

delphia to East Mount Airy. Blacks came in ever-increasing numbers into Nicetown and Germantown. Jewish families deserted North Philadelphia for Oxford Circle and the northeast generally. Many middle-class professional families left the city altogether, going to the suburbs or even farther into the country. Even the city's two major universities, Penn and Temple, flirted with the notion of moving to suburban campuses.

Philadelphia was a city on the move. The mindless adherence to the standpat politics of the Republican machine was loosening. The city had given FDR its support since 1936; now the welfare programs of the New Deal were eroding the committeeman's hold on his constituents. Bankers and businessmen interested themselves in plans for the city's future and appeared to be abandoning their indifference to everything but their own concerns as narrowly defined. Men and women unhappily surveyed a shabby city and an inept municipal government and thought about the possibility of changing an increasingly unsatisfactory situation. By 1946 Philadelphia was rather like the sea, hiding a deceptive undertow beneath an unruffled surface.

Rally and Relapse 1946-1968

by Joseph S. Clark, Jr., and Dennis J. Clark

Early planners considered the business of the city to be economic growth and, therefore, concentrated their efforts on Center City and allowed the strictly residential areas to grow haphazardly. When a new interest in planning began in the early 1940s, it also focused on Center City problems.

— RICHARD SAUL WURMAN, architect,
and JOHN ANDREW GALLERY, urban planner

The reformers have had to cast around for a new general to lead their troops. And, tardily, they realize he needs more troops to lead.

— LORIN PETERSON, commenting on Philadelphia in the 1960s¹

As the fantastically garbed Mummers strutted up Broad Street to the jingling music of their traditional tunes in the New Year's Parade of 1946, the city of Philadelphia was poised to enter one of the most exciting periods it would experience in the twentieth century. The Mummers' troupes, composed of working men from tightly knit neighborhoods throughout the city, symbolized one of the great strengths of Philadelphia, its local community cohesion and the solid reliability of its residents. It was this local neighborhood vitality that had enabled the ordinary people to withstand the abuses of the industrial revolution, the struggles and privations of the age of immigration, and the neglect of a city government whose corruption had become a national byword. In the face of their postwar problems and amid bitter winter weather, the throngs of Philadelphians along Broad Street could still celebrate in a great democratic demonstration of enjoyment as if to testify that despite prejudice and failure, despite generations of urban misfortune, they still had the hope and capacity for something better.

The city itself before 1950 still physically reflected the forms and achievements of the Victorian age. Downtown the rectangular blocks were crammed with office and retail buildings whose fronts were heavy with artifice, statuary, and crenellation. On City Hall a miscellany of many figures sat high above dingy gray porticos. The Witherspoon Building on narrow Juniper Street had brown ranks of Protestant saints and heroes standing rigidly along

its elaborate cornices. All through the old financial district that occupied the most historic streets of the city near the Delaware, banking and brokerage houses and insurance firms were encased in tomb-like Victorian dignity behind massive doors and huge carved stone fronts. Shopping streets, fashionable Rittenhouse Square, railroad terminals, and government buildings all conveyed the same image of Philadelphia's public character: heavy, old-fashioned immobility. A view across the city's skyline from the gloomy upper reaches of City Hall tower provided a perspective on the institutions that made the city great. Looming among the row-house neighborhoods in all directions were the dark-windowed factories and mills that had roared with productive energy for over a century. Set among them were the steeples and domes of the churches that bound the city's people together in committed congregations. Ranged around the mills and churches were thousands of row-house streets, broad and narrow, in which lived the city's working families, skilled and unskilled, attentive to labor, accustomed to the sacrifices and small rewards of the unlovely industrial metropolis.²


Philadelphia and its suburbs from 1946 through 1970 formed a microcosm of the problems affecting cities wherever population shifts, changing technology, and social transformations were altering the shape and conditions of urban life. If, as Aristotle said, "Men come together in cities to live. They remain to live the good life," then Philadelphians were confronted continually with new difficulties in trying to achieve the good life in the turbulence of the modern city. An examination of the politics and government of the city in the post-World War II era reveals how altruism must grapple constantly with the forces of decay and irresponsibility to maintain a humane urban environment.

I

The period after World War II was one of vast change in American life, change that followed swiftly after the great dislocations of the war years. Shortages of all kinds occurred because of lags in production of civilian goods. Major strikes of railroad workers, miners, and plant workers, feverish anti-Communist crusades, and the hasty resettling of veterans in sprawling new suburbs all frustrated the postwar yearning for normalcy.³ In Philadelphia all of these influences affected the conditions of family and community life. The story of the changes in the city's public life provides perhaps the most dramatic evidence of sweeping change in the postwar era.

In 1946 the politics of Philadelphia was still largely controlled by the Republican party organization, in close alliance with the business community. The Republican organization, and particularly Sheriff Austin Meehan, dominated Mayor Bernard Samuel and the city Council. The national and state elections of 1946 were a disaster for the Democrats, who had shown some signs of taking over the city just before World War II.

Yet there were many Philadelphians who, in common with that staunch Republican Elihu Root, speaking in 1908, felt: "I have a strong desire that the City of Philadelphia, whose history and good name are so dear to every



Independence Hall and Chestnut Street (c. 1948). The nineteenth-century buildings on Chestnut Street were demolished by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 1953 to make way for Independence Mall. The Philadelphia Bourse, Fifth Street between Market and Chestnut, in the left middle ground of the photograph, reopened in 1981 after adaptation of its galleries and atrium for use by restaurants and specialty shops.

INDEPENDENCE NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK COLLECTION

American, shall be relieved from the stain which a corrupt and criminal combination masquerading under the name of Republicans have put upon her."⁴ Unfortunately the Democratic party had offered little alternative, even though it made occasional noises about reform to capture the so-called independent vote in local elections.

Stirrings of genuine reform surfaced in 1947. Richardson Dilworth, lawyer and returning war hero, was selected by a desperate Democratic City Committee to run for mayor. He summoned such friends as Abraham L. Freedman and Walter M. Phillips, young and energetic attorneys; Joseph S. Clark, son of a socially prominent family who had been interested in politics before World War II; and John Patterson, an activist local businessman. He persuaded them to organize an independent group of politically discontented younger people. All five of these leaders had become active in Americans for Democratic Action, organized at the end of World War II to perpetuate the ideals of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Philadelphia branch of the A.D.A. under

the leadership of three intrepid women, Ada Lewis, Emily Ehle, and Molly Yard Garrett, was destined to play an active role in the municipal reform movement for the next twenty years.

Dilworth took to the street corners in a gaily decorated sound truck to declaim the vices of the incumbent Republican administration and the political machine that shored it up. He was defeated by the incumbent mayor, Bernard Samuel, by 93,000 votes in the election of 1947, but a new political force had arisen in Philadelphia with the slogan "Sweep the rascals out!" In some of his appearances Dilworth carried the symbol of a broom prepared to sweep the city clean.

It was during Dilworth's 1947 election campaign that the exposure of municipal corruption was raised to a new level. Philadelphians had long since become inured to the intermittent charges of public stealing that the newspapers carried. Dilworth expanded such charges until they were so extensive and specific that they were irrefutable. Standing at a campaign street rally in Mayor Bernard Samuel's own Thirty-ninth Ward, he named names and amounts of bribes and peculations. His charges included 128 officials, ward leaders, and magistrates. The city Council was compelled by business and press opinion to create a Committee of Fifteen, five councilmen and ten representatives of civic groups, to investigate the charges. On March 1, 1948, the committee after months of effective research revealed a huge catalog of scandalously haphazard and crooked city practices. The city Council, in transports of fear and loathing, was forced to provide a larger budget for the Committee of Fifteen. The battle was on full scale after that.

In the following months \$40 million in city spending was found to be unaccounted for. One employee of the Department of Supplies and Purchases was arrested on forty-nine counts of embezzlement, forgery, and other crimes. In May 1948 William B. Foss, an official in charge of part of the tax collection office, committed suicide when faced with the prospect of testifying before the committee. A grand jury was appointed to continue the investigation, and in the following four years one revelation after another rocked the city and amazed observers in the nation whose interest was focused on Philadelphia. A Water Department employee, a plumbing inspector, and the head of the police vice squad all killed themselves in the light of exposures. The fire marshal went to prison. The president judge of the Court of Common Pleas was shown to have tampered with cases in collusion with the chief of city detectives. These scandals were of staggering proportions, overwhelming in their flagrancy, in the amounts involved, and in the damages to orderly government. The public howled for reform as the newspapers relentlessly headlined the findings of such civic groups as the Committee of Seventy, the Bureau of Municipal Research, and the Pennsylvania Economy League, all of which aided the Committee of Fifteen. The press was particularly effective, and four years of outrage preceding 1950 set the stage for the momentous overthrow of the nation's most entrenched and incredibly corrupt political machine.⁵

In 1948 the Democratic City Committee was reorganized under the inspiring leadership of handsome, white-haired James A. Finnegan, a former army colonel, who was able for the time being to control the Democratic ward leaders who were no better and no worse than their Republican opposite numbers. Once again the Democrats carried the city in a presidential election, Harry S. Truman taking Philadelphia by 8000 votes. More significant for the local party, five Democratic congressmen from the city were elected, and Democratic strength in the Pennsylvania legislature was much increased.⁶

Dilworth again took the lead in challenging the incumbent city machine in the campaign of 1949. One fine spring night he used a sound truck to call forth a public rally near Sheriff Meehan's home in the northeast section of the city to denounce the sheriff and other Republican leaders. His stock in trade was to challenge his opponents to public debate on corruption in Philadelphia. A friend of Meehan's in the crowd stated that he was authorized to accept the challenge on behalf of the sheriff. July 12 was agreed on as the date, the Academy of Music as the place.

When newspapermen brought the news to the sheriff he was both furious and nonplussed. A man of little formal education, he knew he would be no match for Dilworth the skilled trial lawyer. But he was a man of considerable courage and a sincere conviction that he and his friends were being libeled by Dilworth. So he did not repudiate the unauthorized agreement.

Press and radio built up the debate as a political spectacular. The audience of some 3000 consisted, by agreement, of an equal number of partisans of each contestant. But it seems likely that all who owned a radio in the city, perhaps half a million people, were listening. Enormous publicity was given in the newspapers.

Dilworth won the debate hands down. At the end of his speech he announced that he would run for city treasurer and Joseph Clark would run for controller in the coming September 13 primary election. Finnegan strongly supported the self-appointed ticket, and it won both the primary and the general elections handily, the latter by a majority of some 112,000 votes. The forces of reform attained their first vantage points of power.⁷

Clark and Dilworth were anomalies in modern Philadelphia politics. They came from similar backgrounds, well-to-do families, Clark from Philadelphia, Dilworth from Pittsburgh. They were regarded as representatives of the old patrician tradition. They had known each other in their youth; Clark wrote, "We learned the American way of life together on the beaches of Southampton, Long Island before World War I." In the 1930s both had run unsuccessfully for public office as Democrats. When they came back to Philadelphia and urban life in 1946 after their military service, both still had ambition for public service. They were friends and in a sense rivals. But although the strains of postwar politics sometimes stretched their friendship, it never broke. Clark, the less spectacular of the two, wrote admiringly of Dilworth as "D'Artagnan in long pants and a double breasted suit." Together they led the reform movement in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania for twenty years.

For the two years following the 1949 election Dilworth and Clark busied themselves with politics, unearthing Republican scandals in City Hall and discovering, as they had expected, that the tools for municipal government were hopelessly obsolete and inadequate. So they joined in a bipartisan fight for a new city charter.

Philadelphia's business leadership also had come to realize that a new charter was essential for responsible municipal government. Robert T. McCracken, a leading old-line Republican lawyer, looked into the Allegheny Conference which under the Mellon interests and Mayor David L. Lawrence had improved city government in Pittsburgh, and on his return east organized the more imaginative businessmen of the city into the Greater Philadelphia Movement. Robert K. Sawyer, an attractive, energetic, and able engineer, was hired as its executive director. As president of the city Council, Frederick R. Garman, a respected Republican, helped the G.P.M. get the necessary state legislation to create a Philadelphia Home Rule City Charter Commission with power to reorganize the city government, their proposals to be submitted to the voters. The Democrats in the state legislature as well as the leadership of the AFL and the CIO, always Democratic by self-interest, also put their weight behind the reform movement.

The new city charter was drafted and ready for voter action by the end of 1950. It was largely the work of three able lawyers, Abraham L. Freedman, a Democrat and later a federal judge, and William Schnader and Robert T. McCracken, Republicans and heads of two prestigious Philadelphia firms. After much discussion, the reformers decided to place the charter on the ballot in the April 1951 primary; this was taking a calculated risk, for if either or both of the two political organizations decided to oppose the charter it would have little chance of approval.⁸

Finnegan, the Democratic city chairman, placed a somewhat reluctant Democratic organization squarely behind the charter. Despite the pressure of the Republican leaders in the Greater Philadelphia Movement, the Republicans held back and in the end took no position. An aggressive "Citizens' Charter Committee," co-chaired by John Morgan Davis, a Democrat, and Judge Nochem Winnet, a Republican, waged an active campaign. The vote was light, but the charter was approved by the substantial majority of 119,790.

The importance of the new charter in the reform of Philadelphia's government was great indeed.⁹ It was described by competent observers as "a shining new weapon in the arsenal of good government." It created a strong-mayor form of government and a relatively weak city Council of seventeen members, ten elected by districts and seven at large. Two of the citywide councilmen were required to be members of the minority, or opposition party, one to propose and the other to second a minority position, thus assuring a minority-party vote.

Another important feature of the charter was its strong merit system. Civil service had been a scandal in Philadelphia for many years, with positions in

the government being too often awarded solely as a reward for political activity. Henceforth city positions were to be filled by the mayor's administrators from lists submitted by the Civil Service Commission. Non-civil service appointments could be made by the mayor and needed no confirmation by the city Council. Only the city solicitor, who was to be the lawyer for the Council as well as for the mayor, needed councilmanic approval. The city solicitor was wisely made a member of the mayor's Cabinet.

The charter also created a large number of boards and commissions—the City Planning Commission, the Board of Managers of the Philadelphia General Hospital, and the Commission on Human Relations—to consist of citizens usually serving without pay. The mayor was thereby given power either to create a vibrant group of able and creative thinkers and administrators or to follow the old tradition and fill the commissions with political hacks or personal friends.

Administration generally was streamlined and decentralized. While the mayor was chief executive officer, a managing director was created and placed in charge of ten line service departments such as police, fire, welfare, recreation, and health. A director of finance would have charge of the executive budget, the Department of Collections, and the Department of Purchases and Supplies. These two officials plus the mayor constituted the administrative board that ran the city.

Also in the mayor's Cabinet was to be an amorphous office called city representative and director of commerce. This individual was given the impossible task—as it later turned out—of being the chief of public relations, director of the airport, and secretary of commerce, charged with supervision of the port and implementation of the city's efforts to attract industry.¹⁰

At the same time that the city charter was approved by the electorate, Clark was nominated for mayor and Dilworth for district attorney in the Democratic primary, and a relatively strong slate of Democratic politicians, headed by Finnegan, was nominated for the Council. The Republicans were in a dilemma. To nominate an old regular was, after the debacle of 1949, to invite disaster. McCracken and a number of other conservatives prevailed upon Meehan and the other organization stalwarts to slate a nonorganization candidate, the Rev. Daniel E. Poling, a nationally known Baptist minister and a man of impeccable integrity.

Unfortunately for their cause Dr. Poling was a resident of Philadelphia in name only. His real home was in New York City, and he had not bothered to come back to vote for the city charter in the primary. In the end the effort to drape the mantle of his respectability around the Republican organization failed. Clark was elected by a majority of 124,000 votes, Dilworth by slightly less. All Democratic candidates for district councilman and the five Democrats running at large were elected. The result was a city Council of fifteen Democrats and two Republicans. The reformers seemed secure in the saddle, and for the first time in generations the city of Philadelphia had a Democratic mayor and administration.¹¹



Mayor Joseph S. Clark, Jr., with city officials and Democratic party leaders (January 10, 1952). Standing: George T. Guarnieri, Maurice Osser, William Lennox, Michael Byrne, the Rev. Marshall Shepard, Joseph Scanlon, Lennox L. Moak, and Thomas McHenry. Sitting: Richardson Dilworth, Mayor Clark, Abraham E. Freedman, and James A. Finnegan.

PHILADELPHIA BULLETIN

It became the Democrats' task to staff their municipal administration. Finnegan was elected president of city Council and was to work closely with Mayor Clark.¹² He also remained chairman of the Democratic City Committee until he left Philadelphia for Harrisburg early in 1955 to become secretary of the commonwealth and political adviser to Gov. George M. Leader.

A new type of administrator was brought to City Hall, the professional as opposed to the political appointee. The reform government, moreover, attracted younger men to serve, men like Robert K. Sawyer as managing director, and Lennox Moak as director of finance, with his assistant Robert McConnell. Despite some grumblings in the Council, non-Philadelphians were brought into positions requiring technical skill. For example, Robert Crawford, recommended by the National Recreation Association, came from Oakland, California, as deputy to Fredric R. Mann, recreation commissioner.

The next four years saw a drastic change in the spirit as well as the administration of the city government. The provisions of the city charter were rigorously complied with. The Civil Service Commission was revolutionized under the chairmanship of Sidney B. Dexter and his fellow commission members, Shippen Lewis, a political independent, and the Rev. Luther Cunningham, a black minister active in the reform movement. Appointments to the police and fire departments were made on a strict merit basis, not always to the wishes of the Council and the Democratic ward leaders.

The police and fire commissioners on the other hand were appointed with some concern for political considerations. Thomas Gibbons, police commis-

sioner, was a lifelong friend of Jim Finnegan's, but highly capable, and Fire Commissioner Frank McNamee, although sponsored by both the Democratic organization and the Variety Club, was effective. It is noteworthy that for five years the Philadelphia Fire Department won the National Fire Prevention Award.

Dilworth reorganized the district attorney's office, eliminating political control and establishing for the first time in many years a set of reliable criminal case records. Aided by his young and able first deputy, red-headed Michael von Moschzisker, son of a very conservative former chief justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, he appointed a capable staff of young lawyers and investigators who devoted full time to their jobs. They cut the period prior to trial in nonbail cases from ninety to thirty days, and the delay in reaching trial in bail cases from nearly two years to seven months. Dilworth worked closely with Police Commissioner Gibbons to break up long-standing alliances between ward politicians and the police. Criminal justice was put on as honest and compassionate a basis as the prosecuting attorney was able to do.

These were years of great activity. A logjam of critical problems had built up during the years of Republican control. World War II had left severe dislocations in its wake, among which were a terrible housing shortage and complex difficulties of industrial conversion back to civilian production. Not all problems were solved at once, but strong foundations of a municipal government of ability and integrity were laid to address the problem.

II

The city was changing in ways that put the morale of its citizens on a roller-coaster. Led by the outstanding pitching of Robin Roberts and Curt Simmons and the batting of other young "Whiz Kids" like Richie Ashburn and Del Ennis, the Phillies baseball team won the National League pennant in 1950—its first pennant since 1915 and its second in history; but then the Phillies lost the World Series to the New York Yankees in an embarrassing four-game sweep. In 1952 the Athletics made their first serious run for the American League pennant in two decades, only to falter when their twenty-four-game-winning pitcher, Bobby Shantz, suffered a broken pitching wrist in early September. The A's sank to fourth place and then to seventh and eighth in 1953 and 1954. Their latest collapse resulted in Connie Mack's family's—the old leader himself had finally retired from managing after the 1950 season—inability to continue to afford the operation of a major-league team, and the A's opened the 1955 season under new ownership in Kansas City; they moved again, to Oakland, in 1968.

College football in Philadelphia, popularized by great Penn teams that filled Franklin Field and briefly by the Temple team that played in the first Sugar Bowl in 1936, declined precipitously in quality and appeal during the 1950s.

The football professionals also rode the roller-coaster. Coach Earl

"Greasy" Neale's steady upbuilding of the Eagles achieved fruition soon after the war, when led by fullback Steve Van Buren the Eagles won the Eastern Conference championship of the National Football League in 1947 and then the league championship in 1948 and 1949. After they fell to a .500 record in 1950, however, Neale retired, and the team floundered in mediocrity until Coach Buck Shaw and quarterback Norm Van Brocklin raised it to respectability in 1959 and another league championship in 1960. But Shaw as coach and Van Brocklin as a player were both at the end of their careers, and their retirement after 1960 was followed by another decade of mediocrity. Speeding the descent also was the retirement after 1962 of almost the last sixty-minute (that is, both offensive and defensive) player, center and linebacker Chuck Bednarik, who had come out of Penn in time to play on the Eagles' 1949 championship team and remained to seal the victory over Coach Vince Lombardi's Green Bay Packers in the 1960 championship game by forcing a Packer fumble in the final seconds.

The Philadelphia 76ers of the National Basketball Association played more consistently, but perennially lost out in championship playoffs to the Boston Celtics—except for the 1966–1967 season when center Wilt Chamberlain led the team to a regular-season record of sixty-eight wins and only thirteen losses, the season and playoff championships, and eventual recognition as the greatest NBA team of all time. The 76ers' roller-coaster days came later, when the departure of Chamberlain to Los Angeles and the aging of their other stars brought them crashing to a nine-wins, seventy-three-losses season in 1972–1973, before they began to rise again in the later 1970s.

Professional baseball and football both benefited from wide public exposure through the new medium of television. In 1952 the Federal Communications Commission approved four television channels for Philadelphia, a communications event destined to have profound effects on politics and education as well as almost all areas of entertainment in addition to sports. The first TV spectacles, however, were the antics of Red-baiter Sen. Joe McCarthy.

Throughout the physical city there was a feeling of movement. In the same year that the four television channels arrived, the decrepit ferry service to Camden at last ended, and a new bridge to South Jersey farther down the river was authorized. The old Broad Street Station across from City Hall was closed on April 27, 1952, and the Philadelphia Orchestra serenaded passengers on the last train. Attendance at Army-Navy games on the Saturday following Thanksgiving grew to over 100,000, and many fans could see the Schuylkill Expressway under construction as they drove through traffic jams to the game. In 1955, when Matthew McCloskey closed a \$35-million deal with the Pennsylvania Railroad for a complex of buildings to replace the Broad Street Station and its tracks, plans for the downtown centerpiece of the city's renovation drew a chorus of approval and disapproval from citizens, who were excited but uncertain about the city's future.

This sense of movement contrasted with tensions in the city's life that betrayed growing social friction. A curfew was adopted in 1955 to bar youths

under seventeen from the streets late at night as a result of juvenile delinquency incidents. In the same year twenty-six teachers were dismissed by the Philadelphia School District for refusing to answer questions about Communist affiliations on the basis of their rights under the Fifth Amendment. In 1953 Prof. Barrows Dunham had been dismissed from his position at Temple University on similar grounds and Jefferson Medical School was placed on the American Association of University Professors' censure list for like summary firings. In the city's neighborhoods a steady rash of small-scale racial conflicts occurred as blacks moved into previously all-white areas. Thus while improvement highlighted the city's skyline, the social fabric of Philadelphia was continuing to be subjected to stress and disruption.

The economic underpinnings of the city were changing in fundamental ways. In August 1954 Congress approved the deepening of the Delaware River ship channel to a depth of forty feet by the United States Army Corps of Engineers to facilitate passage of ore boats to a new steel plant outside the city in Morrisville, Bucks County. The location was symbolic of the enormous shift of business and industry to the suburbs. In another symbolic move the Board of City Trusts sold the Girardville Coal Mines, part of the wide hinterland of resources once, but no longer, controlled from Philadelphia. In 1958 the Pennsylvania Railroad was forced to merge with the New York Central Railroad, a step that failed to halt the slide into bankruptcy of the once-mighty Pennsylvania rail empire.

In 1955 Joseph Clark, whose ambition was to go to the United States Senate and to which he was ultimately elected, announced that he would not run for a second term as mayor. His obvious successor was Richardson Dilworth, who was triumphantly elected in the fall of 1955 over Thacher Longstreth, the attractive, argyle-socked, but inexperienced Republican nominee.

Dilworth was mayor of Philadelphia from January 1956 until February 1962, when under the terms of the city charter he resigned to run for governor of Pennsylvania. He continued in large measure the policies of his predecessor. Many of his principal assistants had been aides to Clark and continued a high level of competence. The Police Department under three splendid commissioners, Thomas Gibbons, Albert Brown, and Howard Leary, was probably the best in the country. Dilworth's six years in City Hall were a story of ongoing administrative successes accompanied by a series of turbulent political crises.

Cong. William J. Green, who had succeeded Finnegan as the "boss" of the Democratic party, had sufficient votes in the Council to place amendments to the city charter on the ballot, amendments that could seriously cripple the merit system. Under the circumstances Dilworth thought it wise to compromise with Green.¹³ He agreed to support charter amendments that would remove from the merit system employees of Philadelphia County offices that had not been merged into the city government. These included the traditional offices of sheriff and recorder of deeds which were held by elective officials not responsible to the mayor. The patronage that would thus be released to

the organization was avidly coveted by the ward leaders and the city chairman. The reform element in the city was highly critical of Dilworth for this action. The amendments would also have eliminated the charter requirement that an elected municipal officeholder must resign if he sought other elective office during his term.

Although the amendments were declared illegal by Common Pleas Court on a technicality and then roundly defeated in the primary election of 1956, by midsummer, less than a year after his election, Dilworth's political honeymoon seemed over. He was under attack from all sides, from the reformers for having deserted them, from the organization for not having put the amendments across with the voters.

Then came one of those unpredictable happenings in the life of a politician. Returning with his wife from a European vacation in the summer of 1956, Dilworth was aboard the transatlantic liner *Andrea Doria* when she sank after being rammed in a fog by another liner, the *Stockholm*. The Dilworths behaved with conspicuous courage and were greeted as heroes on their return to Philadelphia. The adventure at sea almost completely eliminated the unfavorable reaction from the so-called Charter Ripping.

After the fiasco of 1956 Congressman Green was wise enough not to tinker again with the city charter, but he did not abandon his efforts to utilize the Democratic City Hall government for patronage and political favors to contributors.¹⁴ Over Dilworth's opposition, Green was successful in securing the renomination and election of Victor H. Blanc as district attorney and of Alexander Hemphill as city controller. He was also successful in thwarting Dilworth's bid for governor in 1958, the candidacy going to Mayor Lawrence of Pittsburgh. Despite this organizational opposition, Dilworth was reelected mayor in 1959 over Harold E. Stassen, lawyer, perennial presidential candidate, and former president of the University of Pennsylvania, by more than 205,000 votes, the greatest majority ever received by an elective candidate for a Philadelphia municipal office.

Yet Dilworth's second term continued to have its share of political fireworks. An effort to solve the problem of inadequate parking facilities in South Philadelphia by issuing parking licenses for which car owners would have to pay resulted in a tumultuous public meeting in 1961 at which the Dilworths were pelted with rocks, fruit, and vegetables. The mayor escaped injury, but the proposed parking tax died a swift death. Dilworth also had difficulty because of some offhand remarks about South Philadelphia which came out in the press as anti-Italian slurs. Conscious of the *faux pas*, Dilworth was perhaps only too ready to make an Italian-American career policeman from South Philadelphia a district police commissioner, and advanced Frank Rizzo to that post, a decision with long-term unforeseen results.

Dilworth resigned his mayoralty in February 1962 to run for governor. Republicans believed that a series of minor scandals that had created a tempest in a teapot would be damaging to his campaign. Although Dilworth lost the election to William W. Scranton, the comedy of errors that the grand jury investigations revealed proved to have little impact on the result.

Much of the public thought of the reform years in terms of Clark and Dilworth, but the politically active spectrum of the city included a wide array of personalities many of whom were remarkable and not easily categorized. In the Democratic party, for instance, Cong. William J. Green was an astute and energetic leader who represented effectively the interests of the city's blue-collar population. James P. Clark, a trucking magnate and chief promoter of the Liberty Bell racetrack, was a key financial backer of the party. John B. Kelly, Olympic oarsman and a major building supplier—"Brick Work by Kelly"—had long been a power in the city, and contractor Matthew H. McCloskey was chief financial adviser to the Democratic National Committee. Real estate entrepreneur Albert M. Greenfield remained involved in many important economic and political issues, so much so that for a time he became known as "Mr. Philadelphia." Harry A. Batten, an advertising executive, was one of the most imaginative figures of the period in his persistent advocacy of sweeping plans for downtown renovation, which included the establishment of the Food Distribution Center in South Philadelphia. G. Holmes Perkins, of the School of Fine Arts of the University of Pennsylvania, and Dr. Stephen B. Sweeney, of the Fels Institute of Local and State Government, were valuable advisers concerning municipal change and public administration. All of these talented people and many more were engaged in the reform movement.¹⁵

III

With the departure of Dilworth, James H. J. Tate, who had been president of the city Council since 1955, succeeded as acting mayor under the provisions of the city charter. Jim Tate, unlike Clark and Dilworth, whose programs he committed himself to support, started in politics as a committeeman and moved up the ladder rung by rung, acquiring administrative experience to supplement his political background as a staunch organization Democrat. A graduate of Temple University and a student for several years at its law school, he had the drive to lead the organization forces. It was said of him that he never missed an important man's or a neighbor's funeral. Amazingly enough, he was Philadelphia's first Irish-Catholic mayor.

In 1963 he ran for election in his own right. By this time the independent element in the Democratic party, which had supported Clark and Dilworth, particularly the A.D.A., was disillusioned with Tate; he was too much an organization man. The independents ran Walter M. Phillips for mayor in the spring primary, but were unable to summon any effective political support for him. Tate defeated Phillips easily and went on to win in the fall from James T. McDermott, the Republican candidate, by a margin of 68,268 votes, somewhat less than half of what had become the expected Democratic majority.

In retrospect Phillips's defeat marked the end of "independent" good-government influence in City Hall. The reform movement of the 1940s and 1950s really died when Dilworth resigned as mayor, although Mayor Tate pursued many of the public plans and projects that had been set in motion.

A working politician, never at ease with the big-business leaders of the city, Tate was much more a mayor of the row-house constituency than of the downtown business and liberal echelons. He made an earnest effort to continue the policies of his predecessors, but he fell out with the business community and with a number of other leaders who since 1951 had had their way in Philadelphia's life. Nevertheless he was a strong mayor as the charter required; some said he was a "big-city boss" in the old tradition. A number of Clark appointments and more of the Dilworth appointments stayed with him, but his top management was new, if uninspired. The complexion of a number of politically sensitive bodies consisting of mayoral appointees, such as the Zoning Board of Adjustment, changed for the worse. Middle management, largely under civil service, continued to be competent.

Paul D'Ortona, the South Philadelphia leader who had moved from a magistrate's office into the city Council in 1951, succeeded Tate as chairman of that body. He and Tate were often at odds. There was constant turmoil in City Hall among the mayor, the Council, and the Democratic City Committee with respect to administration, finance, and the implementation of policy.

The rising protest movement of the 1960s, focused on civil rights for blacks and other minorities, roared into the city's streets fueled by both resentment and idealism. One target of protests was historic Girard College, which a United States Supreme Court opinion in 1957 had declared to be publicly aided to a sufficient degree to require nondiscriminatory entrance policies admitting blacks. After that decision a separate governing board independent of the Board of City Trusts was formed for Girard. Blacks saw this as evasion of the court decree. Picketing on a large scale followed. By 1965, 1000 police had to be detailed to handle the pickets and crowds. The Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., addressed a rally at the college urging nonviolent pressure for open admissions.¹⁶

The federal government had launched a "war on poverty," and a young black lawyer, Charles Bowser, was appointed by Mayor Tate to head the Anti-Poverty Action Committee. Disputes over local community participation became a regular feature of the program.

In the spring of 1965, Arlen Specter, an able and politically ambitious Democratic lawyer, accepted the Republican nomination for district attorney, feeling he had nowhere to go in the Democratic party. Charging that incumbent James C. Crumlish had failed to push the war on crime and to follow up evidence of the use of political influence in city affairs by the Democratic City Committee, he defeated Crumlish in November by 37,212 votes. Once elected, Specter went on the offensive against the Democratic organization.

The Democratic City Committee already had troubles enough in its quarrelling with the mayor. As all mayors must, Tate had contested the committee's patronage and financial demands from the first, but it was not until the death of Tate's good friend Congressman Green, on December 21, 1963, and the succession of Francis X. Smith, that the breach became an open one. Tate

and Smith, for years political allies, became involved in an old-fashioned donnybrook in 1967 when Smith supported for mayor Alexander Hemphill, who had begun as a reformer but as city controller had broken with Dilworth and since then conducted a running feud with the mayor's office. Tate flexed his muscles and by doing so proved able to defeat Hemphill readily in the spring primary. Smith persisted in refusing to support Tate in the autumn general election, whereupon Tate's victory rendered inevitable Smith's resignation and retirement from politics. Tate was able to prevail on the city committee to elect as its new chairman Cong. William J. Green, Jr., the handsome son of the former Democratic leader.

Tate's Republican opponent in the fall election of 1967 was Arlen Specter, a strong candidate. It was widely believed in early summer that Specter would win. Tate, however, had several powerful groups working for him. Philadelphia's large Roman Catholic population was grateful for his influence in obtaining state aid for textbooks and bus transportation for parochial schools. The Italian-American community appreciated his intention to reappoint Frank L. Rizzo as police commissioner. (Rizzo had first been appointed by Tate when Howard Leary, Dilworth's last police commissioner, went to New York to serve under Mayor John V. Lindsay.) Rizzo's relations with Specter were cool. Indeed in a time of violent racial confrontations in many cities and of threatened riots in Philadelphia, Tate's support of Rizzo as a tough law-and-order cop held an appeal far beyond any one ethnic group or economic class, even if civil libertarians regarded the commissioner with suspicion. Of crucial importance was the compliance of the Tate administration at the negotiating table with city government employee unions. Agreements were signed for pension and fringe benefits that would escalate inordinately in the following years with disastrous financial results for the city. These decisions in the mid-1960s were a watershed for the erosion of municipal fiscal integrity. For all this, Tate was reelected by the very narrow margin of 11,000 votes.¹⁷

Tate's second elective term was a continuing succession of scandals and political quarrels. The familiar charges of zoning concessions, extortion, and conflict of interest brought a series of resignations in high places. Some of the most publicized troubles surrounded the building in South Philadelphia of the Spectrum for indoor sports. The principal contractor was Matthew H. McCloskey & Company, a firm deeply involved in Democratic politics. Not only did costs skyrocket, but early in 1968, soon after the Philadelphia 76ers, the National Basketball Association defending champions, and the new Philadelphia Flyers National Hockey League entry began to play there, part of the roof blew away. Similarly the cost of the contract for a new sports stadium in South Philadelphia to house the Phillies and the Eagles soared to unimagined heights as early as the submission of the first bids, requiring the voters to approve new loans. Completion was delayed for more than a year.

By the time the 1969 municipal election came around both the Tate administration and the Democratic City Committee were in disarray beyond the valiant efforts of young Chairman Green to rescue them. The Republicans

won the election. Thomas Gola, a sports hero with an accounting degree, a star of La Salle College's 1954 national championship basketball team and later of professional basketball, was elected controller. Arlen Specter handily won another term as district attorney. The Republicans also gained two new seats in the city Council, leaving that body with twelve Democrats and five Republicans.

Tate blamed city Chairman Green and his preoccupation with his congressional duties for the loss of the election. Green had won his seat in Congress at the age of twenty-six to succeed his father. But he was a different character from his father. Idealistic and intelligent, he had the future of the Democratic party as a liberal reform group very much at heart. He in turn placed the blame for the Democratic defeat squarely on the mayor's doorstep, claiming that the party had come into the control of a small group headed by the mayor who lacked the vision and imagination to bring the Democratic organization back to the position it had occupied some fifteen or twenty years earlier when Jim Finnegan was chairman. Green proposed a reform plan for the organization, pressed it to a vote, and, since Tate was opposed to it, was badly beaten. Thereupon Green resigned as city chairman.

Joseph Scanlon, a ward leader from the northeast and an intimate of Tate's, was elected in Green's place as the mayor's candidate in December 1969, but Scanlon died in the fall of 1970. He was succeeded by Peter J. Camiel, a wise party war-horse with none of the aura of reform about him.

The effect of national trends on the city in the 1960s was powerful. The youthful protest movement and agitation for civil rights advances primed the city for large-scale antiwar protests as the decade ended. In 1969 some 15,000 rallied all over the city opposing the Vietnam War. In May of 1970 more rallies protested the killing of students at Kent State University in Ohio. Students took over the new Philadelphia Community College in a sit-in and, joined by most of the faculty, demanded changes in college administration. Racial outbreaks added to the turmoil. Mayor Tate had constant problems with juvenile and racial clashes. Race riots broke out at the city's Holmesburg Prison. Commissioner Frank Rizzo's police raided coffeehouses full of young "hippie" couples in center city, and the resulting publicity irritated thousands throughout the city. The temper of Philadelphia had changed greatly from the staid days before 1950.¹⁸

As the decade of the 1970s opened, troubles descended on the Tate administration from all sides. Philadelphia was in a desperate financial plight. Its operating expenses outran its revenues, as in almost all other big cities in the country. The budget for municipal services increased from \$100,720,633 in 1947 to \$535,361,000 in 1970. The need for increased revenue was apparent as early as 1939, and under the Samuel administration the city wage tax was first imposed to supplement the inadequate real estate tax. The postwar prosperity of both municipal and national economies made increases in taxation unnecessary during the Clark and Dilworth years, but from 1961 onward increases in both real estate and wage taxes had become almost annual.

Special taxes were added from time to time to meet specific needs, especially those of the schools.

Federal and state grants helped in such areas as urban redevelopment, highways, public housing, and health and welfare activities. Such grants tended to escalate from the Truman administration onward, though political shifts in Washington and Harrisburg made them alternately easier or harder to come by. On the state level the worsening fiscal condition of the commonwealth during the 1950s and 1960s virtually dried up state aid to Philadelphia. The legislators, always suspicious of the state's largest city, became increasingly less willing to help resolve Philadelphia's crying needs.¹⁹

Clark, Dilworth, and Tate all made unending pilgrimages to Washington and Harrisburg in search of funds. Much of their lobbying was done through two municipal government organizations, the League of Cities, tending to represent smaller municipalities, and the United States Conference of Mayors, largely confined to major cities. Clark was vice-president of the League of Cities, which held its convention in Philadelphia in 1954, and he would have become president two years later had he not been elected to the United States Senate. Dilworth and Tate—both well thought of among their peers—served as presidents of both organizations during their terms in City Hall.

Federal and state grants and lobbying notwithstanding, in the summer of 1970 the financial condition of the city was so precarious that Tate refused to spend \$400,000 that had been appropriated by the Council to combat warfare among street gangs, a species of violence that was producing an alarming number of deaths. At the same time the Police Department was seriously undermanned, with some 700 vacancies.

Among the other difficulties facing the Tate administration were confusion at the airport with respect to improvements; the long delay in beginning a subway extension to the northeast and its ultimate deferral; another delay in the construction of the Delaware Expressway from north to south through the city to carry New York-Washington traffic, and the problem of putting this expressway underground in the vicinity of Society Hill; and a related controversy over, and eventual abandonment of, a plan to construct a cross-town expressway between the Delaware and the Schuylkill just south of center city.

IV

Of critical importance to the Democratic party and so to the city government during these administrations was the leadership of organized labor, the AFL and the CIO. Until they merged in 1955 the two labor groups functioned in loose cooperation in their political contacts with City Hall. Unlike the business leaders, their membership and leadership for the most part lived in the city and could vote. They also had access through various devices never questioned legally to large sums of money and much political manpower that they placed at the service of the Democratic party. Labor leaders served under Clark, Dilworth, and Tate on many of the boards and commissions where conflict of interest was not apparent. Tate, however, broke with the position

of Clark and Dilworth when in 1969 he appointed a labor leader to the three-man Civil Service Commission.

Labor gave lip-service to good government, but its primary political interest was economic. Its leaders wanted a sympathetic city administration when disputes arose with management that on occasion resulted in strikes where inevitably the police were involved. Labor also urged higher wages and better working conditions for city employees.

Despite the strong support given them by organized labor, Clark and Dilworth managed to steer a sufficiently neutral course in their official conduct during labor disputes to hold the support of the business community as well. But Tate's loss of business establishment support was in no small measure due to his open advocacy of the labor cause in industrial disputes. Moreover his acquiescence in the demands of municipal employees for large wage increases and fringe benefits was a major reason for the fiscal difficulties in which the city found itself toward the end of his administration.

The labor movement operated politically through the Council on Political Education (COPE), a coalition of all the important unions having Philadelphia locals except the Teamsters, who were expelled from the national movement in 1957 and went their own generally Democratic way. For most of the 1947-1970 period COPE's leadership was in the hands of Ed Toohey from the building trades and Joe Kelley of the Electrical Workers. Both were shrewd politicians. Frequently quarreling not only with the Democratic City Committee but with each other over the selection of candidates, they nevertheless exerted important influence over policy, turned in their dollars to the party treasury, and supplied effective manpower on Election Day. Their relationship with the Clark-Dilworth independents and the A.D.A. was also excellent until 1967, when they broke with the liberals' support of Arlen Specter for mayor. The alliance has never been reformed.

By far the most serious labor disturbances during the period were the almost biannual rows between the Transport Workers Union and the management of the Philadelphia Transportation Company. The pattern repeated itself every time a union contract was about to expire. The union would demand a wage increase, allegedly to match higher wages in other cities, and management would refuse on the ground that there was no money to pay for it. At the last minute, or after a short strike, the dispute would be settled with a significant increase in wages. The PTC would then apply to the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission for a fare increase. The city would offer token opposition, contending that the company was more prosperous than it would admit.

There were seven transit strikes between 1946 and 1967, and in almost every other year strikes were averted at the last moment as a result of City Hall mediation. In 1953, for example, a two-year contract between the T.W.U. and PTC was to expire in the middle of December. The union had insisted on a termination date at the height of the Christmas shopping season, to exert the maximum pressure on the company. Control of the PTC had been ac-

quired that year by a holding company whose principal office was in New York, but Albert M. Greenfield, who had been instrumental in selling control of the company, was still on the board of directors and was placed in charge of management negotiations in Philadelphia. The ordinary process of collective bargaining having failed, negotiations were moved to Mayor Clark's office. As the contract expiration date approached, labor's *deus* (or *diabolus*, to his opponents) *ex machina*, Michael J. Quill, president of the national union, appeared from New York with his shillelagh and an Irish brogue entirely worthy of County Kerry's best. Quill and Greenfield were old but friendly antagonists who had squared off against each other in many a previous negotiating session.

After much palaver brought the parties within measurable distance of an agreement, Clark went back and forth from one room in the mayor's suite of offices to another, from the headquarters of Quill and the local union's bargaining committee—all somewhat suspicious of each other—to the place where Greenfield and the company labor experts gathered around a table. The mayor would cajole each group to yield further in the public interest. Two days before contract expiration, Greenfield told Clark he had gone as far as his instructions would permit. Quill, equally adamant, named a final figure still above what Greenfield was authorized to accept.

A strike seemed unavoidable. As Clark shuttled from one room to another he passed the desk of his executive secretary, on which, as a precaution for such a crisis, a bottle of whiskey was sitting. Appropriating it, Clark returned to persuade Greenfield, with the aid of the whiskey, to call New York and get authority to raise the ante, provided Quill would meet him halfway. Greenfield agreed, but only if Quill would agree first. With the bottle and ice at hand, Clark sent for Quill. After a couple of drinks and an Irish song or two, Quill agreed to a new figure. Greenfield called New York and obtained a new offer that Quill then sold to his labor colleagues, with the aid of what was left of the whiskey. Greenfield, Quill, and Clark celebrated labor peace with a final drink, each of the three convinced he had made a good settlement for his client.

But the end was not yet. At a union meeting, rank and file refused to ratify the agreement and a strike began. Clark called Quill and insisted that the union members be polled by secret ballot conducted by the American Arbitration Association. Quill agreed, and came back to Philadelphia to urge acceptance of the company's offer at a second union meeting. It took four days to work out the procedures for the ballot, but the members then approved the agreement and the strike was called off. The men received a sixteen-cents-an-hour increase over two years and a number of fringe benefits. The Public Utility Commission granted an increase in fares early in 1954. Patronage declined, the PTC's financial condition deteriorated again, but the trolleys and buses ran without substantial further interruption until 1961—not, however, without further tense negotiations at City Hall, further wage concessions, further fare increases, and further reduced ridership.

It was hoped that public ownership of the system in conjunction with operation of suburban bus lines and commuter railroads might break this vicious circle. The Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA), a quasi-public nonprofit company, was formed to operate the Philadelphia area transit system in 1968, purchasing the PTC for a little under \$48 million. Philadelphia County had its representatives on a directing board, as did the suburban counties of Montgomery, Bucks, and Delaware. Their interests conflicted.

A labor area of vexatious difficulty was that of the port, and its problems were symbolic of the city's changing fortunes. Always turbulent, the long-shoremen of the port had for generations led a hazardous and exploited existence. Fr. Denis Comey, a Jesuit priest, had long campaigned for better working conditions for them. With the institution of more regular hiring and work assignment practices in the 1950s, some improvement resulted. But the growing use of large cargo container units for shipping reduced longshore work. Other cities were quicker to adopt container shipping technology. Philadelphia lagged. As a result the fading of the longshoremen from the docks signified the waning of a portion of the port's business as competition from other areas reduced Philadelphia's share of cargo handling.²⁰

V

By the end of this period Philadelphia was the fourth-largest city in the United States, losing third place to Los Angeles in the census of 1960. Philadelphia's population in 1970 was 1,927,863, a slight drop from the 2,002,512 count of 1960, which in turn was less than in 1950.

One of the overriding developments of this period was the astonishing growth of the suburban counties around Philadelphia. While the city's population declined by 6 percent from 1950 to 1970, the adjacent counties of its metropolitan hinterland were increasing by almost 30 percent. This enormous suburban growth took place largely at the expense of old working-class neighborhoods. People, industries, retail facilities, and many other sorts of interests diffused throughout the region. Repeated attempts were made to bind the suburban energies to the city, but the traditionally Republican suburbs were extremely wary of close ties. Commuters from the suburbs resented the city's wage tax; they had fled the increasingly black and crime-afflicted old neighborhoods. Richardson Dilworth's proclamation that the city and suburban school districts should be merged appalled suburbanites who had left the city precisely because of inadequate schools.

The Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Delaware Planning Association sought to chart regional functions in transportation and other areas, but had no statutory power. The Delaware River Port Authority, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, and the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission all sought more regional coordination, but the scattering of local and state governments and deeply interwoven patterns of public authority simply defied any major structural changes. America was not France, and any

plan for highly concentrated control of regional affairs was doomed because of ingrained antiurban hostility. Only in the area of sharing water resources was there a decent record of collaboration.²¹

The city's concentrations of people created an ever-present problem of land use. Philadelphia's tradition of low-rise row-house residences and a limit on high-rise apartments generated pressures to encroach on available parkland and open space for housing. Public opinion seemed resolved, however, to protect the city's remaining open space. Philadelphia's city planners, with the help of Robert Crawford and the Recreation Department, managed to set aside significant amounts of real estate as green retreats from the asphalt jungle of the city's core. These might be only tot lots, bocce courts, playgrounds, or open squares, but they were an achievement in the face of an almost inflexible development pattern determined by land costs and population density.

World War II had left the city with a critical housing shortage. In 1950 over 70,000 dwellings lacked a bath or were dilapidated, and overcrowding affected a huge proportion of the inner-city housing supply. Central to the problem was the age and character of the residential stock. About 50 percent of the city's housing had been built in the nineteenth century. Age of structure was the most significant variable related to deterioration. Overcrowding, neglect, illegal subdivision, and the financial, legal, and tenancy complications that blocked reinvestment to maintain good housing quality all conspired to erode residential neighborhoods. The attraction of new suburban housing, more stylish and spacious than the old row-house stock, also was a major factor in diminishing the desirability of the old housing stock. Added to this was the cultural difference between the growing black population and the whites of the city, leading to steady movement of whites out of neighborhoods that blacks entered in large numbers.

In North Philadelphia the Irish and Ukrainian residents moved out slowly as blacks expanded. Similar patterns developed in West Philadelphia. Thus blacks came to occupy the housing areas that were oldest and hardest to maintain and that provided the occupying families with the worst shelter for the most disadvantageous payment of rents and mortgages. The racism and prejudice that were a historic part of the American mentality were woven through the housing market, and all the problems of supply and finance were complicated by a seemingly inescapable segregation process that distorted the housing market. Throughout the city and its suburbs, whenever blacks sought to move freely in the housing market there was community tension and frequently vandalism, intimidation, street riots, and evacuation of whole neighborhoods by whites. The city's Commission on Human Relations worked diligently to relieve these situations, but the small staff was inadequate to the broad scope of the problem.²²

The ever-growing needs of the congested black neighborhoods continued to challenge the efforts of various agencies to provide low-rent housing for low-income families. Between 1937, when the Philadelphia Housing Author-

ity was organized, and 1970 that agency built, rehabilitated, or acquired and leased on a subsidy basis some 21,000 low-rent housing units. Housing some 106,475 persons, these units were far from adequate, but they were more than a beginning, particularly when one realizes that no low-rent housing at all was constructed in the decade prior to 1952.


The cost of this public housing was underwritten by the federal government. The Philadelphia Housing Authority built the units through private contractors, and administered the projects on completion and occupancy. Initially, high-rise elevator apartments were built with a few surrounding row houses to provide a self-contained community, like the Harrison Plaza and the Raymond Rosen and Schuylkill Falls developments. But these projects tended to create new low-income ghettos, perpetuating the evils public housing was supposed to eliminate. The last elevator project was built in 1967. Other housing in scattered areas was being rehabilitated and then rented to families at a percentage of their certified income, a plan more socially desirable and more generally acceptable.²³

Larger than the Philadelphia Housing Authority and more active in this period was the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority, created by federal statute in 1945. Although federally subsidized like the Housing Authority, the operations of the Redevelopment Authority were quite different. Government funds, covering approximately three-fourths of the ultimate cost of a project, were used to acquire land and either to demolish buildings being put to undesirable uses—slum dwellings or “skid row” commercial properties—or in some cases to rehabilitate existing properties, as in the Washington Square East–Society Hill area. The land was sold to private developers at a price less than the acquisition cost, the authority assuming the difference.

From its first project in 1950 through 1968 the Redevelopment Authority financed more than sixty separate projects involving 3368 acres. Although the tracts were widely scattered, major activity was centered in center city. Some of the money went into slum rehabilitation, partly in the black belt, but more of it to such diverse projects as University City and redevelopment around Temple University, the Food Distribution Center, Washington Square West, and Market Street East. The Redevelopment Authority was a major force in remaking the face of the city.

A third housing agency, the Philadelphia Housing Development Corporation, was created in 1965 to assist its larger associate authorities in further relieving the ongoing housing shortage. A quasi-public corporation with both city and “public” directors, the PHDC used both a \$2-million city fund and federal bonds to acquire rental and sales housing units on a subsidy basis for low-income families. Unfortunately cuts in its budget because of the city’s financial difficulties soon curtailed the corporation’s effectiveness. Furthermore by the late 1960s all the housing programs were suffering from rising construction costs, rising interest rates on mortgages, and the shrinkage of federal housing money as the Vietnam War absorbed federal spending.

For all the accomplishments of the various housing agencies, moreover,



Renewal on of Spruce Street near Second (1965). The Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority, established in 1945, exercised its right of eminent domain to acquire blighted properties to sell or lease for private or public redevelopment. The Washington Square East (Society Hill) project was the authority's earliest major effort.

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deterioration proceeded faster than rehabilitation. The continuing flow of poor black and, later in the period, Puerto Rican families into the city aggravated housing and related social problems that Philadelphia, like many another city, could not solve. The large majority of applicants for low-rent housing were black, but eligible whites were generally unwilling to live in predominantly black developments. White middle- and working-class residents were also violently opposed to public housing projects in their neighborhoods, thus confining them to black areas. Attempts by the Clark administration to disperse sites to outlying white areas in the 1950s led to a furor in the city Council and mob scenes in City Hall as neighborhood groups protested. Too often new housing projects in black areas displaced the poorest people in favor of those somewhat less poor; while federal housing law required that the displaced be relocated, usually their new housing was at least as bad as that from which they had been removed.

The chief defect of the housing improvement policy of the city in the 1950s and 1960s was probably the overreliance on public housing and large-scale

urban-renewal clearances. These were both necessary, but they did not address the problems of the enormous extent of the row-house supply that was the main residential resource of the city. This aging row-house residential fabric held the city together socially and in terms of community life. It was declining at a rate that led people to abandon it, yet public housing or clearance to replace the worst areas did not capitalize on the old neighborhood stability characteristic of the city, nor did it induce widespread conservation and reinvestment in older housing by working people themselves. In Society Hill, Queen Village, and Fairmount the results of such reinvestment for upper- and middle-class families could be seen, and a delightful center-city ambience was created. The same thing never happened for blue-collar families, and the result was that dozens of neighborhoods continued to decline. This condition altered the social character of the city more than all of the ambitious rebuilding projects of the post-World War II decades.²⁴

V I

Concern for human needs, or social compassion, is part of a civilized society and Philadelphia had a great tradition of social concern, yet nowhere in a great urban community was this ideal harder to achieve than in public health and public welfare. When lack of funds required the setting of priorities, these areas were the first to be neglected. Relief from state and federal governments was inadequate and badly managed, and an administrative complexity of overlapping agencies resulted. Despite such obstacles Philadelphia achieved substantial progress in public health and welfare from 1946 to 1970.

In 1946 there were few public health services in the city. The commonwealth maintained a mental hospital at Byberry in the northeast. The Board of City Trusts, a quasi-public agency, operated the Wills Eye Hospital. By far the largest facility was Philadelphia General Hospital in West Philadelphia, an 1800-bed charitable institution that since 1920 was the successor to the old Almshouse founded in colonial times and to "Old Blockley." Administration of the PGH was mediocre at best.

During Dilworth's administration the reformers finally succeeded in giving the medical schools control of the PGH's services. A committee appointed by the Tate administration and chaired by Dr. James F. Dixon, the commissioner of health, considered a plan to rebuild the PGH complex at a possible cost of \$110 million. Eventually, however, the squeeze of public indifference, municipal impecuniousness, and low priorities for welfare when cost rises caught up with the PGH, the flurry of reform activity proved short-lived, and instead of being rebuilt the hospital was closed altogether in the late 1970s.

In the summer of 1949, before his election as controller, Joseph Clark had asked a committee of public health experts to make a survey and prepare a plan for a public health program for the city. The plan became a plank in his platform when Clark ran for mayor. In addition to reform of the PGH the plan called for creating ten district public health centers to be fed by a group of neighborhood centers all of which would operate a decentralized public

health program. Instead of enlarging the PGH or building new municipal general hospitals the plan called for contracts with existing private hospitals for indigent patient care.

The construction of the health centers progressed slowly as funds became available. By 1970 seven district health centers had been built and were in operation, and two older centers were renovated and placed in service. The district health centers were not hospitals. They offered medical and surgical services on an outpatient basis, however, and they improved the health services available to the people of Philadelphia.

Thus Philadelphia progressed in the public health field from 1946 to 1970. But the legitimate demands of the people for services, spurred on by federal programs and appropriations, were never fully met. At the end of the period health services were available to citizens thanks to federal Medicare and Medicaid to an extent hardly dreamed of twenty-five years earlier, yet the demands of a compassionate and civilized society were far from being met in areas of poverty.

Much the same was true of Philadelphia's welfare activities. For many years before 1947 the administration of such activities in the city was a hodgepodge of conflicting and overlapping public and private agencies attempting to breast a vast sea of misery. Unlike many other cities Philadelphia saw much of the welfare or relief for the indigent handled by the state, not the city, under the auspices of the state Department of Public Assistance and the Philadelphia County Relief Board, a state-affiliated agency. The city charter of 1951 attempted to bring a measure of order out of chaos and to strengthen the city's hand by creating a city Department of Public Welfare. As with other city departments under the Clark administration, it was led first by men of professional competence whose employees were under a strict merit system. Randolph E. Wise, commissioner of welfare, and his assistants Manuel E. Kauffman, Edward Hendrick, and Johannes Hoeber were the principal architects of the new organization.²⁵ The department operated its activities under three divisions: Child Care and Custody, Problems of the Aged, and Penal Affairs.

Child-care activities were comprehensive, including the placement and support of children in foster homes or institutions, adoption proceedings for the children of unmarried parents, and protective services for the neglected or abused child. The department generally provided for these services through contracts with voluntary agencies that were reimbursed by the department. Before the adoption of the charter many of these services had been provided either by the county commissioners or by the Juvenile Division of the Municipal Court, both of which had a record of mediocrity and political interference. Administration by the Welfare Department substantially improved their caliber.

Services to the aging primarily involved supervision of Riverview, until the mid-1950s known as the County Home. Riverview was basically a custodial-care facility moving toward nursing home care with medical support for

elderly men and women who were still able and willing to take care of themselves, but who had been living alone and were without relatives or friends. At one time a dreary institution where callousness toward the then-called "inmates" was all too frequent, Riverview later enjoyed renovated physical facilities and a somewhat improved quality of supervision.

The charter gave the Department of Public Welfare responsibility for general supervision over all city penal reformatory and correctional institutions, as well as the county prisons at Moyamensing and Holmesburg. These and the House of Correction for less serious cases were brought under a single superintendent and one board of trustees in 1955. In 1963 a new Detention Center for untried adults was opened on State Road in Holmesburg, and the old county prison at Moyamensing, one of the city's architectural monuments, built in 1835, was closed. About this time a series of decisions of the United States Supreme Court concerning defendants' rights in the field of criminal justice resulted in an enormous increase in the case load of prisoners awaiting trial. In 1963 the ratio in prison had been 66 percent sentenced and 34 percent untried; in 1969, 26 percent were sentenced and 74 percent untried or unsentenced.

Much of the activity of the Welfare Department dealt with black and elderly citizens. The relationship of employees of the department with clients was made difficult because of a chronic shortage of caseworkers. The case load on the welfare rolls administered by the public assistance program of the state increased steadily from 64,760 in 1946 to 183,000 in 1969. Despite general prosperity there continued to be hunger among the poor in Philadelphia. School board officials confirmed the fact in appraising the condition of youngsters going into the public school system. To help meet the need the federal government initially sent surplus food into Philadelphia, to be distributed by the city Welfare Department. Some 75,000 families obtained some of their subsistence from these generally unattractive commodities in the early 1960s. In 1966 the federal food stamp program was instituted, making it possible for the poor to purchase more than surplus foods. By 1970 at least 15,000 families were receiving food stamps; none was any longer getting surplus food. The problem of food for the poor was part of the tangle of bureaucracy and persistent dependency that reflected the complex toll exacted from the poor by urban conditions.

Private agencies, most of them joining in the annual private United Fund appeal (later the United Way), and whose activities were planned with the private Health and Welfare Council, still carried a large part of Philadelphia's total welfare load. Because of the constantly increasing demands of an ever-rising population of indigents, the United Fund tried each year to raise more and more money to support its constituent agencies. The Philadelphia establishment always dominated the United Fund, and generally ran it well. However, there were increasing complaints from the black population that the fund spent too much money on middle-class agencies and neglected the needs of the ghetto.

V I I

Philadelphia, like other large American cities, showed a shocking increase in crime of all sorts between 1946 and 1968. Many streets in the city became unsafe, particularly at night. At the same time there had been evidence, but not strong enough to stand up in court, of organized crime operating in Philadelphia under affiliates of nationwide syndicates. The police and court systems had become terribly complex and overburdened in trying to confront crime conditions, and an experienced lawyer, later a judge, Lois Forer, termed juvenile courts "the delinquent juvenile courts."

Authorities and civic groups continually strove to maintain order with justice and to rehabilitate the offenders. The Voluntary Defender, financed in part with city funds, and the Legal Aid Society both had admirable accomplishments, but their financial and manpower resources were inadequate to assure equal justice under law to those who could not afford a lawyer and to those in need of civil legal aid. The funds for Community Legal Services, part of the Federal Anti-Poverty Program, were cut drastically in the fall of 1970.

The police themselves came in for justifiable criticism in the later years of the period. The earlier police commissioners, Gibbons, Brown, and Leary, were humane and effective. Frank Rizzo was a more controversial commissioner. His determination, supported by Mayor Tate, to eliminate the Police Review Board as a check on possible police brutality was widely criticized by the black community and others. Despite efforts to eliminate the feeling, the police were widely regarded as enemies in the most blighted areas of the black community. The proportion of blacks on the police force, after rising in the 1950s and 1960s, began to decline, and blacks sued the city to compel broader black recruitment. Yet the percentage of unsolved crimes was lower than in most other large cities. Police education, centered on the Police Academy, improved in the 1960s. Still, recruiting of capable young men has always been difficult except in times of economic depression. "Who wants to be a cop when you can make more money as a bartender?" was a common sentiment. No matter how zealous the police were in their efforts to prevent crime, to arrest violators, and to bring alleged offenders to justice, their work was no more effective than the prosecution by the district attorney and the trial and sentencing of those indicted by the courts.

The district attorney's office, brought to a peak of efficiency under Richardson Dilworth, fell into the doldrums under his two successors. Prosecutions were routine, delays mounted, court calendars became clogged. The administration of criminal justice again became infected with the virus of political favoritism. Many a decision was made in the headquarters of the Democratic City Committee rather than in the district attorney's office. The county detectives, eyes and ears of criminal prosecution, tended to respond to political pressure in preparing cases for trial. The election of Arlen Specter as district attorney in 1965 changed this. Specter successfully resisted any effort of the Republican leadership to run his office on a political basis.

Nevertheless the prosecutor's hands were often tied in his efforts to reduce crime. Among the obstacles that confronted him were nineteenth-century court machinery; mounting case loads; too few judges; too few and poorly paid assistant district attorneys; inadequate detention facilities; the slow pace at which justices disposed of cases and released the innocent; failure of rehabilitation of prisoners in jails, with the resulting alarming rate of repeat offenses; and finally the chronic complaint of all district attorneys and police, inadequate sentencing by the judges.

At the lower levels of justice, particularly in the magistrates' courts, political favoritism rather than justice continued to be the rule. Elected by the people, magistrates were usually politicians at the ward level. Fortunately state constitutional amendments in 1968 provided that henceforth magistrates seeking new ten-year terms would have to be lawyers, and this requirement brought improvement.

Like other major cities Philadelphia suffered riots. Philadelphia shared amply in the discontents that caused so many "long hot summers" in American cities during the 1960s, and the credit that Police Commissioner Rizzo received, rightly or wrongly, for keeping the lid on rioting in Philadelphia was a major factor in his eventual ascent to the mayor's office.

Philadelphia's longest, hottest summer came in 1964, when the simmering ghetto of north-central Philadelphia exploded along Columbia Avenue west of Broad Street in late August. The precipitating incident was trivial; an intoxicated couple refused to let police unblock traffic by moving their stalled car. Bad feeling toward the police and the other resentments of the crowd that swiftly gathered—as many as 2000 people inhabited single blocks in the area—created a crescendo of scuffling with the police and then a first night, to be followed by several others, of breaking storefronts and looting. The police barricaded the area and slowly battled their way back into control. Two people died, 339 were injured, and an estimated \$3 million of property was destroyed.²⁶

Fighting between blacks and police broke out in two additional widely publicized disturbances, in the Girard College area on May 1, 1967, and at the Board of Education building on the Benjamin Franklin Parkway in 1969; the latter was a climax to frequent racial incidents in many schools. Rivaling the summer of 1964 for the tensions they produced throughout the city were the problems of crime, violence, and race that polarized Philadelphia in the first week of September 1970. On Saturday, August 31, a Fairmount Park guard was killed and another injured in an unprovoked attempt by seven persons to blow up a guardhouse. Five suspects were arrested and identified as black militants. The following day two other policemen were wounded by different gunmen not apparently involved in the earlier crime. On Monday three headquarters locations of the militant Black Panthers were raided by police. In ensuing gun battles three policemen were injured. Fourteen persons, presumably Black Panthers, were arrested in these raids. No connection, however, had been established between the targets of the raids and the earlier

murder and assaults against law enforcement personnel. The fourteen individuals arrested were searched for weapons but none was found. Nevertheless Judge Leo Weinrott, summoned from bed in the middle of the night, held the fourteen in \$100,000 bail. Meanwhile during Monday and again on Tuesday other policemen were wounded in violent outbreaks that also appeared to be without direct connection to earlier events.

The Black Panthers were sponsoring a People's New Revolutionary Convention to meet in Philadelphia over the weekend of September 5. About ten days earlier Mayor Tate had declared a limited state of emergency in the Tasker and Fairmount sections, which had agitated most of the black population. Feelings were now exacerbated by the shootings and arrests and the imminence of the Black Panther convention.

Police Commissioner Frank Rizzo was the sparkplug of the raids and the arrests.²⁷ Some of his comments, to say the least, tended to arouse rather than to allay emotionalism. Following one of the shootings of a policeman, that of Tom Gibbons, Jr., son of the former police commissioner, Rizzo said: "We need 2,000 more policemen to stop them. The only thing we can do now is to buy tanks and start mounting machine guns. . . . it is sedition. This is no longer a crime, but revolution. It must be stopped even if we have to change some of the laws to do it." Philadelphia was split down the middle. As one reporter wrote: "The atmosphere of crisis, apprehension and anticipation" spread over the city. Those concerned for their personal safety and for the maintenance of order rallied to Rizzo's support. The black community as a whole made heroes of the Black Panthers.

Voices of reason fortunately prevailed. Calling for order and restraint on both sides were civic leaders such as Gustave Amsterdam of Bankers Security; Richard Bond, a retailing executive; R. Stewart Rauch, president of the prestigious Philadelphia Saving Fund Society; Thacher Longstreth, president of the Chamber of Commerce; and Charles Bowser, a black leader, speaking through the Urban Coalition and the Greater Philadelphia Movement. Temple University, with the approval of Gov. Raymond Shafer, opened its facilities for the convention of the Panthers and other black militant groups. The event went off peaceably. The police were not obviously present at Temple during the proceedings, though a number of plainclothes men monitored the meeting. Fears of violence turned out to be unwarranted. The visiting militants departed. A still-nervous city returned to calm. The controversy between the police and civil libertarians continued, but it was no longer front and center stage.

The increase in the number of juvenile delinquents between 1946 and 1970 was appalling. Gang warfare among blacks in the slums became worse in Philadelphia than in other cities. There were forty-one gang killings in 1969. Of all arrests for major crimes in 1968, 46.9 percent were of juveniles eighteen years of age or under. Drug traffic played a role in this deadly conflict.

The initially splendid Youth Study Center on the Parkway for a time did an excellent job in diagnosing the ills of youthful offenders and recommend-

ing punishment and rehabilitation procedures for judges sitting in the Juvenile Division of the County Court. But the facilities of the center became badly overtaxed. Some judges, notably J. Sydney Hoffman, later on the Superior Court, took a compassionate interest in the scores of cases marched before them every day. The reform schools and prisons to which the youth were sent had little success in preventing recidivism. The number of juvenile offenders who became hardened criminals was frightening. When drug use spread as a source of delinquency and crime among juveniles, a problem not only in Philadelphia but elsewhere in the nation, the treatment for narcotics addiction remained primitive.

By the 1970s crime was found to be ranked as the number one problem in a survey of public opinion by the City Planning Commission.

VIII

It was commonly assumed that Philadelphia's mingling of races and ethnic groups had in the past worked pretty well, but this assumption was questionable.²⁸ The surrender of political power by white Protestant to Catholic Irish and Italian and to Jewish hands, first in the Democratic party but more recently in the Republican as well, increased at the close of the 1950s. Dilworth and Stassen were the last two Protestants to oppose each other for mayor. Changes in the ethnic composition and the leadership of banks, law firms, and major institutions moved slowly as Jews and Catholics reached higher echelons, but blacks were even more slowly advanced. Blacks nevertheless appeared on the city Council, on the Civil Service Commission, in important positions in city government, and on the bench from the early days of the Clark administration.

A large percentage of municipal employees were black, and many private businesses, nudged by the Fair Employment Practices Ordinance passed under Clark and given teeth by the Human Relations Commission, opened their ranks to blacks of both sexes. No one could say that racial discrimination in employment had disappeared in Philadelphia. What could be said was that some employment opportunities had opened to the educated black, but that the unskilled remained at a terrible disadvantage. The black middle class increased greatly as a result. The "Philadelphia Plan" sponsored by the federal Nixon administration to some extent opened employment opportunities in the formerly white building trades unions. Serious discrimination decreased in public accommodations and in recreational facilities.

Leadership in areas of human relations was always a serious problem in Philadelphia, even during the era of reform. But Dilworth's departure from City Hall in 1962 brought with it a realization that succession for blacks had not often been provided for. In the 1950s and early 1960s a high level of black leadership was provided by the black Protestant clergy, such men as Luther Cunningham, Marshall Shepard, and William Gray. They devoted themselves to the spiritual leadership of their followers while at the same time engaging in the rough and tumble of municipal politics. Their potential successors, men like the Rev. Leon Sullivan, Judge Leon Higginbotham,

Principal Marcus A. Foster of Simon Gratz High School, the Rev. Henry Nichols of the school board, and Fr. Paul Washington, continued this tradition, but they faced the inevitable competition and pluralist buffeting of a city in which there was a whole constellation of contending ethnic and special interest groups.

Cecil Moore, a tempestuous lawyer and for some years chairman of the local branch of the NAACP, was often in the news. An expert agitator, he led his followers for several years through controversies like that surrounding Girard College. His younger successors were unable to summon more than fragmented support as the problems of blacks became increasingly complex and linked to grave urban ills.

Throughout the period, nevertheless, men and women of goodwill labored untiringly to bridge the racial gap. Much of their work was done through the Fellowship Commission, a coalition of civic groups seeking to create a unified solution to the many indignities that minority groups suffered. Founded in October 1941 by Marjorie Penney, a social worker, and Maurice B. Fagan, a former teacher with an intense interest in improving human relations, the commission was in the forefront of efforts that sought and obtained effective legislation to open public accommodations, employment opportunities, housing, and educational opportunities to all citizens. It had excellent establishment support. Charles J. Simpson, member of the Union League and president of the Philadelphia Gas Works, was long its president and principal fundraiser, Maurice Fagan its executive. Polarization set in about the time Dilworth resigned as mayor, and thenceforth the commission and many other like-minded civic groups had to struggle against grave difficulties to maintain communications between both sides of the racial barrier.

In addition to the rise of greater group consciousness on the part of blacks, other ethnic groups experienced a renewal of identity and solidarity due to various stimuli. Urban renewal had threatened or displaced some old ethnic neighborhoods. Religious changes, especially among Roman Catholics after Vatican Council II, challenged accepted rituals and folk religious attachments. Changing youth behavior made ethnic groups conscious of the indifference of some young people to old values. A great increase in popularity of folk music, ease of travel back to "the old country," and a broader acceptance in society of cultural differences all influenced the ethnic revival. Also, Italians, Poles, Ukrainians, and Irish responded to the new black assertiveness with assertion of their own identity. More and more interest in history and social science showed the extensive role such groups had played in building the industrial city, and hence there was a revival of pride, ethnic festivals, and ethnic cultural events. Race relations may have been inflamed, but young blacks were also experiencing a surge of positive ethnic appreciation of their own background. The Library Company's remarkable 1969 exhibition of black history helped. All of these developments gave the city that had been largely ruled by the image of a "Protestant establishment" in 1946 a whole new pluralist orientation by 1970.²⁹

IX

The political reform movement of the 1940s and 1950s in Philadelphia bypassed public education. In 1947 there were three parallel systems of primary and secondary education. The public school system was operated by a Board of Education of fifteen members selected by the Board of Judges of the Courts of Common Pleas. The second system, of comparable size, was the parochial school system conducted by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Philadelphia. The third was a spectrum of private schools, some of them related to Protestant denominations, some of the oldest conducted by the Society of Friends.

The members of the Philadelphia Board of Education served without pay, and few of them knew anything about education or the public school system when they took office. Leon Obermayer, a respected lawyer and chairman of the board from 1955 to 1961, was at that time the only member whose children had gone to the public schools, but he nonetheless adopted a laissez-faire policy. For all practical purposes during the period 1947-1961 the Board of Education and the school system with it were run by Add B. Anderson, business manager. His philosophy was to keep education as inexpensive as possible in order to prevent increases in school taxation. At the time the board was financed entirely by a tax on real estate fixed by the state legislature; the city Council and the mayor had nothing whatever to do with the system of public education.

Teachers in the public school system were badly paid. As late as 1960 the starting scale for an accredited teacher was \$4000 a year; \$7600 a year was the maximum that could be paid to a teacher with a Ph.D. The results were a mediocre teaching staff, high vacancy rates, teacher unrest, and many temporary uncertified teachers. The pay was better in the surrounding suburban counties. Among the pupils, the drop-out rate was extraordinarily high, averaging about 33 percent per annum in the high schools. Student achievement was significantly below the national average.

While schools were generally coeducational, those that sent the highest proportion of their graduates on to college were not: Central High and Girls High were selective, highly academic schools. There was also a system of vocational and technical schools for children not interested in an academic program, but little effective on-the-job training was provided.

In 1954 the Supreme Court of the United States in *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* decreed an end to *de jure* segregation in all public school systems. Philadelphia moved lethargically to carry the opinion of the court into effect. One dramatic test involved Girard College in North Philadelphia, endowed by Stephen Girard in the nineteenth century for poor, white, orphan boys. (Girard College was not a part of the public school system, but it was administered by the Board of City Trusts.) Despite the 1954 Supreme Court decision the board refused to open the school to black students, alleging that Girard's will superseded as well as antedated both the *Brown* case and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

Two young blacks represented by Raymond Pace Alexander, a distinguished black lawyer and member of the city Council, applied for admission to the school. Alexander's request was turned down, although Joseph Clark and James Finnegan as mayor and president of the city Council and ex-officio members of the Board of City Trusts attempted to persuade the board to admit the youngsters and seek a later decision in the courts. Lengthy litigation ensued, with a final ruling by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, that the will was superseded by the *Brown* decision. After 1968 black youngsters did gain admission to Girard College, but not before the litigation and dispute greatly agitated public opinion.

The public schools had experienced increasing racial problems as the black population expanded around the center of the city. In the 1950s, for example, Simon Gratz High School, in Nicetown or lower Germantown, was equally divided between white and black students. Ten years later because of changing neighborhood housing patterns the school was almost 100 percent black. Marcus Foster, the black principal at Simon Gratz, exerted outstanding leadership in this situation and in 1969 received the Philadelphia Award for his efforts in improving the quality of education at the school.

As the white population of Philadelphia declined and the black population grew, the change was reflected in the enrollment in the public schools. In 1961 there were approximately 125,000 white and the same number of black students enrolled. In 1970, out of a total enrollment of 291,000 pupils, nonwhite enrollment was 174,660. By 1970 Puerto Ricans formed 2.8 percent of the pupil population. Spanish-speaking students presented a special problem both because of the language difficulty and because of antagonism between them and non-Puerto Rican students. The school district was simply not prepared to deal with the special needs of a large number of students whose primary language was not English.

By the early 1960s public interest in the schools began to quicken. The Greater Philadelphia Movement became involved, and a Citizens Committee on Public Education was revitalized. As a result of this awakening a Philadelphia Educational Home Rule Charter was passed by the legislature in 1965 in the form of an amendment to the 1951 city charter. Taxing power for the schools was given to the city Council. The nine members of the Board of Education were to be appointed by the mayor from a list submitted by a citizens' educational nominating panel. Members of the board were to serve for six-year staggered terms and were to be registered voters living in the city. Richardson Dilworth was appointed chairman of the board, and the young, capable educator Mark Shedd was brought in as superintendent of schools.

With Dilworth's accession as chairman of the board, reform came to the Philadelphia school system. In addition to a continuing teacher recruitment problem and a demoralizing drop-out rate, the problems that the new board faced in 1965 were many and crucial: overcrowded schools, many of them firetraps; a tremendous backlog of essential school maintenance to accommodate the children of the baby boom of the 1950s; a need for widespread use

of busing to which there was great public objection; an increasingly strong teachers' union with seniority principles that made it difficult to obtain qualified, experienced teachers for black or Puerto Rican schools; a totally inadequate school budget and financial chaos approaching bankruptcy; serious racial unrest; an obsolete curriculum; and a public educational system designed for children with middle-class mores and quite unsuited to the majority of black and Spanish-speaking and low-income white children.

Faced with this Augean stable, Dilworth, Shedd, and a majority of the board took Herculean measures. By drastically increasing teachers' salaries they reduced the vacancy rate from 20 percent to less than 1 percent, in the process eliminating practically all of the temporary uncertified teachers. The salary scale was increased from \$4000 a year for a beginning certified teacher to \$7300. Expenditures for school construction were increased from an annual average of \$16 million to \$90 million by 1968. New methods of meeting community resentments and community problems were devised through a series of conferences throughout the city with parents and others interested in the educational system. The curriculum was drastically revised. Magnet schools were created to give special priority to different subjects at particular schools. Through a variety of devices, successful appeals were made to potential drop-out students with the result that the drop-out rate was reduced from 33 percent a year to 17 percent.

All of this, of course, cost money. The school budget for 1960 was \$102,867,682; for 1969 it was \$270,563,963. In order to raise the large sums necessary to meet capital and operating budget demands, Dilworth and Shedd were constantly before the city Council, the legislature and governor in Harrisburg, the Congress and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in Washington, attempting to get more money for the Philadelphia schools. To some extent they were successful. As costs increased, however, there was a recurring fiscal deficit that caused grave concern. The situation was aggravated by demands of the Federation of Teachers in 1970 for increases in salaries and other benefits totaling \$28 million, resulting in a strike in September and October that closed the schools. The public school system of Philadelphia faced a critical financial condition with no adequate help in sight from any of the supporting governmental bodies.³⁰

A running feud between Dilworth and Mayor Tate that erupted shortly after Dilworth's appointment, along with dissensions within the Board of Education defying Dilworth's powers of conciliation, complicated all the other problems. By 1970 the highly touted school reforms were widely questioned, and black parents especially perceived increasing deficiencies in policy and practice in the schools. The financial problem mounted yearly, and the teachers union and the Board of Education seemed in a deadlock within a declining system.³¹

The history of the parochial school system during the period 1946-1968 closely paralleled that of the public schools. Both systems were beset by overcrowding, inadequate revenues, serious teacher problems, and an old-

fashioned curriculum having little relevance to modern life. Orthodox Catholic religious instruction contradicting more unfettered trends in youth behavior raised additional major difficulties for the parochial schools. On the other hand bureaucratic problems confronting the public school system did not always exist in the parochial schools. The latter had a much milder race problem. Most blacks in Philadelphia and those who moved into the area after World War II were Baptists, or Methodists. No more than 10 percent of the children in Catholic schools were black, despite efforts over the years to convert blacks to the Catholic faith.

From the late 1950s until about 1965 there was an enormous increase in the number of pupils in the parochial schools and a corresponding building program.³² Starting about 1965 school construction tapered off, in part because of financial problems, and enrollment expansion slowed. The parochial school system was operated under the Archdiocese of Philadelphia headed by John Cardinal O'Hara and later John Cardinal Krol. It was immediately under the care of the superintendent of archdiocesan schools, who for nine years was Monsignor Edward K. Hughes, until he was succeeded in 1970 by his assistant Monsignor Francis B. Schulte. Historically the teaching in the parochial schools was done by members of religious orders. As enrollment increased, however, it was necessary to bring in lay teachers. In 1960, 10 percent of the instructional force was lay teachers; by 1969 the proportion had risen to 40 percent. Since lay teachers in the Catholic schools were not paid as well as teachers in the public schools, there was concern that the caliber of instruction in the parochial schools would suffer, and the demands for higher salaries became more insistent.

In 1967 the lay teachers won collective bargaining rights and a salary agreement after a long and hotly contested dispute with the archdiocese. A further salary dispute in 1970, settled by a considerable increase, required a rise in tuition putting the parochial schools out of the reach of some low-income families. Even with the tuition increase the wage negotiations and the growing number of lay teachers accelerated the growth of the schools' financial problems and the schools had to continue to operate at a loss. Financial aid from the federal and state governments after Congress passed the National Defense Education Act, and more particularly the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1965, gave some relief but, as usual, not enough.

Bridging the gap for the poor student between high school and college was the Philadelphia Community College. It was established pursuant to state legislation in 1964 and opened for classes the following fall, with Dr. Allen T. Bonnell as president, in quarters in the former Snellenburg department store on Market Street between Eleventh and Twelfth. In 1969 full-time enrollment was 4200, with another 2000 students attending part time; another 1500 or more could have been enrolled if facilities and funds had permitted. The curriculum was in effect a thirteenth and fourteenth grade for high school graduates. Some students went on to complete their baccalaureate

elsewhere, but most went directly into the labor market. Human service careers, business administration, health occupations, and paraprofessional engineering courses were the principal subjects taught.³³

Institutions of higher education experienced extraordinary growth after World War II because of the population boom and the G.I. Bill giving veterans tuition-free education privileges. Among the institutions making Philadelphia a center for higher education, Temple University, which had enjoyed a remarkable growth since 1947, became part of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education in 1965. The consequent increase in state support stimulated the university's further growth, especially in its graduate and professional schools. The Jefferson Medical College and its associated institutions became the Thomas Jefferson University on July 1, 1969, including in addition to the Medical College a College of Allied Health Sciences, a College of Graduate Studies, and the Thomas Jefferson University Hospital. The institution that the financier Anthony J. Drexel founded in 1891 as the Drexel Institute of Art, Science, and Industry, to emphasize engineering and business studies, known since 1936 as the Drexel Institute of Technology, became Drexel University on February 27, 1970. Its graduate degrees include the Ph.D. in engineering science and in library and information science. The Women's Medical College of Pennsylvania, after its Board of Corporators voted in 1969 to admit male students to its only remaining all-female department, its M.D. program, changed its name on July 1, 1970, to the Medical College of Pennsylvania.

The University of Pennsylvania was a quiescent place in 1947. Its president, Thomas S. Gates, though a distinguished New York and Philadelphia banker, did not much more than keep the institution afloat; he was not an educator and did not pretend to be. His successor from 1949, Harold Stassen, former governor of Minnesota, more interested in his political than his educational career, did, however, travel all over the country raising for the university an estimated \$34 million, which provided a start for a rebuilding and renaissance program.

Gaylord P. Harnwell, a professor of physics in the university, succeeded Stassen in 1953 and served until his retirement in the fall of 1970. Major credit for the revival of the University of Pennsylvania must go to President Harnwell. In the twenty years from 1950 to 1970 the university's faculty doubled, and it became a younger, more cosmopolitan, more sophisticated, more liberal faculty. There was an extraordinary increase in faculty salaries, necessary to obtain individuals of distinction. As late as 1953 the average annual salary of a professor at Penn was \$8000; by 1969 it was \$19,838, with fringe benefits bringing it to a total of \$22,175.

The student body did not greatly increase in the period. In the fall of 1969 there were 19,021 students, about 13,500 of them full time. An effort was made to enroll more black students, but not nearly so successfully as at Temple. Of the 250 black applicants who were offered admission to Penn in 1969, only about half matriculated. As a result of student unrest a Student Committee

on Undergraduate Education was created, and students sat as members of the Committee on Instruction of the College and on the Graduate and Undergraduate Curriculum Committees.

Many new programs were instituted, relating to the needs of modern society. The graduate schools of the university achieved national distinction in such fields as archeology, law, and business administration. It was a mark of the caliber of the university's graduate work that research grants and contracts rose from \$8.5 million in 1956-1957 to \$45 million in 1968-1969.

Penn's renaissance, of course, cost large sums of money, which was forthcoming to an extraordinary extent. In 1947 annual support for the university from alumni, friends, foundations, and corporations (not including contract grants for specific research projects) was less than \$2 million. By 1969 the comparable figure had increased more than tenfold. The university successfully completed its development drive, which went over the top in 1969 with a total of \$102,318,599. Nineteen new endowed professorships were established. Scholarship and fellowship endowment was increased by more than \$10 million.

At the end of World War II the university campus was physically run-down, and its renewal was planned with the aid of its city planning and fine arts departments. All branches benefited. The Gates Memorial Pavilion and I. S. Ravdin Institute added enormously to the capacity of the University Hospital; new athletic facilities were provided; the Van Pelt and Dietrich Libraries, which functioned together, became a significant regional educational resource; a student housing program in 1968 was financed by the Pennsylvania Higher Education Facilities Authority. The surface trolley cars that used to bisect the campus along Woodland Avenue were relocated underground. Streets were closed, and landscaping and walkways created. In addition to the university's own fund drives, money for campus development included a vast array of city, state, and federal agencies, especially the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority and the General State Authority.

Much of the building and improvement for the university during the 1960s resulted from a redevelopment plan known as University City, a joint project of the University of Pennsylvania and Drexel University. On the basis of plans submitted by both these institutions, the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority obtained from the federal government approximately 90 percent of the cost of tearing down unsafe and unsound structures in the area between the Schuylkill River and Forty-fourth Street, bounded on the north by Market Street and on the south by Spruce Street, together with a smaller area reaching north of Market toward Powelton Village.³⁴

Across the Schuylkill River in north-central Philadelphia, Temple University also experienced an enormous expansion after World War II, and with the aid of federal and state funds transformed what was formerly one of the worst slum areas of Philadelphia into a great university center. Much of the

credit must go to the three presidents of Temple during the period: Robert H. Johnson, formerly an executive of *Time* magazine and director of the Pennsylvania State Welfare Program during the Earle administration of the 1930s; Millard Gladfelter, long associated with Temple, during whose term the university entered the Commonwealth System of Higher Education; and Paul R. Anderson, who came to Temple initially as vice-president for academic affairs from the presidency of Chatham College in Pittsburgh.

In its undergraduate schools Temple was a commuters' university, two-thirds of its students living at home. Like Penn, Temple encountered bitter opposition to its steady accession of land while displacing poor blacks. Conscious thereafter of the problems created by its growth in the midst of a ghetto neighborhood, Temple formed a steering committee of university officials, community representatives, and delegates from federal, state, and city agencies to explore ways in which the university, in partnership with the community, might help revitalize the whole community surrounding the campus with the assistance of government. The university later made special efforts to recruit able young people from low-income families. Scholarship aid increased significantly. In 1969 about one-third of all Temple students received some form of assistance through various programs administered by the university.

Total enrollment that year was 44,779, including summer school. The university had twenty-four separate colleges and schools and a faculty that had doubled in the preceding ten years. The main campus changed from a crowding together of row houses and a few academic buildings into a coherent arrangement of such new buildings as the Samuel Paley Library, the 481-seat Tomlinson Theater, and humanities and social science towers centering on a Bell Tower Plaza. In addition to its main campus, Temple took over the former Pennsylvania School of Horticulture in Ambler. The university's Tyler School of Art was located in Cheltenham Township, and a Health Sciences Center including the medical school and Temple University Hospital expanded around Broad and Ontario Streets north of the Broad Street and Montgomery Avenue complex.

Because Temple is a state-related university, twelve of its thirty-three trustees were appointed by the governor. Presiding over the Board of Trustees from 1939 to 1969 was Judge Charles Klein of the Orphan's Court of Philadelphia, who shared with the university presidents a major role in the extraordinary growth of a trolley-line college into a great university. Probably the most surprising aspect of Temple's academic and physical expansion was its swiftness. From an institution with an undistinguished profile to one with remarkable scholarly and teaching resources in little more than a decade was a quantum leap.³⁵

X

Philadelphia's universities and colleges contributed much to the cultural climate of the city. During the years 1946-1968 there was solid achievement


in a wide variety of disciplines that make for a civilized community. On February 28, 1955, at the request of the Clark administration, the Philadelphia Museum of Art held a festival to honor six Philadelphians who had made their mark in seven disciplines of the humanities: Eugene Ormandy, conductor; George Howe, architect; Grace Kelly, actress; Alexander Calder, sculptor; Franklin Watkins, painter; Marian Anderson, singer; and Edna Phillips, harpist. They were each recognized for the honor they had brought to their native city. The mayor presented the awards, and more than 30,000 Philadelphians turned out for the occasion.

One area of considerable change was in the religious life of the city. All of the major religious groups experienced an increase in social activism among portions of their clergy and laity. Much of the black leadership in the city came from the ministry of Baptist and Methodist churches. The Rev. David Gracie and others led Episcopalians in marches for civil rights goals and stormy protests against the war in Vietnam. Picketing Quakers protesting the war were arrested by the police, and they sued for infringement of their rights of free speech and won in the higher courts. Jews continued their remarkable expansion of educational and service institutions and were deeply engaged with support for the State of Israel. Catholics emerged from the forty-year episcopate of Dennis Cardinal Dougherty and were confronted with an onrush of ecumenical and internal church change following Vatican Council II in the 1960s. While traditional religious allegiances weakened during the period, new suburban churches, new religious orientations, and ecumenical cooperation on a wide variety of social projects grew with notable rapidity.

The Philadelphia Museum of Art, supported by the city, continued to open more areas of its sprawling building and acquire more treasures during the period through the gifts of the still-opulent Philadelphia establishment and of those who sought entry into the establishment through the art donation route. The Museum of Art reached a peak popularity with a Van Gogh exhibit in 1970 that drew 400,000 visitors. The Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts, the oldest art school in the country, with its fine collection of masterpieces by American painters and sculptors, opened a second building in 1964, the Peale House on Chestnut Street, for student activities as well as gallery space. The Philadelphia College of Art, founded in 1876, came out from under the Philadelphia Museum's umbrella as a separate entity and inaugurated in the 1960s a redevelopment program not only to improve the school's facilities but to revitalize the area immediately around its main building, the former Asylum for the Deaf and Dumb designed by John Haviland at Broad and Pine Streets. On the Parkway, the Moore Institute of Art, the oldest professional art college for women in America, attained full college status in 1962 and expanded its facilities. Despite a constant drain of talent to New York, a vigorous artistic community remained in Philadelphia, both in creative work and in the many exhibitions in public and private galleries.

The cultural life of the city was also ornamented by institutions whose reputations were international. The Curtis Institute of Music sent forth talent

to concert halls all over the world. The Rosenbach Museum held literary treasures of unequalled value. The Library Company of Philadelphia continued to increase its extraordinarily rich collections of original research materials, as did the archives of its neighbor the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. To these scholarly institutions were added the growing renown of the Pennsylvania Ballet, the Singing City Choir, and the Philadelphia Drama Guild, all of which performed at the restored Walnut Street Theatre. Private



Leviathan, sculpture at Penn Center by Seymour Lipton, photograph by A. K. Strobl (1967). The Philadelphia Art Commission, chartered as an official city agency in 1919, sponsored an ordinance that requires an expenditure of 1 percent of net construction costs for art in all major development projects in which city money is involved.

PHILADELPHIA CITY PLANNING COMMISSION

philanthropies like the William Penn Foundation, created by the Haas family, the Philadelphia Foundation, and the Samuel S. Fels Fund all aided the arts in the city.

Post-World War II architecture in Philadelphia remains a controversial subject.³⁶ The wide variety of design, from the airport to Penn Center to Independence Mall and the Society Hill Towers, the high-rise and low-rise public housing, the two television and radio station buildings (WFIL and WCAU) on City Line Avenue, supplied the subject of much cultural debate. Practicing in the city and contributing to the cityscape were men like Vincent Kling and Louis I. Kahn. The former's Municipal Services Building at Broad Street and John F. Kennedy Boulevard, built in 1964, achieved a difficult harmony with a surrounding profusion of architectural styles; the latter's Alfred Newton Richards Medical Research and Biology Building of the University of Pennsylvania, also completed in 1964, was cited in 1961 by the Museum of Modern Art as "Probably the most consequential building constructed in the United States since the war," a work of solid geometrical



Alfred Newton Richards Medical Building, University of Pennsylvania, built 1957–1960, designed by Louis I. Kahn (1901–1974), photograph 1976 by Will Brown.

PHILADELPHIA MUSEUM OF ART

integrity. Late in the 1960s Romaldo Giurgola arrived in the city and Robert Venturi began his practice, and both belatedly received the recognition or commissions in Philadelphia that had been bestowed on them elsewhere.

Restored during the period and designated a National Historical Landmark in 1963 was Napoleon Le Brun's Academy of Music. Instituted by Stuart F. Louchheim, the Academy Ball, now the city's premier social event, pro-

vided most of the funds for rehabilitation. The Academy remained the home of the Philadelphia Orchestra, perhaps justly considered by Philadelphians to be the finest in the world. Throughout the period the orchestra's great tradition, bequeathed by Leopold Stokowski, was maintained by its conductor Eugene Ormandy.

Most of the city's cultural institutions, though founded many years ago, emerged from their past into a vigorous and effective existence. Two of the most venerable of them erected new buildings: the American Philosophical Society built its library across from Philosophical Hall on Fifth Street in 1959, and in 1966 the Library Company of Philadelphia moved from its neo-Greek Revival temple on South Broad Street to a modern multistory home on Locust Street next to the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

The Free Library of Philadelphia, under the inspiring leadership of Emerson Greenaway, revolutionized library service in the city. In the 1950s and 1960s the book stock of the Free Library doubled, to more than two and a half million volumes. In 1951, ninety-two cents per capita was spent on library service in Philadelphia; by the end of the 1960s the figure was over five dollars. Seventeen new library buildings were constructed after World War II—alas, building was more politically acceptable than staffing—another sixteen were rehabilitated, and two others were located in more modern quarters. Traveling bookmobile routes were established. Approximately 30 percent of the city's population became regular library users. Serving the readers in 1951 were only fifteen staff members with library school degrees; by 1969 there were 307. But many more were needed, and by 1970 when Keith Doms assumed its direction the further progress of the Free Library, like that of so many institutions, was imperiled by rapidly worsening financial stringencies.

X I

Philadelphia in 1946 had four daily newspapers—the *Evening Bulletin*, the *Inquirer*, the *Daily News*, and the *Record*.

The *Record*, owned and operated by J. David Stern, was a partisan Democratic daily throughout the 1930s and early 1940s. Always entertaining, it made no serious effort to separate news from editorial policy. Competition from the other three dailies was keen, sometimes bitter. Advertising was not sufficient to make the paper profitable and newsprint in the late 1940s was in short supply. In a desperate effort to stay alive, Stern printed the *Record* on brown paper for several weeks. Its staff compounded Stern's problems by joining the Newspaper Guild and striking successfully for higher wages and shorter hours than those of the other papers. Finally, on February 1, 1947, Stern gave up. The *Bulletin* paid him a reputed million dollars for the *Record* and closed it down.

For most of the period, then, Philadelphia had three daily newspapers, the *Inquirer* in the morning, with its satellite the *Daily News*, and the *Bulletin* in the afternoon. They were quite different in content and philosophy. The *Inquirer*, aggressively Republican, handled the news in more colorful fashion

than its staid and respectable competitor the *Bulletin*. The *Daily News* was a tabloid making little effort to convey national or international news except that made available by the wire services. Its concentration was on matters of local human interest, with a high emphasis on sex, violence, and the bizarre.

The *Inquirer* was a one-man show. Walter H. Annenberg, who had inherited it from his father Moe, dominated its policy. He partly built and partly inherited a communications empire: a radio and television station, WFIL; a prosperous magazine for teens, *Seventeen*; a racing sheet, the *Morning Telegraph*; and a number of other ventures including *TV Guide*. They were all owned by Triangle Publications, which was owned by Annenberg. He established the Annenberg School of Communications at the University of Pennsylvania and donated Annenberg Hall to house the same activities at Temple.¹⁷

Notwithstanding its Republicanism, the *Inquirer* supported Dilworth and Clark in their initial efforts to win and hold city office. It opposed them in their efforts to achieve state and federal office, but never strongly so. There were times when the level of reporting in the *Inquirer* left much to be desired. In 1967 Harry Karafin, a prominent reporter whose by-line appeared almost daily, was indicted and subsequently convicted of extortion and blackmail using information he had uncovered as a reporter. It was difficult for Annenberg to find capable men of high integrity willing to work for him. He used his paper to wage his personal vendettas (the name of President Harnwell of the University of Pennsylvania was banned from the *Inquirer* after a minor altercation). Yet the *Inquirer* was a power not only in Philadelphia but throughout the eastern half of the state.

In October 1969 Walter Annenberg and John S. Knight jointly announced the sale of the *Inquirer* and the *Daily News* to Knight Publications, publishers of a chain of newspapers including the *Detroit Free Press* and the *Miami Herald*. When Knight took over in January 1970 there were major changes for the better in both personnel and policy.

The *Evening Bulletin*—"Nearly Everybody Reads the *Bulletin*"—which began to print a Sunday edition in 1947, was owned since 1895 by the McLean family. "Major" Robert W. McLean—the title came from World War I and stuck—was for many years its publisher. Long president of the Associated Press, he built the *Bulletin* into one of the better American newspapers by impartially printing the news gathered by a highly competent staff of reporters and refraining from taking controversial editorial positions. In 1960 the Major retired from the active direction of the newspaper to be succeeded by Robert Taylor, Mrs. McLean's nephew.

Brief mention should be made of *Philadelphia Magazine*, a bright, slick-paper monthly, full of advertising. Its publisher, D. Herbert Lipson, and its editor, Alan Halpern, built the magazine from an inconspicuous beginning as the voice of the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce to a successful and widely read publication: an up-to-date muckracking sheet in the tradition of Lincoln Steffens.

Radio as a medium of communication was in full swing in 1947, and it remained an important source of capsule news, political comment, and entertainment, especially music. At the end of the 1960s there were forty-one AM and FM radio stations operating in the Philadelphia city market and a good many more in the suburbs. All of the major national networks owned stations, as did the *Bulletin* and the *Inquirer*. Special mention should be made of station WFLN, owned by Lawrence M. C. Smith, veteran supporter of liberal causes. From a shaky financial beginning in 1947 on an FM channel, it became a profitable venture, the "Good Music Station," offering programs of classical music and the news with relatively few commercials on both AM and FM channels.

Commercial television was in its infancy in 1947, but it grew in spectacular fashion. Local political television did not become feasible until after the 1951 mayoralty campaign. After that it was extensively used. Clark, Dilworth, and Tate all appeared on television to explain their programs to the people. Shows like "Tell It to the Mayor" and "Report to the People" were powerful tools for the mayor. Other local features included the televising of school board meetings. Philadelphia came to have seven television stations, including outlets of the three major networks and WHYY, the public television station which went into operation in 1961.

From the point of view of news and commentary television and radio probably had a greater impact on public opinion than the newspapers. In terms of politics television had an important effect in "selling" candidates, especially the young and personable. For other media of entertainment television became a fierce competitor, especially for the movies; many of the large movie theaters built in the 1920s heyday of the film industry, some of them monuments to the architectural tastes of their era, closed.

X I I

Air in a big city, unlike talk, is a scarce resource that must be managed. Air pollution and the need to control it were recognized as a problem early in the Clark administration. The city charter created an Air Pollution Control Board, and a model air pollution ordinance was passed in 1954. It was thought that the principal city polluters were the Philadelphia Electric Company, which generated electricity at its several plants by burning soft coal; the five oil refineries along the Delaware south of the Schuylkill; open-dump burning of city refuse; and a few tanneries in the near northeast, most of which subsequently closed or left town. There was also considerable pollution across the Delaware from New Jersey when the wind blew from the east. Philadelphia, of course, returned the compliment when the wind blew the other way.

Under the gentle prodding of Morris Duane, chairman of the Air Pollution Control Board, the Philadelphia Electric Company and the oil refineries, notably the Atlantic Refining Company, installed expensive equipment in the 1950s to curb their pollutants. But much of this equipment soon became obsolete, more serious pollutant factors have since been uncovered, and the problem remains.

Toward the end of the Clark administration the city constructed a series of regional incinerators that eliminated much of the city's open-dump burning. Unfortunately the incinerators did not have perfect combustion and were inefficiently operated. Despite an excellent new air pollution control ordinance passed in 1969, Philadelphia remained one of the principal offenders in polluting its air. In September 1970 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania announced that it was suing the city for violating state air pollution standards.

If in the matter of air the outcome of the race between civilization and disaster was in doubt, with respect to water civilization was perhaps running slightly ahead. Philadelphia obtained most of its water supply from the Delaware River, a tidal estuary from Trenton to the sea. A small part of the supply came from the Schuylkill River. Efforts to control pollution in the Delaware and its tributaries met with little success before 1952. Conditions indeed were worsening as raw sewage continued to be dumped in the Delaware and its tributaries by many upstream municipalities. Philadelphia's sewage treatment plants in the late 1940s and early 1950s were utterly inadequate. In 1955, however, Mayor Clark decided that the political situation was ripe for a four-state effort to control the uses and abuses of the Delaware River.

At that time Democrats held the governorships of Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey. Robert Wagner was the Democratic mayor of New York City. Only Caleb Boggs, liberal governor of Delaware, was a Republican. The four governors and the two mayors called into being the Delaware River Basin Commission and successfully solicited public and industrial support for an interstate compact to control the all-purpose use of water in the Delaware Basin.

The interstate compact creating a commission with power to regulate the flow of water in the Delaware required the approval of the United States Congress to become effective. Clark, moving from the mayor's office to the federal Senate, enlisted the support of Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, and together they secured the backing of the twenty-three separate federal agencies that had a legitimate part in the program. The interstate compact sailed through Congress almost without opposition in 1961. Thus an effective mechanism for purifying the waters of the Delaware River was provided. For the first time in many years shad survived the not-inconsiderable remaining pollution and swam to the upper Delaware to spawn, and the oyster beds in Delaware Bay were again considered safe from infection.³⁸

In the Schuylkill River the same problems of pollution were made worse by the presence of acid drainage from the anthracite mines. The Delaware River Basin Commission undertook effective work to clean up the Schuylkill too. Swimming again came to be considered safe in many of the upper reaches of the Schuylkill as well as the Delaware—though it would be a rash man who would plunge into the waters near their confluence.


One of the major complaints against Philadelphia's city government in the 1940s was the inadequacy of trash and garbage collection. In the higher income areas the streets were kept clean and trash and garbage were regularly collected (to be disposed of by open-dump burning in South Philadelphia).

In less prosperous areas the situation was far different. Streets filthy with trash and open garbage cans smelling to heaven were the rule. Cleaning the streets was a rare event. Some of this neglect resulted from inadequate equipment and lack of city funds, but political operation of the streets and sanitation departments also played a major role. With the end of financial stringency for the time being and the coming to office of a reform administration, the situation quickly improved in the 1950s. Generally speaking the city continued to hold its own against the trash problem even into the 1970s.

The narrowness of the city's victories in the race with man's destructive tendencies, and the frequency of defeats, was a key factor that helped spur the exodus of Philadelphians to the suburbs. Industry fled along with people. Among the additional reasons for the exodus were a necessarily constantly increasing city tax rate; inadequate sites for industrial and commercial development in an era that required large amounts of space for automobile parking; an architectural tendency toward horizontal rather than vertical construction of commercial and industrial establishments. There was also the feeling by much of business and industry that the social composition of the city and the characteristics of the labor market, strongly unionized as it was, did not provide a climate in which business, and with it profits, could expand and flourish.³⁹

Perhaps more disturbing was the "brain drain." Competent young people tended to leave the city to seek their fortunes elsewhere. There was a discernible belief among many of them that Philadelphia was a city without much imagination or intellectual stimulus. A similar situation arose from the transfer of ownership of many of Philadelphia's leading establishments to other places. The Atlantic Refining Company, for example, merged with Richfield Oil and its headquarters moved to Los Angeles. Philco was sold to the Ford Motor Company, transferring the decision-making to Detroit. Even banking leadership, which was supported by a solid core of inherited wealth, tended to gravitate to New York, in part because bank mergers that could have created financial institutions large enough to service the big Philadelphia industries were disallowed by the courts. Absentee ownership thus became a threat to leadership of the city in the philanthropic, business, and industrial world.

Beset though it was by so many problems and discouragements, there was steady planning for the development and improvement of the physical city. Under Mayor Samuel, Edward Hopkinson, Jr., a staunch and conservative Republican, had placed his considerable weight (over 225 pounds of it) behind a rejuvenated City Planning Commission, of which he became chairman. The commission, directed in turn by three brilliant urban planners, Robert Mitchell, Robert Leonard, and finally for many years Edmund Bacon, went to work planning public improvements ready to move from the drawing boards into construction as soon as municipal finances could be rehabilitated. In 1947 these men put on a Philadelphia Exhibition in Gimbels department store illustrating the plans and hopes for the new Philadelphia. The exhibition caught the imagination of the public, and a remarkable proportion of those plans and hopes eventually came to be realized.⁴⁰




Edmund N. Bacon, executive director of the Philadelphia City Planning Commission from 1949 to 1970 (September 28, 1966). Society Hill Towers (1964), designed by I. M. Pei & Associates, are reproduced in the model of the Webb and Knapp 1960 proposal, at the left, and the building of the United States Customs Service, Second and Chestnut Streets, appears at the right.

PHILADELPHIA BULLETIN

XIII

A view of Philadelphia from the top of City Hall tower would reveal some of the changes that took place under the excitement of the post-World War II reform era and of the beginnings of comprehensive city planning.

The center city area extended from the Schuylkill on the west to the Delaware on the east, up to Spring Garden Street in the north and no farther south than South Street. It was the modern version of Penn's original city plan. Around this center city were brackets of immigrant and black areas, a vast district bounded on the southeast by an industrial wilderness of oil refineries, automobile graveyards, incinerators, and dumps. Only the Navy Yard, historic Fort Mifflin, the airport, Eastwick, and one or two new industrial plants relieved the squalor and smoke at the confluence of the Schuylkill and the Delaware. The old settled city arc covered much of West Philadelphia, ranged across the Schuylkill around Spring Garden Street, and ran north toward Germantown. Crossing Broad Street it included much of the area between the two rivers far north into Kensington. All of the city is not visible from City Hall tower, but with a powerful pair of binoculars one could see most of it on a clear day, because except for Roxborough, Manayunk,



Philadelphia Planning Commission model of Center City. The model was designed by Edmund Bacon for the Better Philadelphia Exhibition held at Gimbel's department store in 1947.

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Chestnut Hill, and Mount Airy, it is generally flat.

Down by the Delaware River, to the south, below the Delaware's confluence with the Schuylkill, was the Philadelphia International Airport. The rudimentary S. Davis Wilson Airport existed at the end of World War II. It was obvious, however, that it had to be drastically improved and enlarged. This was done; the new airport was dedicated by Mayor Clark, who flew to the dedication in an army helicopter in 1954. At the time many thought it was a white elephant. Air traffic was light because of competition from Washington, New York, and Baltimore's new airport. Even though President Truman had it certified for international travel at Mayor Clark's request, naming the airport "International" was generally considered a joke.

It soon became apparent that the problem was not too little traffic but too much, and that the design of the airport was almost immediately inadequate to the demands of the air age. One building after another was added to provide for additional traffic, which through the 1950s and 1960s continued to increase at the rate of 25 percent a year. By 1970 traffic was up 800 percent since the opening of the terminal; from 1962 onward the city was unable to keep up with air traffic demands. By the end of the period the city had embarked on a \$250-million expansion loan program, to be repaid out of airport revenues, but

progress dragged. The failure to provide high-speed rail connections to center city and the congested highways made matters worse; nevertheless it takes less time to get from the airport to center city than in all but a few of the nation's major cities.

Across the road from the airport the Tinicum Wildlife Refuge was expanded, a unique development for a major metropolis. During the Clark administration, at the behest of Allston Jenkins, the city set aside this area as a wildlife sanctuary, a resting place for migratory wildlife including duck, heron, Canada geese, and snipe. The area was low-lying marshland, flooding and ebbing with tidewater from the Delaware.


Near the University of Pennsylvania was the Civic Center—the Civic Center Auditorium, the Grand Exhibition Hall, and the Commercial Museum. At the end of World War II Philadelphia was obsolete as a center for large conventions and trade shows. The Democratic and Republican National Conventions came in 1948, but the experience was not satisfactory. Part of the capital program of the City Planning Commission over the years was directed at remedying this deficiency through the modernization of existing facilities and the building of new ones. The completion of the Grand Exhibition Hall in 1967 largely finished the job as originally envisioned, and Philadelphia had far better facilities for a national gathering than ever before. But as with the airport and so much else, the original post-World War II plans failed to anticipate the acceleration of new demands; the Civic Center Auditorium, formerly called Convention Hall, remained inadequate particularly because of the limitations its design imposed on the television coverage of major conventions, while both inadequate hotel space and insufficient transportation between center city and the Civic Center also discouraged the largest national meetings from coming to the city.

North of Market Street, still in West Philadelphia, is Powelton Village, an area where partially successful projects for the integration of black and white families developed. Not far to the east, opposite the Thirtieth Street Station, the modern Bulletin Building, completed in 1955, one of the last structures designed by George Howe, was seen as a model of what a newspaper building should be. But north and south of Market Street in West Philadelphia were block after block of rundown slums, a tinderbox of political and social unrest and violence.

Running from South Philadelphia to Valley Forge was the Schuylkill Expressway, built in the early 1950s to serve the traffic needs of that horde of suburban Philadelphians coming into and through center city each day from the Main Line and as a truck route to and from the west. Many of them headed north over the Roosevelt Boulevard Extension, others east to New Jersey and south to the airport. With the opening of the Walt Whitman Bridge in 1959, traffic to Jersey shore points and to the New Jersey Turnpike only compounded commuter snarls at the southern end of the expressway. The route of the Schuylkill Expressway and its construction were subjects of great controversy during the years of the Clark administration.

John R. Kelly, well-known civic leader and...

Democratic City Committee, was at this time a leading member of the Fairmount Park Commission. Stressing principles of conservation and recreation, he fought hard to persuade the state and the city to route the Schuylkill Expressway to the west of Fairmount Park. The state, however, was adamant, and the city under the Clark administration went along with the state. The state pinched pennies on both design and construction of the highway. By the time the route opened it was already obsolete. Congestion added to bad engineering and their consequences gave the expressway its jocular but apt nickname, the "Sure-Kill Crawlway." Yet it is an essential artery that has been widened several times. And it has not, as the worst scenario predicted, ruined the river aesthetics.



The Schuylkill Expressway, Art Museum curve near Spring Garden Street Bridge (c. 1956).

PHILADELPHIA OFFICE OF THE CITY REPRESENTATIVE

Another area that changed markedly after World War II was along City Line Avenue, which divides West Philadelphia from Montgomery County. The impact of lower taxes in the suburban county could be seen clearly. Most of the new development was on the Montgomery County side, although there were several high-rise apartment houses, a 500-room hotel, and one well-designed radio and television station, WFIL, built on the Philadelphia side of City Line.

East of the Schuylkill in northwest Philadelphia there was much less physical change. There was redevelopment in the lower end of Germantown,

where \$10.6 million was made available through the Redevelopment Authority for public housing for the ever-increasing number of black families who moved west and north. In the Roxborough area were some acres of still undeveloped land, much of it in woodland.

In the days immediately after World War II northeast Philadelphia north of Cottman Avenue contained huge areas of undeveloped acreage. The northeast was ripe for profitable development as population expanded and grew more affluent. Almost all the recently undeveloped land of the northeast was soon built up, most of it with row and apartment housing by two builders, A. P. Orleans and Hyman Korman and his sons. Most of the housing is not attractive, inviting a slum of the future. An effort was made during the Clark administration to prevent the exploitation of the area through a new zoning category that would have controlled the building of row houses and provided green areas. Unfortunately the zoning board granted variances in a number of key tracts to permit duplex housing and heavy density. In many tracts, moreover, the city Council itself downgraded higher zoning classifications. The pressure for new cheap housing in the northeast from white Jewish and Irish Philadelphians anxious to move away from the growing black population around center city resulted in disappointment to the hopes of the city planners. The exploitation of the northeast in the period 1946-1968 is one of the great tragedies of modern Philadelphia. Furthermore because the area became almost entirely white, a democratic solution to the citywide problems in housing and education was made more difficult.


The city did achieve the setting aside of substantial areas of the northeast for industrial parks. To be sure, this success accelerated the movement of workers seeking homes and the creation of housing density; but juxtaposing the job and the worker helped solve the traffic problem that had hitherto been a serious deterrent to the development of the northeast. There had never been high-speed facilities between center city and the northeast above the terminal of the Frankford Elevated at Bridge Street. Roosevelt Boulevard, despite improvements, was not an adequate highway to the northeast, but all kinds of facilities clustered along it. At the outer reaches of the northeast, near the Bucks County line, was the Liberty Bell Racetrack, licensed by the Commonwealth and opened on June 7, 1963.

The Delaware Expressway, under construction in 1968, carried the promise of swift traffic flow toward the center of town. This expressway ran through a heavily industrialized area that had seen few changes since World War II. The Frankford Arsenal was shut down by the federal government in 1977 because the army's needs for small arms were adequately filled elsewhere. There were a number of industrial parks where modern industry located, but also a good many abandoned factory sites. A few big estates along the river near Torresdale became new locations for cheaper housing. In Frankford and Kensington the abandonment of many multistoried factories no longer economical to operate brought more urban blight. The working-class families that lived there for generations, largely a white population,

continued to live there amid the declining mills and aging facilities.

Farther west, on Broad Street, the Temple University campus, a product of the federal urban redevelopment program and of state and federal aid to higher education, was long surrounded by slums. Redevelopment accomplished some limited improvements in the area by 1968, and the Progress Plaza Shopping Center, operated by black businessmen on the block bounded by Broad, Oxford, Jefferson, and Thirteenth Streets, was a boon to the area. This project was conceived by the Rev. Dr. Leon H. Sullivan, black minister and civic leader, and was financed by the Redevelopment Authority for the sponsor, a nonprofit corporation formed by Dr. Sullivan's Zion Baptist Church.

In center-city Philadelphia many changes took place in the years after 1946. Looking out the Benjamin Franklin Parkway to the Art Museum on Fairmount above the Schuylkill River, a complex of post-World War II high-rise and high-rent apartments and office buildings could be seen. The broad tree-lined Parkway remained one of the most beautiful entrances to any city in the world, bringing residents of Germantown and Chestnut Hill and



Excavation at Penn Center, from Seventeenth Street, looking east (c. 1955). Three Penn Center is under construction and Suburban Station (Penn Center Station) at Sixteenth Street rises at the left.

TEMPLE UNIVERSITY, URBAN ARCHIVES

the northwestern suburbs into town from the East and West River Drives of Fairmount Park and the Expressway.

On Market Street west of City Hall extraordinary changes took place. The Chinese Wall—the elevated tracks of the Pennsylvania Railroad from West Philadelphia into Broad and Market Streets—and the Broad Street Station came down in 1953. Thereafter all the major trains of the Pennsylvania, and later the Penn Central Railroad and Amtrak, operated through North Philadelphia and Thirtieth Street Stations; suburban trains came into center city on the old Pennsylvania lines, but their tracks ran underground east of Twentieth Street.

Directly west of City Hall the Penn Center development was largely built in the early 1950s on the site of the Chinese Wall. Here a series of modern, architecturally imaginative office buildings arose, housing some of the more important firms doing business in the city. Planning provided open walkways both above and below ground in much of this area. On the north side of Market Street commercial redevelopment made over the face of the city all the way to Thirtieth Street Station across the Schuylkill. Little Filbert Street west of Broad was widened to create Pennsylvania (later John F. Kennedy) Boulevard. Along both sides of the boulevard modern apartment houses, hotels, and office buildings transformed the area after 1946 from a commercial skid row to a place of architectural cleanliness and economic utility. Immediately north of Penn Center the Municipal Services Building on Reyburn Plaza, a Hospitality Center to welcome visitors to the city, a new Bell Telephone building, and a group of other modern structures were built.

A walk around the rim of William Penn's hat on City Hall tower viewing the part of center city to the east presented a prospect of plans in the making for the redevelopment of Market Street East. The area around Independence Hall in all directions had been redeveloped. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania transformed the blocks directly north of Independence Hall to Race Street into a blockwide mall of grass and trees. On Fifth and Sixth Streets on both sides of the mall rose new and modern buildings, including a new United States Mint on the northeast corner of Fifth and Arch, a new federal courthouse, and the Rohm and Haas Building. Slightly to the north, on the Vine Street expressway to the Benjamin Franklin Bridge and just east of Philadelphia's Chinatown, a new Police Administration Building, a circular modern structure, was completed during the Dilworth administration.

To the east and south of Independence Hall the Society Hill redevelopment resulted in the demolition of most of the slum-like commercial structures that cluttered the area before 1946, including the "skid row" of the old Dock Street markets. Historic buildings such as Carpenters' Hall, the First and Second Banks of the United States, and the Merchants' Exchange were preserved and renovated by the federal government's Independence National Historical Park. Old houses were rehabilitated to restore Society Hill as a residential area, with high-rise apartments and newer houses—notably I. M. Pei's Society Hill Towers and Town Houses—interspersed among them.

Some of the business and professional leaders of the city moved to Society Hill, Mayor Dilworth among them; but not all of the housing of the area was in the highest cost category, and many a young lawyer, newspaper executive, or businessman also returned to the central city by moving to Society Hill. Furthermore a similar residential rebirth extended west from Society Hill along Locust, Spruce, Pine, and Lombard Streets to the Schuylkill River.

Beyond Society Hill to the east the Port of Philadelphia remained in 1968 the center of the largest freshwater port complex in the world. The wharves and docks had fallen into great disrepair during the years just before World War II. In 1965 the city, the state, and the Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce formed the Philadelphia Port Corporation to work out a sensible plan for the rehabilitation of the port facilities and to handle the containerized packaging that was revolutionizing methods of handling cargo. The Packer Avenue Marine Terminal with complete modern facilities was opened in 1967. The Tioga Terminal followed in the 1970s. Both had facilities for container cargoes, but the port's modernization had not yet caught up with rival cities', and the ancient handicap of Philadelphia's considerable distance from the sea remained.

Mass transit into a large and congested urban center became an increasingly difficult problem in the years following World War II. Philadelphia drew workers from a wide region, including New Jersey across the Delaware. At least one partial solution to the transit problem came with the opening in 1969 of the high-speed line from Lindenwold, New Jersey, across the Benjamin Franklin Bridge to the former Locust Street Subway with a terminal at Sixteenth and Locust Streets. The Lindenwold line was a project of the Port Authority Transportation Company (PATCO), which developed the line and two new bridges across the Delaware at Chester and Pennsauken, begun in 1969 and opened in the 1970s, as part of a single financing package involving expenditures of over \$300 million.

In Philadelphia itself construction began to extend the Broad Street Subway from Snyder Avenue south to the new sports complex of Veterans Stadium and the Spectrum at Pattison Avenue, a project completed in 1973.

Railroad traffic and passenger service into Philadelphia declined in the postwar years. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad eliminated all passenger trains through the city. The advertised benefits of the merger between the Pennsylvania and New York Central Railroads suffered a severe setback when the Penn Central, the combined company, petitioned for reorganization in bankruptcy in 1970. In 1964 the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority was created, leasing from the Pennsylvania and Reading Railroads most of their suburban lines. Initially SEPTA acquired new electric air-conditioned aluminum coaches, reduced commuter fares, and began to operate the transportation system in a way that made a perceptible impact on highway traffic congestion. In 1968 SEPTA also took over the Philadelphia Transportation Company which operated the city's trolley lines, buses, subways, and elevated trains. Unfortunately by the 1970s the familiar economic

squeeze of rising costs, including expensive union contracts, and limited and declining government subsidies began to wipe away the improvements in Philadelphia's mass transit systems, though Philadelphia was still considerably ahead of most American cities in the potential of its mass transit.

The face of Philadelphia had a very different appearance in 1968 from that of 1946. A combination of private and public investment had rendered the city in many areas more beautiful, more functional, and more modern than it was before World War II. In many other ways Philadelphia became a different city. In 1946 it was still corrupt and contented. In 1947 it began to find a new life, and for the next fifteen years experienced a time of great achievement. Late in the 1960s, however, came relapse, and as 1968 closed creative forces no longer appeared to control the city's destiny.

Bertram Zumeta, an economist who for some years served the Federal Reserve Bank in Philadelphia, has written that two paramount national influences were at work in shaping the life of Philadelphia after 1946. One was war. World War II left a legacy of problems and dislocation. Then the Korean War in the 1950s again taxed industry and the economy. The Vietnam War started a cycle of inflation that profoundly influenced municipal finance and standards, institutions, and the lifestyle of citizens. A second factor was the drop in rates of natural population increase beginning in the 1960s.⁴¹ These national forces caused huge disruptions of plans and expectations. Schools were built, then population declined. Institutions modernized and then encountered a whole new set of priorities and operating conditions. Urban officials and civic leaders were unable to foresee the impact and consequences of suburbanization, dominance of the automobile, widespread racial change, alteration of industrial technology, and momentous changes in family composition and behavior.⁴²

The period of political, civic, and physical reconstruction from 1946 to 1970 was profoundly important for Philadelphia even if the reform was gradually eroded and the physical changes were unevenly accomplished. The reform tested the determination of leadership and the idealism of the city's talented and wonderfully diverse population. The political renewal proved that from the very depths of municipal corruption a new spirit could be summoned. It demonstrated the capacity of a polyglot and ethnically varied urban citizenry for mobilization in behalf of improved standards of public responsibility and a new vision of urban life. It was testimony that even amid the contradictions and complexity of an industrial metropolis democracy could manifest itself vibrantly. The chief shortcomings of the entire effort were that standards were still not raised sufficiently to actually transform long-term social and political habits, and the changes made were not appropriately directed toward the root causes of social disability in the urban environment.

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108. *Bulletin Almanac*, 1940, p. 483; *ibid.*, 1941, p. 518; *ibid.*, 1942, p. 519.
 109. *Ibid.*, 1942, pp. 46, 325; C. F. Bender, "Philadelphia Program of Vocational Education for Defense," *Industrial Arts and Vocational Education* 31 (March 1942): 83-87.
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 113. *Bulletin Almanac*, 1943, p. 515.
 114. *Inquirer*, Dec. 1, 2, 3, 1941, and Travel Section, Dec. 7, 1941.
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 117. *Bulletin Almanac*, 1943, pp. 515-16; *ibid.*, 1944, p. 519.
 118. *Ibid.*, 1941, p. 517.
 119. *Ibid.*, 1943, p. 516; *ibid.*, 1944, p. 518.
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 129. "FEPC Challenged: Philadelphia Transit

- Union Defies Order to End Discrimination," *Business Week*, Jan. 15, 1944, p. 95; *Bulletin Almanac*, 1945, pp. 476, 477; *ibid.*, 1946, p. 489; "FEPC on Spot: End of Philadelphia Transit Strike Leaves Basic Issue Unsettled," *Business Week*, Aug. 12, 1944, pp. 103-4; D. G. Redmond, "Trouble in Philadelphia: Analysis of the Philadelphia Strike Shows That the Real Issue Has Not Been Settled," *Current History* 7 (Sept. 1944): 186-92; "Trouble in Philadelphia: Transportation Strike," *Time*, Aug. 14, 1944, pp. 22-23; "Race Trouble in Philadelphia Brings Test of Wartime Powers," *Newsweek*, Aug. 14, 1944, pp. 36-38; "Racism in Philadelphia," *New Republic*, Aug. 14, 1944, pp. 176; "Philadelphia Strike," *Nation*, Aug. 12, 1944, p. 172.
- 130. "Philadelphia Strike," *Nation*, Aug. 12, 1944, p. 172.
- 131. *Bulletin Almanac*, 1945, pp. 463-64, 477.
- 132. *Inquirer*, April 13, 14, 15, 1945.
- 133. *Ibid.*, Aug. 9, 10, 11, 14, 1945 (all front-page stories), and Aug. 15, 1945.
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- 142. "Brotherly Love: Philadelphia Wants the U.N.," *Time*, Dec. 2, 1946, p. 21; *Philadelphia: Cradle of Liberty*, pamphlet prepared for U.N. representatives by the city government.
- 143. *Inquirer*, Aug. 12, 1945; A. D. Carlson, "Philadelphia's Stitch in Time," *Survey Graphic* 33 (July 1944): 324-25; N. L. Bok, "In Time of Crisis," *Survey Graphic* 33 (Nov. 1944): 435.
- 144. Areas of greatest growth were in the northwest, in Roxborough and Germantown; in the northeast; and in the southwest, in the Cobbs Creek section and Wynnefield (Public Information Bulletin no. 5, Philadelphia City Planning Commission, June 1952).

RALLY AND RELAPSE, 1946-1968

1. Richard Saul Wurman and John Andrew Gallery, *Man-Made Philadelphia: A Guide to Its Physical and Cultural Environment* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1972), p. 81; Lorin Peterson, *The Day of the Mugwump* (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 157.
2. For an interesting portrait of Philadelphia in 1950, see John Lukacs, *Philadelphia: Patriots and Philistines, 1900-1950* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1981), pp. 278-310.
3. Eric Goldman, *The Crucial Decade—and After: America 1945-1960* (New York: Vintage, 1960), pp. 3-91.
4. Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root* (2 vols.; Dodd, Mead, 1938), 1:444.
5. The Committee of Seventy, *The Charter: A History* (Philadelphia: The Committee of Seventy, 1980), pp. 6-8.
6. James Reichley, *The Art of Government: Reform and Organization Politics in Philadelphia* (New York: Fund for the Republic, 1959), and Kirk R. Petshek, *The Challenge of Urban Reform: Policies and Programs in Philadelphia* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1973), both depict the reform movement.
7. "The Philadelphia Story: Citizens Clean Up Graft," *Newsweek*, June 14, 1948, pp. 27-28.
8. James Crumlish, *A City Finds Itself* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1959).
9. Nochem S. Winnet, "The Form of Government," *Shingle* (Philadelphia Bar Association) 14, no. 4 (April 1951).
10. The provisions of the city charter are explained more fully in the Committee of Seventy, *The Charter: A History*, pp. 11-70.
11. For a brief overview of these events, see Peterson, *The Day of the Mugwump*, pp. 150-57.
12. A daily record of major decisions by Mayor Clark is contained in the "Daily Log of Mayor Joseph S. Clark," William L. Rafsky Papers, Urban Archives, Paley Library, Temple University. The account of events in this chapter is based upon Mayor Clark's firsthand experience.
13. Leon Shull, director of the Americans for Democratic Action, contended that Dilworth misled him and other liberals in making a secret deal with Green which Shull took credit for exposing (Leon Shull, interview, May 4, 1976, Walter M. Phillips, Sr., Oral History Collection, Urban Archives, Paley Library, Temple University, pp. 23-25).
14. Even during the reform few experienced people viewed the city Council as a full-time job, and members retained all kinds of outside business and professional ties (*ibid.*, p. 16).
15. The differing views of many such figures about the reform are contained in the Walter M. Phillips, Sr., Oral History Collection.
16. R. Stewart Rauch, head of the Philadelphia Saving Fund Society in the 1960s, recounted that in 1968 the business community was brow-beaten into assembling a fund of \$1 million to assuage militant black leaders, and that \$250,000 of this fund was never adequately accounted for after it was funneled to ghetto groups (R. Stewart Rauch, interview, Oct. 11, 1978, Walter M. Phillips, Sr., Oral History Collection, p. 4; see also Miriam Ershkowitz and Joseph Zikmund, eds., *Black Politics in Philadelphia* [New York: Basic Books, 1973], pp. 55-145).
17. Paul D'Ortona, president of the city Council, attributed the growing problems with municipal unions to the decision of the Pennsylvania legislature to permit compulsory arbitration of labor issues for uniformed city employees. Thus Philadelphia had to live with a Harrisburg decision of enormous importance for the future (Paul D'Ortona, interview, May 17, 1977, Walter M. Phillips, Sr., Oral History Collection, p. 3).
18. Peter Binzen, *The Cop Who Would Be King* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979).
19. Reed M. Smith, *State Government in Transition, 1955-59* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1961). The relation of the reform movement in Philadelphia to Pennsylvania politics is treated in Paul B. Beers, *Pennsylvania Politics: Today and Yesterday* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1980), pp. 193-207.
20. Collection of the Oral History of the Port of Philadelphia, Philadelphia Maritime Museum; "War on the Waterfront," *Philadelphia Magazine* 53, no. 10 (Oct. 1962): 18.
21. William W. Cutler III, "Persistent Dualism: Centralization and Decentralization in Philadelphia, 1854-1975," in William W. Cutler III and Howard Gillette, Jr., eds., *The Divided Metropolis: Social and Spatial Dimensions of Philadelphia, 1800-1975* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980), pp. 249-84.
22. Dennis Clark, *The Ghetto Game* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962), pp. 118-19, 163.
23. William L. Rafsky, in Stanley Newman, ed., "The Politics of Utopia," a report of a conference, April 28-May 23, 1975, Political Science Department, Temple University, 1975.
24. Edmund S. Bacon, executive director of the City Planning Commission in the Clark and Dilworth administrations, ruefully confessed the great toll exacted from low-income people through relocation and disruption of family and social life by the downtown and university rebuilding programs in Newman, ed., "The Politics of Utopia." Conrad Weiler, *Philadelphia: Neighborhood Authority and Urban Crisis* (New York: Praeger, 1974), is very critical of the reform administrations' programs.
25. Randolph Wise, interview, Jan. 12, 1978, Walter M. Phillips, Sr., Oral History Collection, pp. 2-23. Wise notes that even at the height of reform good personnel was superimposed on mediocre personnel without much displacement.
26. Lawrence Reddick, in Newman, ed., "The Politics of Utopia," provides background on the conditions producing the riots.
27. Binzen, *The Cop Who Would Be King*, pp. 70-110.
28. Peter O. Muller, Kenneth C. Meyer, and Roman A. Cybriwsky, *Philadelphia: A Study of Conflicts and Social Cleavages* (New York: Ballinger, 1976), pp. 11-34.
29. E. Digby Baltzell, "The Protestant Establishment Re-Visited," *The American Scholar* 45 (Autumn 1976): 499-518.
30. Weiler, *Philadelphia: Neighborhood Authority and Urban Crisis*, p. 101. Weiler sees the great weakness of the school reform to have been the failure to build a political base outside the schools to support the changes. Actually many of the reforms credited to

- Dilworth and Shedd were set in motion by the unglamorous previous superintendent, C. Taylor Whittier, and board member Elizabeth Greenfield, including nondiscrimination actions, early childhood education, and concentration of full-time teachers in black schools. The big change came in 1965-1966 when federal funds under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act became available (interview of Dennis Clark with Ezra Staples, former school official, June 4, 1981). For a view of school problems from the neighborhood level, see Peter Binzen, *Whitewash, U.S.A.* (New York: Random House, 1970).
31. Graham Finney, a planner who worked for the school district in the 1960s, saw the key problem of sustaining school reforms affected by two lines of policy he termed "short-sighted," the attempt to "do too much too soon," and the failure of not "heeding ethnic and labor forces that are crucial in the school system" (Graham Finney, interview, Jan. 1, 1978, Walter M. Phillips, Sr., Oral History Collection, p. 16). For ethnic competition among school district personnel, see Murray Friedman and Daniel Elazar, *Moving Up: Ethnic Succession in America* (Philadelphia: American Jewish Committee, 1976). The disruption in the schools in the 1960s is chronicled by Henry Resnick, *Turning on the System: War in the Philadelphia Public Schools* (New York: Pantheon, 1970).
 32. Thomas J. Donaghy, *Philadelphia's Finest: A History of Catholic Education in the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 1692-1970* (Philadelphia: American Catholic Historical Society, 1972).
 33. "A Guide to the Establishment of the Community College of Philadelphia," Philadelphia Commission on Higher Education, Jan. 1964, and Allen Bonnell, "Master Plan for the New Campus," 1968 (both in the office of the President, Official Records of the Community College of Philadelphia).
 34. Martin Meyerson et al., *Gladly Learn and Gladly Teach: Franklin and His Successors at the University of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978).
 35. John Rhoads, "Temple University Campus Planning Report," Temple University, May 1969; Herman Niebuhr, "A Program for North Philadelphians," mimeo, Center for Community Studies, Temple University, 1961.
 36. Valerie Sue Halverson Pace, "Society Hill, Philadelphia: Historic Preservation and Urban Renewal in Washington Square East" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1976). A visual record of changes in the cityscape is contained in Edwin Wolf 2nd, *Philadelphia: Portrait of an American City* (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1975), pp. 320-36. See also Nancy Love, "Paradise Lost," *Philadelphia Magazine* 59 no. 7 (July 1968): 72.
 37. "Annenberg," *Philadelphia Magazine* 60, no. 4 (May 1969): 64.
 38. Rena Corman, *Air Pollution Primer* (Philadelphia: American Lung Association, 1969).
 39. A critique of the emphasis on downtown development was presented by Paul Levy and Dennis McGrath, "Selective Resurgence: Corporate Strategy for the Urban Northeast," Institute for Civic Values, Philadelphia, 1980. See also Muller, Meyer, and Cybriwsky, *Philadelphia: A Study of Conflicts and Social Cleavages*, pp. 35-64. A broad view of metropolitan problems by key figures in the reform effort is presented in Stephen B. Sweeney, *Metropolitan Analysis* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958).
 40. Cyril Bahr Roseman, "Public-Private Co-operation and Negotiation in Downtown Redevelopment: A Study in the Decision Process in Philadelphia" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1963). Roseman believed the complexity of the planning process at times resulted in haphazard output. Another view is given by Cynthia Pushaw, "Urban Renewal in Philadelphia, 1942-1980: The Program, the Process, the Proposals" (Honors thesis, Bryn Mawr College, April 21, 1980). Graham Finney, who served on the City Planning Commission, believed that recommendations for the Community Renewal Program stressing the social dimensions of planning were rarely accepted by the commission (Graham Finney, interview, Jan. 11, 1978, Walter M. Phillips, Sr., Oral History Collection, p. 4).
 41. Bertram Zumeta, in Newman, ed., "The Politics of Utopia."
 42. Conrad Weiler found the base of political authority in the city during and after the reform to be "tenuous and unstable," and prey to "manipulation of ethnic and ideological symbols," its direction "largely determined by national events" (Weiler, *Philadelphia: Neighborhood Authority and Urban Crisis*, pp. 211-12). Another observer found the effect of the reform years to be "superficial," with politics not much changed (J. R. Fink, "Reform in Philadelphia: 1946-51" [Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 1971], p. 231). Former city Council Pres. Paul D'Ortona, responding to the question of "Who subverted reform in Philadelphia?" said, "The people themselves. The voters of Philadelphia broke it down." He criticized the lack of voter participation (Paul D'Ortona, interview, May 17, 1977, Walter M. Phillips, Sr., Oral History Collection, p. 5). Decreasing voter participation is detailed in Peter McGrath, "Bicentennial Philadelphia: A Quaking City," in Dennis Clark, ed., *Philadelphia 1776-2076: A Three Hundred Year View* (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1975), pp. 69-100.

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Study of recent Philadelphia history must be undertaken through archival research, since there are not as yet many secondary sources and books relating to the period following World War II. The *Bulletin Almanac*, published until 1976 by the *Evening Bulletin*, provides a brief summary of annual events. The Archives of the City of Philadelphia has available papers and records of the executive branch of city government and of the city Council and the courts. The library of the City Planning Commission and the records of the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority and the Philadelphia Housing Authority provide detailed information on major physical changes in the city. The Urban Archives of the Paley Library at Temple University contain an excellent collection of personal recollections and agency records pertaining to this period. *Philadelphia Magazine* has numerous articles after 1960 dealing with city affairs, as do the metropolitan and local community newspapers, and such ethnic papers as the *Philadelphia Tribune*.

Studies of particular community networks and situations can be reviewed with great profit, including the research reports of the Bureau of Municipal Research, the Pennsylvania Economy League, and the Philadelphia Council for Community Advancement. The studies and reports of the Fels Institute for Local and State Government and the Community Leadership Seminar provide background on problems of city administration and civic organization. Demographic and economic data in the files of the Chamber of Commerce of Philadelphia and the files of a wide array of institutions is generally accessible.

Dr. Henry Klein in his doctoral dissertation at Temple University, "The Network of Community Organization Leadership" (1964), gives a helpful profile of the power elite of the city. Recollections of city changes are contained in unpublished memoirs of the Hon. James H. J. Tate, former mayor, and such energetic citizens as Frank Delaney, former director of the Germantown Commu-

nity Council, but these are privately circulated at this point.

The extraordinary photographic collections of the Urban Archives of the Paley Library at Temple University and at the Library Company of Philadelphia and the newfilms of local television stations are a great visual treasury, as is the slide collection of the Philadelphia Cultural Consortium.

Federal and state archives contain a massive amount of material, for the period was one of swift expansion of programs of all kinds at those governmental levels. Although United States Bureau of the Census materials have been placed on computers, there is no guide to the vast compilations of data dealing with the city that is even minimally adequate. The Center for Philadelphia Studies of the School of Public and Urban Policy at the University of Pennsylvania was launched in the 1970s to provide a continuing vehicle for study of the city with modern methodology.

THE BICENTENNIAL CITY, 1968-1982

1. Editorial, *Inquirer*, July 4, 1977.
2. The statistics for this section were figured on data compiled from several sources. Some general information can be obtained from the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), which has tables for the years 1950-1968, taken from the reports of the United States Bureau of the Census. The 1980 *Yearbook of the Britannica* is also useful. Other sources consulted include *Preliminary Reports, 1980 Census of Population and Housing* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census), for Pennsylvania and New Jersey; *Philadelphia Statistical Data '77* (Philadelphia: City of Philadelphia Department of Finance, Office of the City Economist); *Tract Group Profile* (Philadelphia: City Planning Commission, July and Nov. 1977); *Technical Information Paper: 1980 Census, Special Population Summary for Philadelphia Census Tracts* (rev. ed.); Philadelphia: City Planning Commission, June 1981). Printed statistics for earlier periods can be found in Dennis Clark, ed., *Philadelphia 1776-2076: A Three Hundred Year View* (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1975), and Peter O. Muller, Kenneth C. Meyer, and Roman A. Cybriwsky, *Metropolitan Philadelphia: A Study of Conflicts and Social Cleavages* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1976).
3. Several good maps illustrating population and its movement within the city can be found in the *Technical Information Paper, 1980 Census*.
4. Muller et al., *Metropolitan Philadelphia*, p. 12.
5. *Bulletin*, Jan. 1, 1970, suburban section.
6. *Philadelphia Statistical Data* states in its forward: "originally conceived to serve as a source of basic statistical information on the economy of Philadelphia, and was intended for use primarily by the business community. . . . Our experience has demonstrated that the demand of the business sector for localized data transcends traditional economic interest in employment, transportation, systems, taxation, and the like. . . . the treatment accorded subjects included . . . has also been amended . . . better to meet the requirements of business research." See also *Issues for the 1980's* (Philadelphia: Philadelphia City Planning Commission, 1979), esp. pp. 7-8, which also deals with economic developments.
7. These and most of the statistics which follow are based on "Preliminary Financial Statement for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1980," City of Philadelphia, May 1981, typescript in files of the City Planning Commission. This report includes much data for all of 1980.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 1-3.
9. For a good description of suburban mall development see Muller et al., *Metropolitan Philadelphia*, p. 49ff.
10. "Preliminary Financial Statement," p. 1-4, Table 1-3, lists the largest nongovernment employers in Philadelphia in 1980, based on figures supplied by the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce. The largest by far is the University of Pennsylvania, with 12,500 paid personnel. Bell of Pennsylvania with 8695 is next, and the others over 5000 include Temple University; SEPTA; Sears, Roebuck, & Co.; the Budd Co.; and Philadelphia Electric. The overall list has twenty-four employers, with the smallest at 1755 employees; six of these are in education or delivery of public services, four are retailers, eight in production of goods, and six in money and finance.
11. Clark, *Philadelphia, 1776-2076*, "Philadelphia 1876: Celebration and Illusion," p. 51.
12. *Bulletin*, Jan. 1, 1970, p. 20; *Issues for the 1980's*, p. 20.
13. Richard Webster, *Philadelphia Preserved: Catalog of the Historic American Buildings Survey* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1976), p. 8. This is an important book that not only presents complete coverage of identified historic buildings in Philadelphia, some of which have long since disappeared, but also provides an excellent historical overview of the significant neighborhoods.
14. For the ethnic background of Philadelphia neighborhoods, see Caroline Golab, *Immigrant Destinations* (Philadelphia: Temple University