Philosophy Paper

Problems of Philosophy Collins 15 December

Criticizing Pascal’s Wager Blaise Pascal offers a pragmatic argument as to why he feels God should be believed in by all. He does this in the form of a wager, offering both sides of his argument in order to convey that his stance is the more logical of the two. However, Pascal’s wager does not come without opposition, as I will be criticizing his stance on why he feels it is the safer bet to believe in God. Pascal begins by admitting that we cannot prove God’s existence through sheer reason. Because of this, he offers more of a persuasive consideration, giving reasons as to why someone should believe in God, as it is in their best interest. Pascal essentially believes that the potential benefits of having faith are far better than the potential consequences. His wager basically goes as follows: if you do believe in God, and he actually exists, you will be infinitely rewarded, and have a place in heaven. If you believe, but there turns out to be no God, the only consequence is wasted time; as in going to church, praying, and other holy endeavors. On the other side of this, if you do not believe in God, and upon death you realize God does exist, as a result of your unfaithful and therefore unfulfilled life, you are subjected to eternal damnation. However, if you do not have faith and there is no God, you saved more time in life by not going to church and praying than those who did have faith. Pascal believes that the mere possibility of God’s existence makes faith worthwhile, and that eternal damnation is a consequence too severe to justify atheism. It seems as though one has all to gain and nothing to lose by simply believing. Ifyou were to place a bet on which option is safer, which would you choose? Pascal believes having faith is the ‘safer’ option, and this is the wager that he argues.

Pascal’s wager does not come without criticism. One objection I will pose to Pascal is that he assumes too much about the nature of God. He assumes that God is one who rewards believers and punishes nonbelievers. This cannot be assumed, as we know nothing about the actual nature of God, regardless of the question of his existence. It is just as theoretically possible for God to punish all theists as he is to reward them. Pascal might respond by saying that it is still a safer choice to assume that God is benevolent, and his nature is rewarding believers and punishing nonbelievers. In response to this, I would argue that though it is the safe choice, it is not necessarily the smart choice. His argument can be compared to one such as this. If I were to say to my friend, “Give me $20 or an asteroid will plummet to the Earth, killing us all”, it would be the safer choice for my friend to give me the money, ensuring our survival, but it is not the smart choice as the odds of an asteroid plummeting to the Earth are miniscule to say the least. Just because an option is safe, does not mean it is logical. Another objection I will pose is this: you cannot force yourself to believe in something that you do not truly believe in; but even if you try, there are an endless amount of Gods and Goddesses that could possibly exist that you must seemingly account for. A belief is more of a reaction to evidence than a decision, but Pascal seems to argue that one only needs to believe in order to attain salvation. However, if the standard Judeo-Christian identity of God is accepted for this argument, then God is all-knowing. It seems fallacious that a being who is all-knowing would not be able to identify a false believer amongst those who truly believe. Believing in God simply for the payoff is believing for the wrong reasons, and an all-knowing being that Judeo-Christians accept as their idea of God should be able to identify this. But if one does desire to believe in God solely for the idea of a payoff in the afterlife, then he or she must believe in all Gods and Goddesses across every religion. This is the only one way to completely guarantee that a payoff can be attained, as all options are therefore covered. Pascal only identifies two options on the existence of God in his wager: God exists, or God does not exist. The conditions of the wager do not specify which God or Gods to believe in, so would the wager stay true for the Greek/Roman Gods, the Nordic Gods, and countless others? One would have to believe in all of the Gods and Goddesses to be certain of a payoff in the afterlife, but this strategy is self-defeating if there were actually only one true God. Pascal may respond to this by saying that it is in one’s best interest to eliminate the least probable options. By doing so, you save time and energy in which to focus on attaining salvation for the God most probable to appear in the afterlife. In order to ensure the best and most likely payoff, one must get rid of the negligible options. In response to this, I would argue that improbable does not mean impossible, and that though the concept of meeting the Greek God Zeus in the afterlife is highly unlikely, there is still a chance that should be accounted for, assuming one is only believing for the prospective ultimate payoff in the afterlife. Pascal’s wager implies that we should force ourselves into believing in a higher power for the wrong reasons, and does not account for the possibility of many Gods and or Goddesses that could possibly appear in the afterlife. Pascal’s wager is seldom used in modern arguments for the existence of God, most likely due to the barrage of objections it has faced since its creation. Though he provides sort of a persuasive consideration on the rationality behind believing in God, there are simply too many strong objections that his wager cannot successfully overcome. Pascal attempts to convince us that it is the rational choice to believe in God, as eternal damnation is a consequence too severe to ignore. However, he assumes too much about the nature of God, and ignores the theoretical possibility of many other Gods and/or Goddesses being presented in the afterlife. It is for these reasons that Pascal’s argument is no longer considered to be theologically valid, and has been largely discarded by the religious community.