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US POLICIES ON TWO TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES, ILLICIT DRUG

TRAFFICKING AND CYBER-LAUNDERING, WILL NOT SECURE THE

HOMELAND FROM TERRORIST THREATS

A Master Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty

American Public University

First Name Last Name

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

April 2012

American Public University

Charles Town, WV

The author hereby grants the American Public University System the right to display

these contents for educational purposes.

The author assumes total responsibility for meeting the requirements set by United States

public domain.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to XXXXX for supporting me throughout my educational

journey. Without his patience and understanding the completion of this work would not

have been possible.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank XXXXXXXX and XXXXXXX for their support, patience, and

understanding. I also wish to thank….. {You want to acknowledge anyone who inspired

you or supported you throughout your educational journey.}

I have found my coursework throughout the Homeland Security Program to be

valuable in helping me gain a better understanding of the multiple issues surrounding

homeland security.

ABSTRACT

US POLICIES ON TWO TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES, ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING

AND CYBER-LAUNDERING, WILL NOT SECURE THE HOMELAND FROM TERRORIST

THREATS

First Name Last Name

American Public University System, May 5, 2012

Charles Town, West Virginia

Dr. Christopher Reynolds, Thesis Professor

The purpose of this paper is to explore US Government policies targeting illicit drug

trafficking and cyber-laundering while identifying vulnerabilities within the policies (if any) and

its impact on threats from terrorist organizations. Transnational crime, narcotics, and terrorism

financing are not geographical concerns. All three can be linked specifically by having potential

effect across national borders. Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) has established a

significant and increasing threat to national and international security, with dire implications for

public safety, public health, democratic institutions, and economic stability across the globe

(Finckenauer, 2006). The US Government have many Presidential Directives (PD) and policies

that target these areas, but are they really having an impact? Without a shadow of a doubt, drug

trafficking has resulted in funding that has supported terrorism and in some cases such as the

Madrid bombing, drugs were being utilized as the currency. The same scenario can happen in

any small or large city in America. US Government policies must be able to compliment or

supplement other Nations policies in the fight against transnational crime. Because of varies

religious beliefs and political views of western nations, the tasking will be equivalent to finding a

cotton ball in the field of snow.

Cybercrime is such a lucrative criminal adventure because anyone can be anyone and

anywhere in a digital environment. The utilization of electronic funding transactions

domestically and or internationally can create difficult detective efforts for any government, not

just the US. In a world where there appear to be an increase in ordinary criminals, extremist

groups, and or terrorist organizations seeking to conduct their business through cyber means, US

policies must be specific to be effective. Additionally, policies must not infringe upon civil

liberties that may expose an area of opportunity for terrorist threats. Despite US initiatives to

combat transnational crimes, the relationship between transnational crime, narcotics, and

terrorism financing seemingly has continued to expand.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………….....01

II. LITERATURE REVIEW……………………………………………………………..03

III. THEORETICAL APPROACH.....................................................................................14

IV. METHODOLOGY.……..…………………………………………………………….15

V. RESULTS…..................................................................................................................16

Transnational Crime vs Organized Crime…………………………………………….16

The Relationship between Transnational Crime and Terrorism……………………....19

Illicit Drug Trafficking: A Continued Security Threat to the Homeland……………..20

Cyber-laundering: A Continued Security Threat to the Homeland…………………...29

US Policy Designed to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking & Cyber-laundering……….37

VI. DISCUSSION………………………………………………………….……………..42

LIST OF REFERENCES…….………….…………………………….………………….......51

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES PAGE

1. Figure 1 - Unity of Effort that is required to Eliminate Gaps in US Policies…………..14

2. Table 1 - Classification of Transnational Crimes……………………………………… 17

3. Figure 2 - Model of Transnational Organized Crime Operation in Illicit Markets……. 18

4. Figure 3 - Statistics and Trend Analysis of the Illicit Drug Market…………………… 21

5. Figure 4 - Global Trends in Drug Use, 2006-2012……………………………………. 22

6. Figure 5 - South America…………………………………………………………….... 23

7. Figure 6 - Most Important Cocaine Trafficking Routes to Europe……………………. 24

8. Figure 7 - Cannabis Consumption………………………………………………….......27

9. Figure 8 - Marijuana Legalization Status (January 20, 2015)……………………….....28

10. Figure 9 - Internet Users in the World Distributed by World Regions – 2014…………31

11. Figure 10 - Internet Users in the World by Geographic Region – 2014…………….. ...32

12. Figure 11 - World Internet Penetration Rates by Geographic Regions…………….......33

13. Figure 12 - Transnational Cyber-laundering in a Snap-Shot……………………………35

14. Figure 13 - Top Five Reported Crime Types………………………………….……......47

15. Figure 14 - Major Fraud Types Reported in 2011……………………………..……….47

INTRODUCTION

The threats to America that are imposed from transnational crimes are constantly changing.

The threats may originate from other nations throughout the world; but, the impacts throughout

America is surreal. The US Government fight against transnational crimes are nothing less than

intricate. US interests abroad are impacted by these threatening networks. Weapons trafficking,

intellectual property theft, cybercrime, human smuggling, trafficking in persons, and illicit drug

trafficking contribute to other crimes that evolves around these transnational crimes. The bottom

line is that the threats created by these crimes are not isolated to one specific nation or a specific

region in the world. The US Government policies that are designed to combat transnational

crimes must address both present-day threats and potential future threats.

The horrible events that were caused by terrorist over the past two decades have instilled long

lasting memories of suffering and pain for so many families throughout the world. The events

that occurred on September 11, 2001 in one of the most iconic cities in the US, New York, sent a

chilling effect throughout the world. While threats persist, our nation is stronger than it was on

9/11, more prepared to confront evolving threats, and more resilient in the face of our continued

challenges (Department of Homeland Security 2011, 1). US policies have made a difference in

global security; but, the fight against illicit drug trafficking and cyber-laundering that contributed

to the events leading up to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, continues to be a major security challenge.

In the US the illicit drug market is significantly profitable. Insurgents and criminals of all types exploit the financial gains from the US and abroad. Over time, this profitable illegal

business has attracted diverse aggressive and sophisticated drug traffickers. The drug network

begins with the growth of raw ingredients that are processed, packaged, and smuggled into the

US or other nations. The smuggling of illegal drugs can be by way of air, land, or sea. Because

of the multiple possible entry points into the US specifically, the policies must address all facets

domestically and internationally.

The cyber network has no boundaries. Therefore cyber-laundering can occur from any

location throughout the world. The two primary limits are the integrity of the equipment being

utilized to conduct the illegal act and the skills or ingenuity of the person committing the act with

all intent to deceive government and law enforcement authorities. The art of hiding the origin,

the material, or illegal application of income, and then masking money received to make it

appear lawful are attributes of a network that best supports illegal drug traffickers, insurgents,

and terrorist organizations. More and more supporters of terrorist organizations and terrorist

organizations themselves are using underground financial networks to sustain their operations.

Additionally, the reach to terrorist supporters from around the world has increased to a number

that has yet to be calculated. This research paper will provide scholars that have interest in homeland security and

Department of Homeland Security leadership the effects of US policies that empower terrorist

organizations; subsequently, increasing homeland security threats from terrorist organizations.

Approximately 15 years ago, in the year 2000, a treaty addressing transnational organized crime

was adopted by the United Nations. In years to follow, the US conducted a thorough review in

2010. The review revealed the growth and influence of criminal networks that posed an

enormous threat to the US and the international community. The report follows many years from

the initial introduction and enactment of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing

Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001.

The USA PATRIOT Act grants federal officials greater powers to trace and intercept terrorists’

communications both for law enforcement and foreign intelligence purposes. It reinforces federal

anti-money laundering laws and regulations in an effort to deny terrorists the resources necessary

for future attacks (Doyle 2002).

The US Government has policies that address transnational crimes. By conducting a quick

review of these policies without considering implications will most likely not reveal possible

gaps or disconnects. This paper proposes the following research question: Are there

vulnerabilities in current US Government policies targeting transnational crime on illicit drug

trafficking and cyber-laundering that will increase homeland security threats from terrorist

organizations?

In order for US policies targeting illicit drug trafficking and cyber-laundering to be effective,

the requirement for international support must be paramount. The current policies may address

the threats of the past and possibly some of the current threats. Unfortunately, terrorist

organizations are forever changing. Terrorist organization leadership, support structure, and its

members are constantly changing. This paper will analyze US Government policies that are

specifically designed to target two transnational crimes, illicit drug trafficking and cyber-

laundering. Possible vulnerabilities that may be identified throughout the research will result in

improvement or mitigation recommendations.

LITERATURE REVIEW

A wealth of academic literature on transnational crimes has increased over the past decade.

In particular, illicit drug trafficking and cyber-laundering, are two of the most active crimes that

are being utilized to support terrorist organizations. The first of the resources for this research

paper comes from Jay S. Albanese’s 2012 Deciphering the Linkages between Organized Crime

and Transnational Crime from the Journal of International Affairs, Volume 66, Issue 1. The

significance of this particular literature is that it provides characteristics of organized crimes and

transnational crimes which is important for this study. The review of this literature highlights the

linkage between organized crimes and transnational crime while making the point clear that the

two are distinctively separate. By having a sound understanding in the particulars are critical as

US policies are reviewed and discussed for analysis throughout the research. The root conduct

of both organized crime and transnational crime parallels each other according to studies. A

synopsis of this literature provides distinct differences between transnational crimes and

international crimes in that transnational crime are those crimes leading to or resulting in

individual profit. One of three elements, if not two or all three, may exists during the

identification of transnational crimes. The elements are illegal substances, the arrangement for

illegal labor, and or penetration of either commercial or government businesses operations.

Additionally, the literature characterizes international crimes as those crimes that involves crimes

against humanity that sometimes includes several countries. There are three classifications of

transnational crimes, Provision of Illicit Goods; Provision of Illicit Services; and Infiltration of

Business or Government (Albanese 2012, 2). Studies have shown that the existence of

transnational crime is nothing new. These crimes have in fact existed for many decades and

there has been little to no change in them; but, the innovative technology has advance the means

in which these crimes are executed.

Another literature review provides an in-depth concern for political officials. John Rollins

and Liana Wyler convey these concerns clearly in their 2010 article International Terrorism and

Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress. The

literature adds value to the research because the recognition of political disconnects and law gaps

that terrorist organizations exploit are highlighted. In this report to Congress there are

conceivable strains between counterterrorism and anti-crime policy objectives; to include, the

usefulness of integrating financial intelligence techniques for combating terrorist financing with

counterinsurgency using a concept referred to as “threat finance” (Rollins and Wyler 2010, 36).

The Internet Crime Complaint Center (iC3) 2011 Internet Crime Report is specifically

utilized in this study to highlight the dangers of transnational organized crimes when loop holes

in laws and policies continues without check. The mission of iC3 is (iC3 2011, 4):

To serve as a vehicle to receive, develop and refer criminal

Complaints regarding the rapidly expanding arena of cybercrime.

The Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) gives the victims of

cybercrime a convenient and easy-to-use reporting mechanism that

alerts authorities to suspected criminal or civil violations. For

law enforcement and regulatory agencies at the federal, state, local,

tribal and international levels, IC3 provides a central referral

mechanism for complaints involving Internet-related crimes.

The IC3’s success has captivated global interest. Countries other than the US such as Canada, the

United Kingdom and Germany use the IC3 as an ideal for similar cybercrime centers. In

expanding of its continuing support of foreign law enforcement, the IC3 composed country-

specific statistical reports and distributed several of complaint referrals to the Federal Bureau of

Investigations (FBI) field offices throughout the world.

Gilipowski W. Paraschiv’s 2013 Conceptualizing Transnational Organized Crime:

Economic, Management, and Financial Markets, Volume 8, Issue 2, is an eye opening piece of

literature. The purpose for inserting this literature within the research is to exclusively bring to

the forefront the enormous amount of resources and assets that it will take to unify the

international community in order for US policies to be more effective. A clear synopsis of this

literature supports other areas of research in making it clear that the boundaries of transnational

organized crimes are nonexistence. The article provides an understanding to how the

international community realizes that transnational organized crime is a common threat while

highlighting the division in international law and policies. Additionally, the article highlights

transnational organized crime having developed in various countries throughout the world;

subsequently, making this emergence a phenomenon. The literature illustrates the political

influence throughout the international community that makes US policies vulnerable. For an

example, Asia’s footprint consists of multiple loop holes added with corruption and a lack of

effective governance (Paraschiv 2013, 173-178). Without a clear definition or understanding to

distinguish between gangs and organized crime, the political initiatives could have challenges. If

there is not an objective to influence politicians to establish judicial authority at the national level

to combat organized crime, many efforts to minimize this baseline that influences transnational

crime will be doomed at the start. The size and growth of transnational crime cannot truly be

determined because the crime groups often establish and maintain contingent ties with each

other. Worthy to note is the hierarchical structure described in this article that clearly articulates

the complexity in comprehending the international community’s ability to fight and stop

transnational crime, the global threat impact of transnational crime, and the business and

economic dimensions of these crimes.

The Congressional Research Service describes various patterns that parallels to interaction

among terrorist groups leading to transnational security issues. In recognition of these activities,

the US Congress continues to respond with policies in attempts to remain abreast with the rapid

changing environment in Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for

Congress by John Rollins and Liana Wyler, 2013. US global security interests are threatened by

transnational crimes and to this extent, in 2011 President Obama issued the Strategy to Combat

Transnational Organized Crime. Although, the US security strategies maybe multidimensional

in focusing on citizen security and dismantling illicit networks, the support from governments

throughout the international community is needed. The literature is significant and support the

research in defining the complexity to establish policies to support the people to carry out

strategic objectives that are identified within this study, starting at the top of the political stage.

In Congress charge to evaluate the current policies and practices in determining if the US is

synchronized in effectively fighting transnational crimes, the committee realizes that the

conceptualization of transnational crime will require interagency coordination with international

cooperation. Yet the question remain, “Should a specific agency or an interagency coordinating

body be designated as leading U.S. government responses to crime-terrorism threats (Rollins and

Wyler 2013, 21)? Adding to the challenge of loyalty and total commitment is geographic

regions and politics. Clapper’s testimony to Congress in 2012 emphasized that illicit networks

have been fundamental in the growth of transnational crimes that has led to profitable terrorist

networks; subsequently, increasing the threats to US national security.

The research study focuses on two specific transnational crimes, illicit drug trafficking and

cyber-laundering. The first of several literature reviews to support this research study in the area

of illicit drug trafficking is a thorough analysis of US drug policy by David Boyum and Peter

Reuter in 2005, An Analytic Assessment of US Drug Policy. The review of this literature

supports the claims that policies targeting the prohibition of drugs are universally ineffective.

The constant development of illicit drugs and its distributions are staying ahead of policies and

counterdrugs programs designed to combat such activity. American drug policies are

unconvincing Boyum and Reuter 2005, 93). Although drugs growth in quantity are

geographically limited, the sophistication involved in establishing an illicit transnational drug

trafficking network makes the fight against these crimes more challenging. Another key point to

highlight from the review is that US policies along with tougher laws will not materially reduce

the use or illegal sale of drugs. The study within this literature exclusively discusses the need for

drug treatment services that is in short supply. The ability to treat drug users is a key aspect in

fighting the war on drugs; however, some US policies do not address the root issue or concern.

The absence of US policies to target this area is a gap requiring lawmakers and politicians

attention. The identified gap contributes to the research findings and establish ground for later

discussions.

Drug Policy in Understanding America: The Anatomy of a Exceptional Nation by Jonathan

P. Caulkins and Mark A. R. Kleiman, 2008, highlights the counterdrug initiatives carried out by

the US. The literature supports the study in many ways; but, specifically in such a way to

magnify discussions surrounding US policies. In accordance to this literature, the US fight on

illicit drugs has led to more arrest and imprisonments than its European partners (Caulkins and

Kleiman 2008, 563). A sense of relevancy is established in this literature that aid the

conceptualization of illegal drug trafficking. The US parallels countries like Columbia and

Nigeria in comparison to its severe drug problem. The literature focuses many efforts on

comparing the US with other countries throughout the world to highlight the use of illicit drugs.

The results of studies performed are anything less than stunning. Combating the trafficking of

transnational illicit drug exhausts many US resources that include equipment, money, and

people. Before the US could actually identify the chaos associated with its leading illicit drug,

cocaine, Americans embraced the illicit drug before its exposures. Other countries simply watch

the effects that it took throughout the US before trying the drug. To this extent, other countries

did not have the capability in availability for cocaine. The US have large Colombian immigrants

communities in Florida and New York and with so much legal trade occurring in these areas, the

literature suggests that the capability to effectively hide the illegal trafficking of cocaine is

almost seamless.

The Congressional Research Service study focusing on the illegal drug trade in Africa has

direct ties to the US policies designed to combat illicit transnational drug trafficking. The

majority of the illicit drug growth and trafficking in Africa is directed towards South America

and European countries according to Liana S. Wyler and Nicolas Cook in their 2009

congressional research Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy. However, other

illegal products such as heroin and precursors required to make illicit drugs do enter the various

borders of the US. The issue that is revealed in the literature is the threat to US policy and its

interests both at home and abroad. Because of the enormous illegal drug production

environments throughout the western portion of Africa, US policies combating transnational

illicit drug trafficking faces an uphill battle. The challenge becomes even more complex when

terrorist organizations occupy various parts of the region for safe havens. Additionally, the

revelations of US policies being in its early stages or formative stages are exposed during this

study (Wyler and Cook 2009, 27). The study further suggests that there is not a solid

commitment or coordination on roles from both the US and the international community’s

counternarcotic agencies.

Continued support that suggests the US policies for combating illicit drug trafficking are

ineffective comes from a review of the updated 2006 Congressional Research Service Report for

Congress, International Drug Trade and U.S. Foreign Policy by Raphael F. Perl. U.S.

international drug control policy is implemented by a multifaceted strategy that includes the

following elements: eradication of narcotic crops; interdiction and law enforcement activities in

drug-producing and drug-transiting countries; international cooperation; sanctions/economic

assistance; and institutional development (Perl 2006, 3). In pursuit to establish the perfect anti-

drug control policies, the US finds itself in a political storm that results from contradictions of

national policy interests. The relevance of this literature to the study is significant because the

findings proves invaluable in that the links between drug and terrorist organization are brought to

the forefront. Additionally, another gap in US policy is exposed that sets the stage for follow on

discussions throughout the research. The multiple programs that are discussed within this

literature contributes to the confirmation of findings relative to this research study. Finally, the

background regarding the rise in production of opium, marijuana, and coca supports discussions

relative to US policies being insufficient due to the corruption of national leaders.

An in-depth review of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime World Drug Report

2014 provides analytical data that will bring merit to this research study. The World Drug

Report provides an annual overview of the major developments in drug markets for the various

drug categories, ranging from production to trafficking, including development of new routes

and modalities, as well as consumption (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2014, ix).

The data reviewed and collected from this source will prove valuable to the support of this

research in gaining a conclusion. The literature exclusively highlights the growth of clandestine

drug laboratories and the impact to the international community’s fight against illicit drugs. The

analysis from this report will serve as evidence towards US policies. The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) describes the greatest cyber threats to be the

illegal acquiring of assets, sensitive data such as economic information or military classified

intelligence. Gordon M. Snow’s 2011 article, Federal Bureau of Investigation: The cybersecurity

threat, focuses on the cyber threats to the US private sector, supply chain, and critical

infrastructure. The article suggests that the US critical infrastructure will not be 100% intrusion

free; thereby, always being available for anyone with the ability and means to gain access. There

are tremendous economic losses resulting from cyber threats. Although, the FBI constantly

changes its methods in dealing with cybercrimes, so does terrorist organizations. Innovation of

new cyber technology improves national and international relations. Unfortunately, this same

advance technology becomes available or can be gain through illicit means by terrorist

organizations. The article clearly make a point to address the theft of intellectual property and

supply chain issues that can be interrupted by terrorist organizations. The threat, although

specifically discussed targeting US interests, is not an isolated threat for one nation. The

growing cyber threat is an international issue with improvements in the availability and the

ingenuity placed in creating malicious software that makes current national security policies an

issue. Transnational crimes such as cyber laundering can be hidden through multiple layers of

cyber access points created by automation increase requirements. Another issue is that with

internal support given to adversaries by recruiting business and intellectual individuals, as

suggested by the article, the damages caused by cybercrimes will continue to grow, making it

impractical to calculate. This is another reason that Snow suggests that one agency cannot

combat the threat alone (Snow 2011, 5). Information gained from this article contributes to

further analysis of US policies targeting cyber-laundering.

Lieutenant Colonel John W. Brennan’s 2012 literature United States Counter Terrorism

Cyber Law Policy, Enabling or Disabling recognizes the need for political lawmakers and

national decision-makers to place emphasis on the modification to current US policies. This

study was conducted to determine if US counter terrorism cyber laws and policies were enabling

or disabling government initiatives to counter the fight on terrorism in cyberspace. There appear

to be no optimization on the use of national counter terrorism assets according to the study; to

include, a lack of policies update that are designed to effectively support government officials.

Although there are US strategies such as the 2011 International Strategy for Cyber Space, the

study emphasizes the need to initiate a comprehensive sourcing for domestic and international

law (Brennan 2012, 17). The failure to take these actions will continue to hinder the

professionals from performing their jobs effectively whom are the very ones the strategy is

designed to support. The gap that is created resulting from inconsistencies between national

security, counter terrorism and its cyber strategies, and the laws and policies currently

established enables terrorist organizations to occupy and operate cybercrimes successfully;

including, cyber laundering. The review of this document increases the awareness of US policies

that are not fully supported by domestic or international law.

A 2008 report to Congress by Clay Wilson, Botnets, Cybercrime, and Cyberterrorism:

Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress, reveals the modernization and sophistication of

cybercrime. The report supports this research in that evidence is provided that support gaps

within current US policies targeting cyber-laundering. Additionally, the literature specifically

bridges the two researched transnational crimes, illicit drug trafficking and cyber-laundering.

The article points out the fact that normal business practices for some IT business consists of

developing more advance computer codes for the sole purpose to be utilized for cybercrimes

(Wilson 2008, 9). The illicit profits are recognized as being extraordinary. Modern technologies

continue to surpass policy for law enforcement. Complications of coordination among agencies

of different nations, also with clashing national policies about crime in cyberspace, cultivate to

the benefit of cybercriminals who can select to function from geographic locations where

penalties may not exist for some forms of cybercrime. Value is added to the research with the

insertion of specifics from this literature because it magnifies the complexities that must be taken

into consideration during the establishment of new US policies or the modification of current US

policies.

Cyber-laundering techniques that are utilized by criminals or terrorist organizations are

discussed in Wojciech Filipkowski’s 2008 article Cyber Laundering: An Analysis of Typology

and Techniques. The purpose of this literature is to add examples and highlight symptoms of

cyber laundering. Additionally, facts and evidence revealed in this literature substantiate many

claims within this research in regards to criminals or terrorists organizations who want to

legitimize their illicit profits (Filipkowski 2008, 15-27). Policies and laws that are tailored to

human beings may exist in both the physical natural environment and the cyber environment.

Unfortunately, the authority to enforce policies and laws amongst digital profiles in the cyber

environment is not a simple task. The ability to exchange or transfer currency in a digital

environment swiftly, easily, securely, and mostly anonymously are all great attributes of the use

of the Internet. The issue arise in the increase use of these same attributes by terrorist

organizations for both illicit drug trafficking and illicit cyber-laundering.

A review of Douglas Farah’s 2012 document, Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism,

and Criminalized States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority,

establishes a different perspective when considering the fight against illicit drug trafficking and

cyber-laundering. Farah points out the fact that the emergence of new hybrid (state and non-

state) transnational criminal/terrorist franchises in Latin America operating under broad state

protection now pose a tier-one security threat for the United States (Farah 2012, 1). The

possibility of these hybrid franchise models expanding throughout the world is a considerable

factor for national security. This source supports the research in that the corruption of

government at its highest levels are exposed.

The pursuit of literature to support the concept that the international community must be

involved in the fight against illicit drug trafficking and cyber-laundering paid off after reviewing

the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols

Thereto, a product produced by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The literature is

in contrast with other literature in that within this literature, the international community

demonstrated the political will to answer a global challenge with a global response (United

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004). The literature discusses the challenges that are

created with innovative technology and how criminals and terrorists use this same technology to

expand their illicit activities by exploiting the gaps in an open globalization market.

The research study would not be complete without a review of The White House Strategy to

Combat Transnational Organized Crime. President Barrack Obama directed his Administration

to the pursuit of four enduring national interests: security, prosperity, respect for universal

values, and the shaping of an international order that can meet the challenges of the 21st century

(The White House 2011). The immediate threat to this strategy is the increasing size, purview,

and stature of transnational organized crime. The strategy recognizes the comprehensive

challenges that are created through continued technological innovations. Although innovations

are normally for the good of mankind, the strategy suggests that transnational criminal

organizations have taken advantage of innovations over the past several years to spread their

illicit activities. The strategy further supports this research study in that it supports evidence

throughout the study that points to the fact that these networks also threaten U.S. interests by

forging alliances with corrupt elements of national governments and using the power and

influence of those elements to further their criminal activities (The White House 2011, 3). The

strategy is further analyzed to identify gaps in US policies that are meant to support this strategy.

A 2014 report by Attorney General Kamala Harris, Gangs Beyond Borders: California and

the Fight Against Transnational Organized Crime, addresses all three emerging pillars of

transnational criminal activity: the trafficking of drugs, weapons and human beings; money

laundering; and high-tech crimes, such as digital piracy, hacking and fraud (Harris 2014, 1). The

significance of this document that it recognizes transnational organized crime as a notable

problem; but, also suggests that it is not insurmountable (Harris 2014, 1). Key portions of this

literature provides evidence that is contrary to other resources and thereby presents follow-on

arguments that are discussed throughout this study.

The idea for law enforcement agencies to work together at every level is not a new concept

when having the conversation to combat illicit drug trafficking or cyber-laundering. The

additional resources that compliments law enforcement agencies comes from state and local

leaders, community-based organizations, private sector and international partners (Department of

Homeland Security 2011, 1). The 2011 Strengthening the Homeland Security Enterprise

document by the Department of Homeland Security, highlights many initiatives taken to increase

the US security in pursuit to deter or minimize threats. The purpose of this document is to

analyze the things that have been accomplished and determine the link between previous or

standing US policy. The task is to determine the effectiveness of the implemented efforts and

confirm or deny its relativeness to US policy against illicit drug trafficking and cyber-laundering.

Charles Doyle’s analysis of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing

Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act provides

general regulatory data that was established following the September 11, 2001 terrorists attacks.

The document, The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis, supports research findings related to

cyber laundering. The Act, in section 325, empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to

promulgate regulations to prevent financial institutions from allowing their customers to conceal

their financial activities by taking advantage of the institutions’ concentration account practices

(Doyle 2002, 31). In relations to combating cyber-laundering, the USA PATRIOT Act is

designed to place additional initiatives to combat money laundering. Furthermore, the Act

places more effort in the prevention of money laundering to counter terrorists attempt to gain

resources for attacks. The literature is utilized to either confirm or deny consistency in US

policy. According to the USA PATRIOT Act, federal authorities attack money laundering

through regulations, international cooperation, criminal sanctions, and forfeiture (Doyle 2002,

24).

Tara Raghavan’s 2003 In Fear of Cyberterrorism: An Analysis of the Congressional

Response gives a profound perspective regarding the US national security system. The focus is

directly aimed on combating cyberterrorism. The link between cyberterrorism and cyber-

laundering may not be as revealing on the surface; however, the two are integral involved in

illicit cyber activities. Cyber-laundering that supports cyberterrorism remains a viable option for

any individual or group wanting to use it to further their goals (Raghavan 2003, 297). The

literature provides additional perspectives regarding the USA PATRIOT Act, the Cyber Security

Enhancement Act of 2002 (CSEA) that is an improvement to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

of 1986 (CFAA), and invaluable details on cybersecurity-related laws that were passed by

Congress. The data adds to the analysis of laws and the impacts regarding possible loop holes

that are exploited by terrorist organizations when it comes to US policies on cyber-laundering.

In simple text, cyberterrorism would most likely be linked to computer hijacking or execution

of viruses and malware on a specific organization or entity. Saint-Claire’s 2011 Overview and

Analysis on Cyber Terrorism expands the horizon of both meaning and application of

cyberterrorism. The analogy is specifically unique with much value to this study in that it

recognizes the enormous advantages that criminals and terrorists organizations have within cyber

communications. The data obtained from this analysis will be linked to US policies to determine

the effectiveness of such policies against cyber-laundering. The use of cyber activities are not

limited to simply communicating messages; but, can be linked to supporting the underground

network for illicit drug trafficking. The similar advantages the Internet and superior technology

bring to the public and to business -- speed, security and global linkage -- are helping

international terrorist groups arrange their lethal and disorderly activities (Saint-Claire 2011, p.

95). The Internet becomes the vehicle of travel for terrorist organizations and so the discussion

is to determine if US policies are protecting the cyber roadways.

To no surprise, the Internet can be considered the backbone of the US digital infrastructure.

The growing sophistication and breadth of criminal activity, along with the harm already caused

by cyber incidents, highlight the potential for malicious activity in cyberspace to affect U.S.

competitiveness, degrade privacy and civil liberties protections, undermine national security, or

cause a general erosion of trust, or even cripple society. To this extent, the reviewing of the

2010 Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and

Communications Infrastructure, a product by The White House, was not optional in this research

study. Cyber-laundering is in essence a breach of security because attempts to conceal or falsify

pertinent information is being performed; to include, gaining entry to a legitimate banking

network to conduct illicit activities. In November 2008, the compromised payment processors of

an international bank permitted fraudulent transactions at more than 130 automated teller

machines in 49 cities within a 30-minute period, according to press reports (The White House

2010, 2). The literature exclusively makes the point that without major advances in the security

of these systems or significant change in how they are constructed or operated, it is doubtful that

the United States can protect itself from the growing threat of cybercrime and state-sponsored

intrusions and operations (The White House 2010, i). The document gains support from other

reviewed sources in that it too recognizes the need for cooperation from the international

community. The United States needs to develop a strategy designed to shape the international

environment and bring like-minded nations together on a host of issues, including acceptable

norms regarding territorial jurisdiction, sovereign responsibility, and use of force (The White

House 2010, p.20). The document supports various discussions within the study and aims to

suggest that a more integrated approach to policy making will result in a more unified,

aggressive fight against transnational crimes.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The growth of drug trafficking through Africa poses new challenges to international counter-

narcotics efforts, as well as a variety of emergent threats to the US; additionally, US counter-

narcotics policy responses to the rise in trans-Africa drug trafficking are in the formative stages

(Wyler & Cook 2009). The incongruence between national counterterrorism cyber policy, law,

and strategy degrades the abilities of federal counterterrorism professionals to interdict

transnational terrorists from within cyberspace (Brennan 2012). Combating these challenges

without vulnerabilities within US policies that empowers terrorist organizations is the basis for

this research paper. Without the support of the international community, US policies targeting

illicit drug trafficking and cyber-laundering will have vulnerabilities that will increase homeland

security threats from terrorist organizations. The effectiveness of US policy impacts both the

international community as well as local communities as displayed in Figure 1. Attacking the

threats at each level requires coordination and synchronization with total commitment from

government officials at every hierarchy.

METHODOLOGY

In efforts to clearly understand the research problem, both quantitative and qualitative

research and methods are utilized throughout this study. The mixed methods research design

approach to this research establishes a frame of questions that is relative to the theory. A key

feature of mixed methods research is its methodological pluralism or eclecticism, which

frequently results in superior research (compared to mono-method research) (Johnson and

Onwuegbuzie 2004, 14-26). Conducting an in-depth, comprehensive quantitative and qualitative

data analysis to bridge a literature-based research is significant to the overall study. The means

to accomplish a clear and concise research will include historical and comparative analysis of

various collected data. Analyzing historical US policies and the effects of those policies will

establish facts that will support the conclusion of this research. Additionally, comparing past

policies to current policies will parallel situations in the present to identify possible

vulnerabilities in current US Government policies targeting transnational crime on illicit drug

trafficking and cyber-laundering that will increase homeland security threats from terrorist

organizations. The analogy is to identify and confirm the direct relationship of cause and effect

related to US policies, illicit drug trafficking and cyber-laundering. The basis is to collect

quantitative and qualitative data simultaneously; however, analyze the two separately. The

results of the two analysis will be merged during interpretation as both will have equal value for

understanding the research problem.

The reviewing of multiple collected literature is essential to gaining a base knowledge for the

research. The sources will provide data with evidence that supports the facts in determining the

best recommendations at the conclusion of the study. The mixed method approach ensures the

collection of sufficient data that is invaluable and relevant to this research study. The results are

indicative of the findings throughout the research in pursuing a clear and concise response to

answering the research question. All recommendations are based on collected and analyzed data

with the researcher’s interpretation that does not reflect practical experience within the field.

This research study addresses all threats and activities associated with transnational organized

crime of both illicit drug trafficking and cyber-laundering and the intersection thereof with US

policies targeting these two specific areas. The study is to attempt to find the policy gaps, and

organizational redundancies that makes the policy subjective to exploitation by terrorist

organizations. The research findings are intentionally separated in order to ensure clarity

throughout the study. All related data that is relevant to transnational crimes on illicit drug

trafficking is analyzed first. Second is the analysis of all collected data relevant to cyber-

laundering. The two transnational crimes are brought together during the analysis of US policies

that targets illicit drug trafficking and cyber-laundering. Subsequently, gaps that are identified in

US policies that presents threats to the homeland by allowing criminals and terrorist

organizations to exploit are revealed. The review does not provide an in-depth analysis of

options; however, it presents the necessity for a greater balanced and integrated policy-making

approach to address illicit drug trafficking and cyber-laundering.

RESULTS

A comprehensive and thorough analysis of the data results in the finding of gaps in US

policies targeting two specific transnational crimes, illicit drug trafficking and cyber-laundering.

The gaps identified presents opportunities for criminal groups and terrorist organizations to

exploit current US policy to their advantage while enhancing the threats to the US homeland and

its interest abroad. The gaps can be mitigated, but requires the coordination and total

cooperation of the entire international community. In order for the US to be successful in

combating these two transnational crimes, US policy must meet the needs of local, state, federal,

and international institutions and fully integrate the international community.

In the analysis to differentiate transnational crime from organized crime, the results revealed

many similarities between the two. The evidence obtained suggests that the separation of the

two are extremely minor resulting from the nature in how they overlap in relation to the crimes

committed, the perpetrator involved, and how certain criminal opportunities are harness for

profit. Additionally, both transnational crimes and organized crimes share lineage of the same

principal conduct and the same types of offenders. The opportunities to conduct criminal acts

are similar; although, over the years many have changed in form. In continuing to clarify

misconceptions of transnational crimes, Table 1, Classification of Transnational Crimes

(Albanese 2012, 2) separates the crimes into categories: Goods; Services; and Infiltration.

A thorough review of the offenses listed in Table 1 portrays the majority types of transnational

crime has a nucleus consisting of organized crime activity rather than on standard, independent,

or politically influence crimes. The norm for conducting these crimes usually require two or

more people to plan and execute with the goal to gain some sort of profit. Additionally, the plan

is well organized and stretches through two or more countries given the extent of transnational

crimes. As reflected in Table 1, there is not an infinite number of transnational organized

crimes, but there is a finite number of criminal activities that distinguish the majority of

organized crime.

The following is an example to assist with the understanding of how transnational crimes are

committed. Subject X establishes an online auction that reaches out to multiple countries using

resources such as Craigslist and eBay. Buyers from the US and other countries electronically

purchased the desired product using their bank transfers; unfortunately, the items were simply a

hoax. Subject X, not only moved from and to various cities to conceal his or her identity, new

bank accounts were able to be establish to continue the illicit practice. The example is a clear

case of a transnational crime committing fraud. Basically, you have a violation of the law that

involves and impacts multiple countries, unlike traditional crimes within a specific country.

Figure 2, Model of Transnational Organized Crime Operation in Illicit Markets, portrays a

simple concept of operations of the underground networks (Albanese 2012, 10). The bottom line

is to provide an illicit good while eluding laws and avoiding competition in efforts to reach the

customer to gain maximum profit.

The study revealed another clear distinction between transnational crimes and international

crimes. Transnational crimes has a denominator that consists of the involvement of two or more

nations whereas international crimes, which involve crimes against humanity, may or may not

involve multiple nations. Examples of international crimes include genocide and terrorism, as

well as violations of human rights, often without a profit motive—a central objective of virtually

all transnational crimes (Albanese 2012, 2). The word terrorism is made mention in the previous

sentence because the threat exceeds the traditional non-state theory of limited activity, such as

drug trafficking and money laundering. These two activities, drug trafficking and money

laundering, could possibly be linked to the procurement and trafficking of weapons of mass

destruction by terrorist organizations and their sponsors, hence the relationship between

transnational crimes and terrorism.

There are activities conducted with the support of regional and extra-regional state actors

whose leadership is entangled in criminal activity that generate well into the billions of dollars in

illegal proceeds annually. These corrupt governments have a common belief of asymmetrical

warfare against the United States and its allies. The criminal networks are not decreasing;

unfortunately, these networks are expanding and branching out their activities. According to

Kleiman, drug trafficking — in source countries, transit countries, and consumer countries,

including the United States — could contribute to the problems of terror in at least five distinct

ways (Kleiman 2004, 1-2):

1. Supplying cash for terrorist operations.

2. Creating chaos in countries where drugs are produced, through which they pass, or in

which they are sold at retail and consumed — chaos sometimes deliberately

cultivated by drug traffickers — which may provide an environment conducive to

terrorist activity.

3. Generating corruption in law enforcement, military, and other governmental and

civil-society institutions in ways that either build public support for terrorist-linked

groups or weaken the capacity of the society to combat terrorist organizations and

actions.

4. Providing services also useful for terrorist actions and movements of terrorist

personnel and materiel, and supporting a common infrastructure, such as smuggling

capabilities, illicit arms acquisition, money laundering, or the production of false

identification or other documents, capable of serving both drug-trafficking and

terrorist purposes.

5. Competing for law enforcement and intelligence attention.

No government is exempt from the temptations of illicit activities. Transnational organized

crime constitute a devastating and flourishing threat to national and international security, with

dreadful consequences for public safety, public health, democratic institutions, and economic

security across the world.

In nations with frail governance, there are corrupt officials who pivot the opposite direction to

transnational organized crime. The emergence of crime as an international security problem

arises from the increasing interdependence of global markets and the emergence of resilient

cross-national crime groups (Paraschiv 2013, 173-178). Transnational organized crime networks

maneuver themselves into the political process in a mixture of ways. To no surprise they attempt

to pursue their goals through direct bribery. Other ways may be running for a political office,

setting up shadow economies; infiltrating financial and security sectors through coercion or

corruption; and positioning themselves as alternate providers of governance, security, services,

and livelihoods (The White House 2011, 5). Transnational organized crime piercing of

governments leads to corruption and eroding governance, rule of law, democratic institution-

building, and transparency.

Terrorist groups utilizes criminal techniques, including drug trafficking and cyber-laundering,

to raise funds in order to sustain their operations. In today’s world of innovation, terrorist

organizations and criminal organizations that have been unrelated are starting to unite and work

together. So as criminals expand their activities in support of terrorist organizations; terrorism,

drug trafficking, cyber-laundering, and other transnational organized crimes becomes entwined.

The absence of transnational crimes such as drug trafficking and or cyber-laundering could have

a devastating impact to terrorist operations throughout the world. The development of US

policies to directly strike this area is critical to the security of the homeland and US interest

abroad.

Illicit drug trafficking is a major transnational organized crime activity that terrorists and

insurgents have increasingly engaged to produce funding and obtain logistical support to conduct

their threatening acts. The link between transnational organized crime and terrorism is obviously

apparent in the fight targeting illicit drug trafficking. The Department of Justice reports that 29

of the 63 organizations on its FY 2010 Consolidated Priority Organization Targets list, which

includes the most significant international drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) threatening the

United States, were associated with terrorist groups (The White House 2011, 6). The demand for

illegal drugs throughout the world increases the power and violence of criminals, insurgents, and

terrorist around the world. These may include non-drug-related transnational organized crime

networks and, potentially, U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations, including the leftist

rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and Hezbollah (Wyler and

Cook 2009, 4). Additionally, the history of these two groups reflects the participation of drug

trafficking and money laundering in other regions of the world.

The trafficking of illicit drugs starts in many countries, some more prominent than others, but

they all have the common goal to avoid getting caught, beating arrival competition, and making

profit through an underground organized network. The drugs ranges from heroin, coca/cocaine,

marijuana, opiates, cannabis, and various types of amphetamine and hallucinogens. The bottom

line is that drugs are a profitable business and a fountain of global criminal activity. Illicit drugs

remain a serious threat to US citizens’ safety, security, and financial well-being as well as US

allies and other nations throughout the world. A key analysis within this research is to examine

the drug profiles by category in order to effectively highlight any gaps within US policies

designed to target illicit drug trafficking as a whole.

The top three illicit drugs that closed out a 2012 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

(UNODC) annual report questionnaire are opioids/opiates, cannabis, and cocaine. See Figure 3

(UNODC 2014, 1). Opioids/opiates are utilized to relieve pain. Common name drugs include

morphine, hydrocodone, codeine and related drugs. Cannabis is considered to be a depressant

type drug. The most common description of this type drug is marijuana. Finally, there is

cocaine and its use dating back to the early 1980s which is considered to be a psychoactive

substance, derived from coca leaves. A thorough analysis of the data obtained from UNODC

clearly suggests that the popularity of opioid use is growing world-wide. According to UNODC

the rise results from increased misuse of prescription opioids, whereas the prevalence of opiate

(heroin and opium) use has been stable at the global level and declining in some regions such as

Europe (UNODC 2014, 12). Figure 3 highlights the demand for cannabis is higher than that for

cocaine. Although cocaine use corresponds to significant trauma, the far higher number of

cannabis-dependent users results in more global demand.

The evidence is clear. The continued increase of illicit drug trafficking results from the

demands world-wide. See Figure 4 (UNODC 2014, 1). Combating drug trafficking is one issue;

however, the add-ons associated with drug trafficking is another. Case in point is the linkage

between drugs and terrorism in Colombia. Terrorist groups are linked to drug producers and

distributors in the Western Hemisphere; to include, illicit drug trafficking by members of radical

Islamic groups.

In order to confront an issue, the examination of pertinent data and resources are essential.

To this extent, the discussion points must involve the countries that are supporting illicit drug

trafficking either knowingly or unknowingly. The Andean region is the source of virtually all

the world's cocaine (Beers and Taylor 2002, 2). Coca and other finalized products from the coca

plant are primarily produced by Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. The exploitation of drugs as a key

revenue source is only fitting for terrorist organizations located or operating discreetly in

Columbia and Peru. Transnational organized crime seeks openings that yields little to no

hostility. Because of these tactics by criminals and terrorist organizations that are seeking to

bring harm to the US and its allies, the policies established must be free of loop holes.

Nevertheless, the country of Bolivia provides both, an excellent geographical location for

terrorist networks. Unfortunately, the additional dangers that this unique area presents are

threats to its national and citizen security.

The research study involves the analysis of illicit drugs trafficking routes. This area is

important to the study because any US policy established must consider the nations involved or

impacted by the illicit travel network. Starting with the country of Bolivia which has become an

anchor area of South America’s illegal narcotics trade. The country also produces its own

cocaine. To make this network more complex, Bolivia borders both Brazil, the second biggest

consumer of illegal drugs in the world, Peru the world’s principal producer of cocaine, and

Paraguay, South America’s primary producer of marijuana.

In Bolivia, the Colombians can produce its illicit drugs and move drug shipments across the

Bolivian border into Brazil or Argentina with the least risk of interdiction and nearly no risk of

extradition. These two nations also act as transshipment points for the most lucrative markets of

all: Europe and Asia (McDermott 2014, 6). Illicit drug trafficking principal ports into Europe are

Spain and Holland. For example, cocaine is produced in Bolivia that is transported to either

Brazil or Argentina which are not land lock nations. Subsequently, transported to Europe or

Asia. Traditionally, cocaine bound for Europe traveled a northerly route from South America.

From there the illicit drug travels through the eastern Caribbean and the Azores, to landing points

on the Iberian Peninsula and the Netherlands. There has been a rise in cocaine trafficking to

Europe through West Africa. Enormous shipments of cocaine are now moved from Colombia

and onward to Brazil, Venezuela, and some little destinations, from where they finally enter

West Africa. The largest known loads of cocaine en route to Europe via West Africa have been

transported by boat (including fishing boats, sailing yachts, and speedboats) and on container

ships and other so called mother ships that hand off shipments to smaller, faster boats outside

territorial waters (Wyler and Cook 2009, 11).

This research also revealed that small private airplanes are also utilized for illicit drug

trafficking. France, Portugal, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands are major European entry points

for cocaine flowing through West Africa. While more circuitous than direct routes between

South America and Europe, the southern trans-Atlantic oceanic distance between South America

and Africa is geographically shorter and thus more secure for trafficking purposes than that

between South America and Europe (Wyler and Cook 2009, 11). Many people do take the

ultimate risk in trafficking cocaine by ingesting tiny amounts of the narcotic or hiding it in their

luggage or clothing on flights from South America to Europe.

A common channel for smuggling between east and west, the Balkans has become a modern

environment for the cultivation and growth of transnational organized crime. Frail institutions in

Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina have enabled Balkan-based transnational

organized crime groups to gain control of vital drug and human trafficking routes and Western

European markets. The Balkans region has become a new entry point for Latin American

cocaine, a source of synthetic drugs, and a transit region for heroin chemical precursors for use in

the Caucasus and Afghanistan (The White House 2011, 10).

West Africa has become a key transit point for illicit drug shipments to Europe and for

Southwest Asian, heroin to the US. Also, this route has become a source and transit point for

methamphetamine destined for the Far East. West Africa also serves as a transit route for illicit

profits going back to source countries throughout the European environment. Transnational

organized crime inflame wrongdoing and subvert the rule of law, democratic processes, and

business practices in multiple African states that already endure from fragile institutions. Due to

its lack of law enforcement capabilities, its susceptibility to corruption, its porous borders, and its

strategic location, Guinea-Bissau remains a significant hub of narcotics trafficking on the verge

of developing into a narco-state (The White House 2011, 10). The Government of Guinea-

Bissau understands the extent of the drug problem and desires to take action; unfortunately, in

this part of the world, a crippling lack of resources and position continues to delay any progress

towards combating drug trafficking.

Russian and Eurasian organized crime networks are a significant threat to economic

expansion and democratic institutions. Russian organized crime syndicates and criminally linked

oligarchs may attempt to collude with state or state-allied actors to undermine competition in

strategic markets such as gas, oil, aluminum, and precious metals (The White House 2011, 10).

Simultaneously, transnational organized crime networks in the region are creating new ties to

international illicit drug trafficking networks. The US will continue to cooperate with Russia and

the nations of the region to combat illicit drugs and transnational organized crime (The White

House 2011, 10).

Transnational organized crime networks, specifically those involved in illicit drug trafficking

are integrating their activities in the Asia/Pacific region. Due to the region’s global economic

ties, these lawless activities have grave implications globally. The economic importance of the

region also heightens the threat posed to intellectual property rights, as a large portion of

intellectual property theft originates from China and Southeast Asia. Human trafficking and

smuggling remain significant concerns in the Asia/Pacific region, as demonstrated by the case of

convicted alien smuggler Cheng Chui Ping, who smuggled more than 1,000 aliens into the

United States during the course of her criminal career, sometimes hundreds at a time (The White

House 2011, 11). Transnational organized crime networks in the region are also active in the

illicit drug trade as well as trafficking precursor chemicals to be used in illegal drug production.

Additionally, a concern related to the North Korean government entities are possible ties with

established crime networks that manufacture counterfeit US monies, threatening the global

integrity of the US dollar.

In analyzing other illicit drug trafficking, the focus turns to the country of Afghanistan. Over

the past decade, Afghanistan has become a focal point for terrorist activities. News headlines of

terrorist threats, bombings and massive killings seemed to have placed illicit drug trafficking in

the shadows. In the mist of all the other chaotic activities, Afghanistan, which has an enormous

opium poppy cultivation, saw an extraordinary growth in the area under cultivation. Supporting

evidence suggests that Afghan heroin is increasingly reaching new markets, such as Oceania and

South-East Asia. Furthermore, the long-established Balkan route seems to remain a corridor for

the transit of Afghan heroin to the lucrative markets in Western and Central Europe (UNODC

2014, x). The “southern route,” as it is referred, is growing with heroin being illegally moved

through the southern parts of Afghanistan reaching Europe, via the Middle East and Africa, as

well as directly from Pakistan (UNODC 2014, x). Indeed drug trafficking has produced funding

for insurgency and terrorist acts throughout the world, encompassing in transit regions. Without

a shadow of a doubt, drug trafficking has resulted in funding that has supported terrorism and in

some cases such as the Madrid bombing, drugs were being utilized as the currency. The same

scenario can happen in any small or large city throughout the world.

Unlike drugs, varying trafficking routes, and dissimilar organizations have distinct

relationships to terrorist threats. Mexican drug trafficking organizations are increasing their

violence in effort to bring their market share together within the Western Hemisphere, secure

their operations in Mexico, and enlarge their reach into the US. The bottom line is that the U.S.

demand for illicit drugs foster the black markets for Mexican drug trafficking organizations;

possibly being a contributor to the increase of violence in parts of Mexico.

The evidence supporting this study confirms that North America is the number one customer for

cannabis (marijuana). In recent years with US laws changing and authorizing the legal use of

marijuana in some of its states, these actions may have influenced drug trafficking organizations

in Mexico to increase its illicit trafficking activities.

History recalls many years of illicit marijuana drug trafficking from Mexico to the US via the

Cartels. A deeper research into the current state of marijuana trafficking reveals that the

trafficking of marijuana to the US has reverse. Cartels are conducting illicit trafficking of high

quality marijuana from the US to Mexico for illicit sales. US Drug Enforcement Administration

(DEA) spokesman Lawrence Payne told U.S. News that traffickers working in the US are

stealing marijuana that’s much higher quality and more expensive than pot that isn’t grown

legally (Engel 2014). As a result, violence between various cartels such as the Sinaloa Cartel

and the Los Zetas Cartel are beginning to escalate.

The legalization of marijuana within the US may have devastating impacts to areas such as

Culiacan, Sinaloa, which is located in the heartland of Mexico. As in some nations, the same

holds true for Mexico when it comes to harvesting illegal drugs for the sake of earning a living to

supplement income to take care of family needs. Will the US find itself participating in illicit

drug wars with Mexico cartels? The question is legitimate for a possible follow-on research.

Nevertheless, in so much as establishing US policies to combat illicit drug trafficking from

entering the US, the policies must also confront illicit drug trafficking out of the US. Additional

questions are raised after further analysis of current US cannabis/marijuana status. Will

insurgents and terrorist organizations seek to buy into any US illicit cultivation marijuana land

fields or even legitimate business that are designed to produce marijuana for medical purposes?

Are there laws or policy to prevent terrorist supporters or groups from exploiting this new era

within the US? Will US citizens become more involved in an illicit drug trafficking network in

pursuit of higher profits from foreign black markets? Did the US just invite insurgents and

terrorist organization to exploit US national security posture? The list of questions can go on and

on. For now, we will have to watch any changes that may occur over the next few years.

The Mexican drug cartels are some of the most comprehensive and prosperous organized

crime networks in history. They are advanced, transnational criminal enterprises that control and

regulate access to illicit supply routes across the Western Hemisphere. There is increasing

evidence that the cartels’ influence is emerging throughout South Asia, Africa, Europe, and

Australia. Drug trafficking, because of its connections to other forms of transnational organized

crime, is vital national security challenge that requires unwavering attention from the US

government, its allies, and international partners. As with terrorism, drug trafficking will be

around for several years, continuing the opportunities to fund terrorist organizations. All of the

corruption and violence that is directly or indirectly due to the demand for illicit drugs such as

cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines will continue unless there is an absolute global

fundamental change.

Information is insufficient in regards to the distribution of proceeds from illicit drug sales, but

foreign supply cartels employ influential control over wholesale distribution in the US illicit

proceeds are frequently laundered and invested through foreign financial institutions.

Transnational organized crime networks are becoming more and more connected in cybercrime,

which results in the loss of billions of dollars annually. The threats are surreal to corporate and

government computer networks, and undermines global trust in the international financial

system. The impacts of negligence or illicit activities through cybercrime by transnational

criminal organizations or terrorist organizations could easily hinder e-currency, banking systems,

stock markets, and credit card services. These services are vital for the existence of the world

economy. The Internet through the use of computers or mobile devices play a significant role in

most transnational crimes, either as the target of interest or the weapon used in the crime. The

good thing about the use of the Internet, personal computers, and mobile devices is that a trail of

digital evidence is created during use. Depending on which side of the law you are on, this could

be bad or good. Frequently the correct investigation of this evidence trail demands highly

trained and competent individuals. Unfortunately, in today’s environment, the rate of

cybercrimes being committed are out pacing the investigations processes. The shortage of

investigators with the expertise to effectively and efficiently analyze increasing amounts of

potential digital evidence does not help the fight against cybercrime. In fact, such shortages can

be viewed as a hindrance.

To have a comprehensive background on cybercrime is essential before moving forward in

discussing cyber-laundering (money laundering). A conceptual view of cybercrime could very

be that it is transforming to a transnational organized business. Criminals or terrorists can

leverage the Internet to conduct crimes as previously discussed such as distributing illegal drugs.

Moreover, they exploit the digital environment to facilitate crimes like payment card fraud or

identity theft. This research study revealed that there are various views and opinions when it

comes to defining cybercrime. Cybercrime is crime that is enabled by, or that targets computers

(Wilson 2008, 4). Nevertheless, conceptualizing cybercrime involves a number of key elements

and questions, including where do the criminal acts exist in the real and digital worlds (and what

technologies are involved), why are malicious activities initiated, and who is involved in carrying

out the malicious acts? (Finklea and Theohary 2015, 2). The most important thing to understand

about the cyber world is that it is linked to the physical world. In the physical world we have

boundaries that are easily identifiable. In the digital world, boundaries do not exist. However,

there are boundaries between the digital world and the physical world. The mediators between

the two worlds are things such as keyboards, mouse, and login passwords. Finlea and Theohary

makes the clear point that computers and other advanced technologies may be components of

cybercrime through a variety of roles:

• In some cybercrimes, computers themselves—or data contained therein—are the

victims or targets of crime;

• In other instances, computers or other digital technologies are used as tools for carrying

out crimes (victimizing individuals, organizations, or government); and

• Technological devices may serve as repositories for evidence of a cybercrime

All of these issues underscore the salience of location in any conceptualization of cybercrime

(Finklea and Theohary 2015, 3). Contributing are the online skills, many which are high

technology, for rent to anyone having the revenue to pay for the services. Unfortunately, the list

of potential customers include criminals, insurgents, nation states, terrorist supporters, and

terrorist organizations throughout the world.

Criminal and terrorist organizations alike, operate in the cyber environment mainly to

circumvent ordinary established constructs such as international borders. In the cyber

environment, these groups can depend on relative anonymity to conduct their business.

Throughout the world in today’s atmosphere, cyberspace is recognized as a vital strategic

environment amongst citizens, businesses, and governments who are challenged with various

cyber threats from cybercrime and disruptive network attacks. The growth of businesses can be

linked to high-speed Internet communication; unfortunately, the same holds true for the

expansion of criminal and terrorist networks. The Internet has strengthen the criminal and

terrorist organizations’ abilities to operate in the cyber environment where potential targets are

attainable on a global level. This research study is focused on identifying gaps within US

policies that allows criminal and terrorist organizations to exploit these gaps that leads to threats

on US citizens, national security and US interest abroad. The research reveals that these threats

will continue to grow in the coming years as more people and business take advantage of new

innovations that uses the Internet as its nucleus.

The evolution of virtual currencies and new technology that emerges such as three-

dimensional printing will escalate cyber threats even further. In concert with Sir Isaac Newton’s

third law of physics, as the security terrain evolves, both in the cyber and physical world, so does

the threats from terrorist organizations. Between December 2000 and June 2014, the estimated

number of Internet users grew from almost 361 million to nearly 7.2 billion—an increase of

more than 741%, see Figure 9 (Internet World Stats 2014). Similarly, the digital technologies

used to facilitate these crimes, such as Internet servers and digital communication devices, are

located in physical locations that may not coincide with the locations of the criminal actors or

victims (Finklea and Theohary 2015, 5). Because of these circumstances, the challenge to

combat cybercrimes are more complex than physical crimes.

The days in which criminal and terrorist organizations will launch cyberattacks are already

here today. The days of saying perhaps or later in the future are no more. The Internet is already

being used for an array of other activities. More times than a few, news headlines are discussing

some type of activity that was discovered via the Internet or cyber environment regarding

criminal or terrorist communication, recruiting, planning, or training.

There has been evidence over the recent years regarding the messages inserted within jihadist

websites attempting to destabilize Muslim communities in Western democracies, encourage

support for violence while attempting to justify their reasons for terrorism.

Asia and Europe are the top two Internet users in the world according to the analysis of

collected evidence during this research study, see Figure 10 (Internet World Stats 2014). To no

surprise, the US Internet penetration rates are the highest in the world; but, not only are they the

highest rates, it nearly doubles the world average rate, see Figure 11 (Internet World Stats 2014).

In respect to Internet penetration, there are several areas to consider when discussing the cyber

environment. These areas include and are not limited to cyber-laundering, cyberattack, cyber

espionage, cyberterrorism, and cyber warfare. The important thing to remember is that

cybercrimes may be viewed as matters of national and economic security. The focus on

transnational cyber-laundering for this study is within the scope of both national and economic

security threats. Criminal and terrorist networks depend on cyber technologies to execute frauds

that are extremely sophisticated in most cases. The results are the losses of billions of dollars

from individuals and businesses. Cybercrimes such as cyber-laundering carries a psychological

impact in that systems that are often compromises leads to the distrust in the network or financial

system involved. This could have a devastating impact on a society because these systems have

become vital to daily living throughout the world.

The link between cyber-laundering and cyber terrorism is that cyber-laundering or money

laundering is an attack launched as part of a criminal enterprise in effort to bring down or hinder

a vital component of a country’s critical infrastructure (economy system). Cybercrime can create

financing for terrorist activity in the same manner that illicit drug trafficking does. In

establishing a foundation to begin the discussion on cyber-laundering, discussing various facets

of cybercrime provides a more in-depth view in how cyber-laundering can impact so many other

areas within the cyber environment.

Cyber-laundering is viewed to be quick, discrete, secure, and global. The gateway which is

the Internet, provides the platform for this growing transnational digital society with no rules,

laws, or boundaries. This near perfect tool is where criminals and terrorists can interface more

freely than in the physical world, sharing expertise and methods to exploit. Quite obviously,

over the past couple of decades, the Internet has become the instrument of choice of several

criminal and terrorist organizations to transmit funds from one global location to another without

the risk in leaving many traces. The practice of using the Internet as a tool to hide the origins of

illicit funds continues to grow. To attempt to address a problem without fully understanding the

situation can be a waste of time, money, and valuable resources. To this extent, as with this

research study, in order to understand how US policy can successfully stop and fight against

money laundering and terrorist financing over the Internet, we first have to understand how

illegal funds can be moved by the simple click of a mouse. How does this happen and what

contributes to this vulnerability? This research revealed that money can be laundered via the

Internet through fake online sales, online games, online auctions, and online gambling websites

to name a few. If we were to truly think about how easy it is to conduct money laundering, many

may be surprised. Mobile phones is an instrument that is capable of easily making peer-to-peer

transactions. The funds laundered in this manner goes from one individual account, directly into

another’s; subsequently, avoiding financial oversight and possible detection. When using a

computer, criminals and terrorist can easily prevent the tracking of their online identity by using

proxy servers and anonymous software (Strauss 2013, 3). When a criminal activity makes a

considerable amount of money, the individual or group involved must acquire a way to control

the funds without gaining attention to the underlying activity or the people involved. This is

accomplished when criminals or terrorists supporters disguise the sources, change the form, or

move the funds via cyberspace to a location where they are less likely to attract attention.

How do cyber-laundering begin? First the launderer insert his illegal proceeds into the

legitimate financial system. There are various ways in which this initial step can be

accomplished. Keeping in mind that the launderer do not want to draw attention to himself, he

will break up any large amounts of cash into smaller that can be deposited without raising a

concern. The cash is then deposited directly into a bank account. Another approach may consist

of the purchasing of multiple money orders by multiple individuals that are later collected and

deposited into accounts at various locations. Once the funds are within the financial system, the

second step begins. During this step a series of movements and shifting of the funds occurs in

order to break ties with the origin or original source of the funds. The easier process is for the

launderer to simply conduct multiple wiring of the funds through several accounts (bouncing

around) throughout the world. Of course when this happens, the illicit actions becomes

transnational. The ideal approach is to funnel the money through countries with less of an anti-

money laundering establishment. More often during this step, the money is camouflage to

present the appearance of transfers for legitimate goods or services. The final step involves the

integration of the illicit funds back into the legitimate economy. The funds may be utilized to

purchase homes, cars, or even coerce authorities in order to gain a high value asset.

There are no specific or designated locations throughout the world that an individual or group

of people need to reside in order to participate in money laundering. The only requirement is to

become a participant in illegal profit making crimes in which money laundering becomes the

consequence.

The dirty money, blood money, or black market money must reenter a legitimate economy

system in order to be effective at some point. The potential social and political toll of money

laundering could be severe if there are no actions taken to fight this transnational crime.

Transnational organized crime can result in the infiltration of global financial institutions and

present a clear opportunity for criminals or terrorist to obtain significant control of the economy

through investment or the like.

The evidence clearly suggest that if one is to believe that there is a peaceful ending to

transnational organized cyber-laundering, this misjudgment would be a grave mistake. The

focus in this segment of the study turns to threats created by cyber-laundering such as financing

terrorism and corruption. The research in this area is significant to the analysis of US policies in

determining the effectiveness of such policy. Terrorist funding includes the requesting, seeking,

collection or provision of funds with the clear understanding that they may be used to sustain

terrorist acts or organizations. Funds may be derived from both legal and illegal origins. More

precisely, according to Article 2 of the International Convention for Suppression of Financing

Terrorism, a person commits the crime of financing of terrorism “if that person by any means,

directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that

they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to

carry out” an offense within the scope of the Convention (The White House 2000, 1). To the

extent of the understanding of Article 2, the principal objective of individuals or entities

participating in the financing of terrorism is therefore not necessarily to camouflage the sources

of the money but to conceal both the financing and the purpose of the financed activity. To be

clear regarding the findings and evidence that is supportive of this research, money laundering is

the process of camouflaging or disguising the illegal origin of revenue of crimes. Additionally,

the bottom line in respect to terrorist financing, it is the compilation or the arrangement of funds

for terrorist intentions.

The highlighted factor in the distinction between money laundering and terrorist financing is

that the funds are always of illegal origin for money laundering; however, in respect to terrorist

financing, funds can be derived from either legal and or illegal sources. Many of the techniques

that are applied to conduct money laundering and to finance terrorist activities are somewhat

indistinguishable and in some instances identical. For this reason, an effective anti-money

laundering and counter financing of terrorism policy cannot neglect to address the prevention,

detection, and consequences for funds entering a legitimate financial system and the

consequences for providing support or funding terrorist organizations or their activities. Both

corruption and money laundering have gained the attention of the International Monetary Fund

(IMF). There are many disruptive consequences that corruption and money laundering has on

national and regional economies is a legitimate threat. The IMF promotes international monetary

cooperation and exchange rate stability, facilitates the balanced growth of international trade, and

provides resources to help members in balance of payments difficulties or to assist with poverty

reduction (IMF n.d). Nowhere is the convergence of transnational threats more apparent than in

Afghanistan and Southwest Asia. The Taliban and other drug-funded terrorist groups threaten the

efforts of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the United States, and other international partners

to build a peaceful and democratic future for that nation (The White House 2011, 9).

Currency can be laundered by way of casinos, money exchange agencies and through

underground banking networks. The practices of money launders establishing legitimate

businesses to simultaneously engage in illegal activities while pouring the illicit proceeds into

their legitimate businesses laundering as turnover and profits is not uncommon. The research

reveals that smuggling cash together with wire transfers between countries can also be used to

launder money, taking advantage of regulatory loopholes in banks and financial service

providers such as trust companies (Unger and Busuioc 2007, 11). The National Cyber

Investigative Joint Task Force, led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), functions as a

domestic focal point for 18 federal departments or agencies to coordinate, integrate, and share

information related to cyber threat investigations, as well as make the Internet safer by pursuing

terrorists, spies, and criminals who seek to exploit US systems (The White House 2011, 8). A

key factor to consider is the differences between countries in the regulation of corporate

governance and what is considered wrongdoing. For example, activities that are considered

everyday business practice in one nation may very well be an offence that could lead to charges

of money laundering in other nations.

The study now shifts to the analysis of US policies that are designed to combat illicit drug

trafficking and cyber-laundering. The International Drug Trade and US Foreign Policy is a

concern because over the past decade, as evidence has shown, the flow of illicit drug trafficking

has actually increased. The elevated national priority directed to terrorism has resulted in

intensified focus on links between drug and terror organizations. The federal anti-drug initiative

has two major elements: (1) reduction of demand that is sought through education to prevent

dependence, through treatment to cure addiction and through measures to increase prices and risk

of apprehension at the consumer level and (2) reduction of supply which currently accounts for

about 64.5% of the federal anti-drug control budget, is sought by programs aimed at destabilizing

the operations of illicit drug cartels at all levels and severing their links to political power, and by

seizing their products, businesses, and financial assets (Perl 2006, 2). As mentioned early

onward within this research, drugs are an extraordinary profitable business.

A foundational adjustment of current prohibitionist-oriented international drug policies has

been raised by international advocates in recent years. Today, international drug control efforts

are grounded on the policy foundations laid by three United Nations (U.N.) treaties: the 1961

Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended; the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic

Substances; and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

Substances (INCB 2014, 7). An analysis of these U.N. treaties reveals that participating

countries agree to the limitations placed on the production and trade of a list of narcotic drugs,

psychotropic substances, and the precursor chemicals that are essential in making these

substances for predominantly medical and scientific reasons. Furthermore, the treaties sets in

place international mechanisms to oversee treaty adherence via the International Narcotics

Control Board and for the gathering of data associated to the illicit cultivation, production, and

manufacture of prohibited drugs. As an issue of international policy concern for more than a

century, and as a subject of longstanding US and multilateral policy commitment, US

counterdrug efforts have expanded to include a broad array of tools to attack the international

drug trade, such as the following (Wyler 2013, 26):

• Reducing drug production at the source: Central to reducing

cocaine and heroin production is the eradication of coca bush

and opium poppy crops and the provision of alternative livelihood

options to former drug crop farmers. Both policy approaches

ultimately seek to reduce the amount of illicit drug crops cultivated.

• Combating drugs in transit: To reduce the international flow of

drugs from source countries to final destinations, US efforts focus

on joint monitoring and interdiction operations as well as other forms

of border, police, and maritime cooperation and training.

• Dismantling international illicit drug networks: The United States

collaborates with other countries to target major drug traffickers and

their transnational networks through various law enforcement

interventions, judicial mechanisms, and financial sanctions. With the

provision of US foreign assistance, the US government supports

other countries to strengthen their capacity to investigate, arrest,

prosecute, and incarcerate drug traffickers domestically.

• Reducing and preventing drug demand abroad: In addition to

supply side drug control efforts, the United States supports

programs to reduce global drug abuse through demand reduction

assistance.

• Creating incentives for international cooperation on drug control:

In order to deter foreign governments from aiding or participating

in illicit drug production or trafficking, certain US foreign assistance

may be suspended to countries that are major illegal drug producers

or major transit countries for illegal drugs, known as “drug majors.”

Similarly, certain drug majors countries may be deemed ineligible to

be a beneficiary of preferential US trade arrangements.

Analysis of the actual policy influence options that the US has comes down to four of the five

listed, eliminating reduction and preventing drug demand abroad. Regardless of clear national

political rule to tackle the drug problem, inherent contradictions often appear between US anti-

drug policy and separate national policy goals and concerns. The pursuit of drug control policies

occasionally affect foreign policy interests and create political instability and economic

dislocation to countries where narcotics production has become embedded economically and

socially. As a result, many narcotic supply interdiction programs are often at odds with US

strategy; thereby, creating opportunities for criminals, insurgents, and terrorist organizations to

exploit.

Unfortunately, the invitations for U.S. policy makers’ assistance does not meet a warm

welcome in places like Afghanistan/Central Asia. According to State Department and Pentagon

officials, stopping drug-trafficking organizations has become a matter of national security

because they spread corruption, undermine fledgling democracies and can potentially finance

terrorists (Lopez-Mills, 2013). In Afghanistan, the Taliban has benefited enormously from its

linkages with the opium and heroin industry and has been able to make a comeback using profits

generated through taxation of farmers, providing security to illicit drug shipments, deployment of

mobile drug laboratories, and have taken a small role in trafficking. Additionally, the geographic

location for the production and trafficking of illicit narcotics has a significant role within this

illicit network. The U.S., Mexican and Canadian partners can fight the drug battle along the

southern and northern borders to hinder the criminal narcotics logistical and shipment networks.

However, Afghanistan borders with Pakistan are wide open, enabling low-risk smuggling back

and forth. Adding to this non-existence fight against illicit narcotics, almost no drugs are seized

in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) although thousands of tons transit the region

(UNODC, 2009, 2). To add additional insult, the abuse of the Afghan Trade Transit Agreement

(ATTA) as well as exploitation of centuries old kinship ties, have turned the Afghanistan /

Pakistan border, already known for the unimpeded movements of insurgents, into a massive

illicit free trade zone of drugs, chemicals precursor, money, people and weapons (UNODC,

2009, 2). The issues and concerns are complex in the Afghanistan/Central Asia region.

The one true greatest impediment to successfully interdicting transnational crime and

narcotics trafficking is the total commitment from all governments to take a hard stance. The

challenges become more complicated when you have nations that are unwilling to address their

transnational crimes and narcotics trafficking issues. Transnational crimes and narcotics

trafficking is not a U.S. problem alone, but an international community problem. The U.S. role

in being a front runner in combating transnational narcotics is enormous. The world is forever

changing, and the same holds true for transnational crime tactics and techniques in voiding

military and law enforcement initiatives that are designed to deter or destroy illicit activity.

Charles Doyle’s analysis of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate

Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act provides general

regulatory data that was established following the September 11, 2001 terrorists attacks. Since

the 9/11 attacks it has been far more difficult to move money following the introduction of the

USA PATRIOT Act and other punitive measures including those pertaining to money laundering

(Macdonald et al. 2014, 7). The USA PATRIOT Act has closed many loop holes in regards to

cyber-laundering/money laundering. Unfortunately, there has been an adjustment by terrorist

organizations to move away from central funding system to more of an independent and smaller

splinter cell system. Within this system, the ability to raise funds on the Internet relies on some

critical factors: anonymity; access to criminal forums; and, the ability to transfer payments

(Macdonald et al. 2014, 7). Remaining nameless or to remain unidentified is a vital component

for criminals and terrorist organizations for both accessing the Internet for fundraising purposes

and also for communicating.

The USA PATRIOT Act was passed a few weeks after the 9/11 attacks. A synopsis of some

of the main features of this Act are (Doyle 2002, 1):

 The Act gives federal officials greater authority to

track and intercept communications, both for law

enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering purposes.

 It vests the Secretary of the Treasury with regulatory

powers to combat corruption of U.S. financial institutions

for foreign money laundering purposes.

 It seeks to further close our borders to foreign terrorists

and to detain and remove those within our borders.

 It creates new crimes, new penalties, and new procedural

efficiencies for use against domestic and international terrorists.

A closer analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act reveals that a key initiative in combating money

laundering that may be used to support terrorist activities or support their organizations is Title

III – International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-terrorist Financing Act of 2001.

Although, the USA PATRIOT Act provides almost limitless authorities to various organizations

to combat against transnational crimes such as illicit drug trafficking and cyber

laundering/money laundering to the extent that many US citizens question the possibility of legal

and civil rights infringement, the Act itself is not sound proof. This research has highlighted

how some countries way of living is deeply embedded in the black market and underground

illicit economy networks. Adding to this issue is the universal loop hole that can circumvent

most any policy is corruption.

The study establishes the fact that transnational organized crime threatens US economic

interests and can cause enormous damage to the global financial market through its subversion,

abuse and distortion of legitimate markets and economic activity. A growing concern for the

business leaders in the US, perhaps others around the world, is that US businesses are being put

at a competitive disadvantage by transnational organized crime and corruption, particularly in

emerging markets where it appears the laws are meaningless. The World Bank estimates about

$1 trillion is spent each year to bribe public officials, causing an array of economic distortions

and damage to legitimate economic activity (The White House 2011, 5). The price of doing

business in countries affected by transnational organized crime is also increasing as companies

budget for more security costs, adversely impacting foreign direct investment throughout the

world. Another fallout from transnational organized crimes are activities that can lead to

disruption of the global supply chain: subsequently, reduces economic competitiveness and

impacts the ability of US industry and transportation sectors to be resilient in the face of such

disruption. Additionally, Further, transnational criminal organizations, leveraging their

relationships with state-owned entities, industries, or state-allied actors, could gain control over

primary commodities markets such as petroleum products, aluminum, and precious metals, along

with potential exploitation of the transportation sector itself.

The political and social reaction that is stimulated as a result of illicit narcotics trafficking and

cyber-laundering is warranted in light of other transnational crimes. In July 2011, President

Barack Obama unveiled his Transnational Organized Crime Strategy, the first comprehensive

national policy effort to articulate and combat illicit economies that, cumulatively, have grown to

more than $1 trillion (Farah 2012, iii). The leader of a country has the ultimate responsibility in

protecting the residing citizens. The war against illicit drug trafficking is more than simply

removing illegal drugs off the streets within communities. The illicit drug trafficking war

reaches beyond many nations boundaries; therefore, nations must see beyond their borders when

it comes to protecting their sovereignty. Illicit drug use can be linked to other transnational

crimes and most often is a key contributor leading to violent crimes.

First, the global security threat that accompany illicit narcotic trafficking. In recent years,

terrorist organizations and insurgent groups have found their way into the drug trafficking

environment. The underground economy network created by illicit narcotic trafficking provides

a gateway for terrorist organizations and insurgents groups to grow their influence along many

dimensions via cyber-laundering. The ability to obtain and control physical resources while

gaining local population support are examples of how these organizations gain their power.

These actions create a grave security threat to local governments, to global security, but more

specifically, to the US and its international interests. The financial profits gained by these illegal

drugs allow terrorist organizations to improve their technical and tactical capabilities by paying

combatants a better salary than the local populace, purchasing better weapons, and most

importantly, simplifying their logistical chains which allow many transactions to go undetected

by domestic and international border security. Illicit narcotic trafficking is a multi-billion dollar

black market. Since transnational organized crime is driven by market forces, countermeasures

must distort those markets and not solely focus on the criminal groups that exploit the.

Unfortunately, the world is not without corruption, and the connections can be linked to illicit

transnational narcotic trafficking.

Second, political corruption is truly not blown out of proportion when related to transnational

narcotic trafficking. Political elites are unfortunately, in several cases, contributors to the

facilitation of illicit narcotic trafficking. The enormous profits made by the drug cartels allow

them to corrupt national political and economic systems and bring about social decay (Sample

1998, vi). Specifically, in Latin America, apart from the corrupting power of such huge sums of

narcotic dollars on police and judicial systems, Congressmen are elected with cocaine funds,

banks are sustained or broken by trafficking groups and exchange rates fluctuate in sympathy

with the state of the trade (Kendall 1985, 1). The impact to the legitimate global economy is

threatened by these corruptible actions. The challenges are rigid, and there may never be a total

end to political corruption that indirectly or directly allows the protection of transnational

trafficking of illicit narcotics. The U.S. and other international partners must continue to combat

this crime for the sake of the legitimate global community.

Third, some of the social reaction surrounding illicit narcotic trafficking creates anger because

of a potential lack of understanding or education. For example, in Afghanistan there are many

land fields and farms that grow poppy (opium). The high production of opium throughout

Afghanistan is no secret to the world. Many people do not understand that the U.S. and other

nations cannot simply destroy these cultivation areas because of the economic devastation that

will be brought upon over 70% of the nation which will result into an international disaster.

There has to be a balance for these people to rid themselves from producing opium and

contributing to the illicit transnational drug network and economy while being able to be

legitimately productive in a legitimate economic network. Mr. Yury Fedotov, United Nations

Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) Executive Director, called for a sustained effort by the

Afghan Government and international stakeholders to address illicit cultivation with “a balanced

approach of development and law enforcement measures” (United Nations News Centre 2012,

1). As in Afghanistan and areas in Africa, Latin American peasant growers of narcotic crops can

profit from 20 to 50 times more in supplying the illegal drug market than they can if they were to

be legitimate agricultural farmers for a legitimate economic network. Mr. Feotov, is only one

voice, although heard by many, other nations must be involved in the political strategy to rid

nations like Afghanistan, Bolivia, and Colombia from its drug farming culture to a developing

cultural that yields legitimate produce for global markets using a legitimate economic system.

Policy makers face unique transnational crime and narcotics issues in Afghanistan/Central

Asia compared to other parts of the world. A concern for Congress is how to proceed in outward

years in order to conceptualize this complex-terrorism phenomenon and oversee the

implementation of cross-cutting activities that stretches across several geographic regions,

functional disciplines, and a multitude of policy tools that are largely dependent on effective

interagency coordination and international cooperation. Several countries experience a

substantial amount of poverty and are dependent upon illicit narcotic productions as well as the

associated black market economy for their livelihood. The environment is perfect for terrorist

organizations to establish a footprint and utilize illicit funds to employ citizens and offer social

advancement within an illicit network.

In many parts of the world there are governments who have joined the international

community in fighting the war on drugs. These countries realize that there must be a unity of

effort and welcomes external resources and support from other nations. The sophistication and

violence of the traffickers is so great that the U.S. military is training not only law enforcement

agents in Latin American nations, but their militaries as well, building a network of expensive

hardware, radar, airplanes, ships, runways and refueling stations to stem the tide of illegal drugs

from South America to the U.S. (Lopez 2013, 1). To the extent of combating illicit narcotic

trafficking in Latin American while implementing U.S. policies and strategies, there are

potentials to further disrupt the trafficking from Latin America to other locations throughout the

world. The most significant factor is that drug interdiction and eradication is welcomed in many

parts of Latin America. U.S., Mexican, and Canadian border patrols aggressively monitors and

pursue illicit narcotic trafficking in or out of their country. In nations where U.S. policy makers

are welcomed to assist with the development of policies that will deter or destroy illicit narcotic

activities, significant strives are being made. In some areas, adjustments are required. For

example, given the vast scope of Mexican cartel networks, the U.S. was, in many ways, right to

dismiss the Global Commission on Drug Policy’s report as too narrow in its purview. The drug

trade -- and the powerful criminal organizations that control it -- has become a national security

problem, and needs to be dealt with as such. Fighting terrorism increasingly includes targeting

the global drug trade.

The utilization of electronic funding transactions domestically and or internationally,

establishes the criminal environment in which ordinary criminals, extremist groups, and or

terrorist organizations seek to conduct their business. The means of using cyberspace, or the

digital world to conduct transactions and payments, simply expands the relationships between

transnational crime, narcotics, and terrorism financing. Unfortunately, currently, there is no

established international unified policy or law which specifically supports an all-out approach in

combating and prosecuting cybercrimes. In the meantime, analysts have identified a series of

potentially disturbing patterns that has hastened the expansion of relationships between terrorist

and transnational crime groups (Rollins & Wyler 2013, 1). Criminal syndicates appear to be

growing in size, scope, and ambition. Globalization has extended their transnational reach, while

major developments in technology, trade, and the financial industry have provided them with

opportunities to exploit vulnerabilities in emerging criminal sectors, such as cybercrime.

Transnational criminals, illicit narcotic networks, and terrorist groups are becoming more

resilient, resulting from combination of continued state sponsorship or support, as well as

entrepreneurial expansion into profitable criminal activities. Resulting from these events are

possible increases in cross-leveling geographically which allows criminals and terrorists to

operate and interact. These patterns may also suggest greater blurring of distinctions between one

group and the other, the adoption of activities such as narcotics, often attributed to the other, or

the ad hoc evolution of a group’s objectives based on the security challenges they encounter

(Rollins & Wyler 2013, 1). Therefore, money to support a terrorist activity may have to distinct

purpose; to meet the terrorist ideological objective and eliminate friction being caused which

may be impacting transnational crime activities and deployment of narcotics which leads back to

the illicit financial network.

The illegal profits gained from illicit drug trafficking cannot go without being addressed.

The international community is unified in its stance and agree that urgent action is required for

new innovation in continuing the crackdown on cyber-laundering/money laundering activities.

Transnational crime organizations; to include terrorist groups, in particular, will seek to use new

channels and new means of payment that will ensure the bypassing of the financial sector and its

financial regulations. If we want to effectively reduce the rising use and abuse by criminals of

the internet for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing in an effort to avoid

national and international regulators and law enforcement agencies, we have to take joint and

coordinated action that has to be swift, creative, effective and truly global (Strauss 2013, 3).

Strauss “4-I” approach does not only make sense, but is supportive of the evidence and findings

within this research (Strauss 2013, 3):

The 4-I approach

1) we need better IT knowledge

2) we need better ID checks online

3) we need better IP tracking

4) we need better IC (international co-operation)

A quick synopsis of Strauss ideas makes it clear that every entity involved in the prevention or

fight against money laundering and terrorist financing is in critical need of strengthening its

Information Technology (IT). Politicians and lawmakers must also expand their knowledge in

the IT environment in order to keep up pace with criminals and terrorist across the globe. A

possibility would be to hire former hackers; however, criminal organizations will also be seeking

his same talent and most likely with the ability to offer more money than what a government’s

agency is willing to pay. Innovation and advance training can prove invaluable; but, this

requires emphasis from the top.

Transnational organized crimes are committed by people of advance intellect. The resources

that are poured into establishing an underground network to remain anonymous is significant.

However, the lax laws and policies outside the financial institutions benefits criminals, terrorists,

and the like. New innovation is needed that will complicate the duplication of financial

instruments, coupled with an advance identification system that parallels the use of such

instrument. For example, Apple Pay may very well be 99.9% secure when using; unfortunately,

how confidence is the pay recipient at the time of verifying the identification of unknown

purchasers?

To no surprise, criminal and terrorist organizations invest in computer users to the extent in

seeking university and college students with concentration in the cyber environment. The main

purpose for these smart, cyber-savvy users is to provide an added layer of protection in the

erasing of identity or cookie trails that may remain behind in the high-tech cyber environment.

Financial institutions operates in three aspects; local, national, and or international.

Unfortunately, the rule of law and national and international policies have a key role in the

regulating of funds to sustain a sound global economy. Research and development that

concentrate on tightening the trackers for digital, electronic, or on-line money transactions could

prove invaluable in a world where billions of dollars are loss to money laundering activities

annually.

Finally, it is a known fact that no two countries are identical with identical national and

international laws and policies. This specific gap can be identified in almost every international

policy to date. The root of international laws and policies is cooperation. If there is no

commitment to cooperate to enforce laws and policies, all is like a cloud waiting to suddenly

evaporate. Another reality challenge is trying to synchronize the international community to

establish and enforce laws. In a world where business practices may be considered criminal, as

this research highlighted, may very well not be considered a criminal act in another country.

Obviously, a loop hole such as this invites criminal and terrorist organizations to the land of

lawlessness. So how effective is communications of possible international offenses, money

laundering in particular, from country to country? The answer depends on two key elements: 1)

A legitimate government executing all laws and policies accordingly; and 2) A legitimate

government by international views, but with bias corruptions. There could be situations whereas

a legitimate country offers assistance to another country to prevent a major transnational crime,

but there must be an invitation extended for the acceptance. The focus on establishing new

mechanisms to be put in place to prevent money laundering must not waiver.

Despite U.S. initiatives to combat transnational crimes, the relationship between

transnational organized crime, narcotics, cyber-laundering, and terrorism financing seemingly

has continued to expand. The U.S. has committed multiple assets and resources towards

stopping some of the most dangerous organizations and countries threatening the world today

from utilizing the U.S. financial system, including terrorists and drug traffickers. Unfortunately,

the common denominator of this relationship of three is massive injuries and deaths of innocent

people. The international community has to make a unified effort in order to break such a robust

criminal network operating under multiple jurisdictions and laws.

A concept to consider is how law enforcement agencies function. The objective for the

majority of law enforcement agencies is on apprehension of criminals which is the core of their

mission. History, however, shows us that the arrest of organized crime personnel often does not

annihilate the group, because it simply recruits new members or promotes existing members after

a successful prosecution to expand its propaganda. The thought process is that by prosecuting

individuals, usually high ranking within an organization, this will interfere and possible slow

down or cease the operation of the group; subsequently, hindering the illegal market for the illicit

products being made. This entire concept and philosophy should be questioned. The successful

prosecutions of organized crime figures is like wearing a small band-aide on a small cut.

Because the reality is that customer demand for illegal products or services is not decreased by a

prosecution. Because of this reason, existing or new criminal groups or terrorist organizations

will continue to exploit these illicit markets. A UN assessment concluded that, “While organized

crime groups can become problems in themselves, eliminating these groups is unlikely to stop

the contraband flow” (UNODC 2010, 6). A focus on organized crime activities and their

markets, rather than on groups, is useful for purposes of assessment and analysis in order to

produce an objective basis for investigative priorities and prevention initiatives (Albanese 2012,

2). The concern continues to expand throughout the global community while there lacks to be

any sort of best practices for addressing transnational organized crime. In an era of scarce and

declining resources it is imperative that attention is targeted at the most significant organized

crime problems as determined by their threat and harm. A consensus definition of organized

crime, using the common elements of multiple scholars, is “a continuing criminal enterprise that

rationally works to profit from illicit activities that are often in great public demand. Its

continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, threats, monopoly control, and/or the

corruption of public officials” (Albanese 2012, 3). The expanding of transnational organized

crime organizations will continue to threaten stability and undermine free markets as they build

alliances with political leaders, financial institutions, law enforcement, foreign intelligence, and

security agencies. All which will eventually lead to terrorist threats, supplying cash for terrorist

organizations, creating chaos and instability, supporting corruption, providing concealment and

sustaining common infrastructures for illicit activity, and competing for law enforcement and

intelligence attention.

The material gathered in this study provides a rich and diverse context for understanding that

transnational organized crimes encompasses some of the most talented people the world has to

offer; unfortunately, the choice to live life in the fast lane with illicit wealth and power

established by an illegal networking system carries no true value. The focus on two of the most

lucrative transnational organized crimes, illicit drug trafficking and cyber-laundering, has

revealed that there are gaps within US policies that will prevent securing the homeland from

terrorist threats. The evidence is sound and supportive of the findings. Recommendations are

made in various specific areas of the research study to coincide with supporting evidence.

Nevertheless, the underlying recommendation is for US and international policymakers truly

commit to change the global environment by establishing coordinated prosecution of

transnational crimes, synchronize national and international legislation to the extent that it does

not cause a fundamental change in one’s country; and finally there must be a closing of the gaps

on views of nation’s criminal law and crimes and international crimes. Thus, the aim in this

study examined US policies and derived a conclusion consistent with the presented evidence and

findings in respect to the overwhelming and expanding problem of transnational organized

crime, the unwavering increase of illicit drug trafficking and increasing innovation for cyber-

laundering.

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