Roma Identity

profileirakan_0
romaarticle.pdf

Identity, Communication, Inclusion: The Roma and (New) Europe Liliana Lubomirova Herakova

Based on the theoretical concepts of imagined communities (Anderson, 2006), public

sphere (Habermas, 1962/1991), and muted groups (Kramarae, 1981), this essay looks at

issues of identity and identity formation of the largest European minority*the Roma, or Gypsies. The essay argues that, similarly to the European identity project, the Roma are

actively building a transnational identity without abandoning national identities.

Although this model can be a valuable blueprint for increasingly globalizing societies, it is

neglected as a possibility because of Roma’s marginal social status. Further exploration of

self-organized Roma identity-construction is advised.

Keywords: Ethnic Identity; Imagined Communities; Public Sphere; Muted Groups;

Roma

In a continuously globalizing world, human rights and a chance at social equality

remain a loudly promoted focus of development programs, as indicated in the United

Nations Millennium Declaration (United Nations, 2000). In Western Europe and the

former Soviet bloc, a central issue of equality is the effective social integration of

national minorities. Of special concern is the social inclusion of the largest European

minority*the Roma or Gypsies. The need for solving a problem of social exclusion on racial and ethnic basis is signified by the European Union (EU) Directive 43 (European

Commission, 2000), ‘‘implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons

irrespective of racial or ethnic origin’’ ( p. 22).

Several factors underline the implementation of the Directive in regards to the

Roma. First, as with other EU legislation, the decisions and monitoring are

transnational, but the changes are to be implemented within national borders. Second,

and perhaps more significantly, unique to the Roma is their position simultaneously

outside and within European national communities. The Roma are not a homo-

geneous ethnic group (Horváth, 2006; Marushiakova & Popov, 2001; Petrova, 2003),

Liliana Lubomirova Herakova is affiliated with the University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA. Correspondence

to: University of Massachusetts Amherst, 240 Hicks Way, Amherst, MA 01003, USA. Email:

[email protected]

ISSN 1751-3057 (print)/ISSN 1751-3065 (online) # 2009 National Communication Association

DOI: 10.1080/17513050903177318

Journal of International and Intercultural Communication

Vol. 2, No. 4, November 2009, pp. 279�297

yet they claim a bond with other Roma across and beyond national boundaries, on one

hand, and, on the other, take on the national identity of their country of citizenship

(Horváth, 2006; Margalit & Matras, 2007).

Commenting on the dialectic of Romani identity, Horváth (2006) notes, ‘‘Social

scientists, just like any ordinary person, cannot give a proper answer as to who is

a Romani person. . . . In fact, it is the awareness of our dual identity that allows us to

understand the essence of Romani identity [italics added]’’ ( p. 2). Thus, not only is the

essence of a Romani identity debated, but perhaps, in the case of the Roma, we need

to reconceptualize our very definition and understanding of identity as a fluid

singular.

Simultaneously, within the EU, one of the largely debated issues is that of the

possibility for a European identity surpassing but not erasing the borders of national

identities (e.g., Habermas, 2007). Thus, the new European citizens, if they were to

emerge, might experience a dual (or multiple) identity not so different from the

present Roma experience (not forgetting, of course, that European Roma should, in

theory, also be European citizens). The question is, then, could the debate over the

development of a European identity be informed by the (marginalized) Romani

experience.

The current paper considers the role of communication in constructing and

sustaining European Roma’s dual identity and discusses possible links between

debates on European and on Roma identity. Specifically, it explores the ways in which

communication theories can explain the history and the present of European Roma’s

marginal national belonging and Roma’s transnational bonding in the face of such

marginalization. Cursorily, and by no means exhaustively, I also consider the

implications the Romani experience may have on debates on European identity and

the reasons why such implications may be overlooked. I argue that, in regards to

Roma identity, theoretical interpretations need to be reconsidered to encompass the

experience of dual collective identity, related to experiences of marginalization and

activism. Such focus does not only provide a new, more positive, direction for

consideration of the Romani experience, it also may inform debates on European

supernational identity.

Because of the socially marginal status of European Roma, three theories

connecting matters of power and (in)equality, identity, and communication are

considered as explanatory lenses of the Romani experience: Anderson’s (2006)

imagined communities, Habermas’ (1962/1991) public sphere (which presently

extends to a ‘‘transnational public space,’’ Habermas, 2007, p. 82), and Kramarae’s

(1981) muted groups. Within each theoretical vista, the European Roma experience

of identity and identity formation is considered. I begin with some historical and

social background on the European Roma, Roma activism, and identity. After

discussing the Roma’s experience of marginalization and transnational bonding

through the lens of each of the above theoretical frameworks, I conclude with possible

implications for reconsidering collective identity as a multiple entity within the

framework of political communication.

280 L. L. Herakova

Roma, Roma Rights, and Roma Identity in the European Context

Currently, ‘‘Roma’’ is the formally accepted and politically correct name for those who

are most popular under the (derogative) label of ‘‘Gypsies.’’ The unifying name was

accepted as a self-appellation in 1971 at the First World Romani Congress (Patrin,

1998). When it comes to individual self-identification, however, not all Gypsies would

consider themselves Roma (Margalit & Matras, 2007; Petrova, 2003). Petrova (2003)

sees present-day Roma as a ‘‘continuum of more or less related subgroups with

complex, flexible, and multilevel identities’’ ( p. 114). Because of such heterogeneity,

the notion of a unified transnational Roma identity is sometimes contested and seen as

a political assumption more than anything else (e.g., Simhandal, 2006).

Despite such contentions, and indeed fueling them, the dominant published

discourse suggests a transnational Roma identity that coexists with intragroup

subdivisions and Roma’s national identities (e.g., Gheorghe & Acton, 2001; Horváth,

2006; Marushiakova & Popov, 2001; Stauber & Vago, 2007). Such arguments are

mostly supported by Roma’s efforts to organize internationally without abandoning

their national and subgroup identities (Marushiakova & Popov, 2001). As summed

up in Gheorghe and Hedman’s (2000) online press release announcing the first

International Roma Day:

The spirit of the First International Congress set up a goal to bring the Roma together and to encourage them to act throughout the world, to bring about their emancipation in accordance with their own intuition and ideals*to go forward to a rhythm that suits them. Everything they do will bear the mark of their own personality, it will be amaro romano drom, ‘‘our own Gypsy way.’’ (’2)

Such sentiments suggest not only that the Roma are organizing internationally, but also

that there are common Romani ‘‘intuition and ideals,’’ ‘‘rhythm,’’ and ‘‘personality’’

that bind the Roma together. Further, these qualities are discursively positioned in

emancipatory resistance to the continued marginalization of the Roma. Thus, the

historical construction of Roma’s marginal social status as national citizens seems to

have affected the historical construction of a transnational Romani identity. This

section of the paper traces connections between Roma history, Roma rights, and Roma

identity in Europe.

Overview of Roma History in Europe

While reports on Romani arrival from India to Europe vary, most scholars agree that

certain Roma tribes were present in 11th-century Byzantium (European Union, 2004;

Fraser, 1995; Petrova, 2003) when settled communities already populated Europe.

Some sources suggest that in Eastern and Central Europe the Roma enjoyed relative

equality under Ottoman rule (e.g., European Union, 2004). However, others (e.g.,

Oprea, 2005) find that some practices of the Roma, currently criticized by human

rights activists, such as pollution taboos, developed as resistance strategies under

slavery. Citing Hancock, Petrova (2003) also asserts that ‘‘undeniably, the Romani

culture has historically been relatively closed and inaccessible to outsiders, which

Journal of International and Intercultural Communication 281

would be expected from a community constantly at risk’’ ( p. 138; Margalit & Matras,

2007, echo a similar observation). Such statements not only assume a ‘‘Romani

culture,’’ they also suggest Romani bonding in the face of discrimination.

Petrova (2003) traces the ‘‘core of the anti-Gypsy stereotype’’ to the ‘‘fifteenth-

century encounter of the nomadic Roma with Western European civilization’’ ( p. 127).

The nomad lifestyle contradicted the developing nation-state model of territorial

enclosures. Further, the developing ethics of Protestant Christianity and capitalism saw

the Romani traveling habits and lack of steady occupations as unproductive and

suspicious of criminal activity (Gheorghe & Acton, 2001; Petrova, 2003). At the same

time, contemporary notions of policing were developing, legitimizing Roma prosecu-

tion and contributing to the contemporary Roma-criminality myth (European Union,

2004), which is still often cited as a valid reason for segregation and exclusion (e.g.,

Xanthaki, 2005, p. 517). The successful ideological construction of the anti-Roma

stereotype emphasizes the historically weak social position of the Roma, which is

currently perceived as a major obstacle to overcoming negative misconceptions

(European Union, 2004; Oprea, 2005; Petrova, 2003).

More recently, the ‘‘Roma problem’’ became significantly more visible after the fall

of the communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe, where the majority of

European Roma live. Under communism, the Roma, as national citizens, relied on

state institutions that legitimized equal basic rights for all. This link was broken after

1989. According to Kovats (1999), ‘‘‘Integration’ meant Roma had to negotiate with

institutions in order to secure services and resources. It also brought into sharp focus

inequalities in distribution and heightened the debilitating effects of anti-Roma

prejudice’’ ( p. 149). Inequalities, as a foundational concern of Roma activism, are

mostly evaluated as such in contrast to other citizens of the European states in which

Roma reside.

Roma Activism, Roma Identity

Although highlighting a transnational effort to organize, Roma activism is grounded

in a sense of national identification with the country of residence, which allows for

comparison with other citizens of the same state. As a Rom, Horváth (2006)

emphasizes this relation:

According to our inner identity, we exist as a cultural and economic community

based on the clan system. Yet, we have another identity derived from the

surrounding nations, perceived as an entity distinct from those amongst whom

we live (. . .) this second identity also means that we consider ourselves part of those (majority) nations and we see ourselves with their own eyes, although the

latter do not believe that we are also they. ( p. 1)

Thus, for the Roma, discrimination is (largely) a national experience, while the

antidiscrimination effort has more transnational dimensions. Although the problem

of anti-Roma discrimination was recognized much earlier than after the fall of

communism (for example, at the First World Romani Congress in 1971), Roma

282 L. L. Herakova

activism did not really draw international attention until the 1990s (Simhandal, 2006;

Vermeersch, 2005).

Also at this time, the wider use of the previously accepted name ‘‘Roma’’ was

propelled in effort to escape negative stereotyping associated with the traditionally

used ‘‘Gypsy’’ (Marushiakova & Popov, 2001). Simhandal (2006) points out that in

comparison to ‘‘Gypsy,’’ which was an exonym, ‘‘Roma’’ was a politically selected

endonym, which only entered the dominant discourse in the 1990s. This ethnically

unifying (re)naming was perceived as necessary by external and internal activists as

a way to foster political and social change, based on ‘‘existing international norms

and standards for recognizing cultural, ethnic, and national minority identities’’

(Vermeersch, 2005, p. 456).

The making of a European Roma identity was an attention-grabbing strategy of the

earliest activist efforts, projected, for example, in the Human Rights Watch reports of

the early 1990s (Vermeersch, 2005). The idea was that the more grandiose and

nonborder-confined the problem, the larger its chance of receiving international

support. Shahar (2007) points out that the effort to emphasize a transnational Gypsy/

Roma identity has been criticized for allowing the emergence of large-scale anti-

Gypsism. However, Shahar refutes such criticism, connecting the notion of a

transnational, ethnically large, Roma identity to political battles for inclusion which

opposes views of the Roma as ‘‘social misfits’’ who are ‘‘targeted for assimilation’’ (p.

14).

The acceptance of a transnational Roma identity by the dominant political discourse

is also evident in the establishment of EU’s Specialist Group on Roma and Gypsies and

the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC; Guet, 2006). Today, the ‘‘Roma problem’’

persistently stays on the global social-change radar, as visible from the recent World

Bank initiative on the Decade of Roma Inclusion. In addition, the Amala School offers

education in ‘‘Romany culture in an original setting’’ (Amala School, n.d.). Even

though the summer workshops are held in Serbia, the school does not claim to offer an

experience of the Serbian Romani culture, but of the (transnational) all-Romani

culture. Further, the founder of the school, Dragan Ristic, clearly links the activist

efforts of the school with both a reality of an all-Romani culture and a non-Romani

perception of such a reality:

Our approach to the majority population is to play to the image of Gypsy as

musicians and singers. They like it because they really react to the Roma just like

entertaining minstrels . . . in this way, we proudly have a way to involve our culture in European and world culture. (Talvi, 2006, p. 47)

Thus, the idea of a common Roma-ness becomes a Roma activist tool. However, the

political function of transnational commonality is problematic. Criticisms address

the notion that a unified identity allows for unified culture-based blaming of the

individual for his or her social standing (Petrova, 2003; Vermeersch, 2005; Xanthaki,

2005). Further, not all gypsies adopt the ‘‘Roma’’ identity and its implications (e.g.,

the German Sinti, see Margalit & Matras, 2007), while outsiders may readily label

them as such.

Journal of International and Intercultural Communication 283

The Problematic of a Transnational Roma Identity

‘‘Roma’’ as an identity marker is not clearly defined in the traditional sense*‘‘No one presents a greater challenge to the ‘classic’ situation in social and cultural policy of

equating one people with one culture than the Roma’’ (Gheorghe & Acton, 2001,

p. 54). The heterogeneity of the group (Marushiakova & Popov, 2001; Petrova, 2003;

Stauber & Vago, 2007) and the elasticity of the ‘‘Roma’’ category in European discourse

(Simhandal, 2006) make fixing Roma identity difficult. Furthermore, these same

characteristics may suggest that ‘‘Roma’’ is the category of ‘‘other,’’ which can only be

defined in respect to that which it is not, as in, for example, marking ‘‘other’’ when

none of the check-box options for ethnicity or race applies.

Although this text cannot offer a full treatment of Roma’s transnational identity, the

arguments made here are based on an understanding of a politically constructed Roma

transnationality as an ethnic community ‘‘possessing a myth of common descent,

common historical memories, elements of shared culture, an association with

particular territory and sense of solidarity’’ (Smith, as quoted in Stauber & Vago,

2007, p. 117). As such, the sense of Roma transnationality is supported by the narratives

of common origin in India, common history of European marginalization of Gypsies/

Roma, common art forms and linguistic foundation, and organized Roma activism

against marginalization. These elements of a basis for community were discussed in the

previous two sections. In addition, it is worth noting that a sense of Roma transnational

solidarity has also been constructed through conscious group differentiation from the

gadje or non-Roma (Gheorghe & Acton, 2001), including the very naming of the gadje.

The articulation and repetition of narratives of Roma-ness, for example, in forms of

organized cultural reproduction such as the International Roma Day and the Amala

School, has continued to work toward establishing the reality of Roma transnational

identity.

On the other hand, perhaps the most serious criticism of the notion of a

transnational Roma identity comes from questioning its organic realness. Simhandal

(2006) criticizes the assumption of a transnational Roma-ness, pointing out that

‘‘Roma’’ is a political category created and altered in and by EU and European

Commission discourse since the 1970s. She makes a strong case for the ways in which

dominant discourse mutes marginalized groups (Kramarae, 1981) by naming them

and confining their realities into a language of power. However astute this discourse-

grounded observation about ‘‘the relevance of language in the construction of the

social world’’ (Simhandal, 2006, p. 98) may be, it neglects Romani self-organizing

around the sense of Roma-ness. Simhandal discusses the name ‘‘Roma’’ as an endonym

that gradually replaced other terms in EU discourse, but fails to notice that before the

EU adopted the name, it already was selected as a collective ‘‘category’’ by the Roma at

the First Romani Congress in 1971 (Margalit & Matras, 2007; Patrin, 1998).

This is not to say that transnational Roma-ness is any less of a political

construction than what Simhandal (2006) suggests. Indeed, Margalit and Matras

(2007) point out that even ‘‘Romani nationalists . . . implicitly accept [italics added]

the concept of Gypsies as a transnational group’’ (p. 111). However, what is relevant

284 L. L. Herakova

here is that the construction of Roma transnationality can be seen as more than an

imposed dominant discourse*it can be seen as conscious self-organizing (despite being led by Roma political elites). Indeed, it is the self-organized project of a

transnational Roma identity that may be informative to the project of a European

identity. The Romani experience and attempts at creating a collective transnational

Roma-ness that does not negate individual Roma nationalities may model the

execution of the project of a dual identity. Comparisons between the discourses and

the narratives surrounding the construction of transnational Roma-ness and Europe-

ness are beyond the scope of this paper. However, a communication theoretical look

at Romani experience of dual (national and transnational) identity provides insight

into (1) how this duality came to be, (2) how it may be sustained, and (3) why it may

be neglected as a valid model for European identity.

Theoretical Considerations of a Dual Roma Identity in the EU Context

Three sociocommunication theories provide possible context for a discussion of

Roma identity within EU nations. Each theory provides a different perspective on the

issue, forming roughly the following model: according to Anderson (2006), people

identify with a certain group based on perceived solidarities; civic solidarities,

according to Habermas (1962/1991), are formed by participating in the public sphere

and are mediated through it; finally, Kramarae (1981) considers factors limiting

participation in the public sphere, and, hence, affecting the forming of solidarities

and identity. All three theories discuss language and communication as systems of

inclusion and power relationships, suggesting implications for marginalized popula-

tions. After a brief overview of each theory, the question of Roma identity is discussed

within each specific framework.

Anderson’s Imagined Communities, Identity, and the Roma

According to Anderson (2006), ‘‘imagined communities’’ are the basis for the

development of national consciousness and nationalism. Imagined communities

include people who might never know each other, but are united by shared

knowledge of the world and by the similarities such shared knowledge highlights.

Print language has a metapower to convey such knowledge and build on similarities,

since, through advances in technology and travel, it transcends space and time. What

holds a nation together, then, is the perceived solidarity: ‘‘Members of even the

smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even

hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’’

(Anderson, 2006, p. 6).

Imagined communities and Roma’s national identities. The perceived solidarity is the

starting point for the discussion on the duality of Roma identity, since one dimension

of this duality is Roma’s national identification. Horváth (2006) expresses the notion

of national identity, simultaneously reminding us of the Roma pariah position in

Journal of International and Intercultural Communication 285

society: ‘‘When we made sacrifices in the struggles of the majority nation, we were not

considered Roma. When it was the majority’s turn to help us, we became strangers in

the eyes of our own mother nation’’ (p. 1). So how is it possible for Roma to continue

perceiving themselves as members of national communities while pushed to the

margins of these communities by the national majorities?

In the center of Anderson’s theory is print language in its communicative potential

to relate experiences across space and time, thus allowing people who would never see

each other to discover similarities and develop the notion of belonging. Anderson

asserts that ‘‘much of the most important thing about language is its capacity for

generating imagined communities, building in effect particular solidarities’’ (2006,

p. 133). Furthermore, ‘‘language is not an instrument of exclusion: in principle, anyone

can learn any language’’ (p. 134).

This theory of language as a builder of imagined national communities explains (at

least partially) Roma’s national identification since, for the most part, Roma are able to

speak and read the language of the ‘‘host’’ nation. At the same time, Romani languages

do not have written forms. Roma share knowledge and use of the scripted national

language with the national majority. Simultaneously, most of the majority population

is not familiar with Romani languages. This further encloses the Roma, not allowing

the gadje (non-Roma) to develop a bond of solidarity with the Roma community, even

if other factors did not preclude that. Moreover, if we follow Anderson’s hypothesis

further, the lack of Romani script would prevent the Romani community from

forming a Romani national consciousness leading to demands for territorial and

political independence.

In addition, Roma’s particular national identity is legitimized by formal documents

(e.g., ID cards) written in the particular national language. To further strengthen the

legitimacy of national belonging and foster social inclusion, educational institutions

also step forth in the integration efforts (e.g., Panayotova, 2002), providing primarily

mono-lingual education in the national vernacular and script. However, curricula

seldom include mentions of the Romani lifestyle, culture, history, and so forth.

Similarly, Anderson (2006) notes in regard to colonialism that the ‘‘paradox of

imperial official nationalism was that it inevitably brought what were increasingly

thought of and written about as European ‘national histories’ into the consciousness

of the colonized’’ (p. 118).

Thus, Roma inclusion increasingly reminds of Roma assimilation (if not internal

colonization). In defining their identity, Roma have to negotiate between the

education they receive in schools (which ignores the legitimacy of their culture

altogether) and the knowledge they receive within the Roma community through

experience and verbal transmission of traditions and histories. By excluding the Roma

from curricula, the educational system suggests that fully fledged national identity

requires renouncement of the Roma identity; that duality is impossible.

Székelyi, Csepeli, and Örkény (2003) hint that Roma might have picked up on this

suggestion supported by observational ‘‘knowledge’’ that most non-Roma live better

than the Roma. Székelyi et al. note that Roma with an upward social mobility often

do not claim Roma identity. Among Roma of various social statuses, they found that

286 L. L. Herakova

‘‘the tendency toward assimilation prevails especially when weakening Romany [sic]

identity is associated with relatively high status and a neglect of Romany culture’’

(Székelyi et al., 2003, p. 70). Similarly, Margalit and Matras (2007) note that in their

attempts to become German nationals, Sinti feel the necessity to distinguish

themselves from the Roma, despite evidence for common Gypsy genealogy. In this

context, true social integration might mean that Roma are recognized as nationals

without having to denounce their transnational identity.

Imagined communities and Roma’s transnational identity. The idea of a transnational

identity remains challenging, while the reality of it presses questions. Without written

language and print culture to preserve history and connect generations, how does the

idea of a transnational Roma-ness fit Anderson’s framework of imagined communities?

Ardovino (2005) suggests ‘‘imagined communities might also be defined in terms of

citizenship and political participation, based on a civic approach, or they might be

based on historical biological links which presuppose an ethnic approach’’ (p. 31). As an

activist effort, Roma’s transnational identity may be seen as part of the civic approach.

In addition, however, a claim of common ethnic origin in India is part of the myth

binding a transnational Roma identity (Stauber & Vago, 2007). In the absence of a

written language, however, how does this binding ethnic myth reach Roma commu-

nities and how is it reproduced within such communities? One answer may go back to

the sites of cultural reproduction, such as the International Roma Day and the Amala

School for Romani Language and Culture. Such consideration will extend Anderson’s

focus on the written language and may also suggest ways for European transnational

bonding which does not require abandoning one’s national identity.

Certainly, suggestions in support of the above possibility of transnational identity

building by means other than written communication are not absent from popular

discourse on sustaining and communicating identity. There are suggestions, for

example, that plantation slaves in the U.S. formed solidarities through the humming

of melodies, since they did not share a language, leave alone a scripted form

(Hayward & Norris, 2007). Anderson (2006) touches on the idea of religious

paintings as contextualized representations through which people form affiliations

and develop a sense of belonging. Yet, he pronounces such a form archaic and does

not consider the potential of communicative means other than written language to

form solidarities.

Since members of the EU do not share the same language or script system (since the

acceptance of Bulgaria in the EU, Latin and Cyrillic are the official alphabets), the

question is also pertinent to the debate over the possibility for a European identity to

surpass but not erase national identities. Although Anderson (2006) points out that ‘‘in

principle, anyone can learn any language’’ ( p. 134), should we limit our understanding

of language and ignore the possibility of other means for effective development and

sustainability of a collective identity? The example of the building of a transnational

Roma identity, continued despite linguistic differences and lack of a Romani writing

system, certainly seems to suggest an answer to the contrary. Furthermore, although

Roma’s marginal national status may have served as a motivation for transnational

Journal of International and Intercultural Communication 287

community building, marginality certainly does not seem to be a requirement. Debates

on the possibility of European transnational identity suggest such motivation for

identity building already exists among Europeans; the Roma experience can serve as an

embodied example for enactment of this motivation.

However, the potential of alternative ways to a collective identity is not too popular

in the discourse on European identity. In fact, one of the most prominent supporters

of the notion of identity ‘‘beyond national borders’’ (Habermas, 2003), Habermas,

refers, very similarly to Anderson, to the language-mediated model of national

consciousness development as a blueprint for developing a European identity.

Further, Habermas is concerned with the public sphere where civic participation

legitimizes the belonging to a certain imagined community (solidarity). The Roma

experience might suggest, however, that in the face of exclusion from the public

sphere, other ways of community and identity building might be possible.

Habermas’ Public Sphere, Identity, and the Roma

In regards to the possibility of European identity, Habermas (2003) asserts that ‘‘the

process by which European states of the nineteenth century gradually created national

consciousness and civic solidarity*the earliest modern form of collective identity’’ (pp. 97�98) is a learning process of identity formation, which can be extended transnationally. In this, he hypothesizes the existence of a ‘‘transnational public

space’’ (Habermas, 2007, p. 82) as the sole arena where a civic European identity can

evolve through the ‘‘process of consciousness formation’’ (p. 82).

The notion of a ‘‘transnational public space’’ (Habermas, 2007, p. 82) is an extension

of Habermas’ (1962/1991) seminal concept of ‘‘public sphere.’’ As a construct, the

public sphere is the connecting space between society and state, and the arena of public

opinion formation. The public sphere provides an intersection for the functionality

(strategic and purposeful actions) of political and economic systems (the state) and the

moral consciousness of society (Edwards, 2004). Public opinion arises as an expression

of civic solidarities in this intersection.

According to Habermas (1962/1991), the public sphere was ‘‘established’’ (p. 106) in

the homes of bourgeoisie. In an unmistakable connection between imagined

communities and the public sphere, Anderson (2006) notes that ‘‘in world-historical

terms bourgeoisies were the first classes to achieve solidarities on an essentially

imagined basis’’ (p. 77). Although both public sphere and imagined communities are by

definition potentially inclusive, they are literacy based, which makes participation in

both dependant on social status, education, and access to a common communicative

system.

In fact, Habermas (1962/1991) emphasizes the issue of social inequality, embedded

in the history of the public sphere:

In the case of the structural transformation of the bourgeois public sphere, we can

study the extent to which, and the matter in which, the latter’s ability to assume its

proper function determines whether the exercise of domination and power persists

288 L. L. Herakova

as a negative constant, as it were, of history*or whether as a historical category itself, it is open to substantive change. (p. 250)

Since the public sphere provides an arena for the forming of civic solidarities, the

major issue of inequality in its context is that of inclusive participation. Thus,

marginalization can be deliberately or accidentally achieved by limited access to the

public sphere.

Exclusion from the public sphere, transnational Roma-ness, national marginality. A

marginal position of a certain group (e.g., the Roma) within the context of a nation-

state is related to stereotyping, and stereotyping is further perpetuated by lack of

participation in the public sphere. If we accept that ‘‘the public sphere was realized . . .

in the public use of reason by all who were adept at it [italics added]’’ (Habermas, 1962/

1991, p. 105), then, not participating in the public sphere might create the impression

of even greater inferiority of the marginalized (as they would seem nonadept), despite

objective systemic limitations to participation. Thus, a sort of individual-blame

prejudice develops.

Blaming the Roma for their marginal social position is one of the most common

racism-denial mechanisms in Europe (Petrova, 2003). Roma’s historical difference

from Europeans and from the European settled lifestyle has been seen as a legitimate

reason to segregate them. This has limited their potential for participation in the

public sphere. Through their absence from that sphere, where civic solidarities form

and identities are legitimized, further segregation and marginalization of the Roma

has been perpetuated. However, the ‘‘same factors can be described as the root cause

of anti-Gypsism and the survival of the Roma as one single*but not yet internally homogenous*cultural identity’’ (Petrova, 2003, p. 113). In essence, being excluded from the public sphere, where national consciousness was forming, allowed the Roma

to ‘‘preserve the sense of belonging together’’ (p. 112). A marginalized national

identity contributed to the potentiality of a transnational identity. Similarly, present-

day activism brings up transnational Roma-ness as a strategy to opposing

discrimination of the Roma within European nation-states (e.g., Gheorghe &

Hedman, 2000).

Nevertheless, Roma do not see themselves as less ‘‘national’’ (e.g., less Bulgarian,

Hungarian, etc.) than the majority population in a certain nation-state (Horváth,

2006). The national majority, however, perceives them as outsiders. In fact, Petrova

(2003) goes as far as to determine ‘‘the essential element of anti-Gypsism that

Western and Eastern European public opinion have in common . . . [is] the

perception of Roma parasitic existence, and, hence, the deep-seated attitude that

the Gypsies are subhuman’’ (p. 132). So, while national majorities recognize the

within-the-nation existence of the Roma, they see that existence as one of an

uninvited outside organism harming the national well-being.

It is in this clash between Roma self-perceived national belonging and the majority’s

rejection of such belonging that social inequality and uneven public sphere

participation originate as a problem. Petrova’s (2003) claim for a European public

opinion which holds anti-Gypsy attitudes suggests that the Roma are, by default,

Journal of International and Intercultural Communication 289

excluded from that public opinion. According to Habermas (2006), the political public

sphere needs, but lacks, ‘‘input from citizens who give voice to society’s problems and

who respond to the issues articulated in elite discourse’’ (p. 421). He credits this lack of

responsive citizenry partially to ‘‘social deprivation and cultural exclusion’’ providing

for ‘‘uneven participation in mediated communication’’ (p. 421).

Thus, Habermas sees social inclusion as a necessity for a public sphere which

properly mediates between state and society. Extending this view to global public

sphere and to a transnational European identity, he asserts that such identity would

be achieved when ‘‘citizens are able to extend their civic solidarities beyond their

respective national borders with the goal of achieving mutual inclusion’’ (Habermas,

2007, p. 76).

On a basic level, what unifies Habermas’ public sphere and Anderson’s imagined

communities is the notion that this ‘‘mutual inclusion,’’ a sense of solidarity and shared

identity, is formed through communication among individuals and among groups.

This communication is possible through time and space by access to (1) a commonly

understood and fixed linguistic system (Anderson, 2006) and (2) a public sphere

(Habermas, 1962/1991) where the artifacts of this linguistic system are available to the

public and serve as bonds among members of the public. Limited access to these

resources, as in the case with European Roma, results in marginalization and in an

identity which, in the eyes of the majority public, is other than and inferior to their

own.

But the worldview of the marginalized is different. Horváth (2006) notes about the

Roma: ‘‘We consider ourselves part of those (majority) nations and we see ourselves

with their own eyes, although the latter do not believe that we are also they’’ (p. 1).

The feminist communication theory of muted groups (Kramarae, 1981) offers one

explanation for the occurrence of such mismatch of majority versus minority

perceptions. Muted groups theory offers a consideration of linguistic systems with

regards to matters of domination, inclusion, and social equality. It also provides one

possible explanation why a valid model, such as Roma’s experience with transnational

identity, may be neglected by the dominant discourse.

Kramarae’s Muted Group Theory, Social Equality, and the Roma

Muted group theory (MGT) considers language as a constructively expressive entity

which affects and legitimizes the distribution of social power. This concern with

language’s social significance connects MGT with Anderson’s imagined communities

and Habermas’ public sphere.

The theory is based on the idea that language reflects a worldview. Similarly,

Habermas (1962/1991) supports the Kantian notion that the world is ‘‘constituted in

the communication of rational beings’’ (p. 106). However, inequality arises when not

all communication is equally valued and, hence, worldviews*and, in this, mindfully constructed worlds*are disregarded. In short, elites determine and enforce the collective linguistic system and ostracize what does not fit the norm. Printing, on the

290 L. L. Herakova

other hand, allowed the mass production of the normative language, thus legitimizing

it and producing ‘‘languages-of-power’’ (Anderson, 2006, p. 45).

According to MGT, the existence of such languages-of-power allows for a social

order of inequality to persist, as not everyone is allowed equal opportunity to

participate in the formation of public opinion. In its anthropological foundation, the

theory asks ‘‘whether everyone in society has participated equally in the generation of

ideas and their encoding into discourse’’ (Ardener, 2005, p. 51). In answering these

questions, MGT posits that the dominant groups solely determine the appropriate

communicative systems and that the subordinate groups are then ‘‘inarticulate,’’

because the language they use is that of the dominant groups, instead of one that

reflects their own, unique point of view (Ardener, 1975).

Although in the field of communication MGT was originally concerned with

gender-based social inequalities (Kramarae, 1981), the theory has been further

extended to the communication practices of minorities (Orbe, 1994, 1996, 1998).

This application, coupled with the unquestionably marginalized position of European

Roma, makes the theory relevant here. MGT also applies to matters of Romani

identity: if identity is reflected in communicative practices, exploring these practices

and their function will also provide insight into the ways in which identity is

constructed and sustained. In fact, one of Kramarae’s (1981) first assertions is that

‘‘experiences peculiar to the subordinate group have not yet been encoded in a

language’’ (p. 7). Therefore, feminism’s advance to gender equality included women’s

efforts to ‘‘name themselves and their activities’’ (Kramarae, 1981, p. 8). Similarly, the

First World Romani Congress in 1971 named ‘‘Roma’’ the groups of heterogeneous

‘‘Gypsy’’ clans that originated in India and spread throughout the world. In addition,

museum exhibitions and cultural celebrations, such as the International Roma Day,

also encode Roma experiences in a communicative system that is familiar to them, but

is also understood by the majority, as Dragan Ristic may suggest (Talvi, 2006).

Following MGT, the unifying name ‘‘Roma,’’ though arbitrary, is more than one

more word in dominant vocabularies*it allowed for a consideration of a worldview previously disregarded; it allowed for the beginning of a process of legitimization of

an identity which was traditionally pariah in dominant European (and other)

societies. The name ‘‘Roma’’ was not readily accepted. However, ‘‘in recent years . . . the term ‘Roma,’ which is the ethno-cultural self-appellation of many of those

perceived by outsiders as ‘Gypsies,’ has come to dominate the official political

discourse, at least in Europe, and has acquired the legitimacy of political correctness’’

(Petrova, 2003, p. 111).

This gradual acceptance of ‘‘Roma’’ as an identity marker also signifies the

acceptance of a transnational identity, as the unifying identity marker ‘‘Roma’’ applies

to groups dispersed in different European states. Simhandal (2006) argues that the

use of the term by EU institutions may in fact be violent, as, in such use, the

dominant discourse confines marginalized groups. However, it is worth remembering

that ‘‘Roma’’ was adopted by geographically dispersed Gypsy groups as a self-

appellation prior to the EU use of the term. Yet, not understanding the national-

transnational duality of Romani identity, the dominant discourse had attempted to

Journal of International and Intercultural Communication 291

cast the Roma transnational identity in a national mold (Margalit & Matras, 2007).

Horváth (2006) finds ‘‘initiatives to create a Romani nation . . . are anachronistic, violent and futile’’ (p. 2). He asserts that ‘‘the idea of a separate Romani political

entity was not developed by the Roma’’ (p. 2), but is rather a pseudo-humanitarian

act, fitted to the European nation-state model.

If we look at that situation from the combined points of view of imagined

communities, public sphere, and muted groups, the act of casting the Roma in a

singular national identity is really one of exclusion, rather than inclusion. A Romani

nationality (as opposed to transnationality) would mean that the Roma do not have

to claim the national identity of the majority. If the Roma had a territorial nation of

their own, on the face of it, they will not be a marginalized national community,

because they will be their own entity, separate from and outside the current national

majorities; they will not be ‘‘muted,’’ because they will be given the right to dominate

their own national discourse.

The problem is, of course, that the very suggestion of casting the Roma into a

nation-state mold mutes them by admitting only one concept (worldview) of identity

as normative. Because dual identity is not generally part of the dominant experience,

there is also no language to properly and meaningfully name and describe such an

experience. Kramarae (1981) posits that in such a situation the subordinate groups

‘‘are likely to find ways to express themselves outside of the dominant public modes of

expression . . . in both their verbal conventions and their nonverbal behavior’’ (p. 4). Perhaps traditions develop out of such alternative modes of expression. For example,

Oprea (2005) suggests that what she sees and has experienced as the Romani tradition

of child marriage as a communicative ritual was a response to historic threats from

national majorities.

However, even if the dominant group realizes that subordinate groups do have

means of expression, they might dismiss them as incomprehensible. Kramarae’s

(1981) comment about the language-worldview relationship between men and

women as dominant and subordinate groups applies here, as well: ‘‘While women

have had to learn the language structure of the dominant group, men have seldom

had to discern or have wanted to discern the women’s model of the world’’ (p. 9). The

potential dismissal of communicative means and systems enhances the ‘‘otherness’’ of

the marginalized.

At the same time, MGT posits that the subordinate groups would adapt to the

dominant modes of expression and be able to use and understand them (Kramarae,

1981). Such a majority versus minority dichotomy may explain why Roma have a

sense of national identity, seeing learned similarity in communicative means, while

the national majorities do not necessarily feel the Roma share a national identity with

them, because of a focus on the difference. In their subordinate position within

European nation-states, Roma appear to have adapted to at least some of the

dominant modes of expression in attempts to participate, if marginally, in society.

Perhaps not all of this adaptation has been voluntary and what we see today as

Roma’s ability to speak the national languages of the states where they reside, for

example, is a result of assimilation politics. However, some of this adaptation has

292 L. L. Herakova

been a more organic process, which has also affected and changed Romani

communities, contributing to present-day differences in language dialects, traditional

practices, and lifestyles (Margalit & Matras, 2007). Beyond the use of language,

ethnographic research suggests Romani adaptation to the dominant culture is also

expressed in leaving and forgetting their traditional crafts and occupations for more

‘‘socially acceptable’’ jobs (e.g., Slavkova, 2007).

Along with such adaptation to the dominant culture, however, Roma have

preserved some common cultural base with other Roma throughout the world,

allowing for the potentiality of transnational activist bonding (e.g., Gheorghe &

Hedman, 2000). Such a dual identity, even its potential, is unfitted to the singular

national identity model, dominant in European societies, which makes the duality

incomprehensible and often ignored. Horváth (2006) points out that ‘‘the non-

Romani people imagine the Romani identity as a lot more unambiguous, coherent,

and descriptive than how the Roma see themselves’’ (p. 3). Such a reflection, from an

emic perspective, suggests a perception of being fitted in the dominant discourse, so

as to be made sense of. Such experience, in turn, marks not integration, but social

exclusion.

Through the theories of imagined communities (Anderson, 2006), public sphere

(Habermas, 1962/1991), and muted groups (Kramarae, 1981), this essay suggests that

identity and identity perception are related to social dominance and inclusion.

Further, all three theories support the notion that identity and especially identity

perceptions are constructed through communication and that communication is a

power-arena. While such considerations explain the Romani marginal status in

Europe and the process of social exclusion, they do not provide sufficient (if any)

background to understand the phenomenon of duality of Roma identity.

The idea of transnational identity might be comparatively new in the context of

European unification, but for the Roma the notion of such an identity, which surpasses

but does not erase the national identity, seems to be a longer standing tradition. The

fact that the conceptual model of duality is not seen as possible for European identity

only emphasizes the insignificance attached to European Roma, their lifestyles, and

experiences. Moreover, the inevitable focus on the exclusion happening within

national borders, rather than on the collective solidarity across borders, suggests

that perhaps the theoretical model linking identity and communication needs to be

reconsidered.

Implications for European Identity and Social Inclusion of the Roma

The Roma experience of identity is unique in its lack of singularity or coherency.

Formally, Roma are national citizens of the countries they inhabit. They accept and

live that national identity. At the same time, they self-organize in and identify with

a Romani transnational community which has no nationalistic territorial or political

aspirations. The nonschizophrenic coexistence of these two identities is difficult to

comprehend in the European model of modernity, which centers on national

consciousness and civic participation. The ambiguity of Romani identity enhances

Journal of International and Intercultural Communication 293

the group’s marginal status in European societies. The logic of social exclusion sees

the Roma as national parasites who, having a unity resembling national community,

‘‘lack the ambition to create a nation’’ (Horváth, 2006, p. 1).

Paradoxically, such logic of exclusion carries into efforts for (so called) social

inclusion of the Roma, which become more of assimilation than integration efforts.

As such, they often meet resistance among the Roma who feel just as strong a bond

with their Roma-ness as with their national-ness. The problem is that often

integration efforts organized, carried on, and monitored from outsiders, as well-

intentioned as they might be, rely on traditional interpretations of theoretical models

and rarely succeed in understanding Romani experience, adapting the models to that

experience, and move toward true integration.

The theoretical models themselves are not inherently and entirely inapplicable. In

fact, this paper employed three theories to pursue further understanding of the

Romani marginalized experience and its effect on Romani identity. Linking the

paradigms on imagined communities (Anderson, 2006), public sphere (Habermas,

1962/1991), and muted groups (Kramarae, 1981) in the national context, one may

conclude that Roma are generally excluded from national imagined communities

because inarticulateness and nondominant worldview (because of different experi-

ences) prevent them from participation in the public sphere. Such lack of participation

allows the formation of an anti-Roma public opinion continuing the cycle of

marginalization in national societies.

However, a significant gap remains in such an analysis*an attention to that which is different in the Roma experience, namely, the duality of collective identity. If

Anderson’s and Habermas’ models are truly applicable to the development of national

consciousness and if the Roma transnational consciousness resembles that national

model in certain aspects, but is yet different in its construction and sustainability, it

would be beneficial to explore that difference as a possible alternative model.

Furthermore, building on MGT (Kramarae, 1981), Orbe (e.g., 1996, 1998) proposes

cocultural theory as a way to focus on the unique communicative systems

nondominant groups develop in order to participate in and interact with dominant

cultures. This essay suggests that the Roma might have developed such a commu-

nicative system in relation to their activist efforts of transnational community building

(e.g., the model of the Amala School), while, at the same time, adapting to the

dominant communicative systems of the states where they reside. Applying cocultural

theory to future Roma research may provide more specific insights into the Roma

communicative system and its relation to both national and transnational identity.

Such an approach may also offer an alternative to Simhandal’s (2006) criticism of the

trajectory of Roma research as violating Roma rights by blindly and ignorantly naming

Roma experiences.

Finally, the Roma experience is worth exploring for its potential of simultaneously

building and sustaining both national and transnational identity. Anderson (2006)

suggested that the ability to communicate a shared narrative and discourse is

foundational for the formation of national identity. A similar process might be going

on in Roma’s efforts of transnational community building. Some of the elements of

294 L. L. Herakova

their shared narratives*their origin in India, their common linguistic base, and experiences of discrimination in Europe*have been discussed here and elsewhere. However, the discourse reproducing these narratives has not been explored in much

depth. Roma around the world now have their own publications, web sites,

organizations, and events*these are all sites of Romani discourse. To better understand the potential role of the Romani model to European identity building,

such discourses might also be compared with European discourses on shared identity

and narratives to support such identity. Such a task was beyond the scope of this text,

but, however cursory, this essay suggest parallels between Romani and European

transnational community building are worth exploring.

Considering the duality of Romani experience of identity and community, as

suggested here, and if communication is essential to the politics and the existence of a

community, it is impossible to assume that Roma are inept in communicating. It is

safer and, at the same time, more challenging to question dominant interpretations’

ineptness at reading and listening to Romani communication systems and identity. In

a hopeful opening for future research, such questioning leaves ellipsis, so that more

innovative and ethical ideas for minority integration and community building may

enter.

References

Amala School. (n.d.). Retrieved October 13, 2008, from http://www.galbeno.com/

Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined communities (3rd ed.). London: Verso.

Ardener, S. (1975). Perceiving women. London: Malaby/Dent.

Ardener, S. (2005). Ardener’s ‘‘muted groups’’: The genesis of an idea and its praxis. Women and

Language, 28, 50�54. Ardovino, M. (2005). Are the Balkan EU candidates different? Building a Balkan model of support

for European integration. Romanian Journal of Political Science, 1, 29�51. Edwards, G. (2004). Habermas and social movements: What’s ‘‘new’’? In N. Crossley & J. M.

Roberts (Eds.), After Habermas: New perspectives in the public sphere (pp. 113�131). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.

European Commission. (2000). Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the

principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origins

[Electronic version]. Official Journal of the European Communities, L 180, 22�26. European Union. (2004). The situation of Roma in an enlarged European Union. Retrieved January

29, 2007, from http://www.errc.org/db/00/E0/m000000E0.pdf

Fraser, A. (1995). The Gypsies (2nd ed.). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Gheorghe, N., & Acton, T. (2001). Citizens of the world and nowhere: Minority, ethnic and human

rights for Roma during the last hurrah of the nation state. In W. Guy (Ed.), Between past and

future: The Roma of Central and Eastern Europe (pp. 54�71). Hatfield, UK: University of Hertfordshire Press.

Gheorghe, N., & Hedman, H. (2000, March 23). To whom it april concern. Retrieved October 15,

2008, from http://www.romnews.com/community/modules.php?op�modload&name� News&file�article&sid�556

Guet, M. (2006). MG-S-Rom: Council of Europe Committee of Experts of Roma and Travellers: 10

years experience behind and new challenges ahead. Roma Rights Quarterly, 2/3. Retrieved

February 15, 2007, from http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk�2652

Journal of International and Intercultural Communication 295

Habermas, J. (1991). The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of

bourgeois society (2nd ed., T. Burger, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Originally

published in German, 1962, Darmstadt, Germany: Luchterhand)

Habermas, J. (2003). Toward a cosmopolitan Europe. Journal of Democracy, 14, 86�100. Habermas, J. (2006). Political communication in media society: Does democracy still enjoy an

epistemic dimension? The impact of normative theory on empirical research. Communication

Theory, 16, 411�426. Habermas, J. (2007). The divided West. Malden, MA: Polity Press.

Hayward, A. S. (Writer), & Norris, M. (Host). (2007). A joyful noise! [Radio series episode]. In E. V.

Tait, Jr. (Producer), Every voice and sing! Washington, DC: National Public Radio.

Horváth, A. (2006). Gadjo nation, Roma nation. Roma Rights Quarterly, 2/3. Retrieved February 14,

2007, from http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk�2655 Kovats, M. (1999). Minority rights and Roma politics in Hungary. In K. Cordell (Ed.), Ethnicity and

democratisation in New Europe (pp. 145�157). London: Routledge. Kramarae, C. (1981). Women and men speaking. Rowley, MA: Newbury House Publishers.

Margalit, G., & Matras, Y. (2007). Gypsies in Germany*German Gypsies? Identity and politics of Sinti and Roma in Germany. In R. Satuber & R. Vago (Eds.), The Roma: A minority in Europe

(pp. 103�116). New York: Central European University Press. Marushiakova, E., & Popov, V. (2001). Historical and ethnographic background: Gypsies, Roma,

Sinti. In W. Guy (Ed.), Between past and future: The Roma of Central and Eastern Europe (pp.

33�54). Hatfield, UK: University of Hertfordshire Press. Oprea, A. (2005). Child marriage a cultural problem, education access a race issue? Deconstructing

the uni-dimensional understanding of Romani oppression. Roma Rights Quarterly, 2.

Retrieved February 14, 2007, from http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk�2295 Orbe, M. (1994). ‘‘Remember it’s always Whites’ ball’’: Descriptions of African American male

communication. Communication Quarterly, 42, 287�300. Orbe, M. (1996). Laying the foundation for co-cultural communication theory: An inductive

approach to studying non-dominant communication strategies and the factors that influence

them. Communication Studies, 47, 157�176. Orbe, M. (1998). An outsider within perspective to organizational communication: Explicating the

communicative practices of co-cultural group members. Management Communication

Quarterly, 12, 230�279. Panayotova, D. (2002). Successful Romani school desegregation: The Vidin case. Roma Rights

Quarterly, 3�4. Retrieved February 14, 2007, from http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk�1630 Patrin. (1998, Nov. 23). Timeline of Romani history. In The Patrin web journal: Romani culture and

history (chap. 4). Retrieved July 18, 2007, from http://www.geocities.com/Paris/5121/timeline.

htm

Petrova, D. (2003). The Roma: Between a myth and the future. Social Research, 70, 111�161. Shahar, S. (2007). Religions minorities, vagabonds, and Gypsies in early modern Europe. In

R. Satuber & R. Vago (Eds.), The Roma: A minority in Europe (pp. 1�18). New York: Central European University Press.

Simhandal, K. (2006). ‘‘Western Gypsies and Travellers’’*‘‘Eastern Roma’’: The creation of political objects by the institutions of the European Union. Nations and Nationalisms, 12, 97�115.

Slavkova, M. (2007). Evangelical Gypsies in Bulgaria: Way of life and performance of identity.

Romani Studies, 17, 205�246. Stauber, R., & Vago, R. (2007). The politics of memory: Jews and Roma commemorate their

persecution. In R. Satuber & R. Vago (Eds.), The Roma: A minority in Europe (pp. 117�132). New York: Central European University Press.

Székelyi, M., Csepeli, G., & .Örkény, A. (2003). Ambitious education: The role of family, school, and

friends in the development of successful Romany life courses. Romani Studies 5, 13, 53�72.

296 L. L. Herakova

Talvi, S. J. A. (2006, June 16). Kal (black) like me [Electronic version]. In These Times, 46�47. Retrieved October 1, 2006, from http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/2701/kal_black_like_

me/

United Nations. (2000, September 18). United Nations millennium declaration. Retrieved October 1,

2006, from http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf

Vermeersch, P. (2005). Marginality, advocacy, and the ambiguities of multiculturalism: Notes on the

Romani activism in Central Europe. Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 12,

451�478. Xanthaki, A. (2005). Hope dies last: An EU directive on Roma integration. European Public Law, 11,

515�526.

Journal of International and Intercultural Communication 297