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Recalling anti-racism Ghassan Hage

School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

ABSTRACT Despite its many achievements and some remarkable victories against the forces of racism in their variety of forms, it cannot be said that anti-racism has been particularly successful as a social, cultural, and political force. This essay uses Bruno Latour’s figure of the ‘recall’ to rethink certain elements of the anti- racist tradition. Latour sees the figure as combining both ‘recalling’ in the sense of remembering, but also ‘recalling’ in the way a company recalls a product when it realises it has some defect. In much the same way, the essay uses the idea of ‘recalling anti-racism’, firstly, in order to stay in touch with anti-racism’s ‘founding principles’, to develop a sense of the cumulative gain that has been made throughout its history, and, secondly, in order to critically re-examine how it can be modified and made more efficient.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 5 January 2015; Accepted 27 April 2015

KEYWORDS Anti-racism; neo-liberalism; reciprocity; mutuality; critical anthropology; racism

Introduction

There is little doubt that the ‘re-configuring’ of anti-racism is an urgent task today. As a current of thought and as a social movement, anti-racism has a long history. From the opposition to slavery, to the anti-colonial struggles, to the civil rights movement in the USA, to the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, to today – where anti-racism is most notably present in the struggles in support of asylum seekers and against the Israeli treatment of Palestinians in Israel/Palestine – anti-racism has been and remains a vital and important current of thought and social movement. It embodies the noblest of all human values – at the very least, a belief in the right of all human beings to be treated with dignity and respect regardless of where they come from and how they happen to be classified.

Yet, despite this long history and some remarkable victories against the forces of racism in their variety of forms, it cannot be said that anti-racism has been particularly successful as a social, cultural, and political force. Every- where we look today, racism is on the rise. In Australia, and also in the USA and

© 2015 Taylor & Francis

CONTACT Ghassan Hage [email protected]

ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES, 2016 VOL. 39, NO. 1, 123–133 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2016.1096412

Canada, if we look at the treatment of Indigenous people and the immigrant populations originating from the Third World, or at the rate of imprisonment of black populations, all remain marked by excessive racism. Likewise is the treatment of asylum seekers everywhere around the world. Most importantly, we are seeing a massive rise in virulently racist and intolerant forms of ethno- religious nationalism, with Zionist nationalism in Israel being an extreme case of what is fast becoming the rule rather than the exception. But perhaps, nowhere is the salience of racism made clearer than in the case of South Africa, the country where the forces of anti-racism have registered what is undoubtedly their greatest victory. For there, and despite the undeniable victory, racism remains an enduring social force, leaving its imprint on many facets of South African life. It is with all of the above in mind that I want to investigate the need to reconfigure anti-racism through the process of ‘recalling’ it.

‘Recalling’ has been put forward by Latour (2007) as a critical way of reflect- ing on modernity. It combines both recalling in the sense of remembering to ensure we build on past achievements, but also recalling in the way a company recalls a product when it realises it has some defect. As Latour (2007) highlights:

In no way does this recall aim to damage the product, nor, of course, to lose market share. Rather, it has quite the opposite strategy. By showing consumers the care it takes with the quality control of its goods and the safety of their users, it wants to demonstrate initiative, rebuild media confidence, and, if possible, recommence the production that was too quickly halted. (11)

It is in this spirit, then, that I want to initiate a recalling of anti-racism.

The functions of anti-racism

More so than ‘modernity’, anti-racism is a ‘product’ with a well defined func- tion, and it is important, indeed, to recall, in the usual sense of the word, what these functions are. First, in order to stay in touch with its ‘founding principles’ and also in order to develop a sense of the cumulative gain that – despite the shortcomings – has nonetheless been made in the history of anti-racism, I want to highlight six central functions. Although these clearly overlap in prac- tice, I will list them for the purpose of exposition. (1) Reducing the incidence of racist practices: Anti-racists have struggled

throughout history to create social and legal pressures that make it diffi- cult for racists to externalize their racism whether in society at large (everyday racism) or within institutions (structural racism).

(2) Fostering a non-racist culture: This differs from the cultural work needed to stop racists externalizing their racism as it involves the more difficult work of using municipal, educational, and artistic forums and institutions, aiming to ensure that people are not racist in the first place.

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(3) Supporting the victims of racism: This includes the various modes of pro- tecting and offering shelter and counselling to victims of racist violence and racist abuse.

(4) Empowering racialized subjects: The struggles to bring about anti-racist laws and to create networks of solidarity do not only have the effect of stopping racists and helping victims; they can also be directed at making the racialized more autonomous and more able to withstand and fight back against racism. Such work has a more lasting effect in the long run and, as such, is more important than helping victims.

(5) Transforming racist relations into better relations: Like feminism, anti-racism is an ambivalent struggle. It involves by necessity a war-like sentiment of enmity towards the racists as a dominant, oppressive, and sometimes violent group, but, at the same time, such enmity cannot be left unchecked such as to include an ethos of extermination. Instead, anti- racists need to offer those who are racializing them, in the same way fem- inist women offer sexist men, modes of coexisting and relating that con- stitute an alternative to the dominant racist or sexist relation.

(6) Fostering an a-racist culture: Finally, and perhaps ultimately, anti-racists aim to create a society in which race has no significance as a criterion of identification. As a long critical intellectual anti-racist tradition has taught us, we do not need – and it could still be described as racist – to settle for a society that naturalizes racial identification. We can and should aim where appropriate for a state of affairs in which racial identi- fication is no longer a relevant or salient mode of identification. The a- racial is thus an ideal of a social space characterised by a radical indiffer- ence to race.

It is when looking at these functions and objectives that the necessity of ‘recal- ling’ anti-racism in its full Latourian sense becomes clear. While anti-racism has had some notable successes at achieving its goals, it has been, as already mentioned, far from an efficient, fault-free product. It has often failed to perform and rise to the situations it is confronting. Indeed, if we are to compare racism and anti-racism as products, we can say that across history racism has been far more successfully ‘recalled’ and made operationally suit- able for a variety of socioeconomic and cultural environments. It has morphed and shown a capacity to target a variety of people, sometimes many at the same time: blacks, Asians, Arabs, Jews, Roma, and Muslims. It has been used as a tool of segregation, a tool of conditional integration, and, most dramati- cally, a tool of extermination. It has efficiently constructed its object, success- fully adapting to the dominant modes of classification of the time, be they phenotypical, biological, cultural, or a combination of these and more.

Comparatively speaking, anti-racism has been conceptually rather ossified and is always trying to catch up with the racists’ fluid modes of classification. Anti-racist academics have certainly contributed to this ossification, perhaps

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more so than activists. While racists have happily moved from one form of racism to another, caring little about logical contradictions, inconsistencies, and discrepancies in their argumentations, too many anti-racist academics spend an inordinate amount of time trying to judge racists on precisely such grounds. In a classical case of what Pierre Bourdieu (1990) calls ‘project- ing into the object one’s relation to the object’ (27), they criticise racists as if the racists are fellow academics with whom they are having disagreements in a tutorial room about how to interpret reality. The performativity of racist statements and more obviously racist practices, which is what is most impor- tant to the racists themselves, is given far less attention than needed. Instead, the racists’ greatest sins are made to be interpretative/intellectual ones. They are accused of being bad thinkers: they are ‘essentialists’, they deviate from ‘classical’ biological racism, or they are making false statements about reality that the anti-racist academics can empirically correct by highlighting a lot of statistical data that proves them incorrect: ‘No, there aren’t that many asylum seekers trying to get into the country’ or ‘No, there are no ghet- toes here. Look at the demographic data’-type argumentation.

It is because of such tendencies that recalling anti-racism is a crucial task. It is particularly so since racism for the last couple of decades or so has yet again been undergoing an important reconfiguration, becoming intimately fused with the logic and needs of neo-liberal capitalist accumulation. To recall anti-racism now, in the midst of this transformation, might allow us to develop an anti-racism that is evolving in continual response to, rather than trying to catch up with, the racisms it is trying to oppose.

The neo-liberal recalling of racism

One of the most important transformations that have shaped the new ‘neo- liberal racism’ is the increasingly important role that nationalist ideologies play in securing the relative cohesion of most nation states. Economic globa- lization has meant that very few nations are left with a national economic structure that works as a solid base for securing the togetherness of the nation regardless of what people within the nation thought. This has meant, among other things, a relative increase in the importance of the func- tion of the ideological (e.g. national values, national histories) as a centripetal force securing both the practical and the ideological unity of the nation-state. Because of this centrality, the social forces that take on the task of protecting ethno-national ideologies develop an increased racist intolerance towards the plurality of ideas and identities that not long ago marked the most benign forms of multiculturalism. Such pluralities are increasingly constructed as cen- trifugal forces of disintegration and are systematically attacked as a national threat.

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The second feature of neo-liberal globalization that is having an impor- tant impact on shaping the dominant forms of racism in the West is the increasing move towards a de-industrialized landscape. The current figure of the unwanted asylum seeker as opposed to the liminal but included migrant workers of the post-World War II is metonymic of a changing economy characterized by more prevalent figures of undesirability and dis- posability. Despite the plurality of forms that racism has taken throughout history, it has always fluctuated between two tendencies: the racism of exploitation and the racism of extermination. The first is deployed when the racialized are considered as valuable such as in the case of slavery or migrant workers. The second dominates when the racialized are considered harmful, or at least when they are evaluated as more harmful than they are useful, such as in the case of anti-semitism, as well as in certain instances of colonial encounters. In the first case, racism works to marginalize people in society, ensuring they have a place in it even if it is a precarious place. In the second, racism aims to marginalize people from society, ensuring they have no social or even physical presence in it whatsoever – this could be through active physical extermination, or through passive extermination: letting people rot through a strategy of total neglect the way one lets an old truck rust away on one’s property, or, in a similar manner, through ensuring the targeted people remain on the outer side of the borders they are aiming to cross, as with asylum seekers.

The third feature is the rise of particularist anti-racism. This is the anti- racism of those who are racialized and are as such struggling against their racialisation. But in their struggle, what is important to them is not that ‘racism is wrong’. Rather, it is that racism against them is wrong. Such people don’t mind racism as such, they mind being subjected to it themselves. Indeed, they often are happy to dispense racism themselves. Nowhere is this racist particularist anti-racism, with its capacity to racialize others in the name of fighting against one’s racialisation, more powerfully present and institutio- nalized than in the state of Israel today. But it can even be said that this par- ticularism has become a generalized cultural form with so much racism today being dispensed by racists claiming to be racialized themselves. Even white populations in Europe, the USA, Canada, and Australia, with their long history of colonization, have happily taken it on board, often arguing that they are subject to ‘reverse racism’.

This particularist anti-racism raises what is perhaps the most crucial point that needs to be considered in the process of recalling racism: to what extent is anti-racism wedded to an ‘alter-political’ conception of society? That is, to what extent does it not only work on opposing existing racism, but also work on thinking through and working for a non-racist society.

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Anti-racism and anthropology’s three modes human of existence

Perhaps one of the richest and most critical dimensions of anthropology, which makes it so particularly suitable for thinking alter-political questions, is its long tradition of dealing with cultures that the colonial expansion of our capitalist modernity has put us in touch with, but which nonetheless remain outside it in a variety of ways. Anthropology investigates modes of thinking and existing that strike us to begin with as radically different from our own. Yet, at the same time, it invites us to note how this radical difference actually speaks to us; that is, we come to realise that there are nonetheless certain commonalities between our own lives and those seemingly exotic modes of existence that have been depicted and analysed. This is precisely when anthropology becomes critical: it invites us to see that there are whole realities or dimensions of realities that were hidden from us, even though they have always been constitutive elements of our lifeworld. As such, critical anthropology helps us become conscious of the fact that our reality is far more layered and differentiated than we thought and that, just as there are dominant and dominated forces within a reality, there are also dominant and dominated realities.

The anthropological tradition has highlighted two human modes of exist- ence that I want to introduce here, not only because of their intrinsic impor- tance but also because they speak in particular to the question of racism and anti-racism before us. These are what I will refer to as the reciprocal and the mutualist modes of existence. They can be differentiated from the mode of existence that dominates our own modernity, what I will call the domesticat- ing mode of existence. To speak of human modes of existence is to speak of a human mode of inhabiting, being enmeshed in and relating to the world that is part and parcel of constituting the world. I will define each of these modes of existence through their way of conceiving, creating, and relating to other- ness since this is what concerns us most here.

The domesticating mode of existence, with which we are most familiar, is a world dominated – although, one must stress, far from saturated – by an instrumentalization of one’s surroundings. It creates an otherness that is mostly conceived as an object that needs to be dominated for utilitarian pur- poses. A logic of extraction of value, physical and symbolic, prevails through- out this world. All differences that are articulated to domestication become a form of polarization: human–animal, man–woman, white–black. The bound- ary between self and other is characterized by the problem of how to domi- nate and maintain sovereignty over the other.

The reciprocal mode of existence offers a different relationality, grounded in the logic of the gift. The radical difference that is inherent in gift exchange was initially and classically highlighted in the work of Marcel Mauss ([1925] 2000)

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on the subject. What is difficult about the order of the gift is that, in the first instance, it is hard to see how the logic of the gift is any different from the instrumental reason that rules in the realm of domestication. For indeed, at one level, it does not take particularly sharp analytical skills to uncover a calcu- lative logic of self-interest that is a feature of gift exchange. The brilliance of Mauss’s work was to insist that if one sees in the gift only this logic of self-inter- est, one misses a different dimension, which is precisely the space of radical difference where it takes us. In that space, things are not merely ‘offered’ as gifts in a strategically motivated act. Rather, the reciprocal gift relation is a relation that is always a surplus to the instrumental calculative relation. People, animals, plants, and objects stand as gifts towards each other. Their mere presence before each other is constituted by a kind of inter-giftness. The exclamations of joy that accompany a child entering a room is a good example of the way someone’s presence by itself is experienced as an offering. Some forms of religious thought capture this dimension by making life and everything that exists a gift of God requiring to be recognized as such, and where the very recognition of this giftness, the sentiment of gratitude, is itself a form of reciprocating the gift. Mauss’s analysis of gift exchange showed that while this reciprocal gift-based mode of existence is minor in our society, and indeed tends to become negligible with the increased domi- nance of calculative instrumental logic, there are societies where this dimension remains far more pronounced. If the order of domestication invites an experi- ence of the boundary as an intrinsic component of defining and consolidating one’s sovereignty, in the order of reciprocity the border between self and other is primarily perceived as the site of exchange and inter-relationality.

The mutualist mode of existence is also about inter-relationality. But it is in an inter-relationality of a different order. I am borrowing the concept of mutuality here from recent work by Sahlins (2012) on kinship. It highlights an order of existence where people (and animals, plants, objects, and so on) exist in each other. ‘He is from us and in us,’ the Lebanese say to empha- size that someone is strongly connected to them. Mutualism is this sense that others are ‘in us’ rather than just outside us. It can be argued that anthropol- ogy’s research on mutualist forms of existence begins with the earliest works of Tylor (1976) on animism. But its critical anthropological ramifications became more developed with Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s work on ‘participation’: a mode of living and thinking where we sense ourselves and others as partici- pating in each other’s existence, where the life force of the humans and the non-humans that surround us are felt to be contributing to our own life force (Keck 2005). If the domesticating mode of existence stresses a sense of boundaries concerned with the delineation of a space of sovereignty, and the reciprocal mode of existence highlights boundaries and borders as a zone of exchange, the mutualist mode of existence underscores a reality where boundaries between self and other, human and animal, and so on,

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are far less absolute and even non-existent, where we experience an interpe- netration between self and other.

In order to grasp what this means for our understanding of racism and anti- racism, it is important to stress again the critical anthropological reach of these modes of existence. Despite some facile claims to the contrary by people eager to attack anthropology’s supposed colonial exoticization of otherness, neither Marcel Mauss nor Lévy-Bruhl, nor any of the anthropologists who took their work seriously, claimed something as simplistic as ‘Look at us. We are modern and rational, and look at those others who are so different from us that they live in a world of gift exchange, or in a world of mutuality.’ Both emphasized that rational instrumental calculative forms of thinking and living existed in the societies they were examining. They respectively argued, however, that the logic of the gift and the logic of participation were more pronounced in those societies than they were in our own. Thus, they were also claiming right from the start that the logic of participation and the logic of gift exchange were not as foreign to us as we might first think. Our world must be made out of a multiplicity of modes of existence, and if those modes of existence like gift exchange and mutuality speak to us, it is because they are always already one of our many modes of creating/ relating to the world. We can say that Mauss and Lévy-Bruhl were multi-realists well before Viveiros de Castro (2014) introduced the concept. It is in this sense that their anthropology was a critical anthropology: it works like a sociocultural archaeology, digging up and making apparent modes of existence that, while less salient in our lives, are nonetheless very much part of them. The domesti- cating, reciprocal, and mutualist modes of existence are concurrently part of everyone’s lives even if one dominates over others in certain social, historical, or personal circumstances. Thus, I might see in a tree something I need to instrumentalize, to cut in order to ‘extract’ its wood and build myself a house, and in that sense the tree exists for me in the domesticating order of reality. What Mauss and others would insist upon, however, is that there is another mode of relating to the tree, which occurs concurrently, where its mere presence, regardless of the value of its wood, is a gift: I look at it and I say, ‘Thank you for existing, even though I am sorry that I need to cut you down.’ Likewise, I might consciously or unconsciously feel that the being of the tree and its life force is participating in my own existence and enhancing my own life force, and when I cut the tree I might, also consciously or uncon- sciously, feel that my own life force has been diminished when I cut it down. I am living and relating to things in all these three forms of existence at the same time, and perhaps many others of which I am not conscious.

With this in mind, I want now to move to show the relevance of this for a recalling of anti-racism. The crucial point that needs to be emphasized here is that racists, like all of us, are multi-realists in practice, while it is only we, the anti-racists, who have clung to a mono-realist ‘rationalist’ mode of existence

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in theory for too long. When, for example, racists classify someone as extermin- able, they don’t only do so from an instrumentalist/calculative rationality point of view. To be sure, they do classify them in this way, perceiving them as super- fluous and harmful. But this is not enough to explain the lethal and visceral nature of exterminability. Racists also experience and classify the racialized within the realm of reciprocity. As I have argued above, the way we greet a child entering a room is a good example of treating someone’s presence as a gift in itself. What is crucial to add here is that it is precisely through this process that we instil in children a healthy narcissistic sense of self-worth. It goes without saying that we might under- or over-do it sometimes, but it remains true nonetheless that it is good for us to walk around knowing sublim- inally that our worthiness is not merely relative to how ‘useful’ others think we are.

It is precisely this intrinsic sense of worthiness inherent to our very pres- ence, and that is beyond or outside instrumental reason, that the racists try to withhold from those they are racializing and in so doing try to remove them from the reciprocal mode of existence. It is this removal that adds an important layer to what it means to be exterminable. Indeed, in the case of asylum seekers, the withholding of this intrinsic giftness, and the symbolic/ psychological injury this entails, is one of the most important dimensions of the racist encounter.

While this already adds depth and complexity to our understanding of the racism of extermination, it is by understanding the way racism also draws on the experience of mutuality that the true murderous intent of this racism can be more fully understood. As has been made clear above, the mutualist order of existence involves a sense of inter-penetration of existence whereby the other is seen as participating in our very existence and vice versa. In exempli- fying this, I used the positive example of the life force of others enhancing our own life force. Yet one of the vilest expressions of racism emanates from a negative experience of this mutuality, an experience akin to forms of black magic and sorcery: seeing in the existence of the other malefic forces that are diminishing rather than enhancing one’s own life force. This is indeed one of the most unpleasant and visceral forms that racism takes. Here, the racist conceives of the other in the figure of the ‘dementor’ in Rowling’s Harry Potter novels: the mere proximity of someone they classify as black, Asian, Arab, or Jew is seen as sucking one’s life and soul away from them, leaving them drained. Not only is the presence of the other not a gift, it is also an actual ‘existential threat’ that animates our exterminatory impulses.

Writing anti-racism

What I have tried to show in the above is that by taking the many dimensions of the racism of extermination on board we can begin to think of an anti-

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racism that can rise to its multi-realist complexity. For if racism constitutes itself within the domesticating, reciprocal, and mutualist modes of existence, this certainly does not mean that these modes of existences are intrinsically racist. Modes of existence are like all social worlds, spaces of struggle. Just as racism finds resources in them to thrive, so can anti-racism and – most importantly – the alter-politics confronting racism. Just as the order of the gift implies a move away from the domesticating order of instrumental valor- ization, the reciprocal mode of existence offers us an anti-racism that moves beyond the ‘valorization of the other’ that characterizes multicultural anti- racism. Anti-racism, then, without vacating the empirical/rational ground in which it has been mostly grounded, can productively move to think of itself as affective, and even as magical, in ways that speak to the racist sentiments and affects generated in the realm of reciprocity and mutuality. More impor- tantly, the mutualist mode of existence offers us experiences where the very distinction between self and other disappears, and as such offers one of the most important grounds for setting the utopia of the a-racial on secure grounds.

It is here that we come to the question of anti-racist writing. For what is true about anti-racist practices in general is also true of the particularities of anti-racist writing as a practice. For writing, like any other practice, is also enmeshed in a multiplicity of worlds, with their corresponding forms of otherness. One can write ‘about’ the racialized, treating them as passive sub- jects of analysis. There is no doubt that such a form of anti-racist writing can be over-analytical, treating racism, racists, and the racialized as objects of what amounts to analytical domestication. This is when all writing aims to do is to ‘capture’ reality, a concept with an impeccable domesticating pedi- gree. But this is not all that anti-racist writing does or can do. One’s writing can take the form of a gift to the racialized. There is a long tradition of sociological and anthropological writing reflecting on how to write ‘with’ rather than just ‘about’ one’s informants. This is particularly true of ethno- graphies of indigenous people, where anthropologists have a long history of being sensitive to questions of reciprocity. Anti-racist writers can learn a lot from these ethnographies. Finally, a piece of anti-racist writing can be in itself a form of life that participates in enhancing the being of the racialized, aiming to speak to them in the sense of speaking into them. Sometimes this can be a question of style: it is hardly a revelation for anti-racist activists that one can write something like ‘1-in-3 African Ameri- cans will go to prison’ as either a mere ‘depressive’ confirmation of margin- alization or as an invigorating call to arms stressing the racialized’s agency and capacity for resistance. I think that the poetic/phenomenological tra- dition, such as what one finds in the work of Michael Jackson (see for instance Jackson 2009), can offer an inspiration for a more consciously mutualist writing in this domain.

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The question then becomes: what does it mean to become more conscious of anti-racist writing as enmeshed in this plurality of modes of existence? I would like to think that, at the very least, such consciousness would widen the writer’s anti-racist strategic capacities and render anti-racist thought more efficient at combatting racism. This is crucial as anti-racist political forces face the lethal neo-liberal forms of exclusion meted out on the racia- lized today. For example, the ease with which asylum seekers are radically expelled and disallowed to set a footing in society appears at one level as a form of instrumental/rational/bureaucratic decision making, even if judged as extremely harsh. Yet such extremism is impossible without a culture of dis- posability and exterminability in which this exclusion is grounded, and that is far from being entirely instrumental/rational/bureaucratic. It goes without saying that from a disciplinary perspective it is this culture that is by definition the appropriate domain of anthropological investigation and writing. It so happens that, politically and ethically, it is also the most important to address, understand, and struggle to transform.

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Mauss, Marcel. [1925] 2000. The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies. Translated by W. D. Halls. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

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