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The sociology of global climate change Stephen Zehr∗

Sociological research on global climate change (GCC) can be found in several subfields, but it has primarily emerged within the theoretical and substantive domain of sociology of the environment. This review provides an overview of sociological literature on climate change and identifies key areas for further research and development. The review focuses on four broad areas: social causes, construction of the problem, relationship between GCC and social inequality, and social dimensions of mitigation and adaptation. © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

How to cite this article: WIREs Clim Change 2015, 6:129–150. doi: 10.1002/wcc.328

INTRODUCTION

Sociological research on global climate change(GCC) has made significant progress over the past decade and new work is rapidly emerging. Efforts have been taken to bolster sociological agendas,1 implying both the persistence of knowledge gaps and the overall importance of sociological approaches. This review is structured primarily to review a large body of this work, but also identify substantive and theoretical gaps where they exist.

The review is organized around four substan- tive areas of research. The first section addresses research on social causes of GCC.2 It reviews the IPAT and STIRPAT models, theories such as political econ- omy, ecological modernization, and world systems, and empirical studies based within these traditions. The second section reviews sociological studies of the construction of GCC as an environmental problem. This research fits into a more general tradition on social problem construction, which examines public values, attitudes, and knowledge and social movement activity. The third section reviews studies connect- ing GCC to social inequality. This body of research argues, correctly in my view, that knowledge and formal recognition of this relationship must be inte- grated into mitigation and adaptation policies for both

∗Correspondence to: [email protected]

Department of Sociology, Anthropology & Criminal Justice Studies, University of Southern Indiana, Evansville, IN,

Conflict of interest: The author has declared no conflicts of interest for this article.

their legitimacy and effectiveness. The fourth section reviews sociological studies of mitigation and adap- tation. This section reviews empirical studies, mostly without an overarching sociological theory present in the other areas. It is the least developed area of research of the four areas with much opportunity for further work.

A disciplinary review of an interdisciplinary topic is always a challenge. The boundary between sociological and non-sociological studies is not clear or precise. Legitimate questions can be raised about what is included or excluded from this review. My approach was to originally search for sociologi- cal literature via the SocIndex Database using the search terms ‘global warming’ and ‘global climate change.’ Additional literature was gathered from other sources and via reviewers’ recommendations. There are undoubtedly some gaps in coverage, sometimes due to spatial considerations. There also is a North American focus in this literature, though attempts were made to be more broadly inclusive.

Much sociological work on GCC has emerged from the subfield of environmental sociology. This field began to emerge with William Catton and Riley Dunlap’s work 3,4 on the new environmental paradigm, which drew extensively from prior work of Otis Dudley Duncan and neighboring fields such as biological ecology, ecological anthropology, and evolutionary theories (Refs 5–7 review this history). Catton and Dunlap called attention to deficiencies in sociological literature on human ecology that, in their view, seemed to imply human exemption from environmental impacts. They emphasized three main

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functions of the natural environment—supply depot, waste repository, and living space; the global lim- its that these functions imply; and the environmen- tal problems that emerge at points of overlap. Their analysis clarified the need for a basic framework in sociology that tied the social world to the natural envi- ronment, both as cause and consequence. GCC is a salient example of this basic claim.

Sociological work on GCC that couples social and natural systems also is influenced by sociologi- cal analyses of energy. Though some early theory rec- ognized the importance of energy inputs into human development, it often assumed that natural energy capacity was limited only by technological develop- ment. The idea of limits to energy, or more specifi- cally, energy in a more entropic form emerges from various sources (Refs 8, 9 review the intellectual foundation). The general sociological question in this literature is how forms of energy, in high or low entropy states, interact with socio-technical systems to accomplish work for human development and the consequences of this energy transformation for future systems. Current sociological work on GCC understands these interactions not within clean causal chains but as heterogeneous linkages among the natu- ral, social, and technological. Although there is insuf- ficient room here to fully review sociology of energy literature, reviews can be found in several places, 8–10 as can theoretical developments on energy system transitions.11,12

SOCIAL CAUSES OF GCC

The IPAT model of environmental impact emerged from research and debate between John Holdren and Paul Ehrlich on one side and Barry Commoner on the other.13–17 It serves a useful organizational tool for examining causes of GCC and has been influential in discussions of coupled human and natural systems.18

The basic point of IPAT is that environmental impact is a multiplicative function of population, affluence, and technology (Impact = Population * Affluence * Tech- nology). GCC can easily fit into this model by showing how change in greenhouse gas emissions (impact—or a stressor which causes impacts) is driven by popula- tion change, change in the level of development (e.g. GDP, per capita consumption of resources), and tech- nological change (e.g. greenhouse gases emitted per unit of production or consumption).

Perhaps because it is straightforward, the model has been criticized in sociological research for its lack of attention to other social dimensions of GCC (reviewed in Ref 18). For example, Edward Cren- shaw and Craig Jenkins19 note that it ignores the

impact of social structures and their mediation of PAT, feedbacks and nonlinearities, and the impact of global social inequalities. Thomas Dietz and Eugene Rosa20,21 have adjusted the model by formulating the STIRPAT model for stochastic impacts (STI) by regres- sion (R) on population (P), affluence (A), and tech- nology (T). This revised model is used successfully in several studies to estimate CO2 emissions,

22–25 though technology is often treated as an error term due to lack of consensus about appropriate indicators.26 STIR- PAT also can include other factors by simply entering them into the equation. For example, one study adds several variables in a cross-national comparison, find- ing that the level of non-governmental organization (NGO) activity in particular is an important addi- tional predictor of environmental impact.26

Overall, this model is useful for further quanti- tative studies of GCC. It directs our attention to gen- eral causes of GCC: population (growth, density, etc.), affluence (production and consumption), and technol- ogy. As such, the model is used in this review as an organizational guide, with the exception of technol- ogy which has yet to be standardized and adequately developed in this literature.

Population: The impacts of population on GCC pose a potential problem for sociologists due to nor- mative and technical reasons. Although population growth is obviously relevant, undo attention to it could be interpreted as blaming-the-victim since cur- rent and future projected growth rates are highest in least affluent and most vulnerable nations. Con- sequentially, sociologists have highlighted affluence, while population is sometimes politely ignored or only casually mentioned. Second, population growth itself is not a singular or linear variable since changes in population structure (e.g. density, age, house- hold structure) have significant effects on the climate system.27 This structural variability across nations makes it difficult to incorporate population as a sin- gular causal variable.

Studies that do focus on population find a clear relationship to CO2 emissions. For example, a study of 86 developed and less-developed nations between 1960 and 2005 finds a stable relationship between national-level population size and CO2 emissions.

This relationship holds for less-developed and devel- oped nations analyzed separately and the effects are greater than proportionate. An analysis of age struc- ture finds that per-capita CO2 emissions increase with age until about age 60, which leads to predictions that CO2 emissions will continue to grow in nations with young populations.29 Household size also is relevant with some evidence suggesting that number of house- holds may be a better predictor of CO2 emissions

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than total population.30,31 Since the number of global households is anticipated to grow more rapidly than total population, the population variable in IPAT analyses may underestimate demographic effects, unless a household growth variable is included as part of affluence.31 Housing density also may be relevant. A study of global cities finds that higher urban density increases air pollutants, though CO2 itself was not studied.32

Some sociological studies of population situate the issue in a policy context, interrogating strate- gies for controlling population growth in GCC and sustainable development policies. One of the policy targets of population-focused research is the Kyoto Protocol, which called for Annex 1 nations to meet specific emission targets below 1990 levels by 2012. Frederick Meyerson33 argues that the negotiation of these targets largely ignored population dynamics in the signatory nations. For instance, from the early 1970s to the late 1990s global CO2 emissions cor- relate more closely with population growth than per capita increases, though there is variability across nations.33 Total emissions increased in growing and developing nations and the gap between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 nations in per capita emissions narrowed.33 A study of deforestation from 1990 to 2005 in a sample of 40 nations also finds population growth to be a key causal variable,34 though another study indicates that urbanization, with its accom- panied increase in demand for processed foods and animal products, and agricultural exports to other nations are key causes over this time period.35

Though limited, these studies indicate that effective GCC mitigation treaties must internalize information about population projections and per- haps supplement these data with projections on growth in number of households. Meyerson notes that policy based on current per capita emissions alone will likely make some targets unreachable and others more easily reachable than necessary.33 From the standpoint of a critique of policy, this argument is not without criticism,36 but it does underscore a legitimate concern that population growth and dynamics may too often be ignored in sociological analyses of GCC drivers. This gap may partially result from opposition to what some have called a ‘social physics tradition’ in sociology: a tendency toward precise causal explanation and objective pro- jections about future outcomes.37 The sub-discipline of demography is arguably the best example of this tradition. Nonetheless, more sociological attention is necessary especially on the impacts of changes in urban and household density, age structure, and migration. Sociological sub-disciplines such as social

networks, organizations, culture, and urbanization might complement this work.

Affluence: The affluence variable in the IPAT model has received much attention, perhaps because of its centrality to political economy theory in sociol- ogy of the environment (often referred to as ‘treadmill of production’). Working from a Marxist framework, Allen Schnaiberg shows how profitability motives in capitalism not only lead to labor but also envi- ronmental exploitation.38,39 Each economic decision in capitalist organizations has implications for the environment, yet they remain secondary in the deci- sion making process due to profitability requirements. Only external forces such as state regulation place environmental checks on these decisions. However, regulation occurs sporadically at best because the state also has an interest in promoting economic growth. The result is called a ‘treadmill of production’ where perpetual increases in production and its environmen- tal fallout are required to maintain capitalist growth and political stability.38,39

To keep the treadmill moving, a complemen- tary ‘treadmill of consumption’ is necessary, which is generated and nurtured through advancements in advertising, improvements in the means of consump- tion, spread of conspicuous consumption across social classes, expansion of the sign value of products, ratio- nalizing consumption (e.g. ‘McDonaldizing’ society40) and so on. Both capitalists and labor, who become dependent upon expanding production through a work-and-spend cycle,41 are caught in these tread- mills, yielding escalating fallout in the form of envi- ronmental extractions and waste.

A sizeable body of sociological work applies this theory to the rise of greenhouse gases. At a general level, John Bellamy Foster applies Marx’s concept of metabolic rift.42 For Marx, a metabolic rift occurs when capitalist agriculture depletes rural soils of nutri- ents by transferring them from rural lands to the city to feed a growing army of urban industrial work- ers. Food is produced in rural lands, but consumed in urban areas where organic wastes are disposed of locally. Attempts to solve the rift through artificial fer- tilizers deplete other resources. For Marx, a solution to this rift emerges under communism with redistribu- tion of industry and population to rural areas. Foster finds this concept relevant to GCC because capital- ism enables and demands the extraction and burn- ing of stored carbon from fossil fuels.43 This pro- cess releases CO2, upsetting the carbon cycle due to increased demand to metabolize emissions. The capac- ity for absorption and sequestration of CO2 in oceans and forests is limited because the former eventually become saturated and the latter depleted through

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resource extraction for profit.43 Although advanced capitalism might generate energy efficient technolo- gies, political economy theorists argue that they are inevitably outstripped by expanded production.43 The treadmill metaphor is apt here with its determi- nate logic—production is perpetually sped up fed by environmental extraction with its accompanying waste. Political economy theory also can be easily adapted to economic globalization, either by build- ing it into world systems theory or simply recog- nizing globally based treadmills of production and consumption.44–46

In contrast, Gert Spaargaren and Arthur Mol propose ecological modernization theory which argues that in advanced modernity, organizations become restructured to take into account environ- mental as well as economic rationality.47 ‘Superindus- trialization’ leads to more environmentally efficient production systems, more environmentally benign products and services, and reorganized societies that center environmentally based criteria into everyday decisions both in the private and public sector.47,48 In applying this theory to GCC, an inverted U-shaped curve is predicted where industrialization increases emissions of greenhouse gases up to a point followed by decreases in advanced industrial societies (reviewed by Fred Buttel49 and Tom Dietz et al.18).

Empirical research can be found to support each theory, depending upon the industrial sector, scale, and socio-historical context. There also is potential for the- oretical integration in ways that draw attention to historical context50 (see also Maurie Cohen’s unified framework for ecological modernization and risk soci- ety theories51). At a macro-level, political economy theory seems to best fit current conditions and evi- dence. Cross-national analyses by Andrew Jorgenson, for example, reveal that intensity and social organi- zation of production across several sectors have sig- nificantly increased methane emissions.52 Increases in beef and veal production, oil and natural gas extrac- tion, biomass energy production and, more generally, the level of economic investment in manufacturing are all positively correlated with methane emissions. These macro-level indicators seem to point to a tread- mill of production phenomenon and are interpreted by Jorgenson to indicate flaws in ecological modern- ization theory.

Similarly, Richard York correlates cross-national CO2 intensity with overall CO2 emissions to find out whether reduced intensity (less CO2 per unit output) leads to lower emissions53—a trend that would be consistent with ecological modernization. Comparing China, the United States, Russia, India, and Japan from 1980 to 2006, York finds no evidence to support

the notion that reductions in carbon intensity lowered overall CO2 emissions. In fact, the opposite is found, which is interpreted to mean that savings in energy efficiency generate new forms of consumption (a phenomenon called ‘Jevons Paradox’). The finding also supports treadmill of production theory and implies that technological efficiencies alone will not ease the GCC crisis.53

On the consumption side, income and wealth along with factors such as consumerism, advertis- ing and marketing, and driving behavior have drawn sociologists’ attention. Consumption itself is not a one-dimensional variable in the normative context of GCC. For instance, ‘luxury’ consumption can be dis- tinguished from ‘necessary’ consumption in assign- ing responsibility for GCC, though it is important to recognize these categories as socially constructed and therefore culturally variable.54 A study of advertising finds that expenditures on advertising, along with dis- posable income, explain about 65% of the variance in levels of consumption and has a greater impact on purchase of luxury goods (operationalized as automo- biles and household appliances) than necessary goods like food and clothing.55

Automobile transportation has been addressed behaviorally by focusing on the difficulty of overcoming a ‘behaviorally based momentum’,56

or structurally by analyzing the challenges of revers- ing the dominance of this socio-technical system for mobility.57,58 For example, a case study of Berlin driving-patterns finds limited options for urban plan- ners to reduce traffic generated CO2 emissions, short of the draconian solution of limiting space for traffic.59

More optimistically, practice oriented researchers draw attention to the use of visioning processes, scenario building, and small-scale socio-technical experiments as methods to facilitate learning about alternative more ecologically sustainable forms of personal mobility.60

A reduction of work hours has been studied as a means for countering consumerism and the so-called work-and-spend cycle.61 A study of 29 Organisa- tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) high-income nations finds that an increase in the number of work hours is correlated with increases in three environmental impact variables: ecological footprint, carbon footprint, and CO2 emissions.

This study recommends policies that reduce national work hours, arguing they will yield better environmen- tal outcomes than policies directed to energy efficient technologies. Similarly, some cross-national studies find that human well-being is increasingly decoupled from environmental stressors of the work-and-spend cycle in high income nations.63,64

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In the ecological modernization literature, studies focus on sub-populations that have altered consumption patterns for environmental purposes. This work notes the importance of integrating altered consumption into a deliberative, coherent lifestyle.65

The availability of alternative socio-technical systems for energy consumption (e.g. the Dutch case of con- sumer choice among electricity providers) can help develop these lifestyle groups of citizen-consumers who employ diverse environmental heuristics in consumption choices.12,66,67 These more localized developments, it is argued, are necessary in an increasingly globalized world where the environmen- tal authority of the state is diminished.68 Sustainable consumption policies must incorporate non-state environmental authority in the form of ecological citizenship, political consumerism, and life-politics of citizen-consumers. This decentralization and diversity in green consumption emphasizes experimentation, deliberation, and avoidance of lock-in in the develop- ment of more sustainable socio-technical systems for consumption.69

Additional research on affluence focuses on potentially mediating effects of state interests and environmentalism at civil society and state levels and globalization in the relationship between afflu- ence and GCC. Political interests that emerge from governing a territory with an abundance of coal, oil, or gas, and associated employment pressures from these labor-intensive extractive industries, make it politically risky to support legislation pro- moting environmentally friendly consumption.70

Also, higher levels of political oppression is cor- related with environmentally damaging behavior such as deforestation.71 Evidence on the importance of environmentalism is mixed. In a cross-national study of OECD nations Dana Fisher and William Freudenburg find that degree of ‘environmental institutionalization’—including presence of national parks, environmental nongovernmental organi- zations, and contributions to intergovernmental environmental organizations—has no significant effects on CO2 emissions

72 (but see a methodological critique of this study73). Using a different sample, however, Jorgenson finds that presence of environ- mental NGOs is beneficial specifically for protection of natural forest areas.34

There is widespread agreement that global- ization must be considered in studies of affluence, both its potential mediating effects and impacts on cross-national accounting of emissions.74 A theory of unequal ecological exchange52 argues that in a globalized world developed nations tend to exter- nalize their consumption-based environmental costs

to less-developed nations, which is important to consider in the interpretation of data that show a decoupling of GDP and CO2 emissions in postin- dustrial societies.26 To what extent is this increased ‘efficiency’ an epiphenomenon of the externalization of ecological damage? For example, less-developed nations with more exports to developed nations expe- rience higher rates of deforestation, while nations with higher GDP experience lower deforestation.34,52,75

The less-developed nations themselves experience limited consumption-based environmental demand75

even though their overall contribution to greenhouse gases increases with manufacturing and agricultural activities for external consumption. A recent study that develops a trade-linked database for CO2 emis- sions from 1990 to 2008 finds that emissions from the production of traded goods and services increased from 20% of global emissions in 1990 to 26% in 2008.76 This study also finds that most developed nations have increased their consumption-based emis- sions faster than their territorial emissions, suggesting that unequal ecological exchange is a significant global factor in CO2 emissions and must be considered in GCC policymaking (see also Ref 2). Environmental tradeoffs also require consideration where overall reduction in CO2 emissions or reduction in carbon intensity may come at a cost of increases in alterna- tive energy footprint (e.g. nuclear waste, ecological damage from dams).24

Unequal ecological exchange aside, it is impor- tant to recognize that core location is still strongly correlated with CO2 emissions.

77 For example, when cross-national data on CO2 emissions and forest biocapacity (for carbon sequestration) are combined into an overall measure of climate footprint, results still fit a traditional version of world systems theory where core nations are ‘global warmers’ and periphery nations are ‘global coolers’.78

To conclude, much of the research on affluence has been theoretically framed in allegedly oppositional traditions of Marxist/political economy/world systems theories versus ecological modernization. A question is whether to move away from the either/or theoriz- ing of these two approaches.72 One direction might be empirical studies that isolate meso-level behav- ior, which is potentially more open to regulation and behavioral change.50 Some economic sectors may be particularly damaging, whereas others may be pro- ceeding through ecological modernization. Further sociological studies that tease out this detail would be informative and useful for designing effective reg- ulatory and other behavioral solutions. However, one must be mindful of Jevons Paradox79 and environmen- tal distancing and tradeoffs, where energy efficiency in

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one sector leads to increases in consumption or trans- fer of ecological fallout in other sectors.

A second area that needs attention is the challenge of operationalizing technology within quantitative macro-comparative research. Due to this challenge, sociologists may ignore technology in favor of affluence in the IPAT framework, or there may be concern that it diverts attention away from social dimensions of GCC toward technological causes and solutions. A movement away from technological solutions also has been documented in U.S. environ- mental movement,80 in contrast with the European environmental movement which has adjusted to ideas of ecological modernization.81 However, removing a false dualism between the technological and social opens up fruitful avenues of research that could bor- row from and contribute to the neighboring field of science, technology & society (STS) where theoretical approaches such as actor-network theory,82,83 social construction of technology,84 and co-production85

or co-evolutionary approaches emphasize a more integrative understanding of the social and technical. Technology becomes a social actor at the same time that it is socially shaped by designers and users. Work on energy and society also has addressed technology, which may be usefully applied to the GCC case.9

Drawing upon these approaches, sociologists might fruitfully focus on specific socio-technical systems and their impacts without theoretical limitations imposed by either political economy or ecological modernization theories or a perceived need to draw macro-level conclusions. I do not suggest this move as a replacement for current macro-level work, but as an important addition.

CONSTRUCTION OF GCC AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM

As an environmental problem, GCC is constructed and interpreted differently by people across social and cultural backgrounds and informational contexts. This section focuses on four areas of sociological work on GCC: public values, attitudes, beliefs, and knowl- edge; media framing; the environmental movement; and the countermovement or backlash against GCC as an environmental problem. Sociology has a long his- tory of addressing the construction of social problems with environmental problems forming a subset of this body of research. Methodologically, there is variabil- ity in approach ranging from an agnostic stance on the truth-value of a problem, sometimes referred to as methodological relativism, to accepting some defini- tive, perhaps scientific, account and explaining why

people believe or do not believe this version. The con- struction of GCC as a problem is of obvious impor- tance for understanding the translation of GCC as an identifiable global environmental problem in the scientific community into a publically accepted prob- lem that potentially motivates behavioral, structural, and policy change. This change does not automati- cally occur through the availability of scientific infor- mation, regardless of how clearly and forcefully it is communicated. Rather, the process of problem devel- opment is mediated through values, attitudes, beliefs, local knowledge, media framing, social movements (or countermovements), and so on.

Values, attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge: This section reviews sociological research on relevant pub- lic values and current attitudes, beliefs and knowl- edge about GCC and GCC policy. Much of this research has focused on the United States. Not all rel- evant work can be reviewed for spatial reasons. A recent review of psychological research,86 and work by Anthony Leiserowitz and colleagues,87,88 Nick Pid- geon and colleagues,89–91 and Sandra Marquart-Pyatt and colleagues92 can be consulted for additional information.

As generally used sociologically, values refer to deeply held views about what is desirable or unde- sirable that transcend specific situations. Values may help guide attitudes, which are views about some- thing specific, and beliefs and are ordered in a salience hierarchy.93,94 One approach to connecting values to GCC beliefs and attitudes is Inglehart’s theory of post- materialist value change,95–97 which, as Dunlap and York describe,98 combines Abraham Maslow’s hierar- chy of needs with Karl Mannheim’s view that basic values are shaped in one’s pre-adult years. The argu- ment is that industrialized, post-World War II gen- erations coming of age in the 1960s shifted from materialist to postmaterialist values.97 Once they per- ceived that basic material needs were met, new val- ues emerged including concern about environmental protection. Although the theory has some empirical support,97 it also has been critiqued methodologically in the measurement of postmaterialist values93 and empirically in whether this transition has occurred. For example, using data from an international ‘Health of the Planet’ survey conducted in 1992, Dunlap and York find that, in opposition to the theory’s predic- tion, as affluence increases expression of environmen- tal concern goes down across nations.98 Residents of poor nations are no less likely than residents of wealthy nations to support environmental protection, even when it brings personal costs.

A different approach places clusters of environ- mental values into a two-dimensional framework (see

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review by Dietz et al.93 and a more general discus- sion of values by Shalom Schwartz and Wolfgang Bilsky94,99). One dimension consists of the opposing poles of self-enhancement versus self-transcendence (or altruism) and the other conservation (or tradition- alism) versus openness to change. Altruism can be further delineated between humanistic and biospheric altruism.100 Placed on two cross-cutting axes, envi- ronmentalism is predicted among people who fall into the two quadrants on either side of altruism—either through conservation or social changes that protect the environment. Admittedly, it is difficult to draw a causal relationship between values and environmen- tal behavior due to mediating factors such as per- sonal capacity and organizational context. However, there is some empirical evidence of the importance of altruistic values on pro-environmental behavior and environmentalism101,102 and support for GCC policy.103

Attitudes and beliefs are easier to study empir- ically because they are directed toward specific behavior as in the perceived need to reduce CO2 emissions. Past studies of U.S. public found GCC ranked low among environmental and other health related problems with a majority not very worried about it.104,105 A review of 40 surveys from 1989 to 2004, however, finds that U.S. public concern is comparable with other nations106 and more recent surveys indicate that concern is more widespread in the United States and European Union.89,107–109

The type of question asked has some effects on the response. A majority report being concerned about GCC when it is presented as a stand-alone question. However, they may not rank it high compared to other social problems, except potentially during occa- sions of high media attention or extreme weather events—especially among those without entrenched beliefs to the contrary.110–112 Expressed concern about GCC is influenced by political party and level of education. In the United States, Democrats are more likely to believe in anthropogenic-caused GCC and express concern about it than Republicans, with educational level increasing this belief and concern for Democrats but having no effect or even reducing concern among Republicans.111,113

In terms of GCC policy, a survey of residents in Michigan and Virginia in the United States finds several predictors of support for mitigation poli- cies: high level of trust in environmental groups, less trust in industry, greater awareness of the conse- quences of GCC, higher income, older age, and racial self-definition as black.114 Of eight proposed poli- cies, a majority of respondents favored all of them with the exception of taxes on gasoline and ‘gas

guzzlers’, which are overwhelmingly opposed. Trust in government also increases policy support.115 Stud- ies of public attitudes about energy policy also indi- cate some support for favorable GCC policies. A 2008 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Energy Survey of public attitudes about local siting of coal, natural gas, nuclear power, and wind power facili- ties indicates that a majority of U.S. residents oppose building the first three within a 25-mile radius of home but accept the latter.116 These attitudes are influenced most heavily by environmental concern followed by cost and risk attitude (i.e. being risk averse or not). A different survey comparing preferences for expansion of coal or nuclear energy finds greater support for the latter.117

Positive attitudes toward GCC mitigation pol- icy are affected by level of awareness, knowledge, and perceived scientific consensus. A review of more than 70 public surveys of U.S. residents over the past 20 years finds an increasing percentage who report having heard of GCC and feeling knowledge- able about it.118 A majority are convinced the problem is real, though the conservative countermovement has recently pushed this percentage down. Also, the pub- lic is now less certain on where scientists stand on global warming than it once was.118 This review finds an increase in the belief that the effects of GCC have already begun, but only a minority con- sider it a threat in their lifetime. A recent study of U.S. public opinion surveys on GCC from 2002 to 2010 develops an aggregate opinion index—Climate Change Threat Index—and analyzes the impact of five potential drivers of opinion on time series changes in the index.119 The most important driver was elite partisan battles operationalized as conflict in congres- sional statements and actions, while the amount of media coverage and economic/unemployment condi- tions had some effect. Extreme weather had no effect on public opinion at the aggregate level, while scien- tific reports had a small effect but only if they appeared in popularized material.119

A question that emerges in this literature is how dichotomous U.S. public attitudes about GCC have become. Work by Leiserowitz and colleagues finds several distinct interpretive communities in terms of risk perception of GCC, ranging from ‘naysay- ers’ to ‘alarmists’.120 The naysayers are more likely white males; pro-individualistic, pro-hierarchical, and anti-egalitarian; distrustful of most institutions; highly religious; reliant on the radio for news; and Repub- lican and politically conservative. According to Leis- erowitz, they make up only about 7% of U.S. adult population, but are politically active, have strong rep- resentation in national government, and strong allies

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in the private sector. However, other research indi- cates that in recent years attitudes about GCC are increasingly polarized across political ideology and party affiliation.115,121–124 Liberals and Democrats report beliefs and concerns more consistent with a scientific consensus on GCC while conservatives and republicans report the opposite. Recent research finds empirical evidence that belief in a scientific consensus mediates the relationship between political position and belief in and support for GCC policy.121,123,125

Survey and focus group work in the UK finds about 75% of the public very or fairly con- cerned about GCC.89 A majority support pragmatic, long-term energy system transitions, about equally on the demand side including household and business energy efficiency measures and supply side including wind farms, biofuels, and electrification of transport. These preferences, according to the study, are deeply rooted in public values about environmental concern and affordability, availability, and safety of energy supply and are not limited to GCC.89

Future research on attitudes and beliefs might fruitfully address the significance of temporal and geo- graphical scale. The public often perceives GCC as a moderate risk that will largely impact geograph- ically and temporally distant people and places.112

There is less concern when impacts appear so dis- tant. However, this distancing impact is not consistent across all environmental problems. For example, peo- ple worry about consequences of nuclear waste thou- sands of years from now because of the unbounded nature of the risk.126,127 Further research might clar- ify exactly how the scale and temporal gap impacts risk perceptions of GCC and whether they change as near-term and local impacts are predicted and expe- rienced. This research also might query the impact of public understanding of GCC risk management on overall risk perception. GCC may appear less risky and generate less concern within an interpretive frame- work where reduction of risk is perceived to require radically changed lifestyles, or alternatively, where scientific/technological communities appear to hold definitive understanding and managerial handle over the problem. Thus, an emphasis on ‘scientific consen- sus’ in public domains may generate different or unex- pected responses. Acceptance of a scientific consensus may well increase belief in and concern about GCC, but also lead the public to yield responsibility for solv- ing it to scientific and engineering communities.

Sociologists also might critically analyze what is generally accepted as public knowledge about GCC. Surveys of public knowledge often pose questions where correct responses match a consensus posi- tion among natural scientists, a practice which is

problematic in two senses. First, there are both diverse sources of knowledge about GCC and diverse inter- pretive communities. That some people answer these questions ‘incorrectly’ does not necessarily indicate a lack of knowledge, nor do correct answers indi- cate knowledge. Incorrect answers may be due instead to disagreement with the scientific community and alternative sources of cognitive authority. Second, ‘basic knowledge’ in these surveys rarely includes social dimensions. Survey questions typically avoid social causes of GCC (affluence, population growth) or inequality in causes and effects. There is value in maintaining older standardized questions for longitu- dinal comparisons, but a broader sense of what consti- tutes public knowledge of GCC needs consideration. Furthermore, sociologists might attend to cultural diversity in knowledge about GCC, with variation already identified across gender, age, occupation, and ethnicity.128

Media framing: The literature on media rep- resentation of GCC is vast, overlapping several disciplines. I limit this section to a few key socio- logical points. One area of research interest is the distortion of knowledge in media accounts due to the drama constructed within them,123,126 journalists’ unfamiliarity with the topic,126 editors’ concerns about space and desire for people-centered stories,126

and overemphasis on scientific uncertainty.129–131

The latter issue has drawn much attention over the past two decades. Earlier work focused on the norm and practice of journalistic balancing, which involved elevating views of a skeptical minority of scientists against more established science.129,132–134 According to Max Boykoff,135 however, this norm declined in significance in the early 2000s. Other work focuses on uncertainty generated by scientists themselves in the media who introduce caveats to research results, tie preliminary or incomplete findings to their poten- tial implications for GCC, and contrast areas of agreement and disagreement.131

Most sociological studies of the media focus on content that is included. William Freudenburg and Margarita Alario136 emphasize what is left out. They argue that distortions of GCC and other environ- mental problems may divert attention from them and legitimate a status quo of business as usual. This methodological twist opens up many opportunities for research on knowledge gaps in media represen- tations. For example, a study of two national Cana- dian newspapers over three time frames (1988/1989, 1998/1999, and 2007/2008) finds evidence for a nar- rowing of complexity within articles, measured by a reduced number of narratives within articles over time, even as the diversity of issues across these articles

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increased.137 On the other hand, another recent study finds evidence for an expansion of themes.138

Whereas past research on media framing focused primarily within nations, especially the United States and UK, some recent research explores cross-national differences and similarities. These efforts are beginning to expand beyond the United States/European Union comparisons135 to other world regions such as Australia/New Zealand139 and the United States/India.140 This trend is welcomed.

Environmental movement and GCC: Envi- ronmental movements are another avenue for development and mobilization of GCC knowl- edge. Over the past decade they have been critiqued in sociological literature for addressing problems with big price tags, complacency and organizational rigidity, over-emphasizing global and transbound- ary environmental problems to the neglect of local ones, and being out of touch with public environ- mental values.141,142 For these reasons, they may appear less relevant and interesting to the public than they once were. However, other researchers find public sympathy for and belief consistency around environmentalists’ objectives.143

GCC poses a vexing challenge for environmental movements because its impacts generally appear dis- connected from daily life and objections to greenhouse gas regulation are based less in challenges over future environmental impacts than its economic cost. Main- stream environmental organizations have partially adapted to these circumstances by emphasizing eco- nomic benefits of greenhouse gas reductions.144 But GCC is challenging in other respects as well. Visual representations of environmental issues are key modes of communication, but GCC provides fewer oppor- tunities because many visually stimulating impacts lie in the future.145 Greenpeace, for example, has transi- tioned its efforts to make ‘real’ the potential and invis- ible risks of GCC: from focusing on immanent and inevitable destruction from a warming planet (destruc- tion metaphorically similar to a nuclear bomb) to emphasis on present-day impacts such as visual images of glacier retreat, ‘dirty’ oil (picture of George Bush and ‘E$$O’), and renewable solutions (picture of a windmill).145

Conservative countermovement: The environ- mental movement also faces a conservative counter- movement. So-called ‘skeptics’ or ‘naysayers’ deny the existence or significance of human-caused GCC, often blaming liberal politicians, environmentalists, and the scientific community for orchestrating or embellish- ing the problem. The countermovement draws upon the authority of a few scientists who are portrayed as bold and independently minded enough to tell

the truth despite personal attack and marginalization by the mainstream scientific community. Sociologi- cal research has focused on funding, strategies, and impacts of this countermovement.

Several studies link scientific research used by the countermovement to support from conserva- tive think tanks with underwriting by fossil fuel industries.122,134,146–150 Strategically, movement mem- bers construct GCC as a non-problem, but have recently changed their focus of attention.147–149 In the 1990s, members claimed that evidentiary basis for warming was weak, any warming that did occur would have net positive effects, and regulatory policies would do more harm than good. More recently, the countermovement has misrepresented and suppressed scientific results and intimidated or threatened to sanc- tion individual scientists.149 These efforts have sig- nificantly impacted media representations118,149 and views of elected members of government, especially in the United States. Aaron McCright and Riley Dunlap interpret the countermovement as anti-reflexive in that it attacks two dimensions of reflexive modernization: the environmental movement and ‘impact science’ as it pertains to resolving environmental problems149

(see also 151). The social organization of ‘denialism’ also may take forms that do not lead to outright denial of GCC. A case study of a small community in Norway argues that residents engaged in ‘impli- catory denial’.152,153 They did not reject information about GCC, but failed to integrate that knowledge into everyday life and action (see also Ref 154). Other research focuses on how skeptics or naysayers use sci- entism to derail the dominant scientific view. GCC skeptics use a language of skepticism as a rhetorical tool for advancing an underlying political philosophy, claiming that remaining gaps in knowledge require suspension of judgment. That is, a rush to consensus undermines the spirit of true scientific inquiry.155 Sim- ilarly, Freudenburg et al.156 introduce the concept of ‘scientific certainty argumentation methods’ (SCAMs) to draw attention to how some actors try to delay or defeat regulatory action. They argue that SCAMs are contradictory to how science actually operates with its probabilistic and ambiguous nature.

Several of these studies focus on the organiza- tional networks and tactics of skeptics (e.g. Refs 147, 148), while others focus on the values and ideolo- gies of this countermovement.120,157 Skeptics tend to support rational neoliberal development, close off or erase nature in favor of anthropomorphism, and sup- port global ecological inequality.157 Also, they are politically active and hold power and influence well beyond their numbers.120 This influence has gener- ated much public support, especially in the United

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States and Australia, though not a majority. One won- ders, however, about the strength of the values that underpin support. This question arises out of recent and preliminary laboratory-based social psychologi- cal research that suggests the beliefs and behaviors of GCC doubters can be manipulated toward more GCC concern and action through self-affirmation exercises.158

The conservative countermovement largely has been a U.S. based phenomenon, with smaller but effective activity in other nations including Australia and the UK. Further sociological research might focus on cross-national differences in the development, or absence, and effectiveness of the movement. At the same time, this critique need not dominate sociolog- ical research on GCC to the point where it becomes a seemingly normative position uncritical of main- stream science and politics. Scientism in the counter- movement easily could be mirrored by scientism in uncritical support of a scientific consensus.159,160 It is important to analyze the values, ideologies, and orga- nizational activity that shape perceptions of GCC risk and avoid uncritical acceptance of somewhat mono- lithic perspectives on risk that have appeared in some scientific consensus reports.89

GCC AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

Sociological research on environmental inequality and justice focuses on unequal sources and distribution of environmental ‘bads’ or ‘goods’ across social class, race, ethnicity, and gender and between developed and developing nations. Though there is some truth to Ulrich Beck’s observation that pollution knows no boundaries,161 empirical findings are definitive: envi- ronmental contaminants and dangerous manufactur- ing and extractive activity are overrepresented in areas occupied by the less powerful. The Union Carbide accident in Bhopal, India sticks out as an obvious example.162 Research on social inequality in sources and consequences of GCC include cross-national stud- ies that fit within a world systems theory framework and studies that disaggregate vulnerable collectives along dimensions of age and gender.

Cross-national dimensions of inequality: Studies of cross-national inequality place GCC within a histor- ical context of colonialism and neo-colonialism.163,164

As with economic exploitation, opportunities for envi- ronmental exploitation gain traction with colonialism and continue with development of a global economy. In the case of Honduras, for example, Bradley Parks and J. Timmons Roberts argue that the impacts of Hurricane Mitch in 1998 serve as a parable of future vulnerabilities to GCC.164 Most of the fertile land in

Honduras belongs to large U.S. multinational corpo- rations, forcing a majority of Hondurans to live along- side still-affordable riverbanks and steep hillsides where they have close access to workplaces. These Hondurans were particularly vulnerable to flooding and landslides from Mitch and continue to be vul- nerable to future severe climatic events. Although bad geography or decision-making might on the surface appear to be the cause, a deeper explanation connects this vulnerability to Honduran colonial history and position within a global economy.164

Inequality across nations in sources of green- house gases is equally significant. Parks and Roberts point out that the richest 20% of the world’s popula- tion is responsible for over 60% of current emissions of greenhouse gases, climbing to 80% if past contribu- tions are included.164 On a per capita basis, countries like Australia, Canada, Luxembourg, and the United States have rates about 4–5 times the global average, whereas many poorer nations with low emissions rates find themselves particularly vulnerable and faced with economic impediments to adaptation.164

Other research focuses on avenues through which GCC poses significant threats to poorer nations. This research ranges from detailed case studies (e.g. Honduras, Mozambique, and Tuvalu164) to studies that link GCC with other threats. In the latter work, GCC is conceptualized as a risk multiplier in public health, flooding, hurricanes, and other environmen- tal impacts. Several studies show impacts on disease vectors and other health risks.165–167 For example, a rise in sea surface temperature may increase cholera epidemics due to the association between cholera vib- rio and plankton growth.165 The increase in severity of extreme weather events from GCC will generate different health risks for people across income lev- els, geographical locations, and other demographic characteristics.167 Regional populations often success- fully adapt to slow climate changes, but extreme weather events and abrupt climate changes pose chal- lenges. Heat waves are particularly detrimental for the elderly (especially women), the mentally ill, children, and others in thermally stressful occupations or with pre-existing illnesses. Heat waves also affect people living in urban areas more than rural areas, especially those without the buffering capacity of air condition- ing and other means to respond.167 Since less devel- oped countries are now rapidly urbanizing, the poor in these nations are increasingly vulnerable.168

Inequality has received limited attention within the policy and NGO communities.169 For example, a study of NGOs within the politically active coali- tion ‘Stop Climate Chaos’ finds that only 40% of these organizations mention the threat of GCC for

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developing nations on their websites and only 27% frame it as a global climate justice issue.170 Other more normative research analyzes the different negotiating positions of nations. These studies range from describ- ing current policy mechanisms like emissions trading as a neo-colonial tool that maintains wealth in one part of the world and pollution in another,163 to stud- ies that identify the vested interests of different policy making factions. Roberts finds two factions among rich nations (E.U. and the ‘foot-draggers’) and at least five distinct bargaining positions among poorer nations in Kyoto negotiations (OPEC, Alliance of Small Island States, India and China, a silent majority not actively involved in negotiations, and ‘emissions entrepreneurs’ which stand to gain from emissions trading).171 This array of bargaining positions make GCC global treaty negotiations more complex than what might unfold around a simple division between rich and poor nations. Despite this complexity, an environmental justice approach to dealing with long term and globalized impacts of GCC is defended, with emphasis on developing an equally burdensome divi- sion of chores across nations.172,173

Further sociological research on cross-national inequality is necessary. As some of the above research clarifies, it needs to move beyond the two world and three world structural models, such as world sys- tems theory and its focus on economic differences, to a more nuanced analysis of how regional and local inequalities intersect with cultural, political, and geo- graphical features and dynamics.168 More detailed case studies are important for understanding the inter- section of cross-national and within nation inequal- ity. Also, a research gap persists on inequality in the design and distribution of mitigation and adaptation technologies. The success of attempts to design and innovate our way out of the problem will depend heav- ily on technological diffusion to developing nations. Rich sociological and anthropological case studies of technological diffusion and adaptation, that address issues like intellectual property rights, will provide a necessary and important guide. Without them, one can anticipate many well-intended, but culturally and socially misguided efforts.

Disaggregation of vulnerable collectives: Gender has been the key focus of literature that disaggregates vulnerable collectives, with some additional attention to age. Starting here with age, over two-thirds of all environmentally related preventable illness (e.g. diar- rheal disease, malaria, respiratory infections) is esti- mated to occur in children.174 These illnesses will likely be exacerbated by GCC. Although metabolic, behavioral, physiological, developmental, and other factors make children particularly vulnerable,174 they

also must be conceptualized as active agents in con- ditions of adversity and potentially more resilient to negative environmental impacts than other age groups.174,175 At the other end of the age spectrum, the elderly are particularly vulnerable to heat waves, with their diminished physiological capacity for thermoreg- ulation, and to abrupt climate changes with their lim- ited mobility.167 Economic standing, of course, heavily modulates impacts across age groups, so children and elderly in poorer, developing countries are particularly at risk.

Studies of gender focus on five areas of concern: gender-specific resource-use patterns that can degrade the environment; gender-specific effects of GCC; gen- dered dimensions of mitigation and adaptation; gen- dered dimensions of decision-making about GCC; and gender-based inequities in access to GCC-related education, training, and technology.176 There is a consensus in the literature that women are more vul- nerable than men176–181 and also perceive themselves as such.182 Their vulnerability is due to higher lev- els of poverty,178–180,183 domestic roles that connect them closely to the environment,183 and lack of access to resources during environmental disasters.176,178,182

For example, a case study finds that Bangladeshi women face major domestic burdens during floods and are less likely to congregate in shelters during dis- asters because of a culture of restrictive interaction.178

One unresolved point of contention is whether women’s increased vulnerability is due more to gen- der or to lower socioeconomic positions and higher rates of poverty. Although much of the literature focuses on gender as a key independent variable, there also is some support for the poverty argument.178,180

Resolution of this issue is important for considering adaptive assistance. Should some assistance be tar- geted specifically to women regardless of economic circumstances183,184 or can it be effectively targeted to poorer, rural areas where women may be the primary beneficiaries?181

GCC policy-making and program planning also exhibits gender inequality. Women’s voices are often invisible in policy negotiations, even when recommendations have more impact on women than men.179 Policymakers have been inattentive to honing and tapping women’s indigenous knowl- edge and skill as energy managers when designing adaptive strategies.179 Market-based mechanisms, in particular, either mostly exclude women because of their economic situation or do not specifically take into consideration their domestic needs. Favored technological solutions, such as carbon capture and storage, are often masculine based focused on command-and-control procedures and industries

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dominated by men.183 Even when women partici- pate or are represented in decision making, benefits may not accrue if underlying structures of gender inequality go unchanged.185

Future sociological research on GCC inequal- ity and justice might move beyond critical analyses of existing structures to empirical cases where design and implementation of new socio-technical systems reach environmental goals, while also empowering vulnerable collectives. This knowledge might be gener- ated through pushing critical case studies further like that of Margaret Alston177 who examines gendered impacts of drought and declining water availability in the Murray-Darling Basin of Australia or Sam Wong185 who analyzes unanticipated consequences of new ‘green friendly’ technologies in Bangladesh. Wong’s case is particularly revealing of the neces- sity for interdisciplinary collaboration among soci- ologists, anthropologists, and natural scientists and engineers in the design of new socio-technical systems that avoid negative consequences. The introduction of World Bank sponsored solar systems in Bangladeshi villages did indeed bring environmentally friendly and improved lighting, but also increased women’s work- day because domestic work could continue into the evening. Men, on the other hand, used the additional evening hours for leisure activities. The improved lighting also supported and enhanced the broader structure of inequality in villages by making lighting a visible symbol of status and wealth, while kindling blaming-the-victim ideologies when some could not pay their bills.185 How might this case have turned out differently if the project actively engaged sociologists and anthropologists in collaboration with solar system designers? These types of studies might be extended through an imagination of alternative socio-technical systems and sociologists might more proactively insert themselves in the design process.

RESPONSES TO GCC: MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION

Actions to mitigate and adapt to GCC are arenas for more extensive sociological analysis. Research in this area remains underdeveloped despite some theoret- ical work50,186 and opportunities to borrow theory from neighboring areas such as response to disas- ter, technological accidents, and socio-technical sys- tems. The existing literature varies across issues of governance and social structural and individual level behavioral change and between the goals of critiquing existing capacity and improving it. This section treats research on mitigation and adaptation separately. The subsection on mitigation focuses on public support

for mitigation policies and capacity for social struc- tural and individual behavioral change. The subsec- tion on adaptation reviews studies of the potential for resilience and adaptation to GCC. Other sociological and cross-disciplinary literatures on disaster research, response to natural hazards, and socio-technical inno- vation are relevant, but left out unless it directly addresses GCC.

Mitigation of greenhouse gases: As reviewed above, there is strong public support for legislation that reduces greenhouse gases. U.S. national surveys find that a majority believe global warming is occur- ring and support policies designed for mitigation, including fuel economy and energy-efficiency stan- dards, mandated use of renewable energy sources, and limitations on emissions by utilities.187 Similar findings are reported for other nations, with pol- icy support contingent upon level of public GCC knowledge.119,188,189

Several social and cultural factors mediate this position. Support is affected by personal attitudes and response capabilities, along with contextual forces related to the social and natural environment.190 A study that combines survey responses with GIS map- ping of respondents in social and physical spaces finds that with the exception of household income attitu- dinal and personal capability measures predict pol- icy support.190 However, the social context variables of environmental citizenship and participating in a social network interested in GCC do not.190 This study finds some effects from the measured physical context of living near a coastline, but the perception of risk is more strongly correlated with policy support than actual physical risk itself. This latter result is inter- preted to indicate a paradox where people increasingly place themselves at higher risk by moving to the coast, yet do not increase their support for greenhouse gas mitigation.190 It would be worthwhile investigating, however, whether physical threats such as coastal liv- ing are truly being ignored or simply peripheralized as a distant future threat, perhaps beyond one’s lifetime. Also, other recent studies (e.g. Ref 115) find ideologi- cal polarization in support for mitigation policies, thus political ideology may now increasingly override other social factors as predictors of policy support.

Expressed support for mitigation policies is one thing; willingness to pay for policy outcomes or change behavior is another. Real costs and their rep- resentation are additional mediating factors between expression of support and a stronger form of support that generates change. The well-rehearsed message of negative impact on the economy and concomi- tant loss of jobs is still the principal argument used against mitigation policies and other environmental

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regulation. At an individual level, cost is a significant inhibitor of behavioral change even when it may have economic benefits in the long run. Similar impacts are observed at the collective level, even though the message itself might not be accurate. One sociological study, for example, has found that nations with more environmental laws, organizations, and activity actu- ally perform better on several measures of economic activity than those with less.191

GCC policies often include price signals such as emissions trading or a carbon tax. This eco- nomic approach to behavioral change has drawn some sociological criticism. Price signals may turn a blind eye to social inequality because people at lower socio-economic rungs often do not hold the short-term means or flexibility to make the economically benefi- cial changes. Price signals also have been critiqued for lack of attention to social changes and feedback mech- anisms because most nations will need to follow a mix of decarbonization instruments.192 A further concern is that price signals are sometimes politically imprac- tical and may promote an economic determinism that distances or de-legitimates other policy frames.192 For example, an emissions trading scheme may limit social movement activity by, ironically, legitimating the very idea of pollution and the corporate act of polluting and transition debate from political and public realms to the corporate/economic realm.193 Attention to eco- nomic considerations through price signals may pro- duce what has been termed ‘weak sustainability’,194

where there is a tradeoff between environmental and socio-economic factors. Also, the transition from macro-level policy to micro-level behavior is not auto- matic; a significant gap remains between economi- cally rational behavior implied in price signals and real world decisions of individual households and businesses.195

A sociological critique of emissions trading and other price signals might be extended by framing them as part of systems or networks—a research gap that is beginning to be addressed.195–197 Once price signals are theorized not solely as economic tools alone but part of social systems or networks that encompass a heterogeneous collection of values, organizations, enforcement mechanisms, and social institutions, they begin to look like agents or forms of social change, potentially open to social shaping and reconstruction. This conceptualization is consistent with risk management policies described in a recent NRC report.198

Policies targeted to voluntary efforts at the indi- vidual, firm, and urban levels also have received sociological attention.199,200 At an individual level, changes in government policy and other macro-level

factors can result in voluntary behavioral change, even when not targeted to that specific behavior.201

Data from a 2000 international social survey indi- cate that more stringent pro-environmental policies, increases in international cooperative efforts to protect the environment, and fewer subsidies for energy and material use are all linked to self-reports of reduced automobile use for environmental reasons.201 Infor- mational feedback is an important mediating vari- able. A study using an experimental design indicates that university students are more likely to reduce the miles they drive when given direct feedback on money saved and pollution prevented.202 Other researchers have focused on what they term a behavioral wedge between the design and adaptation of carbon reduc- tion programs targeted at the household level.195,197

They argue that policy designs have often underesti- mated the impact of household decisions on reduced energy use. Policies to reduce household energy use should follow six basic design principles: prioritizing high-impact actions; providing sufficient and quickly and easily executed financial incentives; marketing the program effectively, especially through informal social networks; providing credible information at decision-making points; keeping programs as simple as possible (e.g. minimal paperwork); and providing quality assurance about products and providers.197

Further research on individual and household energy related change continues at places like the Center for Research on Environmental Decisions at Columbia University and the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research in the UK.

At an organizational level, the literature indi- cates that participation in ‘voluntary’ programs com- monly occurs with sufficient incentives. A case study of U.S. voluntary green lights program indicates that both green reputation and energy savings were market incentives for early joining firms, with green reputa- tion more conducive.203 At later stages, firms were more likely to join out of an institutional motive to improve their relationships with regulatory agencies and relieve regulatory pressure.

At a local government level, a study has looked at factors affecting municipality decisions to adopt the ‘Cities for Climate Protection’ program in the United States, Canada, and Australia.204 This study uses an institutionalist framework in sociology that emphasizes organizational fields (e.g. suppliers, con- sumers, regulatory agencies) in bringing about orga- nizational change and adjusts it by emphasizing the often competing and conflicting dynamics within these fields and their overlapping and nested char- acter across local, national, and global levels. It finds that municipalities’ rate of adoption increased

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at the local field level with the size of city, edu- cational level of city residents, and participation in environmental activities.204 However, the number of local environmental NGOs had no effect. Beyond the local field level, ties to national and interna- tional change agencies influenced municipalities’ rate of adoption. Municipal decision-makers in the GCC arena face competing influences within the local orga- nizational field that may overlap with or be affected by national and international fields, with some evidence indicating that local-level characteristics are more important.205

Other research examines the potential of energy alternatives such as nuclear or wind power as vehicles for mitigating greenhouse gases. Nuclear energy has sometimes been advanced as a largely CO2 free source, but this is true only when lim- ited to reactor operation.206 The inclusion of other stages of the nuclear fuel chain—mining, milling, fuel fabrication, enrichment, reactor construction, decommissioning, and waste management—yields non-negligible amounts of fossil fuel usage. The size of this impact depends heavily on the grade of ura- nium. As higher-grade uranium is first used for its cost advantages, the carbon footprint of nuclear power is predicted to increase over time.206 This study, along with literature in neighboring fields, demonstrates the importance of life-cycle analysis of energy alter- natives. The challenge for sociology, however, is to place life cycle analysis within relevant social and cultural contexts. For example, ‘safe’ disposal of nuclear wastes is affected more by norms and values about risk than the typical variables used in risk assessment.

Sociological research on wind power has focused on siting disputes over the location of wind farms207,208 and the role of the environmental movement in promoting industry development.209

Siting disputes often center on different values and perspectives about the importance and impact of wind farms on landscape, which increasingly serves as the medium through which people interact with nature.208 Since means of subsistence for most people are removed from direct contact with the natu- ral world, interaction with nature and its framing become dominated by the visual in the form of landscape.208 Opponents of wind farms often focus on the disruption of landscape as it currently exists. Proponents point to an already culturally conditioned landscape (e.g. through farming, logging, and other land management practices) and emphasize economic benefits and reduced CO2 emissions that windmills bring. Thus, both parties may use environmental values to defend their positions, but values articulated

through different social constructions of landscape and nature.208

A few studies also have addressed opportuni- ties for and impacts of carbon sequestration on rural communities. A study of forest-based carbon seques- tration efforts in Bolivian rural communities demon- strates a potential for long-term rural sustainable development as long as projects are carefully imple- mented and include participative design.210 Thomas Rudel’s analysis of reforestation and decline in defor- estation in the tropics finds that strategies appealing to people in the West such as building parks, build- ing an economy for extractive reserves/non-timber for- est products, sustainable forestry, and carbon set-aside markets for tropical forests have limited potential for development.211 Instead, Rudel argues for a ‘for- est transition’ strategy where reductions in the rate of deforestation and reforestation occur as improve- ments are made to agricultural lands and job oppor- tunities generated in urban areas. Rudel sees forest transition as similar in timing and substance to the demographic transition, and, as observed with pop- ulation, could occur more rapidly in currently devel- oping nations.211

Adaptation to GCC: The primary focus of soci- ological research has been on impacts and adaptive capacity in developing nations, much of which was reviewed above in the section on inequality. Although the focus, rightfully, has been on adaptive challenges, it also is important to be mindful that develop- ing nations are not passive victims of GCC due to their vast experience dealing with climate variabil- ity. In fact, they may even be more resilient than the developed world.212 Analysts also need to be cognizant of the potentially competing objectives of GCC adaptation and the broader goals of sustainable development.212,213

Although some efforts at building a general the- ory are underway,6 sociological research is still lim- ited. Research on developed nations emphasizes their limited socio-cultural capacity for building resilience to extreme climatic events. An example is Raymond Murphy’s analysis of an ice storm in 1998, which led to failures in tightly coupled infrastructure in northeastern sections of North America.214 Placing this storm in a theoretical context that recognizes the coupling and complexity of socio-cultural and biophysical dynamics, Murphy identifies key points where failures could have led to disastrous conse- quences. They include a decision in Montreal to with- hold key information from the public to avert panic and irrational behavior and a set of conflict points that led to confusion, turf battles, and delivery of resources through untested channels. Murphy uses

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this case to identify reasons people do not prepare for future, potentially disastrous events like GCC: cost, diminished perception of risk, uncertainty, and an assumption that risks are in the distant future214

(see also Ref 215). Tying this analysis to resiliency to disaster, Murphy contrasts societies dependent upon large, tightly coupled socio-technical systems with a small northern New York State religious commu- nity of Amish who were minimally impacted by the storm. Despite the dependence of Amish lifestyle on nature and climate, they have developed smaller scale socio-technical systems and social capital that build resilience to abrupt environmental and socio-technical change. Further sociological studies of similar cases of resiliency could be beneficial for rethinking and redesigning socio-technical and other social systems to improve their adaptive capacity.

Other research focuses on the capacity of gover- nance structures to facilitate adaptation. Overlapping responsibilities across different levels of government is one of the governance challenges. For example, a study of governance structures for managing coastal areas in England identifies a shift to more participatory tech- niques for improving community adaptive capacity to changing coastlines.216 However, overlap of gover- nance structures, along with uncertainties, make par- ticipatory recommendations difficult to translate into actual policy.216 This study and others call for more effective communication between community-based organizations and NGOs, along with better bridges between scientific and local knowledge.217–219 Gover- nance is also challenging due to the limited visibility and immediacy of the problem.220 GCC is particu- larly vexing due to an economically discounted dis- tant future when highly disastrous effects are more likely to be experienced. This challenge leads Anthony Giddens to claim that we currently have no poli- tics of GCC: no developed analysis of the political arrangements necessary to address the problem.220

Nonetheless, some adaptive efforts are emerging, pri- marily in urban areas in both the global North and South.221 These efforts should be closely studied by sociologists.

Adaptation to GCC may require a transition from probabilistic risk assessment to what Lee Clark calls ‘possibilistic’ assessment.222 The latter makes us envision and prepare for plausible, though unlikely, outcomes, shifting our attention away from the cen- ter of a normal distribution to its tails.222 Simi- larly, there is a need for post-normal, precautionary science where Type II errors are of more concern than Type I errors.223 That is, the burden of proof would focus on demonstrating that a risk does not exist rather than on demonstrating that it does.

Reshaping science policy so that knowledge is more directly usable for adaptive decision-making also is a priority.224

Such forays into envisioning a world of effective mitigation or adaptation may require a sociology of the future that imagines potential scenarios. John Urry sees two tasks for sociologists: (1) examine sociologies of the future that are being imagined in various scien- tific models of GCC and determine whether they are remotely plausible; (2) ask what alternatives can be imagined where consequences of rising global temper- atures are substantially reduced.186 Urry engages this task by outlining two scenarios for future automobil- ity. One involves a sort of regional warlordism over control of oil and transportation systems. The other is what he terms a ‘digital panopticon’ of centralized public forms of transportation that are carefully stan- dardized, monitored, and traced. The first scenario gives us a more Hobbesian view of the future, the latter more Orwellian.

Sociologies of a GCC future need not be so pes- simistic or dramatic. Sociology has much to offer in developing scenarios that (re)build socio-technical sys- tems for GCC mitigation or adaptation. The first step is to reject conceptualizations of technology as distinct from the social and as solely a source of the problem. Several strands of contemporary sociological theory move us beyond this impasse by conceptualizing technology as socially constructed and integrated in often complex, heterogeneous, adaptive, and some- times unpredictable socio-technical systems. A second step is to work through the visioning and design of socio-technical systems in a trial-and-error6 or step-wise69 fashion that is participative and attuned to social causes of GCC, inequality of impact, and alternative framings from different stakeholders or publics.

CONCLUSION

This review has navigated through four areas of soci- ological contributions to our understanding of GCC: social causes, social construction as an environmental problem, social inequality in sources of and vulnera- bility to the problem, and mitigation and adaptation. Although research problems remain in each domain, I see the most significant gaps in the latter area. This review is limited to sociological research that specifically addresses GCC. However, sociologies of mitigation and adaptation might fruitfully draw upon neighboring subfields and disciplines. Urban sociol- ogy and geography have much to offer in envisioning more sustainable future cities. Sociology of develop- ment literature can be used for assessing resilience,

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vulnerability, and adaptive capacities in developing nations. Sociology of energy literature is important for understanding existing social relationships and inter- ests across energy markets and how they might be reconstituted for a low-carbon future. Sociology of sci- ence and science, technology and society literatures can be fruitfully tapped for theory and research on developing and building flexibility into socio-technical systems.

In addition to disciplinary research, interdis- ciplinary collaboration and public and stakeholder engagement are necessary for sociologists to make a major impact on GCC knowledge and solutions.225

That collaborative work must recognize the indetermi- nacies of future climatic changes along with the need for social, political, technological, and cultural adjust- ments on the fly.226 Some of this work is underway. Much more is needed.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank two anonymous reviewers and Myanna Lahsen for their extensive and useful suggestions and Andrew Buck for editorial help.

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