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social research Vol. 82 : No. 2 : Summer 2015 375

Min Zin Anti-Muslim Violence in Burma: Why Now?

one of the darkest aspects of burma’s political transition is a

surge of religious intolerance. Extreme Buddhist nationalism has gained

ground since mid-2012, when communal riots between Buddhists

and Rohingya Muslims broke out in the country’s far western Arakan

state, leaving more than 200 dead and about 140,000 displaced, mostly

Muslims. Since then, anti-Muslim riots have erupted in other parts of the

country, even beyond the issue of “anti-Bengalis immigrants,” which is

how the Burmese government has referred to the Rohingya, who were

not acknowledged as an ethnic group even in the 2014 national census;

instead they are called “intruders from neighboring Bangladesh.”

It definitely creates a sense of dissonance when “pacifist Bud-

dhist monks” are spearheading hate speech. The photos of Burmese

monks marching with huge banners that oppose Islam as “a faith of

animals with uncontrollable birthrates” and calling for restrictions

on interfaith marriage are beyond comprehension for many Western

observers, whose image of Buddhist monks is derived from the “Saf-

fron Revolution” of 2007, which called for reconciliation and peace

in repressive Burma. But monks are even allegedly responsible for

instigating mass killings in some incidents, including in Meiktilar,

a town in central Burma, where Buddhist mobs destroyed Muslim

neighborhoods, leaving at least 44 people dead, including 20 students

and several teachers massacred at an Islamic school. In fact, a series

of anti-Muslim riots have taken place and escalated in the aftermath

of the 2012 by-elections, which coincided with landslide victory of

Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy. The ongoing

376 social research

anti-Muslim religious riots, therefore, display not only sheer bigotry

but also political manipulation.

Why is anti-Muslim violence taking place in Burma now, and

at what cost? Three related arguments must be made to answer the

puzzle, and to do so I draw on a series of interviews and written docu-

ments. First, the pattern, nature, level, frequency, and impact of anti-

Muslim violence during the pseudo-civilian regime that took power

in 2011 have all changed and are distinct from the religious riots that

took place during the previous regime. This observation is crucial be-

cause it calls into question claims of continuity and makes plain the

relevance of the “why now” question. Second, both “hardliners” and

“reformists” of the transitional regime are complicit in the ongoing

communal violence in Burma and taking advantage of it, in contrast

to prevailing depictions of the violence as caused by “dark forces” and

“hardliners” behind the scenes. This addresses a classic question of

politics: “who gets what, when, and how.” Third is an unprecedented

trend: emerging conflicts between the Burmese monastic order and

its lay adherents that would lead to a societal transformation in the

long run, but not before the ensuing religious violence has been prov-

en to have devastating immediate and medium-term costs.

The PreVAiliNg exPlANATioNs There is no shortage of theories that attempt to explain why recent anti-

Muslim violence has taken place in Burma. Some observers portrayed

a new wave of religious conflict as a by-product of the ongoing politi-

cal liberalization that took place in 2011. This view argued that deep,

pent-up societal division and hatred, which was repressed by authori-

tarian rule, is now breaking out thanks to the lifting of authoritarian

control and the democratization process (International Crisis Group

2013). This explanation, which speaks to broader theoretical views of

political opportunity structure (Tarrow 1998, 19–20; McAdam 1996,

27; Snyder 2000, 36–42), highlights changes of opportunity structure

in the political environment that provide incentives for collective

action. Critics, however, dismissed this view as ahistorical. They did

Anti-Muslim Violence in Burma: Why Now? 377

not rule out that the political transition underway has had a great

influence on conflict dynamics, but the historical approach under-

stands “the current manifestations of violence [as] but a continuation

of a longstanding conflict deeply rooted in Burma’s complex history”

(O’Connor 2014). This approach also draws attention to the charac-

ter and dynamics of communal relationships between Buddhists and

Muslims, especially in the context of western Burma (Thawnghmung

2014, 322–338). Other researchers also warned that the violence in

Burma should not be considered a sudden and regrettable by-product

of the political reform; these violent episodes instead arise from the

complete lack of proper institutions such as a fair legal system and

accountability mechanism (Physicians for Human Rights 2013).

Such views, however, understate the role of actors in communal

violence. Interestingly, government leaders, including President Thein

Sein and House Speaker Shwe Mann, opposition activists that include

National League for Democracy, and the mainstream media, blame “in-

stigators behind the scene” (Myanmar Eleven 2014; HRW 2012; Aung

Zaw 2014; Kyaw Win 2014). The alleged culprits in this view range from

hardliners in the ruling party, who resisted the political reform, to the

local Arakan nationalist party, to ineffectiveness or bigotry of local po-

lice forces, to the media, and even to cease-fire groups.

Some researchers, however, question the human agency-cen-

tric approach, which falls short of understanding the underlying

cause of the conflicts. They contend that the current violence is not

simply a state-sponsored project anymore (Chris Lewa 2012; Sai Latt

2012). This view argues that people’s attention should be brought to

a deeper appreciation of the root cause of the anti-Muslim violence

by examining and confronting racism. Another scholar specifically

highlights “the destructive tendencies of Burmese Buddhist national-

ism” as a fundamental cause for religious intolerance and conflicts

(Walton 2013).

In addition to a shift in political opportunity, historical path

dependency, human agency, and sociological arguments that attempt

to explain the recent anti-Muslim violence, there is research that

378 social research

highlights structural causes such as Buddhists’ demographic siege

mentality (Kyaw San Wai 2014), and communication technology and

social media (Freedom House 2013).

Although I acknowledge the importance of each of the afore-

mentioned factors, the specific question “why now” draws my atten-

tion to a particular cause: the agency factor. The question of “why

now” calls attention to the fact that the current anti-Muslim violence

is distinct from that of the past. It also challenges notions of historical

continuity, opportunity shift, institutional failure, structural under-

pinning, and sociological/cultural explanations as necessary but not

sufficient factors of the onset of the violence. Therefore, the puzzle of

this paper, which is why anti-Muslim violence takes place in Burma

now and with what costs, entails a thorough examination of how the

current anti-Muslim violence is different from previous riots in terms

of pattern, nature, level, frequency, and impact.

ArguMeNTs Distinct Conflict

Prior to 2012, conflicts in Burma, no matter whether they were spon-

taneous outbreaks or plotted by the military junta, followed a similar

pattern. A random incident or flashpoint, such as an alleged rape or a

crime or a perceived insult perpetuated by Muslims, which was filtered

through rumor mill, triggered disproportionate revenge against the

entire Muslim community. The destructions of mostly Muslim lives,

properties, mosques, and businesses ensued. Lax security enforce-

ment helped to intensify human and material costs (Karen Human

Rights Group 2002; International Crisis Group 2014; Fisher 2013). The

conflicts tended to be one-time events, though violence often spread

from one geographical area to another during a particular short period

of time. These events occasionally recurred, but the clashes were never

sustained over time as a series of organized campaign.

This pattern, however, has now carried a new variable, which

is undeterred propagation of hate speech coupled with clear politi-

cal coordination. Unlike under previous regimes, where anti-Muslim

Anti-Muslim Violence in Burma: Why Now? 379

hate speech was either word-of-mouth propaganda manufactured by

military intelligence officers or underground publications, people

can now hear vitriolic attacks against Muslims in religious sermons

from the intrusive loudspeakers of local monasteries or donation sta-

tions. People encounter hate speech in books and handouts, watch it

on DVDs that are conveniently available from sellers at almost every

traffic junctions, and on social media. Some elements in the local me-

dia and political parties have been active in promoting anti-Muslim

sentiment. For instance, a powerful Arakan ethnic party, the Rakhine

Nationalities Development Party (RNDP), wrote in its news bulletin

that some inhumane actions, such as the Holocaust or the nuclear at-

tacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, could be justified by imperatives of

racial survival and national sovereignty (Stoakes 2013). Instead of tak-

ing legal measures against hate speech and identifiable hatemongers,

the government appears to feed it fuel.

Reports in the state media treated the rape and murder of a

local woman in Arakan state on May 28, 2012, not as a criminal case

but as a racial crime, highlighting the identity of the victim as an

Arakan Buddhist girl and of the alleged perpetrators as Muslims. The

reports even used the racial epithet kalar, a derogatory term for Mus-

lims, when referring to the victims, though a correction (not an apol-

ogy) was issued the following day. On June 3, 10 Muslims were killed

in the same region in an apparent retaliation for the murder of the

Buddhist girl. While the violence raged in Arakan state, with riots

and burnings by mobs on both sides, the director of President Thein

Sein’s office and a graduate of the elite Defense Services Academy,

Zaw Htay (aka Hmuu Zaw), posted his view of the violence in Arakan

state on Facebook:

It is heard that Rohingya Terrorists of the so-called Rohing-

ya Solidarity Organization [formerly a part of the ARNO]

are crossing the border and getting into the country with

the weapons. That is Rohingyas from other countries are

coming into the country. Since our Military has got the

380 social research

news in advance, we will eradicate them until the end! I

believe we are already doing it. We don’t want to hear any

humanitarian issues or human rights from others. Besides,

we neither want to hear any talk of justice nor want any-

one to teach us like a saint” (Allchin 2012).

When Time magazine ran a cover story in June 2013 about U Wirathu,

a Buddhist monk well known among anti-Muslim hate-mongers

as “The Face of Buddhist Terror,” President Thein Sein condemned

the story and banned distribution of that particular issue of Time in

Burma. In his public statement, the president even praised the 969

movement, a radical Buddhist movement led by Wirathu, as “peace-

ful” and defended Wirathu as the “son of Lord Buddha.” Moreover, in

Wirathu’s vitriolic protest against the United Nations for the organi-

zation’s support for Rohingya citizenship, he called UN Special Envoy

Yanghee Lee a “bitch” and “whore,” and said she should have sex with

the Muslim Rohingya minority if she liked them so much. Despite

senior UN officials urging the government to censure Wirathu,

authorities said there were no plans to act against the monk (Thein

Lei Win and Andrew Marshall 2015).

Such hate speech is not merely inconsequential outbursts.

They are well thought out and planned “frames,” tolerated or even

encouraged by the government, which identify threats posed by

Muslims, propose solutions, and call for strategic/tactical collective

action. On September 25–26, 2012, some 2,000 people throughout

Arakan state gathered in the largest public meeting in Arakan mod-

ern history since Burmese independence in 1948. The participants,

representatives of 17 townships in Arakan state and some representa-

tives of political and social organizations, not only propagated anti-

Muslim hate speech but called for the formation of people’s militias,

reclamation of land from Muslim communities, and unified opposi-

tion against the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) opening

an office anywhere in Arakan state. Neither local nor central gov-

ernment intervened in this action-oriented hate speech. Unsurpris-

Anti-Muslim Violence in Burma: Why Now? 381

ingly, coordinated attacks against Muslims—not only Rohingyas but

also Kamman Muslims, who are recognized as one of the “135 ethnic

groups” in Burma—occurred almost simultaneously within weeks in

nine townships throughout Arakan state and continued unimpeded

for several days.

Several campaigns continue to call for a boycott of Muslim busi-

nesses, including the foreign telecom giant Ooredoo; disrupt Muslim

or Muslim-sympathetic speakers in public lecture events; threaten

boycott against the 2014 census (the boycott didn’t happen because

the government conceded to Buddhist nationalist demand of denying

Rohingya identity in the census rail against the UN and international

aid agencies); demonstrate how hate speech in Burma set political

agendas; and coordinate on-the-ground actions. One striking example

is that the hatemongers have targeted democracy dissidents as pro-

Muslim advocates. Wirathu, for example, branded the peacock of the

NLD (a symbol in the party’s flag) as a mutdoan (meaning a Muslim pea-

cock) rather than a fighting peacock because the NLD party is now full

of Muslims (Wirathu YouTube 2013). A powerful group of nationalist

Buddhist monks known as the Association of Protection of Race and

Religion (Ma-Ba-Tha) issued a statement in late May 2014 calling some

97 Burmese civil society groups “traitors” because they object to the in-

terfaith marriage bill that the monks have put forth. Wimala Buddhi,

another known radical monk from Moulmein’s Mya Sadi monastery,

told the monk meeting in Rangoon: “I would want to know which rep-

resentatives (MPs) turn down the national race protection law when it

is proposed [in parliament]—I will make it so that they get no votes in

2015. A party that doesn’t win votes will end up going down the drain”

(Hindstrom 2013).

These politically targeted hate speeches are consequential. Af-

ter thousands of monks attended meetings held in Rangoon in 2013

and Mandalay in 2014, some leading monks of the Ma-Ba-Tha move-

ment indicated that they would not support amending Article 59 (f ),

fearing it might make Burma vulnerable to the threat of a Muslim

or other non-Buddhist president in near future. Article 59 (f ) of the

382 social research

military-drafted constitution states that the president or vice pres-

ident cannot have a spouse or children who are foreign nationals.

Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters called for amending the article

since they won the by-election in 2012. Suu Kyi had two sons with

her late husband, Michael Aris; both are British citizens. Of course,

the monks urged their followers to vote for Thein Sein instead of Suu

Kyi, since they view her as too weak in her defense of nationalism

and Buddhism. In the aftermath of the 2014 Buddhist clergy confer-

ence in Mandalay, Suu Kyi was shocked to learn that radical monks

had spearheaded a campaign against her effort to amend 59 (f ). In

working with the 88 Generation Group to strategize a public petition

campaign for constitutional reform, Suu Kyi agreed to drop 59 (f ) as a

campaign demand and instead called for amending the amendment

clause, Article 436, as a rallying ground for the opposition’s petition

campaign.1 The political effects of hate speech and related coordi-

nated actions were weightier than ever before.

In short, the pattern of violence has changed when we con-

sider hate speech accompanied by political coordination as a new

phenomenon, and especially that the proliferation of hate speech has

not been stopped or even challenged by the government or the main-

stream opposition. The nature of this new anti-Muslim activity differs

significantly from previous violence, first of all in its organization,

which is so powerful and systematic that it poses a serious challenge

to the established State Supreme Sangha Council, which is the state-

appointed body of high-ranking Buddhist monks founded in 1980 and

has overseen and regulated the Sangha (Buddhist clergy) in Burma.

Two new religious groups have emerged in the aftermath

of political transition in 2011. The 969 Movement—named for the

nine qualities of Buddha, the six qualities of Buddha’s teaching, and

the nine qualities of monastic community—became active in 2012

and is led by Wirathu. The broader and more organized Ma-Ba-Tha

was founded in June 2013 and now has over 200 township branch-

es throughout the country. It has adopted a narrow agenda closely

aligned with that of the 969 group, meaning the imposition of a ma-

Anti-Muslim Violence in Burma: Why Now? 383

jority Burman ethnic and Buddhist-centric state. It is highly unusual

that the government not only tolerates the activities of these two

groups but also promotes them, despite the law and decree of 1980

and 1990, respectively, which ban any independent Buddhist monk

organizations other than the nine sects approved by the state-con-

trolled State Supreme Sangha Council. But in the second week of May

2014, the Clergy Council for the first time in its history acknowledged

another organization, the newly founded Ma-Ba-Tha, and pledged its

cooperation. The minister of religious affairs apparently facilitated a

meeting between Sangha Council and Ma-Ba-Tha.

Not all of the nearly half a million monks identify totally with

these groups, but a large number of them are likely to support anti-

Muslim agendas. Wirathu in fact derided protests of civil society ac-

tors, saying that membership in these civil society groups is not even

as large as audience attending the public lecture he was giving at the

time. Ma-Ba-Tha groups in different regions of the country have re-

leased a series of statements condemning popular media outlets such

as The Voice daily newspaper and Messenger weekly journal, as well as

influential activist groups, including the 88 Generation (Peace and

Open Society)2, as “traitors,” “opportunists,” or “reactionary” because

they are either critical of Ma-Ba-Tha–sponsored laws or provide a plat-

form to those who criticize them. The organizational structure of the

radical Buddhist movement is very effective in coordinating between

different regions, and between online and offline. Wirathu even gives

media training to monks and lay supporters on how to use Facebook

and other social networks to propagate Ma-Ba-Tha agendas.

Another distinctive nature of the anti-Muslim campaign is its

resourcefulness. According to sources I spoke with, senior officials

in the government have informally encouraged chief ministers of

regions and states to approach and support local Ma-Ba-Tha monks

by building “Sayar-Dagar-Setsanye” (a patron-supporter relationship)

between Buddhist monasteries and regional administrative leaders.

The respective administration provides all necessary assistance to the

monasteries. This practice derives from instruction in the military

384 social research

to establish Sayar-Dagar-Setsanye between Buddhist monasteries and

battalions in their respective areas to co-opt the clergy. According to

several interviews I conducted with business cronies, the government

asks them to assist Ma-Ba-Tha monks with lavish donations. In ad-

dition to the aforementioned bribery, permission granted to radical

monks to give religious sermons and collect donations is one impor-

tant way the government funds the radical Buddhist movement.

Moreover, the ongoing anti-Muslim violence is distinct from

previous riots not only because of its sheer destructiveness but also

because it articulates and carries out its objective effectively. The ear-

lier riots intended to inflict physical violence on their Muslim target

either to satisfy a sadistic vendetta against Muslims for their alleged

insults and crimes or to help the junta’s agenda to divert people’s at-

tention away from political and economic crises. They were transac-

tional in nature. The violence in recent years not only carries physical

destruction but also succeeds to a considerable extent in changing

norms, practices, and the very lifestyle of society at large. The Ma-

Ba-Tha monks group, for instance, presented to the President Thein

Sein more than 1.3 million signatures collected in support of four

laws intended to safeguard race and the Buddhist religion. In March

2014, the administration and attorney general’s office accepted the

monks’ proposals and conceded to draft four laws that will restrict re-

ligious conversions, ban interfaith marriage, population control (that

is, Muslim reproduction), and outlaw polygamy. The government sub-

mitted the legislative package, which is known as the “protection

of race and religion laws,” to Burma’s legislature in November 2014.

In March 2015, the Lower House passed the Population Control bill,

which aims to establish government control over women’s reproduc-

tive rights, and the Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage bill, which

would require Buddhist women to seek permission from local author-

ities before marrying a man of another faith. In February, the Upper

House voted in favor of the Population Control bill and the Religious

Conversion bill.3

Anti-Muslim Violence in Burma: Why Now? 385

In 2014, the Ma-Ba-Tha monks successfully campaigned to

force the government to deny the Rohingya minority to register their

ethnic identity in the first national census in three decades, which

was sponsored by the United Nations Population Fund.4 In early 2015,

the government also conceded to their demand over disenfranchising

over 1 million people, largely Rohingya and other minority groups,

by revoking their temporary registration certificates, known as white

cards.5 Though the parliament voted to grant white card-holders

rights to vote in a possible constitutional referendum by acknowl-

edging the rights the card-holders always had enjoyed in previous

elections even under one-party rule, the government announced it

would revoke the white cards in responding to anti-white card pro-

tests organized by Ma-Ba-Tha nationalists. The new round of anti-Mus-

lim violence, therefore, has the political leverage to reshape Burmese

society. In short, the nature of recent violence is transformational.

The level of atrocity in recent anti-Muslim violence has never

been seen before in Burma’s history of communal conflicts. Experts

warn that if left unchecked, this kind of violence with widespread im-

punity for most perpetrators and inaction or acquiescence to by the

government would lead to massive atrocities—including genocide

(PHR 2014; Simon-Skiodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide 2015).

This new campaign of anti-Muslim violence has been sustained for over

two years now without any marked lapse. Depending on the method

of quantification, the frequency of clashes varies. I documented 16 epi-

sodes of anti-Muslim violence, from June 2012 to June 2014, where “ep-

isode” means a group of incidents occurring as a part of a continuous

time sequence. If the count is based on incident rather than episode,

the number increases dramatically. Alternatively, if the count is mea-

sured in terms of location, the frequency of violence is also revealed as

being higher than it would otherwise appear. In one estimate, for in-

stance, attacks occurred in 18 townships across 3 states and 4 divisions

between March and August of 2013 (O’Connor 2014). In my measure-

ment, there were 10 episodes in the same period.

386 social research

In addition to loss of life, physical destruction, and political

impact, the current anti-Muslim violence has had a profound effect

in terms of creating societal divisiveness and distrust between dif-

ferent communities in this multiethnic and multireligious country.

Ethnic minority groups, for instance, showed a grave concern regard-

ing the bills of protection of race and religion because many of them

are Christians. One of the women activists the monks singled out in

their condemnation is a member of parliament and ethnic Kachin

Christian. Calling her a “traitor” could be a bitter reminder to her

constituents of the origin of the Kachin ethnic rebellion of 1961. The

Kachin, who live in the northeastern part of Burma bordering with

China, took up arms to fight against inequality and discrimination,

including the Burmese government’s attempt to make Buddhism the

state religion. The resistance movement is still in full swing in north-

ern Burma, and the split is likely to exacerbate violence not only in

central Burma but also in ethnic minority regions. Dr. Lian Sakhong,

a Chin ethnic leader, also spoke bluntly to Burmese audience at the

7 Days Weekly journal’s anniversary event, saying that if Burma’s Bud-

dhists assert that the union is only for them, the country would never

be stable or free of wars and violence.

Thus, the distinctiveness of the current violence can be appre-

ciated in terms of its unprecedented pattern, nature, level, frequency

and impact. If the violence is significantly different from previous

riots, it entails the question: Why now?

Why Now?

Before we discuss the question of why now, we should clarify what we

mean by a “behind-the-scenes” explanation of the current violence.

Apart from some foreign observers such as the International Crisis

Group, most people, including President Thein and House Speaker

Shwe Mann, presume that there must be some organized forces

behind the scenes. Based on the level of sophisticated coordination

and effectiveness, some cabinet ministers, including San Sint, the

currently imprisoned minister of religious affairs, and many former

Anti-Muslim Violence in Burma: Why Now? 387

intelligence officers have told me that it is hard to imagine that most

acts of recent violence took place spontaneously.6 A behind-the-scenes

explanation, however, does not mean that a mastermind plans the

microdetails. Every dynamic collective action grows into unantici-

pated sidetracks and confusions, but with a behind-the-scenes expla-

nation, the overall agenda does not go wrong.

The government has thus far failed to investigate and take ac-

tion against the real forces acting behind the scenes, and it is dif-

ficult for an independent researcher to establish hard evidence as to

who or what those forces are. Since politics is all about “who gets

what, when, and how,” it would be naive not to think in terms of win-

ners and losers. Many investigative reports, including Voice Weekly’s

cover story “Finding Behind the Crowd” (July 2014), highlight tactics

used by perpetrators that are strikingly similar to those employed by

the previous junta: bringing “outsider” mobs to the scene to inflict

violence and retreat systematically, leaving local people to continue

looting and venting their outrage. This tactic and others remind ob-

servers of the plainclothes civilian militias, such as Swan Arr Shin

(Maters of Force), which was formed under the previous junta, to stir

up violence in local communities. According to several former intelli-

gence officers I interviewed, the regime’s hardliners, including Aung

Thaung, organized the Swan Arr Shin, and their business cronies sup-

plied resources for managing the violence. Aung Thaung’s assets were

frozen by the US Department of the Treasury in October 2014 for his

role in “perpetuating violence, oppression, and corruption” in Burma

(US Department of the Treasury 2014). When I interviewed him, he

rejected the allegation and challenged me to present him with evi-

dence.7 Several media news reports unanimously agreed that in many

of recent violence episodes, police inaction—and even orders not to

intervene, for instance until well into the second day of violence in

Meiktila—indicate that some high-level elements in the authority are

involved in those episodes of violence.

I would argue that not only “hardliners” but also “reformists”

of the transitional regime are complicit in ongoing communal vio-

388 social research

lence. Though President Thein Sein might not be responsible for or-

ganizing the movement, his office’s involvement cannot be ruled out.

In the aftermath of religious violence in June 2012, the 57-member

Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) signed a memorandum of

understanding with the Burmese government on August 11 to open

liaison offices for humanitarian purposes in Rangoon and Sittwe.

The OIC said that it intends to distribute humanitarian aid to victims

from both the Arakanese Buddhist and Muslim Rohingya communi-

ties without discrimination. In September, when Arakan nationalists

protested against the presence of the OIC in their state, the govern-

ment was at a loss until it managed to figure out how to take advan-

tage out of the protests for their political popularity. According to

sources I spoke to, the president’s office encouraged radical monks

in Mandalay to stage similar protests in major cities and organize a

national movement against the OIC so that the government could

cite “the desire of people” and justify its decision to renege on the

memorandum of understanding with the OIC and cancel its mission.

Thein Sein is in regular contact with the nationalist movement, in-

cluding Ashin Wirathu, via the chief minister of Mandalay region.8 As

noted above, the government instructed regional chiefs to approach

and support local Ma-Ba-Tha monks in building Sayar-Dagar-Setsanye

(patron-supporter relationships) and provide all necessary assistance

to the monasteries. Local businessmen were also mobilized to provide

support for the radical monks. The president’s office, according to

interviews I conducted, also mobilized the Myanmar Veterans’ Orga-

nization, since the senior veterans are now patrons of monasteries in

several cities and towns.9 The public stance of Thein Sein’s reformist

government is that it is at the forefront of the movement to legislate

discriminatory laws such as those prohibiting interfaith marriage and

allowing (or even fueling) rampant anti-Muslim hate speech. Thus,

the question is why, and why now.

Anti-Muslim action escalated in the aftermath of the 2012 by-

elections, which saw the National League for Democracy, led by Aung

San Suu Kyi, win 43 of the 44 seats the party contested (out of 46).

Anti-Muslim Violence in Burma: Why Now? 389

These victories pushed the hardliners of the ruling party and the mili-

tary toward greater political polarization, while the opposition sought

to institutionalize the memory of past political divisions, employing

a “good versus evil” political narrative. The opposition, of course,

gained from the public’s distrust and hatred of the previous junta,

which still poisons public opinion of the current pseudo-civilian gov-

ernment. However, using history as a campaign instrument has only

encouraged both hardline and moderate forces within the establish-

ment to defend themselves, using “biology” in campaigns advocating

racial and religious purity. The country is sliding into a history ver-

sus biology political battle. Hla Swe, an outspoken member of parlia-

ment from the ruling party, even publicly criticized the package of

national race protection bills as a political weapon to maximize votes

in the 2015 elections rather than promoting nationalism. In a post

on Facebook on January 2, 2015, Hla Swe called for an investigation

of Ma-Ba-Tha for its role in inciting religious conflicts and splitting

the monastic order. He even jokingly named Aung Thaung, a senior

leader of his own party, in his post: “Don’t get mad at me for making

this comment, (Ko) Aung Thaung” (Hla Swe 2015). Hopes for a gain

in the upcoming elections and a strengthened constituency based on

Burman-Buddhist parochialism have tempted both hardliners and so-

called reformists toward taking advantage of anti-Muslim conflicts.

The Costs and Direction of Anti-Muslim Violence

In the short and medium term, the increased anti-Muslim violence

and impunity could lead to massive atrocities. However, the long-

run trend is not so bleak. The religious riots in Mandalay in July 2014

failed to sustain and spread to other places, and were exposed as an

orchestrated effort by Wirathu’s group with the cooperation of some

elements in authority. As a result, the violent movement has been

highly discredited in the local media and in public perception.

Meanwhile, societal pushback is gaining momentum. Civil so-

ciety actors and increasing numbers of educated people in the cities

are not happy with political agenda of the radical Buddhist move-

390 social research

ment and its accompanying violence (International Republican In-

stitute 2014).10 Many have questioned the legitimacy of Theravada

monks interfering in secular affairs—an unprecedented turn of

events in the millennium-long relationship between Burmese society

and its monastic order. Burmese history has long witnessed conflicts

between the state and Buddhist monks, including anticolonial rule in

the 1920s and an antimilitary regime in from the 1980s through the

late 2000s. There were several splits between different sects of the

order of Buddhist monks over the nature of monastic discipline that

have taken place in Burma’s history. Some intra-order disputes—for

example, a controversy over whether a monk should wear his robe

with both shoulders covered or with the right shoulder uncovered—

lasted more than a century.

Unprecedented, however, is the opposition of large numbers

of lay adherents to the monks at a broad societal or national level

for ideological and political reasons. The Burmese traditionally have

great respect for the monastic order; scholars note that there is prob-

ably no other clergy in the world as honored and respected as are

the Buddhist monks of Burma (Spiro 1970, 396). No doubt there have

been debates over whether or not the monks should engage in poli-

tics in modern history. During the struggle against British colonial

rule in the early twentieth century, the practice of nationalist monks

policing women not to dress in Western fashions was accepted and

never escalated to societal conflict. Public intellectuals and writers

have also raised sharp criticism against monks’ violation of monastic

rules, but these critiques were not political in nature. The Burmese

were taught to pay homage to the virtue of robe or the wisdom of

Buddha rather than to the individual, physical monk in their pres-

ence, even if adherents entertained doubts and ambivalence when

they saw corrupt and immoral monks.

The taboo has been shattered. Treating a class of males in robes

as though they were demigods is now questioned. As a part of series

of protests, 180 civil society organizations from diverse ethnic and

religious backgrounds publicly released a statement in January 2015

Anti-Muslim Violence in Burma: Why Now? 391

calling for four discriminatory bills submitted to the parliament be

dropped because their enactment could “destroy the stability of Bur-

mese society” by “inciting hatred, discrimination, conflict and ten-

sion within diverse religious communities, and also communities of

a single religion” (Roebuck 2015). This was the second major push-

back from civil society players. When the president endorsed the pro-

posed bills in early 2014, some 97 Burmese civil society groups led by

well-known women activists and ethnic minority figures had already

strongly protested against the bills. Ma-Ba-Tha denounced these NGOs

as “traitors.” Instead of bowing to a bigoted threat, more civil society

groups joined in their opposition against the bills in early 2015.

Profile messages and posts on Facebook among Burmese users

exploded: “Count me in, I am a traitor too.” One profile says, “This

account user is a traitor to the nation because s/he protests against

the interfaith marriage bill.” Not only online protests but also criti-

cal articles in some of the largest dailies illustrate that such resis-

tance against the monks’ initiative is a force to be reckoned with.

Media reports and op-ed articles criticized the Ma-Ba-Tha monks and

pointed out a hidden political agenda. They questioned why radical

monk groups are silent over the crackdown on Buddhist monks who

protested against a Chinese copper mine in late 2012, and over the

deepening poverty that has driven thousands of Burmese girls into

neighboring countries, where considerable numbers ended up in the

sex industry. In short, the media alleged that Buddhist groups were

a political tool of the military to undermine Aung San Suu Kyi’s elec-

toral victory in 2015.

Another high-profile relevant case is the trial of Htin Lin Oo, a

well-known writer and NLD information officer who is facing charges

of “insulting religion” under Section 295 (a) and “wounding religious

feelings” under Section 298 of Burma’s penal code, which imposes

punishments of up to two years and one year of imprisonment respec-

tively. He was arrested for a speech he made on October 23, 2014, dur-

ing which he criticized the use of Buddhism as a tool for extremism

and nationalism. He was denied bail. Moreover, when he was brought

392 social research

to the court, a crowd of Ma-Ba-Tha monks and their supporters gath-

ered outside and shouted “put him in jail.” The crowd intimidated

a group of journalists reporting on the case. In order to counter the

Ma-Ba-Tha monks, Venerable Abbot Myawaddy Mingyi Sayadaw from

Mandalay attended the court in Sagaing Region and challenged the

nationalist monks for their violations of monastic ethics. Video clips

of the abbot questioning the monks and defending Htin Lin Oo are

widely circulated among Burmese social media users.

The emerging split in the relationship between society and the

monastic order is a progressive move toward a modern nationhood,

setting boundaries that prevent established traditional elites from in-

terfering in citizen’s political and social lives. Burma, therefore, is

experiencing a dual transition: a political transition as well as a pro-

found social transformation.

Rejection of extremism, however, does not mean that the coun-

termovement embraces Western-styled wholesale secularism. Religi-

osity (indeed spirituality in general) continues to upsurge in this ill-

fated country, but the monastic order will be constantly challenged

to adjust to the aspirations of a modern multination Burmese state

that allows for individual freedom of choice. Asked about why she so

often addresses religion in her political speeches, Aung San Suu Kyi

responded, “Because politics is about people, and you can’t separate

people from their spiritual values” (Aung San Suu Kyi 2008, 39). This

appears to echo the views of the majority in this highly devoted Bud-

dhist country. Politics would continue to be informed by Buddhist

spiritual values such as metta, loving-kindness.

In a practical sense, some prominent figures in this counter-

movement refuse to acknowledge the Rohingya, which is one of the

most persecuted minority groups in the world, as an ethnic group.

While any democratization process entails defining the demos, those

who constitute the citizenry of the country, a modern nation-building

process also requires societal effort to rein in excessive power greed

of the elites such as the church and men on horseback. The long-term

effect of the countermovement could fulfill this societal task.

Anti-Muslim Violence in Burma: Why Now? 393

CoNClusioN This paper posits three related arguments to address the question

of anti-Muslim violence in Burma. First, the current anti-Muslim

violence is distinct from those riots under previous regimes in terms

of its pattern, nature, level, frequency and impact. If the violence is

significantly different from previous riots, it entails the question of

why now. In the second argument, this paper notes that the country

is sliding into a history-versus-biology political battle, especially in

the context of 2015 elections. As a response to this battle, both hard-

liners and so-called reformists find incentives in being complicit in

the anti-Muslim conflicts. Third, this paper observes the emergence

of contentious society-Monastic Order relation, and views this as a

progressive move toward a modern nationhood that sets boundaries

for established traditional elites not to mess up with citizen’s political

and social lives. It argues that Burma is experiencing a dual transition:

political transition as well as a profound social transformation.

Since nature of the research question is current, and sensitive,

and method of collecting data is entirely based on interviews and

media reporting, the research is less definitive but more exploratory.

Since this is one of the significant research questions to investigate,

I would argue that limited nature of data collection should not cause

us to abandon our research works. I have modestly attempted what I

could conduct within the limits. Other researchers should attempt to

advance knowledge on this critical question with more accurate meth-

ods such as survey and better archive data. Burma scholars should

also conduct more comparative research across cases to address this

question of religious conflicts in context of transitional countries.

NoTes

1. Author’s interviews with senior 88 Generation Group leaders and

NLD officials in June 2014.

2. Student leaders who had led 1988 pro-democracy uprising and spent

up to 20 years in prisons for their political activities organized the

group in 2005 to advocate for national reconciliation and peace.

394 social research

3. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/lower-house-approves-two-race-

and-religion-bills.html

4. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26807239

5. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/17/us-myanmar-rohingya-

idUSKBN0LL05320150217

6. Author’s interviews with Minister San Sint in October and November

2013. Also author’s interviews with Gen. Khin Nyunt in November

and January 2013 and August 2014.

7. Author’s interview with Aung Thaung in October 2013.

8. Author’s interviews with senior leaders of government and parlia-

ment in March and August 2014. During the OIC protests in Mandalay,

a senior staff member of the Mandalay chief minister’s office told

one of my sources, “The situation is under control” when the source

asked the chief if the protests were likely to go chaotic.

9. Author’s interviews with senior leaders of government and parlia-

ment in March and August 2014.

10. Author’s interviews with civil society organizations, university

students and young professionals in Rangoon, and Mandalay during

August and November 2014 confirmed this finding.

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