contemporary theory social science

9 4 I C H A P T E R F O U R

bolic capital through symbolic labor. Bourdieu ( I 97 I d, 1 98 5d) contends that both materialist and idealist views of culture neglect the relatively in­ dependent role that corps of specialists historically have come to play in producing symbolic systems. Cultural producers mediate the relationship between culture and class, between infrastructure and superstructure, by constituting cultural markets, or fields, that are vested with their own par­ ticular i nterests.

Bourdieu thus challenges both the Marxist theory of superstructure and idealist views of cultural life by proposing a theory of intellectuals that em­ phasizes the specific symbolic interests that shape cultural production. Bourdieu assigns a particularly important though not exclusive role to the arenas of symbolic specialization and their representatives i n developing the material out of which the symbolic dimension of class struggle is carved. He conceptualizes these arenas as social -cultural markets or fields of force in which specialists struggle over definitions of what is to be considered as legitimate modes of expression.

In summary, Bourdieu's general science of the economy of practices attempts to reappropriate from the idealist/materialist bifurcation of 11U­ man life the totality of practices as fun damentally interested but misrecog­ nized forms of power or capital. Indeed, Bourdieu's sociological project is a study of the political economy of the various forms of symbolic capital. He focuses much of his work on the symbolic producers who specialize in creating symbolic power, but, as we will see i n chapter I I , Bourdieu also thinks of his sociology as an instrument of struggle against the various forms of symbolic violence.

· • • • •

• • • • • •

H A BIT U S : A C UL T URA L

T HE ORY OF A C TION

A central issue sets the agenda for Bourdieu's theory of practice. How is action regulated; how does action follow regular statistical patterns without being the product of obedience to rules, norms or conscious inten­ tion? I How do regular patterns of conduct occur over time without being the product either of some abstract external structure or of subjective inten­ tion? How can one take into account botb the observed regularities of social action, which most frequently are visible only to the social scientist who takes the time and effort to calculate them, and the experiential reality of free, purposeful, reasoning human actors who carry out their everyday ac­ tions practically, without full awareness of or conscious reflection on struc­ tures? Moreover, how does one scientifically model practice without pro­ j ecting the formal characteristics of tlle model onto the informal and dispositional dynamics of most everyday practices? Bourdieu tries to find a scientific language that does justice to these conceptual dilemmas. Two key concepts permit Bourdieu to do this: habitus and field. This chapter takes up his concept of habitus and explores its various dimensions; chapter 6 will discuss his concept of field. A summary statement of his theory of practice that in corporates these two concepts will be found at the end of chapter 6 .

I . 1 \ ( l l l n l i C I l ( 1 ,),)( lt " : (' 5 ) d l " t ' I :I n" � : '" , ' 11 1 1 ' . 11 1' 1 i ' " 1 ,, 1 1 1 1 1 I l l y l i l i l l k i l l g" s l a ri ed i"1"( l1 l 1 l l i i s ! ,( l i l l l : l il lw " :1 1 1 1 'l " I i : I V i l l l l l " I 'l " r!"g l l l a l ! " d w i l i l " l l l 1 11 " 1 1 1 1 1 l i l t , 1 " , , , I I I t ' 1 l e i 1 I 1 , , ' d i " 1 I 1 '" I I I n i l l " S ? "

') I

9 6 I C H A P T E R F I V E

Bourdieu's concept of habitus is familiar to many sociologists and an­ thropologists though far from well understood. Even among those knowl-, edgeable about Bourdieu's work, considerable disagreement exists on just what Bourdieu's concept represents . 2 Part of the problem is that the con­ cept bears so much theoretical weight, leading one sympathetic critic (Di­ Maggio 1 9 7 9 : 1 464) to describe i t as "a kind of theoretical deus ex machina by means of which Bourdieu relates obj ective structure and individual activ­ ity." Part of the problem i s also, as Bourdieu and Wacquant ( 1 99 2 ) charge, that critics have systematically misread Bourdieu's theoretical intent by un­ wi ttingly projecting variations of the subjective/objective dichotomy onto the very concept that Bourdieu employs to transcend that antinomy. This chapter clarifies the central dimensions of the action/structure relationship that the concept of habitus addresses. It surveys briefly several intellectual influences that have shaped the development of the concept, and illustrates the variety of uses Bourdieu has made of the concept. It also notes a number of tensions, difficulti es, and contradictions generated by the concept.

The Individual/Society Dualism

Bourdieu's theory of practice may be seen as a probing reflection on one of the oldest problems in the Western intellectual tradition, namely, the relationship between the individual and society. H e sees his approach, how­ ever, as transcending this classic dual i sm, H e draws on the basic insight of the classical sociological tradition that maintains that social reality exists both inside and outside of individuals, both in our minds and in things. Bourdieu stresses that this dual character of social reality must be preserved in sociological inquiry, and his relentless attacks on various forms of sub­ jectivism and objectivism are efforts to preserve that fundamental insight. Indeed, the purpose of his key concept of habitus is to suggest that "the sociali zed body (which one calls the individual or person) does not stand in opposition to society; i t i s one of its forms of existence" (Bourdieu 1 98oc: 2 9)' Bourdieu's concepntal formulation does not oppose individual and so­ ciety as two separate sorts of being one external to the other but con­ structs them "relationally" as if they are two dimensions of the same social reality.

Habitus emphasizes the mutually penetrating realities of individual subjectivity and societal objectivity after the fashion of social construction-

2 , This observation stems not only from the variety of explanations ;1I1d cri ti ci sms now available i n the secondary literature but also from observi ng sever:ll " l3ourdieu expert s" d i scuss the concept at a conference on Bourdicll's work (Cenl-er for Psychosoc i a l S l u d i e s i l l ( : h i c:lg'' '. March v -A pri l 2 , 1 9RI)).

H A B I T U S : A C U L T U R A L T H E O R Y O F A C T I O N I 9 7

ist theorists such as Berger and Luckmann ( 1 966).3 Like Berger's and Luck­ mann's, Bourdieu's approach to understanding the relationship between actors and structures builds on one key idea: that objective structures have subjective consequences is not incompatible with the view that the social world is constructed by individual actors.

Bourdieu is sharply critical of the institutionalized form that the classi­ cal individual/society dualism has taken in contemporary Western acade­ mia, half appropriated by psychology, which tends to monopolize the study of the individual, and half appropriated by economics, political science, and sociology, which tend to be concerned with structures beyond individuals. In sociology, since the 1 960s, a renewed and vibrant interest in the study of micro structures and processes has nonetheless emerged. Herbert Blumer ( 1 969), Aaron V. Ci courel ( 1 9 7 3 ) , Harold Garfinkel ( 1 967), Erving Goff­ man ( 1 96 7 , 1 969, 1 9 7 1 , 1 9 74, 1 9 8 1 ) and their followers have produced bod­ ies of work identified broadly as symbolic interacti onism and ethnometho­ dology. In recent years renewed interest in a rational-actor model has also emerged among such prominent sociologists as Raymond Boudon ( 1 9 7 9), James S . Coleman ( 1 990), and Jon Elster ( 1 97 9, 1 98 5) , Yet, within the pro­ fessional discipline of sociology these micro approaches, which focus on various dimensions of individual decision making and interaction, tend to be isolated from the more prominent macro approaches.{

For Bourdieu, the problem goes beyond one of fragmenting the unity of human experience through the artificially constructed boundaries of academic knowledge; it i s also a political problem. Bourdieu sees the individual/society dualism as a carrier of political effects that contaminate the scientific enterprise. This antinomy opposes "defenders of individual­ ism ('methodological i ndividualism') on the one side, and those defending 'society' on the other who are then denounced as 'totalitarian' " (Honneth, Kocyba, and Schwibs 1 986A8). In other words, Bourdieu believes that this dualism translates into ostensibly scientific language fundamental political oppositions that pit those favorable to market-oriented public policies

3 . Berger and Luckmann connect individuals to the social world through an ongoing dialec­ tical process composed of three simultaneously occurring moments: internalization, external­ ization, and objectivation. While Bourdieu does not distinguish all three moments conceptu­ ally, he does write of h i s theory of practice as an "experimental science of the dialectic of the internalization of extern(/lity (/nd the externalization of internality" (Bourdieu 1 9 77C: 7 2 ) . In Repro­ duction, h e describes hahi tu s as rhe "product of structures, producer of practices, and repro­ d uce r of structures."

4. This hifu rca l i o l l o r t i ll' d i �('i l ' l i l lt' h a s g'c l l l:r:l I e d pro fessiona l a s well as intell ectual con­ n: I ' l l S . I ' m ressi o l l : d l v . I h ,' '." " :1 1 1 . - . 1 I I l i l ' l'o I I ! :" ' !'O I ' m i l le l l l w a s designared as the u n i fy i n g , I hl ' l l I l' o r 1 I 1 I' I I)K'I : 1 l 1 l 1 l l 1 d 1 1 11 ' 1 ' 1 1 1 111 " I l i I ( ' '\ 1 1 1 1 ' 1 ; 1 ' : 1 1 1 S"" i " I " f l i l ' : 1 1 Associ a l i o n . I m e l lecl u a l ly. t i ll' l "l ' i c h a s / \ l '1 I1 ' I'I I I ( ' d 1 1 " 1 1 1 1 ' 1 " " " 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 '" I I I t i l l ' 1 " " 1 ' '''', , , , " 1 1 1 1 ; l l ' r a l l l l,(, . SlT, 1'1 11' e X :l l l 1 pl . . . A I , ' x : ! I " I , ' r , ' I :d. I 'I K " 1 1 1 1 , 1 ( ; , , l i l l I " 1 '111 1 1 .

9 8 I C H A P T E R F I V E

against advocates of the welfare state. This view reflects Bourdieu's desire to protect the autonomy of social science from all extrascientific influences. But i t also points to ambiguity i n Bourdieu's own position. In France, one can see this dualism employed by Boudon, who advocates "methodological individualism," and who situates Bourdieu's style of sociology and his sup­ port for leftist politics on the "society" side of the dichotomy. Thus Bour­ dieu finds himself embedded in the very antinomy h e hopes to transcend.

Action as Strategy

Bourdieu developed his theory of practices not only in reaction to Althusse­ rian Marxism, as we observed in the previous chapter, but also to the French structuralism of Levi -S trauss. In the structuralist anthropology of Levi­ Strauss, the social scientist develops formal models of deep structural rules that supposedly regulate kinship, social rituals, and mythology.s Bourdieu adopts the language of " strategy" to distance himse l f from strict structural ­ ist forms of determination by stressing the importance of agency within a structuralist framework.

He first employs this conceptual language in confronting a field experi­ ence familiar to anthropologists. In studying Algerian peasants, Bourdieu encolUltered a social order in which social solidarity is based on sentiment and honor rather than on codified rules and regulations. He explains that in Kabyle society "social regulations are not comprehended as an inaccessi­ ble ideal or as a restraining imperative, but are rather present in the con­ sciousness of each individual." Differences and disputes are not adjudicated in a court of law but by "the sentiment either of honour or justice, which, according to each case, dictates both judgement and punishment, and not a rational and formal justice" (Bourdieu 1 96 5 : 2 2 ) .

Though lacking evidence of a formalized code for regulating behavior, many anthropologists nonetheless tend to conceptualize the behavior and statements of their informants as if they were indeed rule or norm governed. Bourdieu approaches the problem quite differently. He argues that models of action must include tirne as an essential component. "To restore to prac­ tice its practical trutl1," he argues, "we must therefore reintroduce time into the theoretical representation of a practice which, being temporally structured, is intrinsically defined by its tempo" (Bourdieu 1 9 7 7c:8).

In a critical reexamination of the classic analyses of gift exchange by Mauss ( 1 967) and Levi- S trauss ( 1 969, 1 97 3) , Bourdieu argues that a proper

5 . In the American struculnll-fullctioll a l i s t· rra d i r i o l 1 , 1l1Odds pn;slTi h� s � t s o i " rol.,s t o I oc' played in response to sJleci(i�d I l O1'lIlS.

H A B I T U S : A C U L T U R A L T H E O R Y O F A C T I O N I 9 9

conceptualization of gift exchange must go beyond the idea that gift giving and receiving are governed by the formal principle of reciprocity i n which gifts automatically call forth countergifts, Rather, the giving and receiving of gifts involve the manipulation of the tempo of gift-giving so that the returned gift is not only different but also defe1"1"ed, Thus, actors participate in the social interaction of gift exchange, not as conscious or even unwitting conformists to the principle of reciprocity, but as strategists who respond through time. Behavior, then, is strategic rather than rule or norm conform­ ing, for, as the label suggests, actors in their everyday practices attempt to move through a maze of constraints and opportunities that they grasp imperfectly through past experience and over tim e , 6 "To substitute strategy for the l"ule, " writes Bourdieu ( I 9 7 7C:9) "is to reintroduce time, with its rhythm, its orientation, its irreversibility." In contrast, "science has a time which is not that of practice." It is only the social scientist, with the outsider perspective and an intellectual disposition to find patterned regularity in the diversity of human conduct, who sees this macro-structure of gifts and countergifts.7 Thus, Bourdieu injects the language of strategy into the structuralist model as a way of introducing agency and of marking the dif­ ference between everyday practices and their formalized models.

I f the notion of strategy is to convey the idea that action is not best understood in terms of compliance to norms or rules, strategies nonetheless involve conduct in normative situations (Bourdieu I 9 7 7c : 8) . Bourdieu does not intend the idea of strategy to suggest that particular types of conduct somehow stand outside normative constraints. Rather, the concept aims to suggest that action involves unce1'Tainty even in normative situations and that actions occur over time rendering the outcomes seldom clear to the actors involved. Even the most ritualized fo rms of conduct permit strategies to some extent, since actors can always play on time (Bourdieu I 9 7 7 C : 9 , I 5 , I 06). Whether or not actors conform to norms or follow prescribed rituals depends on their interests. As pointed out in the previous chapter, Bourdieu considers all action to be interest oriented.s

His language of strategy misleads some critics (e.g. Caille I 98 I , I 99 2 ) ,

6 . The analogy to a game seems appropriate here, and Bourdieu ( 1 987b:80- 8 1 ) indeed draws on the game analogy, particularly in his later work.

7 . l30urdieu thus depa rts from the structural-functional interpretation by G?u. ldner ( 1 9 7 3 b)

o f t h e norl l l of reciprocity. por 130urdieu, actofS strateglZe to enhance thelf mterests over t i l l l � i l l g'i ft �xchang-�s. The ov�rall partern of regularity observed by the social scientist is an I I l l i l l t el l d�d cOllscqll�nce ra t her t h;1 I1 cOl 1 li '1'I l l i r y to an IInderlying- norm or rule.

K . This COIll'L' p t l l ;d s h i rt h a s research c l l l I s c q l l e l l l'CS f ll1' I\ollnliell i n sl' lIdyinp; k i n sh i p as ' "'; l l q � y ra t i w r t h a l l ;1' 1' 1 1 1 " ,. I Ie r C ' I ' L I I 'c's t i l l ' idc';1 I l l' " n dl's I l l' k i l lsh i p"

. w i t h " m a t rimonial

s t r: I I " j \ i " , " ( 1 11111 11 ' : < 1 , I I IIll l i : i ) , :1 1 1 1 1 i'l'd i n ' I ' ' ' :I I I , ' l l t i o l i :IIVI1)' I rl l i l l I " r h l ' l V l ' 1 . 1 " ' I IS o l l l-tc l I �'aloglcs

I I I i n d l l d l ' II 1 1 1 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 1 1' , ,1 1 1 1, , 1' 1 1 1 1' 1 1 \ ' I I l l hl l lI . ' , I I c'! I I I " l I H " !l i l t ! d l l 1 1 - 1' 1 ' 1 ! ! " " , 1 1 1 V I I 1' 1 1 1 1 I': I )' P('� t Il w(·:d d l .

1 0 0 I C H A P T E R F I V E

who see it as an indi cator of the velY kind of utilitarian orientation that Bourdieu opposes. By strategy, Bourdieu ( I 987b:76, 7 8 , 1 2 7) does not mean conscious choice or rational calculation. The strategies employed by the Kabyle are not based on conscious, rational calculations but on a "sense of honor" that guides complex maneuvers of challenge, riposte, delay, aggres­ sion, retaliation, and disdain. The sense of honor derives from sets of dispo­ sitions that internalize in practical form what seems appropriate or possible in situations of challenge, constraint, or opportunity. Thus, choices do not derive directly from the objective situations in which they occur or from transcending rules, norms, patterns, and constraints that govern social life; rather, they stem from pTtlctical di.lpositions that incorporate ambiguities and uncertainties tba t emerge from acting through time and .Ipace. <J Bourdieu em­ ploys the language, "practical knowl edge" and "sense of practice" to describe this fundamentally nonformalized, practical dimension of action that he finds missing in structural ist accounts of human agency. Actors are not rule followers or norm obeyers but strategic improvisers who respond disposi­ tionally to the opportunities and constra ints offered by various situations.

Th e Development of the Concept of Habitus

The idea that actors are practical strategists is then linked to social struc­ tures tl1rough the concept of habitus . l o An early [ I 966J definition of the concept reads as

,1 system of lasting, transposab l e dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions a t every moment as a 71latrix ofpencptio77S, appreciations, and actions and makes possible thc achievement of i n fi n i tely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes permitting the sol ution of simi l a rly sh<1ped problems. (Bour­ dieu 1 9 7 1 C : 8 3 Y I

A somewhat later [ 1 980] and more frequently employed formulation de­ fines h a bitus as

a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, th at is, as principles which generate and organize practices a nd representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes

9· This distinguishes Bourdieu's use of the term from that of Crozier (Crozier a n d Friedberg 1 9 7 7), whose strategies seem embedded within the opportunities and constra i n ts presented by situations, whereas Bourdieu stresses as well the role o f pas\' socia l ization .

r o. The most in-depth discussions of the concept 'lre ro he 1 ( l I l l l d i l l lIot l l'l l i c u 1 9 7 7c, l'h a p­ ters 2 and 4, and in Bourd ieu 1 99oh : 5 1-65.

I 1 . I n Algeria 1 960 ( I 979 : v i i), BOil re i i ell dc I i ncs h a hi I n s i t " " " '. \ " , 1 1 ' " ' , d c i " r:t i , Ie . I 1':1 t 1 S I " cs:t i , l < ­ e ! isposi riolls \VII i ell 1"11 llci i O i l a s I he gCl l C ra I i I'l' 1 >:1 , j , " I ' . 1 , 1 11 ' I l l t t ' d . , , 1 , \ 1 ' 1 I I I t · 1 \' t 1 1 1 1 I i ( , e I 1 '1':11 ' I i c " " , "

H A B I T U S : A C U L T U R A L T H E O R Y O F A C T I O N I 1 0 1

without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the opera­ tions necessary i n order to attain them. (Bourdieu 1 9 90h : S 3 )

Bourdieu has a lso used th e wording "cultural unconscious," "habit-forming force," "set of basic, deeply interiorized master-patterns," "mental habit, " "mental and corporeal schemata of perceptions, appreciations, and action," and "generative principle of regulated improvisations" to designate his key concept . 1 2 The concept has broadened in scope over time to stress the bodily as well as cognitive basis of action and to emphasize inventive as well as habituated forms of action. The variety of designations, nonethel ess, all evoke tl1e idea of a set of deeply internalized master dispositions that generate action. They point toward a theory of action that is practical rather than discursive, prereflective rather than conscious, embodied as well as cognitive, durable though adaptive, reproductive though generative and in­ ventive, and the product of particular social conditions though transposable to otllers.

I noted in chapter 2 that Bourdieu's fieldwork experience among tl1e Kabyle posed the problem of relating individual action to social structure. But the origins of the concept of habitus are also linked to Bourdieu's intel­ lectual strategy for situating himse lf in French intellectual space in the I 9 50S and early I 960s. 1 3 It is primarily in reaction to Levi- Strauss's struc­ turalism and the Althusserian variant in French Marxism and its view of action as a mere reflection of structure that Bourdieu formulates his theory of practice and his concept of habitus. 1 4 His principal concern was to introduce the idea of agency into structuralist analysis without recourse to the kind of voluntarism he found in Sartre's existentialism (see Bourdieu I 98 7 b : I 9) '

The seminal work of Ervin Panofsky offered Bourdieu crucia l concep­ tual help in developing his concept. Reading and translating in the mid­ I 960s Panofsky's Gothic ArchitectuTe and Scbolasticism, about tl1e effect of scholasticism on architecture, assisted Bourdieu in his earliest formulation of the concept. In the afterword to his French translation of Panofsky's work (Bourdieu 1 967a), we find Bourdieu's earliest use of the term. Bour-

1 2 . I n his early work, Un rn7 moyen (Bourdieu, B oltanski et al. I 9 6 5 : 2 3), Bourdieu uses "structured praxis" to designate habitus, even though in a more recent interview he sharply d i fferemiates h i s conceptual l a n guage and understanding of action from the Marxist praxis I ra d i t ion ( Bo u n l i e u a n d \Vacq u a n l I ()H() .

1 .\ ' Bol h I J l l rk h c i l l l a n d M : l I I SS e i l l p loy I h e l .- r l l l , I h O l lg-h neither give i t systematic applica­ l i , , " o r e l c v : 1 I l" i l 1 0 I h c c .x p l : l l l : l i c ,ry ' I a i l i re ' I h : 1 I 1 I " l I I"d i e l i ( 1 1) Hol" : I .1 4) proposes.

1 . 1 . 1 I, , " re l i c l ( I C)I) : 1 .' 1 1 1 1 ) e l l 'I 'hl l C '" l l ' i c C l " l lC ' c ' l i w l ), I h :1 I h : . ! , i I I i S w a s origi n : . ! l y dcsigncd I I I I'l' j n ' l a l l i l l l t ' l I r l ' l l l l d i�1I " ( ' I " i I H I ' 1 , . I 111 ' 1 11 11 ' , I I I I I I H I I I I I I I " 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 : 1 1 l 'l ' I H H l l l l i t ' I l l :n: i l l l i '!,;l l i o l l 1 1 1 I 1I 1 " j·, ! 1 I 1 1 1 ,d',1 1 I H ,I , i l i v i ' l l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 '1 1 1 1

1 0 2 I ( H A P T E R F I V E

dieu builds from Panofsky's insights that scholasticism represented a set of implicit cultural assumptions as well as explicit theoretical positions and that these tacit "mental habits" were not only transmitted by institutions, practices, and social relations but also fimctioned as a "habit-forming force" that generated schemes of thought and action. He draws from Panofsky's ideas of "mental habit" and "habit-forming force" to develop the idea that habitus is a " structuring structure" that generates action. This early formu­ lation emphasizes the manner or mode of thought, or cognitive capacity of action. 1 5 lt is Panofsky's influence that leads Bourdieu to think of school systems as the institutionalized context where the intellectual habi tus of a culture develops.

The early conceptualization also bears the imprint of French structur­ alism, for Bourdieu frequently empl oys a linguistic analogy to express the concept. He draws from Saussure's ( 1 974) distinction between speech and l anguage to define habitus as a kind of deeply structured cultural grammar for action. With habitus, Bourdieu ( I 9 7 7 c: 2 2 - 30, 1 98 5b: I 3 , 1 98 7 b : 1 9-24, 1 99oh : 3 0-4 1 ) develops a "generative structuralism" anal ogous to Chom­ sky's ( 1 96S) idea of a "generative grammar." As grammar organizes speech, the structures of habitus can generate an infinity of possible practices. Bour­ dieu sometimes stresses this "innovative" capacity of habitus. In his analysis of precapitalist Algerian peasants and their encounter with the encroaching cash economy imposed by French colonialism, Bourdieu (1 9 7 9 =4) empha­ sizes that the peasant reaction is not a "purely mechanical and passive forced accommodation" to the new economic system. Rather, the peasants re­ spond with " creative reinvention" to the discrepancy between the demands of the new economic rationality and their customary habits.

Unlike Chomsky's generative grammar, however, the inventive capac­ ity of habitus stems not from a "universal mind" but from "an experience and also a possession, a capital" (Bourdieu 1 98 5 b: I 3)' Habitus is not an innate capacity, such as the physical operation of the brain posited by Levi­ Strauss or the mentalistic outlook of Chomsky. Habitus is a "structured structure" that derives from the class-specific experiences of socialization in fa mily and peer groups.

Over time, Bourdieu's concept of habitus evolved from a normative and cognitive emphasis to a more dispositional and practical understanding of action (Bourdieu 1 9 8oc: 1 3 3) . This shift in emphasis toward the disposi­ tional and practical character of human conduct can be seen in the evol ution of his conceptual terminology. An earlier term ethic gi ves way to l'lbo.l", w h i c h

1 5. We see this cognitive emphasis i l l r h e l <)liK 1 ' I I I 1 I il":l 1 i ' ' ' I . . 1 "I Iw ( :mli "(.\'", .i,,I"gv ( l I . . l l r­ dietl, Chamboreci o l l , a lld Passeroll 1 <)') 1 ), i l l lVhi . . h 1 I ' " l r e l i , ' ' ' 1 " 1 1" , " 1 " '' ' 1 " " I I i V: 1 I i l l / \ :1 1 )' 1 " , . . 1" research h :l h i l l i S l i . r s . . c i :l l SCit'l l l i l i l ' i l " l l l i r)"

H A B I T U S : A C U L T U R A L T H E O R Y O F A C T I O N I 1 0 3

eventually becomes absorbed by habitus. The more recent language of "dis­ positions" suggests a shift from a linguistic analogy to a perspective cen­ tered on socialization and body l anguage.

The term "disposition" is key for Bourdieu, since it suggests two essen­ tial components he wishes to convey with the idea of habitus: structure and propensity. 1 6 Habitus results from early socialization experiences in which external structures are internalized. As a result, internalized dispositions of broad parameters and boundaries of what is possible or unlikely for a partic­ ular group in a stratified social world develop through socialization. Thus, on the one hand, habi tus sets structural limits for action. On the other hand, habitus generates perceptions, aspirations, and practices that correspond to the structuring properties of earlier socialization. The language of "struc­ tured structures" and "structuring structures" captures these two central features of habitus. I next examine in more depth these two faces of habitus.

Structulred Structures and Structuring Structu1res

Habitus tends to shape individual action so tl1at existing opportunity struc­ tures are perpetuated. Chances of success or failure are internalized and then transformed into individual aspirations or expectations; these are in turn externalized in action that tends to reproduce the objective structure of life chances. Bourdieu understands this process in terms of a

system of circular Felations that unite structures and practices; objective structures tend to produce structured subjective dispositions that produce structured actions which, i n turn, tend to reproduce objective structure. (Bourdieu and Passeron 1 9 7 7 = 2°3)

Thus, Bourdieu observes that aspirations and practices of individuals and groups tend to correspond to the formative conditions of their respective habitus. What agents judge as "reasonable" or "unreasonable" for people , of their station in the social world stems from habitus. Habitus tends to reproduce those actions, perceptions, and attitudes consistent with the con­ ditions under which it was produced. It is "necessity made into virtue" (Bourdieu 1 9 7 7 c : 7 7 , 95)·

To explain why inegalitarian social arrangements make sense to both the dominant and the domin ated, Bourdieu employs the concept to empha-

I ii. B o u r d i e l l ( " J7 7 l ': I I ' I ) IV r i l , " l i l : l 1 " I i ", w ord Ihljlo.riliO/l seellls pnrticu1arly suited to ex­ press w h :1 I i s covereel h)1 I i 1 1 ' " " " ( ' ( ' 1 ' 1 . . I' h :d , i l l l S ( d d i l l c e l :IS :I SYS I C I l l o f dispositions), I t e s ­ pl'csses l i rs l I h c 1'1'.1'11/1 ,,1 (/11 1I1 ,Ii" 1I1 111,4 '1. 1 11111, 1V , I i , II 1 I II ' :l l I i l l/\ . . Iosl' 1 0 l i l : l 1 01" worc i s s l l c h :IS ';( I ' l IL'l l l l't'; il : l i s . . . I" "I{ I I 11 I , ' " 11 1 / '1 1 1' IIf /" ' I N ll , II /"'/'1111111 ,1111,· ( 1 " I ",( 'i : d l), . . I" l i , t ' " . . e I ), ) :I 1 I e 1 , i l l I I I I I' l i n d 1 1 r , :I /" 'I'IIi'/ ",,'II/lI/, I t'II'/, '1/. I', /" "1" /1 , 1 1 1', , / I 1I1. IIIIiIII/I/i "

1 0 4 I C H A P T E R F I V E

size the class-based character of socialization. Habitus derives from the pre­ dominately unconscious internalization particularly during early child­ hood of obj ective chances that are common to members of a social class or status group. Akin to the idea of class subculture, habitus brings about a unique integration, dominated by the earliest experiences statistically common to members of the same class (Bourdieu 1 9 7 7C: 79)' Nevertheless, it is the product of class situations, not their cause. If French working-class youth did not appear to aspire to high levels of education attainment during the rapid educational expansion of the 1 960s and according to Bourdieu they did not this was because they had internalized and resigned them­ selves to the limited opportunities that previously existed for their success in school.

Habitus, then, represents a sort of deep-structuring cultural matrix that generates self- fulfilling prophecies according to different class opportuni­ ties. And Bourdieu's "cultural" explanation of tmequal educational attain­ ment differs from the blaming-the-victim version of culture-of-poverty ar­ guments in emphasizing individuals' adapta tion to limited opportunities rather than the cultural origins of deviant behavior, It shows how structural disadvantages can be internalized into relatively durable dispositions that can be transmitted intergenerationally through socialization and produce forms of self-defeating behavior. Bourdieu's habitus thus offers a perspec­ tive that sidesteps the recurring debate among culturalists and structuralists on the origins and perpetuating cycl es of poverty,

Habitus calls us to think of action as engendered and regulated by fun­ damental dispositions that are internalized primarily through early social­ ization. Bourdieu speaks of the internalization or "incorporation" of the fundamental social conditions of existence into dispositions, I 7 He describes the fundamental conditions of existence as those that determi n e materially, socially, and culturally what are probable, possible, or impossible for a given social group. They are simi lar to Weber's concept of "life chances . " These "objective structures" are internalized into corresponding dispositions lead­ ing group members to experience them as reasonable or unreasonable, l i kely or unlikely, natural or unthinkable for people of their own kind, Hab- , , l tu S IS

necessity internalized and converted into a disposition. , . , It is a virtue made of necessity which continuously transforms necessity into virtue hy i nstituting

1 7 , He mentions several determining fa ctors i n pri l l l :t l')' soci;J i i '/,; l l i l l l l , s " d l :ts " d i v i s i o l l 01' labour between the sexes, household objects, I l H H ie S 0 1 ' " I I I I ' l l l l l P l i o l l , p " rl ' l l l I ' h i l . l n:b l i o l l s " ( 1 990h : 5 4), h ut does not oFfer d e l" :t i b l :t l l : t l yses I I I ' w h l l l I l l ' " l l l l , i d l ' 1 'I I I I "" I h I ' 1 1 1 1 lSI i l l l PI I I'\ ; 1 I 1 1 ones,

H A B I T U S : A C U L T U R A L T H E O R Y O F A C T I O N I 1 0 5

"choices" which correspond to the condition of which it is the product, (Bourdieu I 984a: I 7°)

Habitus transforms social and economic "necessity" into "virtue" by leading individuals to a "kind of immediate submission to order" (Bourdieu 1 99oh: 5 4). It legitimates economic and social inequality by providing a practical and taken -for-granted acceptance of the fundamental conditions of exis­ tence. I S

Bourdieu emphasizes the collective basis of habitus, stressing that indi­ viduals who internalize similar l ife chances share the same habitus, While Bourdieu recognizes the singularity of biological individuals' socialization experiences, he argues that " 'personal' style , . , is never more than a devia­ tion in relation to the style of a period or class so that it relates back to the common style not only by its conformity . . . but also by the difference" ( I 9 7 7 c : 86). The collective reference is paramount for Bourdieu, Habitus offers the image of "conductorless orchestration" to emphasize the "regu­ larity, unity and systematicity to practices" without conscious coordination (Bourdieu 1 99oh : 59). Bourdieu writes that "the practices of the members of the same group or, in a differentiated society, the same class, are always more and better harmonized than the agents know or wish, "

The dispositions of habitus represent an informal and practical rather than a discursive or conscious form of knowledge. This practical evalua­ tion and informal mastery of life chances occurs unconsciously. Bourdieu ( 1 9 84a=466) writes,

the schemes of the habitus, the primary forms of classification, owe their specific efficacy to the fact that they function below the level of consciousness and language, beyond the reach of introspective scrutiny or control by the will.

One dimension of habitus that Bourdieu emphasizes is the adjustment of aspirations and expectations to what he (adopting the expression from Bachelard) calls the "causality of the probable." Habitus adjusts aspirations and expectations according to the obj ective probabilities for success or fail­ ure common to the members of the same class for a particular behavior. This is a "practica l " rather than a conscious adjustment. According to Bour­ e1ieu,

d( I I I a l l i l l S i g- h l l 'l t i k l l , i l , i',l l ' I' i l i ' l I I I ' I I I' Hl l l l l'l l i l ' l l 'S w . . .. k , McCa l l ( 1 9 9 2 :R4R) argues that S i l l CC WOI l I C I l i l l h i f( l d y S I I" l l i l i l ' " ''' '' ' 1 1 ' 1 1 1 ''1 I I I' " , " " il1l'd I I I I l l cd i :t l e h c l w e e n t h e "mascu l i n e ! p l I " l i l ' w o r l d " I ' p a i d IV I I I' I, 1 ' 1 1 . 1 i l l t ' 1 " I I I I I I 1 I I , ' / I " ' I ''' l I l 1t i ll' l I r 1 ' ' 1 1 1' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 :1 1 1 rcprnd l l l ' l i o l l " I h �y . I" 1 1 1 1 1 l " " l 'l " ' i l ' l 1 l 'c ' 1 1 \ 1 ' 1 1 d\ l ' I I l e l l' K I I I I I I I ' d " I I I '· 1 11 ' 1 \\ 1 ' 1 1 1 1 c l lq lt ll� i l l l l l I " 11 l i e I j ll t'; i l i ( l I i S 1 1 1 : 1 1 H l l t l n l i l ' l l \ ( ' I J l l t T I I I 1 1 1 ' 1 " . 1 1 1 1 1 )1 1 ',(""

1 0 6 I C H A P T E R F I V E

if one regularly observes a very close correlation between the scientifically con­ structed objective probabilities (e.g., the chances of access to a particular good) and subjective aspirations ("motivations" or "needs") . . . this is not because agents con­ sciously adjust their aspirations to an exact evaluation of their chances of success.

Habitus emerges through primary socialization from a

practical evaluation of the likelihood of the success of a given action in a given sit­ uation [which] brings into play a whole body of wisdom, sayings, commonplaces, ethical precepts ("that's not for the likes of us"). (Bourdieu 1 9 7 7C:77; emphasis added)

The dispositions of habitus predispose actors to select forms of conduct that are most likely to succeed in light of their resources and past experi­ ence. Habitus orients action according to anticipated consequences. Unfor­ tunately, Bourdieu gives little insight into the how the process of internal­ ization becomes activated into a process of externalization. We learn little about the triggering mechanism at work or whether certain types of inter­ nalization are more easily externalized than otllers.

Bourdieu emphasizes the stratifying dimension of early socialization. Habitus conveys a sense of place and out-of-place in a stratified social world. Bourdieu ( I 984aA7 I ) writes that

objective limits become a sense of limits, a practical anticipation of objective limits acquired by experience of objective limits, a "sense of one's place" which leads one

to exclude oneself from the goods, persons, place and so forth from which one is excluded.

This social, differentiating dimension of habitus can be seen

i n the form of dispositions which are so many marks of social position and hence of the social distance between objective positions . . . and correlatively, so many re­ minders of this distance and of the conduct required i n order to "keep one's dis­ tance" or to manipulate i t strategically, whether symbolically or actually, to reduce i t (easier for the dominant than for the dominated), i ncrease it, or simply maintain i t (by not "letting oneself go," not "becoming familiar," i n short, "standing on one's dignity," or on the other hand, refusing to "take liberties" and "put oneself forward," i n short "knowing one's place" and staying there). (Bourdieu 1 97 7 c : 8 2 )

This puts power and its legitimation a t t h e h e a rt o f t h e fu n ct" i o n i n g a n d structure of habitus, since h a h i t n s i n v o l v l:s : 1 1 1 I I I I C O I I s c i o i l S ca lc u l a t i o n o f w h a t i s poss i h l e , i l l 1 ( loss i h l l:, :1 1 1 < 1 p ro h a h le ,i .r i l l d i v i d l l : . I s i l l t i l · i r s p 'e i f i c

H A B I T U S : A C U L T U R A L T H E O R Y O F A C T I O N I 1 0 7

locations i n a stratified social order. "The relation to what is possible is a relation to power" Bourdieu ( I 9 9ohA) writes.

The virtue-of-necessity dynamic of habitus stresses that not all social worlds are equally available to everyone. Not all courses of action are equally possible for everyone; only some are plausible, whereas others are unthinkable. Bourdieu explains that

agents shape their aspirations according to concrete indices of the accessible and the inaccessible, of what is and is not "for us, " a division as fundamental and as fundamentally recognized as that between tbe sacnd and tbe profane. ( 1 99oh:64; em­ phasis added)

Underlying Bourdieu's habitus lies Durkheim's sacred/ profane dualism, which at a velY fu ndamental level for Bourdieu divides the scope of agency between the possible and the impossible. Here again we see the in fluence of the structuralist logic of binary oppositions on Bourdieu's thinking. While insightful, this may render the j udgment of habitus too categorical by not exhausting the fu ll range of socialization experiences. There may be gray areas where uncertainties about life chances are internalized tllat do n ot fit tll e fundamentally dichotomous boundaries that Bourdieu's concept of habitus presupposes.

Habitus is fairly resistant to change, since primary socialization i n B ourdieu's view is more formative of in ternal dispositions than subsequent socialization experiences. There is a n ongoing adaptation process as habitus encounters new situations, but tllis process tends to be slow, unconscious, and tends to elaborate rather than alter fundamentally the primary disposi­ tions.19

Furthermore, some kinds of class habitus appear to be more durable than others. The French working-class habitus in Bourdieu's analyses seems less adaptable to forms of secondary socialization than does the middle-class habitus. Lower-middle class French families appeared more likely to take advantage of expanding educational opportunities during the postwar period than did working-class families. Thus, the relationship be­ tween primary and secondary socialization appears variable by social class, though Bourdieu does not provide a clear directive on this point.

Over ti me, Bourdieu's conceptualization of the dispositional character o f a c t i o n h a s increasingly stressed its "embodied" form. The process of i n tern a l i i'.:l t i o n o f o h j ective structures i s not only a mental process but a corporl::. I O l l l: as w d l . ' I ' l l . C I l : l I l C ·s fo r s u ccess a n d fa i l u re common to a

I I ) . i I ' > l l I 'I l i < " 1 1 I : d ks : 1 1 '" 1 1 1 " " . . 1 , · . . · . 0 " " ·' 1 1 11 1 ' · / 1 " . .. . . d'. II 11'11)' i o " I '; I I I ' 1 I ' l l I l s 1 0 s e l L " ' 1 li 'l" :ICl i o n , 1 1 1 10,(' t l ' I 'I' ! l i l l�1 t l 1 : 1 1 1 I 1 ' l ' 1 '4 , 1 I " i · . t I ' 1 I 1 W i l l , ' 1 �4 I I ' I '� I I I I " • 1 j 14 1 I I 1'4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'4

1 0 8 I C H A P T E R F I V E

class are "incorporated" i n bodily form as well as in cognitive dispositions. They show up in physical manner and style (e . g. , posture and stride) as well as in discursive expression. Bourdieu ( 1 98 5 b : I 3 ) finds a classical source of inspiration for his concept of habitus in the Aristoteli an idea of hexis, "the incorporated and quasi-postural disposition," which subsequently was " converted by scholasticism into habitus."2o Some of Bourdieu's earliest analyses treat the bodily incorporation of cultural dispositions as a some­ what separate dimension of habitus. In his article, "Celibat et condition paysanne" ( 1 96 2 b), for example, the concept is used to identify an affinity between the bodily comportment of rural French peasants and their atti­ tudes and perceptions of their physical behavior. The bodily and cognitive dimensions of habitus are considered separate but correlated. Yet, both mental and physical disposi tions are integrally related, as later formulations of the concept of habitus increasingly stress.21

In Sociology in Question ( 1 99 3 d : 86) Bourdieu argues that "the principles of habitus are inseparably logical and axiological, theoretical and practica l." The dispositions of ha b itus represen t master patte1'"'ns of behavioral style that cut across cognitive, normative, and corporal dimensions of human action. They find expression in language, nonverbal communication, tastes, values, perceptions, and modes of reasoning.

It is a genera l , transposable disposition which carries out a systematic, universal �pplication beyond the limits of what has been directly learnt of the necessity IIlherent i n the learning conditions. (Bourdieu T 984,1 : 1 70)

Habitus has the capacity to generalize through analogical transfers its f'lill­ damental "generative schemes" to all areas of life (Bourdieu 1 99oh:94). Bourdieu ( 1 989C: 3 8 7) suggests an analogy to handwriting that embodies a "stylistic affinity" for each individual regardless of form attempted or mate­ rial used. This key feature of habitus permits Bourdieu, for example, to identify parallel styles of action in arenas as different as family pl anning, dress, choice of sport, and diet. He writes,

marriage strategies are inseparable from i nheritance strategies, fertil ity strategies, and even educational strategies, i n other words from the whole set of strategies for

2 0 . There is some dispute, however, over the original meaning of the term. Boudon ( 1 986: 3 °9), a sharp critic of Bourdieu, claims that the classical notion .is not at all what Bourdieu's usage suggests. But, as noted earlier, Bourdieu is more interested in concept developll lclll a l l d applIcatIOn than scholarly exegesis. The concept has assumed a range o f meanings 1':11'1 i e l l i : l r 1 0 Bourdieu. See Heran 1 98 7 and Rist 1 984 for discussions of the genea l ogy o r h a l , i l l " ,

2 1 . It i s noteworthy tha t the tcrlll bcxi.l' figures more prominentl y i n ()II/Iill,' 111 11 " �" 'I I / I' "I P1'fI(/i(,' ( I <) 7 7c) I h a l l i l l I h e l , l I e r w or k , nil' 1.II�i( III' " I I/(/i(,' ( I <)()o i l ) . , .

H A B I T U S : A C U L T U R A L T H E O R Y O F A C T I O N I 1 0 9

biological, cultural and social reproduction that every group implements in order to transmit the inherited powers and privileges, maintained or enhanced, to the next generation. (Bourdieu I 99oh : 1 60-6 1 )

In Distinction ( 1 984a) Bourdieu explores how habitus accounts for class dif- •

ferences across a broad range of aesthetic tastes and lifestyles. In the strug- gle for social distinction in France, we find tastes and lifestyles that corre­ spond to four distinct class habitus: ostentatious indulgence and ease within the upper class, ari stocratic aestheticism among intellectuals, awkward pre­ tension by middle-class strivers, and antipretentious ignorance and confor­ mity within the working class. Bourdieu traces manifestations of each of these four sets of dispositions across a gamut of lifestyle indicators. In chap­ ter 7 , I will examine more ful ly these class habitus.

Bourdieu uses h i s concept of habitus to make conceptually appealing transitions from m i cro- to macro-levels of analysis and to generalize through quite different domains of human a ctivity. Its originality is to sug­ gest that there may be an underlying connection or common imprint across a broad sweep of different types of behavior, including motor, cognitive, emotional, or moral behaviors. Examples of habitus at work range from "the most automatic gestures or the apparently most insignificant tech­ niques of the body" to very abstract conceptualizations (Bourdieu 1 984a: 466). But this very appealing conceptual versatility sometimes renders am­ biguous just what the concept actually designates empirically.

The concept may be too encompassing for answering certain kinds of important research questions. Bourdieu resists di stinguishing between cognitive, moral, and corporal dimensions of action. His idea is to identify underlying master patterns that represent deep structural patterns tlut cross-cut and find characteristic forms of expression in all of these dimen­ sions. Yet, for certain research purposes, understanding precisely which of these dimensions seems to be more operative is what interests researchers. It is one thing to say that working-class youth do not enter French universi­ ties because they fear failure, and quite another to say that getting a higher education does not belong to their world view or class culture. In the former case, these youths might value higher learning and have hopes of attending the university but choose not to attend because they expect to fail. In the latter case, they would have no desire to attend the university and therefore no expectations. Values and expectations appear to merge in Bourdieu's understand i n g o f h a hi tus as a practical adaptation to the basic conditions o f e x i s t e l l cl ' . T h v y a ppea r not to internalize as separate, d i sti nguishable < l i l l l ' I l S i O I I S , , ' i l l ( '( ' t i l l ' l l i n i s l o f l 3 o l l l'd i c u 's a rgl l l l H ; n l' is 1 ' 0 s l ress t h e CO I l 1 - 1 1 1 0 1 1 I l I l t k r l y i l q . 1 1 1 1 1 1 \ ' " I : d l pracl i ces : I S S I L' l l l l l l i l l g' rrO l i 1 :1 r · w I l l I d l ' l 'l y i l l g'

1 1 0 I C H A P T E R F I V E

master dispositions. Frequently, class values and expectations indeed go together, but not always, and for this reason it is sometimes important to distinguish them.22

Bourdieu sees the internalization through socialization of external op­ portunity structures as a straightforward and nonproblematic process. Hab- itus faithfully reflects, by definition, the obj ective conditions under which it was initially formed. Habitus,

as an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which i t i s constituted, . . . engenders all the thoughts, all the percep­ tions, and all the actions consistent with those conditions, and no others. (Bourdieu 1 97 7C:95; emphasis added)

If an individual or group were to hol d aspirations different ti'om what would seem possible from the obj ective conditions of their primary socialization, this would stem from subsequent adaptations of habitus to new structural conditions rather than because the early formation of habi tus was some­ how deficient. Bourdieu tends to assume that the process of internalization of objective chances occurs without flaw. But we lack sufficient evidence that this actually happens in a consistent manner. Are not miscalculation and distortion common occurrences in early socialization experiences? A growing body of research findings from cognitive psychology and survey research suggest such an assumption to be problematic. Individuals and groups persistently misperceive the sentiments, thoughts, and actions of their peers (O'Gorman 1 9 86).21

Frequently, Bourdieu writes as if there were an a lmost exact correlation between hopes and chances, though at other times he recognizes that these

2 2 . The contnlst can be seen in the different perspectives offered by Kahl ( 1 95 3 ) and Ogbu ( 1 978, 1 990) on opportu n i ty perceptions. Kahl argues that working-class values and world view limit their vision for taking advantage of h i gh e r education opporrunitfes whereas Ogbu argues that lower-class people particularly blacks base their reluctance to pursue advanced schooling on a calculation of limited chances for success.

2 3 . Since I identified a s i m i l arity of concern between Bourdieu's effort to relate individual subjectivity and social objectivity and the social construction approach of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, it is appropriate bere to note an important difference. Berger and Luck­ mann see the degree of success of primary socialization as problematic, and connect i t to the division of labor and the distribution of knowledge: the internalization of objective realities is likely to be more successful in societies with a relatively simple d i v i s i o n n f labor a n d m i n i m a l distribution of knowledge than i n societies with more com p l e x ; l 1 1 d i m:g;d i I" a r i a l 1 S \ rli C l 1 I n:s (Berger and Luckmann 1 966 : 1 64). BOUl·di e l l theorizes a s i l l l i i : t r rel a l i o l l s h i p hel ween h a h i l l l s and the division of labor, but does nO\" CC1I l Ce p l l l a l iz,l' I hc poss i h i l i l y , , 1' ;1 "devialll h ; d ,i I I lS , " On the other h;1 I1 d , l3oLl r d i c I I 's :lppl ic:ll i ' ' ' 1 "I' I t :l l ,i l l l� i � 1 I 1 1 1 ( ' 1 t 1 ' ' ' ' ''( ' :I I \ I ' l I l i V I ' I " d a ss spc" i l i l ' forms o f soci ;t l i z.;l I i t l\' l 1 1 1 : 1 1 1 :1 I'l' I k "ll\"l' � l I d I , I I ( ' k " " " I I I .

•

•

H A B I T U S : A C U L T U R A L T H E O R Y O F A C T I O N I I I I

are never completely synchronized. Bourdieu defends the flexible applica­ tion of his concept against critics who charge that i t is applied too mechanis­ tically, warning against universalizing the model of a high correlation be­ tween subjective hopes and objective chances that simply reproduces social structure (Bourdieu 1 99oh: 63) . Yet if Bourdieu's theoretical intentions are good, the written formulations sometimes fail to convey the intended nu­ ance. An early formulation specifies that

i f members of the lower middle and working classes take reality as being equivalent to their wishes, i t i s because, in this area as elsewhere, aspirations and demands are defined in both form and content by objective conditions which exclude the possibil­ ity of hoping for the unobtainable. (Bourdieu 1 974C: 3 3 )

A systematic distinction between aspirations and expectations would help give further theoretical refinement to Bourdieu's scheme and at the same time could be easily operationalized in research. Is habitus primarily concerned with expectations or does it include aspirations as well ?24 Bourdieu employs both terms interchangeably.

If Bourdieu's concept of habitus helps describe situations where expec­ tations are adjusted to objective opportunities so that tlle dominated actu­ ally participate in their own domination, the concept also misses the miscal­ culations of objective probabilities that are also a common feature of group and individual aspirations. Bourdieu gives insufficient attention to the range of conditions under which aspirations fail to synchronize with expectations and expectations with opportunities. Numerous cases suggest that the alignment process of hopes, plans, and chances is problematic. The elevated aspirations among American blacks during tlle 1 960s for high occupational status, despite overwhelming evidence of limited career opportunities, rep­ resents just one striking example where disjuncture between hopes and chances occurs (Hout and Garnier 1 9 79, MacLeod 1 995). If Bourdieu's capital investment and conversion strategies perspective on class relations insightfully identifies the subtle dynamics of status inconsistency among upper- and middle-class groups, the reproduction dimension of habitus fails to give analogous insight into the complexity and ambiguity of individual perceptions of external realities. The concept of habitus fails to capture the varying degrees of incongruity between hopes, plans, and chances for d i ffer e n t groups.

B O l l rd i e u ( ' yR4a : ' 4 3 -(8) does dc;] 1 with the i ssue of disjuncture be-

l . I , i I" L l r d i , \ 1 ( \ C)H . l a) �l"'·"IS I I I d l ' s C ' \ ' i l l1 ' ''' � I I 1 ' I 'I :tl i , ,"s n, t I , \ ' I ' 1 1 t : 1 1 ' : l s p i r;l I i l ll l s . w h e l l h e w r i l' cs : t I " , " 1 " v i rt ll(' llIac il' I I r I IC ' ( ' ( ' ss i l y " I C I i l l l l i l ':I I I ' t I ' IC I ( ' \ I " '( 'I IC I I I '" ', II I' " . . I"" · I )' , ' , , r rC ' i :t I " c i w i l h "l tjec:­ l i ve.: PI' I II I:d ,i 1 i l i ( '\: .

1 1 2 I ( H A P T E R F I V E

tween aspirations and opportunities in a discussion of the effects of diploma inflation. He sees a "structural mismatch between aspirations and real prob­ abilities" caused by educational expansion without parallel expansion and upgrading of job requirements in the labor market. This structural mis­ match is the source of an "anti-institutiona l cast of mind" that translates into worker discontent and forms of adolescent counterculture. He also talks about a "collective disillusionment," saying that it "finds expression in unusual forms of struggle, protest and escapism" ( 1 44)· But his analysis does not suggest conditions that might help explain why the discontent would take one form rather than another. Moreover, he goes on to sound his fam i l iar theme of reproduction by arguing that "competitive" forms of struggle resulting from " frustrated expectations" are quite compatible with the reproduction of the social order through the "d isplacement of struc­ ture" ( 1 64-6 5).

Under certain conditi ons, however, there can occur a structural lag, or "hysteresis effect,"25 between aspirations and changing opportunities (Bourdieu 1 9 7 7 C : 7 8-79). Habitus implies that actors attend to the present and anticipate the future in terms of previous experienceY' The idea of a "hysteresis effect" is used by Bourdieu to explain why Algerian peasants did not rapidly adapt their notions of time and labor to the new values of economic rationality. It also helps explain why slight improvements over several years in educational opporumity for working-class youth could go largely unperceived in working-class families (Bourdieu and Passeron 1 9 7 9 : appendix). He also uses th e idea to explain th e contemporary dynamics of the overeducated and underemployed worker in th e labor market. Rapid and massive educational expansion without parallel growth in the postwar labor market brought credential inflation and devaluation. Aspirations for higher education credentials that were rewarded by real jQb opportunities in an earlier period became frustrated by the growing "structural mismatch" between education supply and la bor-market demand. Bourdieu ( I 984a: 1 44) explains the growing evidence of "disaffection towards work" and the "anti­ institutional cast of m i n d " that begins developing in the late '60S and early '70S as the "collective disillusionment which results from the structural mis-

2 5 . The term comes [1'0111 p hysica l science, a n d refers to when mag'neti c effects lag behind their C>lllSeS,

2 6 . There i s som e s im i l arity between Bourdieu's llll derstanding of how habims responds to new conditions and Ogburn's ( 1 9 2 2 ) cultural lag hypothesis. Bourdieu's concepmalization of habitus is not to be conflated with Ogburn's notion o f "the adaptive cul mre. " S ti l l , the idea explored by Ogburn that "changes in the adaptive culmre do not synch ron i ze e x a cri y with the change in the material culture" is s im ila r to Bourdieu's u ndersta n d i n g " I ' h : l i , i I I I S : I S a relatively permanent set of dispositions that cnters i n to tcnsion whl:n il COl i I'r" l 1 I , , , 1 . j ( , I ' l ivl" condirions q l l i te d i ffere n t: I'ro l l 1 r hose i l l w h i c h i l W:IS o r i g- i l l ;l l I y gC l l e r:l l " ' ! .

H A B I T U S : A ( U L T U R A l T H E O R Y O F A C T I O N I 1 1 3

match between aspirations and real probabilities."n Conditions for change rather than reproduction are set up when habitus encounters objective strucUlres radically different from those under which i t was originally formed. Yet, the weight of history shapes decisively our response i n those

• • sltuatlOns.

This is not to suggest that Bourdieu views all behavior as being gov­ erned by habitus. He finds ( 1 9 7 7 C : 2 0) that habitus i s most useful for ex­ plaining behavioral patterns in situations where normative rules are not explicit. Conduct relies less on habitus in situations that are highly codified, regulated, or threatening to vital material and political interests. Highly ritualized situations reduce (but do not eliminate) opportunities for strategy and innovation by habitus, whereas less ritualized ones enhance strategic opporumities. In discussing certain types of marriage arrangements among the Kabyle, Bourdieu ( 1 99oh: 1 8 2 ) observes that "the stakes are so high and the chances of a rift so great that the agents dare not rely entirely on the regulated improvisation of orchestrated babitus. "

Bourdieu ( 1 990C: 1 08 ) also acknowledges that habitus "may be super­ seded under certain circumstances certainly in situations of crisis which disrupt the immediate adjustment of habitus to field by other principles, such as rational and conscious computation . " Situations of crisis or where the financial stakes are considerable may encourage highly conscious forms of strategizing. But while admitting that strategizing on occasions can be conscious, he is quick to assert that the effects of habitus are nonetheless discernable. As a general rule, where material interests are considerable or the threat of violence eminent, it i s less likely that prevailing powers leave the course of action up to the habitus and the more likely that action be­ comes highly formalized, such as in diplomacy between states (Bourdieu 1 9 8 7 b : 96). The thrust of his work, however, is to find evidence of habitus at work in most every situation. The stress Bourdieu places on the role of habitus i n shaping action tends to deflect attention away from those situa­ tions when other principles governing practices come into play. H e does not really consider other orga nizing modes of conduct in an extensive way.

Habitus seems to work best not only i n situations that lack riulais and established protocol but also in relatively undifferentiated societies where the principal mode of domination operates through direct interpersonal relations rather than through impersonal institutions (Calhoun 1 99 3 ) .

2 7, ROl i n l i c l 1 ( 1 . ) K . I : t : t . I � ) SCI'S I h i s colkcr i v c deception being most li kel y aIllong social grollps w h " : l rc I l l'''' I " 1 1 1 1 · . . c 1 I I 1 ·: t l i " I I : t l l 'nll'I·ss :I l l t ! ",ho Sl i l l h o l d ro thl: traditional value of !' I l l! c re t ! l' l I l i :d , 1 ' " 1 1 1 1 1 " " 1 1 " I I I t i l l ' 1 " " " ' 1" 1 " 1 ' 1 , 1 , " I ' 1'c 1 I 1 ( ,: l l i ' l i l . T h i s I 'rn " l e l i l is kss l i kely ro Ol'l ' l i r 1 '. , 1 ' 1 1 1 1 "" "' ' ' , ' i l t l l l ' l l l , I t l l l l I lI l • 1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 . ·> 1 1 1 1 ' , ' I I t l l l i l l d l l l l , · , i l l l ; '1"1 1 1 :11 i , I I I O i l I I t I ' ('h;l l l g' i l i g V:t l l I l · " I' " " " " Il I I " l l l t l l l t\ t I " I I I I . t I �

1 1 4 I C H A P T E R F I V E

Thus, the concept seems particularly appropriate for Kabyle society where power is organized through an informal system of honor rather than through formal law. Bourdieu, however, takes the view that the concept applies as well to understanding behavior in advanced societies. In spite of formalized rules and regulations, actors engage in considerable practical strategizing in their everyday interactions that stem more from the disposi­ tions of habitus than from rational choice or norm conformity. 'ports in particular can be highly specialized and codifi ed and yet highlY t regulated by incorporated dispositions (Bourdieu r 988f). Other specialize4 activities

,

requiring trained bodily movement of habitus include driving, \playing a musical instrument, skilled manual labor, dancing, etc. Moreovet\ special-

,

ized mental activities, such as writing, computer programming, and proof- reading, evoke a "feel for the game" in their successful accomplishm ent. Even the daily routines of scientific investigation, Bourdieu reminds us, are shaped by practical mastery of the procedures of science. Nevertheless, the concept shifts level of analysis as Bourdieu moves from Algerian peasant society to modern France. In traditional undifferentiated societies, its con­ ceptual reach is broader, more macro, reproducing the entire societal cul­ ture. In highly differentiated societies, habitus becomes more akin to class­ and status-group subculture. Bourdieu seems to recognize implicitly tlle difficulty, as the concept of field which we will examine in the next chap­ ter becomes relatively more important in his analyses of highly differenti­ ated societies.

Both adaptation and distinction are two types of agency juxtaposed in the concept of habitus without their exact relationship being clarified. On

,

the one hand, practices appear as a functional adaptation to the necessities of life chances. These practices tend to reproduce social position. On the other hand, habitus generates practices that differentiate actors from their competitors. Here Bourdieu (1989C:9) links the tendency for reproduction to a tendency for habitus to "affirm its autonomy in relation to situations" and thereby tend to "perpetuate a differential identity." This type of agency is more relational, since it emerges from the intersection of the dispositions of habitus and the structures of constraints and opportunities offered by the fields in which it operates. Yet adaptation is the more frequent type of agency in Bourdieu's analyses.

Habitus as Cultural Practices and Habits , ,

On one level, habitus can be understood a s BOl i rc i i c l I 's : 1 1 1 l' l l l pl 1 0 w r i tL: :1 theory of culture a s practi ce. T n d L:L:d, h L: ' x p l :l i l l s h i s r h o i l ' l ' o r I h l' l'so l l' l ' i l ' term a s str:HL: g i cl l 1 y w:l r r:1 I 1 I' cd hy t i l l ' ( ) v l ' n k l l ' l ' l I l i l l l ' " l ' i 1 : l r : l l ' l l ' I ' i n I ll l l l l

H A B I T U S : A C U L T U R A L T H E O R Y O F A C T I O N I 1 1 5

lay and scholarly use of the term "culture."28 Bourdieu (r 968: 1 94) theorizes culture as more than a "common code" as in structuralism, more than an ideological system of ideas, beliefs, or values, as in Marxism, or more than a general world view posited by Mannheim's Weltanschauung. All of these images of culture, despite their quite different theoretical origins, convey little sense of agency. While the concept of habitus includes all of these features, it privileges the basic idea that action is governed by a "practical sense" of how to move in the social world. Culture is a practical tool used for getting along in the social world.

Bourdieu's concept of habitus, however, needs to be distinguished from Swidler's (1986) "tool kit" view of cultural practices. Though similar in stressing agency and the practical features of culture rather than norms, values, goals, or preferences, Bourdieu is less voluntaristic than Swidler; he stresses the group embeddedness of individual action. Moreover, Bourdieu stresses more than Swidler the power dimension of cultural resources­ their capacity to constitute social hierarchies.

If on one level habitus can be read as a way of conceptualizing culture as practice, on another level it associates practice with habit. Bourdieu ( 1 977c: 218) explains that the choice of the term habitus stems from "the wish to set aside the common conception of ha bit as a mechanical assembly or performed programme." He wants to emphasize the generative capacity of habitus ( r 993d:87)' Indeed, Bourdieu's concept, as Carnic ( 1986) in­ sightfully argues, can be viewed as an attempt to revive the meaning given by such classical theorists as Durkheim and Weber to the concept of habit.

Durldl eim, and especially Weber, assigned to habitual forms of action an important place in their understanding of agency. Indeed, Weber (1978: 2 I , 2 4 - 2 5) explicitly conceptualizes habitual action as a pure type, and asso­ ciates it with traditionalism. Moreover, he observes that "the great bulk of all everyday action" approximates this type. What these nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century social theorists understood by habit is quite differ­ ent from the relatively elementary, skillfully performed, and virtually auto­ matic activities we normally associate with the term today. Camic points out that the classical writers tend to apply the term at a more general level to identify forms of action that emerge apart from an explicitly reflective process. This expanded notion of habit might include "habits of interper­ sonal interaction; habits of economic, political, religious, and domestic be­ h avior; habits o f o h e d i e nce to rules and to rulers; habits of sacrifice, dis-

� H , 1 1 1 1 \ I I'd i l' \ I ( , 'l I H : 7' 1(,) I , ,, , I ' " I I , ' 'I I " ' " " rI ' d i" , ' I I " i , I " I I r I i :l h i I I I s hy t ) hse rv i 11 g I'h : 1 1' " c I I I I'll re " , w l l i l i d 1 .. . :1 1 .. . 1 1 " " I t " " ' 1 1 , , " , /,,11'111/1 1 1 " \\' 1 ' 1' 1 " , 1 1 1 1 " 1 I 1' I ' rd l ' I I ' I ' I I , i l l C d I " " " T ! , I r i s ks ht: i l l f(' , " i ' ' ' ' l t l l ' r' l l Il Id , " , . 1 ' I " , d i l l " 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 , , 1 , , " , " 1 1 " " ", 1 1 1 1 , 1 \ I I , , ' 1 ' 1 1 1 1 ' I i 1 1 1 1 ' " , d' i " v : l l i d i l l ' , " •

1 1 6 I C H A P T E R F I V E

interestedness, and restraint. " On a still more general level, the term designates a "durable and generalized disposition that suffuses a person's action throughout an entire domain of life or, in the extreme instance, throughout all of life" (Carnic I 9 86 : 1 046). Bourdieu's concept of habitus represents, in part, an effort to revive the idea of habit in the broader and classical sense of the term.29

29, Camic's analysis demonstrates that this expanded notion of habit was abandoned by American sociology dur,i n g the early decades of the twentieth century. A very restricted defi­ nition came to be accepted and relegated to the lie l d of psychology i n a n effort to establish the discipline of sociolo!,'Y as distinct from psychology, Bourd i eu's concept of h a b i m s also i l l ustrates his refusal to accept the institutionalized d i vision of intellectual labor between con­ temporary sociology a n d psychology.

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F IEL DS OF S T RUG G L E

F OR P OW ER

"Field" (champ) is a key spatial metaphor in Bourdieu's sociology. Field defines the structure of the social setting in which habitus operates. Bourdieu defines a fi eld as

a network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions. These posi­ tions are objectively defined, in their exi,,stence and i n the determinations they im­ pose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential simation (sitw) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by th eir objective relation to other positions (domination, subordina­ tion, homology, etc.). (Bourdiell and Wacqllant 1 99 2 : 97)

Fields denote arenas of production, circulation, and appropriation of goods, services, knowledge, or status, and the competitive positions held by actors in their struggle to accumulate and monopolize these different kinds of capital. Fields may be thought of as structured spaces that are organized around specific types of capital or combinations of capital . ' For example , Bourdieu speaks o f the "intellectual field" to designate that matrix of insti­ tuti o n s , orga n i z;l t i o n s , a n d m a rkets in which symbolic producers, such as :Htists, w r i ters, a n d : l e: l d ' l i l i e s , c( ) m pete for sym b o l i c capital. Even science i tse l f \'I l l; s e l f- p rC H' i : l i l l l l ' d i l i g' i l l 's t c x ) ! r 'ssi ( ) n ( ) f o h j ectivity i s produced

I , 1 \ ' l I l l 'c i i ( , 1 1 ( I ,) �C' '' ' : I \ � C ' I ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' " d l i l l 1 1 1 ' 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 " " 1 I 1 'l ' I' I : , i l l o I i s l r i h l l l i C l I l 5 1 I ' l I l ' l 1 1 1'1' C it' ' " 1 1 1 1 ' I, i l l . ! C l I " I I I " I I 1 I. "

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