see description

JiangJingwen

26 K. Zhang

policy. Diaspora politics and transnational business networks have the potential to affect Canada-China relations in ways that generally are not well understood. At the same time, a sizable number of Canadians have moved to live in Greater China.4 The push and pull factors of these Canadians living abroad, who number roughly 600,000 in Asia and about 2.8 million globally,5 are not well understood either, but can have a profound impact on the exchange and development of human capital, as well as on research, development, innovation, business, citizenship, consular ser- vices, public finance, healthcare, social security and border security.

This paper provides an overview of the multi-stream flows of people between China and Canada and illustrates how Chinese communities in Canada have been reshaped as a result. At the same time, it also discusses the growing Canadian dias- pora in China. Looking through the lens of the human capital exchange, this study will examine some of the key policy implications of this migration in the shaping of Canada-China relations this century.

3.2 Emerging Trends

3.2.1 Increasing Flows of People from China to Canada

Under Canada’s current visa provisions, Chinese nationals may come to Canada either as permanent immigrants or temporary residents/visitors. Although the two groups are mutually exclusive at the time they first enter Canada, the two categories often become blurred later on, as some of the temporary entrants switch to become permanent residents.

Immigrants

Historically, Chinese immigration to Canada dates to 1788 when the first Chinese settled in Canada.6 But their number declined precipitously under the Chinese Im- migration Act of 1923, also known as the Chinese Exclusion Act, which prohibited Chinese citizens from immigrating to Canada. In this way, the Chinese were the only ethnic group discriminated against in Canadian history. It was not until 1947 that Canada repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act. And it took another twenty years after that—with the adoption of a points system—that the Chinese were admitted under the same criteria used to accept international applicants from all nations.7

4 Greater China in this context refers only to mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. China is referred to the People’s Republic of China or mainland China. China and PRC are used interchangeably in the rest of paper. 5 APF Canada 2011. 6 CBC News Online, June 10, 2004. 7 UBC Library, Online; Lee 1984; CCNC Toronto, Online; Li 1998, 2005.

273 Flows of People and the Canada-China Relationship in the 21st Century

It was not until the 1980s, however, that the number of Chinese immigrants to Canada started to grow significantly. Since 1989, the number of new immigrants each year from the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has nearly tripled, growing from less than 10,000 a year to a peak of over 40,000 in 2005. That pace slowed to 30,000 a year from 2006–2011, but overall, the PRC has been the top source country of immigrants to Canada between 1998 and 2009 and is currently the third- largest source country of immigrants to Canada overall (see Table 3.1).8

In the first decade of the twenty first century, Canada welcomed nearly 2.5 million immigrants from around the world. During this period China was the leading source country, with 337,317 immigrants or 14 percent of the total, followed by India with11 % and the Philippines with 8 percent.9

Since 2002, Canada’s immigration program has been based on regulations under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). The IRPA defines three basic categories of permanent residents: reuniting families, contributing to economic de- velopment and protecting refugees.10 Each of the categories corresponds to major program objectives.

International Students

The number of Chinese students coming to Canada has grown significantly from just a few hundred a year in the mid-1990s to close to 10,000 a year in the early 2000s. By December 2010, 56,906 Chinese students were studying in Canada, up from just a couple of thousand in the mid-1990s.11 Today Chinese students make up 19 percent of Canada’s annual intake of international students, up from 10 percent in 2000, making China the largest source of international students in Canada. Cur- rently nearly one in four foreign students in Canada is from China.

Foreign Workers

Canada established the Temporary Foreign Worker (TFW) program in January 1973, which was initially targeted at specific groups such as academics, business executives and engineers—in other words, people with highly specialized skills that were not available in Canada.12 Historically, Canada has brought in temporary for- eign workers from countries ranging from the United States and the Philippines to France, Australia and the United Kingdom. China has not been on the list of major

8 CIC, various years. 9 CIC 2011a. 10 CIC 2011a. 11 CIC 2011a. 12 Nakache and Kinoshita 2010. In addition to the TFW program, there are other provisions includ- ing multilateral arrangement such as GATS and NAFTA, which allow foreign workers to enter Canada on a temporary basis.

28

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K. Zhang

29

source countries for a long time but their numbers have been rising steadily over the last decade, doubling from 1,166 to 2,393. This trend was driven not only by the needs of Canada’s labour market, but also due to the growing number of Chinese investments in Canada and an emerging group of Chinese expats who work for Chinese multinational corporations.13 The exact number of Chinese expatriates in Canada remains unknown, but the total stock of temporary workers from the PRC dramatically increased from 1,338 to 12,063 over the same decade, putting China in eighth place today. Temporary workers from China represent nearly four percent of the total number of foreign workers in Canada.

Tourists

Trips to Canada from the PRC grew at an average rate of 12.2 percent year-over-year between 2000 and 2011, rising from a total of 78,000 to 248,000. (The exception was in 2003, when the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome or SARS curtailed much international travel.) The Chinese tourism market holds tremendous growth potential for Canada’s economy under the Approved Destination Status (ADS). 14 Canada is now welcoming group tours from China along with business and individual travelers. In the first 12 months after China implemented ADS for Canada, or from June 2010 to May 2011, tourist arrivals from China increased by 25.8 percent on a year-over-year basis. Arrivals from China over the first 11 months of 2011 were 50 percent higher than the same pre-ADS period in 2009. China is currently the fourth biggest contributor of tourists in Canada, up from sixth place in 2010. 15

Transition from Temporary to Permanent Residents

Canada’s immigration system is shifting towards encouraging immigration by young, bilingual, highly skilled immigrants that can help the country replace its ag- ing labour force. In order to attract migrants with the right skills, Canada is opening its doors to more and more temporary workers. The federal government has granted exclusive eligibility to 29 different occupations under the federal skilled worker program and devolved responsibility for immigrant selection to the provinces.16 In 1998, the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) was introduced to give provinces a mechanism with which to respond to economic development needs at the local level. PNP has grown a great deal since then, and in 2010 represented 20 percent of

13 The Economist 2010a. 14 The ADS scheme is a bilateral tourism arrangement that facilitates travel by Chinese tour groups to other countries. The ADS was granted to Canada in June 2010 and the first flights from China to Canada started arriving in August 2010. To date, China has granted 135 countries and regions ADS. 15 CTC 2012. 16 Reitz 2011; Challinor 2011.

3 Flows of People and the Canada-China Relationship in the 21st Century

30

the total economic class of immigrants, up from 0.8 percent in 2001.17 In September 2008, Canada introduced a new Canadian Experience Class (CEC),18 which aims to make Canada more competitive in attracting and retaining individuals with the skills the country needs. A total of 6,462 immigrants were selected under the CEC designation during the first two years of the program, making up 1.9 percent of all economic related immigration during the same period.

These programs have paved the way for some immigrants initially classified as temporary to shift their status to permanent residents.19 From 2001 to 2010, Canada welcomed over 768,000 international students from around the world, of whom over 114,000 were from China (see Table 3.2). During the same period, more than 83,000 international students made the transition to permanent resident status and 14,000 Chinese students became permanent residents of Canada. The probability of making the leap to permanent resident during that time period was 11 percent for all interna- tional student groups and 12 percent for those from the PRC. The majority of 70 per- cent Chinese students succeeded to permanent residents were gone through the eco- nomic classes, including the skilled workers program (41 percent). Chinese students made up 58 percent of all CEC participants during the first two years of the program.

Similarly, the probability of Chinese temporary workers making the transition to permanent residents is also high. Of the 1.4 million foreign workers entering Canada between 2001 and 2010, 17,000 were from China. During the same period, of the 186,000 foreign workers who became permanent residents in Canada, more than 13,000 were from China. Indeed, nearly 79 percent of the temporary workers from China were granted permanent residency during that period, compared with just 13 percent for workers of other nationalities. And 90 percent of the Chinese workers who were admitted as permanent residents were gone through the economic classes, dominantly by the skilled workers program (36 percent). Finally, Chinese workers made up one-third of all the immigrants who entered Canada under the CEC program.

3.2.2 Changing the Direction of Mobility

While Canada competes in the global marketplace for immigrants, China is gradu- ally becoming a magnet for skilled and well-educated immigrants from around the world—especially those of Chinese origin who have degrees from Western uni- versities. Today the movement of people between Canada and China moves in two directions, a phenomenon also known as circulation. More and more Canadians (of both Chinese and non-Chinese origin) are going to China to visit, study, work, and live.

17 Challinor 2011. 18 The Canadian Experience Class is a new category of immigration for temporary foreign worker and foreign student graduates with professional, managerial and skilled work experience in Can- ada. Unlike other programs, the Canadian Experience Class allows an applicant’s experience in Canada to be considered a key selection factor when immigrating to Canada. (CIC 2008) 19 For more details about these programs, please refer to CIC 2010; CIC 2011b.

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31

Visiting China

China has become an appealing destination for Canadian tourists. In the first decade of the twenty first century, the number of Canadians visiting China grew by about 14 per- cent annually. In 2011, the total number of Canadian visits to China reached a histori- cal high of 300,000, up from just 107,000 in 2001. In the same period, Canadians have made over 2 million visits to China (see Fig. 3.1). China, among all destinations in Asia, accounts for the fastest growing number of visits from Canadian travelers.

Studying in China

The PRC has also become a major destination for international students over the last decade. In 2010, 265,090 international students from 194 countries and regions

3 Flows of People and the Canada-China Relationship in the 21st Century

Table 3.2  Transition from Temporary to Permane)nt Resident Status (2001–2010 Aggregated). (Source: CIC, RDM, Facts and Figs. 2010. Data request tracking number: RE-12.0382

Entry as foreign students Entry as temporary foreign workers From China From all

sources Share of chinese

From China From all sources

Share of Chinese

Total entries as temporary residents

114,275 76 8,218 15 17,480 1,425,330 1

Total transitions to permanent residents

14,240 83,674 17 13,845 186,635 7

Probability of transition

12 % 11 % 79 % 13 %

Immigration category

Economic immigrants

9,985 63,327 16 12,310 138,811 9

Skilled workers (PA)

5,770 29,989 19 4,980 47,257 11

Provincial/Territo- rial nominees (PA)

185 745 25 2,940 23,566 12

Canadian experi- ence class (PA)b

110 191 58 1,435 3,774 38

Other economic immigrantsa

3,875 32,315 12 2,885 64,214 4

Family class 3,665 17,298 21 1,470 46,186 3 Refugees and

others 605 3,049 20 55 1,638 3

Due to privacy considerations, the figures in this table have been subjected to random rounding. As a result of random rounding, data may not add up to the totals indicated. PA: principal applicants a Includes spouses and dependants. b Aggregate data from 2009 and 2010

32

were studying at 620 colleges and universities, research institutions and other edu- cation institutions in the PRC.20 In 2008–2009, the top five source countries were South Korea, U.S., Japan, Vietnam and Thailand. The exact number of Canadian students in China is unknown because China only provides figures for the top ten countries of origin, and Canada is not on that list. By some estimates, the number of Canadian students in China does not exceed 5,000, but that number is likely to increase for several reasons. For a start, China is actively promoting itself as a major destination for international students, and under a government scholarship program (CGSP) is increasing the funds it makes available to foreign students. In 2008, 13,516 international students, or six percent of all international students in China, received Chinese government scholarships, an increase of 33 percent year-over- year. In 2010, 22,390 or eight percent were granted Chinese government scholar- ship, up 23 percent over the previous year.21

China has surpassed Canada as one of the top destinations for international stu- dents. In 2001, the U.S. was the top destination of foreign students globally and attracted 28 percent of all international students studying overseas. At that time, both Canada and China were not among the top list. By 2012, the U.S. remained in the top position, but their share had shrunk to 19 percent and China had become the

20 CSC 2011. 21 Ibid.

Fig. 3.1  Visits by Canadians to China: 2001–2012. (Source: Statistics Canada, Travel by Canadi- ans to foreign countries, top 15 countries visited)

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33

third most popular destination with eight percent of all international students. By contrast, Canada attracted only five percent (see Fig. 3.2).

Working in China

Before the financial crisis struck in 2008, the Washington Post reported that a grow- ing number of the world’s emigrant population was heading East rather than West in search of better opportunities.22 And in the wake of the crisis, the “Go East” strategy to find work has gained a lot of credibility among Asians and non-Asians in North America and Europe. Quoted the Vancouver Sun, “If you’re in London you’re in the wrong place at the wrong time…You gotta move east.”23

China’s economy is one of the most robust in the world, and brighter job pros- pects are attracting many people to move to the mainland. While China has posted average economic growth rates of over 10 percent over the last decade, Canada’s economy has grown at an average of two percent a year over the same period.24

It is arguable that China is no longer a country that just exports immigrants. It has also become a magnet for professionals and students from around the world seek- ing better job opportunities and a good education. And it is evident that perceptions that Chinese immigrants to Canada who return home have “failed” in some way, is completely out of date. The changing direction of the flow of people between the two countries will become more obvious as China further develops policies and programs at the national, provincial and municipal government level that active- ly encourage Chinese citizens or foreigners with Chinese-origin that have trained

22 Washington Post Foreign Service, Oct. 21, 2007. 23 Vancouver Sun, July 7, 2009. For similar reports see New York Times, Aug. 11, 2009; World Journal, Sept. 20, 2009. 24 World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.

3 Flows of People and the Canada-China Relationship in the 21st Century

Fig. 3.2  Top Eight host countries of International students, 2001 and 2012. (Source: Atlas of Stu- dent Mobility, 2011, http://www.iie.org/projectatlas)

34

overseas to return to China. In 2004, for example, Beijing launched a “Green Card” system,—permanent resident permit, which allows qualified foreigners to work in China permanently.25 By the end of 2008, China announced a new strategy to attract talented workers under a variety of different programs, one of which, the Thousand Talents Program, calls 2,000 high-level overseas Chinese to return to China before 2018.26

According to recent Chinese statistics, total foreign residents who have stayed 6 months or longer in China amounted 20,000 in 1980, and jumped to 600,000 in 2011. By the end of 2011, total permanent resident permit holders reached 4,752, among whom, 1,735 are classified as high-level foreign specilists and their family members. In 2000, nearly 74,000 foreign workers in China held work permits, and the number incresed to 220,000 by the end of 2011. They are mainly staff of foreign- funded enterprises, foreign language teachers, foreign representatives in China.27

It is inevitable that some Canadian graduates will have to look for job oppor- tunities elsewhere, including teaching English or French as a second language (E/ FSL).28 Although the exact number and profile of Canadians working in China is statistically unavailable, recent press reports and studies by the Asia Pacific Foun- dation of Canada (APF Canada) have found that Canadians in China are mainly made up of three groups: employees of Canadian or multinational corporations; Canadian students and teachers; and Chinese-Canadians who return for business or other reasons.29

3.2.3 Focusing on Human Capital

By 2010, the number of permanent and temporary international migrants world- wide reached an estimated 215 million. Of those, a significant number were highly skilled people including university students, nurses, IT specialists, researchers, executives, managers, and intra-company transferees. In OECD countries alone, there are more than 20 million highly skilled immigrants in 2010.30 Nowadays, the highly skilled are more likely than the less skilled to move across national borders. Docquier and Rapoport (2005) have estimated that the worldwide average emigra- tion rates amounted to 1.1 percent for the low skilled, 1.8 percent for the medium skilled and 5.4 percent for the high skilled workers in 2000. Between 1990 and 2000 they estimated that the worldwide average rate of emigration of skilled and

25 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Public Security 2004. 26 Wang 2012 27 Xinhua News, April 25, 2012. 28 National Post, June 26, 2009. 29 APF Canada 2010. 30 The World Bank 2010; Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat 2005; University of Sussex 2007.

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35

medium-skilled workers had risen by 0.4 percentage points, against decrease of 0.1 percentage points for low-skilled workers.31

Today, the flow of people between China and Canada has become varied and complex, reflecting the changing economic and social circumstances of the two economies, the evolving relationship between Beijing and Ottawa, and priorities in immigration and visa policies in each country. China’s development strategy is undergoing major changes, shifting from low-end manufacturing towards greater investment in education, science and technology, and research and development. In line with the Chinese government’s objective to transform its economic growth model, the National Medium- and Long-term Talent Development Plan was devel- oped to create a highly skilled national workforce by 2020. Programs such as the Thousand Talents Program, will help China become one of the magnets attracting international talent including Canadians. Canada is changing too. The Canadian economy and its international competitiveness increasingly rely on the country’s capacity for innovation. The Canadian population is aging and immigration is in- creasingly becoming a major source of labour in the workforce growth. Shifts in Canada’s immigration policy have been made to attract top talent from around the world, allowing foreigners to study, visit, work and immigrate to Canada.

Many studies on immigration tend to look at the importance of immigrants in Canada through the lens of the labour market, especially the earnings of immigrants relative to their Canada-born counterparts. Reitz (2011), describes the problem of “brain waste” of immigrants in Canada, which costs Canada at least $3 billion a year, not to mention the ruined dreams of the immigrants themselves.32 Grubel and Grady (2012), however, point out that immigrants who arrived in Canada between 1987 and 2004 received about $6,000 more in government services per immigrant in 2005 than they paid in taxes. In other words, these immigrants impose a huge fis- cal burden on Canadian taxpayers of between $16 billion and $23 billion annually.33

In the contexts of human flows between China and Canada, Li (2011) examines the supply of human capital from China to Canada since the 1990s and discovers that Canada saved about $2.2 billion in education-related expenses by accepting im- migrations from China with university degrees between 1991 and 2000. Li further points out that the Canada’s gain in human capital from China is discounted because a university degree held by men and women born in the PRC is not regarded as highly as a degree held by other Canadians.34

There are also studies in China that shed light on the aspects of human capital provided by foreigners living in China. For example, according to a Chinese survey in 2008,35 the composition of foreign workers in China has undergone a number of changes. Unlike in the past, younger people outnumber retirees; top-level talent has replaced mid-level talent, and workers are staying longer. A more recent report

31 Docquier and Marfouk 2005. 32 Reitz 2011. 33 Grubel and Grady 2012. 34 Li 2011. 35 Xinhua News, Feb. 21, 2008.

3 Flows of People and the Canada-China Relationship in the 21st Century

36

suggests that most foreign workers in China are highly skilled.36 Over 92.3 per- cent have a university degree. The majority hold senior management positions and their ranks include senior technicians, administrators, representatives of foreign companies and so on. Higher salaries and lower taxes also attract skilled workers. On average, foreign workers can earn ¥380,000 (US $55,600) a year in Shanghai, nearly seventeen times the salary of local workers.

3.3 Re-Shaping Communities in the Diaspora

Accelerated globalization and international migration has reshaped diaspora com- munities in both Canada and China. The multi-stream flows are re-shaping the di- versity of Chinese communities in the same way as it does for the entire Canadian society. But the growing number of Canadians in China does not sit well with the national psyche in Canada, which tends to think of itself as a country of receiving immigrants, not a source country of migrant workers seeking livelihoods abroad. And given the importance of knowledge-based economies and competitiveness, these dynamics are having an impact on relations between Canada and China.

3.3.1 Diversified Chinese Communities

The Canadian Census (2006) reported that over 1.3 million people in Canada claim their ethnic origin as Chinese.37 This makes the Chinese community the eighth- largest ethnic group in Canada and the largest of Asian origin. However, the Chi- nese community in Canada has changed, is changing, and will continue to change in many ways that will ultimately have an impact on Canada-China relations.

There is no longer a homogenous Chinese community in Canada. Differences in demographic background, human capital endowment, and migration experi- ence have all contributed to the diversity of Canada’s Chinese communities. Peo- ple of Chinese ethnic origin are not necessarily newcomers to Canada. Some of them were born in Canada and their families may have lived in Canada for more than two generations. And within the Chinese community, Canada-born Chinese (CBC) has become a significant group. The 2006 Canadian Census reported that 27.4 percent of respondents who claimed they were ethnic Chinese were born in Canada. It also found that 14.3 percent were second generation and 2.3 percent were third generation or more, even if the majority, or 83.4 percent, were first-generation

36 China’s www.hr.com.cn, March 26, 2009. 37 Statistics Canada, 2006 Census data products. Ethnic origin refers to the ethnic or cultural origin of a respondent’s ancestors, as defined by the 2006 census. The 2006 census also reported 17,705 Taiwanese and 4,275 Tibetans. The 2011 census results related to this breakdown were not avail- able at the time this paper was revised.

K. Zhang

37

Canadians.38 In addition, 77 percent of the Chinese population holds Canadian citi- zenship only. Five percent possess both Canadian and at least one other citizenship, and another 18 percent had not yet become Canadian citizens.

Ethnic Chinese groups also may have achieved different levels of fluency in Canada’s two official languages. The census found that nearly 86 percent had some knowledge of English, French or both. Only 14 percent claimed they had no knowl- edge of English or French. Nearly one in five ethnic Chinese reported English or French as their mother tongue. Seventy-nine percent indicated neither English nor French was their mother tongue. One third reported they spoke English or French most often at home, with about 60 percent saying they spoke other languages most often at home. The number of respondents with a Chinese language as their mother tongue grew from less than 100,000 in 1971 to nearly 900,000 in 2001 and over 1 million in 2006. However, the respondents who reported a Chinese language as their mother tongue may actually speak different dialects. In the 2006 census, Chi- nese languages were broken down into seven major languages: Mandarin, Canton- ese, Hakka, Taiwanese, Chaochow (Teochow), Fukien and Shanghainese, as well as a residual category (Chinese languages not otherwise specified).

Chinese immigrants may also be admitted to Canada under three streams: an economic one, based on human capital facts; a kinship one, the “family reunifica- tion” program; and a humanitarian one, the refugee acceptance program. Currently, 73 percent of immigrants to Canada from the PRC are admitted as economic immi- grants, including skilled workers, professionals, investors and entrepreneurs. Nearly one in five immigrants from China is gaining entry as a relative of family members who already live in Canada. By contrast, only a small margin is being admitted to Canada on humanitarian grounds. Less than 30 years ago, immigrants from the PRC were mainly relatives of people who had already emigrated to Canada, or over 90 percent of the total (see Fig. 3.3). Recently, a growing number of international students and temporary workers from China to Canada have added to the diversity of local Chinese communities.

Chinese immigrants to Canada come from various source countries or regions. According to the 2006 census, nearly half of the Chinese immigrants arrived in Canada from the PRC (49 percent), and 23 percent come from Hong Kong. Oth- ers came from the Caribbean and Bermuda, the Philippines, India and other Asian countries. Ethnic Chinese are most visible in the provinces of British Columbia (10 percent), Ontario (5 percent) and Alberta (4 percent). In other parts of Canada, the odds of seeing a Chinese person are close to or less than one in a hundred. Chi- nese are concentrated in major cities such as Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal, and more recently, Calgary.

To sum up, the image of Chinese Canadians today is vastly different than it was in the last two centuries when Chinese immigrants were stereotyped as railway coo- lies, laundrymen and waiters. Hollywood exaggerated the stereotype with movies

38 Ibid. First generation refers to persons born outside of Canada. Second generation refers to per- sons born inside Canada with at least one parent born outside of Canada. Third generation refers to persons born inside Canada with both parents born inside Canada.

3 Flows of People and the Canada-China Relationship in the 21st Century

38

about opium dens, celestials in pig-tails with knives hidden up their silk sleeves, slant-eyed beauties with bound feet and ancient love potions.39 What the Chinese Canadian community looks like today is as diversified as Canadian society is as a whole.

3.3.2 Canadian Diaspora in China

Canadians historically have travelled widely and today an estimated 2.8 million Canadians live and work abroad.40 There have always been large numbers of Cana- dians living outside the country for extended periods, especially in the U.S. There are also many Canadian expatriates working for multinational companies and inter- national organizations around the world. More recently, there is evidence that many immigrants to Canada are returning to their countries of origin to pursue business and professional activities, especially in Greater China.41

39 Lee 1984, p. 178. 40 APF Canada 2011. 41 Zhang 2006, 2007.

Fig. 3.3  Chinese immigrants to Canada by category, 1980–2010. (Source: Wang and Lo, 2005; CIC, Facts and Figures, 2001, 2002, 2010) * Includes all residual categories

K. Zhang

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Migration takes place in two directions, and return migration occurs naturally. A recent study by the OECD found that depending on the country of destination and the time frame, 20 percent to 50 percent of immigrants return home or move to a third country within five years of their arrival in a new country.42 A recent report from Statistics Canada demonstrated that a significant number of male immigrants to Canada of working age, especially skilled workers and entrepreneurs, are highly mobile. This suggests that a substantial part of migration to Canada is temporary. The estimated out-migration rate 20 years after arrival is around 35 percent among young working age male immigrants. About six out of ten of those who leave do so within the first year of arrival, which suggests that many immigrants make their decisions within a relatively short period of time after arriving in Canada. Control- ling for other characteristics, out-migration rates are higher among immigrants from source countries/regions such as the U.S. and HKSAR.43

Despite these general observations, the return of Chinese Canadians to China is not well documented. As China increasingly becomes a global economic power- house and the biggest destination for foreign direct investment, more than 90 percent of the top 500 multinationals in the world have set up in China, and 30 percent of those have established regional headquarters there.44 Canadian businesses are in- creasingly involved in the China market, and there are growing numbers of native- born and naturalized Canadian executives, engineers and other professionals and specialists working in China.

The APF Canada (2011) study indicates that these groups have transnational characteristics—often moving back and forth between the two countries at different periods in their life, and having attachments on both sides of the Pacific for busi- ness, family, and social activities.

Transnational Parenting is not uncommon among young Chinese Canadian families. High child-care costs, the lack of family support in Canada and a volatile job market have forced some families to send their children back to China so that grandparents or other relatives can raise them. A study in 2002 of Chinese immi- grants in five prenatal programs found that 70 percent of the female respondents said they planned to send their children back to China to be raised by relatives.45

Transnational Schooling is also quite common. Many Chinese families who want their children to be bilingual and well-schooled in mathematics will send their children back to China for certain years of their education.

Transnational entrepreneurship plays a key role in connecting Canada and China. A report commissioned by the APF Canada in 2008, revealed that foreign- educated Chinese transnational entrepreneurs (CTEs) make up a distinct segment

42 Migration Policy Institute 2008. 43 Aydemir and Robinson 2006; DeVoretz 2010. 44 China Radio International, Sept. 28, 2007. 45 The Globe and Mail, Jan. 2, 2007.

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of the immigrant community. 46 Key characteristics distinguish them from classic middlemen traders, returnee entrepreneurs or those who have returned to their home countries permanently. Instead, the characteristics of Canada-based CTEs include a greater likelihood of having multinational experience; more established in their pro- fessions; more deeply entrenched in Canada and having a stronger desire to engage Canada in cross-border entrepreneurial endeavours. The same report also identified a variety of mechanisms used by transnational entrepreneurs to link Canada and China at the innovation level.

Transnational retirement allows senior Chinese Canadians to enjoy the plea- sure of two homes. Like many Canadian snowbirds in the U.S., these senior citizens are moving across the Pacific as the season changes.

Canadian ESL teachers are another significant group of Canadians in China. They are in high demand not only because of the importance of learning English as a second language, but also because Chinese students seem to prefer the English spoken in Canada to that in England, Australia or the U.S. The success story of Dashan has also helped raise the profile of Canada and the kind of English spoken there. Canadian communities in China also include students and groups that stay there for other reasons.

The growing body of Canadians (Canada-born or naturalized) living and work- ing in China and the HKSAR suggest that a Canadian diaspora is emerging. What policy area does the Canadian government need to develop is to recognize this dias- pora, maintain and enhance Canada’s international ties and maximize the benefits of those ties to Canada. The size and importance of Canada’s diaspora in China point to the need for Canada to revisit its foreign policy toward China.

3.3.3 Human Capital Content and Linkage

Li’s 2011 and earlier studies on China’s supply of human capital to Canada suggest that Canada gained about $2.2 billion in the form of savings on education expenses by accepting immigrants from China with university degrees between 1991 and 2000. This finding is a classic example of the kinds of human capital links that exist between countries sending and accepting immigrants.

Nevertheless, the multi-stream flows have painted more complicated pictures of human capital linkages between the two countries. China constitutes an important source of international brain flow to meet Canada’s human resource needs. Between 2001 and 2010, China supplied a total of 5,470 PhDs, 34,760 people with Masters degrees and nearly 100,000 university graduates to Canada.47 Chinese immigrants have dominated the increase of foreign-born PhDs in Canada, outnumbering the U.S. and U.K., the two dominant sources prior to 1981. The U.S. share went from

46 Lin et al. 2008. 47 CIC 2011a.

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a high of 24 percent during the 1971–1980 period to a low of 6 percent over the 1991–2000 period, while China’s share went up from a low of 2 percent to a high of 25 percent.48 In the past decade, China supplied nearly 70,000 professionals from all occupations; 25,000 managers including 2,400 senior ones; and 14,000 skilled workers and technicians.49

Diversified Chinese communities play a crucial role in the accumulation of hu- man capital for Canada and will continue to do so for many future generations. This is particularly true in terms of teachers at Canadian schools and universities. On the one hand, staff of Chinese origin represented the largest minority group, 28.2 percent of all minority faculty or 4.2 percent of the total Canadian university staff as of 2006.50 And as of September 2010, of the 1,845 Canada Research Chair positions, nearly 100 or 5 percent identified as Chinese, including those from the PRC, HKSAR and Taiwan.51 On the other hand, children from Chinese families have the highest university completion rate (62 percent) among 25-to-34-year-olds in 2006, compared to 24 percent of children of Canadian born families.52 Like other Canadians, Chinese children typically select four areas as their major fields of study in post-secondary education: business, management and public administration; ar- chitecture, engineering and related technologies; health, parks, recreation and fit- ness; social and behavioral sciences, and law.53

The various skills that Chinese immigrants, students and temporary workers contribute to Canadian economy are well documented. For example, the 2006 cen- sus reported that Chinese are more likely to work in occupations related to applied sciences and business, such as natural and applied sciences and related occupations; processing, manufacturing and utilities; business, finance and administrative oc- cupations and sales and service. Perhaps not surprisingly, Chinese are more vis- ible than average Canadians in accommodation and food services (restaurant jobs); professional, scientific and technical services (accountants and lawyers); finance and insurance (bank jobs); manufacturing (general labour) and wholesale trade (im- port and export). However, Chinese are less likely than average Canadians to work in construction, agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting; health care, social assis- tance, and public administration. Similarly, it is often reported in the Chinese media that Chinese immigrant communities have experienced significate upward skill mo- bility from traditional Three Knives (A kitchen knife, Tailor scissors, Shaving knife) to the more modern professions of (lawyers, engineers, doctors, accountants, senior technicians and university professors).54

48 Gluszynski and Peters 2005. 49 CIC 2011a. 50 CAUT 2011. 51 Zha 2012. 52 Garnett and Hou 2011. 53 Statistics Canada 2006 Census. 54 “三把刀”( 刀、剪刀、剃刀)变为“六个师”(律匈、工 师、医师、会 师、 技师和 大学教师). Xinhua News 2007; Iask.com 2012.

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There are many other contributions that Chinese communities make, however, that are less well-known. Despite financial funds that business immigrants contrib- ute upon admission to Canada,55 their entrepreneurship and international business skills are less appreciated. From 2001 to 2010, over 52,000 business immigrants arrived from China to Canada but it has been difficult for many of them to figure out how to connect with local business partners, vice versa.

The business benefits of diaspora networks have been observed by many.56 The transnational networks can have the same effects for the host societies. As an essay in The Economist (2010) pointed out, in the case of the U.S., immigration provides legions of unofficial ambassadors, deal-brokers, recruiters and boosters. Immigrants not only bring the best ideas from around the world to North American shores; but they are also a conduit for spreading American ideas and ideals in their homelands, thus increasing the “soft power” of their adoptive country.57 The same holds true for Canada.

Transnational links also take place in knowledge sharing and innovation. As The Economist also pointed out that in Silicon Valley, more than half of all Chinese and Indian scientists and engineers reported having shared information about technol- ogy and business opportunities with people in their native countries. At the same time, as people in emerging markets continue to innovate, North America will find it ever more useful to have so many citizens who can tap into the latest information from cities like Mumbai and Shanghai.58 In Lin and his colleagues’s study (2008), the authors identify specific roles of internationally educated Chinese transnational entrepreneurs in linking Canada and China in innovation activities. Their study finds that the innovation links established and maintained by Chinese transnational entrepreneurs who concurrently engage in business in Canada and China, but keep Canada as home base.59

Furthermore, the local knowledge immigrants have of their home countries re- duces the cost of doing business for the U.S. and Canadian firms.60 Can the Cana- dian diaspora play a similar role? Nearly 300,000 Canadians living in the HKSAR makes the city largest Canadian one in Asia.61 Over 2.8 million Canadians abroad should be recognized as a major asset for Canada.62 The new challenge is how Canada can deepen its connections with its citizens living overseas for the benefit of all Canadians.

55 About 120,000 business immigrants landed in Greater Vancouver from 1980–2001. These im- migrants brought to Vancouver total funds of $ 35–40 billion (Ley 2011). 56 The Economist, Nov 19th 2011. 57 The Economist, Apr 22nd 2010b. 58 Ibid, Apr 22nd 2010. 59 Lin et al 2008. 60 Ibid, Apr 22nd 2010. 61 Zhang and DeGolyer 2011. 62 APF Canada 2011.

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3.4 Conclusion: Changing Games in the twenty first Century

The turn of the twenty first century witnessed an increasing flow of people moving between China and Canada. Greater freedom of movement in and out of China and the growing affluence of Chinese citizens is rapidly changing the pattern of people flows and broadening them to include tourists, students and professional workers. The flow of people between the two countries has become a two-way flow. China is no longer an exporter of labour but has also become a destination for foreign tal- ent. The popular perception that immigrants to Canada who return to their native countries have “failed” or are “opportunists” is misguided. These game-changing dynamics have broader foreign policy implications.

3.4.1 China as a Source and a Destination

Canada-China people flows will be increasingly characterized by two-way move- ments and by transnational citizens with personal, business and emotional attach- ments on both sides of the Pacific. While there are many challenges that arise from diaspora-like populations at home and abroad, the phenomenon of international labour mobility—especially of the most talented (and sometimes the most notori- ous)—is here to stay. The challenge for policy is to take a holistic and multi-gener- ational view of transnational citizens, rather than to treat international mobility as a problem.

Looking ahead, it is unrealistic to predict that the immigration flow from China to Canada will remain the same as it has been in the last 10–15 years. This should not be regarded as less important for Canada, however, even if China is no longer the top source country of immigration. In fact, many Chinese will still consider emigrating to Canada for lifestyle reasons rather than purely economic reasons.63 Canada has to be prepared to leverage this new trend for Canada’s economic and social benefit rather than just for the benefit of its labour market.

Only if more Canadians understand the new game—that China is both a source and a destination for people seeking new opportunities—will policy change to re- flect the importance of this dynamic. Canada needs to position itself as a preferred destination for Chinese immigrants, students and visitors. Equally important is that Canada should also prepare more Canadians for “going east” to study and work. A broader China policy could ensure that China’s economic rise benefits Canada by increasing two-way trade and investment in goods and services, as well as by increasing two-way flows of people between the two countries.

63 The Globe and Mail, October 3, 2009b.

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3.4.2 Chinese Communities in Canada

The importance of Chinese communities in Canada has been underestimated for a long time. Chinese immigrants, like all immigrants, have traditionally been seen as suppliers of needed manpower. Too often when people try to measure the contribu- tion of Chinese communities to Canada, they will talk about their higher unem- ployment numbers and lower earnings. They also talk about the concentration of Chinese communities in cities like Vancouver and Toronto, or about the perception that they may not integrate fully into Canadian society.64 In fact, the image of Chi- nese Canadians today is vastly different than it was in the last two centuries when Chinese immigrants were stereotyped as railway coolies, laundrymen and waiters. What the Chinese Canadian community looks like today is as diversified as Cana- dian society is as a whole.

Despite its visibility and diversity, the majority of Canadians of Chinese origin feel a strong sense of belonging to Canada. In 2002, 76 percent of those who re- ported Chinese origins said they had a strong sense of belonging to Canada. At the same time, 58 percent said they had a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group. Canadians of Chinese origin also actively participate in Canadian society. For example, 64 percent of those who were eligible to vote reported doing so in the 2000 federal election, while 60 percent said they voted in the last provin- cial election. In addition, about 35 percent reported that they had participated in an organization such as a sports team or community association.65

Major-General Victor G. Odlum (1880–1971), who during his career served as Canada’s ambassador to China, once called for the day when Chinese Canadians would “not be distinguished from other Canadians.” That wish remains as relevant today as it was during Odlum’s lifetime.66

3.4.3 Role of Canadian Diaspora in China

Canada cannot afford to ignore the fact that so many Canadians live in China. How Canada can turn its diaspora in China into an advantage remains a huge challenge. First, how should Canadians living in China or other parts of the world be recog- nized as part of Canada rather than as foreigners who hold Canadian passports? Canadians have to change their mindset and accept the fact that the flow of people moves in two directions. Canada must learn to respect the fact that Canadians, na- tive-born or naturalized, are more internationally mobile than ever before and many have the choice of working and living abroad. When they settle down in Beijing or in another city, Canada must learn to treat them the same as any other Canadian in terms of their rights and obligations. Canada should also encourage their economic

64 Johnson 1979; Guo and DeVoretz 2006. 65 Lindsay 2001. 66 Lee 1984, p. 169.

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and social participation abroad. Canada should think about how to better commu- nicate with its overseas communities, how it can deliver better consular protection and other services. This would also ensure that any risks associated with Canadians abroad are properly assessed and addressed.

Furthermore, how should Canada better leverage its expatriate communities in China to enhance opportunities for trade, investment and business between the two countries? Traditionally, diaspora communities have contributed significantly to their home countries through remittances (India, Mexico and Philippines), trade and investment (China and South Korea) and technology transfer (Taiwan, South Korea and China). This is a new game for Canadian policy makers and members of the business community.

3.4.4 Human Capital Exchange

While the scale of the people flow is growing and its direction is changing, the real focal point is the exchange of human capital. It is likely to continue to be a central part of policy discussion in the future. One layer of the policy issue is obviously related to visa and immigration programs. However the exchange of human capital between the two countries requires more policymaking than that.

Canada needs a smarter, more proactive and collaborative approach in address- ing this exchange of human capital in the twenty first century. A smarter policy will ensure that Canada brings in international talent of all kinds for the benefit of all Canadians.67 A more proactive approach would help Canada be prepared for broader human capital issues. For instance, when Canada welcomes newcomers, it should also embrace its own diaspora, especially when they return.68 There is a need for a welcome package designed for returning Canadians, including things such as re-settlement services and international credential recognition.69

The most challenging area perhaps is collaborating with Chinese counterparts. There is notable friction in a wide range of issues related to human capital ex- change between the two countries. Canada recognizes dual citizenship, but China doesn’t, which has already caused tensions in the implementation of the Consular Agreement.70 There is a tax treaty between Ottawa and Beijing for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on in- come.71 However, bilateral agreements on social security (especial the employment

67 Papademetriou 2003; Kuptsch and Pang 2006. 68 Zhang 2006, 2007. 69 There was a ‘Brain Gain’ pilot project launched in Ontario in Jan 2011. It is a joint effort by the federal and provincial governments to reverse the brain drain. It is aimed at making it easier for Canadians abroad to bring their skills home and contribute to the Canada of tomorrow (CIC 2011c). 70 DFAIT 2007. 71 Department of Finance Canada, Online.

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insurance and pension arrangements)72 and health care have not yet been achieved, both of which are critical. In China, the internationalization of skills and experiences is highly valued, while Canadian employers only look at Canadian credentials and experience. As a result, it is no wonder that there are many agreements or MOUs in science and education collaboration at various levels and fields, while Canada has only one MRA with China for accountants and one with HKSAR for engineers.73

Of all the reasons for Canada to have a robust and forward-looking China policy, people-to-people linkages is arguably the most fundamental. Seen in this light, the nexus of Canada-China human capital is a unique focal point for developing rela- tions between Ottawa and Beijing. While other countries are lining up to sign trade and investment deals with China, Canada can go a step further and investigate the possibility of an agreement on human capital. Such an agreement could encompass issues such as citizenship, visas, education and training, professional accreditation, social security, healthcare, taxation and even extradition. Given the large number of Canadians and Chinese with deep connections across the Pacific, it is a certainty that these bilateral issues will become bigger policy challenges for Beijing and Ot- tawa in the years ahead. There is an opportunity now to address these issues in a comprehensive way and to turn potential problems into a competitive advantage.

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Lin, X. et al. (2008). Transnational entrepreneurs as agents of International innovation linkages. Research Report (December 2008). Vancouver: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. http:// www.asiapacific.ca/sites/default/files/filefield/ImmigEntrepreneurs.pdf. Accessed 27 July 2009.

Xinhua, N. (2007). 从“三把刀”变为“六个师” 华人主流意 增强. http://news.xinhuanet.com/ overseas/2007-12/05/content_7202455.htm. Accessed 4 March 2014.

Xinhua News. (21 February 2008). Survey of stratifications of foreigners in China (在华外国人 分 层 查). http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2008-02/21/content_7639618.htm. Accessed 27 July 2009.

Xinhua News. (25 April 2012). Alien entries grow 10 % annually in the new century, (新世 以来外 国人入境人数每年 增10 %). http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-04/25/c_111842921. htm. Accessed 26 April 2012.

Zha, Q. (16 April 2012). What factors influencing the direction of global brain circulation: the case of Chinese holders of Canada research chair. Workshop Presentation. Vancouver: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.

Zhang, K. (22 March 2006). Recognizing the Canadian Diaspora, Canada Asia Commentary, #41, Asia Pacific foundation of Canada, Vancouver. http://www.asiapacific.ca/analysis/pubs/pdfs/ commentary/cac41.pdf. Accessed 27 July 2009.

Zhang, K. (30 September 2007). ‘Mission Invisible’-rethinking the Canadian diaspora, Canada Asia commentary, #46, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, Vancouver. http://www.asiapacific. ca/analysis/pubs/pdfs/commentary/cac46.pdf. Accessed 27 July 2009.

Zhang, K. (2011a). Flows of people and the Canada-China relationship. In P. Potter & T. Adams (Eds.), Issues in Canada-China relations. Toronto: Canadian International Council.

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Zhang, K. (2011b). Chinese in Canada and Canadians in China: The human platform for relation- ships between China and Canada. In H. Cao & V. Poy (Eds.), The China challenge: Sino- Canadian relations in the 21st century. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press.

Zhang, K., & DeGolyer, M. E. (24 February 2011). Hong Kong: Canada’s largest city in Asia- survey of Canadian citizens in Hong Kong, survey eeport, Vancouver: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. http://www.asiapacific.ca/sites/default/files/filefield/hk_survey_feb2011_v8.pdf. Accessed 18 April 2012.

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Chapter 4 International Migration and Economic Development in Northeast China— the Acquisition and Transfer of New Migrant Capital

Outi Luova

J. Zhang, H. Duncan (eds.), Migration in China and Asia, International Perspectives on Migration 10, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8759-8_4, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2014

O. Luova ( ) Centre for East Asian Studies, University of Turku, Turku, Finland e-mail: [email protected]

Figures on migrant workers’ global financial capital transfers make impressive reading. The officially recorded remittance flows to developing countries reached US$ 316 billion in 2009 and are expected to exceed US$ 450 billion in 2014 (The World Bank 2011, 2013). In addition to monetary transfers, migrants may also con- tribute to their home communities through investments, which may include new technologies, community aid, human and social capital, and wider economic activi- ties generated by “transnational living”.1 When looked at from the point of the home regions, migrants thus provide a large pool of development resources. However, mi- gration cannot be regarded as a panacea for development. It does not alone remove structural obstacles to economic growth, such as bureaucracy, misguided policies or deficient infrastructure.2 Nevertheless, researchers tend to agree that migration gen- erates potential for development, but they still ponder why migration contributes to economic development in some regions, while in other regions it may even have negative consequences.3 The crucial question is under which conditions migration ultimately brings benefit (Ghosh 2006, p. 47, p. 49, p. 70; de Haas 2005, p. 1275, 2007, p. 15, p. 25). However, despite calls for a wider approach, the majority of studies only focus on the migrant remittances and their usage.

1 Luis Eduardo Guarnizo has established that economic activities generated by migration and “transnational living” have complex and significant economic consequences both for the migrant sending and receiving areas. He proposes that an inquiry into the multidirectional and multilevel actions which emerge as a consequence of migrants’ desire to “lead a life that straddles across na- tional borders” would importantly increase our understanding of the economic effects of migration (Guarnizo 2003, p. 680). 2 For a discussion on this, see e.g. the special issue of Social Analysis 3(2009) edited by Nina Glick Schiller and Thomas Faist: “Migration, Development and Transnationalization: A Critical Stance” and de Haas 2007. 3 For literature reviews on the topic, see e.g. Agunias 2006; Ammassari and Black 2001; Carling 2005; Ghosh 2006; de Haas 2005, 2007.

52 O. Luova

This chapter proposes a wider framework for the study of the development im- pact of migration. The author argues that a study on the development potential of migration should pay attention to the economic, human and social capital that mi- grants can acquire and transfer to their home regions. In order to understand the process of capital acquisition and transfer, with its bottlenecks, leakages and distor- tions, it is important to pay attention to (1) the characteristics of the migrants, in particular their capabilities to acquire new capital and their tendencies to spend it; (2) the types of the new economic, human and social capital they can acquire and the appropriateness of the new capital for the local conditions in the home region; and (3) the policies and specific conditions of the home region. These three points and the three types of capital transfers are specified in more detail in Table 4.1. This framework helps to provide a more nuanced picture of the new capital that migration can generate in each specific migration system, and it provides a tool for a detailed analysis of the incongruities between the development potential and the actual outcomes.

In this study, economic development is defined as a process that influences growth and the restructuring of an economy to enhance the economic wellbeing of a community, creating jobs and wealth and improving the quality of life. Because communities differ in their geographic and political strengths and weaknesses, each community will have a unique set of challenges for economic development.4 When studying economic development through migration, one of the core criteria of de- velopment should be the channelling of the advantages to the migrant households, not to the pockets of the local elite.

In this chapter, this framework is applied on Northeast China (Fig. 4.1). China’s three North-eastern provinces stand out as the country’s major sources of interna- tional migrants, alongside the provinces on China’s southern coast. A particular

4 This definition has found inspiration in the definition of economic development provided by the International Economic Development Council 2006.

Table 4.1  Types and nodes of capital transfers The three types of capital transfers The three nodes of capital transfer 1. Economic: remittances, investments

(housing, education, business), savings, goods, donations, technology transfer

1. The migrant: the characteristics (orientation, level of education, legal status, etc.) of the migrants

– what kind of capital and how much can be acquired in the host country

– how the capital will be used 2. Human: new ideas, skills and knowledge 2. The capital: the appropriateness of the avail-

able capital for the local conditions (level of technology, skills etc).

3. Social capital: new networks and access to new resources

3. The home locality: the local policies and conditions in the home region

– supportive environment for capital transfers – the willingness of the migrant to transfer the

capital to home region

534 International Migration and Economic Development in Northeast China

feature of migration from Northeast China is related to the strong tradition of the state-led economy, with the ensuing bureaucratic as well as conservative atmo- sphere. This is in clear contrast to China’s southern coast, where state interventions have been less intensive and private entrepreneurship has long traditions. Another difference lay in the absence of hometown associations and other migrant organiza- tions as significant agents (Fig. 4.1).

The more specific focus of this chapter is on the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture and the Yanbian Korean migrants who work in South Korea. One-third of the prefecture’s 2-million population consist of ethnic Koreans. Labour migra- tion from Yanbian to South Korea started as a popular grassroots movement in the late 1980s. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea in 1992, a South Korean craze and migration fever seized the Chinese Ko- rean population. Some 100,000 Yanbianese migrants work in different parts of the

Fig. 4.1  Map: Northeast Asia

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world, the majority of them in South Korea and Japan. The economic impact of international migration for Yanbian has been significant. In 2007, migrant remit- tances are said to have exceeded US$ 1 billion (Yanbian touziwang 2008).

By analysing official and public documents, and based on interviews with offi- cials in Yanbian, this chapter studies the acquisition of new capital among Yanbian Korean migrants and the transfer of their new capital into Yanbian.5 In the next section, I first discuss the acquisition of new capital. In the following sections, I ad- dress the transfer of capital and the local policies and conditions that influenced the transfers. Finally, I summarize the findings.

4.1 Acquisition of New Capital

Yanbian is a unique place with regard to international labour migration due to its recent history of migration6 and its ethnic ties with the Korean peninsula. The tra- dition of mobility lowered the threshold for migration, and the ethnic ties opened doors to the South Korean labour markets. Hence, the specific ethnic features were important for the entrance to the South Korean labour markets and the acquisition of new economic, human and social capital.

Compared with the Han Chinese (the majority population), Chinese Koreans possess language skills and a knowledge of Korean cultural norms which have giv- en them with an advantage over the South Korean labour markets. Further, through their shared culture, they were also able to carve out a niche in the labour markets in the production of Korean-style foodstuffs and in the service sector, too, particu- larly household services. Interpersonal contacts provided many connections which gave an opening to Chinese Koreans for information on the South Korean labour markets. Further, ties to those South Koreans who had lived in Yanbian during the Japanese occupation (1931–1945) also created important channels for migration.

Chinese Korean workers were not only sent to South Korea, but they were also employed by South Korean companies in other countries, where those companies had operations. Thus, many of the Yanbianese who worked in Spain as fishermen or

5 The chapter is based on the author’s PhD thesis Ethnic Transnational Capital Transfers and De- velopment—Utilization of Ties with South Korea in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, China. Turku: University of Turku, 2007. 6 The current Korean population in China is of rather recent origin. A wave of migration from the Korean Peninsula began in the seventeenth century. However, most of the migrants arrived during the tumultuous decades between the middle of the nineteenth century and the end of the Second World War. Northeast China was first a refuge for poor peasants and later a base for Ko- rean nationalists, who fought against the Japanese colonial rulers in the period 1910–1945. After Japan annexed Northeast China in 1931, hundreds of thousands of Koreans migrated to the new Japanese-dominated state of Manchukuo, including many forcibly sent to work in factories and mines. However, the vast majority of migrants from Korea came allured by the promise of land. When Japan was defeated in 1945, there were 1.7 million Koreans in Northeast China. When the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, some 600,000 Koreans returned to the Korean Peninsula, while 1.1 million remained in China.

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as construction workers in Russia were initially recruited by South Korean compa- nies. Thus, ethnic ties not only enhanced employment opportunities in the kin-state, but also in other parts of the world, wherever companies of the kin-state were also active.

The sheer expansion of Korean migration can be seen as a contributing factor to the overseas employment of the Yanbianese Han Chinese. Labour migration to South Korea, as a meaningful way to find employment and raise living standards, was found among all ethnic groups in Yanbian. In addition to regular migration channels, some Han Chinese migrants were able to find work abroad with the help of their Korean friends (Interview 1, 2005; Wang and Li 1997, p. 25). In this way, ethnic Korean migration channels expanded across ethnic boundaries. Members of ethnic groups other than Koreans were also able to benefit directly from the Korean ethnic transnational ties and, in turn, contributed to the development of their home region.

Empirical evidence from different parts of the world has shown that the initial level of education and occupational skills are an important contributory factor for the acquisition of economic, social and human capital. Low-educated migrants re- ceive low salaries and are seldom able to acquire new skills simply because they are employed as unskilled workers for physical labour and receive no training for the work. For example, studies on migration to Europe have revealed that the majority of migrant workers learnt few new skills as they were engaged in unskilled work. There were even cases of deskilling of workers during migration (Ammassari and Black 2001, pp. 27–28; Paine 1974).

The huge remittances and other capital transfers that Yanbian received could easily be ascribed to the high level of education among ethnic Koreans—the ethnic Koreans have the highest level of education among China’s nationalities, the Han Chinese included (Jin et al. 1997, pp. 50–59). On closer examination, the picture is more complicated. Most of the labour migrants were low-educated peasants and workers. In China, a low education level of the population has usually been believed to hinder economic development; yet, in Yanbian, the alleged low “quality” of the migrants did not impede the emergence of a migration-generated economy, includ- ing entrepreneurship. Thus, clearly, low-educated ethnic minorities and peasants, too, were a formidable force in economic development.

The local officials in Yanbian were aware of the link between occupational skills and salary and hence regarded training as an essential part of labour export. Through training, workers were also able to obtain better paid jobs and employ- ment, in which advanced skills might also be acquired. Another reason for training was to equip migrant workers with some knowledge about their rights and duties. A basic training course was obligatory for those migrants who sought employment through regular channels, such as employment offices or licensed migration agen- cies (Jin et al. 1996, p. 56).

Early on, Yanbian specialized in sending workers to South Korea’s seafaring and knitting industries, which were in demand of a cheap Korean-speaking labour force. In cooperation with South Korean companies, government-affiliated compa- nies in Yanbian began to provide training in these fields for prospective migrants.

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For example, the Ethnic Minority Garment Corporation established a centre to train workers for knitting factories as early as 1989. In addition to technical skills, the training centre also placed emphasis on ethics in the workplace, knowledge of laws and regulations, and patriotism (Yanbian minzu 2004). The government-affiliated Yanbian Seamen’s Training Centre began to recruit students in 1991. A more gen- eral training centre, The Yanbian Training College for Migrant Workers, was es- tablished in 1994 by the Department of Commerce. In addition to arranging the requisite training for prospective migrants, the college also provided training for officials, advice for those who had independently found work abroad, and also as- sisted in locating a place to study abroad (Yanbianzhou duiwai 2004). Afterwards, many private training centres were opened in Yanbian. In fact, during my fieldwork trip to Yanbian in 2004, I was struck by the dominance in the streetscape of adver- tisements for internationally oriented training courses.

However, a large part of the ethnic Korean migrant workers chose to enter South Korea with the help of friends and relatives and without pre-migration training. Many of them worked without proper documents. Yet, compared with those mi- grants who worked as trainees, the irregular migrants often received higher salaries. Hence, in this case, the lack of pre-migration training or proper documents did not necessarily lead to lower salaries.

Clearly, the main motivation for migration was the high salaries available in South Korea. Looking at the amount of remittances, the Yanbianese migrants were able to acquire huge sums of monetary capital. What about the human and social capital? Indeed, all of the officials that I interviewed emphasized the significance of the new skills and ideas which migrants can acquire abroad and return home with. One official informed me that although many migrants work as ordinary labourers, they have still acquired more confidence and self-esteem from their new experi- ences and relatively high income while abroad. This aspect was also included in the pre-migration training, which urged migrants to learn from their experiences and observations.

A majority of the Yanbianese labour migrants worked on ships, in knitting fac- tories, on construction sites, in the service sector or as domestic help. Those who worked on ships were engaged in different kinds of tasks and likely learned a va- riety of new skills useful for machinery operation or employment in a restaurant or in sanitary services. Work on construction sites, knitting factories or in house- holds provided mainly less sophisticated skills, if any. Migrants who worked in the service sector, often in restaurants, transportation or in the beauty care, may have learned both occupational and managerial skills.

Despite positive official context statements, local researchers complained that labour migrants seldom actually learned any new skills since they were usually employed as unskilled workers and in menial jobs. While they praised labour mi- gration as a positive way to expand views, they were at the same time sceptical about the actual likelihood of migrants learning any new skills. Some writers even claimed that migrants were uninterested in gaining new vocational skills for work, but rather only “vacational” skills for their leisure time (Kim et al. 1996, pp. 20–21, p. 130, pp. 144–145; Jin 1994, pp. 250–251).

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The specific features of Yanbian Koreans impacted the type of work and the new skills they were able to acquire abroad. They were also in a better position, com- pared with the Han Chinese, to find relatively well-paid employment. Clearly, the migrants were able to acquire new capital to a significant degree, but to what extent was it transferrable and how was it utilized?

4.2 Transfer of Capital

4.2.1 Human and Social Capital

The non-economic gains of employment abroad were highly valued among the Yan- bian officials. This positive attitude was associated with the general objective to improve the “quality” of the population. In that, the general expectation was that those people who worked abroad were able to widen their formerly limited views and acquire new skills, ideas and perspectives. A mantra-like statement was that “through international labour migration, people can widen their field of vision and learn new managerial and technical skills”.

Then, if new skills were acquired, were they transferable? Bimal Ghosh has sum- marized the critical conditions required for skills transfer into three points, viz: first, migrants should return with more advanced knowledge or higher skills than would have otherwise been acquired in the home country; secondly, any knowledge and skills gained must be relevant and suitable for the local economy. The lack of skills transfer can arise from the poor infrastructure and a discouraging environment in the home region, as well as a development gap between the sending and receiving region. Thirdly, the former migrant workers must be willing to receive the opportu- nity and to use the newly acquired capital upon return (Ghosh 2000, pp. 186–187, pp. 199–200). In sum, returnees must attain new locally relevant skills which they can (and want to) put into effective use.

A majority of the Yanbianese labour migrants found employment that required only low-level skills. Those who worked at construction sites abroad doing physical labour were probably unmotivated to take similar employment back in China, due to lower salary pay. Conversely, those who worked on ships were engaged in dif- ferent kinds of tasks and likely learned a variety of new skills useful for machinery operation or employment in a restaurant or in sanitary services. As Yanbian hosted many textile factories backed by South Korean investors, work in factories located in foreign countries may have provided some new skills useful in local labour mar- kets after return. Alternatively, it is likely that the work provided for the cheap la- bour force in the South Korean-owned textile factories was similar to that in China and therefore did not increase the skill level of the migrants. Migrants who worked in the service sector apparently did bring back new skills, which helped them to establish small enterprises. This can be seen in the expansion of the service sector in Yanbian. The migration-generated consumption craze in Yanbian provided a fertile ground for this trend (Interview 19, 2004).

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The significance of human capital transfers is difficult to assess. It would ap- pear that the transfer of new vocational skills mainly occurred in the service sector. Yet, the human capital in the form of new ideas, new ways to conduct and manage business and affairs, also helped to unleash the inventiveness of the returnees. This more diffuse type of human capital can be assessed as more important to the local development of Yanbian than the straightforward vocational skills, but from the discrepancy between the economies of Yanbian and South Korea, the eventual new vocational skills were not so easily transferable to Yanbian.

The accumulation of such social capital which could be harnessed to enhance employment opportunities on return to Yanbian probably remained small. For ex- ample, in China, some returning domestic migrants have been able to use their newly acquired social capital to establish sub-branches of their former employer’s company in their home town. However, I was unable to personally uncover any information on this kind of practice in Yanbian. Rather, such new social capital en- hanced the migrants’ re-employment opportunities in South Korea instead. Overall, because of their language and cultural skills, Yanbian Korean migrants were in a better position than Han Chinese to acquire new social capital while in South Korea. They were able to interact with their new society and create new social networks beyond their own migrant communities.

4.2.2 Remittances and Savings

The specific features of Yanbian Koreans also influenced the usage of their new capital. The Chinese Koreans preferred to invest in education, and because the tra- dition of entrepreneurship was thin among them, few invested in large-scale busi- nesses. Generally, the migrants’ salaries were used for their family’s needs, with the top priority being the education of children. Many parents wanted to assure a good education for their children, and many desired to send their children to a university or abroad to study. The other common reason for working abroad was to improve living standards; thus, in common with all other migrant sending areas around the world, those migrants from Yanbian also constructed new houses which contrasted to the traditional mud-and-hay cottages or brick-and-tile houses built during the past decades. It was also common for rural migrants to buy an apartment in a nearby city (Interview 13, 14 and 19, 2004).

A large amount of the remittances and savings evidently went into consumption. Some sources claim that in the early 2000s, the consumption level in Yanbian was even higher than in Beijing and Shanghai (Xinhuawang Jilin pindao, 2 Septem- ber 2002). Local researchers complained about this kind of consumption craze (Jin 2003, pp. 7–8). However, buying, furnishing and equipping new homes and using restaurant and leisure services generated business and created further new work places. A demand for modern housing and the growing popularity of restaurants, karaoke bars and saunas also created a concomitant demand for construction firms, furniture shops, interior designers and home electronics retailers. The growing

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number of restaurants also provided new opportunities for peasants to diversify and expand their own production. Such new consumption patterns generated demand for a larger variety of consumer goods, and new shops and department stores were built to cater to these demands, accelerating domestic and foreign trade. In such a manner, migrant money transferred from abroad spurred the economy and created new jobs, particularly in the construction industry and service sector. Moreover, these new companies generated substantial tax income for the government (Jin 2003, p. 4; Du 1998, p. 22).

Research findings from other parts of the world reveal similar patterns. For ex- ample, Luis Guarnizo (2003) has paid attention to the knock-on effect of the con- sumption of migrant households, in that it has generated further demand for services and trade. Moreover, the major economic benefits of such remittances often benefit the migrant sending villages and towns and also flow beyond to regional urban cen- tres which have better economic structures (Taylor 1999, p. 78).

The benefits of migrant remittances for the local economy can be assessed dif- ferently depending on the view point: if the migrants’ savings are seen only as providing the potential for productive investments, their importance may remain minor. Yet, from a wider perspective, their cumulative effects can bring a more positive appraisal; for with a more nuanced approach, the importance of the remit- tances is clearly significant. Firstly, the consumption of the newly acquired finan- cial capital spurred the local economy and created new working places not only in the home villages and towns of the migrant households, but also in the whole region, particularly in the urban areas. Secondly, some of the savings were invested in local companies which supported the expansion of the entrepreneurial activi- ties in Yanbian. Thirdly, some migrants who returned to the rural areas used their savings to diversify their agricultural income sources, while some others invested their savings into new endeavours in towns and cities. Hence, not only “productive activities” but also the sheer consumption of remittances can push forward positive changes in local economies.

4.2.3 Migrant Entrepreneurship

Overall, the local economic, social and political conditions in the sending country have been raised as the main determinants for successful migrant entrepreneurship. An absence of a stimulating environment or suitable arrangements to support mi- grants financially, technically or bureaucratically will prevent successful business formation everywhere (Ghosh 2006, p. 70).

The role of financial capital acquired by migrants has normally been empha- sized in the conventional literature on the benefits of migration. However, research findings show that social and human capital might be even more important than financial capital for business formation resulting from the migrants return. In Ma Zhongdong’s large quantitative survey on the impact of domestic return migration on local development in China, one of the main findings was that acquired skills

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and abilities are far more important than savings. In fact, since migrants’ salaries tended to be so low, their savings seldom provided a basis to establish businesses (Ma 2001, pp. 251–252). With capital deficiency being the major hindrance to es- tablishing a business in rural China, Ma maintains that migrants’ human capital accumulation during labour migration enhances the mobilization of local networks when they return back home. This, in turn, helps to compensate for the lack of funds and thus supports migrant entrepreneurship and investment decisions (Ma 2002, pp. 1780–1781). Further, his study also revealed that compared with non- migrants, migrants are more qualified as investors (Ma 1999, p. 75). The study also highlighted the particular features of female returnees; e.g. despite women having traditionally an inferior position in the household economy, a considerable propor- tion of female returnees had changed their occupation and become small business- women, specialized farmers or factory workers (Ma 2001, p. 249). What was the situation in Yanbian?

Chinese Koreans have been compared with the inhabitants of Wenzhou (Xin- huawang Jilin pindao, 2 September 2002), which is a Chinese coastal city that has become wealthy, partly through entrepreneurial migrants. However, although mi- gration from Wenzhou and Yanbian may be comparable in proportion to local popu- lations, Chinese Koreans cannot be compared with Wenzhou residents with regard to the spirit of entrepreneurship. Although many companies are established by the Yanbianese return migrants, the scale is relatively small, and the majority operates in the service sector. One possible reason for this discrepancy may be that Chinese Korean Confucian traditions tend to neglect trade and place more value on careers in more respected areas, such as bureaucracy and the arts. Another important factor for the relatively low number of migrant entrepreneurs there is the discouraging environment: decision makers in Northeast China still pay heed to the state-owned industrial sector, and the local economic infrastructure is weak. Nevertheless, it is still possible to discern changes in both the attitude towards business among Chi- nese Koreans7 and in the local economic environment that migrants face.

In Yanbian, return migrants were first of all prone to put their savings in hous- ing, education and consumption; after which, they generally did not have much money left. Many returnees did establish restaurants, karaoke bars or hair dress- ing salons, as these businesses did not necessarily require large investments; con- versely, very few established a larger business or invested in production (Interview 4, 1996; Interview 13 and 19, 2004). In 2004, one official noticed that the migrants who returned for the first time—after a period abroad of about 3 years—tended to invest their earnings in the education of their children and in the improvement of their living conditions. However, those who returned from a second term of foreign

7 Si Joong Kim has discerned two generations of Chinese Korean entrepreneurs. The first genera- tion consists of peasants who in the 1980s set up small town and village enterprises (TVEs). Their attempts to grasp the opportunities of South Korea failed in the 1990s due to the lack of skills. The entrepreneurs of the second generation which emerged during the 1990s are more educated and have travelled in foreign countries, thus possessing more skills and networks. They have been successful in trading, IT and the construction industry. However, their businesses remain local (Kim 2003, p. 119).

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employment were more likely to use their earnings in a more productive way—for example, to buy cows or to purchase a car to become a taxi driver. Still, the number of the new entrepreneurs remained low. Nevertheless, this official believed that a change was taking place, but it was not so clear at the time (Interview 14, 2004).

Encouragingly, there are some positive examples of successful migrant entrepre- neurship among Chinese Koreans. Firstly, one informant noted that in the vicinity of urban centres, returning peasant migrants have found suitable opportunities to establish small enterprises and engage in non-agricultural undertakings (Interview 14, 2004). This was well illustrated by one exemplary village close to the prefec- ture capital Yanji which had sent some 100 migrants abroad, of which nearly half of the returnees had become entrepreneurs. New companies in this village were mainly restaurants but also included the transportation business, processing indus- try and wood processing (Interview 22, 2004). In Yanji, one of the most successful returnees was a man who had worked as a sailor for 10 years; upon his return, he established a lucrative sand quarry, which provided sand and gravel for the boom- ing construction industry (Jin 2003, p. 4). Another high-profile success was a hotel built by another returnee on the bank of the river in central Yanji. Admittedly, these examples are exceptions, but nevertheless, they clearly indicate the potential for migrant entrepreneurship in Yanbian, even beyond the service sector.

4.3 Capital Transfers and the Local Policies and Conditions

4.3.1 The Local Policies

The local government started to issue migration-related regulations and policies in the mid-1990s. They included the creation of regular migration channels, develop- ment of pre-migration training, provision of financial assistance to cover migration- related cost, management of migrants abroad, encouragement of capital transfers, support for return migrant entrepreneurship and re-employment of migrants at home or abroad.8 All these policies contributed in one way or another to the acquisition of new capital and the capital transfers.

Although economic development is one of the central policy issues in labour migration, it is also considered the most important means of maintaining social stability. Social and political stability gained extra emphasis in the administration of border regions inhabited by ethnic minorities, and issues connected to employment, living standards and interaction with co-ethnics abroad became crucial questions for the stability of Yanbian. In addition to the maintenance of stability, labour export

8 The governance of international migration in Yanbian is discussed in detail in Outi Luova (2008) “Managing International Migration in China—A View from Yanbian, Northeast China”, Finnish Journal of Ethnicity and Migration 1.

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was also useful for the promotion of economic development and other state-sanc- tioned goals, which were set by the Communist Party and subsequently included in the 5-year plans and annual work targets of the local-level governments in Yanbian. For example, labour export was regarded as a powerful means to pursue such high- priority goals as to achieve a moderately well-off society ( xiaokang shehui), urban- ization, diversification of the rural economy and internationalization (Jin 2003, p. 3; Ximen 2003; Interview 14, 2004). In addition, migration was regarded as a useful means to improve the “quality” ( suzhi) of the rural population.9 Among Chinese of- ficials, the supposed low “quality” of the rural population was generally considered to be the main obstacle to the modernization of China.

In Yanbian, labour export was thus closely related to questions of stability, through factors such as unemployment, inequality, migration-related frauds, ethnic relations and separatism. On these grounds then, I would argue that the proper ad- ministration and promotion of international labour migration in Yanbian was, first and foremost, important on the grounds of social stability, with economic develop- ment, in this case, being of lesser importance. Only when the management of migra- tion had gained strength, stabilizing the field to some extent, did the local govern- ment shift its attention to the economic impact of migration. Overall, in the early years of the 2000s, a new coherent structure for labour migration was gradually emerging, and the network of officially approved service centres, training centres, companies and agents stretched from the prefecture to many villages. In the most cases, these units catered to both domestic and international labour migration.

At the prefecture level, officials only became interested in the remittances when they realized the significant sums these small remittances actually made in total every year. Although the living standard in Yanbian is higher than the provincial average, its overall economic performance still remains well below the average. For example, compared with other autonomous prefectures, its ranking had slipped from second place in 1990 to fifth by 1998 (Li et al. 2002, pp. 47–48). In an effort to improve the economy and restore the higher ranking of Yanbian, authorities viewed these remittances as a partial saviour.

The discussion about the utilization of remittances emerged at the beginning of the 2000s. Among the earliest documents which mention these remittances was a report compiled by the head of the prefecture’s Foreign Trade Bureau, in which it was noted that these were worth the equivalent one-fifth of the prefecture’s GDP. To channel this capital into practical use, he had two suggestions. Firstly, he proposed that special high interest bank accounts should be made available, in order to collect the migrants’ savings into the banking system. Secondly, he made the suggestion that the reward policies designed to encourage people to mediate investments in Yanbian should also be directed toward migrants, so that migrants who thus lent

9 The “quality of the population” is a broad term which can mean one’s level of education, man- ners, moral characteristics or even appearance. Rachel Murphy has defined suzhi as “an amorphous concept that refers to the innate and nurtured physical, intellectual and ideological characteristics of a person”. Although concerns about suzhi applied to the entire population, it was particularly relevant to rural areas, which were associated with backwardness, poverty and lack of culture in general and were considered to need special remedial attention (Murphy 2004).

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their savings to companies could be granted a reward (Ding 2001, p. 154). Another document noted that migrant remittances accounted for 15 % of rural income and that these funds should be utilized for the development of the rural economy (Wang 2001, pp. 22–23).

In 2003, these ideas were formulated into a definitive policy initiative in a docu- ment entitled “Key tasks for the year 2003”, issued by the prefecture government, which contained a proposal that migrant remittances and savings should be turned from “dead into active money” ( ba "si" qian bian "huo"). The document called for measures which would channel migrant savings to both consumer markets and new industries, in order to encourage and fasten the development of new industries (Yanbianzhou renmin zhengfu 2003). However, during my fieldwork trip to Yan- bian in 2004, I was unable to find out which government unit was responsible for the promotion of this proposal and in what ways it was thought to be implemented. I was directed to different government units to make enquiries, which only led to a run-around. Thus, despite such proposals on the injection of the remittances into new industries, they remained widely undisseminated and unimplemented at that time.

The idea was, however, not lost, but rather the opposite. The utilization of remit- tances was incorporated in the policy of “Reinvigorating of the Old Industrial Ba- sis of Northeast China” ( Zhenxing Dongbei laogongye jidi). This state-sanctioned policy urged the Yanbianese leadership to launch initiatives in favour of private en- trepreneurship. To collect funds for new undertakings, a policy document prompted the usage of the large private bank savings in Yanbian as company investments (Zhongguo renmin 2004). In mid-2005, this policy was pushed forward in a speech by the governor of the prefecture, Jin Zhenji, when he stated that since the gov- ernment had by then conducted many studies on the issue, he now had a specific proposal to offer, viz: firstly, he urged that private savings should be collected and channelled into good projects, and secondly, the savers could lend their money to companies, assisted by the banks (Jin 2005c). As set out here, although these ideas were then not new, it was significant that they were now put forward by the gover- nor of the prefecture.

However, my interviewees in government bureaus did not mention these initia- tives, which possibly indicates that they still were at the initial stages. Yet, one local researcher informed me in 2004 about the suggestion to establish an investment centre where migrants could club together their savings and invest them in new en- terprises. This researcher emphasized that as this was a new plan, it had to be stud- ied thoroughly (Interview 13, 2004). This kind of scholarly but cautious approach, which seemed to be common amongst Koreans, partly explains the slow process for these new initiatives. I also heard about plans to launch reintegration policies, which included measures to encourage the returned migrants to use their savings wisely. In practical terms, these proposed reintegration activities would be arranged by a “reception office” ( jiedaiban) for prospective and returning migrants. This office, eventually affiliated with the Department of Commerce, would especially help migrants who returned home after several years abroad through assistance with reintegration, job location and advice on how to invest their savings (Interview 19, 2004). However, similar kinds of ideas were introduced by a local newspaper in

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2008, which indicates that the plans had not yet been materialized (Yanbian Ribao, 11 April 2008).

The government gradually became very keen on the infusion of migrants’ sav- ings into the local economy—or at least so far as in political speeches. An advo- cate for the “new economics of labour migration” school, the economist Edward J. Taylor reasons that the creation of a fertile ground for remittances to contrib- ute to migrant sending areas is the key to promoting development from migration. However, Taylor accepts that it is unrealistic to expect migrants to be competent in transferring savings into production. Therefore, he proposes special measures in order to collect savings from migrant households and to redirect their availabil- ity for local producers (Taylor 1999, p. 74). This was precisely what the Yanbian government planned to do. However, economists seem to be confident with the rationality of the economy planners of migrant sending areas and their commit- ment to sustainable development. Suspicion arose that funds may have disappeared on futile construction projects, or to corruption, and that the development projects based on remittances had only benefited the traditional elite while overlooking the needs of migrant households. Since Yanbian has been unable to demonstrate good performance in the management of its local economy, it is open to question whether local authorities would be the most competent to decide on how to spend migrants’ savings.

Nevertheless, the local banks were eager to collect such remittances into their vaults, so in the early years of the twenty-first century, there was fierce competi- tion between the local banks for these migrant remittances, which gave migrants many effective channels to choose from. Wall and street-side advertisement boards, as well as the sides of buses, were full of advertisements all providing quick and cheap international transfers of money when I visited Yanji, the capital of Yanbian, in 2004. The existence of reliable and cheap channels for remittances has been per- ceived as important for the successful transfer of migrants’ capital, as in the absence of such channels, migrants have to rely on unofficial (therefore often unreliable) agents or organize their savings themselves (Ghosh 1992, pp. 427–428).

In a research report compiled in 2003, a retired leading official, Jin Zhongguo, stressed that returnees should be given an important role in developing the economy and society. This report had circulated around local government bureaus. He pro- posed three ideas on the development of migrant entrepreneurship, viz: first, local government should train and guide returnees to commence business. Secondly, to support this goal, he further suggested that the local media should advice returnees on successful models and negative experiences. He also proposed that the local government should set up a structure for investment cooperation, which could lead and organize returnees to pool their funds and start up joint-stock enterprises. For this, he emphasized the role of non-governmental organizations to generate ideas and help coordinate new economic activities. Finally, he stated that the government should provide returnee entrepreneurs with similar preferential policies as foreign investors received (Jin 2003, pp. 8–9).

The reinvigoration of the Northeast strategy came to the support of these new local ideas, in that it called for the promotion of private entrepreneurship in order

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to create new employment opportunities. The Yanbian Department of Labour and Social Security took the first step in this direction when it initiated a training pro- gramme in 2004 for returnees who wished to start new undertakings. In this pro- gramme, the returnees were offered a choice of suggested projects that were pro- posed by the local authorities. The classes included project planning, which was later evaluated by experts. This training was expected to create a solid basis for new projects (Zhongguo laodongli shichang 2004, 2005). The promotion of entrepre- neurship in Yanbian was also one of the Employment Office’s major tasks assigned for the year 2004 (Yanbian jiuye jianbao 2004).

This training programme seemed to be a watershed in local migration related practices, as return migrants were considered capable of managing projects and had been offered an active role in the local economy. Notably though, the projects which they embarked upon were not their own but were handed to them by the officials. Although an innovative and important initiative, presumably it was not widely dis- seminated in Yanbian, as when asked about initiatives to inject the migrants’ sav- ings and skills into the local economy, my contacts at the Employment Office, the Department of Labour and Social Security and in the Department of Commerce failed to mention this project. If this type of training course does successfully trans- form return migrants into entrepreneurs or project managers, it will add to the argu- ments against the usual claims that migrants are of low “quality” and incapable of pursuing more advanced economic activities.

The development of migrant entrepreneurship may also gain additional support in a change of the status of small and medium-sized companies and the service sector in local development plans. An official document prepared in 2004 empha- sized the expansion of the service sector, especially new fields such as consultation, transportation and judicial services, i.e. business-to-business services, which were regarded as important to support the development of the market economy (Zhong- guo renmin 2004). The governor of the prefecture, Jin Zhenji, developed this policy further in early 2005. He pushed for the creation of a new entrepreneurial culture which could enhance the development of private companies. He also raised the im- portant issue of supportive policies and assistance for entrepreneurs. He even went so far as to suggest that the nurturing of new projects supported by private capital should become a matter attached to the civil servant evaluation system, and the relevant leaders at the prefecture, county and city levels should take responsibility for the proper management and successful implementation of one to two signifi- cant projects (Jin 2005a). To promote this drive, the prefecture arranged a seminar on private entrepreneurship a month later at which Governor Jin gave a speech in which he particularly elevated return migrants as potential sources of new capital for small and medium-sized companies (Jin 2005b). However, it is notable that mi- grants were not portrayed as entrepreneurs, but rather as sources of capital.

With regard to the new migrants, the local government was mainly interested in the remittances of ordinary labour migrants. Generally, the labour migrants’ new ideas and skills were regarded as important, but only at the end of the 2000s did the local government initiate policies to encourage the returnees to start up new undertakings, which themselves were a part of a re-employment campaign under

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the strategy for the reinvigoration of the Northeast. Officials did not launch policies per se to attract successful migrants to return, for if they returned, there was a high risk that they would only add to the unemployment statistics. Thus, the government was initially not that concerned with injecting the labour migrants’ new human and social capital acquired abroad into local economic development. Policies to attract exchange students and professional expatriates to return home were launched by the prefecture, but this took place alongside the national level campaigns and did not involve much enthusiasm.

4.3.2 The Local Conditions

Still, some new migrants and returnees had made investments and established com- panies in Yanbian, but this was done mainly on their own initiative and without any active involvement of the government. The government was not committed to the effective transfer of the wide variety of capital available abroad. Instead, it promoted transfers selectively depending on the demands of the development plans and the rationale of the fixed ways of practices and approaches.

This then raises the question as to why the local government remained indifferent to the full potential of new migrants, other than being only interested in their remit- tances. The reasons for this biased approach might be due to the economic traditions of Northeast China and Yanbian and the stereotypes attached to labour migrants. Due to Yanbian’s position at the border, state interventions in local affairs have been pervasive.10 The role of the state has been further emphasized because Northeast China is a base for state-owned, large-scale, heavy industrial factories, and the dom- inance of state-owned industry has left small-scale private companies in its shadow, as they have not received the attention and appreciation of the regional economy administration. This approach extended to Yanbian and became influential at the onset of the Tumen River Area Development Programme: with this, Yanbian should develop into an international trade hub with the aid of large-scale infrastructural and industrial projects. This model seems to have become stigmatized in the minds of the local officials under the influence of the Tumen Programme hype, who did not regard small-scale ventures as worthy of any attention. This kind of attitude prevailed, as there was no strong tradition of private entrepreneurship in Yanbian to counteract it—neither among the Han Chinese nor the Koreans. The push for a change came from above. The strategy for the reinvigoration of the Northeast, sanctioned from above, placed more emphasis on small and middle-scale compa- nies and the service sector, which triggered a new direction. However, it is still too early to estimate what kind of impact this policy will have in practice. For example,

10 This is in contrast to the experiences of Fujian, which is strategically located at the sea border opposite to Taiwan. There, the state interventions in the local economy were minimal, which al- lowed the local administration to take its own initiative in economic development, and which was aided by a long tradition of entrepreneurship in the region.

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Barry Naughton, a specialist on the Chinese Economy, claims that China’s border regions have suffered significantly from the state-led economic experiments rather than from their absence (Naughton 2004). The centrally sanctioned economic poli- cies have so far had a bad record in border regions. However, this new policy may still prove beneficial.

With regard to the role of labour migrants in the development of local busi- ness, the attitudes of local government were even biased, as labour migrants were, in general, not considered as able to initiate and run businesses. The frequently heard complaint was that their “quality” ( suzhi) was too poor. Furthermore, in the tradition of strong governmental intervention in local affairs, civil servants were accustomed to simply carry out the specific tasks assigned to them, of which the maintenance of public order was one of the central tasks. Migrants themselves only became the object of local policies when the migration business itself became prob- lematic and threatened social stability, and had it not, the local government would probably have remained indifferent to the migration business for longer. However, as government officials began to later learn just how much the otherwise minor remittances actually totalled, they became excited. The accumulating huge sums were something which they could appreciate, but nevertheless, they were incapable in the beginning of promoting any viable policies to direct the remittances into the local economy. Further, the local way of introducing new policies only after thorough studies and enactment of related regulations and laws slowed the pace of any reforms. This style of administration was in stark contrast with the “Cantonese way”, for which it was common to adventurously try out new strategies even before any clear signals of approval had been received from Beijing (Hsing 1996, p. 2251).

One local informant criticized the tardiness of the prefectural government, in that local officials were incapable of finding new practices and did not exercise any own initiative but merely followed orders from above. He explained that in southern China, local governments helped in the collection and investment of for- eign earnings in factories and local infrastructure, for which migrants then became shareholders and entitled to dividends. This kind of practice was still absent in Yan- bian (Interview 1, 2005), although it was mentioned in speeches. Thus, from this example, the true reason for an alleged lack of injection of migrants’ earnings into the local economy may actually lay with the low “quality” ( suzhi) of the officials, and not in that of the migrants.

This then, was one step away from the attitude that prevailed during the hey- days of the Tumen river programme, when industry and infrastructure development had dominated the economic development strategies. Now small and medium-sized companies and the service sector were also elevated to an important position in the plans, and returnee migrants’ capital as a fuel for economic development now became appreciated. However, the migrants themselves, with their new human and social capital, were still not regarded as a force to reinvigorate local business activi- ties. Even the initiative of the Employment Office to train return migrants in busi- ness and project management was only launched initially to reduce unemployment; development of local business was just a useful side effect.

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As of this writing, there are no larger local level studies on the development im- pact of international migration in China, thus it is difficult to make comparisons at this level with other parts of China. Nevertheless, some researchers do acknowledge similarities between domestic and international migration in China,11 and as such, I suggest it is acceptable to compare the impact of Yanbian’s international return migrants with that of domestic return migrants.12

The sending areas of domestic labour migrants have planned and implemented various schemes to inject the new capital acquired by migrants into the local econ- omy. Rachel Murphy’s study on the impact of migration into rural areas of Jiangxi revealed a variety of preferential policies and publicity campaigns aimed to encour- age successful migrants to return and set up companies. For example, one town- ship had established a development zone for returnee business creation. Preferential policies additionally included temporary tax reductions and assistance with access to land, credit and electricity and also confirmed the importance of local govern- ment in the injection of migration benefits. Overall, her research provides examples of the successful incorporation of returnees into local development by the local government (Murphy 2002, pp. 136–141). A study by Gong Weibin on rural migra- tion from Anhui also highlights similar activities. In one of his fieldwork counties, support for migrant entrepreneurship was even regarded as equally important as the proper implementation of the one-child policy, which itself is of the highest concern for local level officials (Gong 1998, pp. 231–233).

However, studies by Murphy and Ma Zhongdong give the impression that, de- spite the rosy promises of local government, excessive claims by local bureaucrats in China had complicated and hindered migrants’ business formation (Murphy 2002, pp. 180–182; Ma 2002, p. 1782). Thus, although local government seems to be the key for successful capital transfers, the modelling of viable programmes still requires the will, time, knowledge and altruism from local authorities.

Other areas outside Yanbian have formulated more advanced policies to inject migrant capital into their own villages and cities. Local officials were aware of some advanced practices in other parts of China, but a more effective compilation and dissemination of the best ones would help local governments to draft policies without a need to affect them through trial and error. Nevertheless, in the end, un- less sanctioned from above, it is in the hands of the local government to decide on

11 Income differentials in China between coastal and inland areas correspond with those between developing and developed countries. Moreover, because of China’s two-tiered social system which excludes rural migrants from the social services of cities, Chinese rural-urban migrants have been in a similar discriminated position as international migrants. A third similarity is the geographical distance between sending and receiving localities. Solinger 1995, pp. 113–139; Kenneth D. Roberts has treated China’s domestic migration as comparable with Mexico-US migration (Roberts 1997). 12 Yanbian also had numerous domestic return migrants who had established enterprises. Yet, in reports and in research they have been left in the shadow of international return migrants. Further, Zheng Yushan estimates that one-fifth of all Korean return migrants in Northeast China (provinces of Heilongjian, Jilin and Liaoning) have set up a company (Zheng 2000).

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implementation. In the case of Yanbian, it would seem that these new policies had to be enforced from above before they were launched.

4.4 Discussion

An inquiry into the acquisition and transfer of migrant capital in the context of Yan- bian disclosed many particular details in the different types of capital that Yanbian Koreans were likely to acquire abroad and the various ways they preferred to use the new capital. The analysis also revealed severe incongruities between the devel- opment potential generated by migration and the actual outcomes.

The Yanbianese peasant-migrants have acted as pioneers, initiating a down- to-top development with the help of their new economic resources, new ideas and skills as well as new networks. The local officials have tried to harness and steer the transfer of the new capital with appropriate measures, but their tool box is outdated, and they seem to be unable to update it. The local government in Yanbian was effective in formulating and implementing policies that promoted migration and capital acquisition, but its abilities to channel the new economic, human and social capital back to Yanbian and into viable development programs were weak. Despite rosy political speeches, few actual practices were established to help migrants to inject their new capital into businesses or development proj- ects. The main reasons for this were the traditional values that belittled the ca- pabilities of peasants and did not appreciate small and middle-sized enterprises (SMEs). Because of the less attractive business environment in Yanbian, it is pre- sumable that the entrepreneurial migrants invested their savings in coastal China, where the conditions for business formation are better. However, the massive migration-generated consumption and the concerted efforts by some migrants to establish SMEs invigorated the local economy and set into motion a process that may lead to the creation of an economic environment that encourages grassroots initiatives and private entrepreneurship.

Going back to the definition of economic development presented in the begin- ning of this chapter, the international labour migration from Yanbian indeed influ- enced economic growth as well as the restructuring of the local economy, and it enhanced the economic wellbeing of a community to some extent, but much of the potential has remained unrealised.

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Yanbian touziwang. (2008). 2007 nian 1-12 yuefen quanzhou shangwu tiaokong zhibiao qing- kuang yilanbiao. http://www.yanbiancom.gov.cn (accessed 24 February 2008).

Yanbianzhou duiwai maoyi jingji hezuoju. (2004). Yanbian chuguo renyuan peixunyuan jianjie. Official Website of the the Yanbian Prefecture Foreign Trade & Economic Cooperation Bureau, link: jigou shezhi. http://invest.yanbian.gov.cn (accessed 24 April 2004).

Yanbianzhou renmin zhengfu. (2003). Zhou renmin zhengfu 2003 nian zhongdian gongzuo. 20 February. Yanbian Ribao [printed newspaper].

Zheng, Y. (2000). Lun dongbei chaoxianzu de duiwai jiaoliu. Manzu yanjiu 1. Zhongguo laodongli shichang. (2004). Yanbian dui guiguo renyuan jinxing chuangye peixun. 1.

June. http://www.lm.gov.cn. Article originally published in Zhongguo laodong baozhangbao (accessed 20 January 2005).

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Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Yanbian chaoxianzu zizhizhou weiyuanhui (2004). Zhou zhengxie guanyu jinyibu tuijin quanmin chuangye de jianyian. 14 July. Official Website of the Zhengxie, link: jianyan xiance, http://www.ybzx.gov.cn (accessed 10 August 2004).

O. Luova

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Chapter 5 Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong: The Paradoxes of Lives Lived on Hold

Gordon Mathews

J. Zhang, H. Duncan (eds.), Migration in China and Asia, International Perspectives on Migration 10, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8759-8_5, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2014

G. Mathews ( ) Department of Anthropology, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China e-mail: [email protected]: [email protected]

Much of this paper is taken from my forthcoming book. Ghetto at the Center of the World: Chungking Mansions, Hong Kong (University of Chicago Press, 2011). The research for this paper has been funded by an Hong Kong RGC Earmarked Research Grant, “Chungking Mansions as a ‘Global Building,’” ID 2110148.

5.1 Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong

Asylum seekers are those who have fled their home countries because of political, ethnic, or religious persecution—or for economic reasons, although this cannot be publicly admitted—and come to a new country to make whatever lives they can for themselves. There are millions of asylum seekers in the world today, with a significant minority traveling from the developing world to the developed world. Many compelling recent books describe the treatment of asylum seekers and refu- gees in the United States, Western Europe, and Australia (see Gibney 2004, Nyers 2006, Brennan 2003, and Moorehead 2005); in this paper I deal particularly with the situation of asylum seekers in Hong Kong. I have been teaching a weekly class of asylum seekers over the past 6 years, which is where much of the ethnographic information in this paper comes from.

There are some 6,000 recognized asylum seekers in Hong Kong as of 2009 (Hong Kong Legislative Council 2009), an increase from less than half that number 2 years earlier (Momphard 2007). Most are from South Asia, with a significant minority from Africa, and a smattering from other countries, although there are none from China, since Hong Kong is itself part of China. Hong Kong’s population is largely made up of those who fled China at some point over the past 60 years (Mathews et al. 2008, pp. 25–26), to some extent resembling in spirit today’s asylum seekers. Hong Kong has long suffered from panics over illegal immigrants, from the outcries

74 G. Mathews

over Vietnamese boat people in the 1980s and 1990s (Chan Wai-kwong 2003), to worries over mainland women seeking to deliver their babies in Hong Kong and thereby make them Hong Kong residents (Altman 2007). However, African and South Asian asylum seekers are quite new in Hong Kong. I am told by asylum seek- ers that the biggest reason why asylum seekers began coming to Hong Kong is that in the wake of 9/11, other nations tightened their visa policies, making Hong Kong an appealing destination (see Frelick 2007, pp. 45–55).

Hong Kong is unusual among societies in the developed world in that it has a largely open border. Arrivals from many societies are given a landing permit at Hong Kong’s airport for 14, 30, or 90 days. This makes Hong Kong easy to travel to as a tourist destination for people from across the globe; but this is also a major reason why Hong Kong has served as a magnet for asylum seekers. Even those who come from countries requiring visas for entry into Hong Kong have a relatively easy time getting in to Hong Kong—very few are turned away at the airport. As one Somali man told me, shaking his head at the stupidity of my question, “Why did I come to Hong Kong? Because I knew they would let me in!”

Most asylum seekers, either at the border or in the days and weeks after en- try into Hong Kong, turn to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which has an office in Hong Kong, to officially declare themselves as asylum seek- ers. The UNHCR may take up to 3 or more years to hear a case, with appeals added to this. Many asylum seekers also turn to the Hong Kong government, which is a signatory of the Convention against torture; these claims also may take many years to evaluate. Once they have surrendered themselves to immigration authorities, asy- lum seekers can obtain HK$ 1,000 in rental assistance each month and HK$ 900 in groceries each month through International Social Services, an NGO commissioned by the Hong Kong government. On this amount it is possible to survive, barely. Asylum seekers tend to be among the well-off in their home countries, as shown by the fact that they were able to come to Hong Kong: many I know were teachers and accountants and bankers back home—making their all-but-penniless status in Hong Kong particularly difficult to bear.

The aim of asylum seekers is to be accepted as refugees and then admitted to a third country to live, such as Canada or the United States. However, only a small number of asylum seekers—most often from countries that are in chaos, such as Somalia—have attained this aim. Others manage to marry Hongkongers or other foreigners, and obtain visa status that way; some return home, and some are de- ported; but most continue to eke out lives year after year in Hong Kong, unable to travel outside the territory, and waiting interminably to have their cases decided.

5.2 “Real” and “Fake” Asylum Seekers

These asylum seekers must convincingly claim to have been persecuted ethnically, religiously, or politically, if they seek refugee status through the UNHCR, or to have been tortured or face the threat of torture if they seek protection through CAT, the

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Convention Against Torture. The organizations they appeal to must decide whether their cases are valid or not, but often this is extraordinarily difficult to do. Torturers and persecutors in developing countries may not leave paper trails documenting their actions: these are reaches far beyond the light that Google may shed. Thus interviewers look for internal consistency in asylum seekers’ accounts, but one who has been tortured or persecuted may not or may no longer have the logical or ora- torical skills to meet the interviewers’ criteria. Who is valid and who is not becomes a game gambling with asylum seeker’s lives hanging on the balance of a scant few hours or minutes of interviewing (see Essed and Wesenbeck 2004, p. 53). Remark- ably few win this game: in 2008, of 1,547 refugee claims evaluated by the UNHCR, only 46 were recognized as valid (Crawford and Tsui 2009): a bit less than 3 %. The Hong Kong government has recognized only one torture claimant thus far, with the growing thousands of others still waiting.

One asylum seeker told me that probably 80 % of asylum seekers are bogus in their claims. That is a huge percentage; however, the longer one looks at the issue of “real” and “fake” asylum seekers, the more complicated the matter becomes (see Daniel and Knudsen 1995; Wilson 2009, pp. 214–215)—the line between “real” and “fake” is so blurry as to be all but indistinguishable.1 There are some asylum seekers who are manifestly genuine. There are others who have left their home countries for the sake of economic gain: they have claimed asylum-seeker status because it enables them to make money in Hong Kong. Many asylum seekers fit neither of these types, but are in the middle between them. It is often very difficult to meet the requirements of the UNHCR or Convention Against Torture even if one has experienced or been threatened with violence. A West African asylum seeker told me that a neighboring family was after his family’s land; one member of this family had threatened to kill him after an acrimonious argument. An East African asylum seeker said that he was running a boat, and it crashed and people drowned— the husband of a woman who died vowed to kill him. An Indian man described to me how “I lost my business selling T-shirts….My creditor said, ‘If you don’t give me my money, I will kill you!’ My mother said, ‘You are my only son. Go some- where else, anywhere!’” It makes sense that these people would flee—their lives seem, to at least to some extent, to have been in danger. However, although these cases involve death threats, they do not involve torture or its threat, or political, religious or ethnic persecution; rather, they are more personal disputes. Thus they “don’t count” according to UNHCR or CAT guidelines.

I know several asylum seekers who wear their claims directly on their bodies. One is a Sri Lankan with a bullet lodged in his femur. He showed me the X-rays, which he always carries with him—he was shot illegally by police, and remains in grave danger, he claimed. Another is from Bangladesh, and always wears dark glasses; he was blinded in prison, he says, when prison guards forced him to stare

1 One asylum seeker who read this chapter has advised against the use of these terms, since the line is so unclear: “You’re saying that some people are entirely genuine and other people are entirely not, but that’s not the way it is.” His point is valid; however, because these terms are so often used, I retain them, albeit in quotation marks.

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at the sun for hours by taping open his eyelids. However, these claims will not hold up without corroborating evidence. How can the Sri Lankan prove that he was ille- gitimately shot by police rather than shot in an accident? How can the Bangladeshi prove that he was blinded in prison? The claims of these asylum seekers are on their bodies, but this is not enough. They can only hope that there is some public record that will corroborate their claims.

Some asylum seekers are flamboyantly lying. One West African told me this story. When small, he was forced to join a religious sect; when he was 20, he found out that the sect planned to castrate him on his 21st birthday, so that he would not be attracted to women but would unconditionally love God. He hurriedly escaped and fled deep into the jungle; in hiding, he met two Australian men, who, after he showed them a vial of diamonds his late mother had given him, agreed to help him. They gave him a drink, drugged; he lost consciousness. For an indefinite period, he drifted in and out of consciousness in a dark enclosed space, a ship’s hold, he sur- mised; they continuously gave him more to drink. Eventually, his head cleared, and he woke up: he was in a vacant lot in Hong Kong, with no diamonds, no money, no passport and no idea how he’d gotten there. I told him that no one would ever be- lieve this story; he had seen too many bad adventure movies. But he was adamant.

I had trouble suppressing my laughter when I heard this story, and indeed, UN- HCR personnel have told me that one problem they face is that of interviewers keeping a straight face before the outlandish stories asylum seekers may tell. There is, a UNHCR official told me, a standard story from Nigerians that they hear over and over again: “My father was a king, and I was supposed to eat his heart after he died, so that I would inherit his mantle. My mother was Christian, and refused to let me eat his heart. Not only my community, but also the spirits hate me for this; my life is being threatened, and so I can’t go back.” This story is told over and over and over again; as a UNHCR official told me, “We have to work hard not to laugh out loud when we hear one more story like that.”

However, even for a story such as this, one cannot be sure what is genuine. A West African asylum seeker showed me a detailed account from the internet con- cerning sons of chiefs and the pressure they are under, and how some of them are persecuted, particularly if they have embraced Christianity, as has he. His own case was rejected by the UNHCR—possibly to their stifled laughter?—and he turned to the Convention Against Torture to make his claim, whose verdict he still awaits. Re- cently, he showed me several letters that he had received from academic specialists in the United Kingdom and elsewhere attesting to the plausibility of his claims. He may have been a victim at the UNHCR of having a true story that ran too closely to the false story that the Nigerians are all telling.

The asylum seekers I know occasionally discuss when it is appropriate to lie to the UNHCR or to Hong Kong authorities. I consistently hear that it is wrong to make up a story that has no truth, but very often one must to some extent distort reality simply to have a clear-cut and easily comprehensible story line: “The situa- tion is actually so complicated that you must make it plainer and simpler for them.” This is particularly felt to be necessary because the UNHCR personnel are often

775 Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong: The Paradoxes of Lives Lived on Hold

seen as callow and ignorant—“She didn’t even know where my country was! How can she judge my case?” In a larger, procedural sense, because the UNHCR, unlike the Hong Kong government, has not allowed asylum seekers to correct or even see the transcripts of interviews written up by its caseworkers, there is the potential for mistakes to be made—making lying all the more necessary in some asylum seek- ers’ views. But embellishing or simplifying one’s story carries its own risk. The UNHCR and the Hong Kong authorities emphasize consistency in asylum seekers’ accounts. The danger in lying is that one may slip up and say something inconsistent with one’s earlier account, dooming one’s chances of becoming a refugee: some- thing that has severely hurt the credibility of several asylum seekers I know.

An asylum seeker once told me that if a person is tortured, or has seen someone in their family killed, they will always have that in at least the back of their minds; it never goes away. He acknowledged that he himself has recurring nightmares of the terrible things he saw in Somalia. He maintained that many of the asylum seekers from West Africa or South Asia must necessarily be “fake” asylum seekers, economic migrants, because they seem too happy. I do not know how true this may be. One asylum seeker spoke in a remarkably light-hearted way in my class about torture, making me wonder if he could really have experienced intense suffering in his own life; but then I learned that he had recently been released from a mental hospital in Hong Kong—he too had demons, although not demons that he chose to show to me. How many of the asylum seekers I know have indeed experienced awful things, and hide those in their public faces, and how many have never gone through such experiences? It is perhaps obscene to even ask, but I can’t help but wonder. I remember one extraordinary night in which, alone long after midnight, an asylum seeker from Central Africa confided to me that he had adopted his brother’s name because he himself was responsible for his brother’s death—the authorities were looking for him, and he had hid: they killed his brother instead. He sobbed inconsolably for half an hour. After that night, I never saw him again.

I have visited two asylum seeker’s families over the past 2 years, one in South Asia, one in East Africa. My asylum seeker friend from South Asia is a man of enor- mous, stubborn principle. I saw his family—his mother, father and sisters—in the home of his relatives, and brought his private letters to them. They were very much from the countryside and said little, although they were clearly overjoyed to see an emissary from their son; through an interpreter, I heard his story from his father, a man in his sixties. “My son’s problem was that from the outset, he refused to join the army. Lots of people did that, and paid off the authorities; but he refused to pay off anyone—he was doing this out of principle….I have lost several jobs because he refused to serve; but I respect what he is doing.” The father told me that the son’s secondary school teacher said, “He is so smart. Why are they doing this to him and not to other people?” His son had been arrested, imprisoned, and tortured by au- thorities, using electric shocks; he subsequently fled three times, to different nearby countries, but each time the lure of his family and friends pulled him back—where- by he was be arrested and tortured again. Finally he fled for good, and traveled overland thousands of miles to Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, the same principles that

78 G. Mathews

cause him not to join the army cause him not to work, since it is against the law, and also to be unable to sleep at night, stewing endlessly over his situation. His father died a year after I spoke with him; his son remains stuck in Hong Kong indefinitely.

I visited another asylum seeker’s family in East Africa. I stayed with his cousin, a young politician for the government party, who told me, “Yes, he was threatened; he was a member of the opposition. But you have to somehow cross the line to have them threaten to kill you: he must have crossed that line….But I don’t know, because I can’t really talk to him. My phone is tapped.” Another relative is a promi- nent government minister, with whom I had a long dinner—a jovial and sensitive man who could not really voice support for the child he had raised into adulthood: it was as if my friend the asylum seeker in Hong Kong was a well-meaning eccentric who unaccountably and tragically had ventured down the wrong path in his life by opposing the government. I later had the chance to meet his wife and children—al- most unspeaking and dressed in their Sunday best—to whom I brought the array of presents my asylum-seeker friend and I had bought them; and I met his brother, who had the most telling word. I mentioned that in reading the local newspapers, I saw the harsh criticisms of the government by various prominent opposition figures. Couldn’t my friend have spoken out as they did and been safe, as they apparently were? He said, “They’re famous. The government can’t jail or kill them—they’re too well known. But my brother is not famous: the police could easily kill him.” Indeed, the next day, a low-level opposition figure was murdered by police, an oc- currence duly covered in the newspapers; the culprits, by the time I left, had not been found. Although many asylum seekers may have manufactured claims, these two were clearly and manifestly real.

5.3 The Lives of Asylum Seekers

Because it may take months for asylum seekers to receive the requisite paperwork enabling shelter or rent assistance, some have experienced long periods of sleep- ing outside, in parks or underpasses. When the paperwork finally comes through, the basic physical necessities of life are more or less taken care of, but other wor- ries remain. Some asylum seekers are convinced that secret police from home are after them, a fear that sometimes may be far-fetched, but in other cases is not. Oth- ers have trouble comprehending that their lives have come to this strange current state. I had a long conversation with a Bengladeshi asylum seeker, who said that until very recently he was a wealthy businessman, but he had supported the wrong political party—supporters of a different party came and beat him up. He then left Bangladesh, leaving his wife and daughter behind. As a reminder of his earlier life, he showed me his Global Visa credit card, expired less than a year before, once his ticket to all the globe, but now only a worthless reminder of who he once was. I know of another asylum seeker consumed with guilt because, even with the tiny allowance he gets from the Hong Kong government, he is able to lead a better life

795 Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong: The Paradoxes of Lives Lived on Hold

than the Chinese family leaving next door to him: “They have terrible bedbugs. I can tell from the laundry they hang out.” He hopes that they will never find out that he is aided by the Hong Kong government in his life, as they are not, even though he is utterly poverty-stricken by most Hong Kong standards.

The two different paths of asylum seekers in Hong Kong are those who work and those who refuse to work. Some asylum seekers—often although by no means al- ways those who do not have legitimate cases to make—work, and send their money home. Most struggle on extremely low wages, but a few have managed to make significant business niches for themselves. Other asylum seekers—those who are idealists, strict abiders of the law, or in some cases simply lazy—do not work. Some of those who do not work are, paradoxically, those who could benefit Hong Kong the most if they did—they are political leaders and dissidents in their home coun- tries, and are remarkably intelligent and insightful. But they also are those who most insistently seek to follow the letter of the law, because if they worked and were caught, they might be sent back to their countries and face imprisonment, torture, and perhaps death.

It is often assumed that “fake” asylum seekers are those who work, while “real” asylum seekers are those who do not work; but here too there are many shades of gray. Some asylum seekers are consumed with worry about their families, and are willing to take considerable risks to be able to send money home. Some kinds of work—for example, arranging to send goods to trusted confederates back home for subsequent payment—are difficult for any authorities to trace, as long as certain precautions are used, such as having money wired under a friend’s name. However, to engage in such work, one needs to have reliable African connections, which may be difficult, given the fact that the asylum seeker is indefinitely stuck in Hong Kong. People back in Africa, I’m told, often believe that asylum seekers in Hong Kong are wealthy, and so the money asylum seekers send back home for investment may simply be spent by family members or friends who have their own pressing needs.

Asylum seekers who cannot manage to engage in trade may try other kinds of low-risk work, such as guiding African traders newly arrived in Hong Kong for a hoped-for commission. At one class I taught, a working asylum seeker declaimed at length about how asylum seekers should “get off your asses and work.” He de- scribed how he went to a junkyard and photographed car parts with his mobile phone, and then showed African traders what was available, for a cut of the profits. “Anyone can do this,” he said. The response of some asylum seekers was to declare, “That’s illegal! I won’t do that! I believe in obeying the law”; others said, after he left, “I don’t believe him—I think he’s working for the Hong Kong government and trying to entrap us.” The working asylum seeker later exclaimed to me, “Most asylum seekers are lazy. They don’t want to work! They’d rather get a handout than work for themselves. This is why Africa is so poor and controlled by white people!”

My own observation is that those who work tend to be better able to deal with all the psychological difficulties of being an asylum seeker, in that they have some- thing to keep them occupied day after day. One of the biggest difficulties in asylum seekers’ lives in Hong Kong is the potent combination of uncertainty, boredom, and

80 G. Mathews

a sense of their lives being stalled. Those who do not work literally sit around all day with nothing meaningful to do. I occasionally give a little moral lecture to the asylum seekers I know: “Yes, you’ve suffered. But you’ve been given time. Don’t work if you don’t feel it’s right, but at least study. Go to the library and read every day!” Some have more or less followed my advice, but the capriciousness of their existences made this hard for most.

What might these asylum seekers become? On the one hand, there are those for- tunate souls who are granted refugee status. A number of the Somalis I know have been granted such status; one mused to me about terrible Somalia was, but how lucky he himself was, paradoxically, to be from a country in such turmoil, since that enabled him to gain refugee status. I asked him about his family, if he phoned them often, and he explained that they’ve vanished. He has a rough idea where they are now, but he has no way to contact them and doesn’t know if he’ll ever see them again, since going back to such chaos would be a death sentence for him. He, on the other hand, will soon enough be an utterly new man in a new country with an utterly new life. On the other hand, there is the far larger number of people who are refused. I once asked two of my students what they would do if they weren’t granted refugee status, and they said they would kill themselves. I know of no one among the asylum seekers who has actually committed suicide, but these comments do show the depths of despair that refusal of their claims may lead to: even if they are not repatriated (as most are indeed not), their lives remain in limbo.

It is not surprising that asylum seekers do anything they possibly can to gain refugee status. Once, a Nepalese asylum seeker, a Christian, came to my class in a state of fury. “A pastor baptized a bunch of Nepalis today even though they’d only been in Hong Kong five days! They don’t know anything about the Bible! They don’t know Christianity! They just want to become Christians so that they can get refugee status somewhere!” Western countries, it is commonly believed, more read- ily accept Christians than those who are not Christians. He was offended because he had been constantly studying the Bible himself, and resented those who embraced the faith opportunistically—and those, like the pastor, who abetted this. Another way to break out of the limbo of being an asylum seeker is to find a girlfriend with Hong Kong residence, and marry her; as long as the marriage continues, these asylum seekers will not be deported. Many of the girlfriends of asylum seekers are Filipina or Indonesian domestic helpers, who by the terms of their contracts are forbidden to marry. Other relationships are much harder to form, since they typi- cally require money, something that most asylum seekers do not have. Sometimes older Western women form such relationships, to the scorn of some asylum seek- ers: “These women are using black men, trapping them,” I have heard. One asylum seeker I know has a Hong Kong girlfriend, the holy grail sought by so many, but refuses to marry her. “What if you marry, and the relationship doesn’t work out?… For the first four years, the wife has to write to immigration once a week to say that they’re still married. I’d rather try to get refugee status on my own…” Asylum seekers tend to keep quiet about who they are to their girlfriends. One case involved an asylum seeker who suddenly died, apparently of a heart attack; his well-dressed

815 Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong: The Paradoxes of Lives Lived on Hold

Filipina girlfriend was seen crying out, “He’s been lying to me all this time! He said that he was in business!”

5.4 The Changing Treatment of Asylum Seekers

Over the course of my research, there have been significant changes in how asylum seekers are treated. Before 2006, asylum seekers were dealt with primarily through the UNHCR and its office in Hong Kong, which was unable to handle the flood of asylum seekers that began to arrive. For a period in 2006–2007, the UNHCR began providing not formal letters, but merely appointment slips, which were not suffi- cient to give legal protection. During this time, asylum seekers were regularly sub- ject to arrest by the Hong Kong police; when the asylum seekers I knew saw a po- liceman, they would quickly scurry away, particularly because asylum seekers were detained for an arbitrary and indefinite time, ranging from a month to 6 months or more. Asylum seekers from Asia and Africa were new in Hong Kong, and it seems apparent that the Hong Kong government had no set policy, except to lock them up indefinitely to discourage more from coming. Many asylum seekers I knew, espe- cially Africans, visible as outsiders in Hong Kong, stayed in their rooms day after day for fear of arrest.

Hong Kong mass media, especially English-language mass media, soon began discussing the injustice of this situation; as the South China Morning Post editorial- ized (2006), “Hong Kong’s Treatment of Asylum Seekers [is] Shameful.” Asylum seekers themselves engaged in protests, marching on the UNHCR headquarters; some 30 African asylum seekers, locked up in detention for months, went on hun- ger strikes as a way of protesting their situation (see Ng 2007). Various Hong Kong legislators came to visit them, as did too the Director of Immigration in Hong Kong. Apparently as a result of these protests, the Hong Kong government made the stay in detention for asylum seekers more limited, often little more than a week. After detention, which is meted out as punishment for breaking Hong Kong immigration laws, the asylum seeker is provided with identity papers—a laminated plastic sheet that all asylum seekers carry in lieu of a passport or Hong Kong ID card—that prevents them from being jailed again for immigration offenses, at least until their cases have been decided.

Beginning in 2007, asylum seekers, on the advice of human rights lawyers in Hong Kong, began turning to CAT, the Convention Against Torture as their avenue to gain refugee status, instead of or as well as the UNHCR. The Hong Kong gov- ernment is a signatory to the Convention Against Torture, as it is not to other UN conventions, and given the difficulties of the UNHCR in handling its backlog of cases and its perceived indifference towards the plight of many asylum seekers, it seemed to make increasing sense to go through the Hong Kong government—even if refugee status in a third country was impossible to get through the Hong Kong government, and the Hong Kong government granted residence status to almost no

82 G. Mathews

asylum seekers within its own shores. The UNHCR cannot be sued, unlike the Hong Kong government; the UNHCR has no one in Hong Kong that it must answer to.2 Lawsuits by human rights lawyers on behalf of asylum seekers have been the major factor in shaping the Hong Kong government’s evolving policy towards asylum seekers.

Through all my years of involvement with asylum seekers, it has been difficult to hear a good word for UNHCR, which is viewed by many asylum seekers as be- ing incompetent and arbitrary in its judgments. On the other hand, the Hong Kong police and government are generally viewed favorably. A UNHCR official I spoke with said that one reason why the UNHCR is held in such low esteem is that asylum seekers tend to view the UN in highly idealized terms, and thus its mistakes are seen as unforgivable. But the Hong Kong police are compared to the police in asy- lum seekers’ home countries, and the fact that in Hong Kong the police do not take bribes and are relatively fair is seen as amazing.

Rumors have spread among asylum seekers that claimants denied by the Hong Kong government may be sent home against their will: “If you appeal your denied claim and lose, they can take you away right there. You’ll be sedated and sent back to your home country with no one knowing.” However, from all I’ve been told, the Hong Kong government does not forcibly deport asylum seekers whose claims have been denied, but seeks them to agree to be repatriated, a repatriation that the Hong Kong government apparently pays for. As one asylum seeker told me, “The police may put you in a cell and leave you there for months on end, but they won’t get im- migration to deport you unless you yourself request it.” The only exception to this rule is those convicted of overt criminal acts, but even then deportation is quite rare, apparently. Because so few claimants gain refugee status and so few are deported, the number of asylum seekers continues to grow and grow in Hong Kong, with no resolution in sight. This situation—shaped in part by the ongoing stream of cases brought to the courts by human rights lawyers—cannot be sustained, and something must eventually give way.

5.5 The Future of Asylum in Hong Kong and Elsewhere

The asylum seekers I know in Chungking Mansions seek, above all, to be allowed to legally work in Hong Kong, but this would lead to many thousands of new asylum seekers flooding into the territory. Indeed, this is exactly what happened between March 2009, when a court ruling allowed asylum seekers to legally work, although their employers would still be prosecuted (Tsui 2009), and November 2009, when

2 This is apparently true not just in Hong Kong. Barbara Harrell-Bond writes that, “As one United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) management consultant acknowledged, ‘We work for no other organization in the political, governmental, or commercial world which has such an absence of mechanisms for determining citizen or consumer satisfaction’” (2002, p. 53). The UNHCR, by the accounts of some of my more knowledgeable informants, has a better reputation outside Hong Kong than within Hong Kong.

835 Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong: The Paradoxes of Lives Lived on Hold

work by asylum seekers again became illegal, punishable by a 3-year prison sen- tence. The massive influx of new asylum seekers during these few months, many of whom were South Asians entering Hong Kong from China by small boat under cover of night, led the government to hurriedly revise the law. Five hundred asylum seekers staged a protest against the Hong Kong government over this revision: as one newly arrived Pakistani asylum seeker told me, “People who steal or take drugs in Hong Kong only get put in prison for a few months. But people working without the right papers are jailed for 3 years! It’s unfair!” He joined the protest, but, of course, to no avail—he eventually stopped working, for fear of being caught and prosecuted.

Hong Kong could no doubt assimilate many more thousands of asylum seek- ers than government officials admit, especially given the high intellectual level of many (who would make wonderful English teachers and cultural ambassadors in secondary schools). At the time of this writing, the Hong Kong government is mak- ing plans to consolidate and speed up the processes by which asylum seekers are screened. (Hong Kong Legislative Council 2009); it is widely speculated that the Hong Kong government will within the next several years sign the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which would cause Hong Kong to take full responsibility for asylum seekers, taking over from the UNHCR. If this were to take place, it would dramatically change the situation of asylum seek- ers: if Hong Kong government investigators can, after suitable training, speed up the decision-making process as to the fate of asylum seekers, then it seems possible that Hong Kong will no longer be a haven for economic asylum seekers. On the other hand, it may well be that Hong Kong government investigators will be no bet- ter able than UNHCR officials to determine who is justified and who is not among asylum seekers—and if an asylum seeker is sent home and is subsequently killed, the media outcry would be unbearable for the Hong Kong government.

Hong Kong is a contradictory place in terms of human rights, as is, in a larger sense, the developed world as a whole.3 One key contradiction is the gap between political human rights and legal and economic rights, with the former recognized as reasons for seeking asylum, but the latter not. Why should this arbitrary distinction be seen as valid? A second contradiction is that those asylum seekers who are most eloquent, most quick-witted, or most able to evoke the sympathy of their interview- ers are those most able to win asylum seeker status. Both the articulate and the inarticulate may be tortured; but the intellectually and emotionally articulate retain a great advantage in being able to persuade others as to the reality of their experi- ence. A third contradiction is that almost as a rule the asylum seekers who break the rules and work are far happier than those who follow the rules and do not work. If an asylum seeker works illegally, then that person will be able to have a better life

3 These contradictions are the case far beyond Hong Kong. Among other evocative discussions, see Englund (2006) for a glimpse into how human rights activism paradoxically furthers the op- pression of the poor in Malawi; see Verdirame and Harrell-Bond (2005) on how human rights or- ganizations and refugee relief policies throughout the developing world effectively deny refugees their human rights.

84 G. Mathews

in Hong Kong, and also be able to send money back home, to support one’s family and build up a nest egg for the future; the person will also be kept busy in their new enterprise. This opportunity does not exist for those principled people who refuse to work. All in all, to be an asylum seeker who strictly adheres by the rules is a ter- rible fate: to break the rules—particularly if one is savvy enough to go into private enterprise, as a middleman or entrepreneur—may lead to a reasonably good life.

One matter that should be clear from all that I have written is the strange position of Hong Kong in the world. Hong Kong is part of China, but unlike China, Hong Kong recognizes and accepts asylum seekers in its territory, at least on a temporary basis. It can do this because of “one country, two systems,” whereby Hong Kong in large part keeps its own immigration controls. At the same time, Hong Kong does not recognize asylum seekers from China, which it cannot do, since it is itself part of China. Hong Kong, uniquely in the world, is both part of its mother country and yet autonomous in its decisions as to whom to allow in its borders. This is why, while many South Asian and African businesspeople go to mainland China as well as to Hong Kong, asylum seekers from these societies do not go to mainland China, but only to Hong Kong.

Hong Kong’s borders, as earlier discussed, are remarkably open compared to other developed-world societies. Such openness maximizes Hong Kong’s capacity to take in both businesspeople and tourists; it remains financially worthwhile for Hong Kong to have such open borders. If the numbers of asylum seekers continue to grow, however, Hong Kong’s open immigration policies will have to change— Hong Kong will become more like other developed countries and regions, especial- ly those that are crowded, such as Western Europe, Japan, and Korea, in restricting immigration much more severely. There are signs that this has been happening over the past several years.

This may be a bad thing for Hong Kong in the long run. There is evidence that the tightening of borders in the United States has contributed to economic down- turn, since it has restricted the flow of highly educated and motivated immigrants from such societies as India and China. Some of the asylum seekers I know in Hong Kong are able to make large amounts of money in Hong Kong, tens of thousands of dollars each month, even though they lack a Hong Kong ID Card. If they had Hong Kong ID Cards, they would be able to provide substantial benefits to Hong Kong society, employing Hong Kong people. Those asylum seekers who lack business skills can contribute in other ways—many of the asylum seekers I know were politi- cal leaders and intellectuals in their home societies: they could greatly contribute to Hong Kong education if only they were allowed to do so.

A final thought. Human rights regimes around the world do not recognize the pursuit of economic well-being as a right, but perhaps they should. Ultimately, does the world really need passports? Writers of late (such as Altman 2007) have dis- cussed whether the global regime of national passport controls should be abolished, to let the market alone decide where workers from across the globe might go in search of opportunities for employment and wealth. If this radical step were taken, then the immigration regimes that have been fundamental to states over the past 150 years would give way, and there would be a massive influx of the poor traveling to the cities of the rich in search of freedom or work. Would the worldwide labor

855 Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong: The Paradoxes of Lives Lived on Hold

market eventually lead to an equilibrium? Or would the result simply be global chaos? With worldwide immigration regimes in the countries of the rich becoming increasingly inundated, perhaps the world as a whole will find out. It may be that the asylum seekers in Hong Kong, in all their different individual stories, provide in microcosm a glimpse into the developed world’s future.

References

Altman, D. (2007). Bypassing barriers for a passport. Managing globalization series, International Herald Tribune. 7 Feb.

Brennan, F. (2003). Tampering with Asylum: A Universal humanitarian problem. St. Lucia: Uni- versity of Queensland Press.

Chan Wai-kwong, O. (2003). From refugee camp to city streets: The different lives of young Viet- namese in Hong Kong. M. Phil. Thesis, Dept. of Anthropology, Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Crawford, B., & Tsui, Y. (2009). Reopen refugee camps, say south Asians. South China Morning Post. 8 March.

Daniel, E. V., & Knudsen, J. C. (Eds.). (1995). Mistrusting refugees. Berkeley: University of Cali- fornia Press.

Englund, H. (2006). Prisoners of freedom: Human rights and the African poor. Berkeley: Univer- sity of California Press.

Essed, P., & Wesenbeck, R. (2004). Contested refugee status: Human rights ethics, and social re- sponsibilities. In P. Essed, G. Frerks, & J. Schrijvers (Eds.), Refugees and the transformations of societies. New York: Berghahn Books.

Frelick, B. (2007). Paradigm shifts in the International responses to refuges. In J. D. White & A. J. Marsella (Eds.), Fear of persecution: Global human rights, International law, human well- being. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Gibney, M. J. (2004). The ethics and politics of asylum: Liberal democracy and the response to refugees. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Harrell-Bond, B. (2002). Can humanitarian work with refugees be humane? Human Rights Quar- terly, 24: 51–85.

Hong Kong Legislative Council. (2009). Panel on securiy of the legislative council torture claim screening mechanism. LC Paper No. CB(2)2514/08-09(01). http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/ english/panels/se/papers/se0706cb2-2054-1-e.pdf.

K. C. Ng (2007). Asylum seekers on 3-Day hunger strike. South China Morning Post, 17 Oct. Mathews, G., Kit-wai Ma, E., & Tai-lok, L. (2008). Hong Kong, China: Learning to belong to a

nation. London: Routledge. Momphard, D. (2007). No man’s land: Asylum seekers endure a grim waiting game as their fate is

decided. South China Morning Post. 20 July. Moorehead, C. (2005). Human cargo: A journey among refugees. London: Chatto & Windus. Nyers, P. (2006). Rethinking refugees: Beyond states of emergency. New York: Routledge. South China Morning Post. (2006). HK’s treatment of Asylum seekers shameful. Editorial, 7 July. Tsui, Y. (2009). Asylum seekers allowed to work. South China Morning Post. 3 March. Verdirame, G., & Harrell-Bond, B. (2005). Rights in exile: Janus-faced humanitarianism. New

York: Berghahn Books. Wilson, R. (2009). Representing human rights violations: Social contexts and subjectivities. In M.

Goodale (Ed.), Human rights: An anthropological reader. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Part II International Migration and Marriage

89

Chapter 6 Socio-Cultural Consequences of International Marriages in Korea: Emergence of Multiculturalism?

Hyup Choi

J. Zhang, H. Duncan (eds.), Migration in China and Asia, International Perspectives on Migration 10, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8759-8_6, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2014

H. Choi ( ) Department of Anthropology, Chonnam National University, GwangJu, South Korea e-mail: [email protected]

6.1 Introduction

Korea has been known as one of the world’s few ethnically homogeneous nations, and such racial/cultural homogeneity has been a source of national pride among many Koreans. However, recent forces of globalization and stark demographic trends have led to a dramatic change in terms of ethnic diversity in Korea.

While the belief in homogeneity of Korean society still persists at ideological level, the reality is increasingly changing in many ways. All the statistics indicate that the number of foreigners coming to Korea in search of the ‘Korean Dream’ has been on the rise since 1990s, and more and more foreign women marrying Korean men. Thus, international marriages and multi-ethnic families are becoming impor- tant social issues to be discussed in Korea today. A steep increase of international marriages between immigrant women and Korean men draws our particular atten- tion as such phenomenon involves many important anthropological questions. The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on this recent phenomenon of Korean men marrying immigrant women, so as to assess their implications for Korean so- ciety. In doing so, special attention will be given to the international marriages in rural Korea, as such international marriages are more widely observed in rural areas than urban cities.

This article is a revised version of the paper presented at the International Conference on “Migration in China and Asia” held in Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China, during May 20–21, 2010.

90 H. Choi

6.2 The Myth of Homogeneity and International Marriage

Despite general belief in racial homogeneity, Koreans today no longer strictly ad- here to the long tradition of intra-national marriage. In 2005, international marriag- es accounted for 13.6 % of all marriages in Korea, a dramatic increase from 1.2 % in 1990. The government statistics show that, in 1990, there were 4,710 marriages between Koreans and non-Koreans, and the most of them were marriages between Korean women and foreign husbands. In 2005, there were 43,121 international mar- riages, and this time the majority was Korean men marrying foreign brides as 88 % of the marriage immigrants were women.

Table 6.1 reveals some interesting facts. First, the Korean men’s rate of inter- national marriage started to increase in 1992, when Korea reestablished official diplomatic relations with China. It is worthy of note that there are a large number of Korean-Chinese population in China. Second, it shows that, from 1995, the number of men participating in international marriages surpassed that of women.

Up until the 1980s, international marriages were largely confined to Korean women marrying foreign husbands, and many of these marriages took place in the context of American military presence in South Korea, out-migrating after their marriages (Yuh 2002). However, entering into the 1990s, immigrant foreign spouses became visible population in Korea. At first, most of the international

Table 6.1  International Marriage in Korea, Number of Cases and Rates, 1990–2007 (Unit: No., %). (Source: Korea National Statistical Office, Population Dynamics (Marriage and Divorce)) Year Total Marriage International Marriage Foreign Wives Foreign Husbands

No. No. % No. % No % 1990 399,312 4,710 1.2 619 0.2 4,091 1.0 1991 416,872 5,012 1.2 663 0.2 4,349 1.0 1992 419,774 5,534 1.3 2,057 0.5 3,477 0.8 1993 402,593 6,545 1.6 3,109 0.8 3,436 0.9 1994 393,121 6,616 1.7 3,072 0.8 3,544 0.9 1995 398,484 13,494 3.4 10,365 2.6 3,129 0.8 1996 434,911 15,946 3.7 12,647 2.9 3,299 0.8 1997 388,591 12,448 3.2 9,266 2.4 3,182 0.8 1998 375,616 12,188 3.2 8,054 2.1 4,134 1.1 1999 362,673 10,570 2.9 5,775 1.6 4,795 1.3 2000 334,030 12,319 3.7 7,304 2.2 5,015 1.5 2001 320,063 15,234 4.8 10,006 3.1 5,228 1.6 2002 306,573 15,913 5.2 11,017 3.6 4,896 1.6 2003 304,932 25,658 8.4 19,214 6.3 6,444 2.1 2004 310,944 35,447 11.4 25,594 8.2 9,853 3.2 2005 316,375 43,121 13.6 31,180 9.9 11,941 3.8 2006 332,752 39,690 11.9 30,208 9.1 9,482 2.8 2007 345,590 38,491 11.1 – – – – 1990–2007 6,563,206 318,936 4.8 190,150a 3.1a 90,295a 1.5a a These figures for 1990–2006

916 Socio-Cultural Consequences of International Marriages in Korea

marriage took a form of marriage immigrants from China, and then the countries of origin of the marriage immigrants gradually diversified through time. In recent years, Vietnam is emerging as the most popular country for finding marriage partners. The number of Chinese and Vietnamese women marrying Korean males in 2000 was 3,566 and 77 respectively (cf. National Statistical Office data). How- ever, the trend finally reversed in the year of 2011, as the number of Vietnamese women marring Korean males surpassed that of Chinese women: 7,549 Chinese women vs. 7,636 Vietnamese women. The brides from Philippines also showed a considerable increase. Table 6.2 provides a more detailed information concern- ing the nationalities of foreign spouses during the time span of the last ten years or so.

If we look at the distribution of national origin of brides, the following summary can be made. First, up until 2005, the major portion of brides come from China. In 2005, more than 20,000 Chinese females married Korean males. Since then, the share of Chinese brides has been declining in recent years. Second, the most im- pressive increase was observed in Vietnamese females, reaching the peak to 10,128 brides in 2006, although the number fell slightly thereafter. Third, the countries which ‘provide’ brides to Korean males have been diversified and it seems countries such as the Philippines, Thailand, Mongolia, and Cambodia are becoming impor- tant (Kim et al. 2007, p. 186).

Table 6.2  International Marriage by Nationalities. (Source: Korea National Statistical Office, Population Dynamics(Marriage and Divorce)) Nationalities/Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Korean husband + foreign wives China 18,489 20,582 14,566 14,484 13,203 11,364 9,623 7,549 Vietnam 2,461 5,822 10,128 6,610 8,282 7,249 9,623 7,636 Philippines 947 980 1,117 1,497 1,857 1,643 1,906 2,072 Japan 809 883 1,045 1,206 1,162 1,140 1,193 1,124 Cambodia 72 157 394 1,804 659 851 1,205 961 Thailand 324 266 271 524 633 496 438 354 U.S.A. 341 285 331 376 344 416 428 507 Mongolia 504 561 594 745 521 386 326 266 Others 1,158 1,183 1,219 1,334 1,502 1,597 1,532 1,796 Korean wives +

foreign husbands Japan 3,118 3,423 3,412 3,349 2,743 2,422 2,293 1,709 China 3,618 5,037 2,589 2,486 2,101 2,617 2,090 1,869 U.S.A. 1,332 1,392 1,443 1,334 1,347 1,312 1,516 1,632 Canada 227 283 307 374 371 332 403 448 Australia 132 101 137 158 165 159 178 216 England 120 104 136 125 144 166 194 195 Germany 109 85 126 98 115 110 135 114 Pakistan 100 219 150 134 117 104 102 126 Others 779 993 794 922 939 936 1,050 1,188

92 H. Choi

It is also noted that the percentage of international marriage in recent years has been particularly high in rural communities, where demographic factors are forcing rural men to “import” brides from abroad. Nationwide, 35.7 % of all marriages that were recorded in rural communities in 2008 were international marriages, over half of which were between Korean men and Vietnamese women.1 Then, why is that the number of international marriages is growing especially rapidly in the countryside since the 1990s? To answer this question, we must examine several factors, interna- tional as well as domestic.

6.3 Some Explanations for International Marriages

6.3.1 Political Economy of International Marriages

To understand the international marriages in Korea, we must examine the relation- ship between global structure and women’s marriage migration. International migra- tion is primarily driven by migrant’s motivation for better economic opportunities, and globally an increasing number of women are joining the stream of international migration. Thus, a woman’s marriage can be seen in the context of the structure of global economy and social realities of the countries involved. Therefore, such factors as (1) the uneven development among countries in the global economy and the consequent encouragement of commercialization of women, (2) the country of origin’s culture and government that seem indifferent or covertly encourage female migration so as to soften their country’s poverty and unemployment, (3) destination country’s eagerness to solve the shortage of young female population in certain areas or class of people through international marriage (Seol 2005, p. 3).

Another factor is the so called the influence of cultural globalization. Many scholars have pointed out that the influences of mass media, commercial trade, and other material and cultural exchange reduce psychological distances among coun- tries and stimulate imagination about destination society (Piper and Roces 2003; Teo 2003).

6.3.2 Rapid Industrialization and Changes in Rural Communities

After three decades of rapid industralization and phenomenal economic growth, many Korean rural communities are, instead of enjoying the fruits of economic

1 One rural county, Boeun-gun in Chungcheongbuk-do, became the first in the country to record an international marriage rate of 40 % in 2005; of 205 marriages registered there, 82 were inter- national unions.

936 Socio-Cultural Consequences of International Marriages in Korea

growth, facing hard realities. Demographic imbalance, social disintegration, and value conflicts are some of the serious problems rural communities face today. The most noticeable change in rural Korea since 1960 has been that of population change. On the whole, population movement since the 1960s was characterized by rural desertion and urban concentration. According to census data, the rural popula- tion of Korea in 1960 was 72 %, whereas it was reduced to 26 % in 1990. Rural- to-urban migration was relatively heavy among young, working age population as evidenced by the increase in the dependency ratio of the rural population. The cen- sus data show that the rural areas reached a dependence ratio of 107.3 in 1970 from a previous ratio of 98.0 in 1960, an increase of 9.4 points. More importantly, many rural young women migrated to urban areas since 1960s for factory jobs in cities, and this sex-selective rural-to-urban migration continued in the 1980s responding to the expanding service sector. According to demographer Taewhan Kwon, in the 1980s, it is estimated that about 40 % of 18–24 age group females in rural area left their communities for urban areas. This, of course, has affected age specific sex ratio of rural communities. In other words, the sex imbalance in the rural population has worsened through the past few decades.

This population change has brought about series of related consequences: a chronic labor shortage, increased labor participation by women and aged, increased mechanization in farming, etc. But more importantly, it has caused disrupting im- pact on traditional social organization and structure.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the rural desertion has something to do with changes in values and expectations. Traditionally, farmers enjoyed relatively high social standing, occupying the highest estate among commoners, only next to the ruling ‘yangban’ class. Occupations related to manufacturing and commerce were given a lower social standing. Therefore, even poverty-stricken farmers had the view of occupation that “farmers are the mainstay of the country( 天下 之大本).” The situation, however, has changed tremendously. During the years of rapid economic growth, the highest development priorities have always been given to industrial growth and urbanization in Korea. As a result, the social standing of agriculture as an occupation has been much degraded in contemporary Korean so- ciety. With industrialization and urbanization in Korea, higher income and better educational/cultural opportunities in cities have given more prestige to urban than rural life. Consequently, farmers and rural youth have lost the psychological satis- faction related to agriculture. In fact, many farmers today concede that their living conditions have improved in the recent decades. But they do not want their sons to enter farming. According to a survey of farmers (Kim and Choi 1982), only 3.1 % of farmers interviewed expressed their willingness to recommend farming to their children.

All these factors amount to the reasons why rural Korean males find themselves in a very difficult situation for finding Korean marriage partners. Therefore, a rea- sonable explanation for the dramatic increase of international marriage in rural Ko- rea is that there is a lack of Korean women who are willing to marry men living in rural areas.

94 H. Choi

6.3.3 Demographic Factor

Traditional Korean value system prefers male child over female child. This prefer- ence of boys over girls has been a significant factor resulting imbalance in sex-ratio of Korea’s population, as Koreans have been conducting illegal sex tests on fetuses that often lead to feticide. This can result in a serious unbalance between males and females in marriageable ages.

Demographically, Korea has wildly skewed sex ratios.2 Korea’s sex ratio rose from 104.3 in 1980 to 117 in 1990—then the highest in the world—before falling back to more natural levels in recent years. As a result, South Korea is experienc- ing some surprising consequences. The surplus of bachelors in South Korea means that Korea is in need of importing brides from abroad. Since 2005, over 10 % of marriages were “mixed”, mostly between a Korean man and a foreign woman. The trend is, especially marked in rural areas as statistics of 2005 data indicate (see Table 6.3). If this trend continues, then, Korean government projects, half the chil- dren of farm households will be “mixed” by 2020. Even today, such children are common enough to have produced a new word: “Kosians”, or Korean-Asians (Mar 4th 2010/From The Economist print edition).

6.3.4 Social Environment and Korea’s Policy

A more direct factor explaining the rapid expansion of international marriages is the institutionalization of marriage brokers (Han and Seol 2006). As international mar- riage brokerage is a lucrative business that requires little initial investment, many brokerage firms have sprouted rapidly in recent years, and government regulations

2 The unusual thing about son preference is that it rises sharply at second and later births. The use of sex-selective abortion is largely responsible for this phenomenon.

Province(City, Province) Counties (Gu, Gun) Seoul Jongno-gu Gangwon-do Youngweol-gun ChungcheongBuk-do Geosan-gun, Danyang-gun,

Boeun-gun, Youngdong-gun, Doakcheon-gun

ChungcheongNam-do Buy yeo-gun, Chungyang-gun ChollaBuk-do Gochang-gun, Muju-gun, Imsil-gun,

Jinan-gun ChollaNam-do Goheung-gun, Gurye-gun, Boseong-

gun, Jindo-gun, Hampyong-gun, Heanam-gun

GyongsangBuk-do Gunwi-gun, Yeocheon-gun, Euisung-gun

GyongsangNam-do Sanchung-gun

Table 6.3  Counties with the ratio of international mar- riage over 30 %. (Source: Marriage Registration, The Supreme Court 2005)

956 Socio-Cultural Consequences of International Marriages in Korea

overseeing the sector have fallen behind the pace of its growth, consequently leav- ing activities of the firms virtually uncontrolled. This kind of activity was caught attention of an American reporter in Hanoi, and his story was published on February 22, 2007 issue of New York Times under the title of “Korean Men Use Brokers to Find Brides in Vietnam.”:

Now, that industry is seizing on an increasingly globalized marriage market and send- ing comparatively affluent Korean bachelors searching for brides in the poorer corners of China and Southeast and Central Asia. The marriage tours are fueling an explosive growth in marriages to foreigners in South Korea, a country whose ethnic homogeneity lies at the core of its self-identity.

Another factor supporting international marriage is the explicit and implicit poli- cies of the central and local governments of Korea. Demographic conditions (i.e., shrinking birth rate and unbalanced sex-ratio) are an underlying force influencing the policies. Some local governments in rural areas sponsor international mar- riages through sister-town relationships or through the help of brokerage firms.3 Many local government offices, mostly in rural areas, are now running Korean language or cooking classes designed to socialize foreign wives into the local community. Central government revised the Nationalty Act, the Departures and Arrivals Control Act, and related laws on social welfare so as to provide a sys- temic footing for a marriage immigrant to legally stay and lead a life in Korea. Central government also developed some immigrant-friendly policies such as sup- porting organizations advocating human rights of immigrants and their children (Lee et al. 2006, p. 171).

6.4 Marriage Immigrants: Some Characteristics and Problems

According to 2012 Statistics of Korea, more than 320,000 international marriages took place in the country since 2002. A rough estimation was that about 60 % of foreign wives are from China, and many of them are ethnic Koreans as China has a large ethnic Korean population in the northeastern part of China. Another 20 % of foreign wives are from other Asian countries, especially Vietnam, Philippines and Thailand, and their number is on the rise in contrast to the decline of the number of foreign wives from China. According to some marriage agency, provincial bach- elors prefer Southeast Asian women despite their racial differences because ethnic

3 In 2006, for example, 40 Vietnamese women became residents of the Haenam County of South Jeolla Province after the county offered 5 million won(US $ 5,380) in wedding subsidy per single man as part of its ‘Program for Marriage of Rural Single Males.’ However, although Haenam County budgeted 150 million won for the wedding subsidy, it planned to spend only 21 million won total, as some of the subsidies were just transferred directly to international marriage brokers. A Haenam County council member complained that the county program for the marriage of rural bachelors is turning into a cash-maker for marriage brokers (http://english.hani.co.kr/popus/print. hani?ksn=214674).

96 H. Choi

Korean women from China have acquired reputation of melting away into the cit- ies to work after using their new husband only to get visa. Unlike the Southeastern Asians, the ethnic Koreans can speak Korean rather fluently, and have no problem of adapting to Korean culture. Therefore, they can be quite independent from their Korean husbands, and consequently they can easily melt into the social fabric of Korean society in a short period of time.

According to a survey conducted in 2005, a majority of foreign wives reported that one of their primary motives for marrying abroad was an economic one (Seol 2005). However, for ethnic Koreans living in the regions on northern China and former Soviet Union republics, their motives for migration might be their ethnic ties to Korea, in addition to economic reasons.

Yean-Ju Lee and others examined divorce rate among marriage immigrant groups. The divorce-separation rate is the highest at 13 % among Korean-Chinese wives, and the percentage of differences is statistically significant only with South- east Asians, among whom only 2 % were divorced or separated (Lee et al. 2006, p. 177). This finding raises question whether marital breakup reflect either family values or foreign wives’ control over their lives.

Korean-Chinese and Chinese wives tend to have high employment rates, near 40 %, whereas that of Southeast Asian were 26 %. This difference may be due to Southeast Asians’ poorer command of the Korean language, heavily rural residence, lower divorce rate, and younger ages (ibid., p. 178). However, Lee and others con- cluded that “if Korean-Chinese are the most autonomous, Southeast Asians are the most adaptive to the host society. Their observed rates of Korean citizenship and employment are lower than those of Korean-Chinese, but once years since entering Korea and Korean proficiency are taken into account, the rates are no longer signifi- cantly different (ibid., p. 179).

Problems of migrant wives are wide-ranging and complicated. Some of the mostly cited problems foreign wives face are economic hardship, language barrier, and domestic violence. To deal with such problems, institutional and legal changes in central as well as local government level are needed. An indication of the govern- ment’s willingness to bring about changes vis-a-vis international marriages can be sensed in many areas. For example, the government recently changed official clas- sification of marriage between Korean men and foreign women on all government releases and manuals from “a family of female marriage immigrants” to “a multi- cultural family.” Through this change, it hopes to shift the focus from the migrant’s adaptation to Korea to an international understanding, as the term suggests to rec- ognize and accept the cultural differences. In the past, programs at migrant support centers were heavily focused on educating foreign wives about Korean customs. But new policies stress that the husbands, their families and society must also un- derstand and embrace ethnic differences.

Another salient feature of marriage immigrants is that, as suggested earlier, ma- jority of the recent foreign brides settle in rural communities. Korean rural com- munities have been very homogeneous in terms of culture and race. However, over the past decade this has been also changing dramatically due to international marriage of male farmers with females from other countries. This ‘rurality’ of

976 Socio-Cultural Consequences of International Marriages in Korea

international marriages presents many difficult challenges to the local communi- ties and the Korean society in terms of socio-cultural adjustment and institutional arrangements.

6.5 Social Implications of International Marriages

For years, Koreans have clung to the myth of racial homogeneity. The idea was evident in common Korean expressions like ‘danil minjok(單一民族),’ or ‘a unitary race’ sharing the blood of one ancestor, Dangun(檀君), who founded Gojoseon(古 朝 ) in 2333 bc. In a country with such strong ethnic sentiment, a sudden surge of international marriages brings about new reality with which Koreans must cope.

6.5.1 Rise of Mixed-Ethnic Koreans

According to the estimation of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, the number of interracial children rose from 44,258 in 2007 to 121,935 in 2010. Be- cause fertility rates among immigrant women in rural area are generally higher than among native Korean women, it is expected that the number of the children of mixed nationality will grow rather rapidly in the future years to come. Thus, a recent study by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs projected that immigrants and their descendants will account for more than 5 % of the Korean population by 2050. That’s more than 2 million people.

A report commissioned by JoongAng Ilbo in 2010 on the long-term impact of international marriage indicated that the Korea in the future may be very dif- ferent from the one we know now.4 According to the report, by 2020, one in five Koreans under the age of 20 will be of mixed racial extraction, as will be one in three newborn.5 Thus, it is evident that the greatest impact the increased number of international marriages would be the drastic increase in the number of Koreans of mixed ethnicity.6 Indeed, the number of children from inter-ethnic marriage is rapidly increasing and they definitely would change every aspect of Korean soci- ety from family, school, and community as they go through their life cycles. This

4 We’re witnessing a taste of thing to come even now. In Jeollabuk-do, 755 multiracial students are enrolled in area schools. At one school, Mupung Elementary School in Muju-gun, four of the incoming eight first graders are multiracial. 5 Rural communities have already entered the stage of “super-aged societies”; in 2004, some 29 % of the population of Korea’s rural communities was over the age of 65. The relative lack of social infrastructure in the countryside has led what few younger women there are to avoid marrying rural men. With these trends working against rural communities, the mass immigration of foreign women as brides is not only necessary to maintain the local tax base and labor pool, but also es- sential in ensuring the survival of the communities themselves. 6 This is causing tensions in a hitherto homogeneous society, which is often hostile to the children of mixed marriages.

98 H. Choi

means that the ideology of racial and cultural homogeneity is and will be seriously undermined.

There is a growing sign that Korean society is making some progress to acco- modate such a changing trend. For instance, The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family’s survey conducted in October of 2010 on 1,500 adults showed, 79.5 % of people were positive to the growing number of multi-cultural families, saying the increase will bring more openness and tolerance to Korea, although Korea used to be a homogeneous nation (Korea Times, Aug. 21, 2011). There are other surveys which revealed that over half of Koreans—both male and female—would be open to the idea of marrying a foreigner. Perhaps even more surprising, another survey indicated that over 60 % of parents would be OK with their son or daughter marry- ing a foreigner (Korea Times, April 13, 2006).7 It might not sound like much, but in a nation that has long valued its “pure bloodlines,” the survey results, if anywhere indicative of social attitudes as a whole, would suggest major changes in social views are underway. Naturally enough, one casualty of these demographic changes is the ideology of “one homogeneous race.”

For decades, Korean elementary and middle school history and ethics textbooks stressed that Koreans were for 5,000 years “one pure race.” Not only was this, at best, of questionable historical validity, but it served to alienate Korea’s mixed-race population, which felt the concept marked them as “impure” and “foreign.” Korean government, however, has decided to do away with the concept of ethnic homoge- neity in future textbooks in a bid to better embrace Korea’s multi-ethnic community. What’s more, some sociologists predict that one may soon see the idea of the “hy- phenated Korean” become universal. Like what one sees in the United States, where people often identify themselves as “Korean-Americans,” “Italian-Americans,” and so forth, Koreans may soon use hyphenated terms like “Vietnamese-Korean” and “Filipino-Korean” to refer to individuals of mixed extraction. Recently authorities decided to abandon the Korean term honhyeol ( , literally, “mixed blood”) to refer to multiracial individuals in favor of the preferred term “multi-cultural indi- viduals.” Nevertheless, it is not certain yet as to whether the Korea’s path toward multi-cultural/multi-ethic society is so smooth and equable. There remains some questions about Korea’s ability to embrace increasing numbers of immigrants and their children, and some express concern of possible clashes similar to those wit- nessed in certain Western nations.8

Another factor which facilitates Korea’s internationalization in terms of its de- mography is foreign labor migrants. As Korea’s birth rate is the lowest among the

7 In another study conducted among university students later times, the researchers found that the students were having very positive attitudes toward international marriage, although they had some negative feelings toward international migrant brides. See Kim, Chon-bae and In-sook Oem 2011. “A Study on the University Students’ Recognition on the International Marriage.” Journal of Welfare Administration ( ). 21(1). 51 p–73 p. 8 Sungkyunkwan University professor Kim Tong-won, speaking to the JoongAng Ilbo, warned that if mainstream Korean society is unable to make room for the nation’s multiracial community, it’s not inconceivable that race riots like those that took place in France in 2010 could eventually happen in Korea.

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OECD nations(1.08 in 2005, 1.2 in 2010), Korea’s population is expected to shrink from its 49.8 million in 2011 to 40 million by 2050. The resulting ageing of the society and reduced size of the nation’s economically active population requires acceptance of foreign work forces. A 2000 UN report on replacement migration warned that Korea would need 6.4 million foreign workers between 2020 and 2050 to keep its economically active population at 36.6 million. The growing number of international marriages and the continuous influx of foreign workers, combined together would act as powerful social force that must be considered in the future. The potential social and political implication of this cannot be ignored. If mixed- race and foreign-workers somehow found a way to politically mobilize themselves as a single social and political block, their rising numbers could allow them to wield increasing social and political influence, much akin to the Hispanic community in the United States.

6.5.2 Ethnic Communities

Multiculturalism in Korea is rather a new phenomenon. Therefore, Korea has not seen the development of large-scale foreign ghettos like the immigrant ghettos of some Western nations. Despite this, ethnic neighborhoods are starting to take shape throughout Korea. In Ansan city of Gyonggi-do where over 70,000 foreign nation- als reside, there is a district called ‘border-less village.’ You can also find many areas in Seoul with certain foreign concentration. A “French village” of sorts has developed near the French School in Seorae Village( ), Banpo 4-dong, Seocho-gu. One can find a “Little Tokyo” in Ichon-dong, Yongsan-gu, and there is the ‘Philippines Street’ in Hehwa-dong, Seongbuk-gu. Central Asians, Mongolians and Russians have carved out their own community in Gwanghui-dong, Dongda- emun-gu. In Itaewon-dong, Asian and African Muslims have set up in the vicin- ity of the neighborhood’s hilltop mosque. Ethnic Chinese turned Yeonnam-dong, Seodaemun-gu into a Chinatown, whereas Korean-Chinese have gravitated toward Garibong-dong in Guro-gu, Daerim-dong in Yeongdeungpo-gu and Gasan-dong in Geumcheon-gu, where they’ve established alleys of Korean-Chinese shops and businesses.

6.5.3 Multiculturalism

Korean husbands are gradually realizing the need to learn and understand their wives country and culture. Initially, they did not realize the necessity of learning wives’ foreign culture as a husband and family members. As they asked the foreign wives to learn Korean culture one-sidedly, conflicts in the transnational marriage couples and their relatives created many social and domestic problems. Many stud- ies have shown that marital and life satisfaction are affected by the presence of cultural understanding of the marriage counterparts (Park et al. 2007; Han 2006).

100 H. Choi

Therefore, in relation to the issue of rising multiculturalism in Korea, there is a need to pay attention, not only to the rising generation of mixed ethnic origins, but also to their mothers’ possibilities of retaining links with their homelands. Such links would certainly facilitate the process of cross-cultural understanding, thereby creat- ing a very positive atmosphere for multiculturalism in Korean society.

Although it is just at beginning stage, there are a few signs of multicultral con- cern addressed in government policy. One example is the bilingual multicultural school run by the Seoul Metropolitan Government where Children can learn their parents’ mother tongues. In the recent election, Lee Jasmine, who is a marriage im- migrant from Philippines, was elected to the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea by proportional representation, which indicates that South Korea is indeed embracing foreigners as members of society. Coincidently, bibimbap, a Korean dish which mix various vegetables, meats, eggs, with rice, is becoming a representative Korean cuisine. Bibimbap symbolizes the harmony of diverse cultures. Thus, it is interesting to think of the emergence of ‘Bibimbap culture’ in Korea, as the concept of ‘Salad bowl’ was once characterized American immigrants’ adaptation.

6.6 Concluding Remarks

Korean society is currently facing a new reality in terms of cultural and racial di- versity, as international marriage in Korea has increased drastically since 1990s. Although international marriages increase for Koreans of both sexes, men are sev- eral times more likely to marry a foreign woman than are women to marry a foreign man. The demand for foreign spouses seems to be greater in certain segments of the population, especially among young rural men.

Main characteristics of international marriages in Korea can be summarized as follows: it is mostly Korean men who seek wives from less developed countries; significant number of the couples are arranged by commercialized marriage brokers (or agencies); the majority of the men are rural and economically not affluent.

As the international marriages have challenged the ‘homogeneous’ and ‘pa- triarchal’ Korean society, the central government had to take action. In 1997, the government revised the Korean Nationality Law, abolishing patrilineal and gen- der discriminated factors. In April of 2006, the government announced the ‘Grand Plan.’ The ‘Grand Plan’ has two very important policy implications shifting from the old orientation: (1) from the policy focusing on ‘them’ to one that focuses on ‘us’; (2) from a policy for ‘women’ to a ‘family’ policy. The first shift is especially important, since it is comprehensive to cover the whole processes of adaptation of multi-cultural families and their children, including policies from a pre-stage of their entrance to later stages of their residence in Korea (Lee n.d.).

A true test for Korean society is how the nation would be dealing with the chal- lenge of becoming a multi-cultural society. As economic and cultural globalization processes continue, by experiencing social and political trial and error, the myth of ‘unitary race’ and ‘homogeneous Korea’ soon will become things of the past.

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Indeed, Korean society must find a way to incorporate the multi-racial and multi- cultural assets of these new population into the nation building process in the twenty first century.

References

Han, G.-S. (2006). Family life and cultural encounter of foreign wives in rural area. Korean Cul- tural Anthropology, 39(1), 195–243.

Han, G. S., & Seol, D. H. (2006). Matchmaking agencies in Korea and their regulation policies (in Korean). Gwachon: Ministry of Health and Welfare.

Kim, C., & Oem, I. (2011). A study on the University students’ recognition on the international marriage. Journal of Welfare Administration, 21(1), 51–73.

Kim, C.-K., Choi, C. S., & Han, J. (2007). International marriages and rural community in South Korea: Recent changes and implications. Proceedings of International Conference on Migra- tion and Development. June 1–2, 2007, Inchon Memorial Hall, Korea University. Organized by Institute of Social Research, Korea University, and Social Science Research Council, New York, U.S.A.

Lee, H.-K. (n.d.). International marriage and the state in South Korea. Mimeograph. Lee, Y.-J., Seol, D.-H., & Cho, S.-N. (2006). International marriages in South Korea: The signifi-

cance of nationalty and ethnicity. Journal of Population Research, 23(2), 165–182. Park, Jung-sook, et al. (2007). A study on family conflict and life satisfaction for immigrant wom-

en. Korean Family Management, 25(6), 59–70. Piper, N., & Roces, M. 2003. Introduction: Marriage migration in an age of globalization. In N.

Piper & M. Roces (Eds.), Wife or worker?: Asian women and migration (pp. 1–22). London: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Seol, D.-H. (2005). Foreign wives’ life in Korea: Focusing on the policy of welfare and health— English summary. Gwachon: Ministry of Health and Welfare.

Teo, S. Y. (2003). Dreaming inside a walled city: Imagination, gender and the roots of immigra- tion. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 12(4), 411–438.

Yuh, J. Y. (2002). Beyond the shadow of Camptown: Korean military brides in America. New York: New York University Press.

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Chapter 7 Constructing “Home” across National Boundaries: A Case of Pakistani-Japanese Marriage

Masako Kudo

J. Zhang, H. Duncan (eds.), Migration in China and Asia, International Perspectives on Migration 10, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8759-8_7, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2014

M. Kudo ( ) Kyoto Women’s University, Kyoto, Japan e-mail: [email protected]

7.1 Introduction

This paper explores the process of transnational family-making of Pakistani-Japa- nese couples. This type of mixed marriage increased in number from the late 1980s along with a rise in labor migration from Pakistan to Japan. Marriage with local Japanese women meant that the Pakistani men could then acquire a visa to stay and work in Japan, a country which has thus far maintained a policy of restricting the immigration of “unskilled” laborers. Marrying local women, however, did not necessarily mean that these migrants became more rooted in Japan. Rather, my re- search reveals that in some cases, their family-making has expanded over national boundaries as their life course evolved. This paper examines the complexities as well as the instability involved in the transnational dispersal of family members and contends that this process reflects both the possibilities and the constraints that the mixed marriage families experience in Japan and beyond.

In what follows, I will first briefly describe labor migration from Pakistan to Ja- pan since the late 1980s and the subsequent process the migrants underwent to settle in Tokyo or the surrounding areas during the 1990s. I will then draw attention to the recently emerged tendency for Pakistani-Japanese mixed families to disperse over national boundaries and explore the reasons and motivations which lie behind such a move. To conclude, I will point out the implications that the case studies I describe have for understanding the complexities and uncertainties involved in constructing “home” in transnational space.

The following sections draw on in-depth interview data which I have been col- lecting since 1998.

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7.2 Labor Migration from Pakistan to Japan since the Late 1980s

During the 1980s when the economy was booming, Japan attracted many labor mi- grants from both within and outside of Asia. The number of migrants from Pakistan, as well as from other Islamic countries such as Bangladesh and Iran, increased from the late 1980s (Sakurai 2008, p. 71). A considerable number of Pakistani migrants came from middle class families in the urban areas of Pakistan, such as Karachi and Lahore, and were predominantly males in their 20s and 30s. This reflected a clear gender division of labor among the Pakistani middle-class; that is, the role of women is within the domestic sphere while the men are defined as the bread-winner of their extended family.

These young men had various motivations for coming to Japan, including a de- sire to experience a new life outside their homeland. For the majority, however, transmitting money back home while working abroad was an important reason be- cause this both ensured the economic survival of their extended family and con- structed their identity as dutiful son and brother.

Due to the visa exemption agreement between Japan and Pakistan, migrants could obtain short-term visas upon arrival. However, in 1989 the agreement was suspended and the number of new arrivals from Pakistan dropped sharply. In the same year, the immigration law was amended and newly implemented the follow- ing year. As a result, the status of illegal foreign workers was further marginalized, making the lives of many Pakistani migrants more precarious than before.

7.3 Here to Stay? The Changing Social Environment of Pakistanis in Japan during the 1990s

7.3.1 Marrying Local Women

While the number of new arrivals decreased after 1989, the number of Pakistanis registered in Japan rose steadily during the 1990s JIA (1192–2000). One reason is the increase in the number of those who married local Japanese women (Kojima 2006, p. 122). Marriage with Japanese nationals enabled Pakistani men to acquire spousal visas which allowed them to stay and work within Japan. Importantly, the new visa also made it possible for them to cross national boundaries, thereby rees- tablishing face-to-face ties with their families back home.

In contrast, the Pakistani men who did not marry Japanese nationals remained vul- nerable in socio-economic and legal terms and their movements tended to be confined due to the fear of being arrested and sent back to their home country. For instance, one Pakistani man with a Japanese spouse told me about his friend who overstayed his visa:

My friend came to Japan in 1988, the same year as I, and has remained single. He is now over 40, but has never been back home since. His mother is getting old and obviously they

1057 Constructing “Home” Across National Boundaries

want to see each other. However, his brothers want him to stay on in Japan as they need money to sustain their families with his remittance. He seldom goes out of his tiny rented- room because he is afraid of being arrested.

The above illustrates a stark divide between the lives of those who had acquired spousal visas and those who had not.

7.3.2 From “Factory Worker” to “Entrepreneur”

Once married, the Pakistani husbands with whom I was acquainted tended to en- gage themselves in the used-car exporting business. Among the complex reasons, this shift in their occupation can be seen as an attempt to overcome their marginality as “foreign workers” during the economic recession of the 1990s when they started to feel more susceptible to redundancy than their Japanese colleagues. Their lack of competence in reading and writing Japanese also made it difficult for the Paki- stani men to move up the career ladder. Once the men marry, the cultural and social resources of their Japanese spouses were often mobilized, at least at the beginning stages of consolidating their business. Mutual help among Pakistanis further facili- tated their shift to entrepreneurs and formation of an economic niche as used-car exporters in Japan.

During this same time period, Islamic sites such as mosques and halal food shops began to emerge locally (Kudo 2009, p. 113–115). By gathering in these places in their localities, Pakistani Muslims reconstructed their religious identities in Japan. Those who were self-employed had more flexible work hours and it was easier for them to congregate in the newly-established Islamic sites than the men who were employed by Japanese companies. These gatherings of Pakistani men in turn re- sulted in the creation of a close-knit network of self-employed Pakistani Muslims.

In addition to the tendency for Pakistanis to congregate in various local mosques, the process of building Muslim networks in Japan was facilitated by a global net- work of Muslims, such as Tablighi Jamaat, which extends beyond local or national boundaries. Importantly, marrying and becoming fathers appeared to have influ- enced the men’s sense of being Muslim and led some to pursue a more religiously- oriented lifestyle.

7.3.3 Religious Perceptions and Practices of the Japanese Wives

Upon marriage with a Pakistani man, the Japanese spouse was required to convert to Islam1. What does this conversion mean to a woman and how is her social life

1 Male Muslims are permitted by their religion to marry the people of the Book, meaning mainly Christians and Jews. My interviewees included two Christians, both of whom converted to Islam upon marriage; however, there exist some cases in which women who were Christians prior to meeting their prospective husbands did not convert to Islam upon marriage.

106 M. Kudo

transformed? Most participants of the congregations of Muslim women where I conducted my research were Japanese spouses of Pakistanis2. During the 1990s, they formed a network to exchange information regarding child-rearing and to share their common life experiences as Muslims married to Pakistanis.

A majority of these women told me that when they converted to Islam, they understood it as merely a part of the marriage procedure and their lives were mini- mally affected at first. Interestingly, as their lifecycle progressed, a strong tendency arose among the women to start to redefine themselves as “converted Muslims.” In some cases, the experience of transforming themselves into Muslim women was so intense for them that they started to cover themselves with scarves in every- day life. Despite the diversity in attitudes and patterns of religious practices, the women tended to try to distinguish between “true Islam”—that is, the teachings of the Qur’an or the Hadith3—and “Pakistani customs.” In other words, the women valued following the teachings of Islam through learning of the Qur’an or the Ha- dith more than the local customs practiced within Pakistan. During both interviews that took place at the women’s homes and participant observations at mosque gath- erings, doubt was at times raised by the women as to whether what they were told to do by the members of their husband’s family was in accordance with the teach- ings of “true Islam”(Kudo 2007; 2008). This active construction of the religious self shows that marrying Pakistani Muslims does not necessarily lead the Japanese wives to automatically adapt to their husbands’ culture.

7.3.4 Raising Muslim Children in Japan

As a child of such a mixed marriage reaches school age, nurturing his/her religious identity as a Muslim can become a domestic issue. Because the Pakistani-Japanese mixed families are dispersed over various areas of Greater Tokyo, the couples, es- pecially the wives, tend to become increasingly involved in the largely non-Muslim local community through child-rearing. Currently, there are no uniform measures within Japanese public schools to deal with religious differences. For example, when Muslim parents want their children to eat only halal meals at school, such a request is left to the discretion of each school and/or school staff (Sugimoto 2002; Hattori 2009).

Under such circumstances, the burden of maintaining Muslim practices tends to fall upon the shoulders of the Muslim families, in particular on the mothers who

2 Although I have continued my follow-up interviews among Japanese women married to Pa- kistani migrants until the present, the data related to the women’s religious congregations that I present in this paper was gathered during participant observation I conducted mostly between 1998 and 2001. Since then, I have occasionally visited the same mosques and noticed that the members who congregated had changed considerably and the nationalities of the husbands of the Japanese female participants appeared more varied than before. 3 The Hadith is the authoritative record of Prophet Muhammad’s exemplary speeches and actions.

1077 Constructing “Home” Across National Boundaries

may need to make halal lunch for the children every day. The Japanese mothers also assume a mediating role between the school and the home in other matters, such as concerning girls’ uniforms.

The adoption of Islamic practices by the children tends to be perceived by main- stream Japanese as contradicting a taken-for-granted “Japanese homogeneity.” For example, when one woman asked a kindergarten staff member to provide her child with specially prepared meals without pork, the head of the school called her in for a meeting and asked (while fully cognizant of the fact that the mother is Japanese), “What nationality are you? If you insist on your child not eating pork in Japan, it will seriously hinder the healthy development of the child’s personality.” This case, although rather extreme, illustrates that what is at issue is not only the differing treatment asked for by Muslims, but the fact that the woman and her child are of Japanese nationality. The special request for lunch meals seems to have violated the educator’s taken-for-granted perception of cultural homogeneity.

The children’s differences as Muslims may become more accepted when non- Muslims realize that their fathers are “foreign” Muslims. Thus, although the line between “Japaneseness” and “otherness” is blurred by a child’s Islamic practices, it is then redefined by the foreignness of his/her father. On the whole, the religious identity of the Japanese mother and her child(ren) tends to be suppressed by main- stream society. However, I must add that mainstream society is not homogenous in the way that it perceives and responds to Islamic practices of Japanese Muslims. For instance, one Muslim girl who finished high school told me that after her school friends came to know her well, her differences as a Muslim became a non-issue; on the other hand, those who did not know her personally tended to react to her differ- ences with curiosity or suspicion.

7.4 The Making of the Family across National Boundaries

7.4.1 The Complexities of Motivations behind the Transnational Family

As I discussed earlier, a network of Muslims in Japan developed during the 1990s. This, however, does not mean that the Pakistani-Japanese mixed couples settled permanently in their localities. Rather, my research reveals that in some cases, their family-making expanded over national boundaries as their lifecycle evolved. This tendency became particularly salient as the children of the mixed couples reached school age.

Twelve out of the forty women I interviewed experienced migrating with their children to Pakistan or to a third country while their Pakistani husbands remained in Japan to operate their businesses. In other cases, the children were sent to the

108 M. Kudo

husband’s extended family while the couple stayed in Japan. Examples of third countries where the wife and children relocated include the United Arab Emirates and New Zealand, where the husbands had a business base.

A transnational network of Pakistanis and/or Muslims was mobilized when a family started exploring where to migrate to and also during the subsequent process of settling. In many cases, the mother and child(ren) returned to Japan in the sum- mer holiday periods and the Pakistani father visited them on business trips and dur- ing religious or family occasions such as weddings. Thus, a new, de-territorialized notion of “home” and “family” gradually emerged.

The reasons for this new type of family relocation are many and complex. First, the results of my interviews reveal that some Pakistani husbands expressed a strong desire to raise their child(ren) in an Islamic environment4. The lack of institutional support to practice Islam in Japanese schools, as discussed earlier, may have led them to seek possibilities for educating the child(ren) abroad. Moreover, raising daugh- ters in Japan can become an issue for mixed couples because of the religio-cultural norm of gender segregation. Some husbands felt it particularly necessary to shelter their daughter(s) from “influences from the corrupt (non-Islamic) Japanese soci- ety.” The Japanese wives did not necessarily share such a gender-specific idea of education, but they may have experienced varying degrees of difficulty in having their child(ren) practice Islam at school where the norm of homogeneity prevails5. Second, according to some of the Japanese women, their husbands considered it important for their child(ren) to achieve competency in English. One husband who now travels frequently between Japan and an English-speaking country remarked as follows:

My children go to an Islamic school which provides British academic qualifications. I want to give my children both an Islamic education and good academic qualifications so that in the future, they can get a good job and not have to work long hours like me.

The children who migrated to Pakistan tended to be sent to prestigious schools which offer an English-mediated education. Although international schools do exist in Japan, they are mostly located in the center of Tokyo, which makes daily com- muting difficult, as many Pakistani-Japanese mixed families reside on the outskirts of Tokyo or even in the more remote areas of Greater Tokyo. The expensive tuition is another factor in discouraging many of the families from sending their children to such international schools. By enrolling their child(ren) in prestigious schools in Pakistan, these mixed couples can make the best of the economic difference between the two countries. Third, some fathers wished to pass on family values, such as a close family bond and respect for elders. In relation to this, while it is con- sidered important for the child(ren) to acquire competence in English, the ability to

4 Concerning the complexity of reasons for the relocation of the Pakistani-Japanese couples in order to educate children abroad, see also Takeshita (2008) who conducted a survey in Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates. 5 I add that the husbands’ views are not fixed and may change as their stay in Japan is prolonged.

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speak the father’s native tongue and to communicate with their father’s kin is also valued. Lastly, as one Japanese mother emphasized when explaining why she made the decision to move abroad with her children, experiences of racial discrimination at school may be one important reason for leaving Japan.

The various motivations behind relocating to another country reflect not only the resources and advantages that the families possess, but also the marginalization that they may experience in Japan, such as difficulty in raising Muslim child(ren) and social discrimination against mixed children.

7.4.2 The Fluidity of Transnational Families

In six out of the twelve cases I studied, the family reunited when the wife and the child(ren) ended up returning to Japan. The reasons for the fluidity of movement observed among these mixed families are far from simple and partially reflect the socio-economic marginalization that different members of the family may experi- ence during life abroad. In the case of those who migrated to Pakistan, the difficul- ties of being a woman and a foreigner experienced by the Japanese wife within the extended families is one main factor for returning to Japan6. In the case of migration to a third country, immigration controls often became a critical issue, as the family members found it difficult to renew their visas (although this depended upon the immigration policies of the country to which they relocated). Further, the Japanese wives who migrated to a third country told me that they felt excluded from society due to their differences in outlook and religion. Some of the children who migrated to either Pakistan or a third country also mentioned incidents of being discriminated against. Although such negative experiences may not have directly resulted in their decision to return to Japan, some of the women and child(ren) came to feel that they face a new form of discrimination when migrating to another country.

I would argue that the fluidity of the transnational movement of the family pro- vide the child(ren) with multicultural experiences that increase their cultural/lin- guistic capital and develop their skill to negotiate “differences” in various contexts. On the other hand, the physical movement may in some cases lead to further mar- ginalization. For instance, one Pakistani father remarked, “If a child keeps moving between countries and ends up not mastering any language, he/she will be just the same as us foreigners.” This father showed full awareness of his own vulnerability as a “foreign worker” in Japan and feared that his issues may be reproduced in the next generation.

6 The situation of the Japanese spouse, however, is more complex than it may appear, reflecting not only the power relationships in which gender and ethnicity intersect, but also the global hier- archy existing between the countries (Kudo 2007, p. 11–12).

110 M. Kudo

7.5 The Position of Pakistani Husbands in Japan

Thus far, I have discussed the process of transnational family-making in Pakistani- Japanese marriages. Lastly, I would like to discuss how the Pakistani husbands lo- cate themselves within Japanese society.

The husbands may attain a certain degree of autonomy in both economic and religious terms via the formation of a tightly-knit community of Pakistani entre- preneurs. As I discussed earlier, compared with those who overstay their visas, Pa- kistani men who marry Japanese nationals gain security and stability. Further, an increasing number of the Pakistani husbands have now acquired Japanese citizen- ship. While some husbands are reluctant to lose their Pakistani nationality (Japanese law does not permit dual citizenship), others emphasize the merit of being able to travel more freely for business across national boundaries with a Japanese passport. I would like to add that while their legal status in Japan has become more stabilized, many of the men appear to have continued to invest in Pakistan both economically and emotionally.

When asked about the advantage of living in Japan, some of the men men- tioned that they felt safe there compared to living in their homeland. However, one should note that their sense of safety in Japan is not without drawbacks. Some of the Pakistani husbands I talked to have been stopped by police officers in their lo- cal neighborhoods, particularly after 9/11; the men were in agreement that security control over Muslim foreigners had increased significantly.

7.6 Summary and Conclusion

As the number of Pakistani men marrying Japanese women increased during the 1990s, the legal status of Pakistanis in Japan became differentiated between those who acquired a spousal visa and those who remained “illegal.” However, those who acquire a permanent visa by marrying a Japanese national are by no means entirely free to move across national boundaries at will. While a new form of transnational family has emerged over the years, the movement of a family is constrained by various socio-economic factors, illustrating the limitations and marginalization that a family may experience in transnational space.

For Pakistani men who gain a permanent visa, the meaning of being “safe” is double-edged. On one hand, their legal status within Japan is secured and they think of Japan as a stable place to live compared with their home country. On the other hand, they feel alienated and excluded from Japanese society because of experi- ences of racial discrimination, as well as the perceived tightening security controls over Muslims after 9/11. These negatives affect their feeling of belonging and may lead them to maintain or reestablish ties with their home country, as well as shape new ways in which they extend their ethno-religious networks with other Pakistanis internationally in order to secure future life opportunities.

1117 Constructing “Home” Across National Boundaries

While Japan has become more aware that its society is no longer as homogenous as it was once believed to be, the diversity among both foreigners and the Japanese tends to be ignored. The changes that are taking place within “foreigners” in migra- tion remain largely unnoticed, which may result in a static and essentialized view of “foreign Muslims.” Moreover, while the Japanese media has drawn a degree of—albeit limited—attention to the presence of foreign Muslims as an indication of Japanese society becoming more “multicultural,” changing religious beliefs and the practices of their Japanese spouses who converted to Islam upon marriage often go unnoticed. Differences among those defined as “Japanese” may even be suppressed due to the fixed perception of homogeneity within mainstream society. In addition, children of mixed marriages who travel across national boundaries and are educated in other countries tend to be viewed as “exceptional,” and have not received due attention from schools and other institutions.

To conclude, the rigid boundary between the Japanese and the foreign others is maintained or even strengthened even as Japanese society becomes more multicul- tural. The cases cited in this paper point to the need to recognize the dynamic as- pects of the diversity developing within Japanese society, and illustrate the complex processes in which the notion of “home” is contested and constantly reshaped by mixed families living both in Japan and abroad.

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Takeshita, S. (2008). Muslim families comprising Pakistani fathers and Japanese mothers: Focus- ing on the educational problems of their children. Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World, 6(2008), 202–224.

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Chapter 8 How International is International: A Study on International Marriage Migration in Asia

AKM Ahsan Ullah

J. Zhang, H. Duncan (eds.), Migration in China and Asia, International Perspectives on Migration 10, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8759-8_8, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2014

A. A. Ullah ( ) Centre for Migration and Refugee Studies (CMRS), The American University in Cairo, Po Box 74, AUC Avenue, 11835 New Cairo, Egypt e-mail: [email protected]

8.1 Introduction

In 2008, Bangladeshi and international media covered the story of an Egyptian girl who flew to Bangladesh to meet a man living in a rural area whom she had been having an online relationship with. She travelled to Bangladesh in order to marry this man, leaving behind her angry and anxious parents. In Bangla- desh, this story captured the interest of the public and raised a curious question: what explains her choice to marry an unknown person overseas? These days however, these types of stories are increasingly common. My search on various websites turned out that around one million women globally post their profiles on websites ‘seeking husbands’. Possibly, even more women would have done so if they had access to the internet. Around 10 years ago, marrying a foreigner was acceptable only for females from a low social class in most countries in Asia. In the past few years this trend has shifted dramatically and as a result, foreign marriages have become a common practice in today’s society. Today, even among the upper middle classes, foreign marriage is seen as an exercise of free choice.

The practice of marriage migration dates back centuries—merchants, pilgrims, colonizers and invaders either remained at their destinations or returned with wives or husbands of foreign countries and ethnicities. As the world has increasingly glo- balized, this practice has undergone a substantial burgeoning. Human migration today, partly, takes place because of such international marriage arrangements. To- day, international marriage migration (IMM) has become an embedded concept in migration literature. However, since the mid-1980s, international marriage migra- tion has taken a specific shape and pattern. Discussion on IMM remains incomplete unless included are cases of Korea. In Korea, IMM today has become an important element in migration discourse. Prehistoric myth in Korea has been that during the

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period BC42 to BC532, the King’s first wife of ‘Kumkwan Kaya’ came from India. Most international marriages were associated with the invasion of Korea by China and Japan. During the Chung Dynasty in China, Korean women were captured as spoils of war. Some of these women returned home but remained disintegrated in the society and had to move to live in a segregated area. Therefore, there had been a serious prejudice against international marriage in Korea, mainly towards women because of the ‘virginity’ notions. I quote Young (2011) here ‘This unfortunate co- lonial history still taints relations between Japanese and Koreans, making marriages between the two a potential site for political tensions. The fact that Japan is geo- graphically closer to Korea than any of the top source countries of migrant brides speaks volumes about the influence of colonialism’.

Transnational brides are just one segment of the 100 million female migrants of today. Most of what is known about the economic factors fueling bride migration is in accordance with findings on female labor migration (Momsen 1999). During the 1970s, Western Europe and Australia were common destinations for Southeast Asian brides. In the 1980s and 1990s, IMM diversified to include women from Latin America, Mexico, China and the Philippines who traveled globally (Kojima 2001). After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Central Asian women began to migrate for marriage in larger numbers. There is a remarkable absence of South Asians in the processes of IMM, despite their large presence in male labor migration, the overall size of the South Asian population, and the poor living conditions for many South Asian inhabitants.

Sinke’s study of migrant German women reveals parallels and connections of the contemporary international marriage market with the international male labor market of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As the labor market serves to ad- vance capitalism, the marriage market promotes certain social, political and econom- ic aspects of patriarchy (Sinke 1992). Public objection to international matchmaking hinges on the assumption that marriage agencies are ‘selling women.’ Proponents of the marriage business are quick to point out that international dating agencies are simply a global version of local dating networks and websites. Therefore, one could argue that all dating and marriage agencies are selling a service, not people. Young (2010) argues with an example from the Philippines that the 1990 Anti-Mail Order Bride law has forced international marriage brokers underground, compounding the risks of those who seek their services. In general, there is a great deal of stigmatiza- tion of marriage brokers. Because the practice of arranging transnational marriage is officially illegal, marriage broker agents and their clients have resorted to creative ways to disguise their business practices. However, the language marriage brokers use to market brides is overt and provocative at best, and deeply sexist and racist at worst. It’s not uncommon to read words like “obedient” “submissive,” “white skin,” in the advertisements of marriage broker agencies. Most agencies reinforce the com- modified, racialized and unequal gender roles that critics argue are inherent in the process of international marriage migration. The husband-to-be is the consumer, and the bride-to-be is the object to be consumed (Young 2010).

In order to examine the contours of this global trend, this chapter will examine the inter-ethnic and inter-regional nature of marriage migration. The chapter will also

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consider the term itself—international marriage migration (IMM)—and question it’s usefulness or appropriateness to describe the complexity of flows and forces operating in transnational marriages. Importantly, it will explore the factors which transnational brides and grooms take into consideration when looking abroad for their spouses. In looking at the agency of those undertaking international marriage, particularly wom- en, this chapter will consider whether IMM offers women an avenue for empower- ment and life improvement, or a risky trap for racial and gender based exploitation.

8.2 Objectives and Methods

There is a remarkable absence of the South Asians from the IMM. This chapter argues that international marriage migration is in fact an inter-ethnic and inter-regional migra- tion which explains that some factors are at work giving this particular shape to this phenomenon. Very little is known due to the fact that this has by far not been explored in the past endeavors with academic rigor. This paper attempts to explore the factors that the foreign brides and grooms take into consideration while deciding on the foreign marriage, and how appropriate is to call it international marriage migration. This chapter further touches upon a debate: if IMM is a way of exploitation or empowerment.

This paper is an extract of a research based both on primary and secondary data collection. Primary information was collected through a survey of 33 couples selected on a snowball basis. Distribution and definition of couples are as follows: 6 Filipino couples (Filipina wife and Japanese husban = 4; and Filipina wife and Hong Kong husband = 2); 10 Chinese couple (Chinese wife and Vietnamese husband = 1; and vise versa = 2; Chinese wife and Korean husband = 4 and vice versa = 3); 7 Korean couples (Korean husband and Japanese wife = 5 and vise versa = 2); 6 Taiwan couples (Taiwanese wife and Korean husband = 3 and vise versa = 1; Taiwanese wife and Viet- namese husband = 1 and vise versa = 1); and 4 Thai couples) Thai wife and Western husbands = 4). In order to analyze the data, qualitative techniques were used and some descriptive statistics were applied to show the magnitude of the phenomenon.

8.3 The Regionalization of International Marriage: The Case of Southeast and East Asia

Traditionally in most parts of Asia, migration was largely a male phenomenon. Al- though it used to be a taboo for a woman to travel alone, women are increasingly migrating alone and some figures show that female migration exceeds that of male migration. Within this overall feminization of migration, there has also been an in- creased number of women travelling abroad for marriage purposes. Men also cross borders for marriage, although in fewer numbers than women. These transnational unions however are not equally distributed around the globe, with Southeast and East Asia registering a disproportionately high number of transnational marriages.

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International marriage has a long history in East and Southeast Asia, and has been experiencing growth in scale. In Asia, the patterns of IMM are multi-directional, like Vietnamese- Korean, Korean- Chinese- Chinese- Japanese; Korean –Taiwan- ese; Taiwanese-Chinese; Filipinos- Westerners; and Thais-Westerners.

Of the over 175,000 Filipinos engaged or married to foreigners between 1989 and 1999, over 91 % were Filipino women i.e. brides are from the Philippines. The exposure of the Filipinas to the outside world is attributed to their colonial history. The geographic distribution of the foreign partners therefore is not surprising when considered the historical, colonial and post-colonial ties between the Philippines and the United States, Spain and Japan (Hashimoto 2007). Approximately 40 % (over 70,000) of the foreign partners are from the United States; 30 % (over 53,000) from Japan; 8.8 % from Australia. In 1997, the number dropped to just over 7,000 and in 1998 decreased again to just 6,000, the drop most likely attributable to the Asian Financial Crisis (Freeman 2005). Other research has identified the number of registered Thai-Foreign marriages in Udon Thani in 2003 as being as high as 2,228 (Chan 1999). This number will likely be underestimating the reality, as other research has found that 44 % of Thai foreign marriages in the Isaan area are not registered (Srichan 2006) (Fig. 8.1).

Fig. 8.1  Showing the trend in IMM among the countries in the SE and East Asia

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Looking at IMM in Korea, the number of formally registered marriages between foreign females and Korean males was only 620 in 1990 however, it shot up to around 55,000 by 2005 which constituted around 13 % of total number of regis- tered marriages (Kim 2006). After 1992 when the diplomatic relationship between China and Korea opened up, marriages between Koreans and Ethnic Korean Chi- nese started to rise. As of April 2006, the total number of female marriage migrants in the Republic of Korea was 55,408 with 42.5 % being Korean-Chinese, 20.7 % Chinese and 20.3 % from the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries. The cumulated data of internationally married Korean men was 160,000, from 1990 to 2005 (Lee 2007).

Presently, the number of multi-cultural families due to marriage immigration is increasing. International marriages in Korea account for 35.9 % of marriages in rural areas. Of the Korean men married to foreign wives, the leading group is Chi- nese women (110,000); most of them are ethnic Koreans or Korean-Chinese, which is followed by Japanese (17,000), Vietnamese (10,000) and Filipinas (6,000). The number of foreign men married to Korean women between 1990 and 2005 was 80,000. Among them, the majority was Japanese (44 %) and American (24 %) (Be- langer et al. 2007; Lee 2007). Clearly, China- Japan’s political hostility and histori- cal reality have been trivialized in the inter-ethnic marriage decisions (Fig. 8.2).

Between 1995 and September 2002, there were 58,279 visas issued to Taiwanese men married to Vietnamese wives from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices (TECO)1 in Ho Chi Minh City (Yamanaka and Nicola 2003) and in 2003 officers

1 Statistics on the marriage of Vietnamese women to Taiwanese men are maintained by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices (TECO) in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.

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Fig. 8.2  Nationality of female international marriage migrants, 2007. (Source: Ministry of Gov- ernment Administration and Home Affairs, Korea)

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reported that the running total was in the vicinity of 72,411. The situation in Taiwan is even more dramatic, with international marriages accounting for 32 % of all mar- riages in 2003. International marriage is overwhelmingly Taiwanese men marrying foreign brides—the group of immigrant spouses is 92 % female. About two-thirds of these foreign brides are from China, and the rest from Southeast Asia. Among the latter group, Vietnamese constitute 69 %, followed by Indonesians (15 %), Thais (6.5 %), Filipinas (4.8 %) and Cambodians (3.5 %). There are major differences in the patterns of marriage between Taiwanese men and women from China and Southeast Asia. The Chinese brides tend to be much older than the Southeast Asian brides. However, both the Chinese and Southeast Asian brides were typically mar- rying men 10 or more years older than themselves—55 % in the case of the Chinese and 67 % for the Southeast Asians (Simons 2001; Tsay 2004) (Fig. 8.3).

International marriages are on the increase in Singapore as well. In 2004, over a quarter of male Singaporeans and permanent residents married foreigners, and 9 % of women married foreign males. This was natural, given that more Singaporeans now live and work abroad and many foreigners live and work in Singapore. In 2005, 27 % of Singaporean men married foreigners, compared with 7 % of Singaporean women (Fig. 8.4).

International marriages are particularly prevalent in the big cities of Japan (Hashimoto 2007). In 2000, one in 10 marriages in the Tokyo area were between a Japanese spouse and a foreigner, and in Osaka the figure was one in 12 (Curtin 2002). But there are also certain rural areas of Japan where international marriages are prevalent. The foreign wives of Japanese men come generally from three coun-

Fig. 8.3  Marriages to foreign spouses in Taiwan. (Source: Wang and Chand 2005)

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tries: Korea, China and the Philippines. The Philippines accounted for over one- third of foreign brides in 1995, but this had dropped to a little over one-quarter in 2000, the decline being offset by an increase in brides from China, whose share continued to increase up to 2003. In the case of China, international marriages have increased sharply over the past two decades, and their numbers remain tiny as a pro- portion of all marriages in China. It has been estimated that at least 150,000 Chinese (90 % of them women) have married foreigners over the past two decades (Liu and Liu 2002), which would amount to less than 0.1 % of all marriages in China over that period. These marriages often take place between Chinese women and men from Japan, overseas Chinese societies of Hong Kong, Taiwan and other Western societies (Liu and Liu 2002).

Perhaps one explanatory model can help us to understand the types of flows and connections operating within the Asian region in terms of marriage migration. 3Cs (colony, culture and Cash) model has got to do a lot with this marriage. Here lies the main argument of the paper: that is why perhaps South Asians are not part of this pattern. This model looks at colony, culture and cash and is known as the “three C’s”. This can help us not only to understand the existing flows, but also the absence of certain flows, such as why South Asians are largely excluded from this pattern of Southeast and East Asian marriage migration. Some important questions here are worth asking: is it as simple as East Asia is richer than SE Asia so this is the division of the primary flows? Or are there other cultural, historical, colonial threads which determine the flows of these unions even more so than economics? What about legal/visa issues? What role do they play (Fig. 8.5)?

Fig. 8.4  International of Singaporeans (citizens and PRs) in percentage of all marriages. (Source: Department of Statistics)

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8.4 Empowerment or Exploitation?

A dichotomy exists within the discourse surrounding the growing phenomenon of marriage migration. Trends show that women in Asia are increasingly migrating for the purpose of marriage, but there are wide variances within this group. Not only are there great disparities among women who migrate, but also many variations on the motivations, consequences and risks of women who migrate for marriage. There are two main fields of thoughts on the issue and in many ways they stand in opposition to each other. The feminist argument frames marriage migration through the lens of empowerment, arguing that women are given autonomy and decision making power within the marriage process. Marriage migration is then seen in a positive light; as something that allows women to improve their situation through their own agency. The other field of thought on the issue claims that marriage migration is negative for a number of reasons. These researchers argue that marriage migration is exploitative and has damaging social consequences. However, it is important to look at the issue from many different angles in order to get an understanding of the motivations, consequences and challenges within marriage migration.

There is an internal debate within different strands of feminist thought on the issue of marriage migration. There are two main feminist positions, coming from different feminist traditions. There are those typically “radical” feminists who claim that marriage migration is inherently exploitative—it commodifies women, sexu- ally exploits them, and takes advantage of transnational economic inequalities and stereotypes. If you look at the literature on so called “mail order brides” you will find a lot of this literature.

Fig. 8.5  Origin of Foreign wives marrying Japanese men (percent). (Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Japan)

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A second branch of feminist thought—more third wave or postmodern femi- nists—who argue that women have agency, women make rational choices, women may improve their position through these marriages etc.

‘When women’s migration results in exploitative situations, agency is immedi- ately implicated, especially when the women come from poor regions that augment their vulnerability. Marriage migration is no different. It is important to see what is fueling the demand for marriage migration, particularly when there are significant disparities between the couple’s socioeconomic statuses. In most cases, couples do not meet until they have arrived at the airport lobby, holding signs with each other’s names’ (Young 2010).

Marriage migration is a process of negotiation, and while some argue that it is empowering to women, others argue that the imbalances of gender, wealth, and often also age and class, render it inherently exploitative. Some families are anx- ious to recruit young brides from abroad as they are a source of labor, while other families marry off their daughters to be able to afford necessities or even luxuries for male family members (Ibid:9 and 15). In this way, marriage migration has been seen as a process of commodifying women.

Some school of thought related to marriage migration argues that marriage mi- gration is a positive phenomenon. Marriage migration is more than just an econom- ic phenomenon, but one in which values, cultures and human capital are transmitted (Song 2007). There are a number of motivating factors underlying marriage migra- tion within Asia. Some of those reasons include but are not limited to economic benefits, escape from poverty, entry to a desired country, and curiosity.2 It should be noted that marriage migration occurs through a variety of channels. Some marriages are arranged by brokers or agencies that send women abroad.3 In other circumstanc- es, people meet each other because of increased numbers of individuals traveling, working and living abroad. With this increase in mobility and movement of people across cultures, there is also naturally a rise in international marriages (Lee 2007). Furthermore, many men are finding themselves without wives because of women’s increased mobility and agency in the marriage process. These men are forced to look outside of their community and sometimes culture in order to find a wife. For example, there is a shortage of marriageable women in rural China thus forcing men to look elsewhere for their spouse (Chen 2007). These cross-cultural marriages bring a number of challenges as not only do couples have to work through the nor- mal difficulties of marriage, they also have to negotiate not being familiar with the other’s culture.

There is disparity in the demographics of women choosing to migrate for mar- riage. Some come from well-educated higher classes and marry men they came into contact with through travel, school or work. It is only natural that people will enter into cross-cultural relationships in this increasingly globalized world. For example,

2 Malibiran. ‘Filipina Marriage Migrants in Asia.’ 3. 3 Malibiran. ‘Filipina Marriage Migrants in Asia.’ 4.

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increased numbers of Filipino women have married men from North America, Eu- rope, Japan and Australia. However, for others, marriage migration is not about migrating for someone they have fallen in love with, but rather a structured and formal procedure to procure a different livelihood or even secure the migration journey itself. While feminists have offered sustained critiques of the potentially exploitative nature of women migrating for marriage, recent revisionist approaches have examined marriage migration from the perspective of women’s agency. These approaches argue that women actively select marriage migration as a strategy to im- prove their overall life opportunities and standard of living. Along this line, women are empowered decision makers in marriage migration. In a paper presented at the at the 2007 PAK/IPAR Conference on International Marriage Migration in Asia in Seoul, South Korea, Nimfa B. Ogena and colleagues stated the following to de- scribe the degree of women’s agency and decision-making entailed in the marriage migration process, ‘A Filipina who emigrates to join her foreign spouse has made three crucial decisions: first, whether or not to marry; second, whether to marry a foreigner or a Filipino; and finally, whether to emigrate to join her spouse in a foreign country. All three decisions have to be grounded on one’s assessment of her social, economic, political and cultural location (Nimfa 2007, p. 3–8).’

According to these authors’ assessment, marriage migration is an opportunity for women to increase their autonomy and close gender gaps. Marriage migration is a process of negotiation to secure not only a better economic future, but to also secure additional human capital, such as education.4 A woman becomes empow- ered through marriage migration because she resists her cultural norms by moving abroad. It is made clear by many of these arguments, that marriage migrants are not always passive victims in an exploitative industry, but rather they are able to negoti- ate within the marriage process.

Another school of thought argues that marriage migration is not a form of em- powerment, but rather that it reinforces gender roles and leads to exploitation. There may be well founded reason within both schools of thought. Although some authors make sweeping generalizations about gender roles, there may some truth to their arguments in relation to marriage migration. Edward Jow-Chian Tu postulates that men choose brides for intrinsic reasons and that women tend to value extrinsic attributes (Tu 2007, p. 10). While this is a somewhat offensive generalization, it can be argued that marriage migration in which men choose women for intrinsic reasons reinforces the gender stereotypes that so many seek to reform. Furthermore, results from various studies may reveal that women are not as empowered as certain feminist camps believe. There is a tendency for women who migrate for marriage to be already older than the average marrying age in her context, and marrying a man much older because she is settling for a poorer match out of fears of being alone. This could be related to power/wealth disparity—like older American men marrying attractive Asian women not just because she is afraid of being alone, but

4 Nimfa et al. (2007) ‘Filipina Marriage Migration Streams to Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.’ (Paper presented at PAK/IPAR Conference on International Marriage Migration in Asia, Seoul, South Korea 2007). 8.

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because the wealth and power disparity means that he can access women that he would never be able to have a chance with in his own culture. Furthermore, the majority of female marriage migrants are predominantly undereducated. However, there has been at least one study of Vietnamese women marriage migrants to the US which found that they were actually much more educated than their American husbands who were often truck drivers or labourers in the US. Contrarily, male marriage migrants are usually of the same educational level as that of their wife (Chen 2007, p. 12). On a policy level, many policies still tend to either victimize the women or reinforce gender inequality. In Korea, various international marriage migration agencies have a ‘bride guarantee’ policy stating they will replace a bride if she runs away.5 Through policies such as these, marriage—and indeed the woman herself—becomes a commodity.

Furthermore, there are a plethora of possible human rights violations that put female marriage migrants at risk. Immigration officials and many NGOs discour- age bride migration and cite fraud and exploitation as possible outcomes (Sim- mons 2001, p. 152). Marriage migration does bring with it many risks. Bhassorn Limanonda said that at its most dangerous extreme, ‘marriage has become a con- venient tool for human traffickers (Limanoda 2007, p. 35).’ Many women are also abused by their husbands or sold by their husbands. This reiterates the argument that marriage migration is not always empowering, but sometimes exploitative.

However, possible risks of exploitation are not the only consequence of mar- riage migration. Marriage migration could be a representation of changing norms within society. In many of the Asian countries explored and studied in the research, traditional values related to marriage were still commonly held. Women were mar- ried off by their families and portrayed as inferior to their husbands. Regardless of women’s autonomy within the marriage negotiation, there are community-wide consequences of marriage migration. One problem is that large numbers of men of marriageable age are unable to find a wife as the women have migrated. They are then left to look outside their home country for a spouse. Cross-cultural marriages have added difficulties as not only do spouses exchange vows at a wedding cer- emony, but they also exchange cultures (Limanoda 2007, p. 9).’ Societal changes are evidenced by increased marriage migration, families having fewer children and increasing divorce rates (Chen 2007, p. 3). Divorce rates among Asian nationals have been increasing at alarming rates. Cross-cultural marriages seem to exasperate divorce rates, as the pace of divorce among cross-cultural marriages is much higher than national marriages.6 In light of the increasing desire for divorces, some coun- tries such as Taiwan have simplified divorce proceedings to accommodate the rising divorce rates. These impacts are felt across cultures and will have a long-stand- ing impact on the way in which individuals perceive marriage and gender roles.

5 Lee (2007) ‘International Marriage and the State in South Korea.’ 6 Lee and Lee (2007) ‘Spouse Dissimilarity and Marital Instability: An Analysis of Divorced Couples of International Marriage in Korea.’ (Paper presented at PAK/IPAR Conference on Inter- national Marriage Migration in Asia, Seoul, South Korea, 2007, p. 22.

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However, questions remain about the idea of whether marriage facilitates migration or migration facilitates marriage.

According to the research one could say that both of the above statements could be true. In some ways, migration facilitates marriage as people go abroad and unin- tentionally fall in love and get married. This initiates the migration process. How- ever, for others, marriage is seen as an opportunity to migrate and improve one’s livelihood. However, exploitation abounds within the industry as both marriage and women are made into commodities in the process. There are deep-rooted social con- sequences of this trend of marriage migration as countries see increased divorce rates, large numbers of unmarried people of marriageable age and so forth. Both schools of the thought on the subject of marriage migration have valid arguments. It is true that women are sometimes afforded more autonomy and agency in the nego- tiating of marriage migration. Furthermore, some are then able to improve their hu- man capital and economic capital. However, for others marriage migration maintains gender roles and is viewed as selling the woman for the sake of the rest of the family. Furthermore, risks abound, especially in situations where there is a significant power disparity between the man and his migrant wife. It is important that the individuals, countries and international bodies seek to not delegitimize the benefits of marriage migration but make efforts to mitigate risks and undesirable consequences.

8.5 Drivers for Entering into International Marriages

There are various reasons why people choose to marry foreign nationals in general, and especially some particular nationals. Factors that contribute to this phenom- enal increasing number of international marriages in East and Southeast Asia vary. With the rapid pace of industrialization from the 1960s, many rural young women migrated to urban areas for factory jobs. Gender-selective rural-urban migration has continued while the service sector expanded in the 1980s. Thus, in rural areas, gender imbalance of the population has worsened throughout the past few decades (KNSO 2005). Characteristically, migrants from less developed nations are pulled into industrialized markets because there is a surplus, or abundant supply of labor. If marriage migration is put into this context, certain features remain constant. Poor-to-wealthy is the one thing that remains the same, as it is rarely a case of rich migrant brides moving to poorer countries for the purposes of marriage (Young 2010). Although there are some—in tourism hubs like Indonesia, Thailand, Nepal, India, Western women do marry and sometimes stay with local men in the poorer country. The key factor underlying the increase in international marriage in the region is the widened contact between people through travel and developments in communications and the facilitation by matchmaking agencies. In village societ- ies, before rapid urbanization and advances in communications, contact with other people was typically restricted to the village of residence, nearby villages and per- haps wider contacts through relatives and fellow villagers who had migrated else- where. The wedding issue was thus greatly restricted geographically. Respondents

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pointed out a number of factors explaining why they resorted to transnational marriages. There were differences however in the explanatory factors offered by women of varying nationalities. Reasons offered by the Filipinas are different from those of Japanese. All the factors can be broadly categorized as: social, cultural, emotional, economic, political, geographical, and historical. Some also said due to their reluctance to marry men or women of their own nationality, they searched out their partners abroad.

There has been another fact that led many Koreans to look for brides elsewhere outside of the country. According to the Korean Civil Court (Article 809) there has been a prohibition of marriage between men and women with identical surnames. This made it difficult for many to find their partners. However, on 16th of July 1997, the Constitutional Court of Korea ruled the article as unconstitutional and the National Assembly of South Korea passed an amendment to the article in 2002. This restriction has been lifted, but restrictions remain on close family members marrying.

Some studies demonstrate that migrating women are often influenced by fanta- sies about western ideals of freedom and a liberating life style. Personal choices, dreams of freedom, motherhood and love are affective motives for migration that still need to be understood within the structural frameworks and limited opportuni- ties inherent in the societies of origin. Some of those women who married Koreans said the marriage serves as a passageway to enter Korea without paying exorbitant placement fees to recruitment agencies. For Filipinos, submitting an application to join a recruitment agency bound for Korea requires them to pay from US$ 3,000 to 4,000 to secure factory or industrial work in Korea. Through international mar- riages, it is instead the Korean men who pay marital agencies to match them with a Filipino wife and secure the papers for her to enter Korea. Some of the women inter- viewed in the study were getting beyond their childbearing years and were anxious to start their families and raise their children, so had found their match through the Unification Church or other matching agencies. All unification churches are not at all a matching agency per se, but a religious movement from South Korea that per- forms a lot of marriages and matchmaking.

Rigid citizenship policies often induce potential incumbents to formally marry with people in the receiving countries to more easily obtain citizenship. Some coun- tries grant citizenship after a given period in the country, but only to a selected class. For example, after living for seven years in Hong Kong, a foreigner becomes eligible to apply for citizenship. However domestic helpers are excluded from this policy. Most migrant women wish to obtain citizenship in other countries to se- cure residency status, but in many parts of the world obtaining citizenship through international marriage is not always successful. According to the current Korean Nationality Act, the international marriage migrant can obtain citizenship after at least two years of residence and only with the consent of the spouse, but even those who satisfy the conditions cannot obtain citizenship in many cases. Many female migrants choose international marriage to male citizens of the Republic of Korea expecting better economic opportunities and better living standards in the country that is more developed than their home country (Seol et al. 2006).

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Whether it be marriage or labor migration, from the migrants’ point of view, international migration is primarily driven by opportunities for economic gains, and an increasing number of women are joining the stream of international migration globally (Park 2005; Piper 2002). In a survey of Foreign Wives conducted in Korea in 2005, a majority of foreign wives reported that one of their primary motives for marrying abroad was economic. However, for ethnic Koreans living in the regions of northern China and former Soviet Union republics, Korea is where their ances- tors came from. While they may primarily migrate to Korea for economic reasons, ‘their status as a minority in the countries of residence and their ethnic ties to Korea are intensifying the migration stream’ (Moon 2000).

Some important obstacles migrant women face in the Republic of Korea are: differences in culture, language, food, assumptions, gender structures, family re- lationships, expected roles within the family, interpersonal relationships and more. Cultural and social expectations in the Republic of Korea are alien to the female migrants and they face various hardships on multiple scales. This springs from a dream of fulfilling a role as mother and wife, a dream that the women do not believe they can actualize in their country for fear of violence and alcohol abuse in the mar- riage. They preferred foreign husbands because they have a reputation among Thai girls for not drinking and beating their wives, as well as for letting their wives play a bigger role in marital decisions. Strikingly, many female migrants have left violent alcoholic husbands in favor of their new foreign husbands. In relation to inter-ethnic marriage, many of the female respondents candidly said they are generally not used to dark skinned people. If they marry someone with a darker complexion (South Asian men) they will easily be noticed in their country. Some others said that nor- mally relationships with South Asians do not develop, with relations with other East and Southeast Asians being far more common. Many of them did not want to risk having a baby that is not as white as they are. Interestingly, Thai women generally suggest to the family minded husbands and wife battering issues meaning that they prefer husbands who are family oriented.

8.6 Discussions and Implications

From the late 1990s to early 2000, most international marriages of males from the Republic of Korea were with Korean-Chinese females through marriage agencies, so called ‘marriage brokers’, and personal contact; and those with females from Japan, the Philippines and Thailand were arranged through the Unification Church. The more recent trend, however, is a sharp increase in the number of international marriages arranged through marriage agencies. Also, there has recently been an increase in the number of female migrants from Mongolia, Central Asia and areas of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Korea.

Marriage has increasingly been utilized as a strategy for disadvantaged women to improve their wellbeing. First, there has been a surge in long-distance marriages, in which the poor inland provinces suffer a net loss of women to the rich coastal

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ones (Davin 1997). The 1990 Census data illustrates the imbalance of in-and out- flows of brides between rural and urban areas—marriage accounted for 14 % of the inter-provincial migration nationally, but 50 % of the out-migration originated from Yunnan and Guizhou, and another 25 % from Sichuan and Guangxi. On the other hand, the proportion of in-migration to the respective provinces hovered around 10 % even though the volume of in-migration is significantly less than that of out- migration.

The need of men looking for partners brought about the proliferation of recruit- ment agencies or matching agencies. These agencies and brokers use false promises to deceive the potential migrating women. In the case of Filipino women, there are so many agencies posing as labour recruitment agencies for factory or industrial workers, which are actually using this as a front to recruit innocent and unsuspect- ing women to be married to Korean men’ (Yutani 2007).

Through common networks and friends, Filipinas met their husbands through their common friends at work. Through the internet, the couple could meet through the chat room. They talk with each other through the use of high technology. One Filipina interviewed met her Korean husband through this process. The first and largest matching agency is the Unification Church. These are arranged marriages where the couples have no knowledge about the person whom they would marry until the day that they attend the public wedding or what they call the ‘blessing’ (Yutani 2007).

Marriage migration and the businesses supporting it exemplify an industry that eludes traditional international and national controls by using ‘non-trade’ channels to generate and sustain business. Actual trade of women is not the official business of international matchmaking companies; rather they sell catalogs (of women’s pic- tures) to men. A type of trade does however result from the marketing of images of prospective brides: receiving countries get foreign brides and sending countries get remittances and/or additional benefits (e.g. family-sponsored immigration for relatives).

The husband as sole breadwinner, from the women’s perspective, is not viewed as a perpetrator of exploitation. For the respondents, both male and female, the sexual division of labor with the marriage, far from being an externally imposed, distorted and denigrating straightjacket, was viewed as deliberately chosen. For the women, this signified elevated social and economic status that translated into the concrete advantages of remittances to parents and siblings back home as well as personal benefits to the women themselves and their own children. The theme of ‘luck’ emerged in many interviews as women respondents spoke of their good for- tune in finding a foreign husband and gaining immigrant status.

In a globalized world where nation-state boundaries seemed blurred, marriage migration has become an emerging phenomenon. This blurring of boundaries gives individuals greater access to information or interaction with other people from other cultures. Based on an initial reading of related literature and interviews, there are four emerging arteries facilitating interactions or information leading to marriage migration. These are through marriage brokers and recruitment agencies, common networks and friends, the internet/chatrooms. Owing to frequent television and

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newspaper reporting on international marriages, social awareness has increased on this phenomenon. However, at the same time, negative stereotypes about female migrants prevail. The most common stereotypes are: ‘she married only for money because her country is poor’, ‘she is only interested in sending money back home’, and ‘she can abandon the family and run away at anytime’.

Today, mobility is much greater, thereby opening up a greater field of contacts through travel; also, technological developments such as the internet have opened up possibilities for marriage arrangements between people who have never met each other; and thirdly, the commercialization of international marriage also el- evates the volume of this arrangement. Plausibly, that increased contact leads to greater incidence of international marriage if there are no barriers to such mar- riages. In some cases, there are existing barriers based on nationality, ethnicity, social class, and religion, and the intervention of the state to prevent certain kinds of international marriages. The majority of migrating respondents—irrespective of nationalities—come from relatively poor families. For these women, marriage mi- gration offers the key to an imagined (albeit elusive) dream of achieving a prosper- ous family life in the future.

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Chen, Y. (2007). Individual and structural determinants of marital stability: An exploration of cross-border marriages in Taiwan. PAK/IPAR Conference on International Marriage Migra- tion in Asia. Seoul, 1–24.

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Fan, C. C. (2005). Interprovincial migration, population redistribution, and regional development in China: 1990 and 2000 census comparisons. The Professional Geographer, 57(2), 295–311.

Fan, C. C., & Huang Y. (1998). Waves of rural brides: Female marriage migration in China. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 88(2), 227–251.

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Kim, Y. (2006). International marriage female migrants cultural conflict experiences and policy measures for the solution. Korea: Korean Women’s Development Institute.

Kim, C. (2007). Micro-level analysis of international marriage between men in Korea and women from four major countries. PAK/IPAR Conference on International Marriage Migration in Asia. Seoul, Korea, 1–20.

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Part III Migrant’s Education and Employment

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Chapter 9 Immigration and Diversity: Exploring Immigrant Parents’ Contributions to Teacher Education

Yan Guo

J. Zhang, H. Duncan (eds.), Migration in China and Asia, International Perspectives on Migration 10, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8759-8_9, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2014

Y. Guo ( ) Werklund School of Education, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada e-mail: [email protected]

9.1 Introduction

Immigration is now the main source of Canada’s population growth. This has sig- nificant implications for Canadian school systems, and for the preparation of teach- ers. According to the 2006 Census, almost 6.3 million people, that is, about one out of every five people in Canada, speak languages other than English or French as their mother tongue (Statistics Canada 2008). Moreover, the long-term prospect for this population is continued growth (Statistics Canada 2005). Calgary is the largest recipient of immigrants and English as a Second Language (ESL) students in Alber- ta, and the fourth largest such urban area in Canada, after Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal. The number of ESL students in schools is growing rapidly. In Alberta, for example, there were 14,673 ESL students enrolled in provincial schools in 1989—a figure that rose to 71,541 in 2011 (Alberta Education 2011). The Calgary Board of Education in 2011 enrolled about 25,000 ESL learners.

Given the increasing linguistic and cultural diversity of the Canadian population, existing teacher education programs cannot prepare sufficient numbers of teachers with specialist training to support ESL students. This strongly suggests that all teachers ought to be prepared to teach ESL students. Most teacher preparation programs, how- ever, neglect the needs of ESL students and most classroom teachers have not received preparation to help ESL learners achieve their best. A recent report on ESL education in Ontario states: “The state of ESL in large, multi-ethnic school boards is abysmal, and, in essence, a betrayal of the public trust. The reality is that ESL students are denied ac- cess to supports necessary for their academic success” (Meyer 2003, p. 3).

In addition to appropriate university preparation, immigrant parents represent an important yet relatively untapped source for teachers’ pre-service and ongoing professional learning. Immigrant parents bring their values, language, culture, re- ligion and educational backgrounds to our schools, enriching our educational en- vironments. The literature on immigrant parents, however, tends to employ deficit

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models, highlighting parents’ inability to speak English, and their difficulties in communicating with schools (Bitew and Ferguson 2010; Guo 2006). In opposi- tion to the dominant discourse of immigrant parents as the problematic “Others” in Canadian schools, this study examines how pre-service teachers can learn to incor- porate immigrant parent knowledge regarding the linguistic, cultural and religious diversity in their practicum schools.

9.2 Theoretical Frameworks and Prior Research

9.2.1 Fear of Diversity and Difference as Deficit

Research has consistently shown that many teachers are not well prepared to work effectively with immigrant parents (Malatest and Associates 2003; Turner 2007). In their daily encounters with cultural diversity, many teachers face barriers to under- standing diversity. One such barrier is a generalized fear of diversity (Palmer 1998). For example, fear of Muslims, particularly after the September 11th attack on New York’s World Trade Center (McDonough and Hoodfar 2005), reflects a broader lack of knowledge and readiness to approach cultural and religious diversity. Fear and unfamiliarity are exacerbated by curriculum and teaching practices in K-12 educa- tion, which are characterized by Eurocentric perspectives, standards and values, and do not reflect the knowledge and experiences of our culturally and religiously diverse student and parent population.

A tendency to regard “difference as deficit” (Dei 1996) erects a further barrier to teachers’ learning about diversity. Rather than drawing on different cultural groups as sources of alternative strengths, experiences, knowledge, and perspectives, teachers may ignore diversity, minimize it, or perceive it as an obstacle to the learn- ing process (Cummins 2003; Dei 1996).

The equation of “difference” with “deficiency” also means that pre-service teach- ers and school administrators often fail to recognize and draw on knowledge that immigrant parents hold about their children (Jones 2003; Ramirez 2003). School staff may hold beliefs—often tacit—that the knowledge of immigrants, particularly those from developing countries, is incompatible, inferior, and hence, invalid (Abdi 2007; Dei 1996). Non-recognition of immigrant parents’ knowledge can again be causally attributed to misconceptions about difference, and lack of knowledge about different cultures (Guo 2009; Honneth 1995).

9.2.2 Immigrant Parent Knowledge

The extent to which parent knowledge is gained and used may be modelled as “transcultural knowledge construction,” whereby individuals in immigrant societies

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of the new world change themselves by merging ways of life brought from their home countries with customs and knowledge gained from cultures they encounter in their new country. This dynamic learning process can lead to opposition and dis- crimination, or to cultural creativity and the integration of new knowledge within academic and societal positionings (Hoerder et al. 2006).

Knowledge is power; knowledge is socially constructed, culturally mediated, and historically situated (McLaren 2003). At the heart of the nature of knowledge as social relations is a notion of culture as a dynamic entity, as a way of using social, cultural, physical, spiritual, economic, and symbolic resources to make one’s way in the world. Mobilizing such knowledge systematically in the classroom by teach- ers and administrators would promote insightful connections between curricular goals and immigrant students’ experiences in countries of origin, in transition, and in residence in the local community, in turn making sense of transcultural flows and attachments to locality (Appadurai 1996; Hannerz 1992).

In addition to socially mediated forms of knowledge, immigrant parents’ per- sonal knowledge can play an important role in school relations. Personal knowl- edge here refers to wisdom that comes with embodied meaning (Polanyi 1958). In 1958, Polanyi wrote, “Into every act of knowing there enters a passionate contri- bution of the person knowing what is being known, and this coefficient is no mere imperfection but a vital component of his knowledge” (1958, p. viii), stressing that “It is not words that have meaning, but the speaker or listener who means something by them” (p. 252). Personal thought depends on the central agency of human intelligence, to “sustain the student’s effort to understand what he is being taught,” guided by common standards and consensus (1958, p. 257). For him, “the informal act of assertion and the equally informal act of discovery” are logically related; both are “essentially unformalizable, intuitive mental decisions” (p. 261). Drawing upon subjective knowledge in the form of thoughts, observa- tions, experiences and perspectives to further understand participant perspectives, a person’s initial sketchy ideas become metaphors and categories when reflected upon, to eventually become patterned and thematic conclusions and interpreta- tions (Creswell 1997; Miles and Hubermam 1984). Thus, with the confident use of language, individuals participate personally in the powerful process of con- struction of their own knowledge.

Parent personal knowledge is knowledge gained from lived experience in all aspects of life-at work, at play, with family and friends, and so on. It has tempo- ral dimensions in that it resides in “the person’s past experience, in the person’s present mind and body, and in the person’s future plans and actions” (Connelly and Clandinin 1988, p. 25). Parent knowledge includes that drawn from their own educational backgrounds, their professional and personal experiences of interacting with schools in their countries of origin as well as their current understanding of the host country’s education system, their own struggles as immigrant parents, and their future aspirations for their children (Guo 2012; Pushor 2008).

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9.2.3 Reflection as Practitioner Knowledge

Reflection on practice, considered a staple of quality teacher learning, has gained currency in ESL research and practice. John Dewey (1933) defined “reflection” as the “active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in light of the grounds that support it” (p. 9).

Dewey also acknowledged the importance of translating beliefs into action. Sim- ilarly, Schön (1983) described action as an essential aspect of the reflective process. In his view, reflective practitioners are those who engage in reflection-in-action by observing and critiquing their own thought processes and actions. The original con- cept of reflection-in-action may be complemented by reflection-on-action—that is teachers’ reflections on their teaching theories and procedures both before and after teaching (Calderhead and Gates 1993; Cosh 1998; Guo 2005).

In the study that follows, I asked pre-service teachers to reflect upon their inter- pretations of ESL parents’ knowledge and teaching in addressing the needs of ESL students. This third notion of reflection, as subjective and personal knowledge, will be also examined as a possible bridge toward awareness of the biases and prejudices pre-service teachers may have about ESL students, transcultural understanding, ac- ceptance of conflicting perspectives, a profound respect of others’ lived differences, and a strategic awareness of cultural contexts that influence one’s own beliefs, val- ues, attitudes, and behaviors (Banks et al. 2005; Hoerder et al. 2006; MacPherson et al. 2004; Mujawamariya and Mahrouse 2004; Solomon and Levine-Rasky 2003; Tellez and Waxman 2006).

9.3 Methodology

Guided by the theoretical frameworks described above, this study examines the knowledge construction of pre-service teachers, with respect to the learning of ESL students. I ask pre-service teachers to reflect critically on the incidents they are presented and then reflect on these incidents with respect to their own present and future practice. Two research questions guided this study:

1. How do pre-service teachers interpret immigrant parent knowledge regarding ESL students’ first language, culture and religion?

2. How do pre-service teachers respond to linguistic, cultural and religious diver- sity in their field experiences?

9.3.1 Dialogue Across Differences

I based the methods employed in this study on the notion of “diversity dialogue,” proposed by Charles Taylor (1994, 1997). A diversity dialogue between parents and

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pre-service teachers, or “dialogue across differences” as Burbules and Rice (1991) refer to it, can heighten our sensitivity to “how the ‘same’ thing might look and feel quite different to members of different cultural groups” (Burbules and Rice 1991, p. 405). Taylor (1994) suggests four steps for different parties to engage in “diver- sity dialogue.” First, it is important to listen to other voices because each voice is unique. Second, it is significant to recognize and understand differences since non- recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, and can be the basis of oppression and domination. Taylor challenges the ease with which we ascribe to “how we do things here,” and holds out the possibility that we might recognize the worth of different cultures by expanding our horizons or fused horizons (Strike 1996). The third step is to respect differences. The equal value of different cultures is not only recognized, but also cherished. The final step is to negotiate and accommodate dif- ferences. We can accommodate differences because cooperation allows us to build some remarkable things together (Taylor 1997).

9.3.2 Study Samples

Two participant groups’ experiences were brought together for this study. Parent participants—38 in all—were recruited through the Coalition for Equal Access to Education in Calgary, Alberta. This is a local umbrella organization that brings together community agencies, groups and individuals who are concerned with the current state of ESL instruction in the K-12 public education system and its conse- quences for immigrant children and families. The Coalition is committed to work with community, education and government stakeholders to promote access to qual- ity, equitable education for culturally diverse children and youth.

The parents who participated in this study had recently arrived in Calgary. Their various countries of origin—15 in total —included China, Korea, Vietnam, Nepal, the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Algeria, Ghana, Somalia, Sudan, Co- lumbia, Belize, and Suriname. Among parent participants, 23 different languag- es were spoken. All participants held credentials from their countries of origin. Twenty-five of the parents had bachelor degrees, 12 had master’s degrees, and one had a high school diploma. Occupations held in countries of origin included univer- sity instructors, teachers, engineers, social workers, principals, and managers. Once in Canada, most experienced downward mobility; they became community liaison workers, cashiers, production workers, or were unemployed. Some parents gained knowledge of the Canadian school system by volunteering in schools, participating in school councils, or working in schools as lunch supervisors or teacher assistants. Some had directly observed teachers working with their children and were able to share these experiences. Semi-structured, individual interviews with parents were used to elicit their perspectives on what teachers ought to know about their children. Each interview lasted from 60 to 90 minutes.

The second participant group in this study consisted of 89 pre-service teachers enrolled in the University of Calgary’s Master of Teaching (MT) programme, a

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2-year post-degree bachelor of education program. The pre-service teachers were representative of the nation’s teaching force, which is predominantly white and fe- male. The MT programme is inquiry-based learning, field-oriented, and learner- focused. The inquiry-based stance means that students are asked to explore theories and issues through real-life cases, active questioning, and exposure to a wide range of materials. The program is unique because campus and field experiences are in- terwoven throughout the 2 years, providing students with ample opportunities to reflect on their field experiences.

In the first phase of the study, intercultural dialogues were held between the pre-service teachers and parent leaders. This was followed by an online discussion. Finally focus groups were held with the participating teachers, in which they were asked to reflect on what they had learned from the exchanges with immigrant par- ents. Nine parent leaders were invited to share parent knowledge with four groups of pre-service teachers. Approximately 20 teachers participated in each group. Each of these dialogues lasted for approximately 2 hours. The discussion groups were held between March, 2009 and March, 2011. The sessions were audio-recorded, and the pre-service teachers’ written reflections on these sessions were collected. In the second phase of the study, the pre-service teachers participated in an on-line forum, in which they were asked to reflect on how, during their field placements, they and their school communities responded to immigrant parents’ knowledge. Online prompts included the following:

a. How are students’ first languages valued in your schools? Can you give us an example?

b. Can you give us an example of cultural misunderstanding in your field experi- ence? How is the misunderstanding resolved? What have you learned from this experience?

c. Some Muslim parents in our study requested a prayer space and to exempt their children from certain classes such as dancing and swimming, and sex education in public schools. What is your school’s policy? How would you respond to these requests in your future teaching?

d. Public education in Canada follows a fundamentalist Christian curriculum and calendar. Do you agree with this statement? Why or why not?

In the third and final segment of the study, focus groups were with the pre-service teachers to follow up on the questions that had been posed in the online forums. Each focus group was conducted at the end of a semester, following directly from the online forum that had preceded it over the term. The focus group works well in situations that involve investigating the attitudes and experiences of a homogeneous group of people regarding a specific issue (Krueger and Casey 2000). It allows for meanings to be shared and elaborated upon through group interaction. Focus groups provided a complementary methodology to expand upon the questions posed on- line. Five focus groups were conducted, and each group included between three and five students. Two students who were unable to attend the focus groups agreed to be interviewed individually.

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9.4 Findings and Discussion

Three major themes emerged from data analysis: students’ first languages as a prob- lem versus a resource; cultural misunderstanding and systemic racism; and tensions related to the accommodation of religion in schools. In each case, we were able to identify how cultural variations in these knowledge areas contributed to misunder- standings between parents and teachers.

9.4.1 Students’ First Languages: Problem or Resource?

Most pre-service teachers in our study were open to the use of ESL students’ first languages at school. This new teacher, for example, viewed first language as a re- source for ESL students’ learning:

I think [students’] use of their mother tongue is helping them to succeed in the classroom, and catch on to concepts they might not understand.

Similarly, this teacher observed: Students who speak the same languages assisted each other with math problems that one may not have understood but the other did. (pre-service teacher)

Some pre-service teachers noticed during their practicum that their schools encour- aged the use of immigrant students’ first language in their practicum; others ob- served that immigrant students’ first languages were largely ignored:

I think it’s like an afterthought for her [the partner teacher] that any of the children in her class actually speak a different language and it’s kind of like a bonus when she remembers. The idea that students may speak other languages is not something that is thought about.

This pre-service teacher, however, felt overwhelmed by the need to become familiar with so many languages, and argued against their active inclusion in the classroom:

I do not believe that teachers should allow for ESL students to use their first language at school. Teachers would have to be proficient in many languages due to the wide range of languages. This is because students could be talking about not appropriate things and no one would know…As well as, if ESL students were allowed to speak in their mother tongue other students may feel unwelcome around them.

Her reasoning—fear of her inability to monitor students for inappropriate behav- ior and the potential for other students to feel excluded—is consistent with pre- service dominant attitudes found in studies conducted by De Courcy (2007) and Jones (2002).

Other pre-service teachers were simply uncertain of when and where it was ap- propriate to encourage the use of English. One bilingual pre-service teacher shared that she felt uncomfortable speaking Korean to Korean students:

[The school] just got 3 brand new Korean girls and since I can speak it, I was speaking with them. Then when teachers would walk by I would feel kind of “What am I doing? Should I

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speak English? Why am I speaking Korean to them? Is this right?” I was second guessing myself and then I felt kind of uncomfortable talking in Korean with them. Like this isn’t the way it should be, but still it’s put on me that I need to be speaking English ‘cause we’re at an English school. (pre-service teacher)

This pre-service teacher expressed an ideological dilemma (Billig et al. 1988): the monolingual ideology she had internalized through her own schooling experiences conflicted with the positive values she had acquired about multilingual education through her pre-service education.

9.4.2 Cultural Misunderstanding and Systemic Racism

In our interviews with immigrant parents, they emphasized how important it was for teachers to understand their cultural beliefs and practices. A couple of cultural misunderstanding incidents from the interviews were shared with pre-service teach- ers. Two parents’ accounts are particularly illustrative. A parent from South Korea recounted,

You know how she (the teacher) stated, “I think your son doesn’t respect women…He doesn’t look at me when I talk to him”…In our culture, it is a sign of respect. When the children talk to their parents and elders, they look down.

A parent from Pakistan described, similarly, how a teacher had misinterpreted a boy’s behaviour:

Recently I was talking to one of the ESL teachers. She said she had one student from Paki- stan and he is always following the teachers. She said, “I’m annoyed because he is just following me all the time.” I said “It is not that he is following you. It shows respect. You know in our culture you can’t walk in front of the teacher. So all he is doing is showing respect for you.”

As they reflected on these incidents, pre-service teachers agreed that these incidents had occurred “due to teachers’ lack of knowledge about students’ culture.” This pre-service teacher added,

It is so important to research behaviours, customs etc on the different cultures in your classroom, or things like this can happen. I had no idea about these types of customs, and I will definitely not forget it and hopefully recall them if I am faced in a similar type of situation.

Some pre-service teachers looked at these incidents more deeply, reflecting on the influence of their own socialization, and challenging teachers’ tendencies to ethno- centrism. One teacher commented that “Canadian teachers were thinking of normal or abnormal based on what they know to be true and the norm in their own culture.” Another stated,

I believe that the misunderstandings were caused through placing the norms of the culture in power on all students and assuming that they would understand and follow.

These participants questioned the tendency of those in the dominant culture to as- sume their own cultural values and practices are universal and “normal.” Their

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critical insights allowed them to see the world through others’ cultural and experi- ential lenses.

In another critical case, teachers heard this story about a Sudanese parent and her children:

One day, a 6-year-old child opened the fridge, got some food out, and played with the food. He went back to the fridge several times and got more food out and played with the food. His mother was tired of this and told the kid and his two siblings, “If you guys go again to the fridge, there is a lion there.” Her purpose was not to let the kids touch the fridge… It came out in a classroom conversation. The 6-year old told his teacher he could not get food from the fridge because there was a lion there. So automatically, the teacher reported this incidence to social services. Social services took it serious and they took the kids away. A legal battle dragged the parents to the courts.

The pre-service teachers offered a variety of interpretations, for example, that the teacher may have thought the child wasn’t being fed. Most realized that the African mother was trying to scare her child into behaving, just as a North American parent might say “if you misbehave the bogeyman downstairs will get you.”

Some participants felt the teacher’s reaction was racist. One pre-service teacher commented:

I’m sure that I could get away with far worse and even genuinely destructive behaviour with my own daughter and not suffer the same consequence, as I am an established member of the dominant culture. It seems by the stories that the Sudanese families are being singled out- that their culture is being seen as far more suspect than any particular actions being taken by individual families.

The teacher was aware of his own white privilege, and questioned whether systemic racism towards Sudanese parents may have played a role in the teacher’s miscon- ceptions.

9.4.3 Tensions about Religious Accommodations

Thirteen out of the 38 immigrant parents in the study were Muslim, hailing from Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Algeria, and Somali. They stated that one of the rea- sons for them to immigrate to Canada had been their attraction of its official policies of multiculturalism. Understanding, as one of these parents observed, that religious freedom is enshrined in Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the parents had expected the accommodation of religious practices in schools, including allowing Muslim girls to wear a headscarf. However, practice of hijab remains poorly under- stood in Canada. This parent, for example, described how some teachers initially reacted toward her:

I wear a headscarf when I go to parent-teacher conferences. The majority of the people, I have noticed their initial impression about me would be I am a dumb person because I wear that.

In fact, this Muslim mother had received all her education in English and obtained a Master of Science degree in India before she immigrated to Canada. She spoke

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fluent English, volunteered in school activities, and participated in the school coun- cil. “They [the teachers] thought I am oppressed,” she continued. “I am not op- pressed at home.” As a single mother, she was raising two children by herself, and encouraged her daughter to pursue a law career.

The pre-service teachers reflected on the commonly held belief that hijab is “a symbol of women’s marginalization” (Subedi 2006, p. 234). One pre-service teacher wrote: “I think the teachers…. perhaps assumed that the headscarf was a means to control women and women wore it against their will.” The pre-service teacher realized because of their limited knowledge of different religions, many teachers could fall back on stereotypes and unexamined beliefs. As one new teacher observed,

When we see someone dress differently, look differently, we associate that with the fact that they must not know English. If that person can’t communicate at the same level, then they must be dumb….this superior/inferior attitude remains. It takes a teacher to acknowledge their own inhibitions and move past this general negative attitude towards others.

She argued that it is important for educators to guard against equating difference in dress to English language ability, to a lack of intelligence, or a cultural or edu- cational backwardness (cf. Zine 2006). Such assumptions are based on stereotypes “reminiscent of the long-gone colonial era” (Rezai-Rashti 1994, p. 37).

In addition to requesting Muslim girls to wear a headscarf, 12 out of the 13 Mus- lim parents believed that Muslim girls should be segregated from the opposite sex, so girls are not allowed to wear swimming suits or dance with boys. Aneeka, mother of a 15-year-old daughter said:

In our religion we believe in gender segregation. The man is not supposed to see the beauty of women. I did go and talk to the teacher at the beginning of the school year that my daughter does not swim and dance with boys (Aneeka, Pakistan).

Aneeka requested her children to exempt from swimming and dancing classes. Sana, mother of a 12-year-old daughter expressed her disappointment that some teachers were not sensitive to her religious needs and did not allow exemptions:

I went to the school and told her teacher we don’t allow her to participate in the swimming classes. The teacher was annoyed. She didn’t understand and made a big deal: ‘This is physical education class. She has to be part of it.’

Donika went beyond exemptions by suggesting that schools need to rethink the requirement for swim wear:

This kid was crying because she was not allowed to wear the swimming suit. The teacher in fact forced her to wear the swimming suit. The only thing that this teacher had in her mind is that you can only swim in the swimming suit. That’s not true, a real mistake (Donika, Suriname).

Donika stressed the importance for educators to be open to different perspectives and realize that there are many different ways of doing the same thing. She sug- gested that schools should allow Muslim girls to wear full body suits instead of swim suits.

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The pre-service teachers responded to the parents’ request of exemptions from swimming and dancing classes in different ways. For example, one pre-service teacher responded:

Should the religious and cultural beliefs of one person change the learning experience of all the children in the class? I honestly have no idea what I would do if a parent requested I change the core of my teaching practice.

This pre-serve teacher was not sensitive to the religious needs of her students and did not allow exemptions. She failed to recognize that religion is an essential part of education for some students and failed to accommodate religious difference. An- other pre-service teacher realized the importance to respect the parent’s religious beliefs, but was worried about her Muslim students:

In many cultures, males and females are segregated and this has to do with comfort level. However, in western society it is not the case…It is important to accept religious beliefs but it is also important to be able to function in the society they live in. (pre-service teacher)

This pre-serve teacher said in Canada we are not segregated and these students will be expected to work with the opposite sex in many situations in the future. She was torn between religious accommodations and supporting Muslim students to function in the Canadian society. Religious continuity within Canadian schools is important for some Muslim parents. For teachers, dancing and swimming are part of school curricula and students are required to participate in these classes for their physical and social development. Where the rule in swimming class is that everyone must wear swimming suits or in gym class shorts and T-shirts, religious students should be exempt from the class, or be put in an alternative class (Levy 1997; Spinner-Halev 2000). The clothing requirement should also be rethought and students should be allowed to wear full body suits.

9.5 Implications

This study suggests that pre-service teachers need to unlearn their privilege and need to recognize and make use of the knowledge of immigrant parents to provide a better public education for immigrant students. The study indicates that it is impor- tant for teacher educators to help pre-service teachers to shift their representations of multilingualism from being a problem to being a resource. An example would be the use of dual-language books, where the text is in both English and another lan- guage. A kindergarten teacher, a graduate student in my course, invited parents from eleven different languages to be part of a family reading program in her classroom. Every Friday, she allocated 25 minutes at the drop-off time for parent volunteers to read to small groups of children, often from dual-language books, on their own or with a partner parent reading the English text (Sarah Harrison, personal communi- cation, December 16, 2010). The teacher reported the increasing appreciation of the children toward their classmates’ multilingual abilities, as well as how much the

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parents of these children valued the opportunity to share their first languages and be part of the learning community.

It is also important for teacher educators to support pre-service teachers in devel- oping a critical awareness of cultural and religious discrimination and the attitudes underlying it. Incorporating the home cultures of immigrant parents into the school curriculum challenges pre-service teachers to rethink predetermined involvement typologies that cause immigrant parents to be labeled as unwilling or uninvolved (López 2001). Parents might be invited to visit the classroom and share their knowl- edge (Pushor 2008), or students given homework assignments that require them to interview their parents or their grandparents about their communities or their im- migration experiences. This kind of activity helps to acknowledge parents’ cultural values, and make parents feel they can provide valuable contributions. Students make better connections between the school curriculum and their personal experi- ences, which in turn encourages their academic success.

In response to the recognition of the religious diversity, public schools are re- quired to inform administrators and teachers about the religious practices of their students. Religious discrimination derives in part from religious illiteracy. As White (2009, p. 859) noted, “religion exists in multiculturalism, but it is often omitted from multicultural education.” Religious illiteracy has meant that teachers (the majority of who are at least nominally Christian) often fail to discuss or even understand the religions dimensions of policy challenges (Sumyu Neufeld, personal communica- tion, January 6, 2010). This illiteracy can be addressed with mandatory education on world religions as subjects for respectful study but not indoctrination for all pre- service teachers (Bouchard and Taylor 2008; Bramadat and Selijak 2005). Religion is an important part of a well-rounded academic education. Learning about it will help teachers and students overcome their fear and support social interaction be- tween immigrant and non-immigrant students (Spinner-Halev 2000).

It is important for educators to provide institutionalized means for the explicit recognition and representation of oppressed groups. Part of these means include modifications of school curricula, dress codes, provision of prayer rooms for Mus- lim students (Kanu 2008), and also state funding for privately established Muslims schools in the same way that Catholic schools are funded1, which are necessary to reflect contemporary and religiously pluralistic realities.

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Chapter 10 Intra-metropolitan Opportunity Structure and Immigrant Self-employment

Cathy Yang Liu

C. Y. Liu ( ) Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA e-mail: [email protected]

10.1 Introduction

The rapid increase of immigrant population in metropolitan areas across the United States brings significant changes to urban labor market. While many immigrants in- tegrate into the formal labor market through participation in wage and salaried work, a substantive proportion of Latino and Asian immigrants are making their way into ethnic entrepreneurship through their own businesses (Bates 1997; Borjas 1986). The number of minority owned business experienced rapid growth over the 1980s and 1990s, partly explained by the expansion of the minority groups in the overall labor force (Fairlie 2004). Using the greater Atlanta region as a case study, this article locates immigrants’ self-employment activities in the larger metropolitan economic and spatial context and examines the role of intra-metropolitan employment distri- bution and local opportunity structure on the incidence of self-employment among immigrants, as compared to native-born residents.1 Small business startup among minority and immigrant populations has the potential of employing co-ethnic em- ployees, generating growth in ethnic communities, and combating economic down- turn in the current economic climate. Understanding the structural, economic, social, and cultural contexts that play a role in their self-employment decisions has impor- tant bearings on planning for sound local economies and healthy communities.

Despite the importance of self-employment and ethnic entrepreneurship in im- migrants’ economic assimilation into the host society and in the economic develop- ment of host communities, there has been limited research on the topic, and existing

1 This paper uses self-employment and entrepreneurship interchangeably, making reference to those individuals who have own incorporated or not-incorporated business, professional practice, or farm.

A version of this chapter was published in Economic Development Quarterly.

J. Zhang, H. Duncan (eds.), Migration in China and Asia, International Perspectives on Migration 10, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8759-8_10, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2014

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literature is missing crucial linkages. While the interactive components of opportu- nity structure, group characteristics, and strategies all need to be considered in un- derstanding ethnic entrepreneurship (Aldrich and Waldinger 1990), much research is focused on the individual’s endowments. Individuals’ human capital, skill set, experience, as well as the financial capital and preparedness of the family are found to foster entrepreneurship (e.g. Kim et al. 2006; Fairlie and Woodruff 2010). An- other line of research is conducted on the national level and examines the inter-city and inter-regional variation in firm formation. Cities and regions act as incubators of creativity and innovation as the economic, social, and policy context can shape the entrepreneurial environment and facilitate or inhibit entrepreneurial entry (Lee et al. 2004). Industrial intensity, unemployment rate, population diversity and mar- ket access, among others factors, have been identified as important determinants of regional variations in firm formation (Armington and Acs 2002). The decline of manufacturing employment in both central city and suburban areas also contributes to the rise in self-employment in an era of economic restructuring (Oh 2008). For ethnic minorities, residential segregation in ethnically-concentrated enclaves has either no significant effect on the incidence of self-employment (Yuengert 1995) or even lowers the likelihood of entrepreneurship beyond very moderate levels (Fischer and Massey 2000).

While communities could also act as natural incubators for prospective entre- preneurs (Green and Butler 1996), few studies to date have incorporated spatial, economic, and social contexts on the intra-metropolitan level in analyzing the in- cidence of self-employment among native-born and foreign-born populations. In reviewing various streams of literature on Latino self-employment, Robles and Cordero-Guzman (2007) also pointed out the need for research that link their self-employment and entrepreneurial activities to community context and larger urban processes. This chapter seeks to fill this gap by explicitly incorporating lo- cal residential patterns and socioeconomic structures in addition to individual and household characteristics to examine the intra-metropolitan distribution of immi- grant entrepreneurship. This chapter places particular emphasis on Latino and Asian immigrant populations, with comparisons made to the native-born residents. These two groups comprise an increasing share of current immigration, and the ethnic businesses they established have also proliferated in recent years. It is documented that between 1989 and 1999, Latino self-employment grew by almost 190 %, with significant presence in construction and personal services. The same period wit- nessed a 55 % increase among self-employed Asians, many of whom are involved in retail and professional services (Fairlie 2004). The selection of Atlanta as one of the prominent emerging immigrant gateways (Singer 2004) exemplifies immi- grants’ labor market behavior among cities in the same camp, and complements the research accounts of established immigrant destinations like New York and Los An- geles. The residential location and economic mobility paths of immigrants in these areas might necessarily differ from those in older gateways.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: The literature review sections reviews the theory and literature on immigrant self-employment, especially the

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individual, household and contextual factors that are associated with their entre- preneurial entry. Four sets of contextual factors that could impact the chances of entering self-employment are discussed: those on spatial structure, economic struc- ture, social environment, and ethnic concentration. An overview of the employment growth and demographic change of Atlanta metropolitan area is presented, followed by a description of the data, sample, and methodology of this study. Models are estimated to test the effect of the contextual factors on the incidence of immigrant self-employment while controlling for important individual and household charac- teristics. Potential policy implications to foster the self-employment entry of im- migrant groups are offered in the conclusion.

10.2 Literature Review

10.2.1 Ethnic Entrepreneurship and Immigrant Self-employment

Entrepreneurship in its simplest form was defined as the “creation of an organiza- tion” (Gartner 1988) and ethnic entrepreneurs are business owners or self-employed workers whose group membership is tied to a common cultural background (Yinger 1985). In recent years, there has been increasing research interest from various academic disciplines on the theory of ethnic entrepreneurship (Bonacich 1973; Aldrich and Waldinger 1990; Zhou 2004), trends and performances of minority owned businesses (Light 1980; Bates 1997; Fairlie 2004; Fairlie and Robb 2008), as well as characteristics and earnings potential of minority business owners and self-employed immigrants (Wilson and Portes 1980; Borjas 1986; Yuengert 1995; Logan et al. 2003; Aguilera 2009). While black and Asian entrepreneurs have been the focus of many academic inquiries (e.g. Light 1980; Bates 1997; Fairlie and Robb 2008), recent research has started to examine Hispanic entrepreneurship as well (Lofstrom and Wang 2007; Robles and Cordero-Guzman 2007; Wang and Li 2007; Fairlie and Woodruff 2010).

According to the U.S. Census, self-employment defines those individuals who report that they are “self-employed in own not incorporated business, professional practice, or farm,” or “self-employed in own incorporated business, professional practice, or farm.” This definition includes owners of all types of businesses—in- corporated, unincorporated, employer, and non-employer firms. While the concept of “ethnic entrepreneur” might have somewhat different denotations, it is frequently operationalized as self-employed minorities and immigrants in empirical analysis, especially those utilizing census household survey data (e.g. Fischer and Massey 2000, Wang and Li 2007). Aldrich and Waldinger (1990) argued that there is no clear explanation of how “entrepreneurs” are clearly differentiated from “owners,” or even the self-employed, and define entrepreneurs as the self-employed persons

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who employ family labor and those who employ outsiders. Following these previous studies, this chapter uses immigrant self-employment and immigrant entrepreneur- ship interchangeably using the Census definition.

Entrepreneurial entry provides an alternative route of upward mobility and eco- nomic advancement for ethnic workers besides wage and salary employment, es- pecially when they face “blocked opportunities” in the formal labor market. For immigrants, such barriers may stem from their limited English language skills and depreciation of their home country-acquired human capital, as well as discrimina- tion from employers. In this context, self-employment constitutes an alternative route out of unemployment and poverty, and enables immigrants to effectively uti- lize family resources and home-country knowledge (Light 1980). It is also a mode of economic incorporation by avoiding open competition in the labor market and carving out market niches (Zhou 2004).

In exploring the potential explanations to racial/ethnic disparities in business entry and performance, human capital, managerial experience, financial resources and startup capital are identified as key factors for both Asian entrepreneurs (Bates 1997; Fairlie and Robb 2008) and Hispanic entrepreneurs (Lofstrom and Wang 2007; Fairlie and Woodruff 2010). Further, the relatively low level of human capi- tal, deficiencies in household wealth, inadequate access to financial capital and low startup capitalization have been found to be the major explanations for the relatively low business formation rate and limited business success among Hispanics (Wang and Li 2007; Fairlie and Woodruff 2010). The level of education and experience— especially managerial experience—determines to a large extent the type of industry one enters, and the associated business strategy as well. However, little is known about how self-employed immigrants are spatially distributed within metropolitan areas, and how that distribution is shaped by intra-metropolitan local contexts. In reviewing literature on Latino self-employment and entrepreneurship, Robles and Cordero-Guzman (2007) explicitly call for research that links their self-employment and entrepreneurial activities to community contexts and larger urban processes.

10.2.2 Intra-metropolitan Factors on Immigrant Self-employment

Ethnic entrepreneurship is shaped by three interactive components: opportunity structure, which consists of market conditions, access to business opportunities and dependence on co-ethnics or non-ethnic market; group characteristics, which include ethnic social networks and general organizing capacity; and ethnic strate- gies that emerge from the interaction of the two, as ethnic groups adapt to their environments (Aldrich and Waldinger 1990). Despite the importance of opportunity structure, few have systematically defined or tested the various factors on the intra- metropolitan level that contribute to the spatial distribution of immigrant entrepre- neurial activities. Based on the literature, four sets of factors can potentially play a role: spatial structure, economic structure, social context and ethnic concentration.

10 Intra-metropolitan Opportunity Structure and Immigrant Self-employment 153

10.2.3 Spatial Structure

It is well documented that immigrants are increasingly settling away from the ur- ban core within metropolitan areas (Massey 2008). Recent studies have charac- terized immigrants’ increasingly decentralized residential pattern as “ethnoburbs” (Li 1998), “melting pot suburbs” (Frey 2001) and “suburban immigrant nation” (Hardwick 2008). However, how ethnic businesses emerge from and reflect the di- verse and suburbanizing immigrant communities is not clear. In their analysis of the spatial distribution of ethnic businesses in multi-ethnic Toronto, Fong et al. (2007) argued that the spatial distribution of ethnic businesses across central city and sub- urban communities are dependent on four local conditions: the proportion of recent immigrants, the number of small businesses, the proportion of manufacturing and retail businesses, and the presence of ethnic malls. Thus, it might be expected that self-employment is more prevalent among immigrants in the suburban localities given the lower density land use and thus lower land rent, as well as the develop- ment of new ethnic malls to host ethnic businesses. Such spatial preferences likely differ across businesses in different industries.

10.2.4 Economic Structure

Market conditions and the industrial structure in a locality can play an important role in entrepreneurial entry. The national economy continues to transform from a manufacturing-based to a service-based economy. It is documented that a boom- ing service economy can be associated with growth in self-employment, as self- employment has risen in both specialized producer services such as management, business, finance, and real estate, and social services like health care practitio- ners (Hipple 2004). On the inter-metropolitan level, Wang (2009) found that after individual-level characteristics are controlled for, metropolitan labor market char- acteristics, especially macroeconomic conditions and overall business structure, significantly influence self-employment patterns. On the intra-metropolitan level, the decline in central city (or suburban) manufacturing employment gives rise to self-employment in respective (Oh 2008).

Given the uneven distribution and growth of different industrial sectors across the metropolitan area, it can be expected that immigrants’ participation in self-em- ployment is subject to such evolving economic structure. The exact effect however, could be two-fold. On the one hand, job growth in an area may provide immigrants with ample job opportunities to engage in wage/salary work, depressing their en- trepreneurial aspirations. On the other hand, it may also signal a positive policy en- vironment and business climate of these localities in hosting business startup, thus nurturing and facilitating the process of entrepreneurial entry. Young firms will be able to take advantage of backward and forward inter-firm linkages, existing labor supply, as well as business and social services, and thus reduce transaction costs to a large extent. In this sense, an area with dense retail trade and service industries,

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both of which feature relatively low economies of scale and low barriers to entry, might see a high rate of immigrant self-employment.

10.2.5 Social Context

The density of social networks, local purchasing power, tightness of labor mar- ket, as well as creative environment of a locality also has important bearings on self-employment propensity. It is argued that “the locationally-differentiated web of production activities and associated social relationships” can shape the patterns of entrepreneurship and innovation (Scott 2006, p. 1). Westlund and Bolton consid- ered spatially-defined social capital as a “community characteristic that facilitates or inhibits the kind of innovative, risk-taking behavior that is part and parcel of en- trepreneurship… and acts as part of the resource endowment, favorable or unfavor- able” (2003, p. 79). Two factors are usually used to capture the social environment of a community: the unemployment (and/or poverty) rate as a signal of labor market tightness, and the percentage of the highly-educated in the local workforce as an indicator of the concentration of creativity and talent. A low unemployment rate in a locality is usually associated with a high level of labor market demand, and a tight labor market may indicate a high new firm formation rate, and therefore a high self-employment rate as well. But the lack of economic opportunities, as implied by a high unemployment rate, may also push more individuals into self-employment (Armington and Acs 2002). Some found that the entrepreneurship entry rate among the unemployed is twice as high as is the case among employed workers (Evans and Leighton 1989). However, risk-taking spirit can be discouraged and access to clientele with purchasing power circumscribed when poverty is concentrated geo- graphically (Fischer and Massey 2000). A creative and diverse social environment, one that is open, tolerant, and creative, attracts human capital and produces high level of entrepreneurship. Intensity of creative talent in an area can generate the social milieu of innovation and risk-taking necessary for entrepreneurial activities. The growth rate of incorporated self-employment is triple for persons with a college degree and higher, as compared to those with less than high school degree (Hipple 2004). On the inter-metropolitan level, new firm formation is positively associated with percentage college graduates in a city (Lee et al. 2004). It can be expected that places with high share of college graduates will have higher self-employment participation as well, though it is less clear whether the effect would differ between the native-born and immigrants.

10.2.6 Ethnic Concentration

Ethnic communities can provide the resources, labor pool, and market for ethnic entrepreneurs to serve a market that is deserted by the mainstream economy. As the “protected market hypothesis” implies, ethnic entrepreneurs find their niches

10 Intra-metropolitan Opportunity Structure and Immigrant Self-employment 155

in ethnic communities given their particular understanding of the preference and consumption behavior of coethnics, and special ties with homeland for ethnic goods (Light 1972). Ethnically concentrated communities also provide ethnic entrepre- neurs with a stable consumer base for ethnic goods, recruitment channels for ethnic suppliers and workers, easy access to credit and capital, and role models in business startup (Aldrich and Waldinger 1990; Zhou 2004). All these are essential for na- scent entrepreneurs to mobilize resources and establish businesses. On the national level, some suggest that Latinos are more likely to be self-employed in cities with higher concentration of Latinos (Borjas, 1986; Wang, 2009), while others found no significant effect (Yuengert 1995). Cross-city evidence indicates that rather than en- hancing business opportunities, a high degree of residential segregation may create unfavorable entrepreneurial environment, especially when combined with poverty concentration (Fischer and Massey 2000). It is worth noting that ethnic commu- nities used to concentrate in inner city neighborhoods, forming Chinatowns and barrios in many cities. Recent years have witnessed the emergence of ethnic com- munities of various socioeconomic status in both central city and suburban areas (Logan et al. 2002). These communities would necessarily feature different levels of resource provision for aspirant ethnic entrepreneurs, especially when interacted with the larger metropolitan spatial and economic structures.

10.3 Data and methodology

10.3.1 Data and Sample

Atlanta’s economy experienced substantive growth in the past years. Between 1990 and 2000, total metropolitan employment grew from around 1.5 million jobs to more than 2.1 million jobs, an increase of 43 %. At the same time, the immigrant population has also recorded a phenomenal growth rate of 817 % between 1980 and 2000, from 46 thousand in 1980 to 423 thousand in 2000 (Singer 2004). The selec- tion of Atlanta as one of the prominent emerging immigrant gateways complements the research accounts of established immigrant destinations like New York and Los Angeles. The residential location and economic mobility paths of immigrants in these areas might necessarily differ from those in older gateways.

Studies of minority and ethnic entrepreneurship have mainly used two types of secondary data sources: economic census or firm-level data, especially Character- istics of Business Owners (e.g, Bates 1997) and Survey of Business Owners (e.g., Fairlie and Robb 2008); and population- or household-level data, especially PUMS (e.g. Wang and Li 2007), Current Population Survey (Fairlie and Woodruff 2010), and Survey of Income and Program Participation (e.g. Lofstrom and Wang 2007). PUMS datasets are widely used to examine immigrant entrepreneurship because CBO/SBO data do not record the nativity status of business owners. PUMS data are also helpful to explore the determinants of self-employment entry as it has a

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very representative immigrant sample and includes those who are self-employed and those who are not, making possible the comparison of their characteristics. Thus, this research primarily uses U.S. Census 2000 Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) for the greater Atlanta region (Ruggles et al. 2008), as it is suitable for the research questions at hand.

One concern with using PUMS data is that it might capture those who engage in involuntary self-employment, or the contingent workers who do not have a primary employer. Fairlie (2008) compared estimates of immigrant business owners using PUMS and SBO, and showed PUMS actually yield smaller numbers of immigrant business owners. One potential explanation is that the PUMS estimates include only individuals owning businesses as their main work activity with a substantial com- mitment of hours whereas the SBO includes all firms with receipts of $ 1,000 or more, which may include side or “casual” businesses owned by wage-and-salary workers, the unemployed, or retired workers.

Self-employment is defined by the class of worker question in the Census and includes those who report either “self-employment in own not incorporated business, professional practice, or farm” or “self-employed in own incorporated business, pro- fessional practice, or farm”. Farm owners are eliminated through industry of employ- ment question given the focus on urban entrepreneurship. A first look at the growth of the immigrant population and self-employed immigrants, especially Asians and Latinos, between 1990 and 2008 is provided in Table 10.1. Self-employed immi- grants who work more than 15 hours per week are also reported as a way to exclude very small-scale businesses, disguised unemployment and casual sellers of goods and services (Fairlie 2008), but their share has proven to be quite low.

The growth of both the immigrant population and self-employment immigrants was phenomenal during the period between 1990 and 2008 in Atlanta. While the immigrant population grew by 417 %, self-employed immigrants grew by 464 %, greatly outpacing the comparable growth rates of the general population during the past two decades. Asian immigrants made up 34.9 % of all immigrant entrepreneurs in 1990 and 29.8 % in 2008, with a growth rate of 381.7 %. Latino immigrant entre- preneurs registered a high growth of 1109.8 % during the same period, now compris- ing 35.2 % of all self-employed immigrants as compared to 16.4 % back in 1990.

10.3.2 Urban Geography

The smallest geographic identifier given in PUMS is Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA), which is the unit of analysis for this study2. There are 33 PUMAs in the Atlanta Metropolitan Statistical Areas. PUMAs have been used frequently as the

2 The 20-county Atlanta region is identified on the PUMA level as well. These counties are: Daw- son County, Forsyth County, Cherokee County, Bartow County, Paulding County, Carroll Coun- ty, Douglas County, Coweta County, Fayette County, Spalding County, Cobb County, Gwinnett County, Dekalb County, Fulton County, Barrow County, Walton County, Clayton County, Newton County, Rockdale County and Henry County. The PUMAs that completely or substantively con- tain the above counties are included for analysis.

10 Intra-metropolitan Opportunity Structure and Immigrant Self-employment 157

1990 2000 2008 1990–2000 2000–2008 1990–2008 Number Growth rate (%)

Total labor force 3,351,156 4,135,552 4,825,680 23.4 16.7 44.0 Total self-

employed 286,883 374,617 475,212 30.6 26.9 65.6

Total self- employed, 15 + Hrs./Week

262,304 341,129 446,758 30.1 31.0 70.3

Total Immigrants 114,208 355,140 590,944 211.0 66.4 417.4 Total self-

employed immigrants

12,288 29,220 69,309 137.8 137.2 464.0

Total self- employed immigrants, 15 + Hrs per week

11,332 26,880 66,239 137.2 146.4 484.5

Asian immigrants 33,349 81,668 122,208 144.9 49.6 2665 Self-employed

Asian immigrants

4,290 8,711 20,663 103.1 137.2 3817

Self-employed Asian immi- grants, 15 + Hrs perweek

4,095 8,074 19,961 97.2 147.2 387.4

Latino immigrants 29,052 159,952 280,870 450.6 75.6 866.8 Self-employed

Latino immigrants

2,019 8,842 24,425 337.9 176.2 1109.8

Self-employed Latino immi- grants, 15 + Hrs perweek

1,775 7,812 23,508 340.1 200.9 1224.4

Share (%) Share of Growth (%) Immigrant work-

ers/All workers 3.4 8.6 12.2 30.7 34.2 32.3

Self-employed immigrants/All self-employed

4.3 7.8 14.6 19.3 39.9 30.3

Self-employed immigrants/All self-employed, 15 + Hrs per week

4.3 7.9 14.8 19.7 37.3 29.8

Asian immigrants/ All immigrants

29.2 23.0 20.7 20.1 17.2 18.6

Table 10.1  Growth of Immigrants and Self-employed Immigrants in Atlanta MSA, 1990–2008. (Source: Author’s calculation of weighted PUMS 1990, 2000 and ACS 2006–2008 combined samples)

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geographic unit in employment research in general and ethnic entrepreneurship in particular. Though PUMAs are relatively large statistically designated places with more than 100,000 people, each PUMA usually encompasses one or multiple nuclei cities or identifiable communities, thus serve as good proxies for local labor and housing market. Numerous studies have used PUMAs to geographically define eth- nic enclaves or enclave economies (e.g. Portes and Zhou 1996; Aguilera 2009; Liu 2009). Employment statistics on the census tract level for years of 1990 and 2000 are gathered from Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC). These tract-level data are aggregated to 33 PUMA areas using census tract—PUMA correspondence tables in order to track employment growth by industry during the 10 year period. ARC pro- vides employment statistics by one-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes which divide the economy into 10 sectors. Some of the sectors are further combined to create seven broad industrial groups: Agriculture, Mining and Con- struction (AMC), Manufacturing, Transportation, Communications and Utilities (TCU), Trade (Wholesale and Retail), Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE), Services, and Government (Public Administration).

Following some previous studies, this chapter partitions the urban geography into three areas: central city, inner ring suburbs and outer ring suburbs (Stoll 1999; Liu 2009). This design captures the various levels of job accessibility across the metro region and the possible different effects these locations may have on their

1990 2000 2008 1990–2000 2000–2008 1990–2008 Number Growth rate (%)

Self-employed Asian immigrants/ Self-employed immigrants

34.9 29.8 29.8 26.1 29.8 28.7

SE Asian immi- grants/SE immigrants, 15 + Hrs. per week

36.1 30.0 30.1 25.6 30.2 28.9

Latino immi- grants/All immigrants

25.4 45.0 47.5 54.3 51.3 52.8

Self-employed Latino immigrants/ Self-employed immigrants

16.4 30.3 35.2 40.3 38.9 39.3

SE Latino immigrants/ SE immigrants, 15 + Hrs per week

15.7 29.1 35.5 38.8 39.9 39.6

Table 10.1 (continued)

10 Intra-metropolitan Opportunity Structure and Immigrant Self-employment 159

residents’ incidence of self-employment. The designation of the central city follows the “principal city” definition by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1999 and is the City of Atlanta. The determination of inner ring suburban PUMAs is based on their adjacency to the central city, as well as age of the housing stock (Lee and Leigh 2007). 10 PUMAs in Fulton, DeKalb, Cobb, and Clayton counties are designated as inner-ring suburbs. The rest of PUMAs that make up the metropolitan areas are considered outer-ring suburbs.3 The geographic partition of these three rings is presented in Fig. 10.1. This map also shows the areas with relatively con- centrated immigrant populations as compared to the metropolitan region as a whole. Unlike some traditional immigrant-receiving cities, ethnic enclaves in Atlanta exist

3 In general, the central city PUMAs have median housing age of or before 1960s, and inner ring suburban PUMAs have median housing age of 1970s, and outer ring suburban PUMAs have median housing age of 1980s and 1990s. Exceptions are made to four PUMAs who have median housing age of 1980s but are designated as inner ring suburbs due to their adjacency to the central city in order to make a contiguous ring. Detailed analysis showed that housing built of and before 1970s make up between 37 % and 48 % of total housing in each of these four PUMAs. While Lee and Leigh (2007) also used these two criteria (adjacency and housing age), their ring partition is somewhat different as census tract-level data were used.

Fig. 10.1  Atlanta Metropolitan Areas and Ethnic Enclaves 2000. RCQ, Residential Concentration Quotient, is calculated as the share of immigrants in a PUMA divided by the share of immigrants in the Atlanta MSA

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in suburban rather than central city areas. A notable example is the Buford High- way area which is located in DeKalb County to the northeast of downtown Atlanta, which is home to immigrants from different countries, of different races/ethnicities, and boasts a vibrant ethnic business scene (Walcott 2002).

Table 10.2 lists the employment level and growth between 1990 and 2000 by sector for each area. While total MSA employment grew by about 42 % in this pe- riod, growth is uneven across different parts of the metro, and ranges from 6.9 % in the central city to 93.2 % in the outer ring suburbs. Jobs in almost all industrial sec- tors experienced a decline in the central city, except for TCU and services. For the inner-ring suburbs, jobs in construction, TCU and services grew by 34.9 %, 37.5 % and 70.4 % respectively, while manufacturing jobs declined and jobs in other sec- tors grew by single digits. Phenomenal employment growth happened in the outer- ring suburbs, as construction, TCU, FIRE and service sectors all more than doubled their 1990 levels. The other sectors experienced considerable increase as well. Em- ployment accessibility necessarily varies for residents living in different rings.

Table 10.2  Private Employment (by Sector) and Change by Area in Atlanta MSA, 1990–2000. (Source: Author’s calculation of Atlanta Regional Commission data)

1990 2000 1990–2000 % change Central city

Construction 14,470 12,319 − 2,151 − 14.9 Manufacturing 37,767 31,399 − 6,368 − 16.9 TCU 37,549 46,996 9,447 25.2 Wholesale 31,061 21,608 − 9,453 − 30.4 Retail 63,047 61,981 − 1,066 − 1.7 FIRE 38,678 38,247 − 431 − 1.1 Services 135,783 175,948 40,165 29.6 TOTAL 454,330 485,709 31,379 6.9

Inner ring suburbs Construction 25,298 34,118 8,820 34.9 Manufacturing 64,957 62,774 − 2,183 − 3.4 TCU 69,929 96,147 26,218 37.5 Wholesale 68,837 72,361 3,524 5.1 Retail 113,406 117,156 3,750 3.3 FIRE 47,082 50,103 3,021 6.4 Services 114,863 195,695 80,832 70.4 TOTAL 565,457 698,188 132,731 23.5

Outer Ring Suburbs Construction 39,366 90,323 50,957 129.4 Manufacturing 100,783 125,757 24,974 24.8 TCU 19,840 43,084 23,244 117.2 Wholesale 40,027 84,328 44,301 110.7 Retail 103,167 213,112 109,945 106.6 FIRE 25,038 59,251 34,213 136.6 Services 95,205 242,332 147,127 154.5 TOTAL 518,040 1,000,996 482,956 93.2 TCU is Transportation, Communications and Utilities; FIRE is Finance, Insurance and Real Estate

10 Intra-metropolitan Opportunity Structure and Immigrant Self-employment 161

10.3.3 Model Specification and Variables

Probit models of self-employment status are estimated on a series of individual, household, and neighborhood variables. A first look at self-employment rates for the native-born, all immigrants, as well as Asian and Latino immigrants separately by area in 2000, is provided in Table 10.3. Interestingly, the self-employment rate for all groups combined, all native-born and all immigrants is 9.3 %. Asian immi- grants have a self-employment participation rate of 11.0 %, much higher than the 6.5 % among Latino immigrants. For all groups considered, the self-employment rate is always the highest in the outer ring suburbs, followed by the inner ring sub- urbs, with the central city being the lowest.

Table 10.4 further broke down the industrial composition of self-employed La- tino and Asian immigrants for the whole MSA as well as each ring. Latino en- trepreneurs and Asian entrepreneurs are clustered in somewhat different industrial sectors. For the Atlanta MSA as a whole, 44 % of all Latino entrepreneurs are con- centrated in construction alone, followed by services (33 %) and trade (13 %). For Asian entrepreneurs, the largest sectors are trade (45 %) and services (41 %). Only 5 % of Asian entrepreneurs are involved in construction. The industrial composition in each ring varies slightly for both groups, while largely conforming to the overall patterns. It is worth noting that for both groups, the share in construction businesses

Table 10.3  Self-employment Rate by Area, Race/Ethnicity and Immigrant Status, 2000. (Source: Author’s calculation of 2000 Census PUMS data)

All (%) Native-born Foreign-born Area All (%) All (%) Latino (%) Asian (%) Central city 7.8 8.0 6.9 4.1 7.0 Inner ring

suburbs 9.6 9.4 7.6 5.9 9.1

Outer ring suburbs

9.9 10.1 10.3 8.0 13.1

Total 9.3 9.3 9.3 6.5 11.0

Table 10.4  Distribution of the Self-employed Latino and Asian Immigrants by Sector and Area, 2000. (Source: Author’s calculation of weighted PUMS 2000 data)

Latino Immigrants ( %) Asian immigrants ( %) Central city

Inner ring

Outer ring

Total Central city

Inner ring

Outer ring

Total

Construction 47 43 36 44 8 5 0 5 Manufacturing 3 2 5 3 3 4 9 4 TCU 6 6 3 5 6 3 0 3 Trade 14 12 19 13 33 45 60 45 FIRE 1 2 0 2 2 2 0 2 Services 29 34 37 33 48 40 31 41 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Agriculture, mining and public sector employment are excluded

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declines from the central city to the outer ring suburbs, but the share in manufactur- ing and retail businesses increases. This demonstrates the attractiveness of suburban locations to these lines of businesses, as discussed earlier (Fong et al. 2007).

Independent variables include contextual characteristics, individual character- istics, and household characteristics. Contextual characteristics are obtained on the PUMA level, and include residential location in different parts of the metro- politan area, a vector of spatial employment accessibility measures comprised of employment change in construction, manufacturing, trade, and service sectors be- tween 1990 and 2000, percentage unemployed, percentage college graduates, and percentage immigrants (of own ethnicity). These variables serve as proxies for the various aspects of intra-metropolitan opportunity structure discussed earlier: spatial structure, economic structure, social environment, and ethnic concentration. A list of personal and household variables that are found in the literature to be important determinants of entrepreneurship propensity are also entered into the models (e.g. Kim et al. 2006; Wang and Li 2007). Individual human capital variables include marital status, education, experience, and for immigrants, English language skills and period of arrival. Household conditions that are associated with entrepreneurial entry are: presence of children, presence of other working adults, household wealth as measured by household non-wage and non-business income, number of vehicles in the household, and homeownership. While the majority of nascent entrepreneurs who are in retail and service related industries might use their own resources to meet their financial needs, the last two serve as important collateral when they seek external financing for their startups. Mean descriptive statistics for the self- employed individuals by immigrant status and for Latino and Asian immigrants separately are presented in Table 10.5 and compared to the statistics of their wage and salary counterparts.

The majority of entrepreneurs from all groups live in the outer ring suburbs, with the exception of Latino immigrants (49.1 %). A very small proportion of en- trepreneurs live in the central city, and the numbers are much lower for Latino im- migrants (6.6 %) and Asian immigrants (5.2 %) than for the native-born (13.5 %). For all groups, a lower percentage of the self-employed live in the central city and a higher percentage in the outer ring suburbs than the wage workers. The average age is lowest for foreign-born Latino entrepreneurs, at 36, while it is at 44 for the native-born and 43 for Asian entrepreneurs. Female entrepreneurship is lowest for Latino immigrants as well (24 %), and highest among Asian immigrants (40.3 %). Educational attainment distributions differ substantively across race/ethnicity, with more than half of self-employed Latino immigrants without a high school diploma, while almost half of self-employed Asians have a college degree. 1990s arrivals comprise 50.2 % of self-employed Latino immigrants and 28.1 % of self-employed Asian immigrants, while 1980s arrivals shares are 29.2 % and 46.9 % respectively for these two groups. 42.8 % of Latino immigrant entrepreneurs report having lim- ited English proficiency, and only 24.7 % of Asian immigrant entrepreneurs do.

Household characteristics demonstrate more similarities across racial/eth- nic groups. Latino immigrant entrepreneurs have on average close to 2 addition- al working adults in the household while all the other groups have only about 1.

10 Intra-metropolitan Opportunity Structure and Immigrant Self-employment 163

Native-born all All Foreign-born Latino Asian Self Wage Self Wage Self Wage Self Wage

Residential location characteristics Central city 13.5 % 14.0 % 8.3 % 12.0 % 6.6 % 8.4 % 5.2 % 5.7 % Inner ring

suburbs 24.0 % 26.0 % 41.0 % 45.0 % 44.3 % 46.1 % 32.3 % 36.9 %

Outer ring suburbs (omitted)

62.5 % 59.0 % 50.7 % 43.0 % 49.1 % 45.5 % 62.5 % 57.4 %

Personal characteristics Age 44.4 38.6 40.9 35.4 35.6 31.3 42.6 38.0 Female 32.9 % 49.0 % 31.9 % 36.0 % 24.0 % 24.4 % 40.3 % 42.1 % Less than

highschool 11.7 % 12.0 % 21.7 % 33.0 % 50.2 % 61.8 % 14.6 % 18.3 %

Highschool, some college (omitted)

46.8 % 49.0 % 38.4 % 31.0 % 33.6 % 26.7 % 42.4 % 29.4 %

College degree and above

41.5 % 40.0 % 39.9 % 35.0 % 16.2 % 11.6 % 43.1 % 52.3 %

Experience 24.2 18.49 21.1 16.1 17.7 13.9 22.5 17.4 Arrived 1990s

(omitted) 36.4 % 54.0 % 50.2 % 66.0 % 28.1 % 47.8 %

Arrived 1980s 34.9 % 26.0 % 29.2 % 19.3 % 46.9 % 34.7 % Arrived 1970s 18.7 % 11.0 % 10.3 % 6.1 % 22.2 % 13.7 % Arrived before

1970 10.0 % 9.0 % 10.3 % 8.5 % 2.8 % 3.8 %

Limited English

22.5 % 32.0 % 42.8 % 61.1 % 24.7 % 21.0 %

Married 72.0 % 56.0 % 76.3 % 60.0 % 67.5 % 52.5 % 86.8 % 69.1 % Household characteristics Having

children in household

17.1 % 17.0 % 24.9 % 24.0 % 36.2 % 30.5 % 20.1 % 19.7 %

Number of other household workers

0.9 0.94 1.2 1.72 1.8 2.6 1.1 1.3

Household wealth

46321 40458 40373 42845 39768 46562.3 42660 43249

Number of vehicles in household

2.28 2.11 2.13 1.87 2.0 1.7 2.2 2.1

Homeowner- ship

84.2 % 73.0 % 66.4 % 47.0 % 49.1 % 25.9 % 77.8 % 64.0 %

N 7,730 72,350 962 9,292 271 3,778 288 2,271

Table 10.5  Mean Characteristics of the Self-employed and Wage-employed by nativity and eth- nicity. (Source: Author’s calculation of 2000 Census PUMS data)

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Their household wealth, number of vehicles and homeownership rate all lag behind Asian immigrants and the native-born population. It is worth noting that within each group, the self-employed have in general higher homeownership rate and more vehicles in the household than their non-self-employed counterparts, but not neces- sarily household wealth. Overall, it indicates that Asian immigrant entrepreneurs have higher human capital endowments and financial endowments than Latino im- migrant entrepreneurs.

10.4 Empirical Results

In the empirical analysis, the full sample is stratified to all native-born, all foreign- born, foreign-born Latino and foreign-born Asians to test the possibly distinctive effects the aforementioned factors may have on different groups. Empirical results are presented in Table 10.6. For the native-born, being in the central city increases the likelihood of self-employment participation, while inner ring suburban residents are less likely to be self-employed than outer ring suburban residents. Of all the economic structure factors, only the increase in local FIRE jobs over the 1990– 2000 period has a significantly negative effect on self-employment probability. It might be the case that Finance, Insurance and Real Estate industry usually requires greater amount of capital and skill. It concentrates in areas with relatively high land costs which are not attractive for new business startups. Social context turns out to be very important in the entrepreneurial activities for this group. Individuals liv- ing in neighborhoods with low unemployment rate and high percentage of college graduates are significantly more likely to become entrepreneurs. These indicate a viable and creative environment that would nurture entrepreneurship activities. So- cial networks, especially entrepreneurial business networks are beneficial for en- trepreneurial development (Hackler and Mayer 2008). Minority entrepreneurs in particular benefit from the social networks and ethnic capital that are dense in these communities. Besides market conditions, the structural, institutional and cultural context of the communities also serve as natural business incubators for prospective entrepreneurs (Greene and Butler 1996). Research shows that some minority groups can turn to community-based lending institutions, like Rotation Credit Associations (RCA) in Koreatown, for financing needs when there is an access barrier to formal lending institutions (Light et al. 1990).

Turning to personal and household characteristics, both native-born blacks and Asians are significantly less likely to engage in self-employment than whites. Hav- ing less than a high school degree is associated with higher self-employment rate than high school graduates (without college), while the rate for college graduates is significantly lower. More experience leads to greater propensity towards entre- preneurship, so is being married and having children in the household. Contrary to expectation, the number of other household workers is negatively associated with self-employment probability. One would expect that having salary/wage workers in the household would provide the economic stability and usually medical insurance

10 Intra-metropolitan Opportunity Structure and Immigrant Self-employment 165

coverage to the family, so that it would be safer for the entrepreneur to involve in risk-taking startup activities. Alternatively however, non-working household adults could provide non-paid family help to the entrepreneur. Indicators of household financial capital: wealth, number of vehicles and home owning all significantly increase the probability of self-employment, testifying to previous finding that self-employment rate is higher among the more advantaged, not the disadvantaged group (Fairlie and Meyer 1996).

For immigrants as a whole, only two neighborhood characteristics have a sig- nificant impact on the incidence of self-employment: the growth of trade jobs in

Table 10.6  Probit Model Results on Self-employment Native-born Foreign-born All All Latino Asian

Intercept − 1885*** − 2.150*** − 1955*** − 2 924*** Contextual characteristics Central city 0.222*** − 0.104 − 0.655** 0.033 Inner ring suburbs − 0.013 − 0.022 − 0.276* 0.009 Construction 0.005 − 0.005 − 0.049 0.033 Manufacturing 0.000 − 0.037 − 0.050 − 0.044 Trade − 0.010*** 0.012* 0.017 0.015 FIRE − 0.008 0.011 − 0.006 0.004 Services 0.005*** − 0.001 − 0.004 0.001 Percentage unemployed − 2.860 *** 2.994 7.582 4.917 Percentage college graduates 0.216 *** 0.234 0.162 0.554 Percentage immigrants 0.644* 0.733 4.210* Personal characteristics Black − 0.232*** − 0.272*** Asian − 0.155 − 0.135* Latino − 0.062 − 0.158** No or limited English 0.005 − 0.168* 0.094 Arrived in 1980s 0.165*** 0.012 0.280*** Arrived in 1970s 0.173** − 0.049 0.382*** Arrived before 1970 − 0.037 − 0.042 − 0.117 Female − 0.318*** − 0.172*** − 0.090 − 0.107 Less than highschool 0.082*** − 0.171** − 0.087 − 0.288** College and above − 0.041** − 0.166*** − 0.107 − 0.378*** Experience 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.030** 0.056*** Experience squared 0.000*** − 0.001*** 0.000* − 0.001*** Married Household Characteristics 0.186*** 0.106* 0.072 0.098 Having children in household 0.114*** 0.123** 0.106 0.270** Number of other hh workers − 0.092*** − 0.073*** − 0.055* − 0.108* Household wealth 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 Number of vehicles in household 0.048*** 0.071*** 0.061* 0.032 Homeownership 0.104*** 0.146** 0.196* 0.169 Log likelihood − 23,690 − 2,960 − 926 − 805 N 80,080 10,254 4,049 2,559 *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

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the area and the percentage of immigrants are both positively related to immigrants’ self-employment probability. Areas experiencing substantial growth in trade might signal an expanding customer base and market, creating possible entrepreneurial opportunities. Ethnically-concentrated neighborhoods also provide strong demand in ethnic goods and services, offer dense social networks, ethnic resources and targeted business services in business startup, role models, and easy access to a ready labor pool. Compared to white immigrants, all other minority groups show a lower self-employment rate. More established immigrants—those who arrived in the 1980s and 1970s—are more likely to be self-employed than the newest 1990s arrivals. In all cases, disadvantage theory is not validated. If self-employment is considered an alternative route to wage/salary employment, we should expect a higher self-employment rate among the new arrivals. The fact is that entrepreneurial activities are more prevalent among the established immigrants as it takes time for immigrants to accumulate the economic resources and institutional knowledge to start a business in a different country. The effects of other variables are similar for the foreign-born as for the native-born, with the exception of high school dropouts. While high school dropouts are more likely to be self-employed than high school graduates among the native-born, the reverse is true for immigrants, further illus- trating the higher human capital endowments of self-employed immigrants. Im- migrants face blocked opportunities and barriers in the formal labor market which are associated with their limited English language skills, the transferability of cre- dentials received in a foreign country and mismatch of skills and experiences in a new environment. A case in point is the highly educated Koreans in Los Angeles who are overrepresented in self-employment, especially retailing, due to their de- pressed returns to human capital in wage employment (Light 1980). Distinguishing Latino and Asian immigrants reveals somewhat different patterns. Being in the cen- tral city, and to a lesser extent, the inner ring suburbs, significantly depresses the self-employment likelihood of Latino immigrants. The effects are also negative for Asian immigrants, but not significantly so. Again, the disadvantage theory appears to have no applicability to immigrants. Both these rings feature weaker job growth and less access to business opportunities than the outer ring suburbs, and the chanc- es of entrepreneurial activities are also slimmer for Latino and Asian immigrants. With regards to economic structure, some employment change variables have simi- lar effects for both groups. The decline of manufacturing and FIRE jobs, as well as the growth of trade jobs in the area, gives rise to self-employment involvement. Ar- eas with higher growth in construction and services jobs are associated with lower self-employment propensity among Latino immigrants, and have the opposite effect for Asian immigrants. It is not clear why this would be the case given Latino en- trepreneurs’ disproportionate concentration in construction and service industries. But none of these variables are significant at the 5 % level. Area composition of the unemployed and college graduates does not play a significant role in the case of immigrants. While the local area’s concentration of co-ethnic population is posi- tively associated with the incidence of self-employment, this effect is significant for Asians only. These communities provide a protected market, labor pool, business services, social networks and cultural familiarity for prospective entrepreneurs, and

10 Intra-metropolitan Opportunity Structure and Immigrant Self-employment 167

existing entrepreneurs serve as successful role models for their successors. This is especially important for Asian entrepreneurs, who cluster heavily in retail business.

Certain variations exist between these two groups on the coefficients for personal and household characteristics as well. Self-employment is significantly less likely among those with no or limited English for Latino immigrants only. For Asian im- migrants, earlier arrived cohorts are more likely to be self-employed than new arriv- als, and both high school dropouts and college graduates are significantly less likely to become entrepreneurs than high school graduates. Experience is associated with higher self-employment propensity for both groups, so does having fewer workers in household. The availability of non-working household workers may offer help in the business activities of the entrepreneur. Household wealth indicators have posi- tive signs, and are significant for Latino immigrants only. These results emphasize the importance of human capital endowments—education, experience, and Eng- lish proficiency—on the incidence of self-employment among minority immigrant groups, which is similar to some previous findings (Kim et al. 2006). However, contrary to their results, the role financial capital plays is not negligible, especially for Latino immigrants.

In sum, spatial structure and community context matter differently for the na- tive-born and the foreign-born in their probability to engage in self-employment. Latino immigrants in both central city and inner ring suburbs are less likely to be self-employed. Growth in FIRE jobs in a local area lowers the self-employment rate among native-born residents while the growth of trade jobs promotes self- employment among immigrants. Asian immigrant entrepreneurs are more likely to emerge from Asian-concentrated communities, while no such significant ef- fect is found for Latino immigrants. This might have to do with the fact that as self-employed Latinos are heavily concentrated in the construction industry, their reliance on ethnic resources can be rather limited. Previous research also found that self-employment within more ethnically concentrated areas does not necessar- ily provide economic benefits to self-employed Mexican immigrants in California and Texas due to less affluent customers, more competition, and other social and cultural obligations (Aquilera 2009).

10.5 Conclusion and Discussion

This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the intra-metropolitan pattern of self- employed immigrants as compared to native-born residents. Atlanta is selected as the case study area because it is an emerging immigrant gateway. While Latino and Asian immigrants still make up a small proportion of the urban population, their self-employment rate is on par with that of the native-born residents. The ethic enterprises they establish can be expected to grow in number and importance as immigrants continue to settle in the metropolitan area. As ethnic businesses pro- vide important source of employment opportunities for their ethnic members (Light and Gold 2000), they contribute greatly to the economic vitality of the region and

C. Y. Liu168

economic development of local communities. Latino immigrant entrepreneurs are heavily concentrated in construction and service industries, while Asian immigrant entrepreneurs cluster in trade and service sectors.

This chapter contributes to the literature by explicitly examining the effect of various local contextual characteristics on the incidence of self-employment among immigrants, in the framework of several relevant theories. These intra-metropolitan contexts include spatial structure, economic structure, social environment, and eth- nic concentration. Employment growth in Atlanta is not even across locations, with the outer ring suburbs greatly outgrowing the central city and inner ring suburbs in all sectors considered. However, living in the job-poor central city does not lead to higher self-employment propensity for immigrants, contrary to what disadvantage theory would imply. On the contrary, Latino immigrants living in central city and inner ring suburbs are significantly less likely to involve in self-employment. An area with solid growth in the trade sector spurs entrepreneurial activities among im- migrants, as dense retail networks signal a vibrant local economy, strong consumer base, and possibly established business services and supplier chains. Consistent with the ethnic enclave hypothesis, Asian immigrant entrepreneurial activities are more prevalent among Asian-concentrated areas, though this effect is not significant for Latino immigrants. This can be partly explained by Asian immigrants’ substantive involvement in the trade industry, which may rely heavily on an ethnic market. Con- struction, where Latino entrepreneurs concentrate, is more likely to serve clientele in the mainstream economy. These local contextual factors interact to facilitate or inhibit the entrepreneurial entry of immigrants, and deserve further attention. An- ecdotal evidence accumulates from communities around the country on how ethnic enterprises, especially immigrant enterprises, have revitalized formerly distressed and abandoned neighborhoods including Sunset Park in New York, Bellaire Boule- vard in Houston and Fields Corner in Boston (Bowles and Colton 2007).

Results also point to the importance of human capital and financial capital on the self-employment entry of immigrants, though distinctions exist between the two groups. Self-employment probability increases with experience, suggesting it takes time for immigrants to find their way in the labor market in a new country and to ac- cumulate the necessary resources and knowledge to start up a business. Latino im- migrants with no or limited English proficiency are less likely to participate in self- employment, all else being equal, as entrepreneurship would necessarily require communication skills. Earlier arrival cohorts among Asian immigrants are more likely to participate in self-employment than new arrivals. Household wealth and home ownership are also positively associated with entrepreneurial entry in a sig- nificant way. Native-born high school dropouts are more likely to be self-employed than their high school graduate counterparts, but the reverse is true for both immi- grant groups. This further illustrates that in emerging gateways like Atlanta, self- employment is not necessarily a route out of unemployment or poverty among the newly arrived immigrants; rather, it is a ladder towards greater economic achieve- ment among the established and advantaged immigrants. Having higher human capital and financial capital at their disposal increases the entrepreneurial potential of immigrants in general. Between the two, human capital matters more for Asian

10 Intra-metropolitan Opportunity Structure and Immigrant Self-employment 169

immigrants, and financial capital matters more for Latino immigrants. In any case, traditional theories like the disadvantage theory on ethnic entrepreneurship needs to be reassessed in the urban context of new immigrant gateways, though the ethnic enclave hypothesis seems to still hold. It is worth noting however that the manifes- tation of ethnic enclave hypothesis is not uniform across locations and metropolitan contexts. In Atlanta’s case, enclaves exist in the suburbs rather than central cities. As examples, both Buford Highway area and Norcross area are ethnically-mixed communities with vibrant ethnic business scenes. While Atlanta’s residential dis- tribution results from its own historical paths, such ethnic concentration pattern is more likely to be found among emerging immigrant gateways rather than traditional gateways, where initial arrival in the central cities is the norm among immigrants.

While this chapter provides some preliminary results on the new economic ge- ography of self-employed Latino and Asian immigrants in an emerging immigrant gateway, further research is needed to fully understand these dynamics. Some of the contextual factors that might also play a role include the institutional capacity, financing options, and business services available to nascent immigrant entrepre- neurs. Ethnic entrepreneurs have the potential of hiring local workers, diversifying urban economy, as well as revitalizing some previously abandoned areas (Bowles and Colton 2007), thus accruing economic and social benefits to the local commu- nities. Assistance programs, entrepreneurship training, as well as business linkages and networks can all serve as favorable conditions for these businesses to thrive. Based on evidence from New York City, Servon et al. (2010) identified five gaps that face small businesses. The information gap is particularly relevant for ethnic and immigrant entrepreneurs, as traditional business assistance programs fail to ef- fectively connect to immigrant business communities due to cultural and language barriers (Bowles and Colton 2007). Thus, the local policy environment, especially assistance programs on the community level aimed at helping the entrepreneurial entry of residents and meeting the special needs of immigrants, can make a differ- ence. Given the evidence on discrimination in small business lending (Blanchard et al. 2008), efforts targeted at eliminating such barriers in the financial market can go a long way as well. These institutional and policy environments, together with the spatial, economic, and social structure of local communities, shape the self- employment patterns of locals and immigrants alike.

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Part IV Chinese Migration in Other Countries

175

Chapter 11 Chinese Migration to Japan, 1978–2010: Patterns and Policies

Chunfen Shao

J. Zhang, H. Duncan (eds.), Migration in China and Asia, International Perspectives on Migration 10, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8759-8_11, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2014

C. Shao ( ) Department of Japanese Studies, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia e-mail: [email protected], [email protected]

11.1 Introduction

The rapid economic growth and industrialization of China over the past decades has resulted in widespread mobility among the population, including movement overseas. Studies on Chinese migration have become urgently needed, and have been carried out by researchers around the world. As Robert (2003) rightly stated: “Nowhere is the task of understanding the dynamics of a migration system more urgent than in contemporary China, which is experiencing the largest migration in human history and which faces hard choices regarding labor market integration, urbanization and rural poverty that are impacted by migration policy.”

Contemporary Chinese migration in the post-1978 era shows two main types of population movement. On the one hand, China experienced unprecedented mobil- ity from the rural areas to many provincial capital cities and other coastal cities. On the other hand, massive international migration from relatively developed cities and regions towards overseas occurred on the wider global scale. While many studies on migrants from rural areas to cities within China have been reported, relatively few reports can be found on the movement of Chinese migrants to other countries, particularly Japan.

Chinese international migration is the most significant process driving changes in the pattern of Chinese settlement across the world, affecting transnational life- styles and global citizenship. It has also made a tremendous contribution to China’s recent economic and social development. It is thus crucial to deepen the understand- ing of the patterns, causes and consequences of this cross-border population move- ment and its two-way relationship with economic and social changes (Hugo 2008, p. 82; Shao 2009).

Unless specified, Chinese here are limited to PRC citizenship holders.

176 C. Shao

There has been an exponential increase in the numbers of Chinese migrating to Japan. China’s close neighbor has been one of the most important destinations for Chinese international migration since the mid-1980s. In 1978 Chinese nationals, including Taiwanese, resident in Japan numbered only 48,528, about 6.3 % of the foreign population (766,894). In 2009 when the number increased more than ten- fold to 680,518, the percentage of Chinese among foreign nationals (2,186,121) reached 31.1 %. Since 2007, Chinese has become the largest single ethnic group in Japan, overtaking Koreans who numbered 578, 495, or 26.5 % of foreign nationals in 2009. The gap between Chinese and Koreans who are now the second largest ethnic group, has been widening.

Though there has been increased research on Chinese migrants in Japan (Shao 1996; Shao 2009; Duan 2003; Liu-Farrer 2009), most of them focused on one of the subgroups, and remarkably few attempts have been made to study Chinese migra- tion between subgroups over the long term. This paper will examine the increased human flow of people from China to Japan over the last three decades from demo- graphic and sociological perspectives. It identifies the causes of Chinese migration, the changing patterns and the emerging trends.

The paper collects and analyses a large amount of statistical data1 on Chinese migration to Japan and closely examines recent developments in migration move- ments and policies in Japan in order to deepen the understanding of complexities associated with the surge in Chinese migration to Japan. It categorizes the Chinese migrants into six main subgroups and provides the backgrounds and features of new migration from China to Japan since 1978. It also comments on the impact of Japanese policies on each of these subgroups, and provides concluding observations drawn from the study.

11.2 Contemporary Chinese Migration to Japan

International migration from China to Japan is not a new phenomenon. Even during the era of the Japanese “closed door policy”, there were Chinese migrants engaged in trading, translating for and representing large firms. Since the establishment of “China (Qing Dynasty)—Japan Friendship Agreement” in 1871, many more Chi- nese in trading business migrated to Japan. Until the end of the Second World War, a large number of Chinese from China, especially from Taiwan, were forced to migrate to Japan and serve as slave labourers2.

However, the massive cross-border flow of Chinese into Japan after the Second World War is a post-1978 phenomenon. Since the execution of the “Reform and

1 Data presented in this paper all come from Ministry of Justice, Japan. Japan provides reliable official statistics on international migration by country of citizenship. However new arrivals of Chinese were divided to into PRC, Taiwan (China) and HK (China) and others, but all groups were combined in considering the number of alien registrations of Chinese nationals. 2 See Guo (1999) for more details on Chinese who arrived earlier in Japan.

17711 Chinese Migration to Japan, 1978–2010: Patterns and Policies

Open-door Policy”, the number of visitors between China and Japan has steadily in- creased, with a large number of Chinese nationals visiting Japan every year. In par- ticular, from the middle of 1990, the number of Chinese visitors not only increases but the rate rises markedly. For example, in 1993, as shown in Fig. 11.1, the number of new Chinese arrivals was 127,446, increasing to 769,691 in 2008.

All the Chinese arrivals migrating to Japan held temporary entry visas. Even though the “Immigration Control Order” was issued in 1951 which had a category of entrance permission as permanent residents, nobody was ever permitted to do this until after the Order was abolished, when the new Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act was enforced in 1982 (Kondo 2002, p. 3). Since Japan does not accept permanent settlers directly from overseas, unlike America and oth- er European migrant countries, Chinese migrate to Japan through the following routes. Firstly there is marriage and family migration, including “spouse or child of Japanese national” ( nihonjin no haigūsha 日本人の 偶 ), “spouse or child of permanent resident” ( eijūsha no haigūsha 永住 の 偶 ), “long-term resident” ( teijyūsha 定住 ) and “dependent” ( kazoku taizai 家族 在). Secondly there is student migration, including “college student” ( ryūgakusei 学 ), “pre-college student” ( shūgakusei 就学 ) and “trainee” ( kenshūsei 修 ). A third mode is through skilled migration. This includes all skilled workers on a working visa such as professors, researchers and engineers. The largest category of Chinese migrants to Japan in 2009 was “trainee”, followed by “pre-college student”, “college student”, “spouse or child of Japanese national” and “long-term resident”. In the following sections, the paper will discuss Chinese migration to Japan according to the respec- tive entry categories.

Fig. 11.1  Japan: new arrivals of Chinese nationals, 1978–2009. (Source: Ministry of Justice)

178 C. Shao

11.2.1   College Student (Ryūgakusei  学 )

The most significant population movement from China to Japan is student migra- tion. Since the mid-1980s, Japan has become one of the countries receiving larger numbers of Chinese students. Figure 11.2 shows there has been a sharp increase in the numbers of international student arrivals from China both in numerical terms and as a percentage of all student arrivals. There was only one newly arrived Chi- nese college student in Japan in 1978, but the number increased to 16,839 in 2009. The percentage of Chinese college students among all international college students also increased from effectively zero in 1978 to 49 % in 2002. During the early years (1978 to early 1980s) of the “Reform and Open-door Policy”, college students were mainly those funded by the Chinese government (Shao 1996). Although the number of these students increased rapidly, the scale of student migration was relatively small because of the limited base number. Since the middle of the 1980s, studying in Japan became very popular within the Chinese community, and the majority of college students were self-funded. Hence the number of student migrants not only became larger each year but also increased steeply. The migrant scale has been expanding. Although after 2003 the number and percentage of student migrants dropped slightly, recent years again show a trend to increased numbers.

In addition to the push-factors, such as different levels in the sciences, tech- nology, and education between Japan and China, changes in Chinese government policy, and Chinese attitudes towards study abroad, the Chinese student migration is mainly affected by Japanese government policies. There are two most important policies in Japan relating to the admission of international students. One is “Plan to Accept 100,000 International Students before the Beginning of the twenty-first

Fig. 11.2  Japan: new arrivals of Chinese college students, 1978–2009. (Source: Ministry of Justice)

17911 Chinese Migration to Japan, 1978–2010: Patterns and Policies

Century” (the “1983 plan”) and the other is “Plan to Accept 300,000 International Students by 2020” (the “2008 plan”)3.

The “1983 Plan” ( Ryūgakusei 10-mannin Ukeire Keikaku) was established in August 1983 under Prime Minister Nakasone. The goal of the plan was to accept 100,000 international students by the early twenty-first century. The plan basically aimed at the promotion of mutual understanding between Japan and foreign coun- tries, and at the fostering of human resources in developing countries. International- ization was a fashionable political slogan used widely within the Japanese commu- nity at that time. Through the rapid economic growth after the Second World War, though Japan had become one of the world economic super powers, Japan wished to improve its status in international affairs. By the acceptance of more international students, Japan hoped to expand cultural and technological exchanges with other countries so as to improve its international image and influence. The numerical goal of the 1983 plan was successfully achieved in 2003.

The “2008 plan” was introduced in 2008 under Prime Minister Fukuda. The Plan aims at accepting 300,000 international students by 2020 by creating more open poli- cies. As part of the development of its “Global Strategy”, the plan is to ensure for Japan an expansion of the flow of human resources, goods, money and information in Asia and the world. It also aims at making its intellectual contributions interna- tionally by the strategic acquisition of excellent international students. Comparing the “2008 plan” with the “1983 plan”, we found the main differences in the follow- ing points. Firstly, the purpose of accepting international students has changed from a “foreign aid model” into an “education export model”. Secondly the expectations for residential destinations of international students after their study have changed from their home countries to Japan. This means that Japan wants to retain the inter- national students in Japan’s work force upon the completion of their study. With its declining fertility, its aging population, and the consequent decline in international competitiveness, Japan realizes that it is necessary to rely on immigrants as a source of labor market and population growth. Therefore, the international students edu- cated in Japan become one of the best immigration choices.

11.2.2   Pre-College Student (Shūgakusei 就学 )

Among foreign students studying in Japan, there are two groups: those called college students, and pre-college students. Figure 11.3 shows the number of newly arrived Chinese shūgakusei and the percentage relative to the total number of shūgakusei in Japan. Since the mid-1980s, shūgakusei is the group of students who have caused the most concerns in the community. There were only 113 newly arrived Chinese shūgakusei in 1982. But three years later in 1985, the number increased to 1,199

3 See Shao (2008b) for more details.

180 C. Shao

and exceeded that of college students. In 1987, the number increased to 7,178 and in 1988, it reached its peak, i.e., 28,256.

The important feature of Chinese shūgakusei is that the number and percent- age vary significantly due to the influence of Japanese government policy con- trol. It can be stated that the Japanese government policy control on shūgakusei is implemented through control of Chinese shūgakusei. The phrase shūgakusei was created by government officers when the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act was amended in 1981. It refers to pre-college students, mainly Japanese language students. Until 1982 there was no column labelled shūgakusei in the government immigration statistical data. In the 1980s, Japan experienced an expanding economy, raising the value of the Yen, while it lacked an unskilled labour force. Against this background, the Japanese government simplified the visa assessment procedures and introduced a pre-assessment policy ( Jizen shinsa seido 事前審査制度). This allows Japanese language schools to apply for entry visas on behalf of their students. Furthermore, Japan allowed such foreign students to work legally up to 20 hours per week without permission (Oka and Fukada 1995). The policy changes immediately resulted in the establishment of many new language schools from the mid-1980s, and also enabled unskilled laborers includ- ing Chinese to enter Japan under the cover of shūgakusei-visa. This stimulated Chinese student migration towards Japan and resulted in the steep increase in their number, raising many problematic issues. In November 1988, students who had paid their tuition fees but were refused visas organised a demonstration outside the gate of Japanese Consulate-General in Shanghai. The shūgakusei issues be- gan to affect the political relationship between Japan and China, and contributed in part to an increase in diplomatic tensions between the two countries. The in- flow of a large number of Chinese shūgakusei to Japan also resulted in arguments about which were authentic and inauthentic shūgakusei. Some of them were con- sidered as “money seekers”, a term used by Komai (2001), or “coin raking” used

Fig. 11.3  Japan: new arrivals of Chinese pre-college students, 1978–2009. (Source: Ministry of Justice)

18111 Chinese Migration to Japan, 1978–2010: Patterns and Policies

by Liu-Farrer (2009). Among these students, a significant number entered Japan legally but violated Japanese immigration policies and overstayed, or committed other crimes. These incidents were widely reported by the Japanese media, caus- ing Japanese prejudice against shūgakusei. As a result the Japanese government had no choice but to strengthen the assessment of visa applications. The relatively lower number of shūgakusei entering Japan between 1994 and 1997 is the direct result of these actions. From 1999 to 2003, the marked increase in the number of Chinese shūgakusei resulted from the Japanese government decision to be more lenient on the visa assessment in order to realize the “1983 Plan”. The “2008 Plan” announced in 2008 again results in rapid increases in the number of college stu- dents and pre-college students.

There is another matter worthy of mention—the increasingly significant nex- us between study abroad and permanent settlement. Shao (2009) provides details about changes of visa status, from students to employees, and from temporary to permanent settlement.

11.2.3   Trainee (Kenshūsei  修 )

Apart from the student migration, the largest entry group of Chinese migrants to Japan in recent years is covered by the status “Trainee” ( kenshūsei 修 ). As Fig. 11.4 shows, since 1990 the number for “Trainee” has the steepest increase. During the 1980s, although the number of “Trainees” was larger than that of col- lege students, it is lower than that of shūgakusei. However the number jumped from 3,496 in 1989 to 7,624 in 1990, and continued to increase until 2007. While the number dropped slightly in 2008 the fall was sharper in 2009 because of the global financial crisis which began in late 2007.

Fig. 11.4  Japan: new arrivals of Chinese trainees, 1978–2009. (Source: Ministry of Justice)

182 C. Shao

Japanese companies have been bringing industrial trainees to Japan since the 1960s, but the system only applied to those with FDI in other Asian countries (IOM 2008). In 1981 Japan officially established the “Foreigner Trainee Policy”. This aims to provide collaboration with developing countries in fostering talent by pro- viding training in technological and other skills in Japan. In the early stages of establishing the trainee policy, the intention was an actual study or training activity. However, on April 5 1993, Japan extended the policy to include an activity, the so- called “Technical Internship” (Ginō jisshūsei-“on-the job training”) into the policy and made it into a policy supporting labor importation (Sadakiyo 2009, p. 19). In 1992, among Chinese migrants in Japan, only 199 people held a visa in the category of “special activity (internship)”, but by 2008, the number increased to 84,478. There were only 194 newly arrived Chinese under the category of “special activ- ity” in 2008, so it is obvious that most of the interns had their visa changed from “trainee” to “special activity”.

In the beginning, trainee activities were implemented in the form of ODA through government organizations such as JICA, AOTS, etc. However, in order to provide guidance to and support for the acceptance of foreign traineeships with manufactur- ers and other firms, JITCO (Japan International Training Cooperation Organization) was established in 1991. This followed cooperation between Japanese business as- sociations such as Keidanren and the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Trade, and the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. Since then, the trainee system and the technical internship program are more and more used by small and medium-size enterprises as “side-door”, an indirect way to re- cruit cheap foreign labor in the so-called 3K jobs, namely tasks which are kitsui (demanding), kitanai (dirty) and kikena (dangerous) (Kondo 2002, p. 13).

The term of a trainee visa is one year and the holder can apply for an internship for 3 years. The internship can be renewed once. That means foreign workers are able to work in Japan for a total of up to 7 years under the trainee and internship programme (Zha 2003). According to Japanese law, on completing the trainee and internship programmes, they are not allowed to convert their visas into working visas and continue working in Japan (Wang 2005, p. 81).

11.2.4   Japanese Spouse (Nihonjin no haigūsha 日本人の 偶 )

Another Chinese migrant group to Japan of interest is the “spouse or child of Japa- nese national”. As shown in Fig. 11.5, the number of Chinese who moved to Japan as the spouses or children of Japanese nationals increased from the mid-1980s until 2001. But the number dropped quickly in 2002 and 2003. From 2004, the figure increases again. Marriage migration to Japan was zero in the early 1980s, but it has been showing signs of booming. The number of marriages between Chinese and Japanese, especially Chinese women marrying Japanese men, increases each year. There were 1,106 Chinese and Japanese marriages in 1980, where 912 Chinese women married Japanese men and 194 Chinese men married Japanese women. It

18311 Chinese Migration to Japan, 1978–2010: Patterns and Policies

is believed these marriages mainly happened between Japanese and those Chinese who had arrived well before and were living in Japan. However, the latest statistics show the number of marriages in 2007 has increased to 12,942, among which the percentage of Japanese men who marry Chinese women is as high as 92 % (MHLW 2008). This could be explained in the following ways. Firstly, due to the interna- tionalization of both China and Japan, the expanding exchange between the two countries has resulted in more international marriages. Secondly, in rural Japan there is a significant shortage of Japanese women for men to marry. Large numbers of people, especially young women of marriageable age, have moved to metropoli- tan areas after high levels of economic growth. This kind of domestic population movement in Japan has produced a strong tendency among Japanese men in the countryside to look for brides from overseas, for example from the Philippines, Korea and China.

11.2.5   The Long-Term Resident (Teijūsha 定住 )

Figure 11.6 shows the number of Teijūsha continued to increase from 1986 to 1997. Since then the number has dropped rapidly to around 3,000. It is interesting to note that after 1990 when the Nikkeijin population increased significantly, the number of teijūsha from China remained stable.

When the Second World War ended, as many as ten thousand Japanese, includ- ing Japanese women and children, were abandoned in China. Since China and Ja- pan resumed normal diplomatic relations in 1972, a program began of formally re- turning those Japanese abandoned in China to Japan. The majority of these Japanese

Fig. 11.5  Japan: new arrivals of Japanese spouses, 1978–2009. (Source: Ministry of Justice)

184 C. Shao

returned to Japan with financial support from the Japanese government, while their direct relatives returned to Japan at their own expense (Zhu 2003, p. 131–134).

11.2.6 Skilled Professionals

Beside the five main types described above, Chinese migration to Japan in the years leading up to the global financial crisis of 2008 shows a new trend involving an increasing number and percentage of Chinese entering Japan as skilled profession- als with working visas, particularly “engineer”, “intra-company transferee” and “skilled labour” (Fig. 11.7). Due to space limitations here, the author will write a

Fig. 11.6  Japan: new arrivals of Teijyusha, 1978–2009. (Source: Ministry of Justice)

Fig. 11.7  New Arrivals of Chinese Professionals, 2000–2009. Source: Ministry of Justice

18511 Chinese Migration to Japan, 1978–2010: Patterns and Policies

separate paper regarding skilled migration to Japan, to report the detailed research. Of foreign engineers in Japan, IT engineers form about 30 % (Kurata 2004, p. 7), so here I will only briefly address the causes of the sharp increase in this category. Firstly, since 1990 world-wide competition has developed in the search for IT tal- ent and it became even more competitive since 2000. Japan accepted the “Asian IT Skill Standardization Initiative” in 2000 (Wang 2005) and since 2003 Chinese IT engineers who passed examinations in China were allowed to enter Japan to work in the IT industry. Secondly, former Chinese international students have established hundreds of IT companies in Japan. In order to succeed in this competitive industry, these companies have been very keen to recruit and hire Chinese IT graduates in China and bring them to Japan. But they have been among the most vulnerable to the current global financial crisis because of their relatively small size.

11.3 Conclusion

This paper examined contemporary Chinese migration to Japan and their differ- ent routes over thirty or more years since 1978. Through collection and systematic analysis of a large amount of officially published statistical data, the paper provides detailed data and figures of contemporary Chinese migration to Japan. This study identified the sharply increased scale and scope of population mobility from China to Japan in the new era of global migration (Li 2008). The study also showed the several types of contemporary Chinese international migration, such as interna- tional student migration, marriage migration, family reunion migration and skilled migration. International education, including study abroad and international train- ing, has been the most important and efficient channel of cross-border migrating for Chinese. China has become Japan’s largest source country for various entry categories, specially college students, pre-college students and trainees.

The significant impact of Japanese policies on the inflow of Chinese migration has also been addressed. Through this Japanese case study this paper has shown that international migration has become highly selective in nature, and there has been an increasing education and skill focus in the migration programs of destination coun- tries (Hugo 2007). 1990 is a landmark year for Japan’s international migration poli- cy. Japan has not officially abandoned the public stance that kept the door closed to unskilled foreign workers. During the “bubble economy” in the 1980s, Japan used a “side-door” to accept international students, particularly pre-college students, to compensate for the shortage of unskilled labor. Since 1990 Japan institutionalized a “long term resident” category to allow Japanese descendants to return to Japan for work, and at same time used “training and internship” as an efficient way of import- ing cheap foreign labour, though constantly under strict immigration control. On the other hand, Japan established 14 new working-visa categories by amending its im- migration laws to facilitate skilled professional immigration mainly through hiring international students after the completion of their studies, and increasingly through

186 C. Shao

direct hiring from overseas. Japanese immigration policy has undergone significant changes over the last two decades clearly in favor of wealthy, skilled migrants4.

Foreign people with different backgrounds migrate to Japan through various channels. This presents an ongoing challenge to the Japanese community since the Japanese believe they possess a unique “Yamato Culture”. Earlier arrivals (Old- comers) were required to give up their original culture and forced to assimilate to the Japanese society and culture. However the current economic globalization values human capital more than previously because of their international senses, bi- lingual or even tri-lingual backgrounds and transnational networks. Heterogeneity is no longer considered as a threat to the society but a kind of social asset or added value in the era of the knowledge-based economy. If integration without forced as- similation is the aim, multiculturalism should be the key to success. Meanwhile, it is also a great challenge to Japan not only to attract foreign talented people but to retain them, and to enable them to realise their full potential thereby maximising their contributions to the society.

References

Duan, Y. (2003). Gendai Chūgokujin no Nihon ryūgaku (Chinese Studying in Contemporary Ja- pan). Tokyo: Akashi Shoten.

Guo, F. (1999). The changing identity of Chinese in Japan: Their multidimensional acculturation. Tokyo: Toshindo.

Hugo, G. (2007). “Asian skilled migration to and from Australia: Patterns and policy implica- tions,” Paper prepared for the fourth international conference on population geographers, 10– 13 July, 2007, Hong Kong.

Hugo, G. (2008). A changing diaspora: Recent trends in migration between China and Australia. Chinese Southern Diaspora Studies, 2, 82–103.

IOM. (2008). Situation report on international migration in East and South-East Asia. Bangkok: International Organization for Migration, Regional Office for Southeast Asia. http://www.iom- seasia.org/resource/pdf/iomsituationreport.pdf. Accessed date 18, March 2010.

Komai, H. (2001). Foreign migrants in contemporary Japan. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press. Kondo, A. (2002). Development of immigration policy in Japan. Paper prepared for presentation at

the ASEM Asia—Europe dialogue on globalization and international migration: Asia and Eu- ropean experiences, CERI, Hotel d’York, Paris on 12–13 March 2002. http://www.ip.kyusan-u. ac.jp/keizai-kiyo/dp12.pdf. Accessed date 20, March 2010.

Kurata, Y. (2004). Nihon ni okeru gaikokujin IT gijutsusha kōyō no genjō (Current situation on foreign IT professionals’ employment in Japan), Paper provided by Center for Intergenera- tional Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper with number 217.

Li, P. (2008). World migration in the age of globalization: Policy implications and challenges. New Zealand Population Review, 33/34, pp. 1–22.

Liu-Farrer, G. (2009). Educationally channeled international labor mobility: Contemporary stu- dent migration from China to Japan. The International Migration Review, 43(1), 178.

4 See the relevant report form http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201001200499.html.

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MHLW (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare). (2008). Statistics on marriages in Japan by nationality. http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/suii07/marr2.html, http://www. mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/suii07/index.html. Accessed date 20, March 2010.

Ministry of Justice. (1978–2010). Annual report of statistics on legal migrants. Oka, M., & Fukada, H. (1995). Chūgokujin ryūgakusei to Nihon (Chinese Foreign Students and

Japan). Tokyo: Hakuteisha. Roberts, K. (2003). Changing profile of Chinese labour migration, paper presented at the work-

shop of population changes in China at the beginning of 21st Century, Canberra, Australia, 10–12 December, 2003.

Sadakiyo, E. (2009). Zōkasuru gaikokujin rōdōsha no genjō (Current situation on increase in foreign workers), Centre Mitsui Trust Holdings. http://www.chuomitsui.jp/invest/pdf/repo0903_3.pdf. Accessed date 18, March 2010.

Shao, C. (1996). Nihon no toshi ni okeru esunikku komyunitei no kenkyū–Zainichi chūgokujin rygakusei, shūgakusei o jirei toshite (Research into Ethnic Community in Urban Japan–a case study of Chinese International Students). PHD dissertation to Tokyo Metropolitan University.

Shao, C. (2008b). Japanese policies and international students in Japan, refereed international con- ference proceedings of the 17th Biennial Conference of Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA), The University of Monash, 1–3 July 2008. http://arts.monash.edu.au/mai/asaa/chun- fenshao.pdf, pp 1–15. Accessed date 1, Jan 2010.

Shao, C. (2009). Chūgokujin ryūgakusei to shakai hatten (Chinese international students and so- cial development). In M. Yorozu & F. Murakami (Eds.), Gurobaruka shakai no Nihongo kyōiku to Nihon bunka (Globalising Japanese Education and Japanese Culture) (pp 283–306). Tokyo: Hitsuji Shobo.

Shao, C. (2010). Globalisation and Social Mobility: Chinese Student Immigrants in Japan, ref- ereed international conference proceedings of the 18th Biennial Conference of Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA), The University of Adelaide, July 5–8, 2010.

Wang, J. (2005). Nihon no gaikokujin kōdo jinzai donyū seisaku to zainichi Chūgokujin (Japanese policies on bringing in foreign brains and Chinese in Japan). In J. Tajima (Ed.), Chūgokukei yijyusha kara mita Nihon shakai no shomondai (Issues in Japanese Society through Chinese Engineers’ Eyes). Tokyo: Zaidan hōjin shakai anzen kenkyū zaidan.

Zha, D. (2003). Chinese migrant workers in Japan: Policies, institutions, and civil society. In P. N. a. I. Saveliev (Ed.), Globalizing Chinese migration: trends in Europe and Asia. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Zhu, H. (2003). Nihon kakyō kajin shakai no hensen (The Transformation of Chinese Community in Japan). Tokyo: Nihon Kyohosha.

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Chapter 12 Old and New Chinese Organizations in Suriname

Paul B. Tjon Sie Fat

J. Zhang, H. Duncan (eds.), Migration in China and Asia, International Perspectives on Migration 10, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8759-8_12, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2014

P. B. Tjon Sie Fat ( ) Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands e-mail: [email protected]

To what extent does ‘New Chinese migration’ label a meaningful category and how useful is it in analyses of local positioning of Chinese migrants, particularly in the developing world? Is ‘New’ anything but performative in the field? We could be left to ponder, for instance, whether New Migrants are ‘new’ if there are no ‘old’ migrants to contrast them with in a particular location. In this paper we will take one aspect of local positioning of Chinese migrants in Suriname, namely huìguǎn organization, to explore the newness of New Chinese Migrants.1

12.1 More of the Same?

An ethnic Chinese segment has existed in Surinamese society since the middle of the nineteenth century, as a consequence of Dutch colonial policy to import Asian indentured labour as a substitute for African slave labour. By the early twentieth century chain migration from a Hakka-dominated area in the Eastern part of the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong Province (the Fuidung’on area), created a homog- enous Kejia-speaking Chinese group in Suriname.2 Ethnic Chinese soon dominated

1 This paper is based on material collected between 2003 and 2008 for my PhD thesis at the Uni- versity of Amsterdam, and on information gathered during visits to Suriname in December 2009 and June 2011. 2 Fuidung’on is an anagram of the Kejia pronunciation of the names of the three counties where the ‘Old Chinese’ migrant cohorts in Suriname come from: fui5jong2 (Putonghua: Huìyáng 惠 ), tung1kon1 (PTH: Dōngguǎn 东 ), and pau3on1 (PTH: Bǎoān 宝安). For the informants in Suri- name the term referred to the nineteenth century districts of Dongguan, Huiyang and Xin’an in the Hong Kong periphery, currently corresponding to areas in Dongguan Municipality, Huiyang

P. B. Tjon Sie Fat190

the Surinamese retail trade through an ethnic ownership economy, which exists “…whenever any immigrant or ethnic group maintains a private economic sector in which it has a controlling ownership stake” (Light and Gold 2000, p. 9).3 Chain migration was linked to the ethnic ownership economy as relatives or coregionalists were employed in the corner shop or supermarket of the sponsor to learn the ropes of the retail business and acquire a basic command of Sranantongo, the Surinamese lingua franca.

Despite strong assimilation pressure, Chinese ethnicity remained a constant and visible presence in Suriname due to the link between the retail trade-based ethnic ownership economy and chain migration. On the one hand Chinese ethnicity emerg- es as ethnic capital in the ethnic ownership economy, and is therefore reproduced among Suriname-born generations. On the other hand, chain migration guaranteed a regular influx of fresh migrant cohorts (Kejia: sin1hak7 新客) with a Fuitungon Hakka background, even though between 1940 and 1980 immigration was indi- rect, via Hong Kong. The Chinese of Suriname might have been slowly shifting away from Fuitungon tradition and Kejia dialect towards the modernity of Hong Kong and urban Cantonese language, but for all intents and purposes ‘Chinese’ and ‘Hakka’ remained near synonyms up to the 1990s, when non-Hakka ‘New Chinese’ arrived on the stage.

The New Chinese Migrants in Suriname are associated with a sudden and re- markable increase in Chinese immigration in that decade. In the 30-odd years be- tween the founding of the PRC in 1949 and economic reforms in the late 1970s, mi- gration from mainland China to Suriname was unremarkable. Throughout the 1980s the number of PRC nationals entering Suriname remained a steady 200 persons up to 1990, when about 4,800 Chinese citizens were registered at the Surinamese bor- der controls. The next year a record 7,587 Chinese citizens entered Suriname (more than 11 % of all non-resident aliens entering the country). The numbers sharply dropped in 1996, and averaged a little over 1,100 until 2003, rising to an average of about 1,500 between 2004 and 2010.4 Because they were so unlike the Chinese of

County, Baoan County, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, and the New Territories in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. ‘Hakka’ is used here loosely to distinguish the ethnic label from the language. Following current practice in Chinese linguistics the ‘Hakka dialect’ is here called ‘Kejia’. Kejia names are transcribed according to the Fuitungon Kejia pronunciation dictionary (Chin-a-Woeng 2008). 3 Stress in the original. They continue: “[the ethnic ownership economy is a] rational response to job scarcity, and the fact that the general labour market will probably never provide enough jobs for coethnics to join mainstream”. The ethnic ownership economy does not include members of the same ethnic group who work for wages in the general economy. 4 Data from the Surinamese General Bureau of Statistics ( Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek, ABS): SIC 220-2006/02; SIC 264-2009/11; SIC 278-2011/06. Chinese remained a minor part of the influx of non-resident aliens during these 21 years, as the majority consisted of holders of Dutch passports. Data are from the General Bureau of Statistics in Suriname (ABS) are not fully reliable, however. According to the statistics for 2006 in SIC 242- 2008/1, ‘tourists’ from the PRC outnumbered PRC nationals entering via the international airport

12 Old and New Chinese Organizations in Suriname 191

the past, the unfamiliar immigrants were soon commonly called nieuwe Chinezen (Dutch: ‘new Chinese’) and nyun Sneisi (Sranantongo: ‘new Chinese’). These latest migrants were also ‘new’ to observers from the established ethnic Chinese in Suri- name, and not just as the latest migrant cohort; the Chinese-language newspapers in Paramaribo refer to the these latest migrants as ‘New Migrants’ (PTH: xīn yímín 新 民), a term transplanted from the PRC. In the local Chinese papers, the new cohorts also referred to themselves as ‘New Chinese’ (PTH: xīn huárén 新华人).5

As a segment of globalized migration, such New Chinese Migrants are literally found all over the globe, but they were first described as such in relation to North America and Europe (Nyíri 1999; Nieto 2003; Pieke et al. 2004). Writing in the late 1990s, Zhuang Guotu typified post-1978 migrants as relatively young, firm- ly embedded in Chinese culture, well-educated, mostly legal, and with a definite economic motivation (Zhuang 1997, p. 3).6 Pál Nyíri noted that in a break with established views of Chinese migrants, New Chinese Migrants in Europe could be from regions in the PRC without a tradition of overseas migration, selected des- tinations to minimize competition with other Chinese migrants, did not focus on their hometowns in constructing a Chinese identity, and were less likely to adapt economic and cultural mechanisms to local conditions (Nyíri 1999, pp. 118–128). Much of this is reflected in cases studies of New Chinese Migrants in the develop- ing world, particularly in African contexts lacking any previous history of Chinese immigration (E.g. Li 2000; Dobler 2005; Østbø and Carling 2005). In fact New Chinese Migrants have become part of the (in Western eyes) controversial Chinese presence in Africa, where the distinctions between the increasing influence of the PRC as an alternative to former colonial overlords, transnational Chinese business, and New Migration are at times very blurred (cf. Alden 2007).

Wang Gungwu notes that the term New Migrants was coined by PRC authorities to refer to the renewed emigration following economic reforms in the late 1970s (Wang 2000). The New Migrants category is in fact a pragmatic strategy linked to economic development, and rapid economic development was the main reason why the PRC established policies to engage with the ‘Chinese diaspora’ (Bolt 1996). In the migration policy of the PRC which is geared to bringing migrant groups under its control, the formal category of New Migrants is a subset of the huárén

and the port of Nieuw Nickerie: 1,757 versus 1,391. The data are not fully reliable; in SIC 242- 2008/1, the number of non-resident PRC nationals entering via the international airport in the year 1996 was set at 2,011, instead of 724 in earlier publications (e.g. SIC 220-2006/2). 5 During this period only one official report noted the change in the Chinese population. In an appendix on the Chinese included in their short study of class and ethnic distribution in Para- maribo based on fieldwork conducted in 1992, Schalkwijk and De Bruijne described a basically stable Hakka-dominated urban entrepreneurial minority group (Schalkwijk and De Bruijne 1997, pp. 98–99), but in the revised second edition of 1999, they noted changes with regard to home- lands, languages, and financial resources of recent Chinese migrants, as well as the new phenom- enon of PRC resource extraction and technical cooperation projects (Schalkwijk and De Bruijne 1999, pp. 98–99). 6 Zhuang includes entrepreneurs from Hong Kong and Taiwan in his analysis.

P. B. Tjon Sie Fat192

(华人, i.e. ‘ethnic Chinese’) category, together with huáyì (华 , i.e. ‘people of Chinese descent’), reflecting the tendency to view Chinese ethnicity as inherently and self-evidently monolithic (Xiang 2003). New Migrants are bound to the PRC via transnationalized ethno-patriotic loyalty, which rephrases sinocentric notions of Chinese identity in terms of the PRC as ‘the motherland’ (cf. Nyíri 1999, 2001; Thunø 2001).

Despite the seemingly obvious distinction between earlier groups of Chinese mi- grants and the New Migrants, in the case of Suriname at least one could argue that there is not much that actually merits strict categorization. For most, migration to Suriname was and is an extension of a tradition of domestic migration in the People’s Republic. The reasons for moving to Suriname from China have remained basically the same in almost one and a half centuries: social pressure to leave the hometown to improve one’s standard of living and increase the wealth and status of one’s rela- tives back home. Migration strategies are also basically the same: chain migration linked to a Chinese ethnic ownership economy based on retail trade. Finally, the dif- ference between sojourning and settling in Suriname remains the result of pragmatic considerations of the advantages and feasibility of remigration versus consolidation of one’s economic and political interests locally. This process of moving and adapt- ing has become more complex and faster due to technological innovation inherent to globalization, the changing technoscape, to use Appadurai’s terms. The apparent unwillingness of recent Chinese migrant cohorts to adapt culturally to local condi- tions becomes understandable, as technology makes it possible to leave a hometown without leaving the community, making assimilation seem like a lifestyle choice.

The only substantial difference between the Old and the New Migrants lies in their regional backgrounds and the way that impacts the local imagination and per- formance of Chinese identity. While the ‘Old Chinese’ self-identify on the basis of Hakka hometowns in the Fuidung’on area, New Chinese in Suriname can come from every imaginable place in the PRC, though most originate from the coastal areas, particularly the provinces of Guangdong, Zhejiang, Hainan, and Fujian. In any case, the distinction between ‘Old Chinese’ and ‘New Chinese’ in Suriname is real because that is currently the way Chinese collective identity is produced in Surinamese ethnic discourse. In Suriname and in other locations in the developing world, New Chinese Migrants have become symbolic of the threat of globalization, especially when lines between migration and PRC manufacturing and resource ex- traction become blurred (Tjon Sie Fat 2010).

No specific anti-Chinese violence has been reported in Suriname, though the presence of New Chinese Migrants and the impact of controversial resource ex- traction projects from the PRC have led to widespread anti-Chinese sentiments.7

7 In Albina, near the French border, on 24 December 2009, a quarrel between a Ndyuka man and a Brazilian over money escalated, and the Ndyuka man was stabbed and died. Disenchranchised Ndyuka youths went on the rampage, looting and burning and hunting down Brazilians. As most shops were owned by New Chinese, it seemed as if the violence was not only aimed at Brazilians

12 Old and New Chinese Organizations in Suriname 193

In a civic discourse with strong naive monarchic elements, the Chinese presence in Suriname symbolized everything that was wrong with the way Suriname is be- ing governed. Within the seemingly monolithic ‘Chinese community’, relations between the established and the newcomers were also not optimal, as ‘Old Chi- nese’ faced intense competition from New Chinese in the retail trade-based ethnic ownership economy. Eventually local-born ethnic Chinese striving to participate in Surinamese ethnopolitical power-sharing needed to distance themselves from the controversial New Chinese Migrants, and in the run-up to the 2005 general elections local-born Chinese modified Surinamese ethnic discourse with regard to Chinese by distinguishing ‘Surinamese-Chinese’ from New Chinese. Surinamese- Chinese were loyal Surinamese citizens and essential contributors to Surinamese culture and national identity, whereas New Chinese were foreigners, dangerous and criminal (Tjon Sie Fat 2009, pp. 231–233). However, below the surface of the civic and ethnic discourses, relations between local-born, Old Migrants and New Mi- grants remained pragmatic, and neither ‘Surinamese-Chinese’ nor ‘New Chinese’ were consolidated as labels of ethnic categories.

On the basis of all this one might assume that local organizational strategies of New Migrants deviate from established Chinese patterns, especially when analyses of modern Chinese migration are linked to transnational entrepreneurship and the PRC as an emerging rising economic and geopolitical superpower. As an analytical framework, transnationalism would suggest that local strategies need to be under- stood in terms of transnational social space, which in turn would mean that if New Chinese Migrants are transnational their social organization in Suriname should be different from that of earlier, established Chinese chain migrants. But here too we find that New Migrants are not substantially different, and in fact they have copied established, local Chinese practices with regard to social institutions. In Suriname, transnationalism is a function of increasing technological sophistication under glo- balization, not anything inherent in Chinese identity.

but also ethnic Chinese. However, in the Chinese-language media (TV and huìguǎn newspapers) the New Chinese shopkeepers explained that their shops, not their ethnicity or nationality, had been targeted. (DWT 28 December 2009, ‘Zinloos geweld Albina: “Kiri ala Brasyonman!”’ (Casual violence in Albina: ‘Kill all the Brazilians!’); ‘Moord leidt tot anarchie in Albina’ (Mur- der leads to anarchy in Albina)). Almost a year later, at the end of October 2010, a quarrel between a Chinese shopkeeper and a Maroon got out of hand, with the shopkeeper wounding the client. A policeman shot into the Maroon mob ready to lynch the shopkeeper, killing one man. The incident revealed racial tensions between established city dwellers and Maroon newcomers, and between Maroons and Chinese mi- grants. (DWT 31 October 2011, ‘Incident Saramaccastraat helt naar etnische spanning “Waar zijn wij veilig”’ (Saramacca Str. Incident is leans towards ethnic tensions; ‘Where can we be safe?’); ‘KPS houdt zichzelf spiegel voor “Politieman niet berekend op massa-aanval”’(Surinamese Po- lice Corps admits own failings; ‘Police officer not prepared for mass attack’)). However, the basic conflicts appear to have arisen from competition between migrants (Maroon, Chinese, Brazilian) in urban settings and weak state control.

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12.2 The Huìguǎn of Suriname

Currently there are about 16 Chinese organizations in Suriname, about five of which are organized by and for New Chinese Migrants. The number of entities varies de- pending on how one defines ‘Chinese organization’, and on the motivations of the individuals who list the huìguǎn and shètuán.8 If we limit ourselves to organiza- tions with governing boards that actually meet in a physical location, that actually provide concrete services to an ethnic Chinese constituency, and are recognized by the more established organizations, then the number drops to between six and ten.

The first Chinese organization in Suriname, Kong Ngie Tong (广义堂) was founded in 1880. It was a migrant adaptive organization, a strategy transplanted from internal migration in China to provide migrants and some longer-term resi- dents with housing, employment and social support (Wickberg 1994, pp. 68–69). Virtually all ethnic Chinese in Suriname at the time were Kejia-speaking chain mi- grants from a limited number of locations in the Fuidung’on area, so the fact that Kong Ngie Tong was basically a hometown association (同乡会) went unnoticed. In 1928 rivalry between different generations of ethnic Chinese elites caused a split, from which Chung Fa Foei Kon (中华会 ) arose. In 1943 the Chinese Repub- lican government sponsored a local Kuo Min Tang branch which doubled as an aspiring ‘Chinese Chamber of Commerce’, hence the current name Fa Tjauw Song Foei (华侨商会).9 Together these three organizations remain dominant in Surinam- ese Chinatown politics of the Old Chinese. They jointly run a cemetery, a Chinese school, and organize cultural events, while in practice Kong Ngie Tong Sang10 and Chung Fa Foei Kon produce their thrice-weekly newspapers as a daily paper. All three organize rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), which is the main raison d’être for any huìguǎn in Suriname—huìguǎn that do not organize ROSCAs do not attract ‘members’.11

8 Shètuán could include anything that is not explicitly geared to migrant survival, and so might include the ‘Chinese Women’s Federation’ (Dutch: Chinese Vrouwenfederatie) which was founded on 8 March 2010, International Women’s Day. As the group was described in De Ware Tijd (17 April 2010), the main Surinamese daily, it appeared to be a women’s social club organized by middle-aged people from ‘Hong Kong Chinese’ Hakka cohorts. The group was presented first and foremost as a women’s organization, with membership open to any ethnic group, but it was inaugurated in the PRC embassy in Paramaribo. This opens up the possibility of instrumental identification as a non-ethnic organization as well as a China-backed shètuán. Such groups have come and gone, the best-known being Tsang Nen Foei ( 年会), a Laiap youth organization active in the 1960s, now defunct. 9 The title ‘Surinamese Branch of the Chinese National Party’ 中国国民党 南属支 is maintained on the signboard of the huìguǎn. 10 A conflict with the colonial Surinamese government over gambling escalated in 1930 and Kong Ngie Tong was closed down. The next year it resurfaced as Kong Ngie Tong Sang—‘Kong Ngie Tong Reborn’—though in Chinese texts the name remained Kong Ngie Tong. 11 ROSCAs are basically groups of people who periodically meet in order to organize informal micro-financing. ROSCAs are based on trust, and in their simplest form participants contribute a

12 Old and New Chinese Organizations in Suriname 195

The elites of the Old Chinese organizations continued to claim a gatekeeper role between the ‘Chinese community’ in Suriname and the government, despite the increasing numbers of New Chinese and the clear impact that had on the economic, linguistic, and cultural situation of ethnic Chinese. The Old Chinese elites (both migrants and local-born) successfully marginalized the newcomers for about a de- cade, until the first New Chinese elites emerged and proclaimed their own huìguǎn in 2004; Stichting Zhejiang (Dutch: ‘the Zhejiang Foundation’), a.k.a Zhèjiāng Tóngxiāng Huì (浙江同乡会, ‘Zhejiang Province Hometown Association’). De- spite the name, the vast majority of its target group at the time of its founding were from one region in Zhejiang Province, namely Wencheng District. As was the case with the Old Chinese organizations, Zhejiang Tongxiang Hui was set up by a small group of successful entrepreneurs, who have used the organization as a platform for Chinatown politics as well as diplomacy with the Surinamese State and representa- tives of the PRC. The huìguǎn organizes ROSCAs and raises funds for members of its target group who are in dire straits.

A similar organization is Fújiàn Tóngxiāng Huì ( 建同乡会 ‘Fujian Province Hometown Association’, no Dutch name available), set up shortly after the Zhe- jiangese huìguǎn. The Fujianese are not a monolithic group in Suriname, though that does not mean that specific Fujianese hometown affiliations or dialects play no role in Fujianese organizations or elite formation in Suriname. For instance, the Zhongguo Lin Liangxin Socio-cultural Association was a short-lived organization that provided migrants from Xianyou in central Fujian the option of selling instant lottery tickets as an adaptive livelihood strategy.12 Currently the Fújiàn Tóngxiāng Huì serves people from different parts of Fujian as a migrant adaptive organization in tandem with a role as a platform for a small migrant elite. In fact, the huìguǎn is emerging as a player in Surinamese Chinatown politics with the entrepreneurial success of its leadership.

Finally, the Hǎinán Tóngxiāng Huì ( 南同乡会, ‘Hainan Province Hometown Association’) is the third New Chinese organization that is recognized by the three

fixed sum of money at each session, to be collected by one member in a predetermined order at ev- ery meeting (hence ‘rotating’). Chinese ROSCAs in Suriname are informal (savings and borrowing are untaxed and unregu-lated by the government), but their transactions may involve substantial sums of foreign currency, and require record-keeping, guarantees for participants from external sponsors, and impartial referees. The ROSCAs organized in the Fuitungon Hakka huìguǎn are ‘bidding associations’ (标会 biāo huì), meaning that the order of loans is determined by a system of bidding. In the case of the Fuitungon Hakka huìguǎn in Suriname, participants anonymously bid the highest ‘interest’ they can afford to be subtracted from the monthly contributions they would receive in total as a loan. The order of any equal bids is determined by chance. The main huìguǎn formally have members and regularly hold elections for their Boards. What the elections mean in practice is unclear, but ‘member of a huìguǎn’ is not how most Chinese migrants in Suriname describe themselves. They ‘visit’ or contact the huìguǎn for specific reasons, and therefore would be more accurately described as clients. 12 The organization never used Chinese orthography in public. Zhongguo was likely 中国 ‘China’, while Lin Liangxin apparently was 林 , the name of the organizer.

P. B. Tjon Sie Fat196

senior Old Chinese organizations. It organizes fundraising drives for events and Hainanese who have fallen onto hard times, but is not as prominent as the two oth- ers.13 It should be noted that none of the New Chinese organizations prints its own newsletters or newspapers as yet, but place announcements and advertisements in the joint Kong Ngie Tong Sang/Chung Fa Foei Kon newspapers.

In Surinamese society, where ethnic identification can be supremely dominant, Chinese organizations are ethnic organizations, and are therefore considered ‘tra- ditional’. Nobody involved in the huìguǎn/shètuán disputes this, and when asked about the nature of their organizations they will link structure and function to an origin ‘in China’. As the oldest huìguǎn in Suriname, Kong Ngie Tong Sang was not a copy of a local predecessor, and may well have started as a Brotherhood (Kejia: t’ong2堂). In any case, by 2000 all functioning Surinamese huìguǎn were structured to meet local needs, mainly informal financial services (i.e. ROSCAs) and elite diplomacy. The New Chinese huìguǎn, all of which were set up after 2000, ap- pear to be copies of local models rather than transplanted traditions. Fact is that all functioning huìguǎn with an actual ‘membership’/constituency (i.e. clients) provide virtually the same combination of ROSCAs and political platforms.

12.3 The Proliferation of Chinese Organizations

The emergence of New Chinese organizations is in itself not remarkable, and can be seen as part of a natural tendency of Chinese organization to proliferate. Ever since Chung Fa Foei Kon splintered off Kong Ngie Tong in the late 1920s, surprisingly many, though often short-lived, huìguǎn and shètuán have arisen in Suriname. Some organizations were splinter groups of established huìguǎn, reflecting the emergence of rival elites who required their own political platforms vis à vis Chinese migrants and potential ethnic Chinese supporters, as well as to foster the impression of access to an ‘ethnic Chinese constituency’ in relation to the State. Some community insti- tutions were portrayed as huìguǎn/shètuán by established Chinese organizations as

13 Not all New Chinese organizations are Hometown Associations. In the early 2000s a Haina- nese organization seemed to be claiming a pan-Hainanese forum: Hǎinán Huáqiáo Lianhé Huì ( 南华侨 合会, ‘United Association of Overseas Chinese from Hainan’). And since 2009 a second Zhejiangese organization has emerged: Zhèjiāng Shānghuì (浙江商会, ‘Zhejiangese Trad- ers Association’). By 2011 a Buddhist shrine was being run by New Chinese in Paramaribo under the name Fó Jiào Huì (佛教会, ‘Buddhist Association’). The organization plans to send for a monk and eventually set up a temple (Sabirie Gangapersad, ‘Boeddhisme; Nieuwe temple moet frisse impuls geven’(‘Buddhism; New temple to provide fresh impulse’), Parbode, April 2011). Distrust between Old and New Chinese, based on regional and linguistic differences, separate economic strategies and networks, and distinct migration cohorts, is sharpened by religious distinctions when Old Chinese—seen as Christians—cynically describe Fó Jiào Huì as just another platform for Chinatown politics.

12 Old and New Chinese Organizations in Suriname 197

part of their own agendas. Lists of ‘Chinese organizations’ can be inflated by adding sports clubs, churches, enterprises, and even provisional committees.14

With regard to Chinatown politics, this strategy embeds an established huìguǎn elite in a more extensive institutional network, while at the level of national ethnop- olitics it strengthens the impression of a sizeable, monolithic ethnic constituency. Proliferation of huìguǎn and shètuán also reflects the fact that the needs and re- quirements of different ethnic Chinese sectors are not met by existing huìguǎn once those are co-opted by the specific agendas of established elites. Chinese migrants still need Chinese-language assistance in the still overwhelmingly informal context they find themselves in, while the linguistic and cultural gap between migrants and local-born requires some platform for mediation.

Coalitions will often be strategically added to lists of huìguǎn and shètuán, fur- ther inflating the number Chinese organizations in Suriname. Right after the split of Chung Fa Foei Kon from Kong Ngie Tong in the 1920s increased the number of huìguǎn to two, collaborations were presented to the public as the work of a single entity, the ‘Kong-Chung Association’.15 The three oldest huìguǎn, Kong Ngie Tong Sang, Chung Fa Foei Kon, and Fa Tjauw Sang Foei, are consistently referred to as ‘the Three Associations’ (三团) in the local Chinese-language newspapers, al- though they do not present themselves as a single entity with this name, despite the fact that they often share board members, have some common facilities, and act in unison to the outside world. The strategy of setting up an ‘umbrella organization’, whether or not that claim is founded, has been observed elsewhere (cf. Li 1999). Recent Surinamese examples among the Old Chinese organizations are Fa Foe Foei (华互会) in the 1990s and Stichting Oriental Foundation in the 2000s.16 Up to now the New Chinese huìguǎn in Suriname have not publicly been involved in similar (temporary) coalitions or (bogus) umbrella organizations.

Setting aside for a minute the question what Chineseness means in Suriname, it is easy to forget that huìguǎn and shètuán in Suriname are inescapably and publicly ethnic. Chinese ethnicity in Suriname becomes relevant instrumentally when im- migrants need to access huìguǎn as adaptive organizations, when ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs need to network in the context of the retail trade-based ethnic owner- ship economy, when local ethnic Chinese elites, migrant or otherwise, need to net- work with representatives of the People’s Republic of China, or when particularly

14 Li Minghuan (1999) has noted a similar pattern among the Chinese of the Netherlands. 15 Kong Chung Vereniging. Zijlmans and Enser 2002, p. 82. Likely written 广中会 in Chinese characters. 16 No Chinese orthography is available for the name of the organization. The evening paper De West of 23 October 2008 carried an item on the 155th anniversary of the arrival of the first Chinese indentured laborers, in which Stichting Oriental Foundation was called “an umbrella organization within which all active Chinese associations are united”. Five months earlier, in the Times of Su- riname daily of 28 April 2007, the organization was listed as one of 13 members of a ‘Federation of Chinese Associations in Suriname’ (华侨全会) expressing loyalty to the PRC in protest against Taiwanese pocketbook diplomacy.

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local-born people of ethnic Chinese descent attempt to participate in national ethno- politics. Even the most pragmatic reasons for publicly setting up a Chinese organi- zation will result in an entity that will be recognized as ethnic in Surinamese society, and no Chinese organization has ever been founded in Suriname without reference to Chinese cultural markers. The same holds true for New Chinese huìguǎn; while positioning themselves as loyal citizens of the PRC in a broader context of racial- ized patriotism, they need to be recognizable as tóngxiānghuì to their clients, while adjusting their Chinese image to the broader Surinamese population.

12.4 Recognition by the PRC Embassy and the Surinamese Government

As noted earlier Surinamese huìguǎn were basically tóngxiānghuì before the found- ing of the Republic of China in 1911. Loyalty was to the homeland, which was the xiang 乡 rather than the Chinese State. Republican mobilization of Overseas Chi- nese support became noticeable in Suriname during the Second World War, though the resinicization policy never really amounted to anything in Suriname, where the local, Hakka-based cultural and linguistic identity of the Fuitungon homeland dominated everyday Chinese life. A crisis of loyalties developed during the Cold War era after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, with the Chinese of Suriname torn between following the focus of Republican China away from the Chinese mainland and accepting the status quo in the Fuitungon qiáoxiāng (‘mi- grant hometown’ 侨乡).

A pragmatic choice for the People’s Republic was pioneered by Afoeng Chiu Hung (丘 ), the first Chinese migrant in Suriname to opt for local citizenship sta- tus, and long-standing chairman of Kong Ngie Tong Sang. Though Fa Tjauw Song Foei formally remained focused on the Republic of China, the Three Organizations now looked to the People’s Republic of China in practice. Diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic started almost as soon as Suriname became independent in 1975, and the Republic of Suriname has remained a staunch supporter of the One China Policy ever since. In that context it was hard for any Chinese organization in Suriname to be anything but supportive of the People’s Republic.

Initially, the PRC embassy in Paramaribo did not really engage with the Chinese of Suriname. Its main diplomatic function was to preserve Suriname for the PRC cause in the pocketbook diplomacy conducted in the Caribbean by the PRC and Taiwan. The huìguǎn elites incorporated the embassy in their diplomatic network, presenting themselves as gatekeepers to both the PRC and the Surinamese govern- ment. But to the vast majority of ethnic Chinese in Suriname the PRC embassy was either the representative of a distant, alien state, or a indispensable and ines- capable provider of consular services. In the 1980s the role of the PRC embassy changed, following changes in the way the role of Overseas Chinese was viewed with regard to economic development in the PRC. Overseas Chinese investment in

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the qiaoxiang was to be welcomed, and the embassy was to present a far friendlier image of the PRC to the Surinamese public. By the 1990s, parallel to the increased influx of New Chinese Migrants, resource extraction projects in Suriname became the most important activity related to the PRC over the earlier prestige building projects (Tjon Sie Fat 2009). The role of the embassy changed again, becoming on the one hand more like the representative of an emerging superpower with local geopolitical ambitions, while on the other increasingly seeming like an alternative source of development aid.

In all this the Old Chinese huìguǎn elites continued to present themselves as gatekeepers, though the New Chinese were increasingly challenging this claim, while the PRC embassy would at times demand a kind of huìguǎn support that it did not consistently expect in the past. For instance, in April 2007 a hitherto unknown organization, the Suriname-Taiwan Friendship Foundation announced that Taiwan was offering more than US$ 100 million in aid, in return for diplomatic recogni- tion. Though the Surinamese government immediately reaffirmed the One-China Principle, a Surinamese delegation did visit then President Chen Shui-bian in July 2007. The PRC strongly objected to the visit, and the Surinamese huìguǎn and shè- tuán rushed to limit the damage. In a full-page advertisement in The Times of Su- riname, a ‘Federation of Chinese Associations in Suriname’ (Fa Tjauw Tjoen Foei 华侨全会, see Appendix), consisting of Old and New Chinese huìguǎn stressed the loyalty of the Surinamese Overseas Chinese to the PRC and the One-China Poli- cy.17 Since then, Finlandization of PRC-Taiwanese relations has made the issue of divided loyalties a moot point. The PRC now dominates local Chinatown politics as well as the image of the Chinese State in Suriname. The PRC embassy donated funds and machinery to the Kong Ngie Tong Sang/Chung Fa Foei Kon newspapers, and demands editorial input with regard to content. A Confucius Institute has been installed at the Anton de Kom University of Suriname, which will streamline views of Chinese history, politics, cultural and linguistic identity (for instance, by promot- ing Putonghua as ‘the Chinese language’).

Huìguǎn elites had always sought the approval and recognition of the PRC embassy in Paramaribo, which could enhance their status and general bargaining position in relation to their Chinese ‘constituency’ and the Surinamese State. Em- bassy staff could expect regular invitations to huìguǎn events, and in turn the em- bassy received huìguǎn elites for banquets and photo opportunities at the embassy compound. Of course, the style of huìguǎn-embassy relations varies depending on the specific agendas of the huìguǎn elites and the personality of the serving PRC

17 The PRC embassy apparently understood the popular sentiment that almost 30 years of dip- lomatic relations with the PRC had yielded only rhetoric of solidarity and little substantial aid, surely compared to the US$ 100 million Taiwan was now offering. By early August the PRC promised to donate a US$ 3.2 million container scanner, speedboats, motorbikes and computers to the Surinamese Customs Service, and a week later a high-level delegation from PRC airplane manufacturer CATIC arrived to discuss extending its operations to Suriname. It later emerged that the various political parties who had been involved in the delegation each received cash donations and material gifts from the embassy.

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ambassador, but generally speaking diplomatic relations follow predictable pat- terns. However, up to the appearance of the New Chinese huìguǎn the established Fuitungon Hakka elites were the only huìguǎn representatives dealing with the em- bassy. That has now firmly changed. While the exact reasons for the interactions will always remain obscure, the Chinese-language media in Suriname have carried reports on the leadership boards of various New Chinese huìguǎn being received at the PRC embassy. Recognition by the PRC embassy means recognition of claims by New Chinese huìguǎn that they are equal to the Old Chinese huìguǎn.

Different power-relations underpin the interaction between the huìguǎn and the Surinamese State, so it is no surprise that the Surinamese government does not or- chestrate the same kind of photo-ops as the PRC embassy. It is actually unclear to what extent the government is even aware of—or cares about—differences between Old and New Chinese organizations. Despite the fact that ethnopolitics has domi- nated and shaped Surinamese society for more than 60 years, the Surinamese State formally ignores ethnicity. Though the State will not publicly court specific ethnic groups for whatever reason, various political parties and coalitions will attempt to mine votes among potential ethnic constituencies. Ethnic Chinese were not usually seen as a viable voting constituency, but Chinese entrepreneurs were considered valuable sources of financial support.

Contact with the centre of Surinamese politics is usually initiated by the huìguǎn. Government representatives will be invited to various huìguǎn events, and the more senior the official attending the more complete government recognition is consid- ered to be. The main prize is the President, who is most likely to attend what is gen- erally seen to be the most important ethnic Chinese celebration, the Chinese Lunar New Year (春 ). The Moon Festival (中 ) has also developed into a major ethnic Chinese celebration in Suriname. Other than such pan-Chinese celebrations, huìguǎn anniversaries and the anniversary of the arrival of the first Chinese inden- tured labourers on 20 October 1853 may also be occasions to invite government officials, whether or not they have any meaning for the organizers or anyone who could be labelled Chinese in Suriname.

This is the other important function of huìguǎn in Suriname: a stage for perfor- mative ethnic identity. Before the arrival of New Chinese (i.e. non-Hakka) huìguǎn events staged contrasts between migrants and the Suriname-born, between Hakka as a rural, traditionalist identity and Kejia as a low-status language on the one hand, and Hong Kong culture as a modern, urban identity and Cantonese as a high-status variety on the other. Hakka folklore was marginal in such performances, and Kejia language virtually absent. To non-Chinese Surinamese audiences the message was brief (basically “Chinese are not a threat”) and Chinese symbols stereotypical (red and gold, lion dances, fireworks, food).18 Public events in New Chinese huìguǎn

18 The dominance of Cantonese is one consequence Old Chinese refocusing on Hong Kong while the Fuitungon homeland was inaccessible, at least up to the 1980s. But it also reflects friction between older Fuitungon Hakka migrant cohorts and the younger Hakka cohorts that arrived ac- culturated to urban modernity via Hong Kong. This distinction was irrelevant by the time New Chinese arrived in the 1990s.

12 Old and New Chinese Organizations in Suriname 201

basically follow the same pattern: the distinction between ethnic Chinese in-groups and out-groups is based on home-town dialect, elite dominance is established, non- Chinese Surinamese are told that Chinese are harmless and Chinese cultural sym- bols are reduced to predictable, self-censored stereotypes.19 However, all public events for in-groups in Surinamese huìguǎn, Old or New Chinese, are modelled on China Central Television (CCTV) shows which are part of the mediascape, to use Appadurai’s (1996) term, of Chinese globalization. The message to the Chinese audience is that Chinese identity is patriotic, unified, and Mandarin-speaking. The PRC embassy actively promotes cultural contact with the ‘motherland’, though the consequences of spreading the message of Chinese multicultural unity in Suriname which struggles with its own post-colonial plurality, is not always fully appreciated by the embassy’s cultural attachés. The surprising mix of Chinese regional back- grounds and Chinese migrant cohorts in Suriname are assimilated into a ‘pan-Chi- nese’ identity, while at the same time quickly integrating into the socio-linguistic and cultural landscape of Suriname.20

This monolithic Chineseness that emerges in in-group (i.e. non-Surinamese) contexts dovetails nicely with the monolithic Chineseness that is required to partici- pate in Surinamese ethnopolitics. While identity is more clearly a matter of cultural boundary markers when various Chinese sub-groups interact, or is a form of social capital in the economic strategies of Chinese migrants in Suriname, politics of iden- tity and recognition are the only ways to achieve state recognition in the context of Surinamese ethnopolitics. It does not matter if the Chineseness exhibited then bears any relationship to what people actually do in the field, as long as it is recognizable to the public at large and the ethnopolitical power-brokers, and can encompass the largest possible ethnic Chinese constituency—often grossly over-exaggerating the number of people who would call themselves ‘Chinese’. Chinese migrants quickly position themselves as Chinese in the context of Suriname, which means balancing the idea that ethnic Chinese are somehow important and positive in Suriname with the notion that ethnic Chinese are all linked to the growing prestige of the PRC as an emerging superpower. The result is that despite the ‘obviousness’ of Chinese abroad, Chineseness is very much a local product (cf. Tjon Sie Fat 2009).

The pursuit of state recognition does not mean that the huìguǎn will publicly favor a specific political party, in spite of any special or long-standing ties.21 As entrepreneurs, ethnic Chinese benefit from a stable political climate in Suriname and economic policies that are amenable to the ethnic ownership economy, and

19 Chinese music, for instance, is problematic. Pop songs signify modernity, but traditional music does not, and particularly opera considered too difficult for outsiders, even though karaoke DVDs of local opera styles can be popular entertainment in huìguǎn settings. 20 There is now a generation of New Chinese children who are fluent speakers of Dutch and Sran- antongo, the Surinamese lingua franca, and who are indistinguishable from ‘Old Chinese’. 21 The Creole-dominated National Party of Suriname (NPS) is traditionally considered to be friendly to Chinese migrants, and Chung Tjauw Fu Li Foei (see Appendix) is in fact the ethnic Chinese section of the NPS.

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tend to spread their support (donations and votes) across all factions. However, as platforms for Chinese elite participation, the established huìguǎn have been known to provide donations to specific political actors along business, class, and personal networks behind the scenes. The New Chinese huìguǎn have followed virtually the same pattern as the established huìguǎn, so it should be interesting to know how the new elites are allocating their support. Somewhere, out of sight of the general public, the networks of the New Chinese elites have met the old boys’ network of Surinamese ethnopolitics, and choices have been made in the run-up to the 2010 general elections, either to bet on a particular political entity or to spread donations across the ethnopolitical spectrum. What makes the New Chinese elites interesting to Surinamese political parties is their apparent command of funds. The business empires of the New Chinese elites have expanded beyond trade and now include gold mining, logging and other interests, and are actively linking to transnational business and migration networks. They have achieved this in a shorter time span than the Old Chinese elites, and they are likewise looking to consolidate their inter- ests and expand their positions in Surinamese society.

Note that this is all about elite participation. Democratic participation of a Chi- nese ethnic segment as a group, however such a group would be defined, is never the issue. The Old Chinese elites based their legitimacy on the interests of their per- ceived constituency—chain migrants relying on the retail trade-based ethnic own- ership economy—and sought control of key positions in government, such as the Ministry of Trade and Industry. However, an ethnic Chinese share of political power in Surinamese ethnopolitics did not prove successful or sustainable, being primarily an elite project. In 2005 Chinese support of the Javanese-dominated Pertjajah Luhur party was rewarded with an ethnic Chinese (local-born Hakka) Minister of Trade and Industry, and an ethnic Chinese Member of the National Assembly (cf. Tjon Sie Fat 2009). Migrants’ interests were not protected, and Chinese representation on the whole was not taken seriously by Pertjajah Luhur, who traded the Ministry of Trade and Industry for a specially constructed ministry of land allocation. The coalition the Chinese elites supported lost the 2010 elections, and no ethnic Chi- nese acceptable to all Chinese groups gained public office, though those Chinese businessmen who backed the winning coalition that included the party of former military strongman Desi Bouterse appear to be benefiting economically.22 The PRC embassy regretted the lack of political representation of ethnic Chinese, as well as the fragmentation of Chinese organizations.23

22 Parbode, February 2012, ‘Chinese kartels betalen nauwelijks belasting’ (Chinese kartels hardly pay taxes); De Ware Tijd, 6 June 2011, ‘Is Sino-Forest een frauduleus bedrijf?’ (Is Sino-Forest a fraudulent company?). 23 Lang Chongxin, former second in command at the PRC embassy quoted in De West, 8 Octo- ber 2011, ‘Surinaamse Chinezen niet genoeg op politieke voorgrond’ (Surinamese Chinese not sufficiently in the political foreground).

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12.5 Conclusion

Whereas the ‘Old Chinese’—the Kejia-speakers from the Pearl River Delta—could be described in terms of ‘Overseas Chinese’ (华侨), the New Chinese initially seemed very different, being linguistically diverse, and apparently linked to Chi- nese globalization and Chinese resource extraction projects. However, New Chi- nese in Suriname have repeated the ‘Overseas Chinese’ settlement pattern of the established migrants. They have successfully created their own niche in the local Chinese ethnic ownership economy in competition with the established Chinese migrants, and they have set up their own Hometown Associations (同乡会) as a migrant adaptive strategy. Within the last 5 years elites have emerged within the Zhejiang, Fujian and Hainan Hometown Associations, and these are developing into platforms for New Chinese participation in Surinamese politics, almost exactly the path followed by the ‘Old Chinese’.

The point is that Chinese migrants in Suriname are elaborating on local patterns, no matter how closely bound they are to the Chinese ‘motherland’ through global- ization. These local patterns are pragmatic and therefore comparable to patterns of local positioning of ethnic Chinese elsewhere, while they are not determined by an essential, inherent or unique Chineseness. The distinction between New Chinese cohorts and the established ethnic Chinese is relevant to the way Surinamese ethnic discourse is developing, but is not exactly the same as a New Migrant (新 民) category. As yet there are not enough reasons to say that New Chinese Migrants in Suriname are ‘Completely Different Migrants’.

Analyses of ethnic Chinese groups overseas vary depending on one’s assump- tions about what ‘Chinese’ should be. If one disregards local, fluid distinctions be- tween migrants and local-born, ‘pure’ and ‘mixed’ Chinese, and various migrant cohorts, the result will obviously be monolithic, and equally obviously uninforma- tive. ‘New Chinese Migrants’ should not be taken as a category of analysis beyond the context of ethnicity, in line with what Rogers Brubaker argues.24

24 Brubaker (2004).

P. B. Tjon Sie Fat204

12 Old and New Chinese Organizations in Suriname 205

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versity of Minnesota Press. Bolt, P. J. (1996). Looking to the diaspora: The overseas Chinese and China’s economic develop-

ment, 1978–1994. Diaspora, 5(3), 467–496. Brubaker, R. (2004). Ethnicity without groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Chin-a-Woeng, C. M. (2008). Hak ka ts’u ten 客家 典 (‘Kejia dictionary’). Amstelveen: Benelux

Vereniging. Dobler, G. (2005). South-South business relations in practice: Chinese merchants in Oshikango,

Namibia, draft version, www.ids.ac.uk/UserFiles/File/globalisation_team/asian_driver_docs/ Dobler_Chinese.pdf.

Li, M. (1999). ‘We need two worlds’; Chinese immigrant associations in a western society, Am- sterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Li, A. (2000). 洲华侨华人史 (A history of overseas Chinese in Africa). Beijing: Overseas Chi- nese Publishing House.

Light, I., & Gold, S. J. (2000). Ethnic Economies. San Diego: Academic Press. Nieto, G. (2003). The Chinese in Spain. International Migration, 41(3), 215-237. Nyíri, P. (1999). New Chinese migrants in Europe; the case of the Chinese community in Hungary.

Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. Nyíri, P. (2001). Expatriating is patriotic? The discourse on ‘new migrants’ in the People’s Repub-

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Østbø, H., & Carling, J. (2005). On the edge of the Chinese diaspora: The surge of Baihuo business in an African city. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28(4), 639–662.

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Schalkwijk, A., & De Bruijne, A. (1997). Van Mon Plaisir tot Ephraïmszegen: welstand, etniciteit en woonpatronen in Paramaribo. (From Mon Plaisir to Ephraïmszegen: Well-being, Ethnicity, and Residence Patterns in Paramaribo). Amsterdam: Institute for Social Geography, Univer- sity of Amsterdam; Paramaribo: Leo Victor.

Schalkwijk, A., & De Bruijne, A. (1999). Van Mon Plaisir tot Ephraïmszegen: welstand, etniciteit en woonpatronen in Paramaribo. (From Mon Plaisir to Ephraïmszegen: Well-being, Ethnicity, and Residence Patterns in Paramaribo) (2nd revised ed.). Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Global Issues and Development Studies (AGIDS), University of Amsterdam; Paramaribo: Leo Victor.

SIC 220-2006/02. Verkeers- en vervoersstatistieken 1995–2004/Traffic and transport statistics 1995–2004. Paramaribo: Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek.

SIC 264-2009/11. Verkeers- en vervoersstatistieken 2000–2008/Traffic and transport statistics 1995–2004. Paramaribo: Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek.

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Thunø, M. (2001). Reaching out and incorporating Chinese overseas: The trans-territorial scope of the PRC by the end of the twentieth century. The China Quarterly, 168, 910–929.

Tjon Sie Fat P. B. (2009). Chinese new migrants in Suriname; the inevitability of ethnic perform- ing. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Tjon Sie Fat P. B. (2010). Old migrants, new immigration and anti-Chinese sentiments in Suri- name. In W. L. Lai & T. Chee Beng (Eds.), The Chinese in Latin America and the Caribbean (pp 185–210). Brill: Leiden.

Wang, G. (2000). The Chinese Overseas. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Wickberg, E. (1994). Overseas Chinese adaptive organizations, past and present. In S. Ronald

(Ed.), Reluctant exiles? Migration from Hong Kong and the new overseas Chinese (pp. 68–84). Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

Xiang, B. (2003). Emigration from China: A sending country perspective. International Migration, 41(3), 21–48.

Zhuang, G. (1997). 对 20年来华人国 民活动 几 思 (Some reflections on the activi- ties of Chinese international migrants in the last 20 years). 华侨华人历史 (Overseas Chi- nese History Studies), 2, 1–6.

Zijlmans, G. C., & Enser, H. A. (2002). De Chinezen in Suriname; Een geschiedenis van im- migratie en aanpassing 1853–2000 (The Chinese in Suriname; a history of immigration and adaptation 1853–2000). Barendrecht: Batavia Publishing.

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Chapter 13 A Biographical Study of Chinese Immigrants in Belgium: Strategies for Localisation

Li-Chuan LIU HUANG

J. Zhang, H. Duncan (eds.), Migration in China and Asia, International Perspectives on Migration 10, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8759-8_13, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2014

Liu Huang ( ) Department of Labour Relations, National Chung Cheng University, Minhsiung, Chiayi, Taiwan e-mail: [email protected], [email protected]

13.1 Introduction

The contemporary history of Chinese international migration can be traced back to the Sino-British Opium War (1840–1842), with China, as loser of the war, forced to export contract workers to support growing domestic economic development re- quested by Western colonial powers (Pieke 1998). Before the end of the Second World War, the Chinese population in Western Europe was not significant and in- cluded marine workers recruited from coastal provinces, street peddlers from rural Qingtian (in Zhejiang Province, China), and students. As the Second World War caused a serious shortage of manual labour, there were some 140,000 to 200,000 Chinese labourers recruited by the French government during wartime and around 3,000 of them stayed on through the renewal of their contract (Live 1998). Com- pared with other Western European countries, the Chinese population in Belgium turned out to be a negligible minority that was diversified in origin, mother tongue, social class, and political orientation.

An early student who settled in Brussels before the Second World War recalled that the main components of the Chinese population in Belgium comprised escapers from France, the Cantonese ship jumpers, Qingtian street vendors, and students1. After the Chinese civil war (1946–1949), the Chinese Communist Party established the People’s Republic of China and the defeated Nationalist government led by Chi- ang Kai-Shek was reinstated in Taiwan. Before China’s claim to release control of emigration in 1975, only Chinese immigrants from Taiwan and Hong Kong moved to Belgium for reasons of study, employment, or family reunions2.

1 Records of personal interviews with Mr. Huang in fieldwork conducted from 1996 to 1998. 2 However, some cases show that the mainlanders from Taiwan took advantage of acquired Bel- gian citizenship to help their families in China emigrate. Without a foreign connection, it was impossible for Chinese citizens to go abroad before 1975.

208 L.C. Liu Huang

After 1975, immigration to Belgium gradually increased, resulting in an esti- mated population of 20,000 to 30,000 residents characterised by a growing variety of sub-ethnic Chinese from Southeast Asian countries, Indo-Chinese as refugees in the late 1970s, and Chinese Mainlanders from the Northern regions. The Chi- nese differed in origin, educational background, mother tongue, and political ide- ology, although they tended to work in particular business sectors (i.e. catering, the wholesale and retail trade, construction, and personal services in most European countries; garment and leather workshops, particularly in France, Italy, and Spain) (Li 2003). However, what makes individuals and families leave their home and relocate to another country to find opportunity or settlement is a more vexing question.

In this paper, the various compositions of Chinese immigrants are described in order to address the historical and geographical complexities conditional to the de- velopment of biographical trajectories. Chinese immigrants are often perceived as a general and unified ethnic group, but the biographical narratives recounted below will show that ethnicity is more about a process of meaning-making over the course of a lifetime and less about collective origin.

13.2 Methodology

13.2.1 Rationale

The rationale behind the adoption of the biographical approach is twofold. Firstly, the literature of biographical study offers convincing arguments in tackling the constant dichotomy of culture/structure and agency/action (Archer 1995, 2003; Brettell 2002; Breckner 2002; Chamberlayne et al. 1999; Fischer-Rosenthal 2000). This approach acknowledges the agent’s reflexive and internal deliberations (in Ar- cher’s terms) as an interactive response within the social context constituted by cultural and structural properties. Secondly, the biographical approach enables so- cial researchers to explore the complexity and dynamics of lived experience which the target group (e.g. the immigrants) encountered in their new context (Breckner 2002a, b). A good example can be found in the Social Strategies in Risk Societ- ies (SOSTRIS) Project, a European Union–funded project aiming to explore the meaning of social exclusion in seven developed European societies through the investigation of six socially vulnerable groups (Chamberlayne et al. 1999). An im- portant aspect of this project is its explicit interest in placing emphasis on personal experience as the basis for the development of social policy. Advocates of this ap- proach argue that sound and effective social policy necessitates knowledge of the lifeworld of the target group through exploration of the subjective configuration of their biographical experiences. What must be taken into account, however, is not

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only the aggregated or typical findings from each life story but also the peculiarities of each individual life.

13.2.2 Biographical-Narrative Interpretive Method

The biographical approach adopted by the SOSTRIS Project found its method- ological origins in the German narrativists (i.e. Schutz, Rieman, Rosenthal, and Fisher-Rosenthal) and was then formulated as the Biographical-Narrative Interpre- tive Method (BNIM) by Tom Wengraf, who later became a member of the SOS- TRIS research team (Chamberlayne et al. 1997; Wengraf 2001). For the interview approach the BNIM researchers used ‘a set of non-interfering techniques’ (Thomp- son 2000) or ‘lightly structured depth interviews’, as described by Wengraf (2001, p. 111, cited in Firkin 2004), in the belief that a free and open narrative account without being interrupted by the interviewer ‘comes closest to the experience it- self’ (Thompson 2000). Accordingly, each interview started with a completely un- structured style accompanied by prior communication and an explanation of the research interest. When the interviewee offered his or her concluding remarks, the first stage of the interview was complete. Following the framed themes or stories in the first stage, more detailed and relevant questions were raised and more nar- ratives were developed. Independent of the previous two stages the interviewer would raise questions on underdeveloped themes and receive feedback from the interviewee.

My research started with field observations and participation in line with eth- nomethodological enquiry (Gubrium and Holstein 1997). I noted that it took time to gain the interviewees’ trust. Thus, my prior fieldwork was extremely helpful in the process of investigation and the subsequent inductive analysis. Without having invested time to establish a trusting relationship with the interviewees and cap- ture the contextual details of their lives, it is difficult to imagine acquiring ‘good’ biographies as the interviewer usually must first wade through issues of inner suf- fering experienced during the migratory process and of family shame.

13.2.3 The Analysis Phase

The BNIM analysis welcomes a panel-based discussion when a case has been sepa- rately analysed by a two-track lived history and told story in order to widen the scope of hypotheses for the sake of the multiple panel input (Wengraf 2001, 2006). As the analysis is assumed to be reconstructive, the hypotheses are generated from the interview transcripts without pre-set theoretical input. It is self-evident that the researcher will be equipped with certain theoretical knowledge before entering the

210 L.C. Liu Huang

field and with subjectively lived experiences as a field participant. However, work- ing mainly with the generated themes through the restructured data helps to explore plausible hypotheses with an understanding of the narrator’s reflexive disposition. Analytic induction may help the researcher to avoid theoretical judgment and ex- plore the peculiarities of each individual case (Breckner 2000).

Each interview undergoing BNIM analysis is separated into ‘lived history’ and ‘story told’. A lived history means the basic biographical information is reorgan- ised by the researcher with respect to the chronological order of the narrator’s life events. Then the whole text is studied in sequences and tagged with attributions of description, argumentation, narration, or evaluation, which is abbreviated as the DARNE typology (Wengraf 2001).

The hypotheses were developed with an ‘always looking for alternative’ strategy. That is, to examine the framed hypotheses, some fragments were analysed in great detail and the hypotheses and counterhypotheses were reviewed again (Wengraf 2001, 2006). After testing the hypotheses, the narrator’s life story was reconstructed in respect to his or her subjective order and interpretation. Data gleaned from the biographical analysis demonstrates how the interviewee structures his or her life in a certain way or activates the process of meaning making through free narration.

The importance and interest of a panel discussion in enriching hypothesis de- velopment is acknowledged. However, due to lack of time and limited personal facilities I was not able to organise a team to conduct a segment analysis without knowing an interviewee’s entire life story, as recommended by BNIM. Neverthe- less, it was found that previous field observations and participation were helpful in collecting supplementary data from the interviewee’s family members or close friends, and the use of constant cross-category comparison enabled me to enlarge the span of hypothesis building.

13.2.4 Comparison and Typology

Having analysed individual life stories as described above, some typical actions or common case features can be outlined and conceptualised as a type or pattern and the discussion of typology can be furthered. However, as previously noted, the Chinese immigrants had varying degrees of social embeddedness in the host society and developed different lived experiences, so I found that it was equally important to report the particularities of a singular case and its analysis as well as cross-case comparisons and thematic analyses. I will present an exemplary case in the fol- lowing section and then propose a thematic discussion. The strategic patterns as responses to the migratory process are discussed following a thematic presentation. My major concern in presenting individual cases is to enable the reader to become familiar with an ethnic group culturally unknown to the host society. It is my hope that presenting these biographies will raise the reader’s awareness of Chinese im- migrants’ lived experience.

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13.3 Case Presentation

13.3.1 Hua’s Lived Life

Hua was born in a Mainlander family (the Chinese mainlanders are people who mi- grated to Taiwan after the Chinese civil war) in 1947 in Taipei. As her father hailed from Qingtian, Zehjiang, she spoke the Qingtian language as her mother tongue and practised Mandarin in school.

Hua’s aunt preceded her in coming to Belgium in 1969 and later owned a res- taurant. Hua finished her high school education but failed to enter university. She married a Hong Kong–born countryman who was a university graduate and wanted to go abroad to earn his PhD degree. The original plan of studying abroad was to obtain a doctorate and to earn more money. She remembered that there were only 200 US$ in their pocket when they arrived in Zaventem. Like many Taiwanese students of the 1970s, they had to earn their livelihood and pay study fees with their own funds. Therefore, Hua’s husband took a waiter’s job in a Cantonese restaurant and she worked in her aunt’s restaurant as a kitchen helper.

Hua’s husband gave up his studies for financial reasons when Hua gave birth to their first son in 1975. Given the fact that they had to find another reason to stay in Belgium, the couple chose to get started in the Chinese catering sector, as many students did during that time.

When Chinese emigration was declared open from the late 1970s, Hua, as a restaurant owner of Qingtian origin, could not resist the requests from relatives in Qingtian who wanted to go abroad and needed her assistance in visa processing. Her husband’s family in Fujian made similar requests as well. When the immigra- tion policy of Belgium became stricter, Hua and her husband chose Austria as the next destination for business for the benefit of more relatives.

Hua’s husband left for Austria and started up a restaurant. Hua’s three young- er brothers also migrated to Austria with the couple’s help. The long separation harmed the conjugal relationship and the couple ended up divorcing due to the hus- band’s love affair with a Mainlander nurse. Hua continued managing the restaurant in Belgium and took care of their four sons while her husband settled permanently in Austria. Her long narration showed me how proud she was of her four sons with their high education and upward mobility.

Hua’s previous restaurant was located in a Dutch-speaking tourist city and the business was successful. Then she opened a fish shop that caused her to incur a significant financial loss because of a lack of professional know-how and trust from local clients. She made note of the obstacles faced by Chinese immigrants, who were stigmatised as restaurant people only.

At the time of the interview, Hua had sold her former restaurant and moved to a satellite city around Oostende where she served not only Chinese food but also cuisine that catered to the locals’ taste. She managed the restaurant together with her partner, a native Belgian named Eric.

212 L.C. Liu Huang

Hua described how she coped with the cultural differences of living with a Bel- gian partner. A mixed conjugal relationship forced them to seek common ground.

Hua was born in Taiwan but also considers herself a second-generation Chinese Mainlander. She was annoyed by the then-politicised debate on who was a ‘real’ Taiwanese provoked by Taiwanese politicians who supported a pro-Taiwan rather than a pro-China ideology3. The ideological battle split her Taiwanese ingroup and forced her to withdraw from Taiwanese organisations:

I consider myself Taiwanese as well as Qingtianian. But the Taiwanese will say that I am not Taiwanese because my parents came from Qingtian. As a descendant of Chinese Main- landers, I was sometimes confused and did not know where I belonged.

13.3.2 Analysis of Hua’s Life Story—A Life of Trilogy

Hua came to Belgium with her husband in the early 1970s, a decade when many Taiwanese students were eager to study abroad and earn foreign currency4. The couple’s dream was simple: to earn a PhD degree and go back to Taiwan for a better career. It is clear that the original plan for the couple was career-oriented and Hua played a traditional supportive role for her husband’s career advancement. Never- theless, her husband’s career path had to be curtailed because of increasing family demands.

The birth of a newborn forced the couple to alter course from an individual, career-oriented lifestyle to family survival and long-term settlement in Europe. In addition, the couple felt pressured by interpersonal competition to create wealth for their families. Thus, the couple opened a restaurant and invested all of their efforts into the betterment of their four children’s education in the hope that they would eventually realise their parents’ unfinished dream—to have a better career. Hua expressed great devotion to parenting and satisfaction with her sons’ educational achievements, as they are all university graduates: the elder a practising physician, the second working towards a PhD, the third a financial analyst, and the fourth an economist.

3 As the pro-independent Democratic People’s Party (DPP) won the presidential election in 2000, it was in a position to enable the re-orientation of overseas Chinese policies. Many pro-nationalist overseas Chinese organizations were not satisfied with the DPP’s political stand while the long exiled pro-independence overseas Taiwanese groups started to give support to the Overseas Com- patriot Affairs Committee (OCAC). The relations between OCAC and overseas Chinese and Tai- wanese residents were thus challenged by the controversy surrounding Taiwanese identity, low trust, and the restructuring of power among overseas Chinese and Taiwanese organizations. 4 There is an expression, ‘Come, Come, Come and Come to Tai Da (National Taiwan Univer- sity), Go, Go, Go and Go to America’, directed towards capable university students, in particular students from top Taiwanese universities. Western Europe certainly was another choice, but less interesting to Taiwanese students because of language proficiency.

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For Hua, the effort to develop a business was not only to benefit her core family but also her siblings in Taiwan and more distant relatives in Mainland China. Fol- lowing a co-ethnic occupational path, Hua quickly assimilated into the ingroup’s biographical trajectory and became successful in its niche economy. However, the family was torn apart by her husband’s love affair in Austria. It seems that the resul- tant divorce was the turning point in Hua’s life that forced her to acknowledge that her individuality and independent status differed from her past self-perception as a subordinate, traditional wife. Reflecting on her divorce with a positive attitude, Hua attributed her failed marriage to geographical and temporal factors. She assumed full responsibility for childrearing and kept the restaurant business in good shape, playing the double role of breadwinner and caring mother. Her maternal identity appeared to strengthen after the divorce.

Although Hua was considered a successful restaurateur by her peers and had been elected president of the Chinese Restaurateurs Association, she would rather identify herself as ‘a capable wife and a good mother’ with a connotation of a ste- reotypical maternal identity in a patriarchical society. Hua may be characterized as demonstrating a strategy of ingroup assimilation that enabled her to benefit from cultural connections and to successfully localise the second generation’s mobility. The driving force behind her entrepreneurship was family ideology and maternal love in particular, instead of a sense of feminist independence.

The failed experience investing in a fish shop exemplifies how Hua’s occupa- tional orientation was influenced by the self-learned experience of a stereotypical image. She attributed her failure to a lack of occupational know-how and rejection by local clients because of her ethnicity. Thus, it is important to note that Chinese immigrants’ vocations are not only a matter of business know-how, but also a reluc- tant acceptance spurred by a stereotyped occupational image.

Hua’s first biographical phase was that of a supportive housewife. Her subse- quent engagement in the restaurant business and in the role of an independent single parent enabled her to overcome the structural constraints of economic integration. However, Hua’s journey would not be complete if she had not been introduced to her current partner Eric, a native Dutch-speaking Belgian. She admitted that co- habitation was a process of mutual adjustment; it took some time for her to accept Eric’s belief in a work/life balance, which was contrary to the career-oriented life- style that most Chinese restaurateurs led. Hua’s integrative attitude towards her host culture was exemplified not only in the acceptance of a Belgian partner but also in her multicultural style of restaurant management. To satisfy local tastes more ef- fectively, she not only served Chinese food but also Belgian cuisine specifically for banquets and weddings. All of her efforts demonstrated sensitivity towards local values. Hua’s life could be viewed as a trilogy—coming to Europe as a traditional wife, building a career as a successful entrepreneur, blending her life into a multi- cultural environment—in an extensive process of localisation.

Notably, Hua’s inclusive attitude did not carry over to her son’s dating partner and mixed marriage. How should we interpret her double standard of accepting a foreign partner but rejecting her son’s native girlfriend? Hua’s attitude towards the

214 L.C. Liu Huang

host culture may be assumed to be inclusive or selective depending on whether the continuity of the Chinese identity would or would not be in danger. Her insistence in using Mandarin as the primary language with her siblings’ offspring seemed to ex- press a shared worry for the loss of cultural identity among the younger generation5. Speaking Chinese was a way to enable the offspring residing in foreign countries to communicate easily and to share a common family culture. Finding a spouse with a similar ethnic and cultural origin would be considered a way of assuring the cultural continuity of a transnational family group like Hua’s.

Hua’s story is not only inspiring because of her trilogy of personas but also in light of her interpretation of transitional ethnic identity. As a second-generation Qingtian immigrant from Taiwan, Hua identified herself as a Taiwan-born Chinese but felt marginalised when Taiwan’s political party claimed to be pro-independence and caused intragroup splits. In this case, her identity construction was limited to a position of independence (pro-Taiwan) or reunification (pro-China). However, the ongoing debate of Taiwan’s national identity has been politicised and stigmatised as a battle of Taiwanese versus non-Taiwanese (i.e. the pro-reunification party is simplified as Chinese or non-Taiwanese). Feeling hurt by this political labelling, Hua retreated from Taiwanese organisations and took part in a Mainlander-based Chinese women’s organisation and a Qingtianian organisation but remained wary of getting involved in sensitive political activities.

It is interesting to see how political orientation can be manipulated to impact the development of a national identity. Hua had a multicultural identity—she was not only a Taiwan-born Taiwanese but also a Chinese Mainlander because of her mother tongue—so she anticipated changes brought on by Taiwan’s next presidential elec- tion would allow her Chinese identity to be recognised. In other words, the sense of belonging is a matter of ongoing construction. Hua intended to make sense of her identity not only because of her collective origin but also in light of events that un- folded over time. Her self-defined identity appears to have been alternately ordered by the perception of meaningful events in her life.

Hua’s alternate ethnic identity suggests that identity construction is a learned experience from a biographical trajectory that can be destroyed and reformed depending on the subjective evaluation of contextual limits and cultural constraints. The politicised discourse that split the overseas Taiwanese caused harm to the inter- personal relationship between the informant and her identified group. It is clear to see how the development of a political discourse in the informant’s home country impacted the Taiwanese perception of ethnic identity in the country of reception. Ideological conflict between the Taiwanese and Chinese overseas is nothing new. However, the exclusive Taiwanese identity as a threat to the Taiwanese circle is

5 Hua’s family may be characterised as a transnational network: her parents and elder sister live in Taiwan, one brother lives in Vienna, and another brother and sister settled in the United States. To facilitate communication among intra-and intergenerational family members, Mandarin is ac- cepted by the parents as the primary domestic language by the parents.

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crucial as it forces the uprooted party to look for a sense of belonging from Taiwan’s counterpart at the cost of the ingroup’s disintegration.

13.4 Thematic Analysis—Chinese Restaurateurs and Their Lifeworld

This section discusses the findings and themes that emerged from the interview- ees’ life stories during the analysis. As my research interest centres on the topics of occupation, family relationships, and social identity, the salient points ex- tracted from the data under the above-mentioned framework may be summarised as follows.

13.4.1 Occupational World

Family Status Revised and Occupational Orientation

For many of the informants, the continuity and future development of family was their fundamental life goal and immigration was considered a practical strategy to improve the lives of successive generations. In addition, several informants who as students did not expect to stay permanently in the country of residence decided to change their plans after they experienced events such as marriage and childbirth. In other words, a significant change in family status seems to have provided motiva- tion to assimilate in order to assure their family’s future development.

Although family values were persistent among Chinese interviewees, the struc- tural effects of individualisation in the host society emerged in several cases. The literature asserts that the effects mentioned above would be more significant in the second generation born in the host country, as these children would likely be more acculturated (Massey 2005; Wong 1992). The Belgium-born subjects were not the focus of this research, but their experience would be an important topic for further research.

Whether or not the informants chose a lifelong or temporary occupation in the restaurant business, most demonstrated a clear desire to provide higher career- building mobility for their children. Although a few of the informants suffered from the precarious nature of the business, most endorsed the positive effects of continued family development and entrepreneurship in the process of localisation. Thus, the restaurant sector has been serving as an incubator for the continuity and development of Chinese families. Consequently, Chinese restaurateurs have used their accumulated resources to enable successive generations to have more diversi- fied career options and upward social mobility.

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Transcendent Thinking on ‘Downward’ Occupation

Some Chinese higher education graduates who invested in the restaurant sector were driven by family responsibility and some tended to transcend an occupational orientation to a level of collective interest. This was particularly true for Chinese intellectuals who failed to return to China for political reasons and thus transformed patriotic love into an effort to promote Chinese culture in their host country.

Assimilation of Biographical Trajectory

Family members and the extended-family network are still the main support for informants in the process of economic integration. For the early settlers from Hong Kong and later Qingtians, known as ‘Qiaohsiang (homeland for Chinese overseas)’, an established social network minimised the risk of emigration and facilitated eco- nomic integration by providing an immediate income and support system in the form of the catering business. The restaurants in Belgium act as incubators that enable families to acquire the necessary skills, knowledge, and capital for their businesses to survive. As intergenerational business experience is circulated, cre- ating wealth through the catering business has become a primary commitment in post-migration life. Thus, it is an effective conduit for localisation among co-ethnics that generates benefits from within.

Reciprocity in Family Project and Immigration

The literature asserts that immigration often entails family decision-making in- stead of individual action. My findings support the argument that immigrants usually engage in reciprocal communication with their homeland and country of residence. Immigration not only changes the prospective immigrant’s biographi- cal trajectory, but also that of his or her family. For example, starting a successful business may transform a housewife into an entrepreneur and force her grandpar- ents to assume care for their grandchild, which allows for the subsequent migra- tion of the immigrant’s siblings or other relatives. The engrained reciprocity in the migratory process explains the failure of one-direction immigration policies and also the need to develop multilateral cooperation between governments and citizens.

In addition, the life and work of a married couple may appear to be closely intertwined and hard to separate. As new opportunities and constraints emerge in post-migration life, women tend to play a substantial part in economic integration. Entrepreneurship opportunities for women appear to be legitimated in a society where the family system is more or less based on equality between men and women. However, the economic emancipation of women does not relieve them from family

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burdens, and in reality they must play multiple roles in both family care and busi- ness development. However, some women interviewees welcomed this challenge given such a dual role would be impossible in their homeland.

13.4.2 Family World

The Father-Son/Daughter Dyadic Family System in Transition

The traditional father-son dyadic relationship and family organisation is challenged in a society where equality of individuality and gender is valued and is based on a husband-wife dyadic system. It is not unusual for father-daughter conflicts to occur when both parties are struggling with a status change in the host society. In an extreme case, a daughter attempted suicide in response to her father’s forceful marriage proposition, revealing the naiveté of the young female immigrant and the lack of a supportive environment. Thus, humane and empathetic intervention by professional resources was found to be helpful for the daughter in this interviewee’s case. In this case, the informants relied on an informal family network, so their response to a family crisis was personal and individualised. There should be room for public institutions to create an environment that enables immigrant families to strengthen a supportive and multicultural neighbourhood via ingroup members or ethnic organisations.

Paradox in Immigration and Mobility of Second Generations

Education and knowledge are highly valued by Chinese parents regardless of their territorial identity and former educational background (Qingtian, Cantonese, Tai- wanese, etc.). The assimilated values of higher education ostensibly would produce more career options and opportunities for the second generation. However, the mul- tiple burdens faced by female migrants and familial struggles to overcome a stress- ful downgrading of business are lasting challenges for Chinese restaurateurs. Some couples questioned their emigration decision because of struggles with balancing childcare and business operations. Thus, transnational familial support emerged as an effective solution, with cross-generational childrearing becoming a typical ar- rangement for struggling young parents of Qingtian origin.

Restricted access to the mainstream labour market and oversaturation of a niche sector causes stress for many Chinese families. Although remigration and alterna- tive employment are a part of the solution, providing adequate vocational advice and developing individualised guidance programmes for Chinese restaurateurs who intend to switch occupations appears to be urgent work.

218 L.C. Liu Huang

Institutional Discrimination and Its Effects

Accused of membership in the Chinese mafia and embroiled in legal proceedings since 1995, Zan experienced suffering akin to that of chronic illness (Strauss and Corbin 1998; Strauss 1993). As chronic illness places a physical and mental burden on a patient’s family, similar symptoms emerged from Zan’s biography and his wife felt the related effects. Struck by the unfounded accusation as a family shame, Zan’s restaurant business deteriorated and the couple’s relationship became precarious after he became addicted to cigarettes and alcohol. Thus it is necessary to provide adequate background about immigrants’ culture and empathetic training practices for policemen, social inspectors, and fiscal controllers.

Attitude for ‘Foreign’ Marriage Mate

Ethnicity and cultural origin are still concerns in mate matching, but an attitude of tolerance is increasingly common in older generations. The process of selective acculturation reveals the persistence of Chinese culture when marriage is an issue. Moreover, the lively transnational networking between Chinese families facilitates the activities of mate matching of the same ethnicity for the sake of new communi- cation technology and transport facility.

13.4.3 Social Relational World

Chinese Community—An Ancient Power Game in Modern Times

Ingroup relationships are complicated and intertwined with emotions characterised by concepts of ‘renqing/人情 (favour)’, ‘mianzi/ 子 (face)’, and ‘guanxi/ 係 (personal relations)’, which the literature of psychological anthropology and social psychology have explored (Hsu 1985; Hwang 1987; Ho 1976, 2004; Chang 1994). As the rule of reciprocity applies in chain migration and overseas employment, the ingroup relationship between predecessors and newcomers may be interpreted as a patron-recipient relationship under the framework of favour and unfair employment from an outsider’s point of view. ‘Renqing (favour)’ can be artfully applied to the foundation and management of Chinese organisations, and indeed most Chinese organisations still function under the principles of ‘renqing’, ‘mianzi’, and ‘guanxi’. It is quite rare to find a Chinese organisation where modern management principles have been applied, as evidenced by ‘Chinatowns’ established by second genera- tion immigrants or professionals in the United States. Thus, it is crucial as well as extremely difficult to recruit young multicultural devotees who can identify immi- grants’ emerging needs for more effective localisation through modern governance.

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Chinese Immigrants—Vitality from Diversity

It is self-evident to recognise the supportive function that Chinese social groups and volunteer organisations offer their members and participants. However, a sense of belonging and spirit of collectivity cannot be devoid of cultural concerns such as kinship, territorial origin, mother tongue, political identity, and so on. Similarly, the structural barriers delimited by the sophisticated federal system of Belgium must also be acknowledged. Cross-organisational activity may be found during traditional festivals such as Chinese New Year or Mid-Autumn, or in political events to some extent mobilised by the Chinese government. Apart from these occasions, however, there is no regular cooperation among Chinese organisations, let alone the constitu- tion of a nationwide federation. Some Chinese leaders expect to see a unified Chinese community in Belgium, but the likelihood is this will never happen. Nevertheless, each Chinese organisation has its cultural affinity and particular interests. Indeed, the Chinese are never unified but clustered in a particular way and for unique reasons. It is crucial to increase mutual understanding among these groups and organisations, but it may be Platonic thinking to view the Chinese population in Belgium as a uni- fied group.

Pragmatic Realism in the Process of Localisation

The inclination towards acculturation is perceived as a contingent and practical strategy in the interest of upward mobility. However, many informants admitted the necessity of integration into the country of reception but felt compelled to convey Chinese culture and customs to younger generations. The Chinese language is not only valued out of concern for cultural continuity but also for its growing impor- tance in a globalised labour market. In other words, embedded Chinese culture and acculturated experiences of the host country are perceived as complementary parts in a pragmatic strategy geared towards better integration.

Multicultural Chinese—from Being to Becoming

Seeing Chinese immigrants as having a multicultural identity from the perspective of an individual’s biography suggests giving priority to subjective experiences de- veloped in various cultural localities. As discussed in Hua’s case (i.e. of an unwant- ed break from her self-identified group caused by the hostility between Chinese and Taiwanese groups), the proposed biographical approach would be of help to read ‘Chinese’ with wide and multiple references and enable a new dialogue between long-hostile parties.

220 L.C. Liu Huang

13.5 Strategies for Localisation—Typology

In this section, the localisation strategies among the interviewees are reported. As migrants’ life stories are always concerned with actions and reactions to structural constraints and temporal dis/continuity, their strategies are much about how they make sense of their present situation in light of family history and the socio-eco- nomic challenges of their host society. Note that the strategies were sorted out and generated at the time of the interviews. Some biographies indicate the transfer- ability or interruption of various types of strategies. Hence there is room for mobil- ity among the strategic orientation assumed by the interactive work of agency and structure (Archer 2003).

13.5.1 Ingroup Assimilation

This type of strategy was common for informants who demonstrated a strong con- nection to their past life and culture. Several informants took advantage of embed- ded social networks and expressed devotion to the betterment of their family and future generations. For them, immigration did not necessarily cause a break with the past, nor did it appear to be a turning point in their life. They assimilated into an oc- cupational milieu of senior fellows, seeking an economically independent trajectory that would benefit their core family and successive generations.

Chinese restaurateurs who used ingroup assimilation relied on social bonding with co-ethnics to maintain and develop a network of relationships. They tended to downplay the complexity of Chinese interpersonal relationships and complain about the social relational burden incurred by the Chinese community.

Parental immigrants expressed concern about their children’s upward mobility, but they were pragmatic about issues of localisation. Several informants originated from rural areas that did not offer opportunities for higher education, but these in- terviewees were aware of the limits of cultural capital. Although there are clear benefits to social bonding and cultural continuity, these informants believed that the second generation would deviate from the restaurateur’s trajectory in order to hon- our their parents’ wishes. Thus, ingroup assimilation appears to be a detour strategy for Chinese restaurateurs to generate resources for better localisation.

Some interviewees expressed a sense of isolation and worry about the increas- ing gap between themselves and the second generation. This was particularly true for retirees who lived on their own and lacked social outlets, as there is no Chinese organisation for the elderly other than in downtown Antwerp. A related worry was the possibility of needing care from a local institutional centre once they lost the capability to make a living. How to adapt to local dietary habits and establish per- sonal contacts within an institutional environment appear to be emerging fears for less acculturated immigrants of this type.

22113 A Biographical Study of Chinese Immigrants in Belgium

13.5.2 Endorsing Individuality

Informants who embraced individuality tended to be selective about establishing links with their past—several interviewees had an unpleasant past, and some sought to break completely with their past life. Cultural continuity and the family’s future development were not prior concerns for this group, obviously. Some kept their distance from Chinese social networks due to negative personal experiences and preferred to externalise links with autochthon people. They believed an individual’s efforts were central to career building (vs. family or relatives’ support). When work or business was identified as a primary concern, no resistance to acculturation was expressed. Accordingly, more efforts were made to assimilate to the host society instead of investing time within an ethnic group.

For this group, self-reliance appeared to be the strategy for localisation. Although several informants were capable restaurant owners, they were reluctant to seek out emotional support from co-ethnics or autochthon friends. As they placed emphasis upon life and economic achievements, there was more concern about structural con- straints and the development of occupational alternatives.

13.5.3 Multi-engagement

This type of informant appeared to be capable of connecting cultural and struc- tural resources in service of crossing cultural boundaries. They sought out cultural capital that enabled them to communicate with local people. They expressed an at- tachment to an inherited past and tended to see restaurant work as a way to glorify family and their ancestors. Regarding issues of social identity, they identified with Chinese ethnicity but demonstrated a sense of membership with the host society as well. This sense of citizenship enabled them to move beyond private concerns and devote themselves to collective Chinese affairs. Some of them did not have higher education but all exhibited good communication and leadership skills. Usu- ally the informants of this type overcame difficulties of economic integration and showed commitment to helping their fellow countrymen in an organised and col- lective way. Some people in this group viewed the restaurant business as not only a profit-making enterprise, but also as a way to demonstrate Chinese fine arts by means of Chinese cuisine.

Compared with ingroup assimilation informants, multi-engagement informants tended to incorporate their cultural continuity into concerns for local constraints and to safeguard the interest of their fellow Chinese. In contrast with those who endorsed individuality, multi-engagement informants shared a high degree of inter- est in career development and entrepreneurship but were willing to distribute part of their profits to support Chinese group affairs.

This group was highly involved with Chinese organisations, but were often critical of Chinese self-centredness and their indifference to community affairs.

222 L.C. Liu Huang

Some of them complained that the Chinese would spend money and time on gam- bling but not donate one penny for the common good. Moreover, with their ac- cumulated experiences in restaurant management, they tended to employ various kinds of capital to increase visibility among Chinese co-ethnics or even partici- pation in political affairs in the homeland. A good business profile would enable them to establish connections with local politicians and thus direct more attention to Chinese affairs.

13.5.4 Broken Biography

Some informants were not easily identified with any of the above-mentioned types. At the time of the interview, these informants appeared to be confined by both structural and cultural constraints that prevented certain actions. Some of their biographies may be classified as a sort of ruptured ingroup assimilation, as they demonstrated a strong attachment to cultural continuity and family bonding but felt vulnerable or helpless to develop a concrete plan of action. For example, Zan was a victim of institutional discrimination. He felt his family and life were gravely wounded after a large-scale investigation into whether he was involved with the Chinese mafia. Suffering from an unfounded accusation (and incurring a huge penalty for illegal employment since 1995), Zan’s restaurant business went into a downward spiral and he subsequently was excluded from the Chinese community. He was desperate to repair his marriage and questioned his decision to emigrate from China.

Differing from the deviant type of ingroup assimilation described above, Ping’s biography appears to be a fractured type of individuality endorsement. She strongly regretted having to quit her beloved profession as a dance teacher in Taiwan and felt overburdened by business start-up activities and the responsibilities of having to care for two children. She felt constrained by restaurant work and also wondered about her decision to leave her home country, as she and her husband failed to pro- vide a better environment for their children and were overwhelmed by the demands of running their business.

In the case of broken biographies, the narrators tended to evade challenges and assumed an apathetic attitude towards the future. Some informants obsessed over past misfortunes and were rendered indifferent to their present situation while others adopted a compromised attitude towards risk and felt unable to fulfil their dreams. In both cases, stress prevented informants from drawing a clear picture of their future, and therefore some external consultation or intervention seemed to be needed.

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13.6 Conclusion and Implications

13.6.1 The Sociological Contribution of a Biographical Approach to International Migration

As stated above, the aim of this research project was to investigate how an indi- vidual’s life story makes sense of the past and relates it to the present time. Each biography reflects not only the structural and cultural constraints the narrators encountered but also the possibilities and opportunities that were demonstrated through their projects and actions. In line with the agency’s theory, bridging the micro and macro dichotomy allows us to see how Chinese immigrants respond to structural constraints and transform life projects into practices for localisation. Thus, my findings support structure-oriented theories in the sense that individual actions are the response to and the source of the process of structuration. I argue that migration and settlement form the ‘playground’ of the ongoing interplay of structure and agency.

However, we cannot identify the effects of structural factors without looking at the micro level. Thus, a biographical analysis approach provides a platform for in- depth understanding of the transactions that occur within the phenomenon of inter- national migration. Alternatively, biography produces a meso-level solution to the patch-like theories that frame international migration. That is, it allows researchers and policymakers to avoid overlooking structural undertakings (the macro level) or individual experiences (the micro level), as remarked by Firkin (2004).

13.6.2 Empirical Contribution

Immigration is not an end, but a waypoint in an individual’s life project. Most the- ories see migration and settlement as dependent variables instead of intervening variables. Policymakers need to be aware of the significance of personal and fam- ily stories before considering prescriptions for immigrants, and it is comparably important to evaluate the complexity of immigrants’ life projects which shape their concerns about structural and cultural customs.

Bearing this in mind, it must be noted that categorising immigrants in terms of economic or political reasons, or classification strictly by nationality, can lead to misleading data. To some extent, these reductive categorisations may lead to missed opportunities for exploring the sources of enablement and empowerment that are frequently engrained in migrants’ individual biographies. A pre-set category may oblige immigrants to bear a given image and the related judgments and expectations that accompany it. For example, seeing immigrants simply in terms of economic

224 L.C. Liu Huang

motivation may lead to scapegoating for increased unemployment and unwelcome social burdens. Similarly, categorisation as a political refugee may stoke citizens’ view of refugees as a source of public disorder.

Chinese immigrants are assumed to be the least incorporated ethnic group as they appear to have less involvement with local communities.6 However, in Hua’s case I intended to demonstrate her identity transformation over various phases of her life and her efforts to become part of mainstream society. In other words, I note that social integration can be examined not only through an ethnic group’s pub- lic/collective participation but also by an examination of each individual’s identity transformation over different phases of life.5

13.6.3 Policy Implications

The patterned behaviour or types of actions for localisation presented earlier in this chapter provide a comprehensive picture of Chinese immigrants in the process of migration and settlement. The identification of strategic actions and in particular broken biographies provide insight into the dynamics that should be evaluated be- fore and during immigration policy discussions. Three strategies were identified. The Chinese subjects who pursued ingroup assimilation were apt to take supportive measures for family development and to foresee the specific needs of aged immi- grants within the local social care system. Informants who endorsed individuality were anxious to find work and business opportunities, but they may need more consultation about occupational orientation and guidance regarding alternative ca- reers. Informants who used a multi-engagement strategy may be the most effec- tive bridge-builders for localisation; their devotion to Chinese organisations and related affairs can lead to strengthened organisational management and information exchange. Thus, it is extremely important to create incentives and enable multi- engagement informants to participate more substantially in the process of policy- making and realisation.

Regarding informants who were identified as having broken biographies, the obstacles they are confronted with may require public resources to address their specific needs. A defeated biography, as seen in Zan’s case, may serve as a reminder of the lifelong suffering that the misuse of public order can produce. A failed suicide attempt demonstrates the vulnerability that some immigrant families have to endure when coping with societal change. Finally, the fractured biography of an exhausted interviewee who failed to balance career and family commitments indicates that more cross-departmental collaboration efforts are needed between families, labour market representatives, and immigration policymakers.

In light of the findings above, I suggest that policymakers prioritise two areas: (1) the implementation of an environment that is friendly to immigrant families, and

6 Interview with Ms. S, head of a government-sponsored institution for multicultural integration in 2005.

22513 A Biographical Study of Chinese Immigrants in Belgium

(2) enforcement of capacity building on behalf of Chinese organizations.A tangen- tial concern is the problem of aged ethnic Chinese who need institutional care and expressed concern about social isolation. Chinese organizations that target elders’ well-being should cooperate with local care centres to identify the needs of elderly people, in particular concerns about dietary habits and religious beliefs.

My preliminary research findings tend to support the need for more biographi- cal research work on international immigration. Such work will benefit not only researchers and historians concerned with what lessons migration experiences may teach, but also public servants and policymakers concerned with the public good.

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Chapter 14 New Chinese Immigrants to New Zealand: A PRC Dimension*

Phoebe H. Li

P. H. Li ( ) Tsinghua University, Beijing, China e-mail: [email protected]

In February 1986, China promulgated the Law on Control of the Entry and Exit of Cit- izens ( gongmin chu ru jing guanli fa 公民出入境 法), which may be perceived as a milestone marking a significant governmental reaction to the staggering increase in the number of Chinese citizens going abroad for personal reasons ( yin si chuguo 因 出国) (such as reunion with their overseas relatives or studying in foreign coun- tries) since the late 1970s. It can be argued that the momentous feature of the 1986 Law is its intent, as this was the first time that the Chinese government, under the CCP’s rule, had openly proclaimed the right of all Chinese citizens to leave and return to China. Prior to this 1986 Law, the most notable legislation concerning Chinese citi- zens travelling abroad was the Provisional Method for Control of the Entry and Exit of Overseas Chinese ( huaqiao chu ru guojing zan xing banfa 华侨出入国境暂 办法), which was introduced in 1951. As denoted by its title, this Provisional Method served the specific purpose of catering for the needs of a small number of Chinese nationals living overseas rather than those of the bulk of Chinese in the mainland.

Since 1986, the Chinese government has further removed its restrictions on Chi- nese citizens going overseas for personal reasons ( yin si chuguo 因 出国). Recent major policy changes include: (1) the implementation of the Provisional Method for Control of Citizens’ Self-funded Overseas Tours ( gongmin zifei chuguo lűyou guanli zan xing banfa 公民 出国旅 暂 办法) in 1997; (2) the exertion of the Regulation on Control of Intermediary Agencies for Self-funded Overseas Education ( zifei liuxue zhongjie fuwu guanli guiding 学中介服务 定) in 1999; and (3) the end of the requirement for a foreign invitation ( yaoqing han

J. Zhang, H. Duncan (eds.), Migration in China and Asia, International Perspectives on Migration 10, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8759-8_14, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2014

Some content of this chapter has appeared in Asian Culture, volume 34, 59–82 (2010), International Metropolis Project’s Feature of the Month in 2010, Huaqiao huaren lishi yanjiu 华侨华人历史 volume 93, 21–30 (March 2011), and A Virtual Chinatown: the Diasporic Mediasphere of Chinese Migrants in New Zealand. Brill: Leiden and Boston, 2013.

P. H. Li230

函) and a prior approval for departure ( chu jing ka 出境卡) in 2002. The above moves have together enormously reduced the barrier preventing Chinese citizens from leaving the country and have permitted the new wave of Chinese interna- tional migration. For instance, in 1997, the total number of Chinese citizens going overseas was 5.32 million;1 a decade later, in 2007, there were almost 80 million national border crossings by mainland Chinese.2 These Chinese nationals departed for most parts of the world and comprised a wide range of permanent migrants and temporary migrants such as international students, contract workers and tourists, of whom many were potential permanent migrants.

This chapter aims to present a profile of the PRC immigrants to New Zealand. The making of a specific PRC Chinese migrant community in the country is closely associated with major policy changes in China as noted above, and in New Zealand, a country beginning to abolish its race-based immigration policy in the late 1980s. The first part of this chapter uses New Zealand immigration and census data to de- pict two large influxes of PRC immigrants to New Zealand, during the mid-1990s and the early 2000s respectively. The second employs quantitative and qualitative data acquired from analysing the New Zealand Chinese-language media, which re- veals recent PRC migrants’ perceptions of New Zealand and their aspirations in the country.

14.1 Statistical Analysis of PRC Chinese Immigrants to New Zealand

As one of the well-established former British colonies, New Zealand, along with Canada and Australia, has traditionally been a major and desirable destination for immigrants from the United Kingdom. Brooking and Rabel (1995, p. 36) have summarised a history of New Zealand’s other immigrants and have presented a forthright description of the long-lasting outcome of immigration policy: “main- stream British New Zealand had difficulty coping with the challenge of diversity” and so “politicians, bureaucrats, and the public showed a preference for immigrants whom they thought would fit most easily into the ‘Britain of the South’. ‘God’s Own Country’ was only to be opened to the select white and preferably British few.”

A radical change began with the passage of the 1987 Immigration Act, which abolished the admission of immigrants based on their race (Department of Sta- tistics 1989, p. 202). The introduction of this Act took place within the specific historical context that New Zealand faced a diminishing economic and political alliance with Britain since the latter had joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. Given the loss of this guaranteed export market, it became critical

1 Data from the Official Report of China Tourism Industry for 1998, for more detail, see http:// www.lw23.com/paper_107769631_4. Accessed 19 April 2010. 2 Data from China’s Ministry of Public Security, for more details, see http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/ n84147/n84211/n84424/index.html. Accessed 15 December 2009.

14 New Chinese Immigrants to New Zealand: A PRC Dimension 231

for New Zealand to seek new opportunities in Asia, a region geographically closer and increasingly prosperous. Jim Bolger (1992, p. 20), then Prime Minister, openly admitted that from the perspective of the New Zealand government, a policy of facilitating immigration from Asia was the ideal mechanism to secure new trading partners, to stimulate the New Zealand economy, and thus best to serve the national interests. The late 1970s was also the period when major flows of young and better educated New Zealanders started emigrating to Australia (Hugo 2004). In short, a new policy with a focus on attracting talented immigrants or valuable human capi- tal to New Zealand from non-traditional source countries was an essential process of “replacement migration”. The resulting 1987 Immigration Act has facilitated a strong wave of immigration from Asia. Census data shows that the Asian population in New Zealand has experienced the fastest growth from 99,756 in 1991 to 372,895 in 2006, almost a 4-fold increase.3

In 1991, New Zealand followed in the steps of Canada and Australia and intro- duced the ‘Points System’, which most importantly brought in a new ‘general skills’ category of immigrants. Applicants in this category were approved for residency on the basis of their points awarded for key factors such as age, employability, qualifi- cations, work history and English skills. Such specific criteria were perceived as a great improvement over the general list of prioritised occupations as designated in the 1987 Immigration Act. Since then, the ‘Points System’ has been further modi- fied; a major change occurred in 2003, which focused on encouraging international students to transit from study to work and residence in New Zealand. Data from New Zealand Immigration shows that the ‘general skills’ category has been the main path for the PRC Chinese immigrants to New Zealand.

In New Zealand, there are two distinct Chinese communities. The old one start- ed in the 1860s with gold miners originally from Canton in southern China. They shared a lot in common with the early Chinese sojourners in the United States, Can- ada and Australia during the same period and were victims of a series of legislation against Chinese immigration (Ng 1993; Ip 1995; Murphy 2001). The new Chinese community by and large results from the 1987 Immigration Act and other succeed- ing policy changes. Most newcomers are urbanised professionals and affluent entre- preneurs with their families from East or Southeast Asia. To begin with, immigrants from Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and later Taiwan dominated this new Chi- nese community. However, following the Asian financial crisis in 1997, China has become the leading source of ethnic Chinese immigrants to New Zealand; over the past 10 years or so, China has been one of the top four countries for immigrants to New Zealand as depicted in Figure 14.1.

Figure 14.2 illustrates the composition of the Chinese population in New Zealand according to the 2006 census. It shows that PRC Chinese now comprise more than half of the New Zealand Chinese population, accounting for 3.4 % of the 4.4 mil- lion New Zealand population. Figure 14.3 depicts that within the PRC Chinese

3 New Zealand conducts its census every 5 years. This chapter was written largely based on the 2006 census data. The 2011 census was delayed until 2013 because of the devastating Canterbury Earthquake; its final result has not been released yet.

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Fig. 14.1  Top four source countries for residence approvals. (data from New Zealand Immigration Service)

Fig. 14.2  Composition of the New Zealand Chinese population. (data from Statistics New Zealand)

14 New Chinese Immigrants to New Zealand: A PRC Dimension 233

community, the first large influx of immigrants to New Zealand took place during the mid 1990s; most of these people arrived directly from China under the “general skills” category (Henderson 2003). Figure 14.3 also shows that there has been a sharp increase in PRC immigration to New Zealand since the early 2000s.

In comparison with the previous arrivals of the mid 1990s, the recent immi- grants from China are a very different cohort, including two major groups. One group comprises former Chinese international students in New Zealand. Unlike the United States, Canada and Australia, New Zealand did not experience a significant influx of post-Tiananmen mainland Chinese students-turned-immigrants (Zhou et al. 2006, p. 46; Gao 2006, p. 154), because the total number of Chinese students in New Zealand then was hardly noticeable (International Policy and Development Unit 2002). However, since China liberalised its international education market in 1999 as a result of the implementation of the Regulation on Control of Intermediary Agencies for Self-funded Overseas Education ( zifei liuxue zhongjie fuwu guanli guiding 学中介服务 定),4 New Zealand has quickly become one of

4 The Chinese government did not intervene in the international education market before this, and illegal operations and frauds were rampant. This new regulation ensures that only qualified and licensed intermediary agencies are eligible to provide consulting service to self-funded students studying overseas. Statistics from China’s Ministry of Education show that the total number of such students grew rapidly from 32,293 in 2000 to 128,700 in 2007, almost a four-fold increase. For more details, see http://www.moe.edu.cn. Accessed 21 January 2010.

Fig. 14.3  Two large influxes of PRC Chinese immigrants to New Zealand. (data from New Zea- land Immigration Service)

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the most attractive countries for Chinese students, and since then China has been the leading source country for international students to New Zealand. Figure 14.4 shows the top six source countries for international students to New Zealand between 1997 and 2007. In the financial year ending in 2002, more than 40,000 Chinese students were granted a permit to study in New Zealand. Although the number of Chinese students has decreased since, it still remains more than 20,000 each year. As noted earlier, since 2003, the New Zealand government has encouraged international stu- dents to become migrants once they complete their studies. Chinese students are the largest group benefiting from this policy change (Merwood 2007, p. 35). The other large group of recent immigrants are Chinese business people, who are the largest source of business migrants to New Zealand since 2000.5 The total number of PRC investors was particularly large; between 2000 and 2008, more than 63,000 Chi- nese nationals from the PRC were granted permanent residence; among them, 7,286 were investors out of the 9,672 business migrants. Figure 14.5 illustrates the chang- ing pattern of PRC business immigrants to New Zealand between 2000 and 2007.6 Since New Zealand, like the United States, Canada and Australia, also applies a principle of “centre of gravity” for family reunification, PRC migrants in skilled

5 In New Zealand, business residence covers six categories; statistics show that PRC business im- migrants primarily fell into the Investor Category and the Entrepreneur Category. 6 For more detail, see http://www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/general/generalinformation/statistics/. Accessed 16 December 2009.

Fig. 14.4  Top source countries for international students to New Zealand. (data from New Zealand Immigration Service)

14 New Chinese Immigrants to New Zealand: A PRC Dimension 235

and business streams have accordingly become a source of more immigrants from China; they have sponsored their spouses and young children, parents and siblings to immigrate to New Zealand in the family stream. According to the New Zealand Immigration Service, between 1997 and 2009 a total of 32,679 PRC nationals were granted permanent residence in the family stream,7 accounting for 39 % of all im- migrants from China to the country during the 12 years. Figure 14.6 is a summary of the data of PRC immigrants to New Zealand between 1997 and 2009.

According to the 2006 census, 70 % of PRC Chinese lived in Auckland, the larg- est urban area in New Zealand; the rest cluster in other large cities in the country such as Wellington, Christchurch and Hamilton. In fact, Auckland is not only at- tractive to these newcomers from China, but to all immigrants to New Zealand. The 2006 census also shows that almost 40 % of the Auckland population were immigrants (i.e. not born in New Zealand). After Toronto (with 44–45 % immigrant population), Auckland is among the cites with the largest proportion of migrants in the world (Spoonley 2009).

Within Auckland, there are no settlements equivalent to an actual Chinatown or an ‘ethnoburb’ (Li 1998, 2006), although many PRC migrants appear to clus- ter in certain suburbs with a relatively greater density of Asian immigrants. These suburbs range widely from upper and middle class to less affluent working-class

7 For more details, see http://www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/general/generalinformation/statistics/. Accessed 16 December 2009.

Fig. 14.5  PRC business migrants to New Zealand. (data from New Zealand Immigration Service)

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neighbourhoods. This indicates that these PRC immigrants are not homogeneous, but belong to various socioeconomic groups. It also reveals that the PRC Chinese migrants’ settlement experiences have been varied.

The earlier arrivals of the mid-1990s in fact encountered a very difficult time in finding suitable employment in New Zealand because their academic and profes- sional qualifications and work experience obtained in China were not well-recog- nised in New Zealand (Henderson op. cit.). Those who managed to find a job were predominantly holding unskilled and menial positions (Ho et al. 1999). There were also a small number of self-employed people, among whom a high percentage had no other employees (ibid., 281); the scale and profits of these people’s businesses were thus very limited. Among these skilled migrants, many returned to study either to improve their English or to pursue New Zealand qualifications (Henderson op. cit., p. 148). For some people, return to study may be simply a practical way of liv- ing, since the government provides generous student allowances, a source of stable income at least; among them, some later re-migrated to Australia after obtaining a New Zealand university degree and New Zealand citizenship,8 since they consid- ered that Australia could provide better opportunities for work and living. Birrell and Rapson (2001, p. 8) have found that 2,027 PRC-born New Zealand citizens, accounting for 10 % of the PRC Chinese migrants in New Zealand, re-migrated

8 During the 1990s when these PRC migrants arrived, it required a minimum 3-year of residence in New Zealand before citizenship could be applied for; the minimum length of residence was raised to 5 years in 2005. New Zealanders’ move to Australia is made easy by the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, which since 1973 has allowed Australian and New Zealand citizens to live and work in each other’s country without restrictions.

Fig. 14.6  Streams of PRC immigrants to New Zealand 1997-2009. (data from New Zealand Immigration Service)

14 New Chinese Immigrants to New Zealand: A PRC Dimension 237

to Australia between 1996 and 2000. When this author conducted field work in Auckland between 2005 and 2006, a number of informants mentioned that they had friends or family members who had moved to Australia. According to her study of the PRC immigrants of the mid 1990s, Ip (2006) also notes that some even left New Zealand and returned to China because of the homeland offering better op- portunities for social mobility, and more importantly, their difficulty adapting in the cultural milieu of New Zealand society.

Those recent arrivals are generally in a much better economic position. The busi- ness migrants are certainly affluent, and the bulk of skilled migrants have been granted residence largely because they have been employed in New Zealand. As mentioned earlier, the formation of this new group of skilled migrants is closely associated with the New Zealand government’s modification of the ‘Points System’ in 2003, which began to encourage international students to become migrants once they complete their studies. Under this policy change, many former PRC foreign-fee-paying stu- dents who stayed on to work and became permanent residents had already spent at least 3 to 4 years living in New Zealand. These students-turned-migrants are thus more competent in the English language and more easily adapt into New Zealand society compared to early skilled migrants, who by and large moved to New Zealand from China in one step. Many of these recent young skilled PRC migrants work in professional fields such as IT, accounting or bio-engineering. In addition, many of these former international students are from wealthy families in China. In many ways, the two groups of recent PRC arrivals are among the most immediate benefi- ciaries of China’s accelerated economic growth since the mid-1990s, following Deng Xiaoping’s influential southern tour in 1992, which led the Chinese government’s endorsement of the “socialist market economy” into a new era,9 and has generated a considerable number of newly emerged middle and upper class people in the country.

As the ‘new rich’ from China, the tens of thousands of recent PRC migrants in- cluding international students have had significant impacts on the Chinese commu- nity economy in New Zealand, which now appears prosperous. PRC Chinese-run businesses now range from small businesses like retail stores, restaurants and com- puter gaming rooms, etc., to sizable property development. Walking along commer- cial streets in certain suburbs in Auckland (such as Dominion Road, central parts of Pakuranga, Mt Albert and New Lynn) with a greater density of ethnic Chinese immigrants, Chinese tourists can see various businesses signs written in simplified Chinese characters, which signify that their ownership is presumably PRC Chinese, since most overseas Chinese including Hong Kong Chinese and Taiwanese use the traditional system of Chinese characters.

9 Subsequent to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, Deng Xiaoping lost his absolute power as official leader of the Chinese Communist Party and retired from office. However, in early 1992 he toured Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai and made influential speeches reasserting his agenda for the further reform of China’s economy. This was followed by China’s introduction of stock markets, the expansion of foreign investments, the privatisation of state enterprises, etc. Ever since, the ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ has become the new ideological engine driving the Chinese economy.

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14.2 Recent PRC Migrants in Diasporic Chinese Mediasphere

The booming Chinese community economy has also boosted the Chinese-language media in New Zealand including newspapers, radio, television and websites. All of these media are private commercial ventures and primarily rely on advertising revenues from Chinese businesses. The author spent more than 4 years studying these media in her PhD research, which was completed in 2009. This PhD research is a study of the social dynamics of the current Chinese migrant community in New Zealand through a critical analysis of the Chinese-language media that serves this community. The key research questions include the following:

1. To what extent is the Chinese migrant community reflected by the Chinese- language media?

2. What role do these media play in the process of Chinese migrants’ settlement and acculturation in the core society of New Zealand?

3. How do Chinese migrants perceive New Zealand and what kind of aspirations do Chinese migrants hold for their new lives in New Zealand?

The research was conducted through analysing the content of Chinese-language media (more than 40 issues of newspapers, nearly 200 hours of radio programmes including news reports and call-ins, and hundreds of news items and posts on the In- ternet) during the 2005 New Zealand general election, which lasted for 13 weeks.10 Additional qualitative data were acquired from Chinese audience and Chinese me- dia personnel subsequent to the election.

The findings of this research suggest that these Chinese media mainly serve the much less acculturated and newly-arrived PRC migrants and closely reflect the cur- rent development of this particular community, not only of these migrants’ settle- ment and their economic activities as depicted in advertisements, but also of their perceptions of New Zealand. These perceptions in turn point to these migrants’ aspi- rations for their new life in New Zealand. Despite their lack of experience of demo- cratic elections in China (O’Brien and Li 2000; Oi and Rozelle 2000; Shi 2000), many recent PRC migrants showed a strong interest in observing and participating

10 New Zealand runs its general election every 3 years. Once 18 years or older, a New Zealand citizen or permanent resident who has lived in the country for 1 year or more without leaving the country, is required by law to register on the Parliamentary Electoral Roll. Voting is not compul- sory. New Zealand has been applying an electoral system known as Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) since 1996. MMP was designed to enhance the political opportunities of small parties, giv- ing representation to all those crossing the threshold of 5 % of the overall vote or winning an elec- torate seat. With the party vote determining the overall distribution of seats, electorate MPs and list MPs (according to the rankings chosen by party hierarchy) together comprise the New Zealand Parliament. Larger parties that fail to win a majority of the seats in Parliament have to work with small parties, which may strongly influence the construction of the government. The period of the 2005 New Zealand general election was defined as starting from 25th July 2005, when the Prime Minister Helen Clark officially announced the date of this election, to 21st October 2005, shortly after the new coalition government was formed. This period was 13 weeks in total.

14 New Chinese Immigrants to New Zealand: A PRC Dimension 239

in New Zealand politics. They used ethnic Chinese media as an alternative public sphere (Habermas 1989) in contrast to New Zealand mainstream media to address and discuss certain issues that they were highly interested in and concerned with. During the 2005 election, fifteen Chinese media companies across New Zealand even organised a symposium together in Auckland, which spokesmen for eight ma- jor political parties were invited to attend and to answer questions from a Chinese audience on site; at the same time one Chinese radio station also took questions through call-ins from a wider audience.

Among many issues they discussed, two main themes can be identified clearly. One was about supporting ethnic Chinese politicians standing for two conservative parties, one of whom immigrated to New Zealand from China in the early 1990s. Many recent PRC migrants held a viewpoint such as, “Only people (candidates) who share the same background and experiences as us can understand our feel- ings, and will be able to speak on our behalf in Parliament” (26 August 2005, New Zealand Chinese Herald). Having realised that their favourite candidate would not be able to enter Parliament, some PRC migrants were greatly disappointed, but emphasised their achievement; for instance, one noted, “… we Chinese have been mobilised to participate in New Zealand politics; we therefore have our political influence on the mainstream society” (22 September 2005, New Zealand Chinese Herald). In fact, their votes significantly contributed to one small party’s return to Parliament, as the party leader admitted (Li 2009b, p. 178).

As they gave overwhelming support to conservative parties, the other theme was criticism of the centre-left Labour Party which was then in power. A large number of recent PRC migrants disapproved of the Labour government’s ‘high’ taxation policy and ‘massive expenditure’ on welfare such as state housing and other finan- cial support to low-income earners and beneficiaries. They considered that such expenditure was too generous and would impede New Zealand’s economic devel- opment, which they thought sluggish in comparison with China’s rapid growth. In response to their favorite candidate’s loss and Labour’s victory in this election, some recent PRC migrants even used call-ins on Chinese radio as a platform to deliver accusation against elderly Chinese migrants who received benefits; a pro- Labour Chinese radio programme host originally from Malaysia was under severe personal attack by some audience members and was even labelled as a traitor to ‘the Chinese community’.

Being from the newly emerged middle and upper classes in China, recent PRC migrants hold conservative views that should be also understood by reference to current China, a society in which uneven distribution of wealth and social inequali- ties are widespread. The Gini coefficient is commonly used as an indicator for measuring the overall degree of income inequality of a country. The danger line for the Gini coefficient as defined by the Chinese government is 40 (Shirk 2007, p. 31); China reached the ‘yellow light’ Gini level of 45 in 2003.11 Although the

11 http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jingji/1045/2095334.html. Accessed 26 October 2011.

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Chinese government has recently introduced a new social security system,12 receiv- ing benefits challenges China’s conventional value system, which always rewards hardworking people and condemns hangers-on. While a new social security system is in the making in China, those in severe poverty still suffer from institutionalised social discrimination and stigmatisation. Therefore, attaining social equality and justice through redistribution of social resources is still an alien ideology for recent PRC migrants. By contrast, within the developed world, the welfare state is an accepted mechanism to coordinate social integration and maintain political stabil- ity (Li et al. 2008, p. 10; also see Wilensky 1975; Pampel and Williamson 1988; Pierson 1991). New Zealand has been a well-established welfare state since the 1930s.13

Recent PRC migrants’ ideological distance from the core society of New Zea- land helps to explain their embrace of Chinese nationalism. A number of researchers have argued that the revival of this nationalism is closely associated with China’s fast economic growth in recent years (e.g. Fewsmith 2001; Gries 2004; Hughes 2006; Zweig 2002). During the 2005 election, Chinese nationalism among many recent PRC immigrants to New Zealand was clearly shown by their ill-feeling to- wards the Green Party14 as Labour’s close ally, and their enthusiastic celebration of China’s success in launching its second manned spacecraft. In their view, China’s current prosperity was the basis for funding such a costly and ambitious project, which marked their motherland’s leading role in advanced science and technology in the world.

Although this author did not conduct a specific study of recent PRC migrants’ political choices during the 2008 general election, their preference for conserva- tive parties was indicated by the results of two surveys by the New Zealand Chi- nese Herald and New Zealand Chinese Business Roundtable Council (NZCBR).15 In 2008, subsequent to the riot in Tibet in March, recent PRC migrants’ patriotic sentiment towards China was strongly reflected in their rallies (also joined by Chi- nese international students) in Auckland and Wellington to protest “reporting of untruths” about Tibet by New Zealand mainstream media in order to support the

12 At the end of 1997, the Chinese government introduced the Minimum Living Standard Allow- ance. Shortly afterwards, a new social security system aiming to cover a wider range of Chinese citizens was implemented under the management of the newly established Ministry of Labour and Social Security. However, branch offices of this ministry in all provinces across China were finally set up by the end of 1999. Hussain (2007, p. 112) comments that, “both rural and urban social se- curity systems are highly decentralised”. For instance, social insurance and pension schemes cover only 7 % of the total rural population in China (ibid.,110). 13 In New Zealand, the idea of government provision of social security can be traced back much earlier. The first Liberal government introduced the old age pensions in 1898. 14 Being centre-left, the Green Party believes in ‘post-materialist’ values and advocates liberal views such as the protection of women’s and minorities’ rights. The party often criticises China’s environmental damage caused by its rapid industralisation; it also openly expresses sympathy of both the exiled Tibetan government under the Dalai Lama and the recent East Turkestan indepen- dence movement in Xinjiang. 15 The New Zealand Chinese Business Roundtable Council (NZCBR) was founded in February 2008 by a group of recent business migrants from China.

14 New Chinese Immigrants to New Zealand: A PRC Dimension 241

Beijing Olympics;16 it was noticeable that rallies of this kind also took place in Brit- ain, France, the United States, Australia and many other countries during the same period (Li 2009a, pp. 200–204). Other than their Chinese nationalistic rallies, a large number of recent PRC migrants were also seen present in an anti-crime protest in South Auckland in July 2008, in which thousands of Asian immigrants partici- pated; it was one of the largest demonstrations in New Zealand in recent years.17

Overall, compared with the early arrivals of the mid 1990s, recent PRC migrants in New Zealand seem highly assertive and have demonstrated some clear signs of political mobilisation. Drawn from China’s ‘new rich’, these migrants and their political activities in New Zealand may be theoretically understood by reference to economic growth and social modernisation (e.g. Huntington 1991; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) that has emerged in China in recent years. There have been numerous protests by the middle-class in some large cit- ies (Shen 2008); for instance, Xiamen residents opposed building a chemical plant next to their neighbourhood in 2007,18 and Shanghai residents marched against the maglev railway in 2008.19 Nevertheless, their perceptions of disadvantaged social groups including low-income earners and beneficiaries suggest that these people’s understanding of western democracy, such as New Zealand, is biased because of their privileged social status in China, where the development of a civil society is still at a slow pace (Li, P., op. cit., p. 178). There is abundant evidence of this: redun- dant workers and vulnerable pensioners from former state-owned enterprises held frequent protests in urban China to fight for their rights; the Hukou system20 limits the right of rural Chinese citizens to live in cities; most migrant workers do not have contracts with their employers, and thus obtain no legal protection from work- place injuries, sickness leave and unpredictable redundancy, and of course receive

16 For more details, see http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id 1&objectid=10500330; http://www.nzherald.co.nz/olympic-games/news/article.cfm?c_id=502&objectid=10506170; http:// www.nzherald.co.nz/olympic-games/news/article.cfm?c_id=502&objectid=10506170. Accessed 19 February 2010. 17 The organisers claimed that 10,000 people participated in the protest; however, the New Zealand police estimated the figure to be around 3,000 according to the author’s interview. This protest happened shortly after several brutal homicides of Asian immigrants in south Auckland. People particpating in this protest had great concerns about New Zealand’s law and order, which they perceived tolerated criminals, but did not protect the interests of victims. They also considered themselves as the target of racism. For more details, see http://tvnz.co.nz/view/news_national_sto- ry_skin/1890726. Accessed 8 July 2008. 18 For more details, see http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200705/30/eng20070530_379187.html and http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/05/30/america/pollution.php. Accessed 1 March 2008. 19 For more details, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7188122.stm. Accessed 1 March 2008. 20 ‘Hukou’ is a record of household registration, which officially identifies a Chinese citizen as an urban or rural resident. China originally implemented the ‘Hukou’ system in the 1950s. Under this system, rural residents are strictly prohibited from living in cities without an official urban residency permit. They are not entitled to the same social welfare as urban residents. This system has institutionally differentiated the Chinese citizens into two worlds. Thanks to China’s economic boom, the system has been eroded since the 1980s, with the rural population increasingly leaving the land to find jobs and a better life in many large Chinese cities.

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no pensions (NBS 2005, cited in Hussain op.cit., p. 111). In constrast with their counterparts in China, citizens or long-term residents within a democratic welfare state have legally protected rights to participate in the processes of decision-making about balancing a society’s economic growth, political stability and social equality.

14.3 Concluding Remarks

In summary, the PRC immigrants to New Zealand, especially the recent arriv- als, show some distinct features of the new wave of international migration from China. While millions of individuals have left China to seek a better life in differ- ent parts of the world since the introduction of the ‘Open Door’ policy, the chang- ing social and political contexts in China may have significant impacts on these emigrants. With China’s rise as a new economic giant and the revival of Chinese nationalism, a consideration of ‘the China factor’ may be of particular importance in examining recent PRC immigrants’ perceptions of their host societies and their corresponding behaviours within those societies in both developing and developed worlds. Within such a context, the Chinese development model known as the Bei- jing Consensus (Ramo 2004) deserves some special attention when we examine the recent PRC migrants.

In the view of many critics, the Beijing Consensus asserts fundamental values of authoritarian political governance, but downplays Western notions of liberalisation and social justice. It is certainly beyond the scope of this book chapter to discuss how far recent PRC migrants’ perceptions of the welfare state are not exclusive to New Zealand. Nevertheless, it is arguable that findings about the recent PRC im- migrants to New Zealand may provide a reference point for examining recent PRC migrants in other countries, whether similar to or different from New Zealand. This suggests possible lines of investigation of the emerging PRC migrant communities across both the developing and developed world. In a world where, because of their inequalities in terms of civil, political and social rights and freedoms, nation-states occupy different tiers in the hierarchy (Castles 2005), findings about recent PRC immigrants to New Zealand may be a fresh ground for future comparative research.

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Part V Return Migration

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Chapter 15 Return Migration: New Characters and Theoretical Models

Ding Yueya

J. Zhang, H. Duncan (eds.), Migration in China and Asia, International Perspectives on Migration 10, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8759-8_15, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2014

D. Yueya ( ) National Academy of Education Administration, Beijing, China e-mail: [email protected]

15.1 Introduction

Today, transnational migration has become a major phenomenon of a globalized society. The development of communication and transportation technologies facili- tates the mobility of people across national boundaries. This transnational mobility includes not only migration from ‘sending’ countries to ‘receiving’ countries, but also the opposite, in return migration to countries of origin. The returning phenome- non exists as a popular movement between developed countries and their traditional labour resource countries, such as the United States and the Caribbean. Similarly, the return movement of migrants to some traditional ‘brain strain’ countries, such as India and China, has emerged in the past decade.

Since the late 1990s, return migration to China has developed into a “high tide” due to the booming economy of China (Sun et al. 2005). During the period from 1978 to 2007, for example, it has been reported that 320,000 people with overseas educational qualifications returned to mainland China from the country to which they had emigrated (Dong 2009). Shanghai alone, during the period from August 2003 to February 2007, successfully attracted 21,944 talents from overseas (Chen 2007). In Hong Kong, around 120,000 former emigrants have returned from all over the world since the 1980s. According to a survey of these returnees by the government of Hong Kong in 1999, approximately 35 % of them came from Canada, 24 % from Australia or New Zealand, 12 % from the United Kingdom, and 11 % from the United States (Ley and Kobayashi 2005). Most of them are described as highly-skilled and educated, as they are professionals or students who have experienced studying and/or working abroad (Wang 2007; DeVoretz et al. 2003). Thus, the option of returning now appears more attractive than ever before.

In the current context of increasing globalization, the mobility of people, es- pecially their return movement, is now receiving attention among migration

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researchers. However, return migration is not a new phenomenon, as it has existed since the emergence of emigration itself. In the context of increasing globalization, however, recent studies suggest that today, this phenomenon has developed new characteristics. The traditional idea, that return signals the close of a transnational migration, has now been questioned. Studies have confirmed that in the age of glo- balization, transnational migration is no longer a one-time movement or a single relocation event (King 2000). In contrast, return migration has become a central part of an ongoing migration circle (Ammassari and Black 2001). Thus, returning does not close the circle but provides the possibility of starting a new one. There is room for a future transnational journey. Moreover, in attempting to explain return migration, some traditional theories, such as the “disappointment theory” which treats return migration as a result of failure in the host society (Small 2005), now appear to oversimplify the transitional movement which is thought to be much more complicated and multifaceted. It has prompted researchers to seek a new perspec- tive with which to examine the ‘old’ transnational phenomenon.

The purpose of this article is (1) to examine the new characteristics of return migration and (2) to reflect on how some recent theoretical models pursue those characteristics. I begin with a definition of return migration, present some of its new characteristics in the age of globalization, and then review three theoretical models adopted in addressing this phenomenon. I conclude the article with a critical evalu- ation of the models and a discussion of their applications.

15.2 Defining Return Migration

In the early history of migration studies, different terms were used to describe the phenomenon of transnational return migration. These include reverse migration (Guzzetta 2004), circulation migration (Thomas-Hope 1985), and turnaround mi- gration (Adamchak 1987). In a review of the early literature, Gmelch (1980) also found other terms for return migration, such as reflux migration, repatriation, return flow, retro-migration, counter-stream migration, second-time migration, homeward migration, and so forth.

As a movement of migrants back to their home country after a period of living abroad, King (2000) has summed up different typologies that have developed in the history of migration studies. Return movement can therefore be categorized into three types, depending on the economic characteristics of the sending country and the receiving country: (1) return migration from developed country to develop- ing country; (2) from less-developed country to highly developed country; and (3) between countries that have a roughly equal level of economic development, such as western European countries and Canada. According to the length of stay in the home country of returnees, return migration can also be described as occasional return, seasonal return, temporary return, or permanent return.

The return migration typology developed by Cerase (1974) also maintains its academic values today. In his study of Italian migrants returning from the United

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States, Cerase categorized four types of return migration. (1) The “return from failure”, which takes place when migrants fail to adapt to the receiving society and choose to return home. (2) The “return of conversation”, where migrants always think about returning when they stay abroad. It is difficult for them to be- come acculturated to the host society, so once they accumulate enough resources they return. (3) The “return of innovation” means that even when migrants be- come acculturated to some degree to the host society, they finally return home. They do so, however, with new ideas, new values and aspirations. (4) The “return of retirement”, which refers to older persons who return to their homeland when they retire from work. Through the lens of Cerase’s typology, the majority of to- day’s highly-educated returnees could be categorized as either ‘return of innova- tion’ or ‘return of conversation’.

Today’s return migration, however, is a much more complicated phenomenon than in the past and it is seldom motivated by only one or two reasons. Dustmann and Weiss (2007), for example, describe return migration as a situation where mi- grants return to their country of origin by choice. It may be the result of a micro decision-making process by individual migrants and their families with quite dif- ferent sets of motives, depending upon attributes such as age, sex, ethnicity, marital status, and their satisfaction level with their socio-economic status in the host soci- ety (Constant and Massey 2002; King 2000; Waldorf 1995). At the same time, other studies have pointed out that returning could also be influenced by macro-scale economic or political events, such as preferential government policies for attracting returnees to Asian countries (Ley and Kobayashi 2005; Hugo 2003; Luo et al. 2002; Tsay 2002). Furthermore, King (2000) has argued that every migrant return is due to a combination of reasons rather than merely one. He has identified four broad categories of return: social, economic, political, and family.

It would appear then, that return migration is a highly individualized and mul- tifaceted phenomenon, one that is also embedded in a macro social context. It is important, therefore, to explore the following questions: How are migrants’ return decisions influenced by their personal characteristics and situations? To what extent does the macro social environment of the sending and receiving countries shape this return decision? And importantly, what is the role of agency in the overall decision making process?

15.3 Return Migration in the Age of Globalization

Return migration is not a new phenomenon, but increasing globalization has en- dowed the old phenomenon with new characteristics.

Today, the development of modern communication and transportation technolo- gies allows people to experience life in more than one place (Portes et al. 1999). This makes geographical distance lose their original context in terms of transnational migrants. Even the traditional definition of spatial distance has now been changed from a geographic to a cultural distance, which is determined by an individual’s

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psychological and emotional feeling towards the space, by the density of his/her so- cial network across continents and the degree of cultural commonality perceived by the immigrant himself/herself (Ding 2012). The deterritorialization of transnational discourse provides new perspectives with which to examine transnational migrants and their lives (Wong and Satzewich 2006). A transnational network and its associ- ated practices provide channels for migrants’ economic, political, and socio-cultural connection with their homeland and this makes a return more possible, and more available, than before (Portes et al. 1999). A transnational social field is thus con- structed by a migrant’s everyday life, which combines the ‘here’ and ‘there’ and ‘absence and presence’ across ever-widening distances and spaces (Yeoh et al. 2003; Smith 2001).

Traditional ‘push and pull’ theory explains that unfavourable economic condi- tions in the receiving country, and favourable economic conditions in the country of origin, could be separately viewed as push and pull factors to induce migrants to return. However, some recent studies also point out that single economic factors would not completely explain the reason for returning. It is a combination of both economic and social factors that influence the decision to return (Guo and DeVoretz 2006; Constant and Massey 2002). Migration is thus a rational choice based on the individual immigrant’s self-evaluation of both economic and social benefits over the migration cycle (Dustmann and Weiss 2007; DeVoretz and Zhang 2004). In- deed, some scholars have considered non-economic effects as more important than economic effects (King 2000). For example, one study on migrants who returned from Britain to Ireland found that one reason for their return was to enjoy a particu- lar lifestyle in a rural, safe, and pre-modern social environment in Ireland, instead of the urban modernity they experienced elsewhere (Nı´ Laoire 2007).

Politics, both in the host country and country of origin, has also been considered as a significant factor that could effect the returnee’s decision. Some new political efforts by developing countries have thus attracted researchers’ attention. In order to benefit from a global talent competition, countries in Asia, such as Korea, China, Indian, Iran, Malaysia, and Turkey, have launched various policies and programs to attract their highly-skilled and educated people to return during the past decades. For example, since the late 1990s, China has implemented several preferential poli- cies in order to encourage overseas-trained Chinese students and scholars to return, in order to promote human resource development (Wang 2007). These policies in- clude setting up hi-tech business incubators for overseas returnees in big cities, simplifying application and registration procedures for them to start up endeavours, providing venture funds or research funds, etc. (Dong 2009).

The effects of Chinese governments’ political efforts to encourage return migra- tion are obvious. It is reported that in 2005, the government of Shanghai’s goal was to recruit 10,000 high-level overseas talents in 2 years. In fact, it only took 1 year and 3 months to achieve this goal, and there are now about 22 overseas returnees arriving in Shanghai everyday (Yang 2007). In one of his studies of return migration in Asia, Hugo (2003) stated that the role of government in encouraging the Diaspora to return to the home country is “one of facilitation and removal of obstacles to return rather than one of major interventions” (p. 33).

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Today, globalization also makes the transformation of human capital among dif- ferent regions available, and this makes return migration a feasible and profitable action. DeVoretz and Ma (2002) confirm that on an individual level, the accumula- tion and transferability of human capital exerts an important power in driving im- migrants to move again. They believe that remigration, either in moving back to the homeland, or to other countries, is a useful strategy that results from human capital accumulation and exchange across a spatial dimension. The accumulation of hu- man capital in the host country is often a ‘learning by doing’ process which would improve the migrant’s earning potential back home. After years of living overseas, the accumulation of transnational capital and its transferability in the global context make remigration or returning home a value-added path to achieve self-actualiza- tion. In their study of return migration from Britain, Dustmann and Weiss (2007) pointed out that if the accumulated human capital could attract higher returns at home, then this alone would possibly trigger a return migration. Their data analysis showed that this return is more common among highly skilled immigrants than among the low skilled. More educated individuals tend to return relatively early. In the context of globalization, therefore, return, to some degree, is not only a go-home movement, but also a strategy of transnational capital transformation.

A review of the literature showed that individual returnees, local people, and home societies, could all benefit from transnational capital transformation. Some recent studies report a positive outcome from the transformation of the returnees’ financial and human capital (Williams and Baláž 2005; Lowell and Findlay 2002). Post return, this capital transformation is helpful in the individual migrant’s re-inte- gration into their homeland (Nı´ Laoire 2007; Labrianidis and Kazazi 2006; Small 2005). Labrianidis and Kazazi (2006) also claim that about one-third of respondents reported that they had attempted to establish a business, even before returning. After return, 67.1 % of men and 25.8 % of women reported that they became employers. The longer migrants stay abroad, the more likely they become business owners. As already mentioned, some immigrant export countries are now active in facilitating returnees’ capital transformation by enacting supportive and preferential govern- mental policies (Li and Xiao 2008; Yang 2007).

In a global era, another new characteristic of return migration is the construction of transnational networks due to advances in telecommunication and transportation technology. Today, migrants are able to sustain transnational networks with their family, friends, and communities in many kinds of ways without the limitations of space and distance. Keeping a close connection with people in the homeland is no longer difficult. Studies have found that the more migrants engage in maintaining transnational social networks, the more they have the freedom of choice to return or to move back and forth (Ammassari and Black 2001). In Ireland, New Zealand, the Caribbean countries, and West Africa, researchers indicated that family reasons or family ties are the key factors in the migrants’ decision to return (Nı´ Laoire 2007; Condon 2005; Tiemoko 2003; Lidgard and Gilson 2002).

Furthermore, the transnational networks maintained by returnees post-return also help the local society gain useful information and resources. These include business and investment opportunities, transnational cooperation in manufacture, exchanges

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in technology, and so forth (Patterson 2005; Hugo 2003). Some immigrant supply countries, such as India and China, now regard the transnational networks sustained by returnees as a valuable resource when participating in global technology com- petition. For example, central and local Chinese governments have set up various hi-tech business incubators in big cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen (Wang 2007). By way of special policies for attracting overseas talents, returnees enjoy simplified application and registration procedures for start up enterprises, venture capital or research funding, tax breaks, low interest loans, tax free equip- ment and so on. They are encouraged to create high-tech enterprises and conduct transnational cooperation.

To sum up, in today’s age of globalization, the transnational return movement of migrants has many new characteristics. These characteristics having been discussed above, it is now necessary to apply some new theoretical perspectives to illustrate the ‘old’ transnational phenomenon.

15.4 Three Theoretical Modes on Return Migration Research

Based on a literature review, there are three theoretical models that have been used by researchers in analyzing return migration in recent years. They are the Triangular Model, the Brain Circulation model, and the Transnationalism model. I now discuss each of these models in turn.

15.4.1 The Triangular Model

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, DeVoretz and his colleagues construct- ed a triangular model to explain the movement of transnational migration (DeVoretz and Zhang 2004; DeVoretz and Ma 2002). They avoid the traditional standard bilat- eral analysis of migration movement and argue that transnational migration is a part of a general global system. They argue that it transfers human capital from sending countries such as India and China to entrepôt regions, such as Canada and Europe, and then on to the rest of the world, such as the USA. Here, the entrepôt country is defined as an intermediate destination country which can provide subsidized ben- efits, such as training and education, to new arrivals. In the triangular model, the origin country, the entrepôt country and the rest of the world (ROW) are the three bases of the triangle among which migrants move.

The triangular model, as a new research study in immigrant movement, pre- dicts a complex movement pattern of migrants across countries (Guo and DeVoretz 2006). Usually, migrants have the choice to move or to stay, or move back and forth. However, their decisions during different stages of their migrant life are different due to the capital they have acquired and the potential return of the capital they may

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acquire in different countries. Thus, ‘move or stay’ is a joint investment decision that involves a trilateral movement: the first investment takes place before emigra- tion, as the person acquires human capital in his place of origin; the second invest- ment occurs at the entrepôt country by gaining complementary human capital; and then the migrants’ remigration decision depends on their evaluation of the potential returns on their prior investments that they may obtain through further migration. Therefore, the migrant’s triangular movement is a strategic investment behaviour based on a rational evaluation of the benefits of migration.

When DeVoretz and his colleagues focused their analyses on the individual im- migrant, they used the “individual immigrant decision tree” to present a nested four- stage choice framework for each immigrant. It is also called a “four-stage nested stayer–mover model” (DeVoretz and Zhang 2004). The “individual immigrant de- cision tree” assumes that in different stages of immigrant life, the motivations af- fecting the migrant’s decision to leave or to stay are different. Agents, both in the sending and the receiving societies, were used as examples to illustrate how the migrant’s decision to move was influenced by various factors in the different stages of their migrant lives (DeVoretz and Ma 2002). Thus, in the sending country, the government, its tax policy, services and benefits for emigrants, any limitation of mobility, and also the number of emigrants etc., are analyzed as the main factors influencing the decision to emigrate. In turn, in a more positive manner, the govern- ment can induce the immigrant to return with promises of enhanced employment and social conditions.

In an entrepôt country, the settlement programs available will influence the im- migrant’s decision to stay or leave. Settlement programs offer subsidized general human capital training (e.g. language, knowledge of labour market channels, cultur- al conventions) and specific human capital (e.g. programming skills, retraining for certification, and access to modern technology) with the intention of helping immi- grants to stay. However, the decision of the highly-skilled to stay or not, ultimately depends on potential returns from their newly acquired human capital in different countries. So, settlement programs can either increase or decrease the probability of leaving. Other factors in an entrepôt country, such as citizenship—the main public good which offers free-rider benefits—can also induce the immigrant to stay or to leave. At the same time, reward structures in the ROW, such as lower taxes, higher income, more job opportunities, or large ethnic populations, would also drive immi- grants to move. In this nested model, DeVoretz and his colleagues thus combine the individual immigrant decision tree, and the triangular movement model, to explore the complicated decision making process of migrants.

15.4.2 Brain Circulation

Since the 1950s, the term ‘brain drain’ has been popularized with the flow of im- migration from less developed countries to the United States. ‘Brain drain’ refers to the international migration movement of an educated and skilled labour force from

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less-developed to more-developed countries. This results in the sending countries, who have invested in their citizens’ education and human capital, losing the ben- efits of their investment. Conversely, the receiving country’s gain could be termed ‘brain gain’. The brain drain phenomenon is important, as it is indicative of the global inequality between developing and developed countries. While this issue was heatedly discussed in the early 1970s, it has now been revived in the context of a new global economy, and a new term, “brain circulation”, is now used to describe the phenomenon of migration. In his study of the international mobility of highly skilled professionals (HSP), Cao (1996) confirmed that in the context of globaliza- tion, talent mobility could be viewed as “brain circulation” rather than “brain drain”.

Brain circulation means the mobility of HSP who have marketable expertise and interna- tional experience and who tend to migrate for the short term or make temporary business visits in a country (or countries) where their skills are needed….When the equilibrium between market incentives and personal expectations is reached, an actual instance of ‘cir- culation’ takes place (p. 275).

Lowell and Findlay (2002) regard brain circulation as a way of human capital en- hancement via (temporary) mobility which, implicitly, is used more effectively upon return. DeVoretz and Zhang (2004) describe brain circulation as a process of human capital accumulation and exchange across a spatial dimension. Patterson (2005) views brain drain as the one-way flow of talent from southern countries to the West, but the concept of brain circulation builds a two-way bridge between the South and the West. All of these definitions give prominence to the flow of human capital as the core of brain circulation.

In his literature review, Cao (1996) found that according to the brain drain theo- ry, sending countries permanently lose their talents. Studies carried out over the last decade, however, show that it is now rare for skilled migrants to settle permanently, as happens in a brain drain. Instead, migrants tend to work for a 2 or 3 year pe- riod in one place before moving elsewhere or returning to their countries of origin. Therefore, as a newly developing theoretical framework for modeling the practices of transnational migration, brain circulation, rather than brain drain, is necessary to re-examine the new phenomenon. Cao also provides the following comparison of the characteristics of brain circulation versus brain drain (Table 15.1):

There are different types of brain circulation. The emigrant population may re- turn to their homeland with financial, human, or organizational capital investment (Hewitt 2006). However, for such investment, it is not necessary for the emigrants

Table 15.1  Comparison of ‘Brain Circulation’ versus ‘Brain Drain’ (Cao 1996, p. 18) Brain Drain Brain Circulation

Global human resource Divided Integrated Controlling agency Government Organisation(s) System of mobility Closed Open Policy goal Controlling people Optimising tasks Policy focus Blocking outflow Home environment Direction of movement One-way Multiple directions Duration Permanent Short-term

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to physically return to their homeland. In other words, they can participate in brain circulation by engaging in transnational business with their homeland, sharing in- formation and technology, or by acting as a cultural and communication bridge, all without returning to the homeland (Patterson 2006; Patterson 2005; Wong 2004). However, returning migrants, who participate directly in the brain circulation of their sending counties, will be a particularly significant part of this movement.

In order to encourage and employ brain circulation effectively, a set of purpose- ful policies and investments by a developing nation is necessary in order to increase and enhance the development of its migrant communities in receiving countries. Those policies and projects should also provide channels to enable their emigrants to invest financial, human, and social capital back into their homeland. Patterson (2005) stated that both the “avoidance-of-the-negative approach” and “the pursuit- of-the-positive approach” can be useful in facilitating brain circulation (p. 86).

More and more researchers agree that today’s migration, which includes those who are skilled and unskilled, does not end with a permanent loss of human capital for the sending countries. The brain circulation model suggests that if the send- ing countries build a feasible environment and provide a positive policy to attract their emigrated labour forces, they may benefit from return migration and avoid the frustration of brain drain (Cao 1996). In fact, some countries and regions, such as India, mainland China, Taiwan, South Korea, Mexico, and Africa, have actively adopted positive policies and projects to induce their outflow human capital home (Patterson 2005).

15.4.3 Transnationalism

Since the early 1990s, transnationalism has become one of the mainstream agendas of international migration study, and it has proceeded rapidly since the turn of the new century.

What is transnationalism? Vertovec (1999) has stated that transnationalism “broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states” (p. 447). Upon review of the related literature, it ap- pears that there are quite diverse issues found under the umbrella of transnational- ism. However, it is not necessary to exaggerate transnationalism in order for it to be a pervasive phenomenon in contemporary immigrant communities. The phe- nomenon of transnationalism is the kind of practice that requires regular and sus- tained transnational social contacts over time. They may include a high intensity of exchanges, new modes of transacting, and a multiplication of activities that require continual cross-border travel and contacts (Portes et al. 1999). In other words, it is the scale of intensity and simultaneity of current transnational activities that consti- tutes the essential distinctiveness of transnationalism.

Various practices of transnationalism are usually categorized as political, economic, and socio-cultural activities. At the same time, they can be marked off by different levels: individuals, communities, local and national governments and

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multinational corporations (Portes et al. 1999). Among the three types of transna- tionalism socio-cultural transnationalism is more affective-oriented and less instru- mental than political or economic transnationalism (Al-Ali et al. 2001), but they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Many migrants can participate in all aspects. However, the motives for participating in these different fields are likely to vary, as are the extent and strength of participation. Furthermore, informal, rather than formal, transnationalism provides greater flexibility for migrants, and they engage in it more frequently (Levitt et al. 2003).

The transnational activities that are conducted by common people can also be described as transnationalism “from below”, and those conducted by governments and multinational corporations as transnationalism “from above” (Guarnizo 1997). Keck and Sikkink (1998) have further suggested that the transnational activities of grassroots nongovernmental associations, activists for human rights, the environ- ment, and so on, are also a significant part of transnationalism “from below”. Ac- cording to Wong and Satzewich (2006), because ambiguity always exists, a dichoto- mous distinction of transnationalism between practices from above, and practices from below, may be problematic.

As for the intensity of their involvement in transnational activities, people may immerse themselves in transnational activities or be touched by them only occa- sionally. Thus, concepts of “narrow transnationalism” and “broad transnationalism” are used to differentiate the intensity of people’s participation in transnational ac- tivities (Itzigsohn et al. 1999). Narrow transnationalism refers to institutionalized and continuous participation in transnational activities and broad transnationalism refers to only occasional participation. Based on a quantitative study that focused on the socio-cultural aspects of transnationalism with regard to Dominican, Co- lombian, and Salvadoran immigrants, Al-Ali et al. (2001), found that the research subjects’ participation in broad transnationalism was much higher than in narrow transnationalism.

As for the emergent forms of transnationalism practice, Al-Ali et al. (2001) iden- tified three types in their study. (1) The practices of immigrants as they rebuild their social relations and ways of life from the sending country, such as sending remit- tances, traveling home, and building ethnic institutions in the receiving country, are called “linear transnationalism”. (2) Transnationalism which emerges only when immigrants accumulate enough resources to engage in transnational economic and political activities in the sending society is called “resource dependent transnation- alism”. (3) As immigrants also engage in transnational practices when they experi- ence discrimination or are negatively perceived by the receiving society, this form of transnationalism is called “reactive transnationalism”.

Besides the various transnational activities discussed above as the essential com- ponents transnationalism, two key concepts have also emerged in transnationalism that are relevant in the context of return migration. These concepts are transna- tionalism as social space, and transnationalism as transnational identity. Wong and Satzewich (2006) point out that conceiving of transnationalism as social space has been contributed by geographers, who focus on the influences of time and space on transnational activities. When transnationalism practices cross boundaries,

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geographical edges have less connection with the fixed materialized borders among nations. A new social space is constructed which is not necessarily grounded in particular places at particular times, but brings various boundaries together into a single social field (Yeoh et al. 2003; Faist 2000; Glick-Schiller et al. 1995). Faist (2000) further clarifies transnational social space as “a combination of ties, po- sitions in networks and organizations, and networks of organizations that stretch across the borders of multiple states” (p. 191). Together, these aspects indicate a dynamic social process rather than a static notion of ties and positions.

Transnationalism as social space is a useful framework in describing how trans- national social networks and social capital influence the migration process and migrant adaptation (Brittain 2009; Wiles 2008; Wong 2004). Particularly, given advances in telecommunication technology, transnational networks can be success- fully and easily sustained without the limitations of space and distance. One func- tion of the transnational social space is to sustain the migrants’ feelings of loyalty or allegiance to the home society, and it ties family members who stay and those who emigrate tightly together through a complex system of responsibilities (Gray 2003). Therefore, another key research issue has emerged which focuses primarily on the impact of transnationalism on transnational identities (Wong and Satzewich 2006).

From the perspective of transnationalism, identity may be dynamic and addi- tive instead of subtractive (Sussman 2002) and it may extend beyond the border of one country (Wong and Satzewich 2006). Many studies have confirmed that it is possible for transnational migrants to maintain close social ties with homeland, and at the same time, build new connections with their host country (Lien 2008). It appears that through transnational lives, migrants’ social identity is gradually stripped of territory and evolves from a singular identity to plural identities—a kind of deterritorialization of social identity (Wong and Satzewich 2006). Especially for returnees, keeping the flexibility of identity (Ong 1999), or constructing a transna- tional identity (Eytan 2004; Dwyer 1999), tends to be a useful strategy in breaking the economic limitations or cultural blocks of their external macro circumstances. It also facilitates their successful adaptation into various local societies, which, con- versely, allows them to play an active role in participating in and maintaining trans- nationalism (Itzigsohn et al. 1999).

In conclusion, as a new analytical tool, the concept of transnationalism provides a way of examining the new characteristics of an old phenomenon. As such, trans- nationalism represents a novel perspective instead of a novel phenomenon (Portes 2003).

15.5 Discussion

The current phenomenon of return migration is very different from the transnational practices with which early scholars were concerned. Today, technical innovations, such as air transport, long-distance telephone, fax, and internet communication, make the establishment of networks across space and nations available and feasible.

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With these new technologies, migrants are able to sustain more frequent, less ex- pensive, faster, and more intimate connections with their homeland and other plac- es. “The greater the access of an immigrant group to space- and time-compressing technology, the greater the frequency and scope of this sort of activity” (Portes et al. 1999, p. 224).

In addition, a social context of cultural diversification and globalization encour- ages migrants in receiving countries to sustain, rather than assimilate, different cul- tures and identities through their transnational ties. Both transnational exchange and brain circulation also help sending countries strengthen such ties with their emi- grants. For example, the Taiwanese government plays an active role in a diaspora- homeland collaborative development effort. The Global Chinese Business Network (GCBN) has been established to channel business, economic, and technological information to overseas Chinese (Cheong 2003).

Furthermore, most of those who presently engage in immigrant transnationalism are of an elite type, such as merchants and entrepreneurs, who maintain transna- tional ties with their home offices and communities. Such commercial ties were relatively rare in earlier days. Therefore, Portes (2003) has pointed out the necessity of using a new theoretical perspective to illustrate the ‘new’ transnational phenom- enon in the contemporary globalization context.

All three newly developing theoretical models listed above—the Triangular Model, Brain Circulation, and Transnationalism—contribute to examining the new characteristics of return migration, and they share some common features: (1) They all recognize the importance of human capital investment through return migration, especially the triangular and brain circulation models; (2) They all recognize that migration is not a closed circle but an ongoing process; (3) They all acknowledge the functions of transnational ties and practices in facilitating return migration; (4) The triangular model and transnationalism also emphasize the heterogeneity of re- turn migration.

These models also have some deficiencies. Nevertheless, The triangular model, by its very definition, does not represent the flexibility and complexity of return migration very well as some return migration and its human capital flow may be re- alized by other paths. As Waldinger (2008) has pointed out, “transnational practices may be constant, periodic, or just occasional; likewise, they may occur consistently across multiple social domains—politics, economics, or culture or may be limited to just one” (p. 5). With regard to return migrants, their migration movements may possibly go beyond a merely triangular one. For some, movement between the sending and receiving country may take place in a circular or “astronaut” way (Man 1997). For others, the transnational movement may be an asterisk model, where the homeland is located in the center with many connections branching out to one, two, or more, countries.

In terms of the motives of migration, human capital acquisition or accumula- tion may not always act as a hedge against future hurdles, but would just serve to achieve economic and/or symbolic goals at one point. If their other migration goals, such as savings or education are achieved, emigrants will return to their homeland whether it is underdeveloped or whether the human capital acquired abroad may

15 Return Migration: New Characters and Theoretical Models 259

be less useful at home than in the ROW or in the entrepôt country. Furthermore, there are more complicated motives for individual immigrants to remigrate. In some cases, seeking economic, social or political benefits may not always be as important as emotional motives, such as homesickness, eagerness to reunite with friends, or taking care of old parents (Gmelch 1980). Therefore, the motives of migrants, in returning or in moving on, may not always be rational choices when evaluating the potential benefits of their acquired capital. Some studies have found that personal reasons or family ties are the key factors encouraging return migration. Emotional needs may be the most important factor in opting for return migration. Generally, at the individual level, it may be that the non-economic effect is more important than the economic effect in the decision to return (King 2000).

The brain circulation model highlights human capital flow as the core part of return migration and particularly emphasizes the impact of return migration on macro environments such as nations and societies. As mentioned before however, transnational migration is primarily a grass-roots phenomenon; return migration is a micro-decision-making process for individual migrants and their families. The brain circulation tends to lose its advantage when it comes to analyzing the return- ing phenomenon in the context of the uncertain, heterogeneous, and complex indi- vidual world. Moreover, return migration brings back not only human and financial capital, but also social capital, which has an important influence on changes in individuals, communities and nations. Such social capital is, however, somewhat un-measurable and unobservable, and may be hard to investigate using the frame- work of brain circulation.

One deficiency of transnationalism is that it tries to include, too broadly, all kinds of transnational activities under its framework. The overuse and generalization of the term sometimes confuses both researchers and readers. In order to clarify the main body of transnationalism study, Vertovec (1999) closely scrutinizes the term based on a broad review of recent research across different disciplines. He identifies six themes of transnationalism study: transnationalism as (1) an avenue of capital, (2) a site of political engagement, (3) a (re)construction of ‘place’ or locality, (4) a type of consciousness, (5) a social morphology, and (6) a mode of cultural repro- duction. Portes (2003) has also suggested that primarily, transnationalism should be considered as a grassroots phenomenon which consists of individual cross-border activities; otherwise, “the concept of transnationalism becomes a muddle of the most diverse sort of phenomena and loses its heuristic value in pointing toward a limited and distinct social process” (p. 876).

However, transnationalism has a strong power in exploring the phenomenon of return migration, especially on the individual scale. All the activities of individual return migrants are inevitably embedded in different transnational areas, from the economic to the political and the socio-cultural, from ‘below’ to ‘above’. Thus, return migration itself constitutes a significant part of transnationalism—a cross- boundary practice between several countries, accompanied by a flow of capital. Return migration is also an outcome of transnationalism. Crucially, it is both the transnational network, and its associated practices, that provide the channels for migrants’ economic, political, and socio-cultural connection with their homeland,

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and this is what makes their return possible. All of these elements provide the neces- sity for, and feasibility of, using transnationalism as a tool with which to analyze the return migration phenomenon. Through transnationalism, the returning migrant’s activities, experiences and lives can be explored deeply and comprehensively.

15.6 Conclusion

Return represents a distinct type of migration which is less mentioned in earlier literature, but which has far-reaching implications for the individual, the family, the economy and the society (Small 2005). By examining return migration, the eco- nomic, socio-cultural, and demographic consequences of transnational migration in the age of globalization can be better understood.

Even though return migration is an important issue in migration research, social scientists know relatively little about it (Constant and Massey 2002). Levitt et al. (2003) stated that migrants’ lives involve both observable and unobservable ef- fects, especially in socio-cultural aspects which are largely ignored by much of the early transnational migration research. In particular, the invisible aspects of trans- national lives, such as memories, stories, and artistic creations, are more difficult to capture with traditional theoretical frameworks. However, these ‘invisible aspects’ are critical for exploring transnational migration and should not be overlooked in current research.

All of the three theory models have theoretical significance in examining today’s return migration phenomenon. Transnationalism has an especially strong power in explaining the daily behaviours of people in the circle of transnational movement. Using these theoretical models in their future research is therefore encouraged as researchers examine returnees’ different education levels, career status, cultural and ethnic backgrounds, and socio-economic groups. Further research could also extend the study to female returnees and their experiences of transnational migration, since return migration is also a highly gendered process (Wong and Satzewich 2006). In addition, some macro issues, such as the impact of social and economic changes after an immigrant returns home, are worth studying too.

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Chapter 16 Transnational Migration in the Age of Globalization: Chinese Canadians in Beijing

Shibao Guo

J. Zhang, H. Duncan (eds.), Migration in China and Asia, International Perspectives on Migration 10, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8759-8_16, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2014

S. Guo ( ) Werklund School of Education, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada e-mail: [email protected]

In the age of globalization, the integration of the world economy requires the mo- bility of people across national boundaries. It also requires migration regimes to facilitate such movements. The new order of world economies has consequently transformed membership systems. In the context of Canada, the 2006 Census re- veals that Canada’s population is becoming increasingly ethno-culturally diverse. It reports that 19.8 % of its total population were foreign-born—the highest proportion in 75 years, which places Canada the second highest in the world, after Australia (Statistics Canada 2007). The Census also reports that between 2001 and 2006, 1.1 million newcomers arrived in Canada, and 14 % of the recent immigrants to Canada who arrived between 2001 and 2006 came from the People’s Republic of China, the leading source country of immigration to Canada since 1998.

Also fuelled by forces of globalization, China has gradually shifted from a cen- trally planned economy to one of a socialist market economy since the adaptation of its ‘open door’ policy in 1978. The first step in Deng’s reform was to liberalize the agricultural sector by introducing the household responsibility system in place of the collective commune. Measures were also taken to reform the industries in en- couraging joint ventures with foreign companies, but foreign direct investment did not take place until the mid-1990s when Deng made a trip to south China and pro- claimed a bold shift toward market economy. In particular, following China’s join- ing the WTO in 2001 and the subsequent completion of its market opening pledges in 2006, China has formally entered the age of market economy. As a consequence, China has experienced unprecedented economic liberalization, industrialization, migration, urbanization, and privatization—all are required by economic global- ization. In this context, an increasing number of investors, foreign enterprises, and service agencies are establishing themselves in China. Among them, many are Chi- nese Canadians who emigrated to Canada many years ago and later returned to China. Therefore, it becomes imperative to understand the transnational movements of people and especially the experience of Chinese Canadians in China.

266 S. Guo

The chapter is organized into four parts. It begins with a review of literature on globalization of migration, followed by contextual information on the history of Chinese immigration and emigration. Next, it reports findings of the study with a focus on the profile of Chinese Canadians in Beijing, motivations of transnational migration, and integration and reintegration experiences. Finally, the discussion ends with conclusion and implications.

16.1 Understanding Globalization of Migration

Contemporary transnational migration is fuelled by conditions brought about by processes of globalization. The integration of the world economy has required the mobility of people across national boundaries as ‘global nomads’ (Jordan and Düvell 2003). Conceived thus, migration is less about a choice of work than “a requirement of, a response to and a resistance against, global institutional transformations and the integration of the world economy” (p. 63). Globalization and migration, then, are inextricably intertwined. Where migration is a response to globalization, glo- balization accelerates migration. Castles and Miller (2009) identify six trends in contemporary migration. The first is the ‘globalization of migration’—increasing numbers of countries are affected by migratory movements with entrants from a broad spectrum of economic, social and cultural backgrounds. The ‘acceleration of migration’ shows that the international movements of people are growing in volume in all regions. The third trend, the ‘differentiation of migration’, indicates that more countries have diversified their intake of immigrants to include a whole range of types. The ‘feminization of migration,’ the fourth trend identified by Castles and Miller, demonstrates that, particularly since the 1960s, women play a significant role in all regions and in most types of migration. The growing ‘politicization of migration’ suggests that domestic politics, bilateral and regional relationships, and national security policies of states are increasingly affected by international migra- tion. The last of these trends is the ‘proliferation of migration transition’ that occurs when traditional lands of emigration become lands of transit for both migration and immigration. Taken together, these trends highlight the links between migratory flows and economic, political and cultural change in the context of globalization.

To further elaborate on transnational migration in the age of globalization, De- Voretz et al. (2003) adopt a triangular model to explain the movement of Chinese im- migrants between Hong Kong, Canada, and the rest of the world (ROW). This model predicts a complex movement pattern of human capitals from sending countries (in- cluding Hong Kong) to entrepôt countries (e.g., Canada and Australia), and then to the rest of the world (e.g., USA). The authors argue that immigrants enter an entrepôt country because it supplies subsidized human capital and other free public good. Canada’s unique immigration and integration policies and its strategic geographical location also make it a popular entrepôt destination. However, they continue to argue that, after the initial move to the entrepôt country, these immigrants may decide to stay permanently in the new entrepôt country (Canada), return to the origin country (Hong Kong), or move on to a third country (ROW). The 2001 Hong Kong census (cited in

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DeVoretz et al. 2003) reveals that among 85,793 Chinese who returned to Hong Kong between 1996 and 2001, about 40 % were from Canada. This model has significant implications for understanding the movement of people in the age of globalization.

Emerging from this ongoing debate about transnational migration is the recent discussion pertaining to Canadian diaspora. Studies by the Asia Pacific Foundation (APF) of Canada estimate that 2.7 million (8.8 %) Canadians live abroad as the end of 2001 (Zhang 2006, 2007). The size of Canadian diaspora is larger in propor- tion than that of Australia, China, the United States, or India. Traditionally, many global Canadians went to the United States, but recently they have shifted to Asia as their destination. It is estimated that Hong Kong alone hosts 200,000 Canadians. Overseas Canadians can play a role in helping Canada promote trade, investment, and business opportunities through taste effect, technology transfer, and human net- works. However, unlike the Indian or Chinese Diaspora which is primarily a single ethnic group, the Canadian diaspora includes both Canadian-born and foreign-born Canadians. Here, one important question remains: Are they Canadian diaspora or returned migrants? It is time to explore the characteristics of Canadian diaspora and examine the policy implications of this new phenomenon. If some of them are re- turned migrants, we need to re-examine Canada’s immigration policies with respect to immigrant retention in a globalization era.

16.2 Chinese Immigration and Emigration

To understand the experience of Chinese Canadians, it is important to trace the his- tory of Chinese immigration and emigration, Canada’s immigration policies, and the interconnections between the two. The Chinese are one of the oldest immigrant groups in Canada, and the history of the Chinese in Canada reflects, and is shaped by, a long historic trajectory of Canadian immigration policies. From the Confed- eration of Canada in 1867 to the 1960s, the selection of immigrants in Canada was based on racial background, with British and Western Europeans being deemed the most desirable citizens. Asians and Africans were considered unassimilable and, therefore, undesirable. To illustrate, the Canadian government brought in Chinese workers to build the railroad so fundamental to the expansion of the West, but im- posed a head tax in 1885 to keep out their families and passed a restrictive Chinese Immigration Act in 1923 that virtually prohibited Chinese immigration into Canada until its repeal in 1947. Thus since very early in Canada’s history immigration has served as a means of social, racial, and ideological control. In deciding who are the most desirable and admissible, the state sets the parameters for the social, cultural, and symbolic boundaries of the nation.

The post-war period marked the beginning of a new era in Canada’s immigra- tion history. By the mid-1960s, Canada was experiencing “the greatest postwar boom” in Canadian history (Whitaker 1991, p. 18). Skilled labour was required to help Canada build its expanding economy, but Europe, the traditional source of immigrants, was caught up in post-war economic recovery and unable to meet Canadian demand. The Canadian government thus turned its recruitment efforts to

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traditionally restricted areas: Third World countries. In 1967, a point system was introduced by the Liberal government that based the selection of immigrants on their education, skills, and resources rather than their racial and religious back- grounds. This new system represented “a historic watershed,” and “did establish at the level of formal principle that Canadian immigration policy is ‘colour blind’” (Whitaker 1991, p. 19). The point system was successful in reversing the pattern of immigration from Europe in favour of Asia and other Third World countries. By the mid-1970s, more immigrants arrived from the Third World than from the devel- oped world. The largest number came from Asia, followed by the Caribbean, Latin America, and Africa. Many among the Asian group were from Hong Kong. In fact, Canada admitted 30,546 Chinese immigrants between 1956 and 1967, a number that increased to 90,118 between 1968 and 1976 (Li 1998). It is estimated that Hong Kong had been the source of two-thirds of the total immigrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Mainland China.

Additional major shifts occurred in the last two decades of the twentieth cen- tury. In the late 1980s, a business immigration program was created to favour an entrepreneurial class of immigrants who would invest in Canada’s continuous eco- nomic development. This program attracted a large number of entrepreneurs and investors from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Since the mid-1990s immigrant selection practices in Canada have shifted to favour economic and skilled immigrants over family-class immigrants and refugees (Li 2003). As a result, economic class im- migrants made up more than half of all immigrants admitted throughout the late 1990s. Among them, a considerable number were highly educated immigrant pro- fessionals, particularly scientists and engineers. As Li notes, this new shift was based on the assumption that economic immigrants brought more human capital with them than family-class immigrants and refugees and were therefore more valuable and desirable. This shift has clearly influenced the sharp increase of inde- pendent immigrants from mainland China.

Until the 1980s, direct emigration from China to Canada was relatively small because China had been isolated from the rest of the world since the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949 (Li 1998). The pro-democracy student movement in 1989 became a catalyst as well as a hindrance for the emigration of Chinese people. On the one hand, the event prompted the Canadian government to issue permanent resident status to many Chinese students and scholars who were studying in Canada at that time. On the other hand, the Chinese government tightened the rules to further restrict people’s mobility. However, this restriction did not last long. The 1990s witnessed substantial emigration from China to Cana- da. China’s open-door policy and economic development resulted in an economic boom and a new middle-income class. With the Chinese government’s relaxed passport restrictions, China entered the emigration phase (Wallis 1998). Further- more, Canada opened an immigration office in Beijing that processed immigration applications directly. Given these developments, mainland immigrants outnum- bered those from Hong Kong and Taiwan in 1998, and became the top source coun- try of immigrants with an annual intake of around 30,000 people (Citizenship and Immigration Canada (1999). At this stage it is important to examine the integration

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experience of recent Chinese immigrants in Canada and their transnational move- ment between Canada and China.

16.3 Report of Findings

This study adopted a questionnaire approach because of its capability to maximize the number of responses in a reasonably short period of time. The questionnaire consists of four parts: (i) demographic information, (ii) motivations for migrating between Canada and China, (iii) the integration and re-integration experience in Canada and China, and (iv) concluding remarks. The questionnaire was made avail- able in both English and Chinese. A total of 76 completed questionnaires were re- ceived. Beijing was chosen as the research site owing to the strategic role it plays in hosting international residents, including Canadians. Beijing is the capital of China and the second largest city after Shanghai. Furthermore, Beijing hosts a growing in- ternational community, made up of people from all over the world, including diplo- mats, international students and teachers, and foreign enterprises and employees. It is estimated that Beijing’s foreign population has reached 200,000. In addition, the City has established official linkages with 27 countries and 31 cities in the world. The great success of the 2008 Olympic Games has presented Beijing to the world as a cosmopolitan city which will attract more people from outside China to work and live there. What this study focuses on are Canadians of Chinese descent who emigrated to Canada many years ago but later returned to China, since there is a growing number of them in Beijing.

16.4 Profile of Chinese Canadians in Beijing

Among 76 respondents who completed the questionnaire, 60.5 % were male and 39.5 % female. Most (89 %) were married with one to two children. The majority of my respondents were young, over 90 % in their thirties and forties. The largest group was originally from Beijing (20 %). Fifty-three percent held Canadian citizenship, and the rest were permanent residents of Canada. At the time of this study, 38 % still had immediate family members residing in Canada. Eighty-four percent had left Canada in 6 years, and the average length of time the respondents had stayed in Canada before returning to China was 5 years. Before returning to China, they had resided in Vancouver (30 %), Toronto (25 %), Montreal (13 %), Ottawa (9 %), and Calgary (5 %). Since returning, they had lived in China for an average 3 years, with 92 % returning to China in recent 5 years. The group was highly educated: 31 % held bachelor’s degrees, 42 % had master’s degrees, and 27 % held PhDs (See Fig. 16.1). Most (70.3 %) had completed their highest level of education from institutions in China, a smaller proportion (23 %) from Canada, and the remaining 7 % from other countries in the world.

16 Transnational Migration in the Age of Globalization

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16.5 Motivations of Transnational Migration

What motivated people to move? This is a fundamental question guiding this study. First, people were asked about their motivations for initially moving to Canada. Four most frequently cited reasons were reported: Canada’s natural environ- ment (49 %), seeking new opportunities (43 %), children’s education (37 %), and obtaining Canadian citizenship or permanent residence (36 %) (See Fig. 16.2). The existing literature shows that Canada’s subsidized public goods and quality of life has attracted many immigrants (DeVoretz et al. 2003; Ley and Kobayashi 2005), and the findings of this study conform to this observation. The finding is also con- sistent with those reported by Chinese immigrants in Vancouver who, when asked the same question, responded that non-economic reasons such as environment, edu-

Fig. 16.1  Level of education

Fig. 16.2  Motivations of migration to Canada

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cation, and citizenship, were among their primary motives for moving to Canada (Guo and DeVoretz 2006).

The respondent’s motivations for moving to Canada were compared with those of migrating back to China. When asked what motivated them to return to China, half (50 %) stated seeking new opportunities, followed by taking care of parents (42 %), living in Chinese culture (41 %), having more opportunities for promotion (37 %), and having more job opportunities (34 %) (See Fig. 16.3). Clearly, the findings sup- port Zweig, Chen and Rosen’s (2004) argument that economic opportunities were major reasons behind the decision to move back to China, which are quite different from the initial reasons for migrating to Canada. However, we cannot ignore fam- ily reasons. Similar to Ho’s (2003) findings about Singaporean migrants, familial considerations were important reasons for eventual return. Following the Confucian values of filial piety, many may have decided to return to fulfill family responsibili- ties. Because of China’s one child policy, which was put in place 30 years ago, it is predicted that more people may return in the future to care for their aging parents. In this context, familial obligations and economic motivations may work together to bind transnational migrants to particular geographical and national contexts.

16.6 Integration and Reintegration Experiences

Unfortunately, half (50.7 %) stated that they had not achieved their main goals in Canada before moving back to China. Some of the factors which prevented them from achieving their goals were lack of social network (63 %), Chinese work ex- perience not being recognized (58 %), Chinese qualifications not being recognized (55 %), lack of Canadian work experience (47 %), and language difficulties (47 %) (See Fig. 16.4). A number of studies conducted by independent scholars (Guo 2013; Li 2008; Reitz 2001) as well as government-sponsored research (Statistics Canada 2003) have repeatedly reported similar barriers facing immigrant professionals in Canada. In particular, the devaluation and denigration of immigrant professionals’ prior learning and work experience, coupled with its consequent unemployment, underemployment, and downward social mobility, have become important ‘push factors’, mobilizing Chinese immigrants to repatriate themselves and once again

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Fig. 16.3  Motivations of migration to China

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seek opportunities in China (Guo and DeVoretz 2006). Furthermore, favourable government policies and attitudes towards returnees have joined the globalization forces which fueled this movement (Zweig et al. 2004).

In comparison, the respondents were asked if they had achieved their main goals since moving back to China. The result shows that almost all of them (97 %) indicated that they had, even in a relatively shorter period of time than their stay in Canada. In sharp contrast to the respondent’s accounts of their Canadian employment experience, all participants had secured a job in China, while 12 % reported they were unem- ployed before returning. Eleven percent of respondents had worked in Canada as la- bourers in processing, manufacturing and utilities; none were employed in these fields upon returning to China. Conversely, employment in professional jobs increased once respondents returned to China, with the biggest change in management and teaching. Senior management positions increased from 5 % in Canada to 15 % in China; teach- ers and professors from 19 to 32 %. It is also worth noting that 52 % played leadership roles in China, a significant increase from 25 % who stated they had done so in Can- ada. Interestingly, 65 % stated that their Canadian experience had helped them obtain their current positions in China. When invited to compare their current employment situation in China with their prior one in Canada, it is not surprising that most of them (81 %) felt their current employment was better or much better. Likewise, participants were also asked to compare their current employment with that before leaving China for Canada, the majority (66 %) also indicated better or much better.

The respondent’s improved employment situations in China naturally led to positive impacts on their income. Before returning to China, one quarter (24.6 %) reported an annual household income less than $ 20,000 in Canada and another one quarter (27.5 %) between $ 20,000 and $ 50,000, but only a minority of families (13 %) earned more than $ 100,000 (See Fig. 16.5). These figures reflect findings about immigrants’ income in Canada, especially the over-representation of Chinese immigrants with poverty-level income of less than $ 20,000 (Guo and DeVoretz 2006). It must be pointed out that participants’ income in China after returning reflected almost opposite trends. An overwhelming majority (93 %) reported an

Fig. 16.4  Obstacles preventing Chinese immigrants from achieving main goals in Canada

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annual household income more than ¥ 50,000 RMB. In particular, it is worth noting that almost one third (30 %) earned more than ¥ 250,000 RMB, while the average annual income per capita in Beijing is less than ¥ 25,000 RMB (Beijing Municipal Statistics Bureau 2010). Only 7.1 % earned less than ¥ 50,000 RMB (See Fig. 16.6). It is clear that this was an elite group. As Zweig et al. (2004) point out, elite migrants are the targeted group for China because they are more likely to bring in foreign capital, transfer more goods and services into China, and introduce cutting-edge technology, which subsequently helped with the increase of their income.

In addition to employment, this study also explored the social experience of liv- ing in Beijing. Since returning to China, the majority reported that they had recon- nected with old friends and colleagues (86.8 %) or made new friends (84.2 %), and a relatively smaller group indicated that they lived close to relatives (72.4 %). Most

Fig. 16.5  Household income before leaving Canada (CND$)

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Fig. 16.6  : Household income in China (RMB¥)

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of the study participants (78 %) did not encounter any difficulties in re-integrating into the Chinese society. For those who had, they identified some of the major dif- ficulties as: pollution (47.1 %), bureaucracy (41.2 %), difficulties in building social network (41.2 %), and difficulties in cultural adjustment (35.3 %). It is not surpris- ing that so many people mentioned bureaucracy and pollution, because China is notorious for these. Many scholars, Cheng (2008) for one, highlight bureaucracy and corruption as two of the major challenges facing China today. The finding on pollution is consistent with people’s motivations for initially migrating to Canada. Participants’ difficulties with building social network were likely to do with their absence from China for a lengthy period of time. Regarding difficulties in readjust- ing to home culture, it seems clear that although the respondents were brought up in Chinese culture, they still needed time to readjust because China has changed so much, and the ‘home’ they returned to was not necessarily the same one they left. Clearly, some experienced reverse culture shock as a result of being away for a lengthy period of time (Christofi and Thompson 2007; Gaw 2000). In fact, when asked if China had changed since they left, 76 % answered yes. They identified some of the major changes as more open and more developed, and easier to mi- grate than before. However, the surveyed also indicated that the traffic in Beijing was worse than before and more polluted than before. Despite these problems, the majority (67.2 %) indicated no regrets about returning. Overall, most (68.9 %) felt happier about their life in China than in Canada, and happier than before leaving China for Canada (67.1 %).

In the process of re-integration, most participants found their friends and families (88.2 %) more helpful than their work units (26.5 %) or government organizations (4.4 %) when they needed help. This echoes similar patterns in Canada, where Chi- nese immigrants are more likely to seek help from friends and families rather than government or non-government organizations (Guo and DeVoretz 2006). What dif- fers between the two is that in China, the role of NGOs is lacking. Instead work units replaced NGOs in helping returnees with their re-integration. They needed the most help in two areas: finding a school for their children (27.9 %) and applying for residence permit (27.5 %). Owing to their dual identity as Canadian diasporas and Chinese returnees, the participants fell under the responsibilities of both Canadian and Chinese governments. This finding has important implications for both gov- ernments in initiating collaborative efforts to help Chinese Canadians with their re-integration experience.

One important feature of a diaspora is maintaining connections with the home- land through intermittent visits, or, often, the development of a return movement (Cohen 2008; Safran 1991). In the questionnaire, when asked if they were planning to return to Canada in the future, many (42.9 %) were undecided. For those who were, there was an even split between those who answered yes (28.6 %) and those who stated no (28.6 %). Given that 38 % still had immediate family members resid- ing in Canada and many frequently visited home while living in China, it is likely that many will return to reside in Canada one day while some will continue their transnational journey between China and Canada.

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16.7 Discussion and Conclusion

This study was set out to explore the experience of Chinese Canadians in Beijing, China. The findings reveal that globalization and migration are inextricably inter- twined. Migration is a response to globalization; globalization also accelerates mi- gration. According to Anderson (2002), one of the new world disorders created by globalization is mass migration. It becomes increasingly clear that more and more countries are crucially affected by migratory movements at the same time (Castles and Miller 2009). In the contexts of Canada and China, since the mid-1990s Canada has intensified its admission of skilled immigrants to help build its knowledge- based economy and increase its international competitiveness in a global market. Emerging from this is China as a top sending country to the world as well as Canada in terms of the volume of immigrants and the number of highly educated profession- als. The new stage of globalization also coincided with China’s economic reform which requires international talents, capitals, and cutting-edge technologies to help develop its socialist market economy. In the recruitment process, China developed favourable government policies and attitudes to attract its expatriates because they are more likely to bring in foreign capital, high technology, and goods and services into China. It is evident that both China and Canada are important players in the globalization of migration movement. Meanwhile, the experience of Chinese Cana- dians reinvigorated the debate regarding the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors in mobilizing transnational migration in the age of globalization.

This study also reveals important findings about barriers facing Chinese immi- grants in the process of integrating into Canadian society. In particular, it confirms findings by a number of studies regarding difficulties that many highly educated im- migrant professionals have encountered in having their foreign credentials and prior learning and work experience recognized in Canada (Guo 2013; Li 2008; Wong and Wong 2006). Collectively they demonstrate that recent Chinese immigrants have experienced deskilling and devaluation of their prior learning and work experience after immigrating to Canada. As a consequence, many have suffered unemployment and underemployment, poor economic performance, and downward social mobility, which adversely hindered their integration process. Guo (2013) attributes Chinese im- migrant’s negative experience to a triple glass effect consisting of a glass gate, glass door, and glass ceiling. The first layer, the glass gate, denies immigrants’ entrance to guarded professional communities. Among a number of players and institutions that may be blamed for the devaluation of immigrants’ foreign credentials and prior work experiences are professional associations and prior learning assessment agen- cies because immigrant’s knowledge and experiences are often deemed different, de- ficient, and hence need to be devalued (Guo 2009). However, successful license does not automatically guarantee a professional job, and immigrant professionals need a professional company to house them. According to Guo (2013), in securing a profes- sional job, many immigrants hit the second layer of glass—the glass door, which blocks immigrants’ access to professional employment at high-wage firms. At this level, employers are the key players. Employers may refuse to offer immigrants any

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professional jobs because they do not have Canadian work experience, or their prior work experience is devalued because it is inferior to the Canadian experience. Or, immigrants may not secure any professional job because of their skin colour or their English accents. Guo continues to argue that it is the glass ceiling which prevents immigrants from moving up to management positions because of their ethnic and cultural differences. Worse still, some immigrants may work on the same job but be paid less than their white colleagues, creating racialized disparities in earnings. Guo concludes that glass gate, glass door, and glass ceiling may converge to produce a triple glass effect that creates multiple barriers and affect immigrants’ new working lives at different stages of their settlement and integration processes.

In addition, the study has clearly demonstrated that the boundaries between dia- sporas and transnational migration are blurred. The study shows that Chinese Ca- nadians in Beijing are characterized by its dualities: they are both Canadian and Chinese. While some hold Canadian citizenship, others are yet to be naturalized. Their previous homeland is their adopted country, and their newly adopted country is also their original homeland. Unlike traditional diasporic communities which are often long-time citizens of their homeland, the length of stay for this group in their home country is relatively short. Furthermore, they have a dual belonging. They are simultaneously diasporas and returnees. On the one hand, they are Chinese return- ees completing the cycle of Chinese diaspora. On the other hand, their migration does not stop here. In fact, China is just a stopping point and they will continue to move across borders after this. Their dualities allow them to play a double role as cultural and economic brokers between Canada and China.

The study evokes more important debates about notions of citizenship, diaspora, and transnational migration. The conventional view holds that there is only one way of belonging to Canada. In this view, new immigrants are expected to assimilate into Canadian society without looking back at their previous lives. It claims that maintenance of ethnic tie and heritage is injurious to national allegiance and unity. This study has clearly shown that in the age of globalization, Canadians are becom- ing increasingly internationally mobile as a result of globalization, modern commu- nications and transportation. While Canada continues to rely on immigration to help the country ameliorate its declining maternity rates, aging populations, and labour shortages, it is increasingly becoming a country of emigrants as well. Unfortunately, there has been a lack of recognition of this diasporic community. Furthermore, un- like the early notion of diaspora which is often portrayed as the traumatic dispersal of victimized groups from an original homeland, the transnational experience of Chinese Canadians in Beijing demonstrate the transnational nature of migration, diaspora, and belonging. As Cohen (2008) notes, unidirectional ‘migration to’ is now being replaced by asynchronous, transversal, oscillating flows. Consequently, Cohen continues, diasporization requires nation-states to broaden their understand- ings of migration to account for multiple affiliations and associations, and to allow diasporic allegiances to become both more open and more acceptable.

The findings of the study have important implications for immigration and inte- gration, consular services, and diaspora policies. It requires the development of in- novation programs in foreign credential recognition to help immigrant professionals

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with their settlement and integration. With the triple glass effect, the causes of im- migrants downward social mobility are complex, occur at multiple junctures of the integration process, and therefore any solution should not aim for a quick fix. In- stead, it requires a very coherent policy response, involving multiple players includ- ing government organizations, professional associations, employers, educational institutions, and prior learning assessment agencies. The study also sheds new light on the ongoing debate on citizenship regarding whether foreign-born Canadians are inferior to Canadian-born citizens. Should their children who are born overseas automatically receive Canadian citizenship? The study raises important questions about the definition of Canadian in the age of transnational migration. It is time for Canada to develop a diasporic policy which recognizes the existence of Canadian diasporas, facilitates the movement of Canadians, maintain their connection with the homeland, and help them adapt to a new life overseas. The implications extend beyond the Canadian border. It calls on Canadian and Chinese governments to col- laborate in designing a policy that recognizes dual citizenship.

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