r c e rules and n o r m s t h a t constrain the b e h a v i o r o f individuals. In m a n y societies and in m a n y situations, the capacity f o r concerted social action over- comes the divergence between individual and collective rationality. T h e cases discussed in this p a p e r p r o v i d e ample evidence o f the ability o f groups o f users a n d local c o m m u n i t i e s to organize a n d to m a n a g e local resources ef- fectively. C o n t r a r y to assumptions by m a n y c o m m o n - p r o p e r t y analysts, these c o m m u n a l - p r o p e r t y a r r a n g e m e n t s have persisted. A diversity o f societies in the past and present have independently devised, maintained, or adapted com- m u n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s to m a n a g e c o m m o n - p r o p e r t y resources. T h e i r persis- tence is not an historical accident; these a r r a n g e m e n t s build o n knowledge o f the resource and cultural n o r m s t h a t have evolved an d b e e n tested over time.

T h e new interest in c o m m u n a l p r o p e r t y a r r a n g e m e n t s is p erh ap s re- lated to the resurgence o f interest in grass-roots d e m o c r a c y , public partici- p a t i o n , and local-level planning. State p r o p e r t y regimes in which officials exercise exclusive decision-making powers have b een falling into disfavor. Given t h a t there are m a n y situations in which users have the cap aci t y f o r self-management, it makes administrative and economic sense to involve them

14 Feeny, Berkes, McCay, and Acheson

in resource m a n a g e m e n t . C o m m u n i t i e s o f reso u rce users are, however, n o longer relatively isolated a n d resources o f t e n hav e multiple uses. T h e r e f o r e , complete d e v o l u t i o n m a y n o t be a p p r o p r i a t e ; it m ak es sense f o r the state to continue to play a role in resource conservation and allocation a m o n g com- munities o f users. Shared g o v e r n a n c e o r state regulation j o i n t l y with user self-management is thus a viable o p t i o n . Such c o - m a n a g e m e n t can capital- ize o n the local knowledge and long-term self-interest o f users, while providing f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n with relevant uses a n d users o v er a wide geographic scope at potentially lower transaction (rule-enforcement) cost (McCay, 1988; Ache- s o n , 1989a; P i n k e r t o n , 1989).

Further, the logic o f c o m m u n a l p r o p e r t y can also be applied to resources t h a t are global (rather t h a n local) in scope. H e r e , tragedies are m o r e difficult to prevent. This is perhaps w h y the W o r l d C o n s e r v a t i o n Strategy (1980) a n d the W o r l d C o m m i s s i o n o n E n v i r o n m e n t a n d D e v e l o p m e n t (1987) b o t h em- phasized the global c o m m o n s . P r o b l e m s such as o z o n e depletion a n d car- b o n dioxide a c c u m u l a t i o n in the a t m o s p h e r e are clearly global tragedies o f the c o m m o n s in the making. T h e solution o f such p r o b l e m s will necessarily involve c o - m a n a g e m e n t o n a large scale. T h e 1987 M o n t r e a l P r o t o c o l t o pro- tect the o z o n e layer is an example o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o - m a n a g e m e n t . T h e case o f oil p o l l u t i o n o n the high seas, with various i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n s go- ing b a c k to 1954 (Cuyvers, 1984), and leading t o reductions in accidental oil spills in the 1980's, the Alaska spill n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n can be effective (Worl d Resources Institute, 1988, p. 330).

T h e p r o b l e m posed by H a r d i n over 20 years ago c a p t u r e d the a t t e n t i o n o f a multi-disciplinary collection o f scholars and practitioners, including an- thropologists, d e v e l o p m e n t planners, ecologists, economists, geographers, political scientists, r e s o u r c e scientists, and sociologists. The C o m m o n Property Resource Digest, published since D e c e m b e r 1986, is distributed to m o r e t h a n 3500 individuals a n d institutions. H a r d i n ' s m o d e l p r o v i d e d in- sights and focused attention on i m p o r t a n t analytical issues. H o w ev er, as with m a n y seminal b u t simple models, H a r d i n ' s analysis has b een sh o w n b y sub- sequent studies t o be overly simplified a n d deterministic. As is the usual process in science, t h e o r y will have to be revised t o t ak e into a c c o u n t the new evidence (Feeny, 1989).

A new and m o r e comprehensive t h e o r y for c o m m o n - p r o p e r t y resources must be able to a c c o u n t f o r sustainable resource m a n a g e m e n t u n d e r c o m m u n a l - p r o p e r t y regimes. The t h e o r y should be capable o f accommodating user self-organization or the lack o f it. Such a m o d el can b et t er explain whether a n d u n d e r w h a t conditions sustainable resource m a n a g e m e n t will occur, r a t h e r t h a n simply predicting the demise o f all resources held in c o m m o n .

Tragedy of the Commons 15

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

T h e a u t h o r s a c k n o w l e d g e t h e h e l p f u l c o m m e n t s o f M i n a K i s l a l i o g l u , D o n a l d M c C l o s k e y , S t u a r t M e s t e l m a n , E l i n o r O s t r o m , H e n r y R e g i e r , D a r r e l l T o m k i n s , a n d t w o a n o n y m o u s r e f e r e e s . T h e u s u a l d i s c l a i m e r a p p l i e s . T h e C o m m o n P r o p e r t y R e s o u r c e D i g e s t is a v a i l a b l e f r o m 3 3 2 E C l a s s r o o m O f f i c e B u i l d i n g , 1994 B u f o r d A v e n u e , U n i v e r s i t y o f M i n n e s o t a , S t . P a u l , M i n n e s o t a 5 5 1 0 8 .

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