call for something more. The two severe abuses, of course, also tend to go together. Democratic resistance to authoritarian or totalitarian governments tends to result in the government inflicting severe abuses of human rights on the democratic resistance. Governments that systematically abuse the rights of their citizens rarely have widespread popular support. But they need not go together, hence their independence as criteria. There is one further constraint. Although the only popular movements for which one might justly intervene need not be democratically liberal, it would by these standards clearly be wrong to intervene in favor of a popular movement committed to a political program that would involve the systematic abuse of basic, "objective" human rights.

25. Kindleberger (1973), Gilpin (1975), and Hirsch and Doyle (1977).
26. The popular classic making these arguments is Kennedy (1987).

The United States Political System and International Leadership: A "Decidedly Inferior" Form of Government?

Michael Mastanduno

INTRODUCTION: THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA

The framers of the U.S. Constitution created, by conscious design, a constrained government. They were more concerned to avoid the abuse of political power than to create circumstances under which it could be easily exercised. Thus, instead of concentrating power they sought to disperse it, and created the familiar system of "checks and balances" to assure that no part of government accumulated enough influence to threaten the integrity of democracy.

Foreign policy did not constitute an exception to this principle, and the framers assured that the Executive and Congress shared power and decision-making authority. Indeed, in enumerating the powers of each branch they were arguably more generous to the legislature than to the president. On the crucial issue of war-making authority, for example, the president was named Commander-in-Chief, but Congress was given the authority to raise and support an army, provide and maintain a navy, and most importantly, to commit the nation to armed struggle by declaring war. The president, with the advice and consent of the Senate, was granted appointment and treaty-making powers. However, the all-important power to collect taxes and appropriate funds was given to the Congress, as was the equally crucial authority to regulate the commerce of the United States with other countries.

The design of a constrained government and the sharing of foreign policy authority created a dilemma, the core of which remains with the United States to this day. On the one hand, the dispersal of political power has the *internal advantage* of helping to promote and protect American democracy. On the other hand, the dispersal of power has an *external disadvantage*, in that it poses a potential constraint on the ability of the United States to conduct effective foreign policy.[1] To survive or flourish in an international system characterized by anarchy, or the lack of a central governing authority, often requires speed, secrecy, and decisiveness in foreign policy decision-making. Governments must be able to seize opportunities, respond to threats and challenges, and make and honor commitments. They must pursue a set of core objectives with consistency, and at the same time manage conflicts among these objectives, make tactical compromises where necessary, and adjust to changing international circumstances. These qualities are more likely to be maximized in more centralized, rather than decentralized, political systems. Alexis de Tocqueville, in his classic appraisal of the United States, recognized this dilemma in concluding that "especially in their conduct of foreign relations, democracies appear to me decidedly inferior to other governments." They "obey impulse rather than prudence," have a propensity to "abandon a mature design for the gratification of a momentary passion," and in general are deficient in the qualities demanded by effective foreign policy.[2]

America's early statesmen were similarly cognizant of the so-called democratic dilemma, and they found a way to resolve it in the *substance* of U.S. foreign policy. By adopting an isolationist foreign policy, they reasoned, the internal benefits of democratic governance would be preserved while the external disadvantages would be minimized. If decentralized, deliberative government handicapped the United States in the age-old game of European power politics, the United States could choose not to play. Geography facilitated and reinforced this choice, since the Atlantic ocean provided a physical barrier that could not be overcome easily by the technologies of the day. The classic statement of the new nation's strategy was articulated by Washington in his Farewell Address, as he admonished his fellow citizens to "steer clear of permanent alliances" and counseled that "[t]he great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is . . . to have with them as little *political* connection as possible."[3]

The isolationist solution to the democratic dilemma was feasible for over one hundred years, but by the early part of the twentieth century, as U.S. economic power and political influence increased rapidly, strains were apparent. A return to isolationism following U.S. involvement in World War I resulted in an unmitigated

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disaster for world politics and the global economy. U.S. officials drew the appropriate lessons, and following World War II they abandoned isolationism and sought to exercise international leadership.[4] In the postwar era, U.S. officials were forced to confront directly the dilemma that had been so deftly avoided in earlier times.

DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS AND U.S. LEADERSHIP

The view that the U.S. political system is "decidedly inferior," or a significant constraint on the ability of the United States to lead internationally approaches conventional wisdom among students and practitioners of U.S. foreign policy. George Kennan once made an unflattering comparison between the foreign policy of American democracy and the behavior of a dinosaur with a huge body and pin-sized brain: the beast is slow to rouse, but when it finally recognizes threats to its interests, it flails about indiscriminantly, wrecking its native habitat while attempting to destroy its adversary.[5] Theodore Lowi has claimed that America's decentralized decision-making system creates incentives for leaders to adopt foreign policy strategies that compromise effectiveness, such as the inflation of foreign policy threats and the "overselling" of foreign policy opportunities. He argues that the domestic political system is an "anachronism in foreign affairs," and that it is "the system itself that has so often made our international relations so inimical to our own best interests."[6] In the context of international political economy, Stephen Krasner has popularized the conception of the United States as a "weak state" whose domestic institutions placed it at a considerable disadvantage in the conduct of commercial diplomacy—a disadvantage only offset by the fact that the United States has been extraordinarily powerful internationally.[7] In a 1984 book entitled *Our Own Worst Enemy*, I. M. Destler, Leslie Gelb, and (current Clinton National Security Advisor) Anthony Lake contended that "not only our government but our whole society has been undergoing a systemic breakdown when attempting to foster a coherent, consistent approach to the world."[8] More recently, the distinguished columnist David Broder, reflecting on the first year experience of the Clinton administration, argued that the "decayed condition of our vital institutions" has "damaged the capacity of our system to develop and sustain coherent policy."[9]

What is it about the U.S. political system that so handicaps foreign policy and international leadership? The answer is found in an analysis of the relationship between Executive and Congress: of the institutions of and relationships within the Executive: and of the role played by interest groups and the media in the foreign policy process.

Executive vs. Congress

The power-sharing arrangements stipulated by the U.S. Constitution invite the president and Congress to conduct an ongoing struggle over the control of foreign policy. For the first two decades after World War II, however, that struggle was held in abeyance. The two branches worked out an arrangement in which Congress delegated authority and deferred politically to the Executive, on the grounds

that only the presidency possessed the institutional resources, intelligence capability, and decision-making qualities—speed, steadiness, resolve, and flexibility—required to conduct the cold war effectively and lead a global coalition in the struggle against the Soviet Union and communism. The eagerness of Congress to defer might also be attributed to its desire to atone for its contributions to the foreign policy disasters of the interwar period, such as the Smoot-Hawley tariff and the failure of the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations. In any event, Congress took a secondary and in some cases peripheral role as presidents confronted the Soviet Union in a series of cold war crises, intervened covertly and overtly in the third world, and enmeshed the United States in an array of entangling alliances around the globe. In commercial policy, Congress delegated tariff-cutting authority to the president and passed export control legislation enabling him to restrict trade to any destination for reasons of national security or foreign policy. The great symbol of congressional acquiescence was the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964, which President Johnson took as a green light to expand dramatically America's role in the Vietnam war.

The Vietnam experience shattered this interbranch arrangement and renewed the foreign policy struggle. Out of that debacle emerged the "new" Congress of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s—a Congress that was more assertive politically, less inclined to defer to an "imperial" presidency that had squandered U.S. international leadership, and in possession of greater resources and expertise in foreign affairs. Members of Congress have sought to reclaim or expand their authority over the direct use of force, covert intervention, weapons sales, intelligence oversight, trade policy, economic and security assistance, and numerous other aspects of the substance and process of foreign policy. They have increased the size of their personal and committee staffs and have strengthened the capacity of and their reliance upon collective resources such as the General Accounting Office, Congressional Budget Office, and Office of Technology Assessment. Members of Congress are now less reliant on the Executive for sources of foreign policy information and expertise, and possess the administrative resources to facilitate involvement—and potentially to contest the Executive—across a range of foreign policy issues.

Unfortunately, the new Congress has become less coherent institutionally as it has become more assertive. Reforms undertaken in the aftermath of Watergate and Vietnam created greater decentralization, with less emphasis on seniority and with the erosion of committee discipline. As a result, there are now 535 would-be secretaries of state (or commerce, or defense), each with more resources and political influence at his or her disposal. At the same time, these representatives remain beholden to their local constituencies and retain their tendency to approach foreign affairs from a more parochial, as opposed to national, perspective. In short, the Executive shares power with a Congress whose individual members demand and play a greater role in foreign policy, but without necessarily coordinating their initiatives or framing them in terms of a consistent national strategy. As a former member of the Senate, John Tower, has noted, "Five hundred and thirty-five Congressmen with different philosophies, regional interests, and objectives in mind cannot forge a unified foreign policy that reflects the interests of the United States as a whole."[10]

There are numerous examples of the Executive and newly-assertive Congress working at cross-purposes, to the detriment of coherent foreign policy and effective international leadership. With the passage of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, Congress made its mark on foreign policy by linking most-favored-nation (MFN) status to the human rights practices of communist countries. Unfortunately, the Nixon administration had already completed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union and committed itself to granting MFN without any explicit human rights conditions attached. The Amendment made the United States appear unreliable, and helped to destroy the detente strategy of Nixon and Kissinger.[11] Congress and the Executive clashed later in the decade over the SALT II Treaty, and once again the United States came across as an unreliable negotiating partner.

During the 1980s, the Reagan administration and Congress could not agree on the utility or desirability of aiding the Nicaraguan contras. The result was incoherent policy and the sending of mixed signals to allies and adversaries. The administration's foreign policy was ultimately driven into crisis as executive officials sought in frustration and poor judgment to evade congressional prohibitions through extra-legal means. In trade policy, the exposure of members of Congress to protectionist interests and their tendency to blame foreigners for the U.S. trade deficit led to initiatives—most notably the Super 301 provision of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988—that significantly complicated the task of the Executive as it attempted to move forward multilateral negotiations to liberalize international trade.[12]

Relations Within the Executive

One important reason the Executive is presumed to enjoy a "comparative advantage" over the Congress in the conduct of foreign policy is that the president has at his disposal an enormous bureaucratic machine to assist in the formulation and implementation of policy. The foreign policy bureaucracy was expanded greatly after World War II to provide the necessary resources and expertise to wage the cold war. State Department personnel multiplied in Washington and abroad, and the National Security Act of 1947 led to the development of parallel institutions—a permanent Department of Defense led by civilians, and a centralized intelligence establishment under the direction of the CIA.[13] In addition, postwar presidents could draw upon the foreign policy resources of the Commerce Department, the Treasury, the Department of Labor, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and numerous other more specialized offices and agencies.

This very structure that provides advantages, however, also poses a potential constraint on foreign policy. Bureaucracies obviously are not passive instruments; they develop and defend their own institutional interests. Their interests come into conflict because they share jurisdiction over so many areas of U.S. foreign policy, and not surprisingly they compete with each other to control the agenda and the substance of policy. In the absence of central direction, the result is often stalemate or vacillation in foreign policy. The turbulent postwar history of U.S. export control policy, in which the Defense, Commerce, and State Departments have struggled over whether to liberalize or restrict trade in advanced technology often without clear guidance from the White House serves as an apt example.[14]

The president obviously needs to control and coordinate the various parts of the foreign policy bureaucracy, and in 1947 Congress provided the institutional means through the creation of the National Security Council (NSC). Eventually, this solution created new problems, as the staff of the NSC transcended its coordinating role and became yet another combatant in the inter-agency struggle to control foreign policy. This process began with President Kennedy, who desired an activist National Security Advisor to offset the inherent incrementalism of the State Department, and reached its zenith under President Nixon, whose National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger sought to neutralize the State Department and to run foreign policy directly from the White House with the assistance of a small staff.[15] The Nixon-Kissinger system produced significant accomplishments—the opening to China, detente with the Soviet Union, extrication from the Vietnam war—but also caused significant problems. Important issues were left unattended until they reached crisis proportions (e.g., international economic policy and the eventual "Nixon shocks" of August 1971), and the overall foreign policy was difficult to legitimate since much of it was conducted in behind-the-scenes negotiations by officials who were neither elected by the public nor accountable to members of Congress.[16]

The problem took a new form during the 1970s and 1980s, as secretaries of state and national security advisors battled to control U.S. foreign policy. During the Carter administration, Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski clashed over arms control, human rights, and policy towards Africa. Their debates were often public, exacerbating the incoherence and lack of direction in U.S. policy. During the Reagan administration, Alexander Haig and William Clark engaged in similar struggles over intervention in Lebanon and the U.S. response to energy trade between the Soviet Union and Western Europe. Although public conflict between the State Department and White House was more muted during Reagan's second term, the NSC staff contributed prominently to the turmoil in U.S. foreign policy created by the Iran-Contra initiatives. Congressional and other critics expressed concern that the NSC staff had moved beyond its traditional coordinating function and had usurped "operational control" of U.S. policy from other executive departments. In fact, the Reagan NSC was continuing, in more extreme fashion, the tradition of NSC control established during the Kennedy administration.[17]

The overall point should be clear. The Executive has been plagued to a significant degree by the same institutional weaknesses attributed to Congress—parochial interests, decentralization, and the lack of effective coordination. Even in the absence of congressional "interference," foreign policy by the Executive may tend to lack consistency or direction. With both branches engaged, the problems are multiplied.

The difficulties raised by the NSC in security policy are also found in foreign economic policy. There, too, interagency struggles are commonplace, usually involving the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Labor, the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), the Office of Management and Budget, and several other agencies. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), lodged within the White House, takes on the job of coordinating agency positions and interests in trade policy. Like the NSC, however, USTR is a player as well as a coordinator, with its own set of institutional interests. USTR officials have clashed in recent years with their counterparts in Treasury over the Europe 1992 project, and with officials at the State Department, CEA, and OMB over U.S. trade policy toward Japan.

Two other issues that bear on the ability of the Executive to conduct effective foreign policy are worthy of note. First, although U.S. economic policy and security policy are each plagued by problems of coordination, the problems are far more profound when one considers the need for coordination *across* the two types of policies. As Destler has argued, the economic and security decision-making "complexes" within the executive are self-contained units and almost totally separate from each other in their day to day operations.[18] A President who focuses on one side of the foreign policy house may find it difficult to master or mobilize effectively the bureaucracy on the other side. Bill Clinton has devoted considerable energies to economic policy, and his foreign policy has been criticized as half-hearted, incoherent, and lacking in leadership.[19] In contrast, George Bush sought to master security policy, and often found himself handcuffed in economic policy—as demonstrated by ill-fated trip to Japan in January 1992.

Issues that fall at the intersection of the two policy complexes are often handled poorly. The FSX dispute provides a clear example: the security complex (the State and Defense Departments) negotiated that agreement with Japan in isolation from the economic complex (the Commerce Department and USTR). The former believed the agreement was in the national security interest, while the latter saw it as violating the national economic interest. The resulting bureaucratic battle and decision to reconsider the agreement left America's most important Pacific ally to question the reliability and credibility of its alliance partner. In post-cold war foreign policy, as economic and security issues becoming increasingly intertwined and the United States grows more concerned about "economic security," the institutional divide between the two spheres of policy-making is likely to prove more troublesome. The latest institutional innovation—Clinton's creation of a National Economic Council to mirror the National Security Council and to coordinate economic policy—may reinforce rather than rectify the divide.

Second, the U.S. government has appropriately been called a "government of strangers."[20] The political appointments of each new administration reach far down into the executive bureaucracy. Although this has the advantage of enabling a new administration to put a distinctive stamp on policy, it leaves the United States with a deficit in experience and institutional memory, particularly in contrast to states characterized by "permanent government" such as Japan. Former U.S. negotiators often lament the disadvantage posed to U.S. commercial diplomacy by the fact that Japanese (and other negotiators) often have greater experience and knowledge of the United States than U.S. officials have of foreign countries.[21]

Interest Groups and the Media

Not only is the U.S. government fragmented and decentralized: it also affords ready access to private actors seeking to manipulate government policy to serve their particular interests. If, for government officials, the rule of bureaucratic

politics is "where you stand depends on where you sit," the rule of interest group politics is "which way you lean depends on who is pushing you." A former U.S. Senator, Charles Mathias, noted recently in an assessment of U.S. Middle East policy that "as a result of the activities of the [Israeli] lobby, Congressional conviction has been measurably reinforced by the knowledge that political sanctions will be applied to any who fail to deliver."[22]

Interest groups hoping to influence U.S. foreign policy have a variety of channels through which to exert political pressure. They can "push" on members of the House and Senate, on the White House, and on the different agencies of the Executive. The decentralized structure also enables interest groups to play off one branch of government or agency against another, and thereby enhance their potential influence. This point has not been lost on U.S. firms seeking protection or market access abroad—the rule is if the State Department is unsympathetic, try Commerce or USTR; if the Executive as a whole is unresponsive, try the Congress, which may be able to solve your problem by itself, or at least can help to pressure the executive. In trade with Japan, the dogged determination of firms such as Motorola or Toys R Us to "work the system" has been rewarded by special negotiating efforts by U.S. government officials to achieve market access.

The U.S. government often responds more readily to principles that pragmatism, and thus the more powerful or skillful interest groups, can "capture" foreign policy by appealing to broad principles that transcend their narrow self-interest. During the cold war, firms frequently exploited the fear of communism to prod the government to use foreign policy to serve their corporate interests. The interventions in Guatemala in 1954 and Iran in 1953, in the interest of United Fruit and U.S. oil companies, respectively, serve as prominent examples.[23] Others have appealed more recently to "national security" or "fair trade" to bolster their case for protection or special treatment. The machine tool industry's efforts were rewarded by the Reagan administration's negotiation of a voluntary restraint agreement in 1986, and in that same year the semiconductor industry obtained a commitment to market access through the by now infamous U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Arrangement.

Interest groups do not always push in the same direction, and, since the government tends to be receptive, the result can be immobility or stalemate in foreign policy. Jeff Frieden has traced the ambivalence of the United States government toward international economic leadership during the interwar years to the conflict at the societal level between nationalist and internationalist coalitions.[24] Domestically-oriented industry and agriculture "captured" Congress and the Commerce Department, while internationally-oriented industry and finance held sway over the State and Treasury Departments. U.S. foreign policy, reflecting the industry group struggle, bounced back and forth incoherently between engagement and insularity. A similar problem appears to have plagued the Clinton administration's China policy prior to the May 1994 decision to delink trade and human rights. While Secretary of State Christopher lectured the Chinese on their human rights practices, high Commerce officials and large U.S. firms such as General Electric and AT&T conducted their own diplomacy to strengthen economic ties. Industry officials complained publicly that their economic interests were being jeopardized by the State Department, while State contended that its credibility and leverage as an enforcer of U.S. human rights principles had been undermined by the activities of Commerce and U.S. firms. The United States failed to speak with one voice, affording China the opportunity to exploit the divisions.[25]

It is important to note that access to the U.S. political system is readily available not only to domestic groups, but to *foreign* interest groups and governments as well. Foreign lobbying, of course, takes place in all countries and is a standard feature of international relations. The U.S. system is distinctive, however, in that it is especially accommodating to foreign influence. The same multiple channels of influence that are open to domestic groups are open to foreigners as well. And, since political appointments penetrate deeply into the government structure and high officials frequently stay in government for short periods of time and then return to lucrative careers in the private sector, there is a readily available stream of influential individuals for hire by foreign (as well as domestic) interests.

Over the past several years, as U.S.-Japanese economic frictions have intensified, Japanese lobbying efforts in the United States have become particularly contentious. Critics contend that Japanese firms and foundations have undertaken a systematic financial campaign to tip the U.S. political debate in a direction more sympathic to Japan's point of view, by generously endowing universities and think tanks, and by hiring influential former officials of the U.S. government.[26] There is ample evidence to support this view of a Japanese corporate effort: whether and to what extent that effort has been successful is less certain. Where Japanese firms have succeeded (e.g., in the Toshiba incident of 1987, or in keeping semiconductors off the Super 301 list in 1989), they have done so not by overturning a U.S. consensus on their own, but by throwing support behind one side or another in an on-going U.S. political debate either within the U.S. Executive or between the Executive and Congress.[27] This reinforces the main point—the decentralized and fragmented U.S. system allows ready access to powerful and skilled interest groups, whether they be domestic or foreign.

Like the role of Congress, the role of the *media* in foreign policy was affected profoundly by Vietnam and Watergate. Prior to those events, the media tended to act as a conduit for the executive's foreign policy by interpreting, amplifying, and often supporting official positions. After Vietnam, it became far more assertive and adversarial. Some argue that the media played a dominant role in the war itself, in that its critical stance helped to turn the U.S. public against the war effort.[28]

The new, more assertive media, like the new Congress, helps to preserve the integrity of American democracy. It provides a check on the imperial tendencies of the presidency by subjecting official policy to critical scrutiny and by assuring that voices other than that of the president and his inner circle are heard. Yet what is good for democracy may not necessarily be good for foreign policy. Although the media by itself hardly can be held responsible for incoherence in U.S. foreign policy, it clearly exacerbates any lack of coherence by consistently publicizing and dwelling on disputes among high officials and the contradictions and failures of administration policy. As David Broder has noted:

> Reporters are instinctively fight promoters. Consensus-building is not our forte—or our job. Carrying through policy requires sustained effort. The press in all its forms is episodic. We flit from topic to topic. We hate repetition. Our attitude toward institutions is cavalier.[29]

The media do not simply react to official initiatives, but increasingly have the power to help set the foreign policy agenda by shaping the public and official response to foreign events. Television has replaced print as the principal source of news information for Americans, and one consequence, in the words of Lloyd Cutler, is that foreign policy has been placed "on deadline."[30] Government officials react to the pressure of publicity, and the result is often hasty, ill-conceived policies that play to the immediate impulses of the public rather than to the long-term interests of the country. U.S. policy toward Somalia provides a striking example: the Bush administration's last minute decision to send the U.S. military on a humanitarian mission was driven in part by the strong public reaction to the images of starving children conveyed by evening news programs. Similarly, the Clinton administration's subsequent and rather abrupt decision to abandon the military commitment was influenced by the visceral public reaction of outrage to the image of captured U.S. service personnel being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. At the time, Secretary of State Christopher and other high officials cautioned against conducting "foreign policy by CNN," but that is precisely what the administration seemed to be doing.

LEADERSHIP IN SPITE OF DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS?

The post-Vietnam Congress is assertive yet ineffective in foreign policy. The Executive has problems coordinating policy even within its own institutional setting, much less with the Congress. Domestic and foreign interest groups have easy access to government and can distort policy to suit their needs. The media prey on the incoherence of it all and distort policy further through their control of the information that reaches the public most quickly and directly.

This institutional landscape poses a forbidding constraint on the exercise of U.S. leadership. Or does it? In this section I argue, contrary to the conventional wisdom, that the extent to which the domestic political system frustrates or constrains U.S. leadership has been significantly exaggerated. First, the overall record of postwar U.S. foreign policy has been reasonably strong in terms of consistency, flexibility, and the ability to achieve major objectives.[31] Second, the record also indicates that the President has the means and capability to manage domestic constraints and minimize their detrimental impact on leadership. Third, the President can actually turn the domestic system into an asset, or source of strength, in the conduct of foreign policy and the exercise of leadership. A final point, made in a concluding section, is that power and purpose are at least as important as the structure of the domestic political system in determining the effectiveness of U.S. leadership.

The Postwar Record

"International leadership" was defined earlier as the ability to develop and sustain foreign policies that significantly affect the structure and substance of international relations and that contribute significantly to the solution of collective problems or the realization of collective opportunities. One way to approach the question of leadership capacity is to examine the performance record of the United States in the era in which it sought to exercise leadership. Notwithstanding the democratic dilemma and constraints of the domestic system, the postwar U.S. record is quite strong. U.S. officials managed to develop and pursue a set of policies that had a profound impact on the international system. They pursued these policies with consistency over an extended period of time and across administrations, and achieved a large measure of success. Moreover, U.S. policy has been flexible in adjusting to changes in the international environment, and in responding to crises that threaten core foreign policy objectives.

An obvious example of a foreign policy pursued with consistency and systemic effect was containment of the Soviet Union. From Kennan's long telegram in 1946 to the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union itself), U.S. officials across nine administrations led the non-communist world in an effort to prevent the expansion of Soviet political and military influence. As Gaddis notes, different administrations may have pursued different "strategies" of containment.[32] Yet all agreed on the priority of the core objective of containment, irrespective of whether the party in power was Democratic or Republican, whether Congress was assertive or acquiescent, or whether the era was pre- or post-Vietnam. Deviations from containment were sometimes initiated but never pursued seriously as policy alternatives. In this category one might place the Eisenhower/Dulles exploration of rollback, the Carter administration's interest in shifting foreign policy from an "East-West" to a "North-South" emphasis, and the Reagan administration's half-hearted attempt at rollback symbolized by the Reagan Doctrine. The basic objective of containment remained intact and for the most part achieved success.

A corollary to containment was the formation and maintenance of a set of security alliances with non-Communist powers. Here, too, U.S. officials pursued a policy consistently over time that had a major impact on the international system. Notwithstanding discontent over burden-sharing, several major crises (e.g., Suez in 1956, the pipeline in 1982), and occasional domestic attempts to reconsider the core policy (e.g., the Mansfield Amendment), America's basic alliance commitments were not called into question, and in fact thus far have outlived the cold war.

Another core, postwar objective of the United States has been the creation and expansion of an open world economy and multilateral trading system. That objective has been pursued across administrations and has been institutionalized in international institutions such as the IMF and the GATT. The United States has remained the prime mover in the GATT as that institution first took on the tariff barriers that developed during the war and depression years, then attacked non-tariff barriers, and most recently has accepted the challenge of bringing excluded sectors and issues (e.g., agriculture, textiles, services) into the multilateral regime. As U.S. power has declined in relative terms, domestic pressure has built for protection and a reconsideration of the GATT commitment. U.S. officials have tried to resist the pressure, have not abandoned GATT, and instead have worked to strengthen its efficacy and credibility.

Other examples of core U.S. foreign policy objectives pursued with consistency and effectiveness might include the maintenance of a "zone of peace" that incorporated the aggressors of the last major war, and decolonization and the integration of less developed countries into the liberal world economy.[33] The main point should be clear—in terms of the main policies and objectives of postwar U.S. leadership, pursued over the long term, the domestic political system did *not* result in uncertainty, incoherence, or vacillation. Either the domestic constraints were modest, or executive officials apparently found ways to overcome them quite consistently.

The U.S. record also indicates a reasonable degree of *flexibility* in responding to structural changes in the global environment. The Nixon administration's opening to China, in the interest of exploiting the Sino-Soviet split, reversed decades of ideological hostility that was deeply embedded in public and elite sentiment. The opening was not a one-shot deal, as the commitment normalizing relations with China has been sustained through the Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations. Second, when faced during the early decades of the cold war with the choice between support for democracy or for anti-communist authoritarianism, U.S. officials consistently chose the latter. After Vietnam, U.S. officials began to rethink this approach, and gradually a "pro-democracy" emphasis came to replace uncritical support for right-wing dictators as a core foreign policy objective. The end of the cold war obviously has accelerated this development, but the initial thrust was quite apparent in both the Carter and Reagan administrations. In international monetary policy, the United States moved during the 1970s from supporting a fixed to a floating exchange rate system when it was clear (due in large part to America's own economic policies) that the fixed system was no longer viable. With the glaring exception of the first Reagan administration, U.S. officials have sought in the floating system to coordinate exchange rate and macroeconomic policies with other advanced industrial states in order to recapture the stability and predictability in international economic transactions achieved in the era of fixed rates.[34]

Finally, the democratic dilemma suggests that the nature of the domestic political system will make it difficult for the United States to respond with the necessary speed, secrecy, and decisiveness in times of foreign policy crisis. Again, the record suggests otherwise. Whether one considers threats to national security such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, threats to alliance stability such as the Suez crisis of 1956 or the 1973 Middle East war, or threats to international economic stability such as the Mexican debt crisis of 1982 or the extreme pressures for protection that accompanied record U.S. trade deficits during the mid-1980s, the domestic political system did not prevent U.S. officials from responding quickly and decisively to preserve core foreign policy objectives.

Managing Domestic Constraints

An important reason for the strength of the U.S. postwar record is that an administration with a clear sense of foreign policy purpose has the wherewithal to manage and deflect the potentially detrimental constraints of the domestic political system. Administration officials have at their disposal a variety of instruments and techniques. They can mobilize previously uninvolved domestic actors to support their preferred positions on a given issue. They can appeal to national security and exploit the "rally around the flag" effect as a way to centralize power and gain public support. They can enlist the support of international actors. They can bind the United States to pursue certain policies through international commitments, and then use the existence of those commitments to overcome domestic opposition to the policies. In short, administration officials can exploit their unique position at the intersection of the domestic system and the international system to further their objectives in each arena.[35] Several examples are useful to illustrate these points.

During the Korean war, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had a severe disagreement with Congress over West European and Japanese trade with Communist countries.[36] Executive officials wanted to curtail that trade, yet recognized that it would be politically difficult and economically costly for America's allies to sever it altogether. To demand and expect full compliance would likely do more damage to the alliance than to the Communist bloc, and thus executive officials were willing to compromise and tolerate some level of continued East-West trade. Congress was unwilling to compromise, believing that with U.S. soldiers dying in Korea it was incumbent upon America's allies, who were receiving U.S. financial assistance, to abandon their Eastern trade. To enforce this preference, members of Congress passed a controversial law (known as the Battle Act), which required America's allies to give up either their Eastern trade or their American economic and military aid.

Executive officials, caught between their domestic constraint and their interest in maintaining alliance cohesion, responded creatively. They lobbied for a loophole in the law that would allow exceptions to be made on national security grounds, and they negotiated a change in the alliance export control regime (CoCom) that enabled the allies to comply with the letter of the law without necessarily having to sever their trade completely. The Executive, not Congress, ultimately controlled negotiations with other non-communist states, and used that control to deflect congressional pressure and to achieve its objectives—to maintain as comprehensive an embargo as possible while preserving alliance cohesion.

A second example concerns the critical ability to commit the nation's armed forces to overseas conflict. After Vietnam, Congress sought to reassert its constitutional prerogative in this area with the passage of the War Powers Resolution in 1973. The Resolution helped to restore Congress' appropriate role, but also had the potential to frustrate the credibility and effectiveness of U.S. military statecraft. By imposing specific time limits on the deployment of U.S. troops and other requirements, the Resolution gives America's adversaries the opportunity to exploit divisions between the Executive and Congress when the former contemplates or threatens the use of force.[37]

Since 1973, Presidents have responded to these requirements in a way that allows Congress some role, but without compromising their ability to use force as necessary to further national or collective goals. As a matter of principle, no President has been willing to concede the constitutionality of the Resolution, but most

have been willing to placate Congress by observing in practice at least some of its provisions some of the time. Presidents have been prepared to neglect the consultation or time limit provisions of the Resolution if they believed that to be necessary to protect national security or maintain diplomatic discretion. Even in the case where Congress played its most prominent role, the Persian Gulf conflict, the Bush administration devoted far more energy to gaining international support than to gaining congressional approval. The latter was sought and obtained very late in the process, after an international coalition had been mobilized and an ultimatum delivered to Saddam Hussein.

Third, throughout the postwar era successive administrations have had to defend the liberal trading order against interest groups and members of Congress more inclined toward economic nationalism and protectionism. Executive officials have relied upon delegations of authority from Congress to engage in international negotiations, have channeled demands for protection into the executive bureaucracy, and have cut special deals for interests (e.g., agriculture, textiles) too powerful politically to ignore.[38] Perhaps the most distinctive tactic adopted during the 1980s was the effort to "externalize" the demand for protection at home by focusing on market access abroad. This tactic was employed by the Reagan administration in 1985, as it mobilized export interests by initiating the Uruguay Round, utilizing Section 301 of U.S. trade law, and providing export subsidies in competition for agricultural markets.

The Bush administration similarly adopted a strategy for deflecting illiberal interests. By 1989, large and persistent bilateral trade deficits generated open hostility toward Japan and demands for "managed trade." The administration utilized Super 301, but more sparingly than Congress preferred. It compensated by working with Japan to launch the Structural Impediments Initiative, an ambitious attempt to get at the root causes of market access problems, and a plausible alternative to managed trade. In the face of intense congressional and industry scrutiny, the administration brought both Super 301 and SII negotiations to completion in the middle of 1990, deflecting congressional pressure and leaving Executive officials to focus full attention of their primary trade policy priority—the completion of the Uruguay Round and strengthening of GATT.

These examples suggest that even though Congress and interest groups play a prominent role, the result is not necessarily stalemate, ineffective policy, and the abdication of U.S. leadership. It may require time, effort, and the expense of political capital, but a determined President with a sense of foreign policy purpose can manage the constraints of the domestic political system.

The Domestic System as an Asset to Leadership

Foreign policy officials can do more than merely manage constraints or "limit the damage" of the domestic political system. That system itself can actually be an asset, which Presidents can use to further international leadership.

For example, the pressure exerted by Congress on the Executive can be turansformed by the Executive into bargaining leverage. As Pastor has noted, "a president who is sensitive to the public mood that stimulates congressional concern can turn Congress into an incomparable bargaining asset in international negotiations."[39] Congressional pressure helps the Executive to negotiate more forcefully, by lending credibility to Executive demands while allowing Executive officials to appear moderate and reasonable. This dynamic is most readily apparent in trade policy, and is all-too-familiar to Japanese negotiators. U.S. negotiators hoping to open Japanese or other foreign markets have been able to claim, in effect, with a reasonable degree of plausibility, that "it's best for you to make a deal with us now, for if you wait, Congress will be far more unreasonable and harder on you that we are being." This tactic has also proven useful to presidents in other areas, such as the promotion of human rights.[40] The intense concern of Congress in this area and its willingness to tie U.S. economic and military assistance conditionally to the human rights record of foreign governments has given executive officials the potential to extract concessions in this area while still maintaining a focus on broader geopolitical and security concerns.

Presidents are also subject to the constraint of public opinion, but this, too, can actually be an asset to international leadership. The need for public support creates incentives for executive officials to develop policies that can command a public consensus—or that reflect one already in existence. Foreign policies and international commitments that reflect a public consensus are more likely to be sustained over the long run than are those which do not.

Until recently, the conventional view among political scientists and policy analysts was that on matters of foreign policy, public opinion tended to be impulsive, erratic, and ill-informed. Foreign policy required public consensus, but the public was moodish, unpredictable, and incapable of sound judgment—creating yet one more constraint on effective international leadership. Presidents, by implication, needed to "find a way around" public opinion. However, recent work by Shapiro and Page, among others, has challenged this view and developed what is, from the perspective of international leadership, a far more optimistic view of the public's role in and impact on foreign policy.[41] They find, tracing through decades of survey data, that public opinion on foreign policy issues is "coherent, consistent, and reflective of values that endure over long periods of time."[42] Public opinion is stable and constructive: it signals quite clearly the kind of policies and initiatives that are (or are not likely) to command enduring support. For example, a strong aversion to the direct use of military force—unless there is a clear threat to U.S. interests and no viable alternative—runs through decades of survey data, and was only reinforced by the Vietnam experience. On the other hand, since 1942 there has been high and stable support for an active U.S. role in world affairs, including support for the significant presence of U.S. troops in Europe and Asia. Surveys conducted through the 1970s and 1980s suggest some public sympathy for protectionism: yet, when questions were framed to emphasize reciprocity and the opportunities for U.S. exports, the postwar public consensus in favor of free trade resurfaced.

Although stable, public opinion is not immutable. Shapiro and Page find that public opinion "responds to new information and to objective changes in ways that are regular, predictable, and generally sensible."[43] The collective public is responsive to and can be educated by a President willing to devote the political energy and lay the groundwork for new or changed foreign policy priorities. The postwar

shift in public opinion from isolationism to internationalism, and the more recent shift from viewing the Soviet Union as an "unfriendly enemy" to viewing Russia as a country worthy of economic assistance (despite the general and enduring aversion of the public to foreign aid) illustrate the point. The upshot of this revisionist view is that instead of something to be feared or evaded, the impact of public opinion on foreign policy should be welcomed and cultivated by executive officials.

Similarly, an administration with a sensitivity to public opinion can turn the media into an asset as well. One does not have to believe that U.S. public support for the Persian Gulf war was the result of a conspiracy between George Bush and the "punditocracy," to appreciate that the President did use the media effectively to convey his belief that Saddam Hussein represented a profound threat to U.S. interests and to the values of the international community.[44] Yet, administrations can miss opportunities as well. With regard to Japan, the Bush administration worked hard to defend liberal policies against economic nationalism, but did not always speak forcefully at the public level in favor of this preference. The rhetorical ground was left to the critics of administration policy, who were more inclined, for example, to depict Japanese foreign investment as part of a "Japanese invasion" than as an important contributor to the revitalization of the U.S. economy.

A crucial component of leadership is the ability to enter into and sustain international commitments. The United States has made a host of such commitments in the postwar era, and recently Peter Cowhey has argued that the structure of the U.S. political system actually helps U.S. officials to sustain them.[45] He finds that in systems where power is divided, once international commitments are made they are hard to reverse, since reversal requires the acquiescence of more than one center of power. Moreover, the fact that the U.S. system is open and transparent makes it easier for America's negotiating partners to monitor U.S. compliance with commitments. Since the willingness of other states to maintain commitments depends in part on their assessment of whether the United States will keep to the bargain, the transparency of the U.S. political system helps to increase the prospects for enduring international cooperation. Ironically, the "foreign penetration" of the U.S. political system, viewed by some as a weakness or threat, may actually enhance leadership by helping others to track U.S. adherence to international commitments.[46]

CONCLUSION: POWER, PURPOSE, AND LEADERSHIP

The postwar U.S. leadership record, the fact that administrations have techniques to manage domestic constraints, and the fact that the domestic system can actually be turned to international advantage all suggest that as the United States enters the post-cold war era, the foreign policy process need not be viewed as a serious impediment to the exercise of U.S. leadership. The domestic process, however, is only one possible determinant of international leadership. Two other important ones are international power and foreign policy purpose. Although widely debated of late, the United States retains sufficient international power to lead in a post-cold war world. Whether the United States also possesses the foreign policy purpose, however, is more uncertain.

Is the United States a great power in decline? If "power" is defined in terms of relative position over time, and operationalized as control over economic resources, the answer seems clear. The U.S. share of world trade, of financial reserves, and of global output of commodities such as steel and petroleum decreased sharply between 1950 and the 1980s. During the 1980s, the United States shifted from creditor to debtor status as its international financial position deteriorated sharply and rapidly. At the same time, it faced serious competition in world markets and a challenge to its pre-eminence in advanced technology from Japan.[47]

In absolute terms, however, the United States just as clearly remains a dominant power. Its economy remained the largest in terms of GNP, and its market is either the largest or second largest, depending on whether one aggregates the members of the European Union. U.S. productivity stagnated after 1973 but recently has rebounded, and although the United States does not lead in every sector, across manufacturing as a whole it retains its position as the most productive of the advanced industrial states.[48] Widespread concern during the mid-1980s that the United States was "de-industrializing" seems to have abated, and by the early 1990s attention was focused instead on the striking export performance of U.S. firms. A favorable exchange rate, generous amounts of foreign investment, and a concerted effort by U.S. firms to cut costs and improve quality all seemed to contribute to the renewed prowess of U.S. firms in international competition.[49]

Equally important, economic is not the sole form of international power. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States is unambiguously the world's leading military power and is increasingly dominant in the production (and export) of sophisticated weaponry.[50] The United States also possesses the "soft" power resources of culture and ideology; as Russett and Nye argue, to the extent American values (e.g., anti-authoritarianism, liberal economies, individual rights) have become widespread, the United States has been able to retain control over international outcomes without having to exercise overt power over others.[51]

The point is not that United States enjoys complete mastery over international outcomes, or that it will always prevail in international disputes. It never enjoyed that degree of influence, even at the peak of its postwar power. Rather, the point is that despite its relative decline, the United States clearly retains sufficient power to contemplate seriously a leadership role internationally.

The United States may possess the power—does it also possess the foreign policy purpose? The cold war era was distinctive in that it witnessed the combination of U.S. power and purpose. The elements of U.S. foreign policy purpose are well-known: containment of the Soviet Union, permanent alliances with non-Communist states, a willingness to intervene using direct force if necessary to prevent Communist takeovers, and the pursuit of multilateralism in the international economy. With the end of the cold war, the U.S. purpose is no longer clear. There is no central enemy, and despite the best efforts of some officials, a collection of "nasty little states" such as Iraq and North Korea cannot substitute for the big nasty one. There is no consensus on when the United States should intervene, and for what reason. There is both support for, and suspicion of, joining with the United Nations in collective security efforts. The consensus in favor of economic liberalism and multilateralism has been challenged by advocates of industrial policy, managed trade, aggressive unilateralism, regionalism, and by those who view "geo-economic competition" as the principal source of great power rivalry in the years ahead.

The absence of foreign policy purpose is largely a function of the fact that the cold war ended rather abruptly and the adjustment to a new order is still taking place. Yet the problem has been exacerbated by the Clinton administration, which has been strikingly unsuccessful at providing purpose to U.S. policy. It has been noted often that President Clinton seems to wish for the world to stay still while he handles domestic problems, and that the world is clearly not cooperating. The *Economist* recently editorialized that Clinton's "undisguised disinterest in foreign policy, together with his administration's utter absence of a framework for thinking about America's place in the world, have convinced many of America's friends that their worst nightmare may be coming true: a one-superpower world in which the superpower does not have the faintest idea how to perform its central role of preserving peace through preserving the balance of power."[52]

In the absence of clear purpose, foreign policy tends to be reactive, episodic, and directionless. And this is precisely the context within which the potentially *negative* aspects of the U.S. political system weigh most heavily on foreign policy. When there is a lack of consensus at the top, bureaucratic battles within the executive develop and usually become public, as evidenced by the struggles between Brzezinski and Vance during the Carter years over how to deal with the Soviet Union. When the executive is perceived as weak or uncertain, Congress attempts to fill the void, even though it is institutionally incapable of doing so. When neither the executive nor Congress provide direction, the media and to some extent interest groups tend to fill the void, and the administration finds itself—as in recent policy toward Somalia, Bosnia, and NAFTA—catching up with and reacting to events rather than setting the foreign policy agenda, domestically and internationally.

In these circumstances, it is tempting to find fault with the process, and to retreat into the logic of the democratic dilemma. That, however, is to mistake the symptom for the cause. International leadership requires purpose, and when it exists, the system can be made to work.

NOTES

1. See, for example, John W. Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, *American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, sixth edition, 1994), pp. 17–23.
2. Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. I. trans. by Henry Reeve (Boston: John Allyn, 1882), pp. 299–300.
3. Washington is quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 296–97, emphasis in original.
4. By "international leadership" I mean the ability of a country to develop and sustain foreign policies that have a profound effect on the structure and substance of international relations. I would also include the ability to identify common problems and opportunities, and to take the initiative in mobilizing resources and coalitions to address them.
5. Kennan is quoted in Robert Pastor, "The President Versus Congress," in Robert J. Art and Seyom Brown, eds., *U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search for a New Role* (New York:

Macmillan, 1993), p. 12. Pastor's essay is one of a small handful in the literature that challenges the conventional wisdom directly and effectively.

6. See Lowi, "Making Democracy Safe for the World: On Fighting the Next War," in G. John Ikenberry, ed., *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays* (New York: HarperCollins, 1989), pp. 258–292, quotations at 288.
7. See Krasner, "United States Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness," in Peter Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), pp. 51–88: *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); and "Domestic Constraints on International Economic Leverage," in Klaus Knorr and Frank Trager, *Economic Issues and National Security* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1977), pp. 160–181.
8. Destler, Gelb, and Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 11.
9. Broder, "Can We Govern? Our Weakened Political System Sets Us Up For Failure," in *The Washington Post* (National Weekly Edition), January 31, 1994, p. 23.
10. Tower is quoted in James M. McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, 2nd ed. (Itasca, Illinois: F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1992), p. 341.
11. The Soviets abrogated the trade agreement after the Jackson-Vanik Amendment passed. See Paula Stern, *Water's Edge: Domestic Politics and the Making of Foreign Economic Policy* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979).
12. Most of the world trading community viewed Super 301 as contrary to the spirit and possibly the letter of GATT, at a time when the United States was seeking to strengthen GATT and international adherence to it. See, for example, Jagdish Bhagwati, *Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990).
13. See James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, *Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), pp. 24–25.
14. See Michael Mastanduno, *Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).
15. See Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979).
16. Alexander L. George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy," in Ikenberry, ed., *American Foreign Policy*, pp. 583–608.
17. See John Canham-Clyne, "Business as Usual: Iran-Contra and the National Security State," in Eugene R. Wittkopf, ed., *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), pp. 236–246, at 240–241.
18. I. M. Destler, "A Government Divided: The Security Complex and the Economic Complex," in David A. Deese, ed., *The New Politics of American Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), pp. 132–147.
19. For example, Dan Williams and Ann Devroy, "Buckling Under the Weight of the World: The White House Appears Weak and Wavering in Foreign Affairs," *Washington Post*, National Weekly Edition, May 2, 1994, p. 14.
20. Hugh Heclo, *A Government of Strangers* (Washington, D.C.; The Brookings Institution, 1976).
21. For example, Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., *Trading Places: How We Are Giving Our Future to Japan and How to Reclaim It*, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
22. See Mitchell G. Bard, "The Influence of Ethnic Interest Groups on American Middle East Policy," in Wittkopf, ed., *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy*, p. 79, 86.

23. See Krasner, *Defending the National Interest.*
24. Jeff Frieden, "Sectoral Conflict and U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1914–1940," in Ikenberry, ed., *American Foreign Policy*, pp. 133–161.
25. See Robert S. Greenberger, "Cacophony of Voices Drowns Out Message From U.S. to China," *Wall Street Journal*, March 22, 1994, p. A1.
26. The most prominent articulation of this argument is Pat Choate, *Agents of Influence: How Japanese Lobbyists in the United States Manipulate America's Political and Economic System* (New York: Knopf, 1990).
27. See John B. Judis, "The Japanese Megaphone: Foreign Influences on Foreign Policy-making," in Wittkopf, ed., *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy*, p. 102.
28. See, for example, Spanier and Uslaner, *American Foreign Policy and the Democratic Dilemmas*, pp. 233–36.
29. Broder, "Can We Govern?," p. 23.
30. Lloyd Cutler, "Foreign Policy on Deadline." *Foreign Policy*, no. 56 (Fall 1984), pp. 113–128.
31. In his assessment of the interbranch relationship, Robert Pastor similarly argues that the U.S. performance record has been better than it is usually given credit for in terms of consistency and flexibility. See Pastor, "The President Versus Congress," pp. 16–22.
32. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
33. See Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?," *International Organization*, vol. 39, no. 2 (Spring 1985), pp. 207–231.
34. See John Odell, *U.S. International Monetary Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), and Yoichi Funabashi, *From the Plaza to the Louvre* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1989).
35. For an elaboration and illustration of these arguments, see John Ikenberry, David Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, ed., *The State and American Foreign Economic Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
36. For full discussion, see Mastanduno, *Economic Containment*, Ch. 3.
37. A good discussion is McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, pp. 313–325.
38. See I. M. Destler, *U.S. Trade Politics: System Under Stress* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1986).
39. Pastor, "The President versus Congress," p. 16.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
41. See, for example, Robert Y. Shapiro and Benjamin J. Page, "Foreign Policy and Public Opinion," and Thomas W. Graham, "Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Deese, ed., *The New Politics of American Foreign Policy*, pp. 190–235. The shifting consensus in the literature is reviewed by Ole Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 36, no. 4 (December 1992), pp. 439–466.
42. Shapiro and Page, "Foreign Policy and Public Opinion," p. 217.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 226.
44. See Eric Alterman, "Operation Pundit Storm: The Media, Political Commentary, and Foreign Policy," in Wittkopf, *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy*, pp. 120–131.
45. Peter Cowhey, "Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States," *International Organization*, vol. 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 299–326.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 314. Interestingly, Cowhey finds in comparative terms that the Japanese political system is less well-equipped for international leadership. The electoral system re-

wards private rather than public goods, reducing incentives for leaders to make international commitments; the parliamentary system makes it easier to reverse commitments; and the system is less transparent, making Japanese compliance with agreements harder to monitor.

47. The "declinist" argument has been made most forcefully by Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975) and *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); and Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987).
48. A well-publicized report by McKinsey and Company in 1993 documented the overall superiority of the United States in manufacturing productivity relative to its primary competitors, Japan and Germany. See Sylvia Nasar, "The American Economy, Back on Top," *New York Times*, February 27, 1994, Sec. 3, p. 1, 6, and "Why US is Indeed Productive," *New York Times*, October 22, 1993, p. D1.
49. See "Who's Sharper Now?," and "Ready to Take on the World," *The Economist*, January 15, 1994, pp. 15, 65–66.
50. Ethan Kapstein, "America's Arms-Trade Monopoly," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 3 (May/June 1994), pp. 13–19.
51. Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony," pp. 228–230, and Joseph Nye, *Bound to Lead* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
52. "Cornered by His Past," June 4, 1994, pp. 13–14.

PART ***Five***

PUBLIC OPINION, POLICY LEGITIMACY, AND SECTIONAL CONFLICT

These next three essays focus on the influence of the diffuse pressures of public opinion, reigning political images, and societal interests on American foreign policy. As such they share elements of several of the approaches in other sections. They share a general view that periods of American foreign policy are punctuated by crystallized sets of images and publicly held views about the proper direction of American foreign policy. Yet each provides a distinctive analytical cut into these domestic structures and processes.

Michael Roskin focuses on shifting generational views or "paradigms" of foreign policy. Each generation, Roskin argues, carries with it a set of "strategic conventional wisdoms" that are formed by a decisive historical event and that guide public orientations toward policy. The Pearl Harbor paradigm, according to Roskin, was interventionist. This view had many sources but took form in the traumatic events of Pearl Harbor and the Second World War. The paradigm reflected an imagery of the international system and a set of lessons to which American leaders must attend. Most important was the lesson that aggression must be met head on and not appeased. The imagery of Pearl Harbor took deep root and was not dislodged, Roskin argues, until the failures of Vietnam seemingly discredited its interventionist orientation. With Vietnam came a new set of lessons, wrapped in a paradigm of nonintervention. One is left to speculate about the mechanisms by which these changes occur and the lessons become entrenched.

Alexander L. George also focuses on diffuse sets of public views on foreign policy as powerful forces that set the terms of choice within government. George argues that government officials are not free to conduct foreign policy as they choose. Officials can sustain foreign policy only when it is developed within a consensus. Consequently, government officials build support for their policy. In analyzing the importance of domestic support George advances the notion of