Business Organization

The Communication Contract

and Its Ten Ground Clauses Birgitta Dresp-Langley

ABSTRACT. Global society issues are putting increasing

pressure on both small and large organizations to com-

municate ethically at all levels. Achieving this requires

social skills beyond the choice of language or vocabulary

and relies above all on individual social responsibility.

Arguments from social contract philosophy and speech act

theory lead to consider a communication contract that

identifies the necessary individual skills for ethical com-

munication on the basis of a limited number of explicit

clauses. These latter are pragmatically binding for all

partners involved and help to ensure that the ground rules

of cooperative communication are observed within a

group or an organization. Beyond promoting ethical

communication, the communication contract clarifies

how individual discursive behaviour can be constructively

and ethically monitored by group leaders in business

meetings. A case study which shows what may happen

when ground clauses of ethical communication are vio-

lated is presented. The conclusions of the study highlights

why attempting to respect the communication contract is

in the best interest of all partners at all levels within any

group or organization.

KEY WORDS: philosophical foundations of business

ethics, social contract theory, speech act theory, ethical

communication, communication contract

Purpose

Extensive data published by Huang (2004) in this

journal have shown some of the advantages of socially

responsible, cooperative, and symmetrical, in short,

ethical, communication for public relations, mar-

keting, and the economic development of large

organizations. Apart from being politically correct,

ethical communication may, indeed, prove a sound

business strategy, because it may allow securing long-

term benefits that are more valuable to an organiza-

tion compared with short-term profits obtained

through communication strategies which do not take

into account ethical core values.

Social responsibility is claimed to define one of

the general ground conditions of ethical communi-

cation in the corporate world (see the review article

by Reinsch, 1990). The present article is concerned

with the essential role of individual social responsi-

bility in the sense of ‘‘individual moral agency’’ as in

Reid’s essays on the active powers of the human

mind (1843), or ‘‘personal agency’’ as in Bandura’s

social cognitive theory (2001). The special need for

individual respect of a limited number of ground

rules of ethical communication at the interpersonal

level is discussed, with particular emphasis on busi-

ness meetings. The arguments presented defend the

idea that communicating ethically with our nearest

neighbours or partners is the conditio sine qua non

to give an institution, corporation, or a small

group such as a family a chance to ensure that ethical

core values may eventually be adhered to at a larger

scale.

To provide the theoretical concepts for this

exercise, some relevant links between the philo-

sophical foundations of social contract theory,

speech act theory, and the hypothesis of a commu-

nication contract are introduced. Ten pragmatic

ground clauses, derived from Reid’s essays on moral

agency in communication (1843) and Austin’s

felicity conditions for speech acts (1962), are defined

and discussed. It is argued that these clauses define

universal ground rules of ethical communication

between socially responsible individuals. A case

study example is discussed to show what may happen

when ethical ground clauses are violated by indi-

viduals in a business meeting, and how such

behaviour can be ethically monitored by leaders to

limit clause violations and their potentially destruc-

tive consequences.

Journal of Business Ethics (2009) 87:415–436 � Springer 2008 DOI 10.1007/s10551-008-9929-3

From social contract to communication

contract

Without society, we would live in a state of nature

without positive rights and unlimited natural free-

dom, where anyone can do what they like, for

themselves and to anyone else. To avoid such a state

of ‘‘bellum omnium contra omnes’’ (Hobbes, 1651),

we agree as individuals within society to adhere to

an implicit contract, a so-called social contract.

Through this social contract, we gain rights by

giving up unlimited freedom and by accepting to

respect and defend the rights of others. The idea that

all rational beings would inevitably consent to such a

social contract because it is in their own best interest

was first introduced in theoretical essays by philos-

ophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, as

in Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) and Rousseau’s Du

Contrat Social (1762). This philosophical framework

is now referred to as social contract theory or

‘‘contractarianism’’ (e.g. Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy). In more recent years, social contract

theory has enjoyed renewed success (see Ankerl,

1980), in particular in the business ethics literature.

Donaldson and Dunfee’s (1994, 1995, 1999) inte-

grative social contract theory has substantially con-

tributed to this success by providing a fresh

conceptual framework with a new look on con-

tractarian thinking for ethical business management

and modern economics. The term ‘‘integrative’’

places emphasis on the general, all-encompassing

nature of the social contract as a basic commitment

with binding obligations, which imply adhering to

certain ethical core values and respecting certain

rules of due process.

Ethical core values

Social contract theory recognizes a general, collec-

tive need for adhering to certain ethical core values.

Such core values are, in principle, collectively

acknowledged though not always explicitly formu-

lated. They are derived from philosophical, political

and economic norms which can be considered

universal in the sense that they are detached from

specific cults, religions or beliefs. Ethical core values

are seen as beneficial to society in general, and to any

individual who is part of it in particular. Ethical core

values are non-negotiable. They are the foundations

of ethical standards in society, and of an organiza-

tion’s commitment to corporate responsibility. Core

values explicitly listed in modern codes of business

ethics almost invariably include: responsibility,

integrity, honesty, respect, trust, openness, fairness

and transparency. Translating ethical core values into

action requires an explicit system of ethical ground

rules and principles of due process to ensure that

these rules are respected.

Ethical communication as a contract

Communication between individuals is the most

essential medium for translating ethical core values

into action. According to speech act theory (Austin,

1962; Reid, 1843; Searle, 1969), an utterance in itself

is an act, a so-called illocutionary act, with its impli-

cations and with its consequences. Like a hand

bringing down a hammer to close a deal at an auction

or to kill, the spoken word may have an impact with

similar, more or less dramatic, consequences. The

Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid, one of the

founders of the School of Common Sense Philoso-

phy, was the first to explicitly state the nature of

particular speech acts which involve individual moral

responsibility (moral agency). In his essays on the

active powers of the human mind, Reid points out

that a speaker enters into a social contract, which he is

expected to respect, whenever a speech act consists of:

• asking; • testifying; • commanding and • making a promise.

Reid’s philosophy clarifies why the notion of a

communication contract, which will be defended

here, follows directly from that of a social contract.

Society and any group or organization that is part

of it can, indeed, be defined as a community of

communicating individuals who agree to adhere to

an implicit communication contract (cf. Ghiglione,

1997). Through such a communication contract,

individuals gain rights by giving up unlimited free-

dom of expression or speech and by accepting to

respect the needs, freedom and rights of expression

and speech of others. In the global corporate

world, the growing trans-national embedding and

416 Birgitta Dresp-Langley

interdependence of complex issues such as life

quality, environmental challenges, economic devel-

opment and sustainability have increased the need

for individual social responsibility. To address these

issues, contemporary sociological theory (see Ban-

dura, 2001) has taken up Reid’s original concept of

individual moral agency by placing human agency at

the centre of any future capacity of control over the

nature and quality of all forms of human existence

within society, from families to corporations.

Responsible communication between individuals

has undeniably become one of the most urgent of all

current social needs, worldwide.

Austin’s (1962) speech act theory not only offers a

conceptual approach to the problem of interpersonal

communication but also leads the way towards an

explicit definition of ethical core values and princi-

ples. Subsequent speech act theories (e.g. Searle,

1969) have failed to develop this aspect of Austin’s

work. Communication theories in general have not

expressed much concern for the question of ethics,

and the fundamental link that exists between Aus-

tin’s original speech act theory and the philosophy of

ethics needs, indeed, to be re-established. To this

end, the concept of a speech situation and the associ-

ated felicity conditions will be re-discussed here to

clarify that, beyond offering an analysis of unsuc-

cessful speech acts, Austin’s theory addresses ground

conditions of ethical communication.

Austin’s felicity conditions and

the psychological speech situation

Austin’s felicity conditions define critical and inter-

dependent conditions for a speech situation that are

supposed to cause a given speech act to succeed

when the conditions are fulfilled, and to fail when

the conditions are not fulfilled. The felicity condi-

tions are as follows:

(A.1) There must be an accepted conventional

procedure that has a certain conventional

effect and includes the uttering of certain

words by certain persons under certain

circumstances

(A.2) The particular persons and circumstances

must be appropriate for the particular pro-

cedure invoked

(B.1) The accepted conventional procedure

must be followed by all participants, both

correctly and

(B.2) completely

(s. 1) When the accepted conventional proce- dure invoked is designed for persons with

certain thoughts or feelings or for the

inauguration of certain consequential

conduct on the part of any participant,

then any person participating in the pro-

cedure must indeed have those thoughts

or feelings or indeed intend to conduct

herself/himself accordingly and

(s. 2) actually conduct herself/himself accord- ingly as a consequence.

The felicity conditions thus prescribe that, whenever

we enter a speech situation, we implicitly agree to

follow certain conventions regarding what is said by

whom and when at a first, strictly procedural level

(conventionality), to act in a way that ensures that

these conventions are actualized as part of the reality

of the speech situation (actuality), and at a deeper

level, which is particularly important to the question

of ethics, to formulate sincere intentions according

to expectations, and to act subsequently in a manner

that respects the intentions expressed (intentionality).

Austin pointed out the difference in nature between

the felicity conditions indicated by roman letters A

and B and the felicity conditions indicated by the

Greek letter s: non-fulfilment of the procedural conventionality conditions stated in A and B would

reflect what he called misexecution of the felicity

conditions, whereas non-fulfilment of the inten-

tionality conditions in s would reflect abuse of the felicity conditions.

From misexecution to abuse: the thin line between

ethical and unethical speech acts

Misexecution of the felicity conditions is frequent in

the real world of today. A typical case of misexe-

cution would be incorrectly assuming shared pro-

cedural conventions with regard to who is supposed

to say what and when (conditions stated in A) when,

in reality, all participants do not share these con-

ventions. Deliberately (mischievously, provoca-

tively, etc.) not acting according to actually shared

The Communication Contract and Its Ten Ground Clauses 417

procedural conventions (conditions stated in B) has

also become frequent in contemporary society,

where speaking up when one is not supposed to may

be a deliberate strategic means to a specific end.

Austin’s notion of abuse originally referred to

insincerely expressed intentions, or to a sincere

intention that is not followed by the professed act.

There can be no doubt that a promise uttered

without the intention of keeping it, or an intention

deliberately followed by non-action or an action that

is incompatible with the intention expressed, is a

case of abuse. On the other hand, a sincere intention

that is not followed by the professed act may be the

consequence of factors that are beyond the control

of the speaker. In this case, what is potentially abuse

becomes a case of incidental non-performance due

to facts that could not be anticipated. Conversely, an

apparent misexecution of an accepted convention at

the procedural level might reflect motivated strategic

abuse. In such a case, the abuser would be aware of

the accepted convention, knows what he/she is

supposed to say or not and when, but deliberately

violates the convention to an end only he/she may

be aware of. TV footages of G. W. Bush’s address to

the public on Independence Day 2008 feature sev-

eral such examples, where members of the public

deliberately interrupt the speaker, thereby violating

the convention to keep quiet while being addressed.

In the light of these considerations, it becomes clear

why speech situations, especially in the modern

world, refer to a complex psychological space. This

psychological space exists only through the motiva-

tions and intentions which underlie the utterances

made. Thus, when I speak to you, I am performing a

speech act with underlying psychological motiva-

tions and intentions. These motivations or intentions

are not necessarily made clear through the speech

act. Whether or not felicity conditions are fulfilled,

accidentally misexecuted, or deliberately abused in a

given speech situation requires more than an analysis

of the logical structure of speech acts.

In his book on existentialism, the French philos-

opher Sartre (1945) proposed the psychological

concept of bonne foi (good faith) as opposed to that of

mauvaise foi (bad faith) to provide a universal defi-

nition for fundamentally ethical human acts, partic-

ularly speech acts, as opposed to fundamentally

unethical ones: whenever we pretend in speech or

direct action to be what we are not, to think or feel

what we do not, we are acting in bad faith and

therefore unethically. Conversely, when our speech

or action is true to what we genuinely are, think,

and feel, we are acting in good faith and therefore

ethically.

Misexecution of a felicity condition in speech acts

may be accidental, in which case it does not involve

bad faith. Accidental misexecution may cause a

speech act to fail its purpose, but is not unethical.

Misexecution of a felicity condition may be delib-

erate, such as deliberately provoking a speaker in a

manner that violates an accepted convention.

Deliberate misexecution is not necessarily unethical,

especially when caused in good faith. When, for

example, a hearer interrupts a speaker against an

accepted convention because he/she perceives the

speaker’s utterances as unacceptable, the hearer

misexecutes the accepted convention, but does so in

good faith. While such behaviour has a disruptive

effect, it is not by definition unethical. On the other

hand, any deliberate misexecution that involves bad

faith, such as for example interrupting a speaker

against the accepted convention with the sole intent

to cause trouble is, by definition, unethical.

Abuse of a felicity condition in Austin’s sense

involves bad faith by definition. It is therefore by

definition unethical. In the light of these consider-

ations, we propose the following general definition

of an unethical speech act: ‘‘any utterance motivated

by psychological forces that involve bad faith and

lead to misexecution and/or abuse of at least one of

Austin’s felicity conditions’’.

The psychological speech situation

How can we know for sure whether people we

interact with are communicating in good or bad

faith? Grice (1975, 1981), among others, described

devious speech scenarios where a hearer may act in

bad faith, by taking for granted that a speaker re-

spects the felicity conditions, to gain the warrant to

interpret the speaker’s utterances accordingly. A

speaker may act in bad faith by strategically abusing

the felicity conditions to all kinds of ends. This leads

to contaminated speech situations where commu-

nication may appear ethical at the surface, but is in

reality devious, the felicity conditions being delib-

erately abused at all levels. This explains why trying

418 Birgitta Dresp-Langley

to identify the intentions that motivate utterances or

speech acts by analysing the logical structure of

speech sequences is, as Haberland and Mey (2002)

put it, looking for traces in a petrified product. Any

simple sequence of seemingly straightforward speech

acts may reflect a psychologically complex speech

situation, the true nature of which may remain un-

known to the outsider listening in. This can be

shown through the following scenario, originally

given in Clark and Brennan (1991) as an example to

explain that common semantic ground needs to be

built and updated in a conversation:

Alan: now, – um, do you and your husband

have a – car?

Barbara: – have a car?

Alan: yeah

Barbara: no

Clark and Brennan (1991) argued that it is obvi-

ous from this sequence of utterances that Alan did

not effectively manage to ask Barbara whether she

and her husband have a car because Barbara indicates

by her question ‘‘– have a car?’’ that she has not

understood Alan. The authors consider this sequence

of utterances as an example for ineffective commu-

nication (Clark and Schaefer, 1987; Sacks et al.,

1974; Schegloff, 1982; Schegloff et al., 1977);

however, without any insight into the psychological

context in which the utterances were produced,

such as the kind of relationship between Alan and

Barbara and what may have motivated their

respective utterances, one cannot explain why Alan’s

speech act was unsuccessful.

Now, let us consider the same sequence of

utterances in the light of the following (fictive)

psychological speech situation. Alan and Barbara are

colleagues who work on the same floor. Barbara

loves her garden and flowers and spends a lot of time

taking care of them. Alan is aware of Barbara’s

passion for gardening. His car broke down this

morning and he wants to find someone to give him a

lift into town. When leaving the office, he bumps

into Barbara who is having a cup of coffee and is

reading a gardening magazine in the lobby. Alan

starts a brief conversation with her about how her

garden is doing and whether she has planted any new

flowers yet. After a few exchanges on the gardening

matter, he suddenly utters:

Alan: now, – um, do you and your husband

have a – car?

Barbara: – have a car?

Alan: yeah

Barbara: no

This psychological speech situation sheds, indeed,

a completely new light on the utterances made and,

more importantly, on the motivations behind them.

It is now obvious that Alan’s primary motivation to

talk to Barbara was to find someone with a car to give

him a lift. To gain Barbara’s attention, Alan used his

knowledge of Barbara’s passion for gardening and

involved her in a conversation about flowers. Then,

without any reason that could possibly have been

clear to Barbara in the context given, he abruptly asks

her whether she and her husband have a car. Barbara

delays responding to Alan by asking him to confirm

his question: ‘‘– have a car?’’ In the fictive context

considered, it is most likely that she does so not be-

cause she has not understood Alan, but because she is

surprised and may be even quite shocked about the

nature of Alan’s question, or the abrupt manner in

which he brought it up. In fact, what Barbara does

not understand is not Alan’s question or the meaning

of his utterance. What she does not understand is the

motivation behind the question. In fact, Alan has not

communicated as ethically as he could have. In the

context given, his incongruous utterance about

Barbara and her husband having a car is unrelated to

the initial topic of their conversation. Also, it fails to

make clear to Barbara why the utterance should be

relevant at all, to either her or himself. Moreover,

Alan has not been entirely sincere with Barbara by

pretending to be interested in her garden and her

flowers while the first thing on his mind was, in

reality, to find out whether she and her husband have

car and could maybe give him a lift into town. Alan

has, indeed, spoken in bad faith. He has deliberately

and in bad faith misexecuted Austin’s first felicity

condition relative to actuality and abused the first

felicity condition relative to intentionality. Expressed

in terms of the model that will now be introduced, he

has violated three ground clauses of his implicit

communication contract with Barbara: the continu-

ity clause, the relevance clause and, to some extent,

the sincerity clause.

The communication contract model with ten

binding ground clauses as stipulated is schematized in

The Communication Contract and Its Ten Ground Clauses 419

Figure 1. These clauses encompass and extend

Austin’s original felicity conditions by adapting them

to the communication needs of modern society

with, however, the major aim of exercising control

over any severe form of misexecution and/or abuse

of any of the original felicity conditions. It is argued

that ensuring that respecting these ten simple ground

conditions ensures ethical communication at the

interpersonal level, in particular in business meet-

ings, where a moderator may be designed to monitor

the speech situation.

The ten ground clauses

of the communication contract

The ten ground clauses of the communication

contract proposed here to ensure ethical communi-

cation are as follows:

Sincerity clause

The sincerity clause stipulates that all partners are

to honestly communicate according to the best of

their knowledge, without deliberately omitting,

hiding or falsifying knowledge or intentions that

are relevant to the issue of their interaction. It is

the conditio sine qua non for all of Austin’s felicity

conditions relating to intentionality. In his book

‘L’homme communiquant’ (1997), the French phi-

losopher, psychologist and linguist Ghiglione

described the psychological problem space

addressed by the sincerity clause in terms of a

complex domain between inadequate facts and

straightforward lies. Violations of the sincerity

clause can engender a heavy cost in communica-

tion. They may lead to a total breakdown of

constructive information exchange and thereby

severely jeopardize the outcome of any relationship

between people in the shorter or longer term.

Identifying and preventing violations of the sin-

cerity clause in the discursive behaviour of com-

municating partners is generally difficult, often

impossible. Human beings omit communicating, or

lie about, facts or intentions for many different

reasons and in many different, often subtle, devious

ways. They may sometimes not even be conscious

of doing so. The goal here is neither to address the

reasons why people may be insincere nor to make

judgemental statements about liars or suggest

measures that would allow sorting out who tells

the truth and who does not. The goal of an ex-

plicit sincerity clause is to make individuals aware

that it is in their own best interest to be sincere

and honest when they communicate. As our fictive

example above shows, by not being sincere with

Barbara about his true motivations, Alan created an

immediate grounding problem (Clark and Brennan,

1991) in their conversation. Furthermore, Barbara’s

delaying her reply to Alan may even indicate that

she has become mistrustful of his intentions, in

which case Alan’s lack of sincerity has achieved the

opposite of what he initially wanted: win Barbara’s

trust and cooperation to get a lift into town. Only

by communicating sincerely can partners ever hope

to create and reinforce the climate of mutual trust

that is necessary for building lasting and truly

effective relationships, in organizational and in

private life.

THE COMMUNICATION CONTRACT

Partners and expectations at outset

Ethical Ground Clauses

sincerity relevance continuity clarity prudence tolerance openness prompt resolution balanced speech times optimal timing

Violation of clauses Respect of clauses

Decision making quality Satisfaction of partners at outcome

Figure 1. The communication contract model is based

on ten ground clauses that are pragmatically binding for

all communicating beings. They encompass and extend

Austin’s (1962) felicity conditions, as explained in the

text. It is stipulated that non-respect or deliberate viola-

tion of any of these clauses incurs an intangible cost.

The weight of the latter can be assessed indirectly on

the basis of the level of satisfaction of communicating

partners at the end of a conversation or a meeting (see

the case study presented here).

420 Birgitta Dresp-Langley

Relevance clause

The relevance clause stipulates that utterances have

to be relevant to the goals, topics and objectives of a

conversation or a meeting. It pragmatically ensures

to a large extent Austin’s felicity conditions relative

to conventionality and actuality, which is especially

important in business meetings. It helps a group or a

team focus on goals and contributes to ensure that

relevant issues will not get drowned in, or obscured

by, irrelevant individual utterances. This involves

respecting a given agenda. Meetings where some

partners make others waste their time are costly and

therefore counterproductive. In conversation or

discourse in general, partners have to make sure that

others understand why what they say is relevant and

to whom, as illustrated by the Alan–Barbara example

above. In text designed to be informative, the author

has to ensure that what he/she writes is relevant to

his/her potential audience, the topic addressed, and

the context in which the text is to be published.

Continuity clause

The continuity clause stipulates that communication

is to ensure continuity in contents. This clause is

particularly important in interpersonal communica-

tion and to a lesser extent in written text, where the

reader has the possibility to stop, reflect, and go back

to previous lines to get a coherent representation of

contents. The continuity clause is to ensure that

communicating partners ‘‘get connected’’ and de-

velop a cohesive discourse that effectively takes into

account the other partners’ propositions and argu-

ments. Like the relevance clause, it defines one of

the pragmatic key modalities to ensure felicity con-

ditions relative to conventionality and actuality.

Respecting the continuity clause is avoiding dis-

cursive behaviours where individuals express what-

ever comes to their minds at a given moment

without taking into account what was said by the

partner who spoke before them. Monitoring the

continuity clause regulates self-centred discursive

behaviours and thereby facilitates genuine team

communication. It enables a group to evolve to-

wards cohesive group thinking and effective infor-

mation sharing. Disconnected egotistical discourse,

as illustrated by the non-communication scenarios in

Harold Pinter’s theatre plays, is detrimental to

interpersonal information sharing and, at a deeper

psychological level, prevents people from sharing

certain thoughts and feelings to better understand

each other’s viewpoints.

Clarity clause

The clarity clause states that communicating beings

or partners should be as precise and explicit as pos-

sible. It adds a new dimension to Austin’s felicity

conditions insofar as lack of clarity in interpersonal

communication can make speech acts fail even

though all the felicity conditions relating to con-

ventionality, actuality and intentionality may be

fulfilled. Jargon deserves particular attention here,

especially in business or team communication,

where different jargons are used by professionals

with different expertise, knowledge, age, or social

status. When using jargon in a communication

process, one must be aware that some partners may

not be familiar with it. Jargon abuse, like abuse of

innuendo or lack of general clarity in statements,

needs to be monitored constructively in goal-di-

rected communication. Younger or less experienced

partners should be encouraged to ask questions and

to interrupt whenever they do not understand what

is being said. Putting communication partners in a

position where they have to read between the lines

or spend additional time searching for information

not provided in due course is detrimental to meet-

ings with tight agendas and deadlines that have to be

met. The clarity clause, in short, is to prevent mis-

understandings and their consequences by promot-

ing attention to the information needs of all

communication partners involved.

Prudence clause

As explained above, words, like actions, have their

consequences. Thinking about the possible conse-

quences of what one does, writes, or says is not only

an important key to ethical speech acts, but also a

key to their success or effectiveness (Baron, 1990).

The prudence clause extends the felicity conditions

by encouraging communication partners to deal

with information sincerely but, at the same time,

The Communication Contract and Its Ten Ground Clauses 421

carefully. Careless handling of information can lead

to the rapid propagation of false data such as hearsay,

rumours, or incomplete facts in human communi-

cation networks and thereby seriously compromise

relationships and projects. Whenever dubious or

false information circulates in groups or teams, vio-

lation of the sincerity clause, where certain indi-

viduals deliberately try to manipulate members of

the group or the whole group as such, may be sus-

pected. The psychological argument for a prudence

clause relates to the fact that sincere communication

partners share an interest in relating only information

from reliable sources that can be verified by all

partners at any time if necessary.

Tolerance clause

The tolerance clause stipulates that communicating

beings must not dismiss any sincere and potentially

constructive comment of a partner, even if it may

appear non-conventional or naı̈ve. This clause

encourages handling the felicity conditions relating

to conventionality in an open, tolerant and flexible

manner, which is important in modern multicultural

societies. Unconventional suggestions often help

clarify complex issues. Younger, less experienced

partners and individuals from different domains of

expertise cannot necessarily deal with complexity

with the same ease and insight as some of their more

experienced partners. In groups, naı̈ve questions,

suggestions or comments should be taken into ac-

count within the limits of the felicity conditions

relating to conventionality. Non-conventional

questions also should, if possible, be discussed in a

constructive manner. Monitoring conventionality

conditions with tolerance and flexibility can open

doors to new ideas or ways of conceiving or doing

and can produce unsuspected breakthroughs. Such

potential must not be wasted. Unfortunately, this is

only too often the case. Senior team partners with an

assumedly wider experience often have a tendency

to dismiss or ignore critical statements from juniors

or partners with different or less expertise. In the

senior versus junior scenario, such intolerance may be

due to the fact that, implicitly and sometimes

unwillingly, the junior’s statement or comment is

deemed ‘‘inadequate’’. In the case of the expert versus

non-expert scenario, it may be due to the fact that an

expert may, consciously or unconsciously, consider

that he/she has nothing to learn from someone

outside his/her field of expertise. This kind of psy-

chological problem reaches well beyond a problem

of communication grounding. Pragmatic clauses are

needed to regulate the use of discursive behaviour as

a means of dominating other partners. The tolerance

clause directly aims at situations where relevant re-

marks of team members with inferior hierarchical

position or less experience are overruled by

authority statements from team members with

higher status. Interrupting partners or speaking up

for them without having been asked to do so are

examples of violations of the tolerance clause. Such

behaviour, which can readily be quantified in dis-

course analysis, is considered an indicator of so-

called ‘‘conversational dominance’’ (e.g. Itakura,

2001) in every day and institutional conversation.

Openness clause

The openness clause complements the tolerance

clause by stipulating that all communicating beings

should be as open as possible to suggestions or

arguments of other partners. The function of this

clause is to create a communication climate where

partners are able, when differences in opinion exist,

to accept these differences gracefully. A conversation

or meeting must not become a discursive battlefield

where arguments are used like weapons and where

persuasion strategies replace open and constructive

exchange. Such situations have a potentially

destructive effect on both personal and professional

relationships between individuals and may compro-

mise collective goals and decision making.

Prompt resolution clause

The status of conflict in modern communication has

become an important issue, and extends far beyond

the initial preoccupations of Austin’s felicity condi-

tions. In modern business communication, however,

it is critical to deal with interpersonal conflict ethi-

cally and promptly. The function of the resolution

clause here is to increase the awareness of individual

partners and team leaders that it is in their best

interest to deal with conflicts and misunderstandings

422 Birgitta Dresp-Langley

promptly, openly, self-critically, and constructively

(see other clauses here above). The prompt resolu-

tion clause may be difficult to monitor given that

negative feelings or resentments caused by specific

utterances may be kept tacit and interpersonal con-

flicts may therefore not be immediately detectable.

The monitoring of such speech situations by a psy-

chologically skilled consultant seems an appropriate

way of keeping them under control.

Balanced speech time clause

Fulfilling the felicity conditions in the domain of

interpersonal communication relies on a certain

balance of the times taken by different partners in a

conversation or a business meeting to ‘‘have their

say’’. Situations where some protagonists take sig-

nificantly more speech time than others, or where a

particular partner notoriously monopolizes speech

time, can be costly, especially when such behaviour

leads to important issues being neglected and/or

affects sound decision making. Like violations of the

tolerance clause, violations of the balanced speech

time clause are quantifiable indicators of conversa-

tional dominance patterns (Edelsky, 1981; Itakura,

2001), where partners who do not get their ‘‘fair

share’’ of verbal expression are being dominated by

others. Such scenarios can engender a heavy cost, in

organizations and in families. Recent psychological

insight into the causal relation between conversa-

tional dominance, power discrepancies (victimiza-

tion) and domestic violence (Babcock et al., 1993)

highlights the potential importance of this particular

clause.

Optimal timing clause

Finally, nowadays more than ever, time is precious.

Wasting time through bad planning is unsound, not

only in business but in general. Wasting time

deliberately by letting ‘‘things ride’’ is abusive and,

therefore, unethical. Thus, a communication con-

tract adapted to modern society must include a

clause which stipulates that there is an optimal fre-

quency with which communicating beings have to

interact to keep their relationships and projects

going. An optimal timing clause is therefore

proposed to encourage communicating partners to

combine their efforts in working out a schedule for

meetings which ensures that goals are pursued in due

course and time is not wasted.

Case study: speech act analysis

of a business meeting with

conversational dominance

In institutional interpersonal communication, as-

signed roles and tasks often produce asymmetries in

participatory weights and the distribution of verbal

interactions (Ten Have, 1991). Such asymmetries are

characteristic of conversational dominance (e.g.

Itakura, 2001) and can be identified on the basis of

quantitative data patterns relative to questioning,

topic control, interruptions, and amount of speech.

Communication scenarios where conversational

dominance patterns are present may lead to victim-

ization and domestic violence (Babcock et al.,

1993). As explained above, the presence of con-

versational dominance patterns in interpersonal

communication implies that ground clauses of the

communication contract are being violated.

To illustrate how clause violations and their

possible consequences may affect a business meeting,

the pragmatic analysis of the speech act sequences

from a meeting with traces of conversational dom-

inance in a ‘senior-versus-junior’ scenario is pre-

sented. We randomly selected one of the meetings of

a small team of senior partners and junior members

in a large organization, the identity of which will

remain anonymous. The meeting was called at very

short notice by the team leader. The last team

meeting had taken place 3 months earlier although

the team was supposed to meet at least once a month

to keep track of ongoing projects.

Context and background information

The projects of some of the juniors were not pro-

gressing well. At least seven of the thirteen team

partners were aware of the problem and had

expressed their concern informally at various mo-

ments (coffee breaks, corridor talk, etc.). The team

leader communicated the time and place of the

The Communication Contract and Its Ten Ground Clauses 423

meeting to all team members by e-mail the evening

before. The following agenda was given:

– departmental elections;

– budgets;

– summary of previous directors’ committee and

– junior research projects.

Four senior team members were unable to attend the

meeting and sent e-mails to the team leader, stating

‘‘too short notice’’ or ‘‘have other important busi-

ness to see to’’ as reasons for their absence. The

meeting was attended by five junior members (three

female, two male) and four seniors (three male, one

female), among whom were the former department

director (male) and the team leader himself (male).

Before the meeting, the team was asked whether any

of them had any objection against the meeting being

recorded by means of a digital device and their

utterances being analysed for study purposes. None

of the protagonists objected and all agreed to fill out

questionnaires anonymously, before and after the

meeting. None of them was aware of the goal or the

theory underlying the study.

Data collection and coding scheme

A pre-meeting questionnaire was used to collect

information relative to the expectations of partners

and their previous experience with a given partner

or team. Two post-meeting questionnaires were

given to establish whether partners were immedi-

ately satisfied with the way things went in the

meeting, and how effectively the different topics and

contents were recalled 3 days later. Information

regarding the general context, objective, and agenda

of the meeting was taken into account. The hier-

archical status and gender of partners, whose identity

remains anonymous, were determined. The re-

corded material was analysed using the following

coding scheme, which permits identification of

clause violations on the basis of quantitative and

qualitative criteria.

– In order to detect violations of the balanced speech

time clause, speech sequences are timed and

numbered; quantitative indicators, such as the

speech times of the different partners as a func-

tion of their status and gender, are computed.

– Whenever the content of an utterance bears

no relationship with the content of the pre-

ceding one, violation of the continuity clause is

noted.

– When an utterance suggests that a partner does

not understand why what has been said in a pre-

vious utterance should matter, violation of the

relevance clause is noted.

– Respect of the sincerity clause is questioned

whenever an utterance, or the context in which

it is produced, indicates that a partner is suspi-

cious of what has been said by another. An

example of a sequence of utterances indicating

violations of the continuity, relevance and sincerity

clauses is given and explained in the fictive

Alan–Barbara scenario above.

– Violation of the tolerance clause is noted when-

ever team partners interrupt others or speak for

them without having been invited to do so, as

in classic conversational dominance patterns (e.g.

Itakura, 2001).

– When an utterance is obviously or repeatedly

misunderstood in a sequence, violation of the

clarity clause is noted, as in the following example:

Peter: a different modus operandi was adopted this

time

Paul: a modus – what?

Peter: well, there was pressure from higher up

to do things differently this time

Paul: – pressure from higher up?

– Whenever an utterance contains apparent facts

or figures for which there is no clear evidence,

or is obviously based on hearsay, violation of the

prudence clause is noted, as for example in:

Peter: Mary says they do not feed these cats

properly

Paul: well, the neighbour told me there’s always

food in a bowl in the garden

– Violation of the openness clause is noted when an

argument is dismissed without justification or

when a partner maintains his/her argument with-

out considering a counter-argument presented by

the partner who has spoken before, as in:

Peter: I think they should take these cats away

from them

424 Birgitta Dresp-Langley

Paul: but they cannot do that just because Mary

says these things, can they?

Peter: I think they should take them away

– Whenever an argument leads to a dead end, vio-

lation of the prompt resolution clause is noted, as

for example at the end of the following se-

quence of utterances:

Paul: you must not say things like that, these

people are my friends

Peter: better be more careful choosing your

friends then, right?

Paul: don’t you speak to me like that!

Peter: have to go now – some of us are work-

ing, you know?

– Violation of the optimal timing clause may be

inferred on the basis of answers given in the pre-

and post-meeting questionnaires, as the discussion

of the results of this study will show.

Results and discussion

The pre-meeting questionnaire featured four ques-

tions the different team members had to answer: (1)

‘‘Please state in a few words what you expect from

this meeting’’, (2) ‘‘Do you think your expectations

will be satisfied by the meeting?’’, with five possible

answers to choose from, (3) ‘‘How would you

qualify your experiences from previous meetings

with the team and their outcomes?’’, with four

possible answers to choose from and (4) ‘‘How

would you assess your status within the team?’’, with

five possible answers to choose from. The data from

the analysis of the pre-meeting questionnaires are

summarized in Table I. From these data, we can

conclude that three of the five junior team members

expected exchanges beyond retrieving general

information relative to topics listed in the meeting

agenda. Six of the nine team members, including all

the five juniors, expected the meeting to be con-

cerned with team projects. We further note that

none of the team partners thought that his/her

expectations would be satisfied by the meeting

without difficulty. The five juniors considered that

their expectations would be satisfied either with

difficulty (four replies) or not at all (one reply). Eight

of the nine team members reported having had

reasonably good experiences from the previous team

meetings, with more or less positive outcomes. One

junior team member reported having had poor

experiences from previous meetings, with poor

outcomes or none. None of the participants identi-

fied themselves as the team leader despite the fact

that the team has an officially declared leader and a

clear hierarchical structure. One senior participant

stated that he considered all people in the team to

have equal status. Two of the four seniors identified

themselves with an important status in the team and

the five juniors considered their status in the team

‘not very high’.

Analysis of the recorded discourse material

allowed a reconstruction of the chronological

sequences of speech production (see Table II),

revealing that 54 min of the 64 min of overall

meeting duration were taken by two of the nine

team partners: the team leader (A) and the former

department director (B). The other two senior

partners (C and D) each spoke a few minutes at the

meeting. Of the junior partners, only the two male

juniors spoke. This result indicates a considerable

imbalance in speech time characteristic of a con-

versational dominance pattern, where the two male

seniors with the highest status in the team ‘take the

floor’ (cf. Edelsky, 1981). This is achieved here

through massive violation of the balanced speech

time clause. Further sequence-by-sequence analysis

of the verbal exchanges revealed other clause viola-

tions. Table II may be consulted for localising these

clause violations, which are described here in the

order in which they occurred in the meeting.

Violations of the tolerance clause and the open-

ness clause by B were detected in exchanges with

the female senior team partner C in the first 8 min

of the meeting. These clause violations occurred in

a context where A requested to be informed about

the status of a specific project submission. Senior

partner C, being the coordinator of that project,

should have been the one expected to reply to A’s

question:

A: …will this project be re-submitted? B (replying for C): yes, yes, we will re-submit

C: – well, we

B (interrupting C): we’ll consider the reports,

revise, and then re-submit

The Communication Contract and Its Ten Ground Clauses 425

C: these reports said nothing helpful about the

quality of our products, they… B (dismissive): well, we will consider these re-

ports and re-submit

C: they were quite clear in saying that they

wanted us to include X in this project and that

B (interrupting C): I don’t remember – we’ll

have to see and then make a decision…

Three further violations of the tolerance clause by B

were detected in exchanges with A, the team leader.

One of these consisted of a double clause violation

where B interrupted A, violating both the tolerance

and the clarity clauses:

A: …several new people joined the department recently – there is

B (interrupting A): X got Y in this year

A: beg your pardon?

B: Y is with us this year, X got him in

A: ah – yes…

Another tolerance clause violation by B towards A

was detected subsequently in:

D (asking A): is it really urgent to put this into

practice?

B (replying for A): it is not urgent, but the new

department director wants to put it into practice

as quickly as possible and… A: well, some changes are bound to be immi-

nent, then – now, …

Then, after about 15 min of exchanges between the

four seniors without clause violations, B violates the

continuity and the relevance clauses by interrupting

A. This double clause violation leads to a sequence

of violations of the clarity clause and the openness

clause (see also Table II):

A: …I guess we have dealt with the internships – there also

B (interrupting A): it occurs to me that mem-

bers of … have the same status as members of … – which means X will also be able to take over projects in the new department

D: so do members of …, no? B (dismissive): no – that’s not the same thing

A: what are we talking about here? –

T A B L E I

R e su lt s fr o m

th e p re -m

e e ti n g q u e st io n n ai re

w it h ab b re v ia te d v e rs io n s o f q u e st io n s as k e d an d an sw

e rs g iv e n

W h at

d o y o u e x p e c t fr o m

th e m e e ti n g ?

T h in k y o u r e x p e c ta ti o n s

w il l b e sa ti sfi e d ?

Q u al if y e x p e ri e n c e s o f p re v io u s

m e e ti n g s w it h te am

an d th e ir

o u tc o m e s

Y o u r st at u s w it h in

th e te am

?

‘‘ G e t in fo rm

at io n ’’ (n o n -s p e c ifi c ): 3

‘‘ G e t in fo rm

at io n ab o u t te am

p ro je c ts ’’ : 3

‘‘ E x c h an g e id e as

fo r te am

p ro je c ts ’’ : 3

‘‘ A d d re ss th e m o st u rg e n t is su e s’ ’: 1

W it h o u t an y d if fi c u lt y : 0

W it h m in o r d if fi c u lt ie s: 2

W it h g re at

d if fi c u lt y : 2

C e rt ai n th at

e x p e c ta ti o n s w il l

n o t b e sa ti sfi e d : 2

N o id e a: 3

T o o li tt le

o r n o e x p e ri e n c e w it h

te am

at al l: 0

E x c e ll e n t e x p e ri e n c e s, p o si ti v e o u t-

c o m e s: 0

R e as o n ab ly

g o o d e x p e ri e n c e s, m o re

o r le ss p o si ti v e o u tc o m e s: 8

P o o r e x p e ri e n c e s, o u tc o m e s p o o r o r

n o n e : 1

N o id e a: 1

A ll p e o p le in

te am

h av e e q u al

st at u s: 1

I am

th e le ad e r o r o n e o f th e

le ad e rs : 0

I am

n o t th e le ad e r b u t h av e

im p o rt an t st at u s: 2

M y st at u s is n o t v e ry

h ig h ,

o th e rs h av e a h ig h e r st at u s: 5

426 Birgitta Dresp-Langley

TABLE II

The chronological sequence of speech production in the meeting

Protagonist speaking Status/gender Time Topics covered Clauses violated

A T-Leader/male 3 min 1 0

B Ex-Dir/male 2 s 1 Tolerance!

C Senior/female 1 s 1 0

B Ex-Dir/male 2 s 1 Tolerance!

C Senior/female 2 s 1 0

B Ex-Dir/male 2 s 1 Tolerance!

C Senior/female 5 s 1 0

B Ex-Dir/male 2 s 1 Tolerance! Openness!

A T-Leader/male 5 min 1 0

C Senior/female 20 s 1, 2 0

A T-Leader/male 20 s 2 0

C Senior/female 10 s 2 0

B Ex-Dir/male 10 s 2 0

C Senior/female 5 s 2 0

A T-Leader/male 1 min 2 0

B Ex-Dir/male 2 s 2 Tolerance! Clarity!

A T-Leader/male 2 s 2 0

B Ex-Dir/male 2 s 2 0

A T-Leader 20 s 2 0

C Senior/female 1 s 2 0

A T-Leader 3 min 3, 4 0

D Senior/male 10 s 4 0

A T-Leader 1 min:30 s 5, 6, 7 0

B Ex-Dir/male 3 min 7 0

A T-Leader 1 min 7 0

B Ex-Dir/male 40 s 7 0

D Senior/male 10 s 7 0

B Ex-Dir/male 1 min:30 s 7 Tolerance!

A T-Leader/male 10 s 7 0

D Senior/male 5 s 7 0

B Ex-Dir/male 10 s 7 0

A T-Leader/male 10 s 7 0

B Ex-Dir/male 10 s 7 0

A T-Leader 25 s 7 0

B Ex-Dir/male 30 s 7 0

A T-Leader 10 s 7 0

B Ex-Dir/male 2 min 7 0

C Senior/female 10 s 7 0

B Ex-Dir/male 10 s 7 0

D Senior/male 1 min 7 0

C Senior/female 5 s 7 0

B Ex-Dir/male 20 s 7 0

A T-Leader/male 10 s 7 0

B Ex-Dir/male 20 s 7 0

D Senior/male 30 s 7 0

B Ex-Dir/male 1 min 7 0

The Communication Contract and Its Ten Ground Clauses 427

TABLE II

continued

Protagonist speaking Status/gender Time Topics covered Clauses violated

A T-Leader/male 10 s 7 0

B Ex-Dir/male 1 min:30 s 7 0

A T-Leader/male 10 s 7 0

C Senior/female 5 s 7 0

B Ex-Dir/male 5 s 7 0

A T-Leader 50 s 8 0

B Ex-Dir/male 5 s 8 0

A T-Leader/male 20 s 8 0

C Senior/female 5 s 8 0

A T-Leader/male 50 s 8, 9 0

C Senior/female 5 s 9 0

B Ex-Dir/male 10 s 9 0

E Junior/male 5 s 9 0

B Ex-Dir/male 20 s 9 0

E Junior/male 7 s 9 0

A T-Leader/male 5 s 9 0

E Junior/male 5 s 9 0

B Ex-Dir/male 10 s 9 0

D Senior/male 5 s 9 0

B Ex-Dir/male 3 s 9 0

A T-Leader/male 3 s 9 0

B Ex-Dir/male 5 s 9 0

D Senior/male 6 s 9 0

B Ex-Dir/male 4 s 9 0

A T-Leader/male 15 s 8 0

B Ex-Dir/male 20 s 8 0

A T-Leader/male 2 s 8 0

B Ex-Dir/male 10 s ? Continuity! Relevance!

D Senior/male 4 s ? Openness! Clarity!

B Ex-Dir/male 2 s ? Clarity!

A T-Leader/male 2 s ? 0

B Ex-Dir/male 5 s ? Clarity!

A T-Leader/male 3 s ? 0

B Ex-Dir/male 4 s ? Clarity! Openness!

Silence 6 s – –

A T-Leader/male 2 min:10 s 10 0

B Ex-Dir/male 6 s 10 0

A T-Leader/male 10 s 10 0

D Senior/male 2 s 10 0

A T-Leader/male 3 min 11 0

C Senior/female 4 s 11 0

A T-Leader, male 6 s 11 Clarity!

C Senior/female 4 s 11 0

B Ex-Dir/male 3 s 11 Tolerance! Clarity!

C Senior/female 2 s 11 0

B Ex-Dir/male 2 s 11 Clarity!

428 Birgitta Dresp-Langley

TABLE II

continued

Protagonist speaking Status/gender Time Topics covered Clauses violated

C Senior/female 4 s 11 0

D Senior/male 2 s 11 0

A T-Leader/male 15 s 11 0

C Senior/female 2 s 11 0

B Ex-Dir/male 12 s 11 0

A T-Leader/male 25 s 11 0

B Ex-Dir/male 30 s 11 0

A T-Leader/male 20 s 11 0

B Ex-Dir/male 4 s 11 0

A T-Leader/male 7 s 11 0

D Senior/male 15 s 11 0

C Senior/Female 3 s 11 0

A T-Leader/male 1 min:30 s 12 0

B Ex-Dir/male 30 s 12 0

A T-Leader/male 10 s 12 0

F Junior/male 6 s 12 0

B Ex-Dir/male 10 s 12 Tolerance! Clarity!

F Junior/male 3 s 12 0

B Ex-Dir/male 2 s 12 Tolerance! Clarity!

A T-Leader/male 4 s 12 0

F Junior/male 25 s 12 0

B Ex-Dir/male 5 s 12 Tolerance!

F Junior/male 3 s 12 0

B Ex-Dir/male 1 s 12 0

F Junior/male 12 s 12 0

A T-Leader/male 1 s 12 0

B Ex-Dir/male 3 s 12 0

A T-Leader/male 1 min:30 s 12, 13 0

D Senior/male 20 s 13 0

A T-Leader/male 2 min 13 0

F Junior/male 5 s 13 0

A T-Leader/male 50 s 13 0

D Senior/male 4 s 13 0

A T-Leader/male 25 s 13 0

F Junior/male 5 s 13 0

A T-Leader/male 30 s 14 0

C Senior/female 10 s 14 0

A T-Leader/male 20 s 14 0

C Senior/female 3 s 14 0

A T-Leader/male 10 s 14 0

C Senior/female 6 s 14 0

D Senior/male 40 s 14 0

A T-Leader/male 3 s 14 0

C Senior/female 4 s 14 0

A T-Leader/male 10 s 14 0

C Senior/female 45 s 14 0

The Communication Contract and Its Ten Ground Clauses 429

B: well, there are new equivalences between

certain kinds of qualifications

A: including …? B (dismissive): no, no, no – that is not at all the

same thing

In the following sequence, A violates the clarity

clause, which is followed by a question from C to A.

Then B, without having been invited to do so,

answers this question for A, violating the tolerance

clause once and the clarity clause twice:

A: different weights are to be applied to the dif-

ferent posts in regard to training and research

C (asking A): different weights? What would my

weight be, for example?

B: yours would be more

C: more?

TABLE II

continued

Protagonist speaking Status/gender Time Topics covered Clauses violated

A T-Leader/male 5 s 14 0

D Senior/male 1 s 14? Relevance!

C Senior/female 10 s – 0

A T-Leader/male 5 s 14 0

B Ex-Dir/male 35 s 15, 16 0

C Senior/female 3 s 16 0

B Ex-Dir/male 20 s 17 0

A T-Leader/male 10 s 17 0

C Senior/female 4 s 17 0

B Ex-Dir/male 1 min:30 s 17, 18 0

C Senior/female 5 s 18 0

B Ex-Dir/male 30 s 18 0

A T-Leader/male 10 s 18, 19 0

B Ex-Dir/male 12 s 19 0

D Senior/male 15 s 19? Relevance! Prudence!

B Ex-Dir/male 45 s 19 0

C Senior/female 4 s 19 0

B Ex-Dir/male 20 s 19 0

A T-Leader/male 10 s 19 0

B Ex-Dir/male 5 s 19 0

A T-Leader/male 4 s 20 0

B Ex-Dir/male 1 min:15 s ? Continuity! Relevance! Tolerance!

C Senior/female 1 s – 0

B Ex-Dir/male 1 s ? Openness!

A T-Leader/male 1 s ? Relevance!

B Ex-Dir/male 1 min – 0

A T-Leader/male 4 s ? Relevance!

B Ex-Dir/male 2 s – 0

D Senior/male 3 s ? Relevance!

C Senior/female 2 s – 0

End of meeting

The different protagonists are indicated by letters of the alphabet, reproducing the order in which they have first spoken

up in the meeting. Their status and gender, the times taken to speak, the topics covered (indicated by numbers repro-

ducing the order in which they were brought up), and the clauses violated in a given sequence are shown.

430 Birgitta Dresp-Langley

B: yes, more – more for research

C: well, this is not all too clear…

Later in the meeting, when elections to the new

department council are discussed, B further violates

the tolerance and clarity clauses. The revealing se-

quence started when A asked junior member F

whether he was elected or designated member of last

term’s council:

A (asking F): you were elected into the last

council, weren’t you?

F: no, I was designated to replace P, who had

left after his

B (interrupting): yes, but this is like being

elected

F: is it ? – I thought it was more like being

nominated – we were discussing among us who

B (interrupting): well, for junior members it is

different

A: ok, whatever – this year there are three dif-

ferent groups to be represented and we have to

know who would like to stand for election

F: yes, and I have a question: those of us juniors

who were designated to replace outgoing mem-

bers in the middle of the last council mandate,

will they be able to

B (interrupting): that is not the way it works –

with new elections, all counters are back to zero

F: – like, uh, starting from scratch?

B: yep

A: ok – I might stand for election to represent

the senior partners…

Later on, another senior team member (D) violates

the relevance clause twice. The first violation is

followed by an objection from the female senior

(C):

A: …it says applications will be reviewed under the sole criterion of excellence

D: they’re looking for individualistic shit stirrers,

right?

C: oh come on – I hope there are some young

and bright individuals around who don’t fall

into one of your categories

Then, violations of the relevance and prudence

clauses are noted:

B: …we have not yet had such committees here, but it might come

D: I heard they’ve already had one like that at

… – appears the guy was sacked on the spot B: well – I believe this is for the moment not

the way things are done, at least not here…

After about 60 min, the team leader (A) asked the

group whether anyone wanted to discuss other is-

sues, such as the ongoing team projects. These were,

according to the background information given, not

progressing well and clearly demanded some dis-

cussion. The former department director (B), as if

ignoring A’s question, starts a longish personal

comment on a different and irrelevant matter, pre-

venting other team members from considering A’s

invitation. In doing so, it is considered that B has

violated the tolerance, continuity and relevance

clauses at the same time. This triple clause violation

engendered more clause violations and the rapid

termination of the meeting, in an apparently relaxed

atmosphere:

A: …any other urgent business – maybe the current projects?

B: I really regret having missed that exhibition

last week – they say it was fantastic. That guy

really is a fabulous artist – presented all his new-

est constructions … such an exciting project C: what’s the name of the project?

B: the name of the artist is X

A (asking B): can we maybe have some more

information on that prize we seemed to have

won?

B: well, they are treating it discretely at the mo-

ment, but there might be some publicity in the

next weeks or so

A: there should also be G at the celebration – is

she still around?

B: oh yes, still going strong

D: she still going? – my oh my – been hanging

in there for a while now, the old bat [laughs]

C: old bat – listen to that – old bat yourself

[laughs]

The distribution of clause violations by the dif-

ferent members of the team as a function of their

status and gender are given in Table III. The dif-

ferent topics addressed in the meeting are listed in

The Communication Contract and Its Ten Ground Clauses 431

Table IV, respecting the order in which they were

brought up and with the times dedicated to each

topic. About 39 min, more than half of the total

time (64 min), were dedicated to topics 1, 7, 11 and

12. The remaining 25 min were dedicated to various

topics, either featuring or not on the agenda. There

was a brief mention of an urgent need to plan and

coordinate team projects for the year (topic 17),

followed by a non-specific remark from senior team

partner B to the juniors reminding them that their

projects are not progressing as well as they should

(topic 18) and that there have been discussions about

forming a supervisors’ committee (19). An exchange

of ideas relating to their projects or any of the other

team projects was not produced.

Analyses of the post-meeting questionnaires are

shown in Table V. Seven of the nine team partners,

including the four seniors, were ‘‘reasonably satisfied

with the meeting and its outcome’’. One junior

stated to be ‘‘not too satisfied’’ and another junior

was ‘‘not satisfied at all’’. None of the team partners

reported being entirely satisfied with the meeting

and its outcome.

By applying a ‘satisfaction coefficient’ to each of

the four possible answers, with a coefficient of 1 for

‘‘entirely satisfied’’, coefficients of 0.75 for ‘‘rea-

sonably satisfied’’, 0.25 for ‘‘not too satisfied’’ and 0

for ‘‘not satisfied at all’’, we are able to compute a

quantitative indicator of the ‘terms of closure’ of the

communication contract after a meeting or a con-

versation. Here, for a meeting with nine participants,

TABLE III

Speech times of the different protagonists and number of clause violations

Protagonist Status/gender Total time spoken Clause violations

A Team Leader/male 30 min:51 s 3 a

B Ex-Dept. Director/male 23 min:48 s 26 a

C Senior Partner/female 04 min:26 s 0

D Senior Partner/male 03 min:23 s 6

E Junior Member/male 00 min:17 s 0

F Junior Member/male 01 min:26 s 0

G Junior Member/female 00 min:00 s 0

H Junior Member/female 00 min:00 s 0

I Junior Member/female 00 min:00 s 0

Total time of speech 64 min:11 s

a Balanced speech times clause.

TABLE IV

Topics in the order in which they were brought up in

the meeting, time dedicated to a given topic and whe-

ther it featured (yes/no) on the provisional agenda

communicated to team partners by the team leader

before the meeting

Topic

covered

Time dedicated

to topic

Corresponds to a topic

on agenda given

1 08 min:40 s Yes

2 02 min:40 s No

3 01 min:50 s No

4 01 min:20 s No

5 01 min:10 s Yes

6 00 min:15 s Yes

7 17 min:55 s Yes

8 01 min:30 s No

9 02 min:13 s No

10 01 min:58 s Yes

11 05 min:40 s Yes

12 06 min:10 s Yes

13 01 min:36 s No

14 02 min:28 s Yes

15 00 min:15 s No

16 00 min:25 s No

17 00 min:54 s No

18 01 min:20 s No

19 02 min:09 s No

20 00 min:04 s Yes

60 min:32 s

432 Birgitta Dresp-Langley

the optimal satisfaction rate indicating ‘closure under

the best possible conditions’ of the communication

contract would be 9/9. As it is, we obtain an overall

satisfaction rate of 5.5/9, which is only about 60% of

the optimal rate. When computing satisfaction rates

as a function of the status of the team partners, we

obtain a rate of 3/4 (75%) for the seniors, and a rate

of 2.5/5 (50%) for the juniors. This result suggests

that the juniors were far less happy with the

way things went at the meeting than the seniors.

Generally, we may expect that clause violators

would, indeed, suffer less from the consequences of

the deficient communication scenarios they create

than those who have to suffer the violations.

Seven of the nine team partners considered that

the ‘‘effectiveness’’ of communication within the

team ‘‘needs to improve’’, one junior judged com-

munication ‘‘ineffective’’, but stated that she ‘‘could

not say why’’ and another junior deemed that ‘‘time

is wasted on irrelevant matters’’. None of the nine

team partners thought that the team communicates

very effectively. When asked whether they had and

took every opportunity to speak up in the meeting,

three seniors of the nine team partners stated that

they did, three juniors stated that they did not speak

because they considered it ‘‘not worth it’’, two ju-

niors pointed out the fact that ‘‘others in the team

speak more often’’ and one senior team partner

declared that ‘‘I had hardly any chance to speak and

it bothered me a lot’’.

Four of the nine protagonists thought that the

‘‘team should meet more often’’ while four, of

whom three seniors, deemed that the ‘‘team meets

often enough’’. One junior team partner stated that

there were ‘‘far too many meetings’’ and that ‘‘a lot

of time is wasted’’ in them. When asked to make

suggestions on how the effectiveness of communi-

cation within the team could be improved, three

senior team partners stated to ‘‘have no idea’’, while

two juniors suggested to ‘‘involve the junior team

members more’’. Two others, one junior and one

senior, suggested to ‘‘plan and target the meetings

better’’ and to ‘‘meet more regularly’’.

Analyses of the second post-meeting question-

naire given 3 days after the meeting (results sum-

marized in Table VI) revealed that the items or

topics they most recalled, correctly and in great

detail, were, in the team partners’ own words:

‘‘a need to define and plan projects for the year’’

T A B L E V

R e su lt s fr o m

th e p o st -m

e e ti n g q u e st io n n ai re

w it h ab b re v ia te d v e rs io n s o f q u e st io n s as k e d an d an sw

e rs g iv e n

S at is fi e d w it h m e e ti n g

an d o u tc o m e

T e am

c o m m u n ic at in g

e ff e c ti v e ly

H ad

e v e ry

o p p o rt u n it y

to sp e ak

T e am

m e e ti n g

o ft e n e n o u g h

S u g g e st io n s to

im p ro v e

e ff e c ti v e n e ss

E n ti re ly

sa ti sfi e d : 0

R e as o n ab ly

sa ti sfi e d : 7

N o t to o sa ti sfi e d : 1

N o t at

al l: 1

V e ry

e ff e c ti v e ly : 0

E ff e c ti v e n e ss n e e d s

to im

p ro v e : 7

In e ff e c ti v e , b u t I d o n ’t

u n d e rs ta n d w h y : 1

T im

e is w as te d o n

ir re le v an t m at te rs : 1

H ad

an d to o k e v e ry

o p p o rt u n it y : 3

N o t w o rt h it : 3

O th e rs sp e ak

m o re

o ft e n : 2

I h ar d ly h ad

an y c h an c e to

sp e ak ,

an d it b o th e rs m e a lo t: 1

O ft e n e n o u g h : 4

S h o u ld

m e e t m o re

o ft e n : 4

F ar

to o m an y m e e ti n g s,

w as te

o f ti m e : 1

N o id e a: 3

Im p li c at e ju n io rs m o re : 2

P la n an d ta rg e t th e m e e ti n g s

b e tt e r: 2

D e v o te

m o re

ti m e to

te am

p ro je c ts : 2

M e e t m o re

re g u la rl y : 5

The Communication Contract and Its Ten Ground Clauses 433

(recalled correctly and in great detail by six out of

nine, including the four juniors), ‘‘the juniors need

to report about their progress more regularly’’ and

the related ‘‘project charter’’ (recalled correctly and

in great detail by five out of nine including the four

juniors; recalled by one senior with considerable

deformation in contents). Hardly more than 2 min

of the meeting were actually devoted to these two

topics. Eight out of the nine team members globally

recalled topic 7, but without any of the details that

were discussed at the meeting. The total time de-

voted to topic 7 at the meeting was 18 min.

Conclusions

The results from the study case presented here

highlight some of the implications of the ground

clauses for ethical communication by bringing to the

fore some typical clause violations characteristic of

conversational dominance patterns (e.g. Itakura,

2001). In the example shown here, one of the two

most senior members of the group is found to detain

the power over ‘‘what is said when and by whom’’.

Such power or conversational dominance is

achieved and sustained here by monopolizing speech

time and/or by frequently interrupting other team

partners. These violations of the ‘balanced speech

time’ and ‘tolerance’ clauses often go hand in hand

with violation of other clauses, such as the ‘conti-

nuity’, ‘openness’, ‘clarity’, or ‘relevance’ clauses, as

illustrated by B’s discursive behaviour. The disrup-

tive effect of clause violations in the sequences in

which they occur here is brought to the fore. Not

only are such violations detrimental to successful

communication as defined previously by others (e.g.

Clark and Schaefer, 1987; Schegloff, 1982), but they

also affect interpersonal relationships at a deeper

psychological level by reducing or abolishing mutual

trust and by altering individual levels of confidence.

In families, such communication patterns were

found to lead to victimization and domestic violence

(Babcock et al., 1993). In the present case scenario,

those who appear to lose out are the junior members

of the group, for whom not a single clause violation

could be noted because they were simply not given,

or did not take, the chance to speak. The same ap-

plies to the discursive behaviour of the female senior

of the group (C). Apart from being unethical, sce-

narios where multiple clause violations by a few are

more or less tacitly suffered by others jeopardize

collaborative team projects (those of the juniors in

our case here) and the evolution and progress of a

group in a larger and more general sense. In the

meeting studied here, the clause violations contrib-

ute to reinforcing existing hierarchical patterns.

TABLE VI

Topics in the order in which they were brought up in

the meeting, time dedicated to a given topic, and whe-

ther the topics were recalled 3 days after the meeting by

the different protagonists

Topic Time dedicated

to topic in meeting

Recalled 3 days

later or not

1 08 min:40 s p

1

s 3

2 02 min:40 s s 5

3 01 min:50 s Not recalled

4 01 min:20 s Not recalled

5 01 min:10 s Not recalled

6 00 min:15 s s 4

1

v 1

7 17 min:55 s s 8

1

8 01 min:30 s p

1

9 02 min:13 s p

1

s 1

10 01 min:58 s Not recalled

11 05 min:40 s s 1

12 06 min:10 s s 5

1

v 1

13 01 min:36 s Not recalled

14 02 min:28 s Not recalled

15 00 min:15 s p

2

s 3

1

16 00 min:25 s p

4

17 00 min:54 s p

6

18 01 min:20 s p

5

v 1

19 02 min:09 s Not recalled

20 00 min:04 s Not recalled

p Correctly and in great detail.

s Correctly but without detail.

Slightly deformed in content.

v Considerably deformed in content.

434 Birgitta Dresp-Langley

At the same time, they prevent certain important

topics from being discussed openly and effectively

and, as a consequence, the meeting is not getting

anywhere. The group was given feedback about this

analysis several weeks later, and the outcome has

triggered a collective reflection. The seniors both

claimed to be unaware of the conversational strate-

gies and were impressed with the data and the pat-

terns revealed (Tables II–VI). Senior member B,

twice divorced, stated that he was ‘‘surprised to be

such a bully in the meeting room’’. Most of the

other group members then spontaneously claimed

that they had a strong impression that there was a

serious problem with this meeting, but would not

have been able to identify the problem as clearly and

objectively as the data presented to them.

The primary purpose of the communication con-

tract model is to provide practical guidance for ethical

and interpersonal communication in smaller and lar-

ger organizations. Whatever the psychological forces

that lead to clause violations and unethical commu-

nication, by explaining the importance of the ten

ground clauses to individuals and by making them

aware of what may happen when they are violated,

we may hope to strengthen their sense of individual

responsibility. What can be made explicit can be

traced and analysed, as demonstrated here above.

What can be analysed can, in principle, be improved,

especially in the organizational world where it is

possible to monitor speech situations professionally.

People who know each other very well, like

lovers or good friends, may grant each other certain

degrees of freedom in handling their communication

contracts, and so may business partners who have

been working together for a long time, who enjoy

equivalent hierarchical status and decisional power,

and who are equally aware of what they are doing

and why they are doing it. Ultimately, the notion of

a communication contract invites us all to step back

and ask ourselves whether our own discursive

behaviours are as ethical as they could be. In addi-

tion, the pragmatic approach presented here pro-

vides some diagnostic criteria that could help people

in smaller or larger organizations find out where they

could try harder to communicate more humanly and

more ethically. This could allow them to secure

long-term gains which may ultimately be more

desirable and beneficial than short-term benefits

achieved through unethical strategies.

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LMGC, UMR 5508 CNRS,

Université Montpellier,

Montpellier Cedex 5, France

E-mail: [email protected]

436 Birgitta Dresp-Langley