Administration and managerial communication- Case Study

WACO – Administrative and Managerial Communication - CASE

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/waco/

The situation/disaster of Waco is a valuable learning tool for managers, whether public or private. For the purposes of this case assignment we are looking at the communication or lack of communication issues.

Follow the following steps:

1. Read the case

2. Go to the website listed above.

a. Read the available readings on line

b. Listen to the recordings

c. Look at the pictures

d. Observe the chronology

e. Read the top ten FAQ’s

3. Answer the following questions using the case reading, the above mentioned website and ANY additional research you can find! There is much out there so I expect to have some unique findings in your case!.

A. Describe the communication chain between lower level employees and the upper management (remember we covered this in class –( I am looking for an organizational looking chart that is then explained!) DO NOT answer yes or no to the following: Is the chain of command (organizational structure) clear in the ATF as describe in the reading? Explain in expanded detail your thoughts.

B. Considering that upper management uses more conceptual skills than technical skills what, if any, (based on the reading) “assumed” position did upper level administrators take regarding the Waco invasion – EXPLAIN IN DETAIL what the problems are with how they made the decisions? BE DETAILED!! (we covered decision making and information in class – look up the content)

C. The case is filled with ethical dilemma created by communication processes, especially for those who value truthfulness and open communications in performing their work. Please list and DESCRIBE IN DETAIL a minimum of 3 ethical dilemmas that are caused by bad communication?

D. Explain in DETAIL a minimum of one example, found in the reading, of each of the following:

a. Leadership style

b. Resistance to Change

c. Assumptions in decision making

d. P, O, L, C (DTAILED - one for each) (planning – organizing- leading -controlling)

E. If you were the leader of the FBI, AFT, local Sheriffs Department, or any other major player in this case, WHAT would you do differently - Pick one role and share in detail what managerial changes you would make based on any of the topics we covered in this course. USE CORRECT TERMINOLOGY

Each student will complete the above requirements individually. You are welcome to discuss the case with your group (if assigned). HOWEVER your work MUST be ORIGINAL. All work will be submitted to TURNITIN.com for originality check! – A cover page and APA Citations are expected

WACO

On the morning of February 28, 1993, near Waco, Texas, ATF agents attempted to serve a search war​rant on Mount Carmel, a compound housing the re​ligious sect commonly referred to as Branch Davidians, and an arrest warrant on the sect’s leader, Vernon Wayne Howell. The attempt resulted in a gun battle in which four agents and six Davidians died and twenty-eight agents and four Davidians, in​cluding leader David Koresh, received injuries. Forced to withdraw and leave the compound in the hands of the Davidians, ATF surrendered primary control of the scene to the FBI within days and with​drew to a supporting role. The subsequent fifty-one-day standoff ended on April I 9, I 993, when agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Hostage Res​cue Team injected tear gas into the compound and the occupants responded by initiating multiple fires. The fires and self-inflicted gunshot wounds resulted in the death of over seventy occupants, including a number of children. Both the Departments of Justice and the Treasury conducted extensive investigations, as did the Texas Rangers, who were requested to conduct the investigation of the shootings by the United States Attorney’s Office to avoid a conflict of interest. A subsequent trial in United States District Court resulted in the conviction of several Davidian survivors on weapons and manslaughter charges but acquittal on murder and murder conspiracy charges.

To date, three congressional hearings have been conducted on the raid and siege. The most extensive of these, by a joint House of Representatives sub​committee, extended over nine days during the sum​mer of 1 993 These later hearings were believed to have resulted, at least partially, from pressure from the NRA and others opposed to ATF and gun laws. The Treasury report determined that there had been significant errors in the command and control of the ATI- raid and that some managers had attempted to distort the fact that an undercover agent had warned that secrecy had been compromised but that the raid commanders still had proceeded with the raid. This was particularly critical because the tactics em​ployed were dependent upon surprise. As a result, two ATF managers were dismissed, and the director, associate director of law enforcement, and deputy associate director of law enforcement all retired pre​maturely under pressure. The administration moved Secret Service Director John Magaw to the position of ATF director, which apparently served the dual purpose of placing a high-profile director in charge of a beleaguered ATF and removing from a sensitive post, with access to White House activity, a person closely associated with former president Bush.

Background

The community of Mount Carmel was originally es​tablished by Victor Houteff and a small group of fol​lowers who left the Seventh Day Adventist Church. Although the group remained isolated from much of the larger society and focused their attentions on preparing for the imminent second coming of Christ, it was neither militant nor armed. Upon Houteff’s death, the group divided between followers of Hout​eff’s widow, Florence, and those who accepted the leadership of another member, Ben Roden, who re​ferred to his followers as The Branch. After Florence Houteff’s 1959 prediction of the slaughter and res​urrection of all the believers failed to materialize, many of her followers drifted away and Roden’s fac​tion predominated. After Roden’s death in 1978, his widow, Lois, assumed leadership of the group.

In 1981, Vernon Wayne Howell, a twenty-two-year-old high school dropout and sometimes rock musician, came to live at Mount Carmel. Howell came to exercise substantial influence on Lois Roden and was engaging in a sexual relationship with the seventy-one-year-old Roden by 1982. A contest for control of the group developed between Howell and George Roden, Lois’s son, and in 1984 Howell left Mount Carmel with a group of followers. Lois Roden died in 1986, and in 1987 Howell and a group of armed followers fought a gun battle with Roden for control of the Mount Carmel compound. Although Howell and the seven who accompanied him on the raid were charged with felony assault, Roden made a very poor victim and witness and the jury failed to reach a verdict on Howell and found the others not guilty. Howell and his followers obtained control of the property by paying back taxes, and Roden was later placed in a mental institution.

For nine years, Howell, now known as David Ko​resh, functioned as the unquestioned spiritual leader and absolute potentate of the community at Mount Carmel, as well as among followers elsewhere. Dur​ing this time, Howell-Koresh decreed celibacy for all the male residents and claimed all the female resi​dents as his wives, in some cases engaging in sexual intercourse with girls as young as ten. Koresh also ac​quired numerous firearms in preparation for a proph​esied coming conflagration and rejected the jurisdiction of secular government and law over his actions.

In May 1992 local authorities requested assis​tance from ATF in investigating the activities of Ko​resh and residents of the compound relating to the production of explosives and illegal firearms. The subsequent investigation established probable cause that members were making and possessing unregis​tered NFA firearms, specifically machine guns and hand grenades, in the compound. The investigation also revealed allegations of child abuse, child sex​ual molestation, and holding persons against their will, as well as indications that the Davidians might resist lawful authority by force.

ATF’s investigation included the infiltration of an undercover agent into the compound and the es​tablishment of an observation post that could watch the compound. Operating on the belief that they could overwhelm the Davidians with a show of force and the use of surprise, ATF developed a plan to serve search and arrest warrants on the compound. On February 28, 1 993, a force of seventy-six ATF agents dressed in dark blue utility uniforms and pro​tective vests, distinctively marked with large gold badges and the letters ATF, moved to the scene hid​den in two large cattle trailers pulled by pickups. As the agents burst from the trailers and raced for the front door and rear windows, they were met with au​tomatic weapons fire and grenades. After an ex​tended gunfight between the agents, who were pinned down in a hopeless position, and the occu​pants, a cease-fire was negotiated by telephone and the agents withdrew with their dead and wounded. Before the day ended, Treasury officials had decided to surrender control of the scene to the FBI to avoid any future allegations of bias by ATF and to capitalize on the resources of the HRT. The weeks and months following the Waco incident proved the most trying in ATF history. Every aspect of the oper​ation proved controversial, and the initial ATF deci​sion to make a dynamic entry and the FBI decision to use tear gas to attempt to precipitate a surrender proved the most controversial issues. To understand how and why Waco occurred requires that the events be viewed not through the benefit of hindsight but with an understanding of ATF history, culture, structure, and experience.

The Decision

Given both the physical risk to agents and the po​tential political risk to the organization, why did ATF proceed with the raid on Mount Carmel? The orga​nization had historically displayed an aversion to risk consistent with its precarious political position. No bold new leaders had assumed control. The political environment had not undergone significant change. What then explains ATF’s actions? Viewed in the context of organizational routines formed by struc​ture, culture, environment, and task and as a series of interrelated but distinct decisions by individuals within ATF, the raid becomes understandable, though not essentially defensible. Although the per​sonality and nature of key actors also played a criti​cal role in the Waco decisions, the factors of structure, culture, environment, and task had influenced both the placement and outlook of these key actors.

The process began as a routine investigation after a referral of information and request for assistance made to the Austin ATF office by the McLenan County Sheriff’s Department, regarding shipments of explosives components, inert grenade hulls, firearms parts, and large quantities of firearms to a location called the Mag Bag, a small building near the Davidian compound used by the Davidians. Sub-sequent Investigation by Special Agent David Aguil​era revealed that the Davidians were ordering nu​merous kits of replacement parts for M-1 6 machine guns. Represented as repair parts for legally regis​tered machine guns, these kits have primarily been used to convert semi-automatic AR-15 rifles to fully automatic M-16 machine guns. The Davidians also had obtained explosive components and grenade hulls that could serve as components to manufacture grenades. Agents coupled the orders with statements from former members and reports of machine gun fire from the compound to establish the probable cause required to obtain a search warrant to exam​ine the compound for machine guns, grenades, and evidence of their manufacture.

With some exceptions these constituted routine events for ATF agents. An information referral and re​quest for assistance from a local law enforcement agency precipitated an investigation by ATF agents that revealed probable violations under ATF juris​diction. In addition, the investigation revealed evi​dence of probable child abuse and sexual abuse of minors by David Koresh. The United States Attor​ney’s Office concurred with the evaluation of the probable cause and the need to proceed with fed​eral action. This satisfied the usual standard for fur​ther ATF action. The normal questions asked of an agent were: Is there evidence of a crime? Is the crime within ATF’s jurisdiction? Do the actions justify pros​ecution? And does the United States attorney con​cur? ATF’s standard for prosecution had long required more than just a violation of law to gener​ate enforcement action. Even before the passage of the GCA, the official orders had recognized some​thing called a “nonwillful violation.” Cases that did not involve convicted felons, large-scale commercial violations, or other crimes were not to be pursued unless the violator had been previously warned and persisted. This standard applied only to firearms vi​olations and not to alcohol violations. Although the official policy of not prosecuting isolated firearms vi​olations ceased after 1 968, it remained as an unof​ficial standard.

Much has been made by some critics, particularly in academia, of law enforcement’s efforts to portray the Davidians as engaged in child molestation and abuse, when these were not the crimes charged in the warrants. ATF actions were rooted in years of ex​perience and conditioning. Critics have repeatedly attacked the agency for not pursuing real criminals and for using the gun laws to harass innocent citi​zens. Congressional investigations have repeatedly focused on this issue and United States attorneys have used other criminal activity as a key element for deciding which firearms violators to prosecute. Both the press and the public have displayed far more support for pursuit of firearms violations when the violator has been perceived as a criminal. ATF has interpreted these events as evidence that the im​portance of a firearms violation is largely dependent on the other criminal activities of the violator. Pros​ecution of firearms violations become important when directed at a person or persons whose activi​ties are otherwise objectionable or dangerous. Thus illegal possession of a machine gun is of little con​sequence unless the possessor is a criminal or oth​erwise demonized. Likewise, illegal sales of firearms are of little consequence unless the purchasers are criminals or other violent persons. This constitutes a far different standard than the one applied to drug laws, but it is similar to the attitude toward gambling and liquor laws.

As a result of these experiences, ATF has focused as much on who violated the law as what law they violated. It has become both a formal and informal component of the investigative routine to consider this issue. Thus, the attention agents gave to infor​mation that Koresh molested young children, had been involved in a past violent confrontation, held people against their will, and talked of future violent confrontations was consistent with normal working routine that evolved from past experience. Virtually any police agency would have focused on the same information in evaluating the public safety aspects of the case. ATF agents did not see themselves as gun regulators, whose job was to stop Koresh from ob​taining machine guns. They saw themselves as pro​tectors of public safety, whose job was to investigate Koresh and bring to light all his crimes. The firearms jurisdiction was their legal justification for doing so. Federal agencies, particularly the FBI, have followed this same practice for years and been afforded wide​spread acclaim. The very nature of federal laws that utilized the marginal interstate nexus to allow fed​eral jurisdiction over hate crimes, kidnapping, car​jacking, gun possession, and bombing reveal that Congress has assumed this to be a legitimate federal role since the passage of the Mann Act at the begin​ning of the century.

The symbolic and political importance of additional criminal acts was apparent in the 1995 House hearings on Waco. Widely assumed to be engineered by the Republicans to embarrass the ad​ministration and pacify the NRA, the hearings quickly changed course with the testimony of Kin Jewel, who described her rape by Koresh when she was ten years of age. It became apparent that parents routinely allowed their children to be sexu​ally assaulted by Koresh, both Koresh and the par​ents lost status as victims. Soon Republicans found it necessary to begin every session with the caveat that they did not seek to support Koresh or attack law enforcement, and the political dynamic of the hear​ing changed direction.

Thus for ATF, the decision to investigate Koresh reflected the application of organizational routine in a classic sense. This investigation was exactly what the agency existed to do. Had the investigation re​vealed no criminal activity, other than firearms vio​lations, and no evidence of a threat to public safety, the decision would have been far more problemati​cal, and management might have forced the agents to back away from a law enforcement approach. The decision to use a search warrant flowed directly from the decision to pursue a criminal investigation. Prosecution required seizure of the evidence, in this case the converted firearms and grenades. In addi​tion, the arrest of Koresh and service of a search war​rant very likely would aid in revealing other crimes on the premises. Because firearms are difficult to hide or destroy quickly and are routinely retained for very long periods of time, search warrants have proven a very effective tool for obtaining evidence in firearms investigations. The tendency to retain firearms has resulted in ATF being able to obtain warrants and seize evidence using probable cause that would be considered stale in other types of cases.

Why the Raid?

The raid on the Branch Davidian compound by a large number of uniformed, armed agents shocked a significant portion of the public. Their reaction is typified by Representative Henry Hyde, Republican chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. During the 1995 hearings, Representative Hyde repeatedly expressed shock that seventy-five armed agents wearing helmets and ski masks attacked the com​pound. Even after being repeatedly told that there were no ski masks and that the agents were uni​formed for identification and wore helmets for pro​tection, Hyde seemed unable to comprehend any possible justification for what he apparently viewed as an armed attack on a religious community. ATF agents and other law enforcement officers across the country found Hyde’s response as bewildering as Hyde found the raid procedures.

For veterans of the wars on crime and drugs and for those who live in the neighborhoods where these wars are waged, the scene was unusual only in its scope. Similar scenes, in fact, appeared regularly on the local news in urban areas across the country. ATF had consistently received congressional and admin​istration support for similar actions during the im​plementation of the ACES and the ACES II, both of which received extensive favorable coverage in the Washington media. What, then, prompted the strong reaction to ATF’s tactics at Waco from individuals and organizations who had paid little heed to simi​lar actions by ATF and numerous other agencies in the war on drugs? The differences in reaction ap​parently derived from three separate causes. For the NRA and its followers, the use of coercive force to enforce firearms Jaws lacked legitimacy because the firearms laws lacked legitimacy. In addition, criti​cism of the raid and increased fear of ATF served their political agenda. For a portion of the popula​tion who saw the raid as a conflict between the power of the secular state and unpopular religious views, the raid was an unacceptable repression of re​ligion. Finally, civil libertarians, typified by the American Civil Liberties Union, and radical liber​tarians, such as militia members, objected to virtu​ally all uses of coercive force by the government. Representative Hyde appears to represent this final view, which recoils when confronted with the un​masked use of force, except in narrowly construed circumstances of self-defense. U.S. culture has dis​played a dichotomous pattern with regard to use of coercive force by government. In general, govern​ment authority and coercive means of enforcing it have been distrusted, yet this pattern has reversed when the subjects of the action are perceived as evil or alien.

The agents investigating the case invoked orga​nizational routine and proceeded to obtain a search warrant. Their actions constituted standard practice given the existence of probable cause of a crime under their jurisdiction, related criminal activity, in​terest from the United States attorney, and the need for physical evidence to establish proof of a crime. Although the involvement of a religious sect distin​guished this case from others, the investigation had followed familiar patterns that invoked familiar tech​nology and routines. The next phase of the investi​gation also involved familiar technology and routines, but the magnitude of the operation ex​ceeded anything ATF had previously undertaken.

…The organizational failure began as a failure of management to comprehend the implications of this change in magnitude, thus management made only incremental adjustments to adapt.

The evolving nature of ATF’s mission and task environment combined with promotion patterns to produce a top level of management with little or no applicable experience for overseeing the Waco op​eration. Aggravated by the common bureaucratic pattern of assigning authority based on position rather than experience, knowledge, or skill, this lack of managerial experience resulted in a severe lack of overall command and control. Conversely, the Special Response Team commanders, who were ex​perienced supervisors with extensive experience in police and military tactical operations, enjoyed sub​stantial credibility. The result was an operation in which the operational level was far more qualified than the management level. This was not unusual in ATF and normally would have had only limited im​plications. In this case, however, command and control capacity was necessary, particularly in as​suring that intelligence was gathered, analyzed, dis​persed, and utilized. The entire Department of the Treasury report is critical of command and control, with particular emphasis on poor intelligence support.

Functions such as intelligence, operational secu​rity, and overall command and control had not been well developed in ATF because normal ATF opera​tions could not justify the expenditure of resources for training specialists. Therefore, managers had very little opportunity to develop command and control skills. These are essentially military concepts, al​though law enforcement, firefighting, and civil defense require command and control in circum​stances such as riots and natural disasters. Mainte​nance of command and control capabilities requires an organization to either engage actual experience or practice under realistic simulation utilizing all the organizational components. The military maintains these skills at substantial cost in training and simu​lation, but law enforcement historically does not. For instance, the Los Angeles Police Department’s failure to respond effectively and rapidly to the 1 993 riots reflected a failure in command and control. Law enforcement agencies commit virtually all their resources to routine daily operations. Budgets have not allowed for the overstaffing necessary to conduct large-scale tactical training operations or maintain reserve forces for emergencies. At the federal level, only the FBI maintains a full-time tactical team with full logistical support. Even that team, which repre​sents less than 1 percent of the FBI’s agent staffing, did not exist prior to the mid-1980s.

Many of the problems might still have been avoided if ATF managers had been innovative thinkers who recognized the potential risks, asked hypothetical questions, or invoked different para​digms. This was not the case. ATF law enforcement had cultivated managers and staff for their loyalty and dependability, not for their innovation and in​tellect. Associate Director Daniel Hartnett was well known throughout the agency as a person uncom​fortable with change and dissent. He did not seek out alternate points of view nor cultivate hypothetical discussions. The operational plan for the raid, for in​stance, was not reviewed or critiqued by ATF’s Headquarters Enforcement Staff. Although they were briefed by the Houston SAC and others regarding the investigation, the raid briefing was given to only Hartnett and Conroy. Higgins, who had come up through the regulatory side of ATF, had no expertise or background in tactical operations. This, no doubt, reinforced his tendency to delegate operations to those who, in his mind, had the expertise.

In spite of the fact that the operation appeared on the surface to be similar to past ATF operations, it was not. Excepting the Marion and CSA cases, this situation was not like anything ever faced by ATF. It was, in fact, more dangerous than any operation conducted by a law enforcement agency in the his​tory of the United States. The level of danger was not fully evident to the Special Response Team (SRT) su​pervisors who planned the raid, utilizing intelligence information that was not properly collected, ana​lyzed, or disseminated. The planners never accepted the worst-case scenario, that is, that the occupants would resist en masse, using firearms.

The Decision to Use Dynamic Entry

Critics of ATF and the Waco raid have repeatedly characterized it as some sort of poorly planned pub​licity stunt directed by ATF management for the pur​pose of enhancing the agency’s image. This characterization reflects a misunderstanding of both ATF’s structure and procedures. ATF’s management has never successfully controlled the field activities of its law enforcement personnel. ATF’s law en​forcement component displays the combined traits of what James Q. Wilson calls craft and coping or​ganizations. These organizations are characterized by very limited management control of operators. Al​though headquarters originated the concept for some projects, such as Project CUE and the ACES, indi​vidual agents always initiate the actual investiga​tions. ATF management has attempted to capitalize on visible activity, as has the management of most agencies.

In the case of Waco, much of the criticism has fo​cused on the actions of Sharon Wheeler, the public information officer for the Dallas Division. Wheeler has stated that she was directed by Dallas SAC Ted Royster to obtain weekend contact telephone num​bers for Dallas television news organizations. Wheeler told the contacts at the stations that she wanted the numbers because something important might be happening in the area over the weekend. This evidenced an effort by Royster to capitalize on an expected success at Waco to obtain favorable publicity, not a headquarters-directed plan to con​coct the Waco raid for publicity.

Ironically, the Waco operation did turn into the biggest press event in ATF’s history. The disastrous mistakes in planning, command and control, intel​ligence, and post raid response resulted in the press quickly dubbing the operation as the “bungled Waco raid.” A combination of sloppy research and outright fabrication have received wider acceptance than otherwise might have been the case had the main​stream press not laid the groundwork through the repetition of stories characterizing the raid as bun​gled, without more detailed explanation.

The attempts to characterize Waco as the bungling of an incompetent agency, or worse, as a deliberately illegal attack on peaceful citizens, serve only to conceal the very serious issues raised by the events. The command and control and intelligence failures that plagued this operation would very likely reoccur in most law enforcement agencies, given a similar problem. Although extensive planning and preparation had preceded the raid, a close exami​nation of the planning process reveals a very funda​mental dilemma. Even with adequate intelligence, planning, and command and control, there may be no legally and socially acceptable means of dealing with situations like those confronted at Mount Carmel. A review of the testimony given at the 1995 House hearings reveals a curious pattern. Numerous witnesses are critical of ATF’s choice of tactics, but no alternative that allowed for all known difficulties was offered. Each alternative had its own potential risks, and calculating the risk level requires sub​stantial speculation. Although a siege-and-wait op​tion appears to be favored by agencies after Waco, this strategy forfeits all initiative to the violators, es​tablishes a precedent of rewarding the threat of force​ful resistance, creates immense costs, and risks mass suicide.

Once the probable cause for a warrant had been developed and the decision made that no other course was available, the issue was how the warrant should be served. Two other options were available to ATF, although both so violated the values and routines of the field agents that top-level manage​ment would have had to invoke them. ATF could have ignored the violations, and taken no action. This could have been done by simply closing the case and ignoring the evidence of violations or by making the very questionable assumption that Ko​resh had not intentionally violated the law and by ne​gotiating a voluntary surrender of the firearms. ATF has done both in the past when political risk ap​peared unacceptable. None of the factors that would support such approaches were present, however. Koresh appeared to constitute a potential threat to public safety and to be engaged in other criminal ac​tivity, precluding the argument that the violations were innocent mistakes by a law-abiding citizen. The magnitude and nature of the violations also in​validated such an interpretation. The United States attorney showed interest in the case, thus depriving ATF of any justification for dropping it due to lack of prosecutive potential. Finally, the referral of the case to local authorities would have been difficult, given the earlier request by those authorities for ATF as​sistance. Had ATF failed to take any action and had Koresh and his followers taken some violent action similar to the Jonestown massacre or the Tokyo sub​way gassings, the agency would likely have been the focus of intense criticism from many of its current critics.

A far more professionally and politically prudent approach would have been to request the FBI HRT to effect the service of the warrant. The HRT was clearly the most highly trained and best-equipped law enforcement tactical group in the United States. Although the operation might well have been be​yond their capabilities and likewise ended in disas​ter, ATF would have been politically buffered. Although this would have been a politically shrewd move, and the FBI hardly could have avoided ac​cepting the challenge, it would have met a firestorm of resistance within ATF. At both the management and operational levels, ATF had spent twenty years attempting to differentiate itself from the FBI. Even when ATF actions were critical to an investigation, joint participation with the FBI assured that ATF would be relegated to a minor role in the eyes of the press and public. ATF Special Response Teams had been created largely to preclude the need to turn to the FBI. There is no indication in the official record or in any informal discussion that this alternative was ever considered, though it might have been the best option for ATF.

Four SRT team leaders, each with substantial tac​tical experience, planned the raid. The planners had information from local officials, former Davidians, neighbors, and an ongoing undercover operation. ATF had placed several agents, posing as students enrolled in a nearby technical college, in a house ad​jacent to the compound. One of the agents, Robert Rodriguez, had established contact with Koresh. This residence provided a surveillance post to observe the compound but afforded the agents a view of only one entrance.

The planners considered three options: a siege, the arrest of Koresh away from the compound com​bined with a raid or siege, and a dynamic entry. Ini​tially favored, the siege option faced the problems of a lack of cover for agents and the presence of .50-caliber weapons. The range of these weapons re​quired a parameter beyond ATF’s capabilities. The most influential of the raid planners, William Buford, shifted from a position favoring a siege to one ad​vocating dynamic entry. Buford stated that he changed his position primarily in response to infor​mation from former Davidians that convinced him the group might engage in mass suicide and that ad​equate supplies existed on the compound to hold out for at least three months and likely longer. The plan​ners also believed that a siege would result in the de​struction of most of the evidence, nullifying the purpose of the search. Finally, the planners faced the possibility an assault might still be necessary if a siege failed, albeit against a far more prepared tar​get.

Based on information that the men in the group usually worked outside during the day in a large ex​cavation, referred to as “the pit,” and that weapons were locked in an arms room, a dynamic entry be​came the favored option. This is not surprising in light of the fact that SRT's were created primarily to engage in dynamic entry. Originally designated “entry control teams,” their primary role consisted of making initial entries on arrest and search warrants. Dynamic entry constituted their core technology, their reason for being. Team members had experi​enced great success with this methodology as had members of tactical teams across the country.

Unfortunately, the decision was predicated on faulty information. Apparently, the men did not work in the pit regularly, and the arms were sometimes dis​tributed and stored in the members’ rooms. Numer​ous other intelligence oversights occurred, thus providing an inadequate and undependable infor​mation basis for planning the operation. Planners did not seriously prepare for the contingency that the women might forcefully resist. The plan also lacked adequate checks to assure that no changes had taken place. Finally, no contingency plan was developed to extract the agents and secure the compound if there was an ambush. In retrospect, it appears clear that in spite of the awareness of the large number of weapons and the apocalyptic rhetoric of Koresh, the planners just did not contemplate that they would face armed resistance by a significant number of oc​cupants. The Treasury report attributes this to an as​sumption that the ATF presence would intimidate the Davidians.

The truth is likely even more complex. Although the planners accepted the concept of risk as an abstract reality, they had never observed or experi​enced such massive armed resistance in a domestic law enforcement setting. It was simply not an inter​nalized reality. Similar assumptions had cost the lives of two FBI agents in Miami several years before. Similar inability to foresee risk appears in interna​tional relations, despite the availability of extensive intelligence and large planning staffs. To explain the inability to comprehend such risks is to explain why the United States was surprised at Pearl Harbor, the Soviets by the Nazi invasion, or the United Nations Forces by the intervention of the Chinese in Korea. To some extent, the operation of a civil law en​forcement function requires the assumption that cit​izens will rationally respond to authority and submit. Without such an assumption, police would routinely have to strike first.

An effort to enlist the aid of the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services to lure Koresh out of the compound failed when managers at that agency refused cooperation. Having been advised by former members and the case worker from Protec​tive and Regulatory Services that Koresh seldom left the compound, and having failed to confirm his de​parture through surveillance from the undercover residence near the compound, the planners con​cluded that arresting Koresh away from the com​pound was not practical. This conclusion now appears to have been reached prematurely without adequate intelligence collection and analysis. Al​though the planners may have reached their con​clusions prematurely, their decision may not have been incorrect. Subsequent reports that Koresh left the compound on several occasions do not essen​tially imply he could have been arrested away from the compound. Arresting a potentially violent person away from a fortified stronghold and weapons is clearly a desirable tactic. Use of this strategy requires some predictability in the subject’s departure, how​ever. Random occasional forays present planners with the need to keep an arrest team on constant alert without being detected. Because the search warrant service would have to be coordinated with the ar​rest, this team would also have to be ready to act on a moment’s notice. A mistake in the identity of the individual leaving the compound would have com​promised the entire operation, as would detection of the arrest or search teams by the press or others.

The Plan

Convinced that no alternative means allowed the entry team to avoid or easily overcome resistance, the planners turned to the technology most familiar to them, dynamic entry. Once committed to this op​tion, they followed a common pattern by both at​tempting to perfect the plan and ignoring its most troubling potential weaknesses. The failure to plan for contingencies, such as the evacuation of the raid​ing party in the case of an ambush, likely reflects the fact that admitting such contingencies would have undermined support for the plan. Such a contin​gency was beyond ATF’s ability to respond to, both practically and politically. For instance, providing for intense covering fire or aggressive use of armor to allow a withdrawal would have raised questions that could not have been answered. To plan for such contingencies would have constituted an admission that the operation presented a higher risk than ATF management would have accepted. Combined with weak management oversight and poor intelligence, the tendency to avoid facing worst-case scenarios re​sulted in underestimating the downside risks of the raid plan. In spite of the tactical competency of the planners, intense preparation for the raid, and ded​icated personnel, the raid turned into a disaster for ATF.

The final plan was to serve the arrest and search warrants at 10:00 A.M. on Monday, March 1, 1993. The planners expected that most of the men would be working outside in the construction area known as the pit, thus separated from the women and chil​dren, and more importantly from the weapons. The plan called for the use of three SRI teams, from Houston, Dallas, and New Orleans, to make the entry along with additional agents, who would func​tion as arrest teams. In all, the raiding party would number seventy-five agents. Although the special agents in charge from each of the three field divisions would be present, the Houston SAC would exercise overall command, since Waco was in the Houston District. Although a veteran agent and former police officer, Houston SAC Philip Chojnacki had no spe​cial expertise or training in tactical operations. He delegated planning oversight to his assistant special agent in charge (ASAC), Charles Sarabyn. As the su​pervisor of the SRT, Sarabyn had received SRT train​ing but was relatively young and had only limited tactical experience. As had been the ATF pattern, po​sition and not specific knowledge or background drove the selection of key personnel, a practice that received harsh criticism by the Treasury review.

Raid planners made advance arrangements for a command post and a separate assembly point for the agents, both several miles from the compound. New Orleans ASAC Jim Cavanaugh was assigned to the undercover house for the purpose of exercising over​all command there. The plan also called for advance placement of several forward observer, or sniper, teams on two sides of the compound. All the agents involved were required to wear blue tactical uni​forms with badges and the letters ATF in gold clearly visible on them. Each agent would also wear a bullet-resistant vest and helmet. A small number of agents were assigned to carry AR-15 rifles, and sev​eral others would carry MP-5 carbines or subma​chine guns. Only the AR-15 rifles assigned to the forward observers had the capacity to effectively penetrate walls. The MP-5s and the pistols carried by all agents utilized a low-velocity, 9-mm cartridge and were useful only in a direct confrontation and not for returning fire against barricaded opponents. The arms allocated reflected the planners’ assump​tion that agents would make entry quickly and face risk only from isolated individuals inside the com​pound.

Assigned to secure the arms room, the New Or​leans SRT would first have to scale the roof and enter the second story through the windows. The primary entry team, consisting of agents from the Houston and Dallas SRT’s, would sprint for the front door, an​nounce their identity and purpose, and make entry. Other teams were designated to control the men in the pit and control the dogs. In the service of any search warrant, officers must first locate and control all the occupants to assure the safety of the officers and occupants and prevent the destruction of evi​dence. This is normally accomplished by sweeping the premises quickly, searching, disarming, and moving all occupants to a central location. Although occupants may leave, officers have authority to con​trol any who do not. The search of Mount Carmel did not differ from other warrants in this regard, except that clearing a complex of this size and locating and controlling approximately a hundred people pre​sented tactical problems exponentially more difficult than those normally encountered when clearing a house or apartment.

Planners made extensive preparations for emer​gency medical care of any injured persons. Agents designated and trained as emergency medical tech​nicians received additional training from Army Spe​cial Forces medics, and emergency supplies were stockpiled. In addition, ATF arranged to have am​bulances available on standby for the morning of the raid, a preparation that would contribute to the ulti​mate disaster. After assembling in Waco, the entire raid team engaged in a series of rehearsals at the army’s urban warfare training facilities at nearby Fort Hood, Texas. Army Special Forces advisers critiqued and advised the rehearsals and made suggestions for improvements.

The Execution

One of the agents residing in the residence near the compound, Robert Rodriguez, had established con​tact with Koresh. Rodriguez went to the compound regularly and talked with Koresh about religion and biblical teaching, and they sometimes went shoot​ing together. As the raid became more imminent, the undercover agent’s role was transformed from in​vestigation to collection of tactical intelligence. Ul​timately, Rodriguez played a critical role, not only in the investigation but also in the aftermath that shook AIF to its roots.

Although the raid was originally scheduled for Monday, March 1, 1993, external events acceler​ated the date. The local Waco newspaper, the Tribune-Herald, had been pursuing a story on Ko​resh and the Davidians since the spring of 1992. In October 1992, a reporter contacted the office of the United States attorney for information on Koresh, and the United States attorney informed ATF of the request. Subsequently, ATF and the United States Attorney’s Office received information that the paper had prepared a feature story titled “The Sin​ful Messiah” for publication. The story included much of the information that had been gathered during the ATF investigation including allegations of child molestation and abuse and information re​garding acquisition of firearms. On February 1, 1993, ASAC Sarabyn and Group Supervisor Earl Dunagan met with the managing editor of the paper and requested a delay in the publication of the ar​ticle, offering “front-row seats” to the paper in any upcoming law enforcement action. AIF represen​tatives continued to meet with the paper in efforts to secure a delay in the publication of the article on the assumption that its publication would alert Ko​resh and heighten security at the compound. In so doing they compromised operational security, al​though this may have been worth the risk if they had been successful.

As the raid date approached, ATF personnel be​came convinced that the “Sinful Messiah” article would be published on Sunday, February 28. In fact, the article was scheduled for Saturday, Febru​ary 27. Special Agent in Charge Chojnacki pushed his tactical commander, Sarabyn, to move the raid up to Saturday; however, Sarabyn indicated that Sunday was the earliest possible date. The date of the raid could not easily be altered. Almost a hun​dred agents had to be brought to Waco, equipped, briefed, and rehearsed. Once set in motion, the mechanics of the operation largely dictated the timeline. Thus, through a series of unfortunate cir​cumstances, the agents would arrive the day after Koresh became agitated and alarmed by an article that accused him of criminal activity and implied strong law enforcement interest in his activities. The efforts to serve the warrant before the publication of the story resulted in scheduling for the day on which Koresh would be most focused on and agitated by the article.

While the teams assembled and prepared for the operation, ATF headquarters notified the office of the assistant secretary of the treasury for enforcement of the pending operation in a one-page memorandum. The notification arrived at Treasury on the afternoon of Friday, February 26, 1993. On the same date, ATF was notified by the Tribune-Herald that the “Sinful Messiah” story would run the next day. Events were beginning to move beyond the capacity of the ATF managers to evaluate and respond to them.

After receiving notification on Friday afternoon, Acting Assistant Secretary John Simpson contacted Director Higgins and notified him that ATF should not go forward with the operation at this time. Hig​gins subsequently re-contacted Simpson after con​ferring with Associate Director Hartnett, who, in turn, conferred with Chojnacki. Higgins provided additional information on the raid and assured Simp​son that the plan would allow ATF to avoid the dan​ger of the Davidians’ weaponry and protect the children present. Higgins also assured Simpson that the undercover agent, Rodriguez, would reenter the compound before the raid and assure that no prepa​rations were being made by the Davidians to resist ATF.

Unknown to Higgins and others in ATF, who were focused on making last-minute preparations and satisfying Treasury concerns, an even more crit​ical element in the unfolding events had already taken place. Word of the pending action by ATF had leaked from the newspaper to a local television news reporter. Another employee of television station KWTX had determined from a friend, who was em​ployed as a dispatcher by a Waco ambulance ser​vice, that ATF had requested that ambulances be placed on standby for Sunday morning. On Saturday the newspaper article appeared and local attention was specifically focused on the Branch Davidians and any potential law enforcement action. By piec​ing together their knowledge of an ongoing ATF in​vestigation with the request for ambulances, the local television news staff and newspaper reporters had both concluded that some sort of action was scheduled for Sunday.

All components for a disaster were now on an in​tersecting course. Momentum had taken over the ATF operation, which could not be delayed, only canceled. Local news staffs had correctly concluded the location and approximate time for ATF activity. Publication of an article accusing Koresh of crimes and implying imminent law enforcement action had raised awareness and suspicion at the compound to a peak. And finally, ATF had divided its command structure across several layers, with no single person in a position to exercise overall control. Worse yet, it appears that at least some in that chain of com​mand conceptually focused solely on overt prepa​rations by the Davidians as the criteria for aborting the operation, while others believed that any com​promise of the element of surprise would precipitate an abort order. This resulted in a fragmentation in command without even those involved fully com​prehending that this had occurred. Any decision to abort was made even more difficult by the lack of any alternative options and by the fact that those ac​tively involved in and overwhelmed by the opera​tional details were the only ones who were positioned to make the final call. The pending dis​aster resulted as much from faulty structure and plan​ning as any error in execution of the operation. An operation of this magnitude has immense inertia. To terminate such an operation requires organizational and moral authority, self-confidence, reliable infor​mation, courage, and detachment. Although key par​ticipants collectively possessed these elements, they were not concentrated in a single individual.

Saturday, February 27, 1993

On Saturday, February 27, 1993, the final elements of the raiding party came together in the Waco area with intensive activity, including establishing a com​mand post at the Texas State Technical College cam​pus, housing personnel in over 150 motel rooms, and moving ATF bomb trucks and National Guard helicopters into the area. Although ATF made an ef​fort to maintain operational security, the sheer size of the operation rendered this effort largely ineffec​tual.

On Saturday morning, Rodriguez attended a wor​ship service at the compound and reported that Ko​resh preached about the “Sinful Messiah” article and told his followers that “they” were coming after him. He did not specify who “they” were, but told the fol​lowers to remain calm and do what he had told them to do. What actions might be taken by Koresh were not clear to Rodriguez. That afternoon Rodriguez met with SAC Chojnacki and reported this informa​tion. Chojnacki’s specific questions related to prepa​rations for combat by the Davidians, and Rodriguez reported that he had seen none. The role of analyz​ing intelligence was clearly being commingled with command. The planners lost much of the value of their inside source by focusing exclusively on overt preparations by the Davidians for armed resistance as indicators of danger. Rodriguez returned to the compound at 5:00 P.M. and remained until midnight. Assistant Special Agent in Charge Sarabyn instructed Rodriguez to return to the compound the next morn​ing to make a final check on conditions and to exit the compound by 9:15 A.M. Rodriguez, concerned for his own safety, reluctantly agreed to return but expressed concern that his actions were likely to arouse suspicion and that he might have difficulty ex​iting on time.

Sunday, February 28, 1993

At 5:00 A.M. seventy-six agents consisting of the three SRT teams and the supporting entry teams assembled at Fort Hood. They then traveled by vehicle to the designated assembly point, the Bellmead Civic Cen​ter. The large collection of agents, dressed in distinct blue uniforms with ATF in large letters on the front and back, and the numerous vehicles created a very conspicuous scene. At 8:00 A.M., Sarabyn briefed the raid personnel inside the center. Three Texas

National Guard helicopters arrived at the Texas State Technical College, and Division Chief Andy Vita opened a command center at ATF headquarters in Washington. Concurrent with the last-minute ATF preparations, news personnel from both the Tribune-Herald and KWTX Television, who had collectively analyzed their information to conclude activity was likely on Sunday, set out for the compound. Amaz​ingly, no evidence has emerged from either the Trea​sury review or the subsequent congressional hearings that the extensive movement of agents compromised the operation. This was most likely the result of accident than any action by ATF, as the size of the operation made it impossible to conceal.

If fortune favored ATF on the one hand, it re​voked the favor with the other. ATF had arranged for police to isolate the compound with roadblocks im​mediately before the raid on Sunday morning. The decision to hold off the roadblocks until the last minute to avoid attracting attention allowed the re​porters, who started early in the morning, to move very close to the compound before the roadblocks were established. At least one Texas Department of Public Safety officer and agents in the undercover house became aware of the reporters’ presence. Al​though the agents relayed the reporters’ presence to ASAC Cavanaugh, who was in command at the un​dercover house, no procedures existed to process and utilize this information. KWTX cameraman Jim Peeler became lost. Although he requested direc​tions from his office by cellular telephone, he was still unable to find the compound. He encountered David Jones, a rural mail carrier in a vehicle bearing a “U.S. Mail” sign, and asked for directions to the compound. Unknown to Peeler, Jones was a Da​vidian follower. During the ensuing conversation Peeler advised that some type of law enforcement action might be taking place there that morning and that there could be shooting. Jones drove directly to the compound to report the information.

At 8:00 A.M. on February 28, Rodriguez again went to the compound. Koresh invited him to join a Bible study session with Koresh and two other Da​vidians. Shortly after David Jones drove to the com​pound, his father, Perry Jones, called Koresh out of the Bible study group for a telephone call. Koresh ini​tially ignored the request. Perry Jones then told him that the call was from England and Koresh left the room to take the call. When Koresh returned, he ap​peared agitated, had trouble holding the Bible, and could not talk. When Rodriguez asked him what was wrong, Koresh responded that “neither the ATF nor the National Guard will ever get me.” He then walked to the window, looked out, and stated, “They’re coming, Robert. The time has come.” He repeated, “They’re coming, Robert, they’re coming.” Rodriguez became alarmed for his own safety, not​ing that other Davidians had entered the room, ef​fectively cutting him off from the door. He made an excuse that he had a breakfast appointment and left, driving directly to the undercover house near the compound.

Warning Ignored

Rodriguez immediately reported the events at the compound to Cavanaugh at the undercover house, who instructed Rodriguez to call Sarabyn. Sarabyn asked a series of questions relating to the presence of weapons and specific preparations from a pre​pared list, to which Rodriguez responded in the neg​ative. Sarabyn then asked what the people in the compound were doing when Rodriguez left, and Ro​driguez responded that they were praying. Sarabyn and Cavanaugh discussed the situation at the com​pound, and Cavanaugh advised that he could see no overt signs of preparation there. Sarabyn then went to the tarmac where Dallas special agent in charge Ted Royster and Chojnacki were preparing to board National Guard helicopters. Over the noise of the helicopters, which were warming up, Sarabyn and Chojnacki held an impromptu conference that would decide the fate of agents and Davidians alike.

The exact content of the discussion remains in contention. Sarabyn and Chojnacki were subse​quently dismissed from ATF employment over their actions and Royster was transferred to a far less im​portant and desirable assignment. Regardless of the exact words, the general focus can be reconstructed from events, statements, and the subsequent testi​mony of the participants. The discussion apparently focused on specific preparations for resistance by the Davidians and not on loss of the element of surprise. No doubt, momentum played a significant role, as did the fractured command structure, lack of pre​planning for this specific contingency, the physical location of the discussion, haste, and some break​down in communication as information was passed from Rodriguez to Sarabyn to Chojnacki. Regardless of the relative importance attributed to specific causes, this constituted the most critical moment of organizational and individual failure. Although cir​cumstances and command structure contributed sig​nificantly to their mistake, the failure of Chojnacki and Sarabyn to cancel the raid at this moment con​stituted the most grievous error in the entire chain of events leading to the disaster at Waco.

Chojnacki returned to the command post and called the ATF headquarters communication center. He notified them that Rodriguez was out and that the raid was going forward. He then returned to the he​licopters and both he and Royster departed. Sarabyn left for the staging area where he told agents that Ko​resh was aware ATF and the National Guard were coming and that they had to hurry. Rodriguez sub​sequently arrived at the command post, but Sarabyn had already left for the staging area. Rodriguez tes​tified at the House hearings that he was emotionally distraught and shocked that the raid had not been aborted. What seemed clear to Rodriguez and to most that have examined the events subsequently was apparently not clear to Chojnacki and Sarabyn. They somehow focused exclusively on what actions Koresh took in response to his discovery of the pend​ing raid. Others, including Rodriguez, understood the discovery alone was the critical piece of infor​mation.

At about 9:25 A.M., the raid team left the staging area, concealed in two large cattle trailers towed by pickups, a familiar sight in rural Texas. Sarabyn rode in the cab of the first truck and maintained constant contact with Cavanaugh at the safe house, who re​ported no signs of unusual activity at that location. Ironically, the raid likely would have been canceled if even a couple of armed sentries had been ob​served. However, the possibility of an ambush seems to have been outside the parameters considered by the raid commanders.

Prior to the arrival of the two trailers, the plan called for the helicopters to create a diversion. How​ever, the helicopters arrived concurrently with the trailers. When the helicopters were about 350 me​ters from the compound they began receiving fire from the compound and turned away. They landed in a nearby field and conducted an inspection that revealed two of the aircraft had been hit. It has been alleged by some that the helicopters fired on the compound. These were not attack helicopters. Thus they carried no armament other than the 9-mm pis​tols carried by the agents. These weapons would have been highly ineffectual against a structure at any range and virtually useless firing from a moving helicopter at 350 meters. The rotor noise from the he​licopters would have masked the sound from small-caliber weapons, making it virtually impossible for compound residents to hear gunfire from the heli​copters. Aimed rifle fire from the ground, however, would have posed a threat to the aircraft.

The two trucks and trailers carrying the ATF agents pulled up along the southwest side of the compound. The first vehicle carried the Dallas agents, who were assigned the front door, and a por​tion of the Houston agents, who were assigned the pit area. The second vehicle carried the rest of the Houston agents and the New Orleans agents, who were assigned to move around the northeast side of the compound, scale the roof, and secure the arms room on the second floor. The first agents out of the vehicles were equipped with fire extinguishers to repel dogs, a common raid practice. As agents raced toward the front door, Koresh stepped outside and shouted, “What’s going on here?” The agents, who were wearing helmets and distinct blue uniforms with badges and the letters ATF on the chest, re​sponded by identifying themselves and shouting, “Freeze and get down.” Koresh stepped back inside and closed the doors. Immediately thereafter, gun​fire erupted through the front door, wounding one agent. Cavanaugh later testified before the House Joint Subcommittee that the fire from inside was so intense that the door appeared to bulge out. The agents dispersed for any cover they could find as they were subjected to attack by automatic weapons fire and hand grenades.

The New Orleans SRT moved around the east side of the building and scaled the roof using a lad​der. Seven agents climbed to the roof while an eighth provided cover from the ground. Kenny King, Con​way LeBleu, Todd McKeehan, and David Millen went to the northwest pitch, where they came under heavy fire. McKeehan and LeBleu were killed out​right, and King was shot six times. Badly wounded, King rolled off the roof into a courtyard, where he would remain for almost two hours, undetected by the Davidians. Millen retreated over the ridge of the roof to the southeast pitch and joined agents Jordan, Buford, and Constantino, who had made entry through a window into what had been identified as the arms room. Millen positioned himself at the win​dow. The Davidians fired through the walls and floor of the room with automatic weapons, wounding Bu​ford three times and Jordan twice. The bullets fired through the interior walls of the room exited the ex​terior wall near Millen, who also was being sub​jected to automatic weapons fire through the roof from below. The combined fire forced him to retreat to the ground. This sequence of events was captured by television news footage, as was Jordan’s earlier entry into the window. The wounded agents escaped back out through the window and dropped to the ground. Remaining behind to cover the exit of the wounded agents, Constantino was confronted by a male subject with an assault rifle, who entered the room immediately after the two agents escaped. Constantino fired and the subject fell. Constantino then jumped through the window, striking his head as he did. He subsequently fell from the roof and was severely injured in the fall. Both Constantino and Bu​ford were pulled to safety by other agents. Although it has received little attention in the aftermath of Waco, ATF agents performed repeated acts of courage in rescuing and treating injured comrades while under fire, returning fire in a disciplined man​ner while in exposed and vulnerable positions, and retrieving wounded and dead agents under the guns of the Davidians. Although television and movies often portray police performing heroically under fire, few actually experience exposure to gunfire and very few encounter sustained fire. The performance of the agents is even more commendable if one un​derstands that they were not trained nor prepared for such eventualities. Their experience was more akin to Normandy or Iwo Jima than to policing.

The agents huddled behind any available cover outside the compound and returned fire as best they could, although their weapons were poorly suited to the task. The forward observers, or snipers, kept up a steady fire against the windows. Although they were firing from far greater distance and had a slower rate of fire, their superior weapons actually posed the greatest threat to the Davidians. Close observation of the films of the events reveals that the Davidians uti​lized their volume of fire rather than exercising fire discipline. This likely resulted from a lack of train​ing and experience combined with the ATF return fire. Had the Davidians engaged in effective target identification and produced disciplined, aimed fire, ATF casualties would have been catastrophic. As it was, fifteen of the agents on the ground suffered gun​shot wounds, of whom two, Steven Willis and Robert Williams, died. In addition, seven agents were wounded by grenade fragments, and several others received substantial injuries.

Cease-Fire

At 9:48 A.M., within a minute of the raid’s onset, the McLennan County Sheriff’s Department received a 911 call from Wayne Martin, a resident at the com​pound. Although the deputy could hear gunfire, he could not get Martin to talk with him, and after four​teen minutes, someone at the compound hung up the phone. The Sheriff’s Department called back, using the number that appeared automatically on their screen, and reestablished contact with the com​pound but was unable to reach their liaison officer at the ATF command post, whose radio had been turned off. For almost two hours, periodic contact was made between various compound occupants and the Sheriff’s Department and ATF. It was during one of these calls that Koresh stated that they were under attack and demanded that everyone get off the property.

Eventually, Cavanaugh established communica​tion with Steve Schneider and negotiated a cease-fire. No formal hierarchy designated positions for members, but Schneider functioned as a key assis​tant and spokesman for Koresh. Once both sides stopped shooting, negotiations continued over re​moval of the dead and wounded and withdrawal of the agents from their locations immediately around the compound. Schneider initially demanded im​mediate withdrawal, but Cavanaugh refused to do so until the dead and wounded were removed. Even​tually, Schneider agreed to allow the seriously wounded King to be removed by four agents, who retrieved him from the rear courtyard utilizing a lad​der as an improvised stretcher. A few minutes later, Schneider agreed to allow the removal of the re​maining dead and injured agents, and there was a general withdrawal by ATF.

Because there were no contingency plans for the events that occurred, there were no plans for con​trolling the scene in the aftermath. The perimeter around the compound was not secured. This was a direct result of several factors, including a combi​nation of command breakdown, inadequate proce​dures, and efforts by the ATF management structure to direct events from Washington. Local and state of​ficers responded to the scene by closing all roads, but the Davidians could have walked away en masse. ATF agents did intercept Davidians attempting to enter the compound in two instances. In one in​stance, a group of Davidians attempting to make their way from a shop away from the main com​pound engaged in a gunfight with agents, and one Davidian was killed. Although individual agents did seek out and perform necessary tasks, the command structure essentially ceased to function.

Although ATF management quickly dispatched three additional SRT's to Waco, a request for the FBI H RT was made immediately after the cease-fire. ATF, Treasury and the FBI reached agreement that ATF would relinquish control of the scene to the FBI if the HRT was deployed. Ironically, a request for the HRT to serve the warrant might have spared ATF much of the political attack that subsequently was directed to​ward it. The HRT would have faced the same logis​tical problems encountered by ATF, and the results might have proved equally disastrous. The FBI, how​ever, would have been far better positioned to weather the political and media storm. The FBI en​joyed a large reservoir of public recognition and sup​port and lacked a well-organized opposition devoted to attacking their every action. It would, therefore, have offered a far less inviting target for ridicule by the media or politicians. Turning to the FBI after the disaster, on the other hand, simply reinforced pub​lic perceptions of ATF incompetence among the media, politicians, and the public.

By March 2, 1993, the FBI had assumed opera​tional control of the Waco scene. Cavanaugh, who continued negotiations after the withdrawal, con​tinued his role as negotiator under FBI direction and succeeded in obtaining the release of some of the children in the compound. Although ATF manage​ment’s initial concern focused on the injured and dead agents, their attention soon turned to deter​mining what went wrong and ultimately to provid​ing a public explanation.

Retrospective*

On April 19, 1993, the FBI attempted to end the nearly two-month-long standoff with the Branch Davidians that began with the ATF raid. As FBI armored vehicles battered the buildings and inserted tear gas, the occupants refused repeated requests to surren​der. Ultimately, they engaged in a mass suicide by means of firearms and fire. This suicide by fire on live television assured that the events at Waco would re​main a media focus for some time. Three years later, April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh, a young former soldier and opponent of government and gun laws, bombed the federal building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people in apparent retaliation for the deaths in Waco. In an ironic twist, a newly elected conservative majority in Congress responded to the Oklahoma City bombing with an investigation of Waco.

For ATF, the problems of Waco did not end with the transfer of the scene to the FBI. ATF Associate Director Dan Hartnett continued to appear in press conferences for several days with the FBI on-scene commander. During these appearances, Hartnett continued to deny that ATF had any advance warn​ing of the dangers waiting for them within the Da​vidian compound. Although the Texas Rangers conducted the criminal investigation of the events surrounding the raid at the request of the Depart​ment of Justice to avoid any taint of bias by ATF or the FBI, ATF initiated its own internal shooting re​view. This review quickly revealed that the raid commanders had become aware that David Koresh knew of the pending raid and that the commanders chose not to call the raid off. When Hartnett was advised of this information, he immediately con​tacted the Special Agent in Charge in Houston and was assured that the raid leaders did not have ade​quate reason to call off the raid. Hartnett continued to inform Director Steve Higgins that this was the case and ordered all personnel to so inform the press.

Outraged agents quickly “blew the lid off” the official ATF version. As press accounts emerged, Higgins finally realized that he had not been served well by his deputy, but it was too late. The Secre​tary of the Treasury ordered an extensive investi​gation that ultimately resulted in Higgins, Hartnett and Hartnett’s deputy accepting early retirement. Houston Special Agent in Charge Chojnacki and Assistant Special Agent in Charge Sarabyn were both dismissed, although both eventually were re​instated to non-law enforcement positions on ap​peal.

Hartnett’s intense agency loyalty and conserva​tive nature had served both himself and the agency poorly. Higgins’s openness and trust in Hartnett had done the same. At a moment when brutal honesty and self-examination might have allowed managers to quickly respond to a disastrous situation, man​agers had chosen to believe what was comfortable. ATF’s lack of experience with high-profile events no doubt exacerbated the situation. In retrospect, man​agers should have assumed that reporters would fer​ret out any negative information and that self-serving assertions by on-scene managers would not give an adequate picture of events.

Information played a critical role in every phase of the Waco tragedy. ATF’s inability to process and analyze the intelligence data and the failure to convey data to top management set up the cir​cumstances. The misperception of the potential for a large-scale violent confrontation, based on past experience, moved agents one step closer. The misinterpretation of information during tactical planning put lives directly at risk. The leakage of information from ATF and the careless dispersal of information by members of the press created the immediate circumstances for the ambush. The fail​ure to comprehend and heed the last-minute warn​ings from the undercover agent robbed the managers of their last opportunity to avoid disas​ter. Once disaster struck, the courageous and art​ful negotiation by agent Cavanaugh saved numerous lives of both agents and children in the compound.

In the aftermath, the attempt to manage informa​tion and the failure to seek out or accept unfavorable information resulted in key ATF managers losing their jobs and the agency being held up to addi​tional ridicule. Waco would become a symbol for anti-government activists, gun control opponents, law enforcement critics, and religious scholars. The true nature of events was largely lost in the battle to control Waco, the symbol. For the media, the word “botched” would become the standard modifier when referring to the Waco raid and would be used by many writers with no independent knowledge of any of the events of February 1993. Few who re​ferred to Waco would understand that it was pri​marily about organizational routines, information management, and the inability of managers to con​ceptualize in alternative ways to what they had rou​tinely done before.