debate summary and expansion writing

Erwin Wang - [email protected] - (949) 784-9901

Henna Rahmani- [email protected] (321) 607-8843

Cristina Elizarraraz- [email protected] (714) 927-6577

Miguel Garcia - [email protected] (949) 572-9540

Melenie Van - [email protected] (714) 478-4214 (no texts)

W16 PoliSci 142B: International Relations of East Asia

Position

It is possible for China to continue its cooperation with the West, as it has been for the past decades.

Critical Questions

What are the essential characteristics and dynamics of the US-China relationship?

What factors are driving China and the US toward conflict, rivalry, and partnership?

Has global power shifted toward China and has that affected the relationship?

What domestic political dynamics in America and China influence the relationship?

What interest groups and public opinion inform them?

Presenters

1. Melenie

2. Judy

3. Cristina

4. Henry

Debaters

1. Chris

2. Erwin

3. Jordan

4. (closer)

Arguments

1. Increased Economic Interdependence

i. Since China’s economic liberalization in 1978 until the end of the 20th century, trade value between the countries has grown from $1 billion annually to $120 billion annually.[footnoteRef:0] By 2004, that amount increased to $240 billion annually.[footnoteRef:1] US corporations are major investors in China, and the US is China’s largest single export market. China holds more of U.S. sovereign debt than does any other country, and Chinese investments in the United States are growing rapidly. [footnoteRef:2] [0: U.S.-China Security Review Commission, The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and China (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Oface, July 2002), pp. 38–39. ] [1: U.S.-China Business Council, “U.S.-China Trade Statistics and China’s World Trade Statistics,” http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html, updated February 28, 2005.] [2: Hachigian, Nina. Debating China: The US-China Relationship in Ten Conversations. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). pp. 3]

b. China’s peaceful rise will further open its economy so that its population can serve as a growing market for the rest of the world, thus providing increased opportunities for rather than posing a threat to the international community. In 2004, China’s imports from members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations increased by 33.1%, from Japan by 27.3%, from India by 80%, from the EU by 28%, and from the US by 31.9%.[footnoteRef:3] [3: Bijian, Zheng. “China’s Peace Rise to Great Power Status.” (Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2005), pp. 18-24)]

We need to expand on this argument a little more aggressively. Though, economic interdependence has created a stronger relationship between the United States history shows being trading partners does NOT trump war. This is evident WW1 with Germany and the UK as both countries were each other’s primary trade partners. Moreover, prior to WW2 Japan and the United States were each other’s primary trading partners until the U.S. saw Japan as a security threat to its interests in Southeast Asia.

Point being, economic interdependence is not a deterrent for war nor guarantees cooperation between two or more states. In the international system or realpolitik, security and power capabilities will trump economic needs as survival is the top priority. When security is at risk a state will act militarily as was the case for Germany in WW1 and the US in WW2. Comment by Erwin Wang: While the cases of both Germany-UK and US-Japan should be noted, could the argument be made that trade liberalization and economic cooperation between countries has developed rather than deterred international relations in the grand scheme of the post-WWII era? Comment by Jorden Ricardo Jr. Reyes: _标为已解决_ Comment by Jorden Ricardo Jr. Reyes: _已重新提出_

Furthermore, if we are going to use economic interdependence as a key argument why the US and China will continue to cooperate, we must discuss the broader picture. The economic activity occurring between both states is not insular, but affects the global economy. If our relationship with China were to sour sparking a economic tailspin the global economy would feel the effects whether it be oil, consumer goods, foreign direct investment (FDI) etc… We can discuss this more when we meet.

1. Global Economic Interdependence-with the US and China leading the pack.

2. China’s Increased International Participation

a. China signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in 1996, and joined the WTO in 2001. The PRC’s membership in intergovernmental organizations between 1977 and 1997 increased from 21 to 52. During the same period, its membership in NGOs increased from 71 to 1,163.[footnoteRef:4] [4: David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 163. For a brief summary of the recent mutual entanglement of China and the United States in institutions and regimes, see ibid., pp. 161–188.]

i. Optimistic constructivists argue that China’s increased participation in international organizations will lead to shifts in its strategic culture, the international behavior norms accepted by its leaders, and therefore its national identity. They also argue that these international interactions can mold and shape underlying beliefs, interests, and mental categories of participants.

ii. As of 2014, US and China have conducted more than 60 formal dialogues per year, and their presidents meet regularly at multilateral gatherings (such as the G-20, East Asia Summit, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Meeting) in addition to to frequently communicating by phone.[footnoteRef:5] According to Kenneth Lieberthal of the Brookings Institution, almost every U.S. cabinet department- which include State, Defense, Commerce, Treasury, U.S. Trade Representative, Housing and Urban Development, Health and Human Services, Environmental Protection, Transportation, Energy, Education, Agriculture, and so forth- deals with its Chinese counterpart every week. More than two dozen ministerial-level government agencies on each side have been attending the annual China-US. Strategic and Economic Dialogue initiated in 2009. One could assert that US-China relations in this regard have matured dramatically since 1978. [5: Hachigian, Nina. Debating China: The US-China Relationship in Ten Conversations. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). pp. 2]

iii. Inter-cultural Development

1. More students from China than from any other country are studying at American colleges and universities, and the US government seeks to have 100,000 American students studying in China. The number of people who travel between the two tops 2 million. Chinese has become second only to Spanish as the most studied foreign language in the US, while English is the most widely studied foreign language in China.[footnoteRef:6] [6: Hachigian, Nina. Debating China: The US-China Relationship in Ten Conversations. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). pp. 3]

iv. According to Zheng Bijian, Chair of the China Reform Forum, China aims to transcend the traditional ways for great powers to emerge, as well as the Cold War mentality that defined the post-WWII era. China will not follow the path of Germany prior to WWI or Germany and Japan prior to WWII by violently plundering resources and pursuing regional hegemony. China also is not blatantly vying for global ideological and political domination as demonstrated by the Soviet Union and the United States in the Cold War. Instead, China will transcend ideological differences to strive for peace, development, and cooperation with all countries of the world.

v. Climate Change

1. In November 2014, President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping initiated the U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change. This climate agreement in Paris marked a new era of multilateral climate diplomacy as well as a new pillar to their bilateral relationship. The two Presidents reaffirmed, in September 2015, their commitment to implement domestic climate policies, to strengthen bilateral coordination and cooperation, and to promote sustainable development and the transition to green, low-carbon, and climate-resilient economies.[footnoteRef:7] [7: Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S.-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change” https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/us-china-joint-presidential-statement-climate-change, (Sept 25, 2015)]

2. According to Kelly Sims Gallagher, graduate professor at Tufts University and consultant to the US Department of Energy, it is imperative that the China and the US cooperate to tackle climate change together since they are the world’s first and second largest carbon emitters, respectively. As of 2014, 39 US states have adopted a renewable portfolio standard or goal. China has implemented its Renewable Energy Law, Golden Sun, and solar feed-in tariff policies, wind concession programs, and set targets for reducing carbon intensity. From 2005 to 2010, China’s National Development and Reform Commission reduced its energy intensity (measured by energy use per unit of the GDP) by 20%, eliminating 1.55 billion tons of carbon dioxide. Both countries have also explicitly stated their support of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The US Senate ratified this convention (unlike the Kyoto Protocol), and China views the UNFCCC as a guiding set of principles for international agreements.[footnoteRef:8] [8: Hachigian, Nina. Debating China: The US-China Relationship in Ten Conversations. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). pp 117]

3. On November 14th 2009, then-US Energy Secretary Steven Chu, and Chinese Minister of Science and Technology Wan Gang launched the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, officially announced by President Barack Obama and then-President Hu Jintao in earlier November 2009. During Hu Jintao’s January 2011 visit to the US, both consortia parties of the CERC signed five-year Joint Work Plans (JWPs) which outline high-level, mutually agreed upon topics for CERC collaborative research in the years ahead. After the signings, the teams began developing Ten-Point Plans for each CERC research project to ensure mutual accountability for CERC research efforts. The first year of the CERC research efforts resulted in improved collaboration and advances in technological development promoted through conferences, publications, and IP filings. After completing its second year, the CERC’s technical tracks account for 88 projects, supporting 1,100 researchers, and 110 partners. An independent review found the Center to be a “milestone initiative” that is pragmatic” and “win-win.” In July 2014, the Steering Committee held its 6th meeting to review the CERC’s plans and progress to date and discuss the second possible phase (2016-2020) of the CERC program.[footnoteRef:9] [9: “About CERC,” (US.China Clean Energy Research Center) http://www.us-china-cerc.org/about.html]

3. Limited Regional-Political-Territorial Aims

a. Aside from the reunification of Taiwan, and claims to historical territories in the South China Sea, China has no modern history of territorial aggression. Compared to its revolutionary status in the 1950s and 1960s, China aims to be more of a consistent-revisionist state that adheres to an autocratic-capitalist paradigm to spur domestic economic development (rather than one that aims to proliferate the Marxist-Leninist ideology).

If I was on the other side and someone mentioned China has not demonstrated territorial aggression I would attack relentlessly. China has in fact, showed considerable territorial aggression; whether in the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, or the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. In either bodies of water, the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army and Navy) has had military altercations with neighboring powers.

As far as the political ideologies or references, fact is, China is ran by CCP who has adopted a political command economy or a communist/capitalist hybrid. Both of which are ran state controlled mechanisms and a heavy domestic hand. We need to shy away from these characterizations as they could allow for an attack on human rights violations and freedom of speech oppression.

Truthfully, China has been building up its navy, army, and airforce as well as cyber domain aggressively in the past twenty-five years attempting to expand its power capabilities to lay the groundwork for long term economic/strategic goals.

b. Robert Ross and Michael McDevitt argue that the United States’ sphere of influence lies within maritime capabilities in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, whereas China’s sphere of influence (China historically being a land power) lies within Central Asia and continental Southeast Asia. Does this information pertain to today? Chinese military capabilities are not land based anymore. They are sea based as they have built their submarine force and surface navy to compete with the US navy, who operates in this region frequently.

3. China’s economy is slowing down and facing what is called the “the middle income trap.” All emerging economies face this as did the US and Japan. Though the problem is avoidable I spoke with Blu Putnam, the head economist from Chicago Mercantile Exchange said China’s economy will slow down further. This creates a debacle for China as it has numerous failed infrastructure projects, unevenly distributed capital flow among its provinces, and a demographic problem. Their labor population is decreasing as a majority of its population is nearing retirement age. Without a strong work force no economy will keep its current GDP and other growth rates. This will force China to stay aligned with the US in long term strategic goals as deviated from the current one could place negatively affect Beijing. Comment by Erwin Wang: According to the World Bank, China has a labor force of 806,498,521 as of 2014, almost 2/3 of its current population. Could you elaborate more on the the long-term strategic goals you're referring to?

Opposing Arguments

1. Strategic Distrust

a. The two countries differ greatly in their respective histories, cultures, political systems, social structures and economies. They’re both continental-scale nations, both of whom fail to firmly grasp the domestic policies of the other. China possesses a historical continuity that greatly affects the contemporary social and political structures of the nation. With a few exceptions, Americans have an innate distrust of authoritarian, one-party governments, and is discomfited by the lack of transparency and slight regard given to civil liberties (particularly the China’s neglect over intellectual property theft, market access, and hidden export subsidies).

b. According to Wang Jisi from Peking University, the Chinese-US approachment during the Cold War was driven by single-minded national security considerations- the shared apprehensions about Soviet expansionism and the US desire to extricate itself from the Vietnam War. The nations no longer confront a common enemy, and it is hard to identify an organizing principle to guide the relationship.

c. In recent years, multilateral disputes have increased in frequency. Firstly, Beijing is concerned about Washington’s possible capitalization of territorial disputes with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. The tightening of US security ties in the Asia-Pacific is interpreted by some Chinese as a direct on China. On the US side, there have been concerns that China has not pressured North Korea and Iran for denuclearization hard enough. [footnoteRef:10] [10: Hachigian, Nina. Debating China: The US-China Relationship in Ten Conversations. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). pp. 9]

2. China’s Rising Power

a. Economic capacity is indicative of overall national power, US has a nominal GDP of $17.3 trillion (2014) and China has a nominal GDP of $10.4 trillion (2014)[footnoteRef:11] [11: "World Economic Outlook Database, April 2015". ]

b. A potential security dilemma, caused by an increase in China’s military buildup, is indicative of China’s growing regional hegemony in East and Southeast Asia (the US may intervene in the case of a forceful reunification process between China and Taiwan)[footnoteRef:12] [12: On this issue, see, for example, Denny Roy, “Tensions in the Taiwan Strait,” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 76–96; June Teufel Dreyer, “Flashpoint: The Taiwan Strait,” Orbis, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Autumn 2000), pp. 615–629; and Andrew J. Nathan, “What’s Wrong with American Taiwan Policy,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 93–106.]

2. China’s illegal territorial claims in the South and East China Seas, but more specifically the expanded EEZ (exclusive economic zone) and ADIZ (air defense identification zone). All of which are seen as illegitimate by Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, etc..

3. Also, China’s increased cyber intrusions into U.S. public and private institutions (We can expand on this when we meet).

Counter-Arguments

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