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plsc_405.zipcase brief guidelines spring 2016.pdf
PLSC405 CASE BRIEF GUIDELINES - Page 1 of 4
PLSC405: SEXUALITY and LAW
Guidelines for writing a case brief
WHAT’S A CASE BRIEF?
Case briefs, as the name suggests, are summaries of the most important parts of a case, such as the pertinent facts, the question before the court, how the court ruled, and why the court ruled the way it did. Case briefs are used by lawyers, judges and students.
The briefs that you write for this course will help you learn about the cases we are studying, and will become valuable to you when you prepare for quizzes, and when you are writing your essay for the final exam. Case briefs are useful in several ways: they help you understand a case; they give you practice in analysis and summarization; they help you better remember cases.
Here are some guidelines for writing your briefs.
GENERAL GUIDELINES
Use your own words: Case briefs should be written in clear, simple language. With the exception of key phrases, you should not quote directly from the decision you are briefing. If you can’t write a summary of the decision in your own words, you do not yet fully understand it.
Read the case first: Do not try to write your brief while you are reading it for the first time. Most cases take at least one reading -- and sometimes two or three readings -- before they make sense. You will not be able to separate the relevant from the irrelevant material until you've read the entire case.
Consider the context of the case: As often as not, there is more than one question presented to the Court in a particular case. Additionally, there may be substantial issues related to jurisdiction, etc. Sometimes a great deal of a decision is devoted to issues that, although important to that specific case, are not the reasons why the case is important. So, when briefing a case, how do you know which issues are the lasting ones, and which issues were important only to that specific case? That's tough, especially when you're new to a particular area of law. What to do? Consider what topic we're studying at the time. Take, for example, the case of Reynolds v. U.S. (1879). The bulk of this case is devoted to jurisdictional issues (i.e., did the U.S. Supreme Court have jurisdiction over law in one of the territories). However, that's not why we study the Reynolds case. The Reynolds case is typically studied in the context of the First Amendment right of free exercise of religion (specifically, could the U.S. government outlaw polygamy, even though it was an important practice of the Morman religion). While a case brief about Reynolds would mention the jurisdictional question, the bulk of the brief should concentrate on the free exercise issue.
Be succinct: Case briefs should be no more than one single-spaced page (or a little more) in length. Remember, you are creating a brief version of the case. Leave out all extraneous items.
PLSC405 CASE BRIEF GUIDELINES - Page 2 of 4
ELEMENTS OF A CASE BRIEF
Although different professors may have slightly different formats they prefer for a case brief, all case briefs should contain the elements discussed below. Each description is followed by an example.
Name, citation number and year of case:
Example: Greece v. Galloway 572 U.S. ___ (2014)
Facts:
What actually happened that started the whole controversy? Include only the relevant facts. The facts portion of your brief should be just two to four sentences. Example: Starting in 1999, the town of Greece, New York, started inviting local clergy members to deliver prayers at the start of town board meetings. The town board meets once a month to conduct the official business of the town, including making local ordinances and granting zoning permits to people in the community. Although in theory any clergy who wanted to could offer the prayer, in practice almost everyone invited to give prayers were Christian clergy. Two community members (Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens) sued the town, saying that having the prayers as part of town meetings violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Question(s) / issues before the Court: The key issue in the case is generally presented to the Court as a question. What issue(s) is/are the justices being asked to decide on? Example: Do sectarian prayers at local legislative meetings constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause?
Procedural history:
Before the case got to the Supreme Court, what other courts had the case and which side won in the various courts that have had the case? So, for example, most cases begin in a trial court, so you should say who won at trial. Then describe who appealed the case to previous appellate court(s), and the outcome in those courts. Example:
1. Galloway/Stephens sued the town of Greece, N.Y., in a federal District Court, which ruled in favor of the town of Greece.
Your case brief should be single spaced, and should
include labels for each section (i.e. “Facts,”
“Questions,” etc.)
Case names should always be italicized.
PLSC405 CASE BRIEF GUIDELINES - Page 3 of 4
2. Galloway/Stephens appealed the case to the federal Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the District Court and ruled in favor of Galloway/Stephens.
3. The town of Greece asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review the opinion of the Second Circuit.
Holding/finding:
The holding (also called the “finding”) simply states the results of the case (i.e., says how the Supreme Court ruled in the case). This includes both the procedural resolution (e.g., the Court upheld the lower court, or the Court reversed the lower court, etc.) and the Court’s answer to the specific question. Example: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court said that the prayers at the town of Greece’s legislative meetings do not violate the Establishment Clause, even if the prayers are sectarian.
Rationale:
This is the most important part of a brief. Here you will summarize the arguments of the opinion(s). This is where you discuss why the court made the decision it did. Sometimes there will only be one opinion to summarize, sometimes there will be several, depending upon whether or not there is a dissenting opinion(s), and depending upon whether or not there are concurring opinions filed. You should provide a rationale for each opinion issued in a case (i.e., majority, dissenting and concurring, if applicable). Example: Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court said that cases involving legislative prayer are different than other types of Establishment Clause cases because the U.S. has a long historical tradition of having opening prayers in legislative bodies, going back to the very first Congress. The Court noted that in 1789, at about the same time that Congress was writing the First Amendment, that it also voted to approve the hiring and paying of a clergy person to deliver opening prayers at sessions of Congress. The Court reasoned that this was evidence that the very same people who authored the Establishment Clause didn’t think that prayers at legislative sessions would violate the Establishment Clause. The Court said you have to consider the intent of using prayers to open legislative sessions, and that the intent of the town of Greece was not to try to proselytize but, rather, that the purpose of the prayer was to take a moment to leave the outside world behind and transition into doing the work of the people (i.e., legislating). The Court said that the content of the prayers don’t have to be non-sectarian, because otherwise that would put the government in the position of having to edit prayers, and such involvement in religious expression would violate the Establishment Clause. The Court added that the primary audience for the prayers is the legislators (and not any audience that might be there), and therefore the prayers don’t coerce the public to hear sectarian doctrine. The Court made a distinction between being coerced to hear a religious message and being offended by a religious message. Justice Thomas wrote an opinion concurring with the majority. Justice Thomas noted that the Establishment Clause originally only applied to the federal government should never have been applied to the states, and therefore states shouldn’t have to worry about violating the Establishment Clause.
PLSC405 CASE BRIEF GUIDELINES - Page 4 of 4
Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for the 4 dissenters. Justice Breyer argued that the town of Greece should try harder to make sure that a greater variety of religions are represented (i.e., there should be clergy from a variety of faiths offering the opening prayer, not just Christian clergy). By not trying to take the extra effort to be more inclusive, Breyer argued that the town was marginalizing people of minority faiths.
Rule of law established:
This is the new rule of law that will be applied to future cases. Think of it as the main principle that comes out of the case. (It’s easy to confuse the “holding” and the “rule of law.” The holding is the very specific outcome of the case at hand, whereas the “rule of law” is the broader principle that comes from the case that will be used in future cases.)
Example: Opening a legislative session with a sectarian prayer does not violate the Establishment Clause.
dissectingSCopinionspring2016.pdf
PLSC405: SEXUALTIY & LAW
Dissecting a Supreme Court opinion Dissecting an opinion Before you attempt to write a case brief, it’s helpful first just to identify the parts of a judicial opinion. The case we are going to dissect is As you read through the case, highlight and label the various parts of the case. Just highlight the most relevant parts. For example, in FCC v. AT&T, the first three pages go over the facts that gave rise to the case, but you wouldn’t highlight all of this, just the most relevant parts – i.e., only the facts that are absolutely necessary to understand the case. Before you start dissecting and highlighting FCC v. AT&T, take a look at the sample case that I’ve dissected and highlighted. The case is Snyder v. Phelps 562 U.S. _____ (2011), and can be found on the Moodle course page, in the section labeled “assignment guidelines.” Below are the elements that I would like for you to highlight and label.
1. Case info – i.e., name, citation number and year of the case you’re briefing.
2. Facts – brief summary of the most relevant facts that gave rise to the case.
3. Procedural history – After stating the facts that gave rise to the disagreement, we’re at the point where someone brought the issue into court. The procedural history begins at that point and ends with the case being before the Supreme Court. Identify which courts that case has been in and what each of those courts did.
4. Question(s) presented to the Court – the key issue(s) in the case; what the Court is being asked to decide.
5. Holding/finding – the result of the case. This includes both the procedural resolution (e.g., the Court upheld the lower court; the Court reversed the lower court, etc.) and the Court’s answer to the question.
6. Legal reasoning/rationale – articulate the chain of logic the Court used to arrive at its opinion. In other words, how did the Court come to its conclusion?
7. Rule of law established – this is the principle that comes out of the case that lower courts will apply to similar cases in the future.
FCCvAT_T_case_for_dissection_assignment.pdf
Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________
No. 09–1279 _________________
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. AT&T INC. ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[March 1, 2011]
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. The Freedom of Information Act requires federal agen- cies to make records and documents publicly available upon request, unless they fall within one of several statu- tory exemptions. One of those exemptions covers law enforcement records, the disclosure of which “could rea- sonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U. S. C. §552(b)(7)(C). The ques- tion presented is whether corporations have “personal privacy” for the purposes of this exemption.
I The Freedom of Information Act request at issue in this case relates to an investigation of respondent AT&T Inc., conducted by the Federal Communications Commission. AT&T participated in an FCC-administered program—the E-Rate (or Education-Rate) program—that was created to enhance access for schools and libraries to advanced tele- communications and information services. In August 2004, AT&T voluntarily reported to the FCC that it might
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Opinion of the Court
have overcharged the Government for services it provided as part of the program. The FCC’s Enforcement Bureau launched an investiga- tion. As part of that investigation, AT&T provided the Bureau various documents, including responses to inter- rogatories, invoices, emails with pricing and billing infor- mation, names and job descriptions of employees involved, and AT&T’s assessment of whether those employees had violated the company’s code of conduct. 582 F. 3d 490, 492–493 (CA3 2009). The FCC and AT&T resolved the matter in December 2004 through a consent decree in which AT&T—without conceding liability—agreed to pay the Government $500,000 and to institute a plan to ensure compliance with the program. See 19 FCC Rcd. 24014, 24016–24019. Several months later, CompTel—“a trade association representing some of AT&T’s competitors”—submitted a FOIA request seeking “ ‘[a]ll pleadings and correspon- dence’ ” in the Bureau’s file on the AT&T investigation. 582 F. 3d, at 493. AT&T opposed CompTel’s request, and the Bureau issued a letter-ruling in response. The Bureau concluded that some of the information AT&T had provided (including cost and pricing data, billing-related information, and identifying information about staff, contractors, and customer representatives) should be protected from disclosure under FOIA Exemp- tion 4, which relates to “trade secrets and commercial or financial information,” 5 U. S. C. §552(b)(4). App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a–41a. The Bureau also decided to withhold other information under FOIA Exemption 7(C). Exemp- tion 7(C) exempts “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes” that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal pri- vacy.” §552(b)(7)(C). The Bureau concluded that “indi- viduals identified in [AT&T’s] submissions” have “privacy rights” that warrant protection under Exemption 7(C).
Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011) 3
Opinion of the Court
Id., at 43a. The Bureau did not, however, apply that exemption to the corporation itself, reasoning that “busi- nesses do not possess ‘personal privacy’ interests as re- quired” by the exemption. Id., at 42a–43a. On review the FCC agreed with the Bureau. The Com- mission found AT&T’s position that it is “a ‘private corpo- rate citizen’ with personal privacy rights that should be protected from disclosure that would ‘embarrass’ it . . . within the meaning of Exemption 7(C) . . . at odds with established [FCC] and judicial precedent.” 23 FCC Rcd. 13704, 13707 (2008). It therefore concluded that “Exemp- tion 7(C) has no applicability to corporations such as [AT&T].” Id., at 13710. AT&T sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and that court rejected the FCC’s reasoning. Noting that Congress had defined the word “person” to include corporations as well as individuals, 5 U. S. C. §551(2), the court held that Exemption 7(C) extends to the “personal privacy” of corporations, since “the root from which the statutory word [personal] . . . is derived” is the defined term “person.” 582 F. 3d, at 497. As the court explained, “[i]t would be very odd indeed for an adjectival form of a defined term not to refer back to that defined term.” Ibid. The court accordingly ruled “that FOIA’s text unambiguously indicates that a corporation may have a ‘personal privacy’ interest within the meaning of Exemp- tion 7(C).” Id., at 498. The FCC petitioned this Court for review of the Third Circuit’s decision and CompTel filed as a respondent supporting petitioners. We granted certiorari, 561 U. S. ___ (2010), and now reverse.
II Like the Court of Appeals below, AT&T relies on the argument that the word “personal” in Exemption 7(C) incorporates the statutory definition of the word “person.”
4 FCC v. AT&T INC.
Opinion of the Court
See Brief for Respondent AT&T 8–9, 14–15 (AT&T Brief); 582 F. 3d, at 497. The Administrative Procedure Act defines “person” to include “an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an agency.” 5 U. S. C. §551(2). Because that definition applies here, the argument goes, “personal” must mean relating to those “person[s]”: namely, corpora- tions and other entities as well as individuals. This read- ing, we are told, is dictated by a “basic principle of gram- mar and usage.” AT&T Brief 8; see id., at 14–15; see also 582 F. 3d, at 497 (citing Delaware River Stevedores v. DiFidelto, 440 F. 3d 615, 623 (CA3 2006) (Fisher, J., con- curring), for “[t]he grammatical imperativ[e]” that “a statute which defines a noun has thereby defined the adjectival form of that noun”). According to AT&T, “[b]y expressly defining the noun ‘person’ to include corpora- tions, Congress necessarily defined the adjective form of that noun—‘personal’—also to include corporations.” AT&T Brief 14 (emphasis added). We disagree. Adjectives typically reflect the meaning of corresponding nouns, but not always. Sometimes they acquire distinct meanings of their own. The noun “crab” refers variously to a crustacean and a type of apple, while the related adjective “crabbed” can refer to handwriting that is “difficult to read,” Webster’s Third New Interna- tional Dictionary 527 (2002); “corny” can mean “using familiar and stereotyped formulas believed to appeal to the unsophisticated,” id., at 509, which has little to do with “corn,” id., at 507 (“the seeds of any of the cereal grasses used for food”); and while “crank” is “a part of an axis bent at right angles,” “cranky” can mean “given to fretful fussiness,” id., at 530. Even in cases such as these there may well be a link between the noun and the adjective. “Cranky” describes a person with a “wayward” or “capricious” temper, see 3 Oxford English Dictionary 1117 (2d ed. 1989) (OED),
Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011) 5
Opinion of the Court
which might bear some relation to the distorted or crooked angular shape from which a “crank” takes its name. That is not the point. What is significant is that, in ordinary usage, a noun and its adjective form may have meanings as disparate as any two unrelated words. The FCC’s argument that “personal” does not, in fact, derive from the English word “person,” but instead developed along its own etymological path, Reply Brief for Petitioners 6, sim- ply highlights the shortcomings of AT&T’s proposed rule. “Person” is a defined term in the statute; “personal” is not. When a statute does not define a term, we typically “give the phrase its ordinary meaning.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 4). “Personal” ordinarily refers to individuals. We do not usually speak of personal characteristics, personal effects, personal correspondence, personal influence, or personal tragedy as referring to corporations or other artificial entities. This is not to say that corporations do not have correspondence, influence, or tragedies of their own, only that we do not use the word “personal” to describe them. Certainly, if the chief executive officer of a corporation approached the chief financial officer and said, “I have something personal to tell you,” we would not assume the CEO was about to discuss company business. Responding to a request for information, an individual might say, “that’s personal.” A company spokesman, when asked for information about the company, would not. In fact, we often use the word “personal” to mean precisely the oppo- site of business-related: We speak of personal expenses and business expenses, personal life and work life, per- sonal opinion and a company’s view. Dictionaries also suggest that “personal” does not ordi- narily relate to artificial “persons” such as corporations. See, e.g., 7 OED 726 (1933) (“[1] [o]f, pertaining to . . . the individual person or self,” “individual; private; one’s own,” “[3] [o]f or pertaining to one’s person, body, or figure,” “[5]
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Opinion of the Court
[o]f, pertaining to, or characteristic of a person or self- conscious being, as opposed to a thing or abstraction”); 11 OED at 599–600 (2d ed. 1989) (same); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1686 (1976) (“[3] relating to the person or body”; “[4] relating to an individual, his character, conduct, motives, or private affairs”; “[5] relat- ing to or characteristic of human beings as distinct from things”); ibid. (2002) (same). AT&T dismisses these definitions, correctly noting that “personal”—at its most basic level—simply means “[o]f or pertaining to a particular person.” Webster’s New Inter- national Dictionary 1828 (2d ed. 1954). The company acknowledges that “in non-legal usage, where a ‘person’ is a human being, it is entirely unsurprising that the word ‘personal’ is used to refer to human beings.” AT&T Brief 8. But in a watered-down version of the “grammatical imperative” argument, AT&T contends that “person”—in common legal usage—is understood to include a corpora- tion. “Personal” in the same context therefore can and should have the same scope, especially here in light of the statutory definition. See id., at 8–9, 16. The construction of statutory language often turns on context, see, e.g., Johnson, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 5), which certainly may include the definitions of related words. But here the context to which AT&T points does not dissuade us from the ordinary meaning of “personal.” We have no doubt that “person,” in a legal setting, often refers to artificial entities. The Dictionary Act makes that clear. 1 U. S. C. §1 (defining “person” to include “corpora- tions, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, socie- ties, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals”). But AT&T’s effort to ascribe a corresponding legal mean- ing to “personal” again elides the difference between “per- son” and “personal.” When it comes to the word “personal,” there is little support for the notion that it denotes corporations, even in
Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011) 7
Opinion of the Court
the legal context. AT&T notes that corporations are “pro- tected by the doctrine of ‘personal’ jurisdiction,” AT&T Brief 19, but that phrase refers to jurisdiction in per- sonam, as opposed to in rem, not the jurisdiction “of a person.” The only other example AT&T cites is an 1896 case that referred to the “ ‘personal privilege’ ” of a corpora- tion. Ibid. (quoting Mercantile Bank v. Tennessee ex rel. Memphis, 161 U. S. 161, 171 (1896) (emphasis deleted)). These examples fall far short of establishing that “per- sonal” here has a legal meaning apart from its ordinary one, even if “person” does. Cf. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2010) (slip op., at 8–10) (noting that “ ‘discovery’ is often used as a term of art in connec- tion with the ‘discovery rule’ ” and describing the judicial and legislative codification of that meaning over time); Molzof v. United States, 502 U. S. 301, 306 (1992) (“ ‘Puni- tive damages’ is a legal term of art that has a widely accepted common-law meaning . . . this Court’s decisions make clear that the concept . . . has a long pedigree in the law”). Regardless of whether “personal” can carry a special meaning in legal usage, “when interpreting a statute . . . we construe language . . . in light of the terms surrounding it.” Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 9 (2004). Exemption 7(C) refers not just to the word “personal,” but to the term “personal privacy.” §552(b)(7)(C); cf. Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div., AVCO Corp. v. Automobile Workers, 523 U. S. 653, 657 (1998) (“It is not the meaning of ‘for’ we are seeking here, but the meaning of ‘[s]uits for violation of contracts’ ”). AT&T’s effort to attribute a special legal meaning to the word “personal” in this par- ticular context is wholly unpersuasive. AT&T’s argument treats the term “personal privacy” as simply the sum of its two words: the privacy of a person. Under that view, the defined meaning of the noun “per- son,” or the asserted specialized legal meaning, takes on
8 FCC v. AT&T INC.
Opinion of the Court
greater significance. But two words together may assume a more particular meaning than those words in isolation. We understand a golden cup to be a cup made of or resem- bling gold. A golden boy, on the other hand, is one who is charming, lucky, and talented. A golden opportunity is one not to be missed. “Personal” in the phrase “personal privacy” conveys more than just “of a person.” It suggests a type of privacy evocative of human concerns—not the sort usually associated with an entity like, say, AT&T. Despite its contention that “[c]ommon legal usage” of the word “person” supports its reading of the term “personal privacy,” AT&T Brief 9, 13, 18, AT&T does not cite a single instance in which this Court or any other (aside from the Court of Appeals below) has expressly referred to a corporation’s “personal privacy.” Nor does it identify any other statute that does so. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. On the contrary, treatises in print around the time that Congress drafted the exemptions at hand reflect the understanding that the specific concept of “personal privacy,” at least as a matter of common law, did not apply to corporations. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §652I, Comment c (1976) (“A corporation, partnership or unincorporated association has no personal right of privacy”); W. Prosser, Law of Torts §97, pp. 641–642 (2d ed. 1955) (“A corporation or a partnership as such can have no personal privacy, al- though it seems clear that it may have an exclusive right to its name and its business prestige” (footnotes omitted)); cf. id., §112, at 843–844 (3d ed. 1964) (“It seems to be generally agreed that the right of privacy is one pertaining only to individuals, and that a corporation or a partner- ship cannot claim it as such” (footnotes omitted)); id., §117, at 815 (4th ed. 1971) (same). AT&T contends that this Court has recognized “privacy” interests of corporations in the Fourth Amendment and double jeopardy contexts, and that the term should be similarly construed here. See AT&T Brief 20–25. But this
Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011) 9
Opinion of the Court
case does not call upon us to pass on the scope of a corpo- ration’s “privacy” interests as a matter of constitutional or common law. The discrete question before us is instead whether Congress used the term “personal privacy” to refer to the privacy of artificial persons in FOIA Exemp- tion 7(C); the cases AT&T cites are too far afield to be of help here. AT&T concludes that the FCC has simply failed to demonstrate that the phrase “personal privacy” “necessar- ily excludes the privacy of corporations.” Id., at 31–32 (emphasis added). But construing statutory language is not merely an exercise in ascertaining “the outer limits of [a word’s] definitional possibilities,” Dolan v. Postal Ser- vice, 546 U. S. 481, 486 (2006). AT&T has given us no sound reason in the statutory text or context to disregard the ordinary meaning of the phrase “personal privacy.”
III The meaning of “personal privacy” in Exemption 7(C) is further clarified by the rest of the statute. Congress en- acted Exemption 7(C) against the backdrop of pre-existing FOIA exemptions, and the purpose and scope of Exemp- tion 7(C) becomes even more apparent when viewed in this context. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 6) (“statutory interpretation turns on ‘the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole’ ” (quot- ing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341 (1997))). Two of those other exemptions are particularly relevant here. The phrase “personal privacy” first appeared in the FOIA exemptions in Exemption 6, enacted in 1966, eight years before Congress enacted Exemption 7(C). See 80 Stat. 250, codified as amended at 5 U. S. C. §552(b)(6). Exemption 6 covers “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute
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Opinion of the Court
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” §552(b)(6). Not only did Congress choose the same term in drafting Exemption 7(C), it also used the term in a nearly identical manner. Although the question whether Exemption 6 is limited to individuals has not come to us directly, we have regu- larly referred to that exemption as involving an “individ- ual’s right of privacy.” Department of State v. Ray, 502 U. S. 164, 175 (1991) (quoting Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U. S. 352, 372 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U. S. 595, 599 (1982). AT&T does not dispute that “identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning,” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U. S. 224, 232 (2007), but contends that “if Exemption 6 does not protect corporations, it is because [it] applies only to ‘personnel and medical files and similar files,’ ” not because of the term “personal privacy.” AT&T Brief 36 (quoting §552(b)(6)). Yet the significance of the pertinent phrase—“the disclosure of which would consti- tute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” §552(b)(6)—cannot be so readily dismissed. Without it, Exemption 6 would categorically exempt “personnel and medical files” as well as any “similar” file. Even if the scope of Exemption 6 is also limited by the types of files it protects, the “personal privacy” phrase importantly de- fines the particular subset of that information Congress sought to exempt. See Washington Post Co., supra, at 599. And because Congress used the same phrase in Exemption 7(C), the reach of that phrase in Exemption 6 is pertinent in construing Exemption 7(C). In drafting Exemption 7(C), Congress did not, on the other hand, use language similar to that in Exemption 4. Exemption 4 pertains to “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privi-
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Opinion of the Court
leged or confidential.” 5 U. S. C. §552(b)(4). This clearly applies to corporations—it uses the defined term “person” to describe the source of the information—and we far more readily think of corporations as having “privileged or confidential” documents than personally private ones. So at the time Congress enacted Exemption 7(C), it had in place an exemption that plainly covered a corporation’s commercial and financial information, and another that we have described as relating to “individuals.” The lan- guage of Exemption 7(C) tracks the latter. The Government has long interpreted the phrase “per- sonal privacy” in Exemption 7(C) accordingly. Shortly after Congress passed the 1974 amendments that enacted Exemption 7(C), the Attorney General issued a memoran- dum to executive departments and agencies explaining that “personal privacy” in that exemption “pertains to the privacy interests of individuals.” U. S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s Memorandum on the 1974 Amend- ments to the Freedom of Information Act 9, reprinted in House Committee on Government Operations and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974 (P. L. 93–502), 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 507, 579 (Jt. Comm. Print 1975). The exemption, the Attorney General noted, “does not seem applicable to corporations or other entities.” Ibid. We have previously viewed this Memorandum as a reliable guide in interpret- ing FOIA, see National Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U. S. 157, 169 (2004); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U. S. 615, 622, n. 5 (1982), and we agree with its conclu- sion here.
* * * We reject the argument that because “person” is defined for purposes of FOIA to include a corporation, the phrase “personal privacy” in Exemption 7(C) reaches corporations as well. The protection in FOIA against disclosure of law
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Opinion of the Court
enforcement information on the ground that it would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy does not extend to corporations. We trust that AT&T will not take it personally. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE KAGAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
sample_dissected_opinion0001.pdf
