Market Position Analysis
Which Strategy When?
F A L L 2 0 1 1 V O L . 5 3 N O . 1
R E P R I N T N U M B E R 5 3 1 1 0
Christopher B. Bingham, Kathleen M. Eisenhardt and Nathan R. Furr
COURTESY OF PIXAR ANIMATION STUDIOS FALL 2011 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 71
MARKETS ARE CHANGING, competition is shifting and your business may be suffering or perhaps thriving, at least for now. Whatever the immediate circumstances, managers are forever
asking the same questions: Where do we go from here, and which strategy will get us there? Should
we fortify our strategic position, move into nearby markets or branch out into radically new terri-
tory? To help guide our decisions, most of us have a smorgasbord of strategic frameworks to draw
on. But which one is the right one, and when? The strategic plans, market analyses and hefty bind-
ers that strategy consulting firms leave behind often jumble strategic lenses: Five-Forces analysis,
portfolio review, assessment of core competencies; examination of profit pools, competitive land-
scape and so on. But which analyses are most helpful right now?
Most managers recognize that not all strategies work equally well in every setting. So to understand
how to choose the right strategy at the right time, we analyzed the logic of the leading strategic frame-
works used in business and engineering schools around the world. Then we matched those frameworks
with the key strategic choices faced by dozens of industry leaders at different times, during periods of
stability as well as change. (See “About the Research, p. 72.) Two surprising insights emerged.
First, we discovered that the logics of the different strategic frameworks break into three arche-
types: strategies of position, strategies of leverage and strategies of opportunity. What’s right for a
company depends on its circumstances, its available resources and how management combines
those resources together. (See “Choosing the Right Strategy,” p. 73.)
Second, by observing market leaders employing archetypal
strategies, we found that many assumptions about competitive
advantage simply don’t hold. For example, although strategy
gurus talk about strategically valuable resources, sometimes
Pixar Animation Studios, whose worldwide megahits include the Toy Story movies and Finding Nemo, uses rules such as “great story first, then animation” to guide its strategy.
Which Strategy When? Just when you think you have settled on the right strategy, you may need to change. By understanding the particular circumstances and forces shaping your company’s competitive environment, you can choose the most appropriate strategic framework. BY CHRISTOPHER B. BINGHAM, KATHLEEN M. EISENHARDT AND NATHAN R. FURR
THE LEADING QUESTION How can managers know which strategic framework is the most ap- propriate one?
FINDINGS What’s right for a company depends on its circum- stances, its available resources and how it puts the resources together.
Sometimes ordinary resources assem- bled well can be used to create com- petitive advantage.
To identify the most appropriate strategic framework, start by assessing whether your industry is stable, dynamic or somewhere in between.
S T R A T E G Y
72 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW FALL 2011 SLOANREVIEW.MIT.EDU
S T R A T E G Y
very ordinary resources assembled well are all that’s
required for competitive advantage. Sometimes it
makes good sense to bypass the largest markets and
focus instead on where resources fit best. In other
circumstances, it may be preferable to ignore exist-
ing resources and attack an emergent market. In
some situations, basic rules of thumb work better
than detailed plans. Surprisingly, these simple strat-
egies can be harder to imitate than complex ones.
How to Choose the Right Strategy To figure out when it makes sense to pursue strate-
gies of position, leverage or opportunity, the key is to
look first at the immediate circumstances, current
resources and the relationships among the various
resources. Understanding these factors will help you
get started with the right strategic framework.
Understand Your Circumstances The first step
for managers is a thoughtful review of their industry.
Specifically, assess whether your industry is stable,
dynamic or somewhere in between. How do you
gauge this dynamism? Begin by asking yourself: Can
I map the five industry structure forces in my indus-
try? If you can identify buyers, suppliers, customers
and substitutes by name and tick off barriers to entry,
and if these five factors tend to stay largely the same,
then you are probably operating within a stable in-
dustry. If the industry is too unsettled to map (think
mobile Internet applications) or the basic rules are
in flux (think clean or nano technology), then you
most likely inhabit a dynamic industry.
Next ask: Where do my products fit in terms of
product life cycle? In stable industries, standards are
well-defined, product expectations are clear, product
life cycles are known and often long and a limited
number of competitors may slowly push the devel-
opment envelope with anticipated innovations.
However, in dynamic industries it’s different. Stan-
dards may not yet exist, product life cycles are short,
products are diverse and no clear dominant technol-
ogy or product has emerged. Some industries are in
between. The auto industry is historically a stable in-
dustry. But new technologies (for example, hybrid
and electric-powered engines), compressed product
development times, volatile oil prices and regulatory
pressure have increased dynamism. Also, don’t for-
get that your own company’s circumstances (for
example, whether you’re a startup with a promising
business model or an established player with global
reach) will also affect where you fit.
Take Stock of Your Resources Once you under-
stand your industry circumstances, take a look at
your company. Assessing your resources and the
links among them is essential. Why? Resources lie at
the heart of strategy. They enable companies to set
themselves apart from competitors. Tangible re-
sources (such as Intel’s fabrication facilities or
Starbucks’ locations) are relatively straightforward
to assess. But intangible resources (for instance,
Amazon’s patents or Procter & Gamble’s brands)
are trickier. Beyond these, organizational processes
(for example, the acquisition process of India’s Tata
Group or General Dynamics’ divestment process)
can provide a critical basis for advantage.
Once you know your resources, determine how ad-
vantageous they really are. The most strategically
important resources are valuable (i.e., useful in your
industry), rare (i.e., possessed by only a few), inimita-
ble (i.e., difficult to copy) and nonsubstitutable (i.e.,
lacking in functional equivalents). These resources are
a potential source of competitive advantage. Yet even if
they can provide advantage, they aren’t absolutely nec-
essary for competitive advantage. Indeed, even
common resources can be a source of advantage de-
pending on how they are linked with other resources.
Determine the Relationships Among Resources
A secret to picking the right strategic framework is as-
sessing how your resources relate to one another. Some
resources are tightly linked. For example, Wal-Mart’s
low-cost strategy in the United States depends heavily
on its physical resources (often rural locations), so-
phisticated information technology (like maximizing
selling space in stores and quickly replenishing inven-
tories), efficient logistics (like cross-docking) and
cost-conscious culture, all of which reinforce each
other. By contrast, Google’s resources are more loosely
linked. Executives can recombine human capital and
technical resources as needed to tackle different mar-
kets and products. Of course, there are trade offs:
Tightly linked resources create more defensible strate-
gic positions, but they resist change; loosely linked
resources are easier to change, but they can be ineffi-
ciently deployed and redundant.
ABOUT THE RESEARCH To understand how compa- nies create competitive advantage in different indus- tries and settings, we conducted in-depth inter- views with more than 90 corporate leaders. The lead- ers included both senior executives (CEOs, chair- men, executive vice presidents and business- unit heads) and managers who are charged with strat- egy implementation. We also surveyed all top man- agement team members at 12 U.S., Finnish and Singa- porean companies about the strategies they used for key strategic processes such as alliances, acquisitions, prod- uct development and internationalization as well as the performance results that followed from using those strategies. In addition, we reviewed relevant re- search articles in the field of strategic management pub- lished in leading academic and practitioner journals from 1980 to 2010. From the data collected in our own research and through the review of the extant lit- erature, we were able to zero in on three archetypal strategic frameworks used by industry exemplars at different times and under different conditions of envi- ronmental dynamism.
SLOANREVIEW.MIT.EDU FALL 2011 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 73
Choosing a Strategy When does it make sense to
choose one strategy over another? How do execu-
tives decide whether to build their strategies around
position, leverage or opportunity? We will examine
each framework separately.
The Position Strategy When industries are stable, a strong case can often
be made for a position strategy. Position strategies
involve selecting a valuable and unoccupied indus-
try position and then building up its defenses. This
is the strategy that is commonly associated with
Five Forces analysis,1 where competitive advantage
comes from constructing a fortress around an at-
tractive market. Industry stability ensures that the
position of the fortress provides a long-term com-
petitive advantage, thereby justifying repeated
investments to reinforce and preserve the position.
The strategy remains valuable until the terrain
shifts and the strategic position is eroded.
With a position strategy, competitive advantage
depends first on choosing a valuable and unoccu-
pied strategic position in a given industry, and
second on creating and linking company resources
to defend that position. A valuable strategic position
drives superior profitability through the ability to
either boost prices (e.g., Porsche in the automotive
industry) or reduce costs (e.g., Casio in the watch
industry). Companies often defend their positions
by assembling resource combinations that their
competitors cannot easily imitate. In the U.S. mu-
tual fund industry, for example, The Vanguard
Group has built its strategy around conservative in-
vestment management and low costs. Vanguard,
which claims that the average expense ratio of its
mutual funds is a fraction of its main competitors,
defends its position with mutually reinforcing re-
source choices, including low commissions, modest
management perks and an absence of retail
branches. Thus, the key to advantage with a position
strategy is not just having a valuable strategic posi-
tion, but also linking resources to defend successfully
against challengers.
Position strategies seem straightforward, but it is
often assumed their success requires strategically
important resources. Although such resources can
be helpful, they aren’t necessary. Competitive advan-
tage can come from defending a strategic position
CHOOSING THE RIGHT STRATEGY We found that the logics of different strategic frameworks break into three archetypes: position strategies, leverage strategies and opportunity strategies. What’s right for a company depends on its circumstances, available resources and how management links those resources.
POSITION STRATEGY LEVERAGE STRATEGY OPPORTUNITY STRATEGY
STRATEGY Build mutually reinforcing resource systems with many resources in an attractive strategic position. Deepen their links.
Build strategically important resources for current markets. Leverage them into attractive new products and new markets.
Pick a few strategic processes with deep and swift flows of opportuni- ties. Learn simple rules to capture opportunities.
Circumstances Best for
Stable environments Moderately dynamic environments Dynamic environments
Resources Often mundane Strategically important (i.e., valuable, rare, inimitable and nonsubstitutable)
Opportunity-rich strategic processes guided by simple rules
Relationships Tightly interlocked resources Moderately linked resources Loosely linked resources
Basis of Competitive Advantage
A cost leadership or differentiated strategic position that is defensible
Ownership of specific strategically important resources that can be leveraged
Capture of attractive opportunities before rivals
Sustainability of Advantage
Long term Medium term Unpredictable
Inimitability of Advantage
Through causal ambiguity of tightly linked resources plus time to develop the resource system and path dependence
Through property rights, path dependence and time needed to develop the same resources
Through first-mover advantage and the challenge of inferring rules from partially improvised outcomes
Challenges Adjusting system of tightly linked resources quickly enough and with- out producing negative synergy
Adjusting resource portfolio without being blocked by cognitive and polit- ical rigidities
Maintaining “edge of chaos” with the right number and types of rules. Timely pivoting to better strategic processes
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S T R A T E G Y
through a system of tightly linked resources, not nec-
essarily from the superiority of the resources per se.
Consider JetBlue, the low-cost U.S. airline. On the
surface, its strategy is based on common, even mun-
dane, resources: Airbus A320 and Embraer 190
aircraft, comfortable passenger seats, DIRECTV ac-
cess and SIRIUS XM satellite radio, e-mail and
instant messaging services and fast turnaround ca-
pability at airport gates. None of these resources is
particularly special. But as a package, they are mutu-
ally reinforcing and produce a differentiated offering
that gives JetBlue a competitive advantage that other
airlines would have difficulty imitating.
When resources are tightly linked, they are hard
to copy. Interdependent resources create complex-
ity, and so copying them and their linkages is
challenging and time-consuming. Thus, even if imi-
tators understand which resources are being used,
they probably don’t understand exactly how they fit
together because there are often many resources
with unexpected combinatorial effects. Successful
imitation, therefore, requires not only knowing
which resources comprise another company’s strat-
egy (i.e., ingredients), but also deciphering the
proper sequence of their assembly (i.e., recipe).
Over time, since even fortresses need mainte-
nance, managers with position strategies can’t just
rest on their laurels. To maintain competitive ad-
vantage, they may need to refresh their resources
and strengthen the links among them. For example,
the Spanish clothing company Zara has updated
several resources to bolster its strategic position, in-
cluding more and better small-batch production
that seamlessly links to air shipment logistics. Zara
can now send new designs to any store in the world
in less than two days.
Like any strategy, position strategy has an Achil-
les heel: change. When industries change, moving a
fortress locked into a strategic position is tough.
Changing a tightly linked system means disman-
tling the very synergies that management worked
so hard to build and putting the organization at risk
during the transition to a new strategy. For this rea-
son, many managers either ignore change or make
changes at the margin. But neither approach works.
Once stable markets change, entrenched strategic
positions tend to falter. Change forces managers to
dismantle their existing resource systems and reas-
semble them in new strategic positions. This is
difficult and time-consuming — a combination
that can potentially be lethal because performance
may not improve until the pieces are reassembled
and linked. For example, Liz Claiborne, an apparel
company, relied on a positioning strategy in which
production, distribution, marketing, design, pre-
sentation and sales resources were all tightly linked.
But when the industry changed, the company’s re-
lationships with department stores were disrupted.2
In an effort to adapt, Claiborne executives changed
resources such as their “no reordering” process that
had antagonized department stores. But since this
process was synergistically entwined with other
resources like overseas logistics and distant manu-
facturing locations, the “no reordering” process
could not be undone without damaging system co-
herence. Financial performance sank precipitously.
Only after Claiborne executives dismantled their
existing resources and started reconnecting new
ones did positive performance begin to return.
The Leverage Strategy In markets where change is moderate, leverage
strategies often beat position strategies. Since
change is incremental and predictable, it makes
sense for managers to coevolve their strategically
important resources with the industry. So while
position strategies are based on the fortress anal-
ogy, leverage strategies are more like chess, where
competitive advantage comes from both having
valuable pieces and making smart moves with
them. Take Pepsi. The company has several strate-
gically important resources (including its brand,
product formulas and distribution system). But
what really matters is that the company has smartly
leveraged them to support new products that fit
with increasingly health-conscious consumers.
Alongside its carbonated drinks, Pepsi now offers
an array of alternative beverages, including waters
(Aquafina, SoBe Lifewater), juices (Tropicana,
Dole), teas (Lipton) and sports drinks (Gatorade),
all of which take advantage of the company’s stra-
tegically important resources.
Companies that pursue leverage strategies
achieve competitive advantage by using their strate-
gically important resources in existing and new
industries at a pace that is consistent with market
FALL 2011 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 75
change. This strategy, commonly associated with
the resource-based view of the company,3 focuses
on building or acquiring resources that are valuable,
rare, difficult to imitate and nonsubstitutable, and
leveraging them into new products and markets.
But while resources in position strategies are often
tightly interlocked, resources in leverage strategies
are often only moderately interconnected.
Leverage strategies can focus on refreshing and
consistently deploying core resources in current mar-
kets. For example, although Intel’s short-term success
depends on extracting value from its current genera-
tion of microprocessors, its long-term growth depends
on using its well-known design capabilities, branding
and manufacturing resources in future generations of
microprocessors. Similarly, Pizza Hut’s continued suc-
cess depends on updating its highly important service
resources in its existing markets. The company ex-
panded into India in the late 1990s and soon
distinguished itself from competitors based on its
ability to provide customers with pizza and friendly
table service in a relaxed atmosphere. Yet, by 2005,
India’s casual dining sector was crowded. Pressured by
rivals, including Domino’s, Pizza Hut refreshed its ser-
vice resources and leveraged them to create a more
upscale dining experience. As a result, Pizza Hut is still
the most trusted food brand in India.
While leveraging resources in existing markets is
important, leveraging resources into new markets is
important, too. Under Armour, a Baltimore, Mary-
land, sports apparel company founded in 1995,
offers a good example. CEO Kevin Plank originally
planned to make breathable garments for football
players. But he and his team soon realized that they
could leverage their moisture-wicking synthetic
fabrications into other markets. After screening
markets to see where this resource could be intro-
duced most effectively, Under Armour executives
developed their first line of moisture-wicking run-
ning shoes. Similarly, Home Depot is currently
attempting to leverage its core resources by selling
automotive replacement parts. By exploiting both
its extensive expertise in “do-it-yourself ” and its
2,200 store locations, it hopes to propel growth.
A common mistake with leverage strategies is
forgetting to reassess the strategic importance of
resources (especially value, rarity and nonsubsti-
tutability) in potential new markets. For example,
when Amazon.com first tried to leverage its online
ordering and inventory fulfillment capabilities be-
yond books and music to include other product
categories such as toys, it hit a wall. As it turned out,
the inventory systems that were tailored for books
and music were not well suited for the extreme sea-
sonality of toys, and the company’s warehouse
logistics were not designed to handle toys, which
come in all sorts of shapes and sizes.
Leverage strategy is not only about expansion.
Sometimes, it makes sense to pull back and rede-
ploy resources. For years, Califor nia-based
Advanced Micro Devices used its superior engi-
n e e r i n g d e s i g n re s o u rce s to d e ve l o p s e m i -
conductors. Recently, however, the company has
redeployed some of its resources away from the
hotly competitive semiconductor industry and
into design services. Although products and ser-
vices may rely on particular strategically important
resources, these resources need not be wedded to
specific products or services. Rather, they can be
used to create competitive advantage in other con-
texts. In other words, a deep knowledge base of
resources and capabilities is often fungible across
multiple products and markets.
A primary challenge of creating competitive ad-
vantage with a leverage strategy is updating the
resource portfolio as industries change. This can mean
choosing whether to acquire, partner or develop key
resources in-house. Toyota’s Prius is an example of le-
veraging some existing resources, including brand
and electronics technology, even as the company de-
veloped and acquired new resources for hybrid
technology, engine control software and regenerative
braking. But, even when managers see the need for
adding, upgrading or eliminating resources, en-
trenched beliefs and internal power struggles can
interfere. Immediate performance from existing re-
sources takes precedence over later performance
from new resources that may be several years away.
To support this point, one needs to look no further
than Chrysler. In 1984, Chrysler introduced the first
minivan. Over the next 20 years, it sold more than
10 million minivans, revitalized its popular Jeep line
and introduced successful Ram and Dakota pickups
and Dodge Durango SUVs. But the auto industry
changed. While General Motors and Ford adapted
their engine technologies to emphasize fuel efficiency
Under Armour CEO Kevin Plank and his team realized that they could leverage their moisture-wicking synthetic fabrications into new markets.
COURTESY OF UNDER ARMOUR
76 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW FALL 2011 SLOANREVIEW.MIT.EDU
S T R A T E G Y
and retooled their manufacturing plants for small
cars, Chrysler failed to update its resource portfolio.
As a result, the company, now controlled by Fiat, has
yet to prove that it can gain the resources necessary to
compete well in the new reality.
The Opportunity Strategy In contrast to stable industries, dynamic industries are
characterized by superabundant flows of fast-moving
but often unpredictable opportunities. Industry struc-
ture is characteristically shifting as competitors come
and go, customers modify their preferences and busi-
ness models are in flux. How long will competitive
advantage last? It’s impossible to know, but probably
not very long. As the CEO of a security software com-
pany told us half-jokingly, “You need a degree in
astrology to compete in our industry.” Even though
managers seek a long-term competitive advantage,
they do business as if it doesn’t exist. The famous Intel
axiom that “only the paranoid survive” reflects senior
management’s belief that at any point in time their
competitive advantage will vanish. As a result, strategy
focuses on capturing opportunities that create a series
of temporary competitive advantages.
In contrast to the fortress and chess views of
strategy, pursuing an opportunity strategy is like
surfing: Performance comes from catching a great
wave at the right time, even though the duration of
that wave is likely to be short and the ride a precari-
ous “edge of chaos” experience where falling off is
always a possibility.4 Timing and capturing succes-
sive waves are what matters. The video game console
industry provides a useful case in point. In the space
of only a few years, different companies (including
Sega, Nintendo, Sony and Microsoft) have “caught
the wave” and for a time led the industry.
For companies pursuing opportunity strategies,
competitive advantage comes from capturing at-
tractive but fleeting opportunities sooner, faster and
better than competitors. This strategy, which is
commonly associated with “simple rules” heuris-
tics,5 requires combining two elements: choosing a
focal strategic process and developing simple rules
to guide that process. Together, they enable compa-
nies to be flexible enough to capture unanticipated
opportunities while still being broadly coherent and
efficient. In choosing a focal strategic process, the
key is to choose one where the flow of attractive op-
portunities is steady and deep. Tata Group, whose
diversified operations range from steel and autos to
communications and beverages, provides a good
example. Because of its high market capitalization
and ready access to corporate debt, Tata has relied
heavily on acquisitions as its focal strategic process.
Its managers have pursued a series of acquisition
opportunities quickly and effectively. For example,
in 2007, the company paid $12 billion for Corus, a
European steel company. Several months later, it
paid $2.3 billion to buy Jaguar and Land Rover from
Ford. In contrast, Apple focuses on a different stra-
tegic process — product development — to churn
out coveted new designs. Yet in contrast to position
strategy, which depends on tightly connected pro-
cesses, opportunity strategy is built on processes
that are only loosely connected to one another.
Once managers have identified their focal strategic
process, they need to learn some simple rules. The easi-
est to learn are rules of thumb for picking and
processing opportunities; rules for pacing and priority
rules are more difficult to learn. The idea is to provide
enough structure for action while also allowing flexi-
bility to capture unanticipated opportunities. At Pixar
Animation Studio, whose animated films (including
the Toy Story movies, A Bug’s Life, and Finding Nemo)
have become worldwide megahits, the rules are clear.
One rule is “no studio executives.” Pixar is run by cre-
ative artists, or as Andrew Stanton (director of WALL-E
and Pixar’s ninth employee) called it, “film school
without the teachers.” This gives company artists maxi-
mum leeway to create without having to fight their way
through middle management. A second rule is “great
story first, then animation.” That not only ensures a
steady stream of prestigious awards (Ratatouille holds
the record for the most Oscar nominations for a fea-
ture-length animated film), but also makes it easier to
attract talent. Another rule stipulates “in-house origi-
nal ideas only.” And while ideas must come from
within, they don’t come just from creative types: Every-
one from janitors to auditors is encouraged to submit
ideas, and all ideas are considered. Finally, as the surf-
ing analogy would suggest, the rules affecting pacing
are particularly important. A key one at Pixar is “one
new movie per year.” But while there are rules, there is
plenty of space at Pixar to create unique movies.
On the surface, opportunity strategies relying
on simple rules seem easy to copy. But since the op-
SLOANREVIEW.MIT.EDU FALL 2011 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 77
portunities and outcomes are so varied, it is actually
difficult to decode the rules from the outside. Of
course, competitors can try to mimic processes (say,
for acquisitions or product development), but rules
are often the results of idiosyncratic trial and error,
making them difficult for rivals to duplicate. More-
over, even if competitors understand the underlying
logic and copy a company’s rules, it’s often too late:
The most attractive opportunities will have already
been captured. For example, although Cisco Sys-
tem’s networking rivals eventually copied the rules
of its acquisition process, they could not replicate
the opportunities that Cisco had already acquired.
Managers often tinker with their rules by mak-
ing them better or more suited to their changing
industries. In doing so, managers not only alter the
number and content of rules, but also their abstrac-
tion. For example, CRF Health, an international
company that expedites drug discovery in the phar-
maceutical industry, frequently adjusted the rules
that guided its internationalization process. When
the company entered the United States, it relied on
a rule that had been highly effective in Sweden:
“Hire strong locals using online resources.” But this
rule proved ill-suited to the new market because
there were few individuals with both clinical devel-
opment and technical skills willing to work in a
startup. Indeed, the rule led to several early hires
who were not well-qualified. Based on this experi-
ence, CRF’s team decided that the existing rule
needed to change to one emphasizing local hiring
without regard to source. Thus, leaders raised the
abstraction from “Hire strong locals using online
resources” to the more general “Hire strong locals.”
This new rule focused attention on the overarching
aim of hiring, but did not prescribe whether to rely
on online resources, headhunters or other sources.
Although intuition suggests that rules begin as ab-
stract and become detailed, opportunity strategy
stresses the opposite. Rather than becoming rou-
tine to ensure efficiency, rules often become more
abstract and remain few in number to ensure flexi-
bility to address unanticipated opportunities.
When an opportunity flow becomes less attractive
(e.g., greater competition for the opportunities or
lower payoff from the opportunities) or when more
attractive opportunity flows emerge, it’s time to pivot
to the superior flow and its related strategic process.
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S T R A T E G Y
The key point is that shifts in where to compete are
driven more by the attractiveness of opportunity flows
than by fit with the company’s strategically important
resources. For example, as product development op-
portunities slowed down at Google, management
placed more emphasis on internationalization oppor-
tunities. The company ramped up to enter more than
55 countries with more than 35 languages by support-
ing localized search, and it now generates more than
half its revenue from outside the United States. Simi-
larly, once its user network had grown to a sufficient
scale, LinkedIn switched from emphasizing its strate-
gic process for user acquisition to one for developing
new revenue-producing services.
Just as positioning and leverage strategies have
their pitfalls, so does opportunity strategy. For entre-
preneurial startups, it is often critical to add more
strategic processes and rules than is comfortable.
Too little structure is riskier than too much. But for
large companies, the greater risk is having too much
structure. Most managers intuitively worry about
bureaucracy and red tape. But what they don’t know
is that pursuing an opportunity strategy requires
holding the line on the number of rules, not just their
content. In other words, the number of rules mat-
ters. Managers should also be alert to signs of
consolidation, standardization, longer product life
cycles and other such indications that the industry is
maturing and becoming less dynamic.
SO WHICH STRATEGY SHOULD YOU USE? The real-
ity is that no single strategy works in every industry
always. Although the essence of strategy is being
different, establishing that “difference” — whether
it’s through different positions, different resources
or different rules — depends on the circumstances.
Each approach works best in particular settings and
has its own implications for strategic actions, pit-
falls, competitive advantage and performance. And
just when you think you have it right, you may well
need to change again. But by understanding the ar-
chetypal strategic frameworks and the factors
underlying each choice, you’ll be better prepared to
craft your next strategy.
Christopher Bingham is assistant professor and Phil- lip Hettleman Fellow of strategy and entrepreneurship at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s Kenan-Flagler Business School. Kathleen Eisenhardt
is the Stanford W. Ascherman M.D. Professor of Strat- egy and Organization at Stanford University. Nathan Furr is assistant professor of entrepreneurship and strategy at Brigham Young University. Comment on this article at http://sloanreview.mit.edu/x/53110/, or contact the authors at [email protected].
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors thank Kenan-Flagler Business School at UNC, Stanford Technology Ventures Program, Marriott School of Management at BYU and the National Science Founda- tion (grant #0323176) for their support.
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