8-10 page paper Politics of Violence
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599 On Violence essay on the theor ies o f v io lence The idea here is to engage one of the theories (or literary treatments) that seek to help us to understand violence and apply it to a real-world case in the areas we are examining in the course. I . Structural Considerations A. Tit le Include two dimensions in your title. The first should be descriptive language referring to the paper’s subject matter. And the second should refer to your main point or argument. B. Introduction Your introduction should do four things: (a) make it clear why the study of the act of violence you have chosen is important, (b) a sense of the chief intellectual challenge it poses to theory, (c) a brief statement as to your main finding and (d) a brief overview of the paper. C. Context This section is where you will establish the groundwork for your analysis. You can begin by locating your act of violent activity within its context. Say something here regarding (a) the actors and (b) the essential fact-pattern of the event or case in question. D. Theory In this part of the paper, you can introduce the theory (or literary treatment) you seek to examine in terms of (a) its basic assumptions and (b) ways in which it would seek to account for the event under consideration. E. Evaluation Here you will make a determination as to the utility, the value, of the theory in terms of its explanatory power or its limitations. F. Conclusion Restate the main intellectual issue to emerge from the treatment of the incident and the theories you have selected. Then, restate what you take to be the main point to emerge from your analysis. And, finally, offer some comments as to the implications of this for the future.
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II . Technical Considerations A. Sources JSTOR will be very important here. So too will be the coverage from the Times of London, New York Times and other news services. B. Style About the style of the composition, three quick points will suffice. First, you will not need a title page, just get right to it (name, course number in upper right or left, single-spaced). Second, use only Times New Roman and standard margins. And third, in addition to your paper’s title, use section-headings to announce points of transition in the essay (a single word or a short phrase that captures the essence of what is coming in the section). C. Citations Please use footnotes after the fashion of the Chicago Manual of Style. With regard to the footnotes, remember to put them in Times New Roman and bring them down to ten-point font. Also, provide a bibliography.
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Social–emotional origins of violence: A theory of multiple killing
Thomas J. Scheff ⁎ Dept of Sociology, UCSB, 3009 Lomita Road, Santa Barbara, CA, 93105, USA
a b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f o
Article history: Received 8 November 2008 Received in revised form 8 November 2010 Accepted 4 March 2011 Available online 26 March 2011
Keywords: Violence Recursion Alienation Unacknowledged shame Anger Social–emotional world
This essay outlines a cybernetic theory of violence, supporting and extending earlier studies, particularly Gilligan and Websdale. It spells out recursive, interactive processes of alienation and emotion. The theory proposes that most violence is caused by the interaction between alienation and what Gilligan called secret shame, shame about shame. Recursion need not stop in one round: there may be no natural limit for the resultant spirals. A chain reaction of vengefulness, a shame/anger derivative, can be produced in this way. Two spirals are described: shame/rage and shame/shame. Studies and accounts of multiple killings offer preliminary support. The idea may be applicable to collective behavior also, such as gratuitous wars. Websdale's cases of calmly planned familicide seem particularly relevant to the origins of wars, such as WWI, in which vengeance seems to have played a major part. It would appear that the humiliation–revenge cycle is the most dangerous element in human existence. The last section offers some tentative first steps toward decreasing violence. To the extent that the theory proposed here is true, we face the dilemma of how to present it to a civilization in which the social–emotional world is virtually invisible.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Contents
1. How much shame? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454 2. Case studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454 3. Shame and violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454 4. Isolation and feeling traps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455 5. Emotion spirals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456 6. Recursion of emotions and alienation in killers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456 7. Alienation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457 8. Collective violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457 9. Media and masses33This section summarizes part of Chapter 6 of Scheff (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457
10. Response of historians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458 11. Remedies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458 12. Alienated students . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459 13. Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459 14. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
This article describes social–emotional processes leading to killings, and preliminary steps that might help avoid future ones.1
Because there is a large amount of background information about
multiple killers, and several empirical studies, their cases are used to illustrate the theory. To suggest the possibility that the theory may also apply on a larger scale, some historical materials related to the origins of World War I are also included.
The most useful steps toward a general theory of the emotional causes of violence were suggested by Gilligan (1997), based on his experiences with violent men as a prison psychiatrist.
The emotion of shame is the primary or ultimate cause of all violence… Shame is a necessary but not a sufficient cause of
Aggression and Violent Behavior 16 (2011) 453–460
⁎ Tel.: +1 805 687 6145. E-mail address: [email protected].
1 This article uses the term multiple killing, rather than spree, rampage, mass, or serial killing. I am indebted to Robert Fuller for his comments on an earlier draft, to Chris Poulsen for his help with the large literature on multiple killings, and to Suzanne Retzinger for her support and encouragement.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1359-1789/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.avb.2011.03.007
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Aggression and Violent Behavior
violence, just as the tubercle bacillus is necessary but not sufficient for the development of tuberculosis. The different forms of violence, whether toward individuals or entire populations, are motivated (caused) by shame. (pp. 110–111) [There are three preconditions under which shame leads to violence.] The first precondition is that the shame is a secret probably the most carefully guarded secret held by violent men… The degree of shame that a man needs to be experiencing in order to become homicidal is so intense and so painful that it threatens to overwhelm him and bring about the death of the self, cause him to lose his mind, his soul, or his sacred honor.
The idea that secret shame is the prime cause of violence is very important, but needs to be elaborated. Normal emotions are hardly overwhelming because they are brief and instructive. Fear is a signal of imminent danger, but usually comes and goes in a few seconds, like other normal emotions. Similarly, normal shame and embarrassment are brief signals of actual or potential rejection by other(s). What kind of dynamic can result in feeling overwhelmed by painful emotions to the point of losing all inhibition? We will return to this question below, after considering Gilligan's other two conditions.
…The second precondition for violence is met when these men perceive themselves as having no nonviolent means of warding off or diminishing their feelings of shame, …such as socially rewarded economic or cultural achievement, or high social status, position, and prestige. (p. 112) The third precondition …is that the person lacks feelings that inhibit the violent impulses that are stimulated by shame. The most important are love and guilt toward others, and fear for the self. … (p. 113)
Finally, there is a forth issue implied: Since Gilligan worked only in male prisons, his perpetrators are all men. As discussed below, the majority of multiple killers are men, but there is also a small minority of women.
1. How much shame?
The question of conditions in which secret shame leads to violence turns out to be important, because it seems reasonable to assume that shame, or the anticipation of shame, is virtually omnipresent in most people, especially secret shame. The idea that people spend much of their time and energy involved in or avoiding shame or embarrass- ment, if possible, and managing it if not, was central to much of the writing of Erving Goffman (Goffman, 1959). One example:
“…there is no interaction in which participants do not take an appreciable chance of being slightly embarrassed or a slight chance of being deeply humiliated.” (1959, p. 243, emphasis added).
If this sentence is taken literally, it means that shame and/or the anticipation of shame haunts ALL social interaction. Avoidance of shame/embarrassment/humiliation is the driving force behind Goff- man's central idea of impression management. Two studies that suggest a very high frequency of shame-related episodes in ordinary life will be discussed below.
The idea that shame issues are a virtually continuous presence in human affairs seems odd in modern societies because they foster the doctrine of individualism. We are taught that each person is a sovereign entity, self-reliant, standing alone. This emphasis is just a pipedream, since flourishing and even surviving is completely dependent upon recognition and help from others.
Finally, there is an issue of secret shame that makes trouble, but no violence. Many years ago Cressey's (1953), study of persons jailed for embezzlement shows that every case involved what he called a “non-
shareablefinancial problem,” inGilligan's terminology, a secret (see also Braithwaite, 1989). Similarly, many studies have suggested that bullying, which usually involves only threats of violence, are linked to secret shame (Ahmed, et al., 2001). This essaywill propose that it is not just secret shame, but endlessly recursive shame that leads to violence.
2. Case studies
In the US, at least, many of the multiple killers have been loners who were harassed and ostracized. Yet most people treated that way don't shoot anyone or evenmake trouble.What could be special about the killers? It may be that shamemight be the problem. Although they use the word rejection, rather than shame, Leary et al's (2003) review of school shootings come to a similar conclusion. Again, they don't use the term isolation, but it is implied in their analysis.
Before developing the theory further, first some examples are offered to illustrate the theory. Tyler Peterson was a 19 year old who killed six in Crandon, Wisconsin (Oct. 8, 2007 Milwaukee Journal Sentinel). He had gone to his on-again, off-again girlfriend's house in the middle of the night and instead of patching up their relationship, argued with her. One of the persons gathered at her home for a party called him a "worthless pig". He went home, got his AR-17 machine gun, and returned to kill all of the gathering but one. According to one of his friends, Peterson had been picked on in high school because he was not originally from Crandon, and not an athlete.
Cho Seung-Hui was the 23-year old killer in the spree at Virginia Tech in 2007. Like Peterson and all of the other school killers, he was an isolated male loner who felt rejected. Many of his written complaints imply that he was rejecting those that he felt had rejected him, a strong indication of shame. There are also plentiful indications of isolation. One of his teachers reported, “Hewas the loneliest person I have ever known.” His roommate commented that often he didn't respond at all when spoken to, or with only one word.
In Cho's writings, there are many indications of shame and humiliation. He often mentioned others' disrespect for him and those like him. In one instance he referred directly to humiliation: “Kill yourselves or you will never know how the dorky kid that [you] publicly humiliated and spat on will come behind you and slash your throats.” (Washington Post, August 29, 2007).
His claim to being publicly humiliated could be either true or imagined, since there is at this writing no outside support for it. However, there is such support in the case of Jennifer San Marcos. She was the 44-year-old killer in the Goleta, California post office spree in 2006, killing 7 persons and herself. An investigator who requested anonymity spoke with many of Jennifer's co-workers for several weeks after the spree.
The investigator was surprised to find that with only one exception, the 18 co-workers interviewed expressed deep sympathy not only for the victims, but also for Jennifer. They all told roughly the same story. She was fired because of her mental illness, which had led to periodic misbehavior on the job. On the night she was fired after her latest outburst, she was handcuffed to a mail cart by the management, awaiting the arrival of thepolice. During the extended period ofwaiting, she was in full view of her co-workers, as if she were in stocks. Because this part of the story shows management in a bad light, it has not been mentioned in themedia. Perhaps anyone,mentally ill, or not,would feel intense humiliation under these circumstances.
3. Shame and violence
The role of humiliation in multiple killing was suggested by Gaylin (2003, p. 60) in his analysis of hatred:
The rampage of an ex-employee at the workplace is often the product of …a perceived public humiliation, where the “public” may be only his fellow employees at the post office.
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Gaylin's statement, made several years before the event, is nevertheless a telling comment particularly on the Goleta multiple killing. In an earlier study, Diamond (1997) also emphasized shame and humiliation, stating clearly that workplace violence seems to be based equally on management mistreatment and the killers' shame dynamics.
I have located three empirical studies that support the shame/ violence hypothesis, and a review of large literature of empirical studies (Leary, et al., 2006).The review does not use the word shame, but an expression that is its cognate (feeling rejected). Of the three studies that employ the word shame, two of them are on a fairly small scale, by Brown (2004), and by Thomas (1995).
The third study, Websdale (2010), however, is the largest, most detailed, and most systematic study so far. He found evidence of intense shame in almost all of 211 cases of multiple killings within families: one partner kills the other partner, and one or more child. This type of murder is a multiple killing, but usually enclosed within a single family. (In a few of the cases, however, bystanders were also killed.)
All of Websdale's cases except the very early ones containedmany, many details about each case, obtained not only from media reports, but also from police records and in some cases actual interviews with persons who knew the family. Most of these sources were available to Websdale through the Domestic Violence Fatality Review movement, a sizable group judging from the many persons acknowledged by the author.
The author patiently sifted through these materials in order to understand each case separately. Judging frommy own reactions, this part of his study must have required considerable emotional fortitude on his part: a review of highly detailed material from some 150 tragedies, one after another.
Websdale's findings strongly support Gilligan's idea that violence is caused by shame. However, in addition, Websdale discovered that most of the killings took two seemingly different forms: the livid coercive hearts, and the civil reputable hearts. The first type of violence, a majority of the cases, is clearly parallel to the common- sense idea of violence exploding out of rage.
The second type is quite different, involving killers with no history of violence whatever, and clearly and quietly premeditated, some- times during lengthy periods of time. The idea of a type of premeditated violence turns out to be quite important in several ways, but particularly in understanding collective violence.
The theory outlined here, like Gilligan's and Websdale's, proposes shame as a causal agent, but also has a social component, alienation, equally important. When these two components interact without limit, the stage is set for either withdrawal or extreme violence. Fortunately for the survival of the human race, withdrawal seems to be by far the most frequent reaction.
4. Isolation and feeling traps
A theory of violence requires a way of explaining the extraordi- nary, indeed unlimited force and loss of moral and other inhibitions that produces violence in our civilization. In this section, two main kinds of recursive loops will be considered: a social loop of rejection/ isolation on the one hand, and a shame loop, a feeling trap (Lewis, 1971), on the other.
The idea of a rejection/isolation loop is straightforward. Being or even just feeling rejected by a group leads toward alienation, and the more alienated, the more likely further rejection, a spiral. This process is social rather than psychological, although it is related to shame- based loops, because rejection and isolation are the basic causes of shame.
There is one complexity about isolation that will be considered. Some multiple killings were committed by two persons, not one. We are tempted to say that in these cases, the perpetrators were not
completely isolated, since they at least had each other. This issue will be discussed below by considering a second kind of alienation other than isolation, engulfment or fusion. It can be argued that the pairs of killers were just as alienated as the isolated ones, but in the engulfed mode of alienation.
The part played by emotions in violence is more complex. It seems to be based on shame, but the kind of shame that goes unnoticed and unmentioned. Helen B. Lewis, a psychologist and psychoanalyst, used a systematic method (Gottschalk & Glaser, 1969) to locate emotion indicators in many transcripts of psychotherapy sessions (Lewis, 1971). She found that shame/embarrassment was by far the most frequent emotion, occurring more than all the other emotions combined. Her findings suggest that shame/embarrassment, unlike pride, joy, grief, fear, or anger, was so frequent in the many sessions she studied that it almost always seemed to be unnoticed.
In addition to this study, there is another one that suggests that episodes of unacknowledged shame are frequent occurrences, yet don't result in violence. Retzinger (1991) showed that in the filmed marital quarrels of four couples, all 16 angry escalations she found were preceded by an insult that was not acknowledged. She showed that in each instance the insult generated a triple spiral of shame, anger and isolation, one spiral between the partners, and one within each of them, but there was no violence.
As indicated, Lewis (1971) found that the frequent occurrences of shame were virtually never mentioned by patient or therapist. The episodes involving other emotions, such as sadness, fear, or anger, were often referred to by either patient or therapist or both. However, in almost all of the instances of shame/embarrassment/humiliation, neither patient nor therapist referred to it. She called the unmen- tioned instances "unacknowledged shame."
She went on to note that when shame occurs but is not acknowledged, it can lead to an intense response, a feeling trap: one becomes ashamed of one's feelings in such a way that leads to further emotion. Since normal emotions are extremely brief in duration, Lewis's idea of a feeling trap opens up a whole new area of exploration. Emotions that persist over time have long been a puzzle for researchers, since normal emotions function only as brief signals.
The particular trap that Lewis described in detail involved shame/ anger sequences. One can rapidly become angry when ashamed, and ashamed that one is angry. She called the result "humiliated fury". She found many word-by-word instances of episodes in which unacknow- ledged shame was followed by either hostility toward the therapist or withdrawal. In her examples of the latter, withdrawal takes a form that she called depression. She refers to the shame/anger/withdrawal sequence as shame and anger “short circuited into depression” (1971, p. 431 and passim). In a later chapter (The Role of Shame in Depression over the Lifespan, 1987, pp. 29–49), Lewis reviewed many studies by other authors using various measures that showed strong correlations between shame and depression (Lewis, 1987).
Lewis's references to the kind of shame that leads either to withdrawal or to anger always involved unacknowledged shame, a term quite parallel to Gilligan's secret shame. Neither Gilligan nor Lewis, however, sufficiently explained why it is this particular type of shame that leads to trouble.
The explanation, as it turns out, is not simple. What their work implies is that when shame is kept secret, or unacknowledged, there is little chance that it will be resolved. How is shame ordinarily resolved? Although this question is rarely addressed explicitly, it seems to me that both authors seem to assume that normal shame is resolved through verbal means and through humor. However, in the case of intense humiliation, lengthy verbal or at least cognitive consideration might be needed before any humor can be found in the offending incident.
In many of my classes, I have asked student volunteers to tell the class about the most embarrassing moment in their lives. Invariably some of the volunteers, during the course of their story, become
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convulsed with laughter. Often these same students tell me afterwards that the public telling touched not only the embarrassment from the particular incident, but also shame from other incidents that apparently was also unresolved, a backlog of shame.
It appears that when shame is not resolved, it can build up a backlog of hidden shame. When there is considerable backlog, then any new incident is felt in itself, but also seems to reactivate the backlog, making the new incident, even if seemingly trivial, extremely painful. Even without the spirals to be described below, backlogs of shame can lead to trouble.
The case of John Silber, as described inMilburn and Conrad (1996), provides an example of the link between suppressed shame and anger in a public setting. Silber is the ex-president of Boston University, and was a powerful conservative force in Massachusetts politics. His approach to political issues is a prime example of the politics of rage. As Milburn and Conrad (1996) suggest, it was an outburst of rage during a TV broadcast on the eve of the election that seemed to cost him the race when he ran for governor.
In an earlier interview, Silber stated that his sixth grade teacher laughed at him for wanting to be a veterinarian, since Silber had a withered arm. When the interviewer asked him how he felt about being laughed at, Silber replied that hewasn't humiliated, it made him stronger. This episode can be interpreted to mean that Silber's rage as a person and as a politician might have arisen from the suppression of shame.
5. Emotion spirals
Lewis' idea of humiliated fury as a feeling trap can be a first step toward a theory of the emotional origins of either withdrawal or extreme violence. Since none of the therapy sessions she studied contained physical aggression, she didn't consider the kind of feeling traps that could result in violent aggression, on the one hand, or long lasting or total withdrawal (as in clinical depression).
Lewis described feeling traps as emotion sequences. The sequences described by Lewis involve at most three steps, as in the case of the shame/anger sequence short-circuited into depression. It will be necessary, however, to go beyond three steps, even as far as an endless spiral. Such a process would be a doomsday machine of interpersonal and inter-group withdrawal or violence. The combina- tion of isolation and denial of shame can lead to self-perpetuating loops that generate either complete withdrawal or extreme violence.
Some emotion sequences may be recursive to the point that there is no natural limit to their length and intensity. Blushers provide an everyday example: some who blush easily tend to become embar- rassed that they are blushing, leading tomore intense blushing, and so on. The actor Ian Holm reported an extreme instance. During a live performance when he forgot his lines, he became embarrassed, realized he was blushing, which embarrassed him further, ending up paralyzed in the fetal position. He had to be carried from the stage. This feeling trapwould not be a shame/anger spiral, but rather shame/ shame: being ashamed that you are ashamed, etc.
Recursive shame-based sequences, whether shame about anger, shame about fear, or shame about shame need not stop after a few steps. They can spiral to the extent that they rule out all other considerations. Collective panics such as those that take place under the threat of fire might be caused by shame/fear spirals, one's own fear and that of others reflecting back and forth can cause still more fear, leading to a triple spiral: a spiral within each person, and a spiral between them.
Although Lewis didn't consider the possibility, depression might be a result not only of a shame/anger spiral, but also shame/shame, or a combination of both. Judging from her own transcriptions, withdrawal after unacknowledged shame seems to be much more frequent than hostility toward the therapist.
The less frequent shame/anger spiral, humiliated fury, or a shame/ shame spiral with the anger hidden, might be basic causes of violence to the extent that they result in self-perpetuating loops. A person or group caught up both in alienation and in a shame-based spiral might become oblivious to all else, whether moral imperatives or danger to self or to one's group. Limitless quarrels or withdrawal can be generated by a triple spiral: shame/anger and/or shame/shame spirals within each party, and an isolation spiral between them.
It is conceivable that shame spirals could be a predominant cause of violence, with shame/anger playing only a hidden part. This might be the case in killings that are carefully and lengthily premeditated. Shame spirals and shame/anger spirals could be equally involved, as will be discussed below in a consideration of collective violence.
Perhaps the idea of a spiral of social alienation might be a more general way of referring to Gilligan's second and third conditions, the absence of socially acceptable ways of avoiding shame, such as high status, and the inability to feel love, guilt or fear. Feeling completely forbidden by other persons/groups can dominate all other feelings.
6. Recursion of emotions and alienation in killers
It has been suggested that recursive thinking is unique to human beings, differentiating their mental processes decisively from other species (Corballis, 2007). The theory presented here proposes that recursion of feelings, feeling about feeling, would also differentiate humans from other species, and explain episodes of depression or rage of extraordinary intensity and/or duration.
Gilligan's explanation of the way in which secret shame leads to violence is largely metaphorical, as already indicated:
The degree of shame that a man needs to be experiencing in order to become homicidal is so intense and so painful that it threatens to overwhelm him and bring about the death of the self, cause him to lose his mind, his soul, or his sacred honor.
The model of recursive loops explains how laminations and spirals of shame could lead to pain so unbearable as to feel like one is dying, or losing mind or soul.
The idea of isolation and shame/anger spirals seems to fit most of the recorded cases of multiple killing: the killers were not only isolated but also may have been in unacknowledged shame states. In her book Rampage (Newman, 2004), the social scientist Katherine Newman analyzed 25 school killings that took place in the U.S. between 1974 and 2002. The 27 killers all had been marginalized in their schools. That is, they had been harassed and ostracized to the point that they were completely alienated. Although Newman did not often mention shame or shaming, her descriptions suggest that the killers may have been in a state of unacknowledged shame prior to their rampages.
In another study of school killings, Fast (2008) considered 13 cases, and also suggests isolation (he calls it lack of integration into the school social milieu). Like Newman, some of his terminology (e.g., self-hatred) implies shame without naming it explicitly.
A multiple killing that occurred after the publication of Newman's book and is not mention in the Fast book, (Santa Barbara News-Press. March 25, 2005) suggests both reasons and clues for unacknowledged shame and for alienation. At the Red Lake Senior High School, in Minnesota, JeffWeise killed 7 people and himself. He was a very obese (6 ft, 250 lbs.) 16-year-old, whose father had committed suicide ten years earlier. His mother, driving drunk, was brain damaged in an accident in 1999. According to Jeff's online postings, since her accident, she had been beating him mercilessly, but he never stood up to her.
In another posting, he stated “I have friends, but I'm basically a loner in a group of loners. I've never shared my past with anyone, and I've never talked about it with anyone. I'm excluded from anything
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and everything they do, I'm never invited, I don't even knowwhy they consider me a friend or I them…”
This boy seems to have been without a single bond, rejected continually and relentlessly by everyone around him, including his mother and his so-called friends. It is little wonder that his writing contains many clear indications of shame; for example, “I really must be fucking worthless…”
The Columbine multiple killing has evoked the largest amount of research. Larkin (2007), as already mentioned, has described in detail the circumstances that led up to the killings. It is quite clear from his investigation that the killers, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, were quite isolated from others, but engulfed with each other. In the writing they did in secret, it is also clear that they both felt humiliated by the treatment they received from the high school cliques that rejected them.
7. Alienation
The idea of two types of alienation, mentioned earlier, in connection with killings done by two persons jointly will be further considered here. The founder of family systems theory, Murray Bowen (1978), distinguished between two kinds of dysfunctional relation- ships, engulfment (fusion) when the bond is too tight, and isolation, when it is too loose. In engulfed relationships, one or both parties subordinate their own thoughts and feelings to those of the other(s). In true solidarity, each party recognizes the sovereignty of the other, but balances respect for the other's position with respect for one's own, no more and no less.
Elias's (Introduction, l987) discussion of the "I–self" (isolation), the "we–self" (engulfment) and the "I–we balance" (true solidarity) makes the same point. Elias proposed a three-part typology: independence (too much distance), interdependence (a balance between self and other), and dependence (too little distance).
Engulfed relationships are alienated because at least one of the parties gives up vital parts of the self in order to be loyal to the other party. That is, one or both parties are alienated from self, in service to the other. In this kind of relationship, the kinds of negotiations that can be called upon by two independent parties are lost. All of the pairs of killers that I have examined seem to have been alienated in this mode. One person dominates the other. This was certainly the case of Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold in Columbine. Eric completely dominated Dylan, and Dylan idolized Eric (Larkin, 2007, pp. 144–148).
Clearly a majority of the cases have involved killers who were male, but female killers are not unknown.One examplewasmentioned above, the post office employeewho killed 6 and herself. A recent school killer, AmyBishop, a neurobiologist at theU. of Alabama, is another (NY Times, Feb. 13, 2010). In the U. S., overall women represent only a small proportion of killers. Why men? Perhaps men are less likely to acknowledge shame than women, since most men learn early that emotions other than anger are not considered manly.2 The discussion below of the difficulties in attracting male students into my class on emotions/relationships is relevant.
8. Collective violence
Perhapsmultiple killings occur at the collective level also, in the form of gratuitous assaults, genocides and wars. The individual and interpersonal emotion spirals would be the same, but there would
also be a recursive process between media and people, as suggested below.
The origins of World War I can serve as an example. The differences that divided the countries that fought this extraordinarily destructive war might have been negotiated, had there been last- minute negotiations to avoid war. But there weren't. Historians have so far been unable to explain the causes of this war.
My book on the politics of revenge (1994) proposed that social scientists, have been looking in the wrong places. The basic cause of the war, I argued, was not economic or real politic, but social/emotional. The German and French people seem to have been caught up in alienation and shame spirals. The French defeat by the Germans in 1871 led to national desire for vengeance. The French leaders plotted a war for over 40 years, including a secret understanding with Russia for the purpose of defeating the Germans. (For a more recent and broader discussion of emotions, revenge, and conflict, see Frijda, 2006, Ch. 7)
9. Media and masses3
During this period, the role of mass media in both generating and reflecting collective humiliation and anger is quite blatant. The French public and its leaders experienced their defeat in the Franco–Prussian War (l870-71), and the Treaty of Frankfurt, which ended the war, as humiliating (Kennan, 1984; Sontag, 1933; Weber, 1968).
Going against Bismark's warnings (he feared revenge), the Germans had annexed two French provinces (Alsace and Lorraine). Revenge brought about through the returnof the two lost provinces, revanchisme, became the central issue in French politics of the whole era.
Leading political figures such as Gambetta and General Boulanger talked about revenge openly in their campaigns (Boulanger was known in the popular press as "General Revenge.") Vengeance against Germany was a popular theme in newspapers, magazines, poetry and fiction.
Revenge themes were common in the popular literature of the time. The poetry and novels of that era serve as examples. The war poems of Deroulede (1872), Chants du Soldat (Songs of a Soldier) were wildly popular. Here is a sample stanza (quoted in Rutkoff, 1981, p. l61):
Revenge will come, perhaps slowly Perhaps with fragility, yet a strength that is sure For bitterness is already born and force will follow And cowards only the battle will ignore.
Note that this poemnot only appeals to the French to seek revenge, but also contains a coercive element. In the last line, anyone who might disagree with the poet's sentiments is labeled a coward. There are many other instances of appeals to vengeance, honor, and glory in the other poems: these are the main themes. By l890 this little book had gone through an unprecedented 83 editions, which suggests that it had a vast audience.
The extraordinary acclaim that greeted Chants du Soldat (Soldiers' Songs) prompted Deroulede to publish further books of similar thrust, most of them devoted to military glory, triumph and revenge. For example, in 1896 his Poesies Militaires (Military Poetry) continued in the same vein (Deroulede, 1896). The following is a representative stanza:
French blood! – a treasure so august And hoarded with such jealous care, To crush oppression's strength unjust, With all the force of right robust, And buy us back our honor fair…
2 There are many studies that show men to be much less involved with emotions than women. Several books on alexthymia (emotionlessness) don't discuss gender directly, but most of the case studies are men. Salminen, et al. (1999), used an alexthymia scale. They found evidence for emotionlessness in almost twice as many men as women. 3 This section summarizes part of Chapter 6 of Scheff (1994).
457T.J. Scheff / Aggression and Violent Behavior 16 (2011) 453–460
Although revenge is not mentioned explicitly, the last line implies what might be called the honor–insult–revenge cycle (Scheff & Suzanne, 1991).
Also indicative of open revanchismwas the rash of novels about the plight of Alsace and Lorraine under German occupation, which became popular in the l5 years preceding WWI. The best-known author of this genre, Maurrice Barres, published two: In the Service of Germany (Barres, 1905) and Collette Baudoche (Barres, 1909). These books, like many others of their ilk, were not works of art, but "works of war", to use the phrase of Barres' biographer (Boisdeffre, 1962).
Websdale's idea of a type of multiple killer who not acting in a fit of rage, but carefully and with considerable planning seems to be applicable to wars like WWI. The ruling emotional spiral is not shame–anger, but shame–shame. A person or a nation can become so lost in a spiral of being ashamed that it becomes the dominant force in their existence, as it seems to have been in the French nation in 1871– 1914. The violence that results is not because of lost of control, but of submerging the inhibitions that prevent killing. In an eerily prophetic letter to Ruge in 1843 about nationalism, Marx wrote: “…if a whole nationwere to feel ashamed it would be like a lion recoiling in order to spring.” (Tucker, 1978).
The alienation loops in the case of collective violence are more complex than those of persons in two different ways. The first way has already been mentioned, the loop that develops between the media and the public. The second complexity is that a double type of alienation develops between the contending groups: isolation between the groups (too far) and engulfment within them (too close). My earlier study (1994) named this double type of alienation bimodal, and proposed that it is a necessary condition for aggressive wars, that is wars that don't involve self-defense.
The idea of bimodal alienation has already been discussed with respect to pairs of multiple killers, suggesting that just as they were isolated without, they were engulfed within. This idea might help understand the type of multiple killing that Websdale called civic respectable, a spouse calmly killing a spouse and one or more of the children. In ordinary terms, it seems difficult to understand any killing, especially a parent whowould kill his or her own children. The theory presented here suggests the possibility that the civil reputable parent who kills is so engulfed with his family, and so isolated without, that he or she projects his own unbearable emotional pain on the family members. If that were the case, the killer would think that he or she is helping by ending their pain.
The philosopher of emotions Robert Solomon suggested a parallel butmuchbroader idea: “emotionworlds.” For example, he compares the loveworld to the angerworld. The loveworld (Solomon, 1981, p. 126) is “woven around a single relationship,with everything else pushed to the periphery…” By contrast, in the angerworld “one defines oneself in the role of the ‘offended’ and someone else….as the offender. [It] is very much a courtroom world, a world filled with blame and emotional litigation…” Perhaps in the shameworld of the civic reputable killer, where the family receives nothing but insults and rejections, life is not worth living. It may be that Solomon omitted a significant part of the motivation: in emotions loops the pain generated can be so over- whelming that life seems worthless.
10. Response of historians
With only a few exceptions, the idea of emotional origins of war has not been well received by most experts in history and political science. It seems to me that they are caught up in the denial of the importance of the social–emotional world, assuming that causes lie in the material world, and/or in thoughts and beliefs. They share this denial with most of the members of modern societies, lay and expert alike, as discussed above (see also Scheff, 1990, 1994, 1997, 2006a, b; Scheff and Suzanne, 1991).
The current Iraq war might also be understood as a multiple killing occasioned, at least in part, by humiliation. The motivation of the leaders who launched the war is more complex than that, but even for them the war can be seen as partly motivated by revenge, and the use of revenge to placate the public. Rather than acknowledge the shame caused by 9/11 happening on their watch, and apologizing, they masked it with an attack on a nation that played no part. Like other spree killers, most of their victims are mere bystanders.
Perhaps the crucial question is not about the leaders, but the public. Why have they been so passive about a war that is obviously fraudulent, and for which they must pay with their earnings, and some with their lives? It is possible that the only thing they have to gain is continuing to mask their fear, grief, and humiliation with anger and violent aggression committed in their name. Needless to say, this is only a hypothesis, like all the others proposed here. Given the current world situation, further exploration and study is urgently needed.
The need for public understanding of the part the social–emotional world might play in generating violence can be illustrated by studies of the motivation of terrorists. Several studies strongly suggest that massive experiences of humiliation could be the main motivation of terrorists, such as Palestinian suicide-bombers (Strozier, et al., 2010, pp. 143–147. See also Lindner, 2001; Stern, 2003; Smith, 2006; Jones, 2008).
A remark by the then prime minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, frames our dilemma.When asked by a reporter why Palestinians crossing the border are kept waiting for so long, he replied: “Wewant to humiliate them” (Reported in a talk by Jones, 2010). Both Helmick, 2004 and Michalczyk, 2003 suggest that humiliation was an intentional Israeli policy. If this was true, it would be fair to say that Israeli policy was manufacturing terrorism against Israel.
According to the theory, the humiliation–revenge–counter re- venge cycle is the most dangerous thing in human existence, far more than plutonium. We are in deep trouble because emotional motives are invisible to politicians and the public as well. Our job as social scientists and as citizens is to try to make the social–emotional world visible and as important as the political–economic one.
11. Remedies
If the idea of interacting isolation/rejection and shame/anger and shame/shame spirals turns out to be a step in the right direction, what kinds of remedies might be possible? For the sake of discussion, I will mention two, one concerning emotions, the other, isolation.
The first possible remedy would be to offer classes to children and young adults that encourage them to notice and acknowledge their emotions. Themost effective locationwould probably be high schools, a vale of low grades, cliques and rejection for a substantial part of the student body.
In seminars with varying titles, I have taught college freshmen in this kind of class for many years. Because my intention was to help both male and female students, I noticed early on that if the seminar title had the word emotion and/or relationship in it, male students wouldn't enroll. So I called it "Communicating." The new title picked up a few males, but not nearly enough for gender balance. Because this problem touches on central issues, I will describe two further steps I took to get male involvement.
After the title change, I took a more drastic step: for registration, I divided the class into two, one for men, the other for women. The trick is to arrange that the two classesmeet at the same time and place. This step proved to be effective. It apparently corrects for the different amount of interest in the seminar between men and women: a first option for many women, but a last option for many men. The splitting of class registration keeps places open for the slow-moving males, because the fast-moving females cannot take their slots.
458 T.J. Scheff / Aggression and Violent Behavior 16 (2011) 453–460
The last problem in the seminar has been keeping the men involved in the class. Most of them liked it so long as we were discussing student's real life dialogues. In the language that students use, emotions are seldom referred to directly. References that are made are usually indirect. For example, there are many metaphors that refer to embarrassment, such as “It was an awkward moment for me.” As long as the discussion of emotions in the students' dialogues is absent or indirect, the men are involved as much as the women. The class discussions were linked to learning communication skills that both the men and the women appreciated.
However, when women begin to make open references to emotions, such as anger, grief, fear, or shame/embarrassment, most of the men slow down. Although the women are vitally interested, a large majority of the men grow silent. Occasionally one of the more vocal men complains about what seems to him excessive attention to emotions. Most of them just withdraw. What should be done to get this group involved again?
The first time a dialogue leads to direct discussion of emotion, perhaps halfway through the quarter, I gave a five-minute talk about “How Emotions are Like Sex” (See, under a different title, Scheff, 2006a). This sentence alone seems to remove the glaze from men's eyes. I say that the major emotions are not only signals, but also states of bodily arousal. Each of these states, I continue, has a climax or orgasm. For example, crying can be the orgasm for grief. This tactic has never failed to bring the recalcitrant men back into discussion.
Presently I am teaching classes with the same goal on the topic: The Social–Emotional World of Popular Songs. It seems to have the same effects as the earlier class, but recruits from a much broader group of male student. I believe that these classes are as beneficial to men as they are to women.
12. Alienated students
Learning to identify and acknowledge one's emotions is only half the problem. The other half concerns the extreme alienation, especially in high school, of those who get low grades or are not accepted by mainstream students. One approach would be to encourage these students to organize their own club, an anti-clique clique. Students who feel rejected by mainstream students could join forces. Perhaps they could use a name like The Outrider Club, or some less revealing title. In the aftermath of the Columbine killings, there was much discussion of the Mafia Trenchcoats, but it turned out to be a myth. To the extent that such clubs were organized, extreme isolation of marginal students might be lessened.
A possible effect of the emotion classes might also help in two different ways, if only indirectly. The mainstream students who benefit from the class learn to identify and acknowledge their own shame and humiliation, as well as other vulnerable emotions, like grief and fear. This change might make them more hesitant to humiliate others. Another way is that students make new friends in the class. I know only because it is a question asked in the official course evaluation form. From past experience with other mainstream courses, and from complaints I hear from students, making new friends at college seems to be difficult. Many students who complete 4 years still have friends only from high school.
However, to actually change the atmosphere in schools, many mainstream students would have to take the classes, a tall order. I have been teaching such a class for many years at UCSB; it always gets good reviews from students. Yet being quite small (20–30), it reaches only a tiny proportion of the student body. The suggestions made here are only a first step to what might be a long struggle.
13. Conclusion
This note has described a social–emotional process that might be the cause of multiple killings. Killers seem to be persons that are both
extremely alienated and also have completely suppressed their experience of shame/embarrassment/humiliation. This combination usually leads to withdrawal, but it can also generate a machine of self- perpetuating coupling of social isolation and shame and/or shame/ anger spirals. This process could be the doomsdaymachine referred to above, the social–emotional equivalent of a chain-reaction. If there is no intervention, this process can lead to complete withdrawal or acts of violent aggression against others and/or self.
Two suggestions were made that might become first steps toward decreasing violent aggression. On the one hand, a high school class could teach students how to identify and acknowledge their emotions, and on the other, encouraging outcast students to form clubs of their own, to decrease their extreme isolation. Even if these two steps in combination turned out to be effective on a large scale, further ideas will be needed.
14. Summary
This essay outlines a causal model of multiple killing, based in the social–emotional world: alienation and unacknowledged shame, spiraling with anger and/or more shame, can result in a feedback loop ending in unlimited withdrawal or violence. Because much more information is available aboutmultiple killers, this approachmay alsobe relevant as a first step to understanding all kinds of massive violence.
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- Social–emotional origins of violence: A theory of multiple killing
- How much shame?
- Case studies
- Shame and violence
- Isolation and feeling traps
- Emotion spirals
- Recursion of emotions and alienation in killers
- Alienation
- Collective violence
- Media and masses33This section summarizes part of Chapter 6 of Scheff (1994).
- Response of historians
- Remedies
- Alienated students
- Conclusion
- Summary
- References
10 paged paper instructions/reading.pdf
The General Aggression Model: Theoretical Extensions to Violence
C. Nathan DeWall University of Kentucky
Craig A. Anderson Iowa State University
Brad J. Bushman The Ohio State University and VU University, Amsterdam
This article discusses the General Aggression Model (GAM), which provides a com- prehensive and integrative social–cognitive framework for understanding aggression and violence. After providing a brief description of the basic components of GAM, we discuss how it can be used to better understand 4 topics related to phenomena that occur primarily outside the laboratory and apply to a broad range of people. Specifically, we apply GAM to better understand intimate partner violence, intergroup violence, global climate change effects on violence, and suicide. We also explain how the tenets of GAM can be used to inform interventions aimed at reducing these forms of violence. Finally, we show how GAM can explain why people do not behave violently, such as in societies where violence is exceedingly rare. Applying GAM to violent behavior that occurs outside the laboratory adds to its explanatory power and enhances the external validity of its predictions. Because the 4 topics apply to such a broad range of people, GAM may have broader influence in fostering understanding of aggression in these domains. By increasing our understanding of the causes of violent behavior, GAM may help reduce it.
Keywords: General Aggression Model, climate change, intergroup violence, intimate partner violence, suicide
Nonviolence leads to the highest ethics, which is the goal of all evolution. Until we stop harming all other living beings, we are still savages.
—Thomas A. Edison, American inventor
In the distant past, aggression often was an adaptive behavior for our ancient ancestors who lived in small groups. Aggression and related threat displays played an important role in mate
selection, protection of offspring and other kin, and survival of the group. As humans became more social and developed culture, however, aggression became less adaptive, especially at the group level. Although one can reasonably argue that even today, minor forms of aggres- sion play an adaptive role in socialization and social control (e.g., Tedeschi & Felson, 1994), more serious forms of aggression are more mal- adaptive than adaptive. Aggression breeds ag- gression, and it seems to cause more problems than it solves. Even when it works in the short run, aggression frequently fails in the long run. So, why are people aggressive today? We could blame it on our genes, but that is only part of the story. The purpose of this is article is to explain how an overarching framework for understanding aggression and violence —the General Aggres- sion Model, or GAM for short (see Figure 1)— can be applied to violence outside the labora- tory: intimate partner violence, aggression be- tween groups, global warming effects on vio- lence, and suicide. We also discuss how GAM can be applied to interventions aimed at reduc-
This article was published Online First May 30, 2011. C. Nathan DeWall, Department of Psychology, Univer-
sity of Kentucky; Craig A. Anderson, Center for the Study of Violence, Department of Psychology, Iowa State Univer- sity; Brad J. Bushman, School of Communication, The Ohio State University, Department of Psychology, VU Univer- sity, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
This research was supported in part by Grant BCS- 1104118 to C. Nathan DeWall and Brad J. Bushman from the National Science Foundation. The opinions and conclu- sions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the National Science Foundation.
Correspondence concerning this article should be ad- dressed to C. Nathan DeWall, Department of Psychology, University of Kentucky, Kastle Hall 201, Lexington, KY 40506-0044. E-mail: [email protected]
Psychology of Violence © 2011 American Psychological Association 2011, Vol. 1, No. 3, 245–258 2152-0828/11/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0023842
245
ing these forms of violence and even nonviolent behavior. Applying GAM to aggression that occurs outside the laboratory not only adds to its explanatory power, but it also enhances the ex- ternal validity of its predictions.
Psychologists have proposed a variety of the- ories to understand why people sometimes be- have aggressively. Some examples include frus- tration–aggression theory (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939), socioecologi- cal models (Heise, 1998), cognitive neoassocia- tion theory (e.g., Berkowitz, 1989), social learn- ing theory (e.g., Bandura, 1973; Mischel & Shoda, 1995), script theory (e.g., Huesmann, 1986), excitation transfer theory (e.g., Zillmann, 1983), and social interaction theory (e.g., Tede- schi & Felson, 1994). Each theory offers crucial insight into understanding specific reasons why people behave aggressively. Yet, these mini- theories do not provide an overarching frame- work for understanding human aggression and violence.
GAM integrates minitheories of aggression into a single conceptual framework. In so doing, GAM provides a more parsimonious model of aggression than other theories do, explains ag- gression that occurs because of multiple mo- tives, and offers empirically validated insights into ways to reduce aggression, including how to stunt the development of aggressive tenden- cies over time. It is the only social–cognitive model that explicitly incorporates biological, personality development, social processes, ba- sic cognitive processes (e.g., perception, prim- ing), short-term and long-term processes, and
decision processes into understanding aggres- sion. Therefore, GAM offers scholars a frame- work from which to derive and test hypotheses regarding aggression, a framework that is more expansive than any other social– cognitive model. One major focus of the present article is to show how GAM can also increase our un- derstanding of more extreme forms of physical aggression that occur outside the laboratory— violent behavior.
GAM emphasizes three critical stages in un- derstanding a single episodic cycle of aggres- sion: (1) person and situation inputs, (2) present internal states (i.e., cognition, arousal, affect, including brain activity), and (3) outcomes of appraisal and decision-making processes. A feedback loop can influence future cycles of aggression, which can produce a violence esca- lation cycle (Anderson, Buckley, & Carnagey, 2008; DeWall & Anderson, 2011). Several ar- ticles provide further insight into these basic tenets of GAM (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; DeWall & Anderson, 2011).
Applications of GAM
GAM has received consistent support as a general model of aggression (for reviews, see Anderson & Bushman, 2002; DeWall & Ander- son, 2011). Although it was tested primarily using laboratory aggression experiments, it can also be applied to aggression in the “real world” outside the laboratory. Before we go further, however, we need to define the terms aggres- sion and violence. We define aggression as any behavior intended to harm another person who does not want to be harmed (e.g., Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Bushman & Huesmann, 2010). We define violence as any aggressive act that has as its goal extreme physical harm, such as injury or death (e.g., Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Bushman & Huesmann, 2010).
In this section, we include several novel ex- tensions of how GAM can inform understand- ing and research investigating intimate partner violence, intergroup violence, impact of global climate change on violence, and suicide. We chose these topics for two reasons. First, each topic applies to phenomena that occur outside the laboratory, thereby increasing the explana- tory potential of GAM and the external validity of its predictions. Second, each topic relates to phenomena that occur relatively frequently in
Figure 1. General aggression model.
246 DEWALL, ANDERSON, AND BUSHMAN
the United States and in other countries. Vio- lence between intimate partners in the United States occurs at alarmingly high rates, with over one in five of couples (Schafer, Caetano, & Clark, 1998) and over one in three college stu- dents (Straus & Ramirez, 2002) reporting at least one incident over the past year. Intergroup violence is also very common. In the 40 years after the end of World War II, there were roughly 150 wars and only 26 days of world peace (defined as the absence of international war; Sluka, 1992). In terms of global climate change, the earth is warmer now than it has been at any time in the past 2,000 years (Parry, Canziani, Palutikof, van der Linden, & Hanson, 2007). However, people rarely think of the im- pact of climate change on violence (Anderson & DeLisi, in press). Suicide also claims the lives of over a million people each year (World Health Organization, 2008). Thus, applying GAM to understand these four topics not only increases the explanatory power of GAM, but it also informs consideration regarding phenom- ena that impact millions of people worldwide.
Intimate Partner Violence (IPV)
Previous research on GAM has focused pri- marily on aggression between strangers (e.g., Anderson & Anderson, 2008, Study 2), but we believe that GAM can also provide a useful framework for understanding IPV. As with ag- gression between strangers, person and situation factors play a significant role in increasing the likelihood of IPV. There are dozens, if not hun- dreds, of personal factors involved, including trait anger, attachment style, and alcohol abuse (e.g., Finkel, 2007; Follingstad, Bradley, Helff, & Laughlin, 2002; Holtzworth-Munroe, Bates, Smutzler, & Sandin, 1997; Schumacher, Feld- bau-Kohn, Slep, & Heyman, 2001). Yet, there is little conceptual organization regarding how and why risk factors influence IPV, leading some scholars to suggest that “theory and re- search on relationship violence remain uncohe- sive” (Berscheid & Regan, 2005, p. 52).
Attitudes toward violence are also useful in predicting actual aggression directed toward an intimate partner. In one recent investigation, college students who had more positive atti- tudes toward IPV were more likely to physically assault and verbally abuse their current roman- tic partner 14 weeks later (Fincham, Cui,
Braithwaite, & Pasley, 2008). Other research has shown that people who have permissive attitudes toward IPV also have the highest per- petration rates (Cote, Vaillancourt, LeBlanc, Nagin, & Tremblay, 2006).
Some situational factors that increase aggres- sion toward strangers also increase IPV, such as alcohol (e.g., Hove, Parkhill, Neighbors, McCo- nchie, & Fossos, 2010). Moreover, meta- analytic findings demonstrate that alcohol increases both male-to-female and female-to- male violence (Foran & O’Leary, 2008). Situations that decrease self-control increase aggression toward both strangers and intimate relationship partners (DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007; Finkel, DeWall, Slotter, Oaten, & Foshee, 2009). For example, people who are made to feel mentally ex- hausted, compared with people who are not made to feel mentally exhausted, make their romantic partners endure longer painful yoga poses when the partner insults them (Finkel et al., 2009, Study 4).
Affect, cognition, and arousal may also be related to IPV. Currently experienced anger, for example, is related to more aggressive verbal- izations among intoxicated maritally violent men (Eckhardt, 2007). In addition, having hos- tile cognitive biases toward one’s spouse is as- sociated with perpetrating more violence against one’s partner (Fincham, Bradbury, Arias, Byrne, & Karney, 1997). Relatively little research has examined the role of arousal in IPV. In one relevant study, men who showed diminished sensitivity to their wives’ expres- sions of happiness (an indicator of reduced arousal) were more likely to commit IPV com- pared with men who showed high sensitivity to their spouse’s emotional expressions (Marshall & Holtzworth-Munroe, 2010). Future research is clearly needed on the relationship between arousal and IPV.
The appraisal and decision-making compo- nent of GAM is involved in both aggression toward strangers and toward intimate relation- ship partners. When people do not have suffi- cient mental resources to engage in reappraisal processing, they are more likely to behave ag- gressively toward their romantic partners (Fin- kel et al., 2009). When people are mentally exhausted, they are less likely to control their aggressive impulses when provoked. Just as ex- ercising a muscle strengthens it, people who
247SPECIAL ISSUE: GENERAL AGGRESSION MODEL
exercise self-control are buffered from the neg- ative effects of mental exhaustion on IPV (Fin- kel et al., 2009, Study 5). The implication is that the more self-control strength people have, the more likely they are to carefully consider the negative ramifications of their actions and to choose to behave in a more thoughtful, nonag- gressive manner.
Thus, GAM provides a cohesive understand- ing regarding situational and personal attributes that elevate the likelihood of IPV, mechanisms through which aggressive urges translate into violent behavior and decision-making processes that influence whether people succumb to their aggressive urges or instead engage in thought- ful, nonaggressive behavior. Commonly used theoretical models, such as socioecological models (Heise, 1998) and social learning theory (Bandura, 1973), provide valuable insight into the causes of IPV, but they lack crucial compo- nents that limit their explanatory power. For example, socioecological models do not exam- ine the influence of an individual’s knowledge structures, attitudes, and beliefs on currently experienced emotions, cognitive processes, and arousal levels, and their influence on whether people engage in impulsive or thoughtful ac- tions toward one’s partner. Instead, socioeco- logical models seek to understand the causes of IPV at different levels of analysis (individual, relationship, community, societal), which estab- lishes the source of influence but does not offer clear understanding regarding the role of cur- rently experienced emotion, cognitive pro- cesses, or arousal on appraisal and decision- making processes that influence whether people perpetrate IPV. Social learning theory offers a useful framework to understand risk factors for aggression, but it neglects the importance of factors that increase the risk for aggression that are independent of one’s learning history, such as genetic predispositions known to heighten the risk for aggression (e.g., monoamine oxi- dase A gene, serotonin transporter gene; Dolan, Anderson, & Deakin, 2001; McDermott, Tin- gley, Cowden, Frazzetto, & Johnson, 2009). GAM is a biological–social–cognitive model, which uses both learning history and factors not associated with one’s learning history to under- stand why people perpetrate IPV. For these rea- sons, GAM offers a more comprehensive model from which to test hypotheses regarding IPV perpetration.
Intergroup Violence
Most aggression theories attempt to explain the causes and consequences of aggression be- tween individuals, leaving open the question of whether similar processes may be involved in explaining aggression between groups. GAM offers a useful framework for understanding how aggression between groups begins and why it persists.
Aggression between groups begins as a result of characteristics that each group brings to a situation and of environmental features that in- crease aggression. Groups, like individuals, tend to have enduring motivations, attitudes, values, and beliefs that develop out of their prior history. Indeed, research on the disconti- nuity effect has consistently shown that individ- uals have internal states that are heavily influ- enced by group processes (Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, & Graetz, 1990). Other research from the attitude literature suggests that expos- ing people to an in-group member (e.g., a fellow member of one’s political party) causes people to express strong attitudes that support their in-group, whereas exposing people to an out- group member has the opposite effect (Ledger- wood & Chaiken, 2007). Within the context of group aggression, the terrorist group Al Qaeda believes that an alliance between Christians and Jews threatens the future of Islam. Most people living in the United States are Christians (78%; Newport, 2009), and most people living in Is- rael are Jews (76%; Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009). As a result, situations that signal a strong Christian–Jewish alliance, such as activities re- lated to a coalition between the United States and Israel, may increase aggressive affect, neg- ative attitudes, and arousal among members of Al Qaeda. These internal states may, in turn, increase the likelihood that members of Al Qaeda will perpetrate violence against all peo- ple associated with a U.S.–Israel coalition, even bystanders and civilians.
GAM’s feedback loop also explains why ag- gressive retaliations between groups persist. Once conflict between two groups begins, the violence escalation cycle is triggered. Group A experiences Group B’s retaliation, which causes Group A’s members to have high levels of aggressive affect, to perceive Group B as hostile and aggressive, and to experience heightened arousal. These internal states cause members of
248 DEWALL, ANDERSON, AND BUSHMAN
Group A to act impulsively on their immediate appraisal of Group B as hostile and threatening. Group B then experiences the impulsively ag- gressive act from Group A, which sets in mo- tion the same set of internal states and appraisal and decision processes that result in an even more aggressive retaliation (see Figure 2). Both groups will trade increasingly aggressive retal- iations back and forth, which can result in the widespread destruction of human life and prop- erty. To be sure, the feedback loop can only be applied to understand ongoing aggressive retal- iations between groups. If Group A refuses to respond to Group B’s provocation with aggres- sive retaliation, then Group A bears no respon- sibility for any additional aggression provoca- tion it may experience from Group B.
Thus, GAM offers a parsimonious and ade- quate perspective for understanding why inter- group violence begins and persists. Socioeco- logical models and social learning theory offer useful insight into why intergroup violence oc- curs, but they also suffer significant limitations in terms of the scope of their explanatory
power. From a socioecological perspective, un- derstanding intergroup violence begins with un- derstanding the individual within the group, then understanding that individual’s relation- ships with others inside and outside the group, and finally understanding the group’s relation- ship within society. Although these levels of analysis provide information regarding risk and resiliency factors for intergroup violence, they do not offer much in the way of understanding how mechanisms through which the influence of the four-level socioecological model influ- ences the appraisal and decision process that ultimately determines whether groups will en- gage in violent behavior. According to social learning theory, intergroup violence occurs in large part because members of a group are ex- posed to violence that taught them to solve group conflict through behaving violently. Un- like GAM, social learning theory does not em- phasize the importance of personal factors that enhance or diminish the effect of exposure to violence on subsequent group violent behavior. GAM incorporates the best perspectives of these theoretical models, addresses their limita- tions, and as a result provides researchers with a strong theoretical framework from which to un- derstand intergroup violence.
Global Climate Change and Violence
Global climate change and its wide-ranging environmental consequences (e.g., flooding, droughts, desertification, food and water short- ages) have been recognized by numerous na- tional, military, and international groups as a significant risk factor for social disorder, eco- migration conflicts, and war. Global climate change influences aggression and violence both as a proximate situational factor and as a distal environmental modifier. More specifically, there appear to be three main ways in which rapid global climate change (rapid in geological terms) can increase the risk of violence (Ander- son & DeLisi, in press). First, there is a direct effect of heat on aggressive inclinations. This well-researched line of work has shown that uncomfortably hot temperatures can increase physical aggression in laboratory settings and in real-world violent crime studies (Anderson, 2001). Simply presenting people with words related to hot temperatures is enough to increase aggressive thoughts and hostile perceptions
Violence Escalation Cycle
Appropriate retaliation
B harms A
Inappropriate over-retaliation
A harms B
Inappropriate over-retaliation
Appropriate retaliation
B harms A
retaliation Appropriate
over-retaliation Inappropriate
A harms B
B harms A
Intentional Unjustified
Unintentional Justified
A harms B
Relatively harmful j
Relatively mild
Events sevitcepsrep s'Bsevitcepsrep s'A
Figure 2. The violence escalation cycle. N. L. From Vi- olent evil and the general aggression model, by C. A. Anderson and N. L. Carnagey, 2004, Chapter in A. Miller (Ed.) The Social Psychology of Good and Evil (pp. 168– 192). Copyright 2004 by New York: Guilford Publications. Reprinted with permission of Guilford Press.
249SPECIAL ISSUE: GENERAL AGGRESSION MODEL
(DeWall & Bushman, 2009). Second, many of the environmental risk factors known to in- crease the likelihood of a child growing up to be an aggression-prone adult will become more widespread worldwide, especially in regions likely to experience flooding as a result of sea level increases, tropical storms, glacial melt, and regions likely to experience drought and resulting food and water shortages. Poor pre- and postnatal nutrition is known to influence a host of aggression-related competencies and proneness to violence (e.g., DeLisi, 2005; Liu, Raine, Venables, & Mednick, 2004). Indeed, recent molecular genetics studies have found specific brain chemistry-related Genetic ! En- vironment interactions (both physical and social environments) on violent criminality (see An- derson & DeLisi, in press). Third, historical and contemporary research shows that rapid climate change can increase group violence. Specifi- cally, a growing body of literature supports the notion that rapid climate change (heating or cooling) increases civil disorder, political insta- bility, and war, mostly by creating acute and recurring resource shortages that lead to ecomi- gration and violent conflict. Examples include war in China during 1000–1900 A.D. (Zhang, Zhang, Lee, & He, 2007), civil war in sub- Sahara Africa (Burke, Miguel, Satyanath, Dykema, & Lobell, 2009), ecomigration and violence in Bangladesh and India, and violence associated with the U.S. Dust Bowl and Hurri- cane Katrina. Similarly, U.S. data reveal a ro- bust relation between increasingly hot years and violent crime rates (Anderson, Bushman, & Groom, 1997; Anderson & DeLisi, in press).
GAM does a better job of explaining the effects of climate change on violence than other theories of violence. Whereas socioecological theories of violence focus primarily on how people in one’s environment influence violence, GAM emphasizes the importance of both peo- ple in one’s environment and changes in the physical environment itself as relevant to un- derstanding violence. Likewise, social learning theory would explain the relationship between climate change and violence as a function of observing a greater number of people behaving violently, thereby ignoring the importance of changes in the actual environment (irrespective of the people in the environment) and their influence on the higher number of people be- having violently. Thus, GAM is unique in its
ability to account for changes in the environ- ment that may have implications for increasing violence, such as increasing ambient tempera- tures.
Suicide
Why people commit suicide has puzzled so- cial scientists for centuries. Very few interven- tions aimed at reducing suicide are successful (Van Orden et al., 2010). To prevent suicides, we need to know why they occur. We believe GAM can offer a powerful framework for un- derstanding why people commit suicide.
Many of the same person and situation fac- tors that increase aggression between individu- als and groups also increase suicide, sometimes called self-aggression. Alcohol intoxication, for example, is common among people who die by suicide (Ohberg, Vuori, & Ojanpera, 1996). Laboratory research has shown that intoxicated people inflict more intense shocks on them- selves compared with sober people (McCloskey & Berman, 2003). Feeling rejected and lonely is also robustly associated with aggression toward others (e.g., DeWall, Twenge, Bushman, Im, & Williams, 2010; DeWall, Twenge, Gitter, & Baumeister, 2009) and with suicide (see Van Orden et al., 2010, for a review). One longitu- dinal study, for example, found that feelings of loneliness at age 12–13 predicted higher sui- cidal risk 30 years later (Rojas & Stenberg, 2010). Just as poor self-control and serotonergic dysfunction are related to aggression against other people, they are also reliably associated with an increased risk for death by suicide (e.g., Anisman et al., 2008; Brent et al., 1994; Re- naud, Berlim, McGirr, Tousignant, & Turecki, 2008).
Affect, cognition, and arousal all play a cru- cial role in suicidal behavior. People who gen- erally internalize their anger are also more likely to attempt suicide, which is the leading risk factor for suicidal completion (see Van Orden et al., 2010, for a review). Suicidal ide- ation refers to thoughts related to ending one’s life. The more people think about dying by suicide, the more likely they are to die by sui- cide (Van Orden, Merrill, & Joiner, 2005). In addition, diminished arousal to the pain and distress that are associated with suicidal behav- ior relate to higher numbers of suicide attempts
250 DEWALL, ANDERSON, AND BUSHMAN
(Van Orden, Witte, Gordon, Bender, & Joiner, 2008).
Because most people have a strong fear of death, they must acquire the ability to inflict lethal self-injury through repeated exposure to and habituation to fear-provoking stimuli (Van Orden et al., 2010). Simply having the desire to die by suicide is not sufficient to predict who actually will die by suicide. Recurrent exposure to frightening and painful situations desensi- tizes people to pain and increases their risk for suicide (Nademin et al., 2008). These findings mirror work in the aggression literature, which shows that frequent exposure to violent media desensitizes people to violent images and is associated with higher aggression toward others (Anderson et al., 2010; Bartholow, Bushman, & Sestir, 2006).
For researchers interested in understanding why people die by suicide, GAM provides a social–cognitive framework from which rich and complex hypotheses can be formulated and tested. Socioecological models of violence may identify risk factors for suicide, but they do not elucidate the crucial mechanisms through which these risk factors heighten the risk for suicide. Social learning theorists emphasize that expo- sure to others who commit suicide may heighten one’s risk for suicide, but they neglect personal factors (e.g., traits, genetic polymorphisms) that may exacerbate or buffer people from this risk.
In contrast, suicide researchers can use GAM to make specific predictions regarding the mod- erators and mediators of the effects of belong- ingness and burdensomeness on suicidal behav- ior. They can also understand how the acquired ability to inflict lethal self-injury develops, and whether experiences of lowered belongingness, which influence physical pain processes (Bor- sook & MacDonald, 2010; DeWall & Baumeis- ter, 2006; DeWall, MacDonald, et al., 2010; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003), accelerate the development of people’s ability to commit suicide. In addition, GAM offers suicide researchers an extensive toolkit of fac- tors known to increase aggression against others (e.g., media violence) that may have a similar impact on suicidal behavior. Thus, GAM offers a more comprehensive framework for under- standing suicidal behavior than existing theoret- ical models among researchers who wish to explain why people die by suicide from a so- cial–cognitive perspective.
Using GAM to Inform Violence Prevention Programs
GAM suggests that a knowledge structure approach would be a more useful means of preventing violence compared with existing models. Specifically, it suggests that individual interventions should begin with an assessment of inappropriate aggressive episodes in the in- dividual’s life along four dimensions. The first dimension is how much hostile or agitated af- fect is present. The second dimension is how much a specific thought, feeling, or action has become automatized. The third dimension is how much the primary (ultimate) goal is harm- ing the victim versus benefitting the perpetrator. The fourth dimension is how much the perpe- trator considers the consequences of commit- ting the aggressive act. Doing so allows the model to avoid the problems created by various artificial dichotomies of aggressive behavior types, such as the reactive–proactive dichotomy (Bushman & Anderson, 2001). One then could tailor the intervention to the specific aspects that appear most relevant to the individual. A GAM- directed intervention would be more likely to capture all of the critical elements. In what follows, we discuss how GAM can be applied to violence prevention programs for IPV, inter- group violence, global climate change-related violence, and suicide.
IPV
To illustrate the explanatory power of GAM in shaping effective interventions, consider the hypothetical scenario of an intervention to re- duce violence in a man who is referred to a psychological clinic because he routinely bat- ters his wife. Although some assessment proto- cols for preventing IPV involve setting clear-cut goals and expectations (Sonkin & Liebert, 2003), they do not do so within an overarching framework that assesses inappropriate aggres- sive episodes in the individual’s life along the four dimensions noted above.
A GAM-directed intervention would consist of five steps. First, an assessment session would measure how much hostile affect is present in the man; how much a specific thought, feeling, or action related to violence against his wife has been automatized through repetitive exposure or practice; how much the man’s primary goal is
251SPECIAL ISSUE: GENERAL AGGRESSION MODEL
harming his wife versus benefitting himself (e.g., feeling a sense of power and control in the relationship); and how much the man reflects on the consequences of violently battering his wife. Second, the therapist would provide the man with strategies designed to reduce his hostile affect (e.g., distraction, relaxation) and make him aware of the specific thoughts, feelings, and behavior related to his battering behavior that have become so deeply ingrained in his every- day life that they occur automatically. Third, the therapist would give the man strategies de- signed to increase his thoughtful awareness of the violent thoughts, feelings, and actions re- lated to his wife. Fourth, the therapist would work with the man to reduce his desire to cause harm to his wife (if that is his primary goal) and to develop a list of other activities he could use to feel that he plays an important and valued role in his marriage. Fifth, the therapist would provide the man with activities designed to strengthen his self-regulatory abilities, which may increase the likelihood that he will engage in thoughtful decision-making processes when he has the urge to batter his wife. As noted earlier, practicing self-regulation reduces IPV inclinations (Finkel et al., 2009), even when people practice self-regulation in domains that are unrelated to violence. Thus, GAM can in- form IPV programs that can be tailored to spe- cific aspects that are most relevant to an indi- vidual.
Intergroup Violence
GAM can also help explain how to stop per- sistent intergroup violence. Whereas previous interventions have focused on improving rela- tionships, increasing care and empathy, and be- coming cognitively aware of one’s aggressive urges (Shechtman & Ifargan, 2009), GAM sug- gests that understanding how to break the vio- lence escalation cycle may also prove a useful intervention strategy to reduce intergroup vio- lence. According to GAM, extinguishing per- sistent intergroup violence should occur under the following circumstances. First, Group A may perceive that the outcome of further ag- gressive retaliation is sufficiently important and unsatisfying that they should engage in thought- ful, as opposed to impulsive, actions toward Group B. Next, Group B experiences Group A’s thoughtful response, which should not increase
its aggressive affect, cognition, or arousal. As a result, Group B does not perceive Group A as hostile and threatening, leading it to refrain from further aggressive retaliation. This is an upward spiral rather than a downward one (Slater, Henry, Swaim, & Anderson, 2003).
Thus, intergroup violence should stop in the appraisal and decision process component of GAM. But, of course, this can occur only if the thoughtful process results in a decision to de- escalate. Frequently, in international politics, this does not happen. In fact, formal political policies frequently endorse an escalation strat- egy on the oft-mistaken notion that “if we show the enemy that their provocations will only hurt them more, then they will back down.” There may be cases, however, in which extreme esca- lation can end a conflict because one or more parties are simply unable to continue the esca- lation cycle.
Even in cases of vastly unequal power, how- ever, “relative” escalation may occur (Anderson et al., 2008). That is, the weaker side may not be able to retaliate at the same level as the stronger side, but it still may retaliate more strongly than it did before. Indeed, much international terror- ism has this characteristic.
The Israel–Palestinian conflict offers one ex- ample of how GAM can help explain how in- tergroup violence begins, persists—and how it can end. This intergroup conflict erupted several decades ago when Jews and Arabs exchanged violent attacks over a strip of land, alternately called Israel or Palestine, which Jews claim is their birthright and Palestinians claim as theirs.
When will the Israeli–Palestinian conflict end? A GAM-derived intervention would begin by encouraging citizens from Israel, Palestine, or both countries to perceive that the outcome of their country’s retaliation is both important and unsatisfying. When this occurs, the relenting country will engage in reappraisal processing and thoughtful nonviolent action toward the other country. The opposing country will expe- rience a thoughtful, as opposed to an impul- sively aggressive, action from the other country, which will disrupt the internal states and ap- praisal and decision processes that usually ac- company acts from the other group. For this to happen, of course, major belief systems (knowl- edge structures) must change and be replaced by a set of new beliefs, especially beliefs about each other and about the efficacy of violent
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competition versus nonviolent cooperation. This could be implemented through the use of advertising and marketing campaigns and changes in the public opinions and apologies expressed by political leaders.
Global Climate Change and Violence
To curb the relationship between global cli- mate change and violence, GAM suggests two approaches. The first involves four steps de- signed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to reduce or slow climate change. Previous re- search has shown that people can be motivated to invest money in a fund to encourage people to reduce fossil fuel use if doing so can foster a positive social reputation (Milinski, Semmann, Krambeck, & Marotzke, 2006). A GAM- directed intervention would extend this prior work by changing not only aspects of the social situation related to fossil fuel use but also mo- tivating people to change their beliefs regarding global climate change and its influence on vio- lence as opposed to other outcomes.
First, widespread programs would attempt to change people’s beliefs regarding the presence of global climate change and their attitudes to- ward activities that would reduce global climate change. Second, programs would seek to change aspects of the social situation that may increase behavior that would reduce global cli- mate change. For example, organizations and communities can publicly reward their employ- ees for using the fewest carbon emissions each month, which would establish a norm that lim- iting one’s carbon emissions would be met with social acceptance and approval. Third, a GAM- driven intervention would seek to reduce nega- tive emotions, cognitive processes, or arousal that people may experience in response to over- tures to change their behavior to reduce global climate change. Among people who report that they do not monitor their carbon emissions be- cause it increases their anxiety, interventionists can provide simple and easy solutions aimed at reducing anxiety or tension associated with changing their behaviors that reduce global cli- mate change. Fourth, interventionists would seek to convince citizens that by not taking action to reduce global climate change, the re- sult will have an important and unsatisfying effect on violence. In so doing, citizens will be motivated to engage in thoughtful action to en-
gage in behaviors that will reduce global cli- mate change. By reducing global climate change, such an intervention provides an effec- tive means of reducing violence that occurs in its wake.
The second approach involves directly ad- dressing the violence-enhancing effects of rapid climate change. Although the basic heat effect on aggressive tendencies is likely so subtle and automatic that it will difficult to short circuit, it may be that widespread education programs that inform people about the effects of heat- induced stress on aggression might well help some people to refrain from acting on aggres- sive impulses. More important, international programs can intervene on behalf of the other two climate change paths to violence. Well- mother and well-baby nutrition programs for the poor; improved birth control and family planning access and education; and improved education for all, especially for girls, can reduce the effects of poverty and climate-change- induced food and water shortages on the devel- opment of violence-prone individuals. Simi- larly, large-scale investment in flood and drought control and in general environmentally sensitive economic development in regions that have subsistence economies can reduce future resource crises that otherwise are likely to pre- cipitate ecomigration and war.
Suicide
As noted earlier, suicide prevention programs are notoriously ineffective (Van Orden et al., 2010). Previously successful suicide prevention programs have involved providing people at risk for suicide with information about suicidal behavior and frequent follow-up contacts (Fleischmann et al., 2008; Motto & Bostrom, 2001), but it is unclear precisely why these interventions were successful. Because GAM focuses on understanding the mechanisms un- derlying suicidal behavior, it may provide a useful extension to these previous interventions.
A GAM-directed intervention would take a four-pronged approach to preventing suicide. First and second, therapists would identify per- sonal (e.g., beliefs, attitudes, traits) and social (e.g., social rejection, employment, exposure to violence) factors known to increase the risk for suicide. After identifying an individual’s per- sonal and social “risk profile,” the therapist
253SPECIAL ISSUE: GENERAL AGGRESSION MODEL
would direct the individual to treatments di- rected at each specific risk factor. For example, individuals who have positive beliefs about sui- cide may be exposed to therapeutic treatment aimed at changing the individual’s suicide be- liefs. Individuals who chronically feel rejected would be given opportunities for renewed affil- iation, which quickly reduces the harmful ef- fects of social rejection (DeWall, Baumeister, & Vohs, 2008; DeWall, Twenge, et al., 2010).
Third, therapists would identify whether an individual possesses emotional responses, cog- nitive processes, or arousal levels associated with a risk for suicide. After identifying those risk factors, the therapist would offer the indi- vidual treatments aimed at alleviating each risk factor. Among individuals who have become desensitized to graphic images and physical pain, for example, treatments would center on limiting exposure to situations that might in- crease such desensitization (e.g., exposure to weapons, violent media) and providing medical attention to limit any physical damage that may enhance the individual’s desensitization. Fourth, therapists would motivate individuals to perceive suicide as having an outcome that is deeply important and unsatisfying for them per- sonally and their loved ones. By focusing indi- viduals to engage in such appraisal processes, individuals may be more likely to engage in thoughtful action that does not involve suicide.
Using GAM to Explain Nonviolent Behavior
Whereas the previous sections have empha- sized how GAM can be used to explain violence in four novel ways, this section demonstrates that GAM also can be used to explain nonvio- lent behavior. Most theories of violence are used to explain the causes of these behaviors in contexts in which they occur somewhat fre- quently. At first blush, it might seem natural for GAM to be used only to explain behavior in societies marked by relatively frequent in- stances of violence. We argue that GAM also may be used to explain the nonoccurrence of violence in relatively peaceful societies.
There are not very many of them, but there are some societies in which war is a foreign word and violence is extremely rare (Bonta, 1997; Fry, 2007). For example, more than 100 years ago, the Fipa of western Tanzania trans-
formed their society from one based on violence and war to one based on nonviolence and peace. The Fipa are very competitive in their business dealings, but the competition is constructive and peaceful (Willis, 1989). Another peaceful soci- ety is the Jains of India. The Jains believe in ahimas (nonviolence), and they take vows to avoid any socially harmful acts, including steal- ing and telling lies.
But even in these largely peaceful societies, GAM can explain both the predominance of nonviolence and the rare cases in which people engage in violent and aggressive behavior. Be- cause their lives are filled with largely cooper- ative and prosocial experiences, people embed- ded in highly peaceful societies do not develop enriched aggressive knowledge structures. As a result, violence and aggression in peaceful so- cieties should occur primarily as a result of situational factors that give rise to internal states and appraisal and decision processes associated with impulsive actions.
GAM can also explain why peaceful societies remain peaceful—and how societies marked by frequent war and violence can become more peaceful. Unpleasant stimuli and interpersonal conflict are inevitable, which can increase ag- gressive affect, cognition, and arousal. But members of peaceful societies likely appraise the outcome of an aggressive action as a signif- icant and unsatisfying break from norms that encourage cooperation and peaceful conflict resolution, leading them to engage in a thought- ful nonviolent action. In a similar fashion, so- cieties marked by frequent violent conflicts can become less violent when norms that formerly advocated violence now encourage citizens to exercise self-control to override their violent impulses. The eminent sociologist Norbert Elias (1969, 1982) argued that European societal norms changed from the 9th century to the 19th century to encourage people to exercise restraint over their violent impulses and to shame people who failed to do so, which Elias referred to as a “civilizing process.” Other work has shown that modern civilizations are the most peaceful in the history of the world in terms of deaths by war (Keeley, 1996) and murder (Eisner, 2003), presumably as a result of changes in the situa- tional context that encourage people to override their violent impulses. Thus, although unpleas- ant stimuli and interpersonal conflict pervade human life, GAM argues that appraising the
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outcome of an aggressive action as important and unfulfilling can reduce the likelihood of violence and aggression even in peaceful soci- eties.
Conclusion
This article has highlighted the strengths of a general theory of aggression. Specifically, GAM provides the only theoretical framework of aggression and violence that explicitly incor- porates biological, personality development, social processes, basic cognitive processes, short-term and long-term processes, and deci- sion processes. We not only have discussed the basic components of GAM, but we also have made several novel contributions to the devel- opment of GAM as a theoretical model. First, whereas GAM has been used primarily to ex- plain aggression, we have demonstrated that GAM can also be used to explain violence. Second, GAM was developed to account for aggression between strangers, but we have shown that it can also be applied to understand IPV. Third, we have shown how GAM can help explain how changes in one’s physical environ- ment, such as climate change, can have direct implications for the safety and sustainability of that environment by increasing violence. Fourth, we have suggested that GAM may be applied to understand violence between groups of people and suicide. Fifth, we have explained how GAM can be used to inform interventions aimed at reducing IPV, violence between groups, violence that occurs as a result of global climate change, and suicide. Sixth, this article illustrates the utility of GAM for explaining nonviolent behavior, such as that found in so- cieties in which war and violence are extremely rare.
There are some drawbacks, however, to GAM. Hints about the potential weakness of a general theory of aggression come from the attitude literature. In the attitudes domain, gen- eral attitudes can be poor predictors of specific behaviors (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). For exam- ple, a student’s attitude toward college is a poor predictor of whether he or she will like a par- ticular class. Similarly, GAM was proposed to offer a comprehensive, general view of human aggression. Domain-specific theories may do a better job predicting more specific behaviors.
The disadvantage of domain-specific aggres- sion theories, however, is that they cannot cap- ture the complexity of human aggression and violence. Human behavior, including aggres- sive and violent behavior, is complex and is multiply determined. GAM includes most if not all of the factors that can influence aggression and violence. When grappling to understand the causes of aggression, researchers and layper- sons can use GAM to provide a glimpse into why a person or group behaved aggressively— and how that aggression can be reduced. Such global insights can prove very helpful to re- searchers working on more domain-specific models as well as practitioners involved in in- dividual or intergroup violence. Ultimately, as we begin to understand the causes of aggression and violence, people may stop “harming all other living beings,” which is what Thomas Edison hoped would happen one day.
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Received August 6, 2010 Revision received March 23, 2011
Accepted March 28, 2011 !
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10 paged paper instructions/reading0.pdf
SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION AND THEORIES OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS*
ROBERT J. BURSIK, JR. University of Oklahoma
After a period of decline in the discipline, the social disorganization model of Shaw and McKay is again beginning to appear in the literature. This paper examines five criticisms of the perspective and discusses recent attempts to address those issues and problems that are still in need of resolution.
INTRODUCTION After a relatively brief period of prominence during the 1950’s and 19603,
many criminologists came to view the concept of social disorganization devel- oped by Shaw and McKay (Shaw et al., 1929; Shaw and McKay, 1942, 1969) as largely marginal to modem criminological thought. Arnold and Brun- gardt (1983: 113), for example, flatly dismiss its relevance to theories of crime causation since “clearly, as we usually think of it, it is not even a necessary condition of criminality, let alone a sufficient one.” Similarly, Davidson (1981: 89) argues that social disorganization “should be seen as a descriptive convenience rather than a model of criminogenic behavior.” In fact, as recently as 1987, Unnever’s review of Byrne and Sampson (1986) stated that “as the authors themselves note, Shaw and McKdy’s theory of social disor- ganization, which gave birth to this area of research, has been soundly dis- missed” (p. 845).1
The past few years, however, have seen the publication of three major works (Byme and Sampson, 1986; Reiss and Tonry, 1986; Stark, 1987) and many related papers that clearly indicate that the perspective continues to have important ramifications for modem criminology. This paper examines two basic aspects of the revitalization of the social disorganization approach. ~~ ~
This paper is a greatly revised version of one presented at the 1984 annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology, Cincinnati. The author would like to acknowledge the very helpful comments and criticisms of Mitch Chamlin, Harold Grasmick, Janet Heitgerd, Charles Tittle, Kirk Williams, and three anonymous reviewers of an earlier draft. This work has been supported in part by grant 8CIJ-CX-0071, awarded by the National Institute of Justice.
Readers of the Byrne and Sampson collection may be somewhat surprised by this characterization, for one of the central themes of the book concerns extensions and revi- sions of the original Shaw and McKay perspective. I consider the book to be anything but a total dismissal of the social disorganization perspective.
1.
CRIMINOLOGY VOLUME 26 NUMBER 4 1988 519
5 20 BURSIK
First, five central criticisms that led to the temporary dormancy of the social disorganization tradition are discussed, and the attempts of recent formula- tions to address the problematic theoretical and empirical aspects of the ear- lier work are examined.2 Second, some successful extensions of the framework into substantive areas not traditionally associated with social dis- organization are reviewed.
THE SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION APPROACH OF SHAW AND MCKAY
Although the work of Shaw and McKay is still widely cited, it is primarily in respect to the finding that the economic composition of local communities is negatively related to rates of delinquency. It is important, however, to stress the central difference between their documentation of that negative association and their theoretical interpretation of the relationship, for it has led to some very basic misunderstandings of the social disorganization per- spective. Shaw and McKay did not posit a direct relationship between eco- nomic status and rates of delinquency.3 Rather, areas characterized by economic deprivation tended to have high rates of population turnover (they were abandoned as soon as it was economically feasible) and population het- erogeneity (the rapid changes in composition made it very difficult for those communities to mount concerted resistance against the influx of new groups).‘, These two processes, in turn, were assumed to increase the likeli- hood of social disorganization, a concept that is very similar to Park and Burgess’s (1924: 766) formulation of social control as the ability of a group to engage in self-regulation.
2. The Shaw and McKay social disorganization approach is often referred to as eco- logical. Unfortunately, other very different theoretical models are also classified as such, which can lead to a great deal of confusion. In this paper, the focus is restricted to ecologi- cal research within the social disorganization perspective. Therefore, the paper does not discuss the large body of work that has been grounded in Blau’s (1 977) structural (inequal- ity) perspective, nor does it examine the routine activity (opportunity) approach, except as it pertains to the social disorganization framework. Similarly, the Shaw and McKay work focuses on the dynamics of local communities (i.e., neighborhoods) that are related to crime and delinquency. Therefore, the paper does not discuss ecological work that has analyzed larger aggregates such as cities, counties, or SMSA’s.
In their discussion of the indirect relationship between socioeconomic composi- tion and local delinquency rates, Shaw and McKay drew from many sociological traditions. For example, they argued that certain structural conditions could lead to the formation of subcultures conducive to illegal activity. However, as Kornhauser (1978) has shown, these differing perspectives were not well integrated into a single, coherent mixed model. This paper focuses exclusively on the development of their argument pertaining to the dynamics of social disorganization. Very clear discussions of the role of economic composition in the Shaw and McKay model are provided by Kornhauser (1978) and Tittle (1983).
These assumptions have their source in the human ecology model of Park and Burgess (1924) and Burgess (1925). For a discussion of this relationship, see Bursik (1986).
3.
4.
SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION 52 1
In its purest formulation, social disorganization refers to the inability of local communities to realize the common values of their residents or solve commonly experienced problems (Kornhauser, 1978: 63; Thomas and Znaniecki, 1920). Population turnover and heterogeneity are assumed to increase the likelihood of disorganization for the following reasons:
Institutions pertaining to internal control are difficult to establish when many residents are “uninterested in communities they hope to leave at the first opportunity” (Kornhauser, 1978: 78). The development of primary relationships that result in informal structures of social control is less likely when local networks are in a continual state of flux (see Berry and Kasarda, 1977). Heterogeneity impedes communication and thus obstructs the quest to solve common problems and reach common goals (Kornhauser, 1978: 75).
The causal linkage between social disorganization and neighborhood delin- quency rates was not clearly explicated by Shaw and McKay. In various sections of their work, they freely draw on elements of strain, cultural con- flict, and control theories, but the logical implications of those frameworks are at times inconsistent (see Kornhauser, 1978). Given the intimate theoreti- cal connection between processes of rapid ecological change and the social disorganization framework, a control-theoretic approach offers perhaps the best general basis for understanding the process. That is, the dynamics of social disorganization lead to variations across neighborhoods in the strength of the commitment of the residents to group standards. Thus, weak struc- tures of formal and informal control decrease the costs associated with devia- tion within the group, making high rates of crime and delinquency more likely. Framed in this manner, the Shaw and McKay model of social disor- ganization is basically a group-level analog of control theory and is grounded in very similar processes of internal and external sources of control (for a good discussion of the similarities, see Pfohl, 1985).
1.
2.
3.
CRITICISM I: THE DISCIPLINARY SHIFT IN EMPHASIS
Short (1985) has presented an excellent summary of the dangers involved in confusing the levels of analysis implied by various theoretical models. Macrosociological models, such as social disorganization, refer to properties of groups; that is, they assume that there are important community-level dynamics related to crime that are not simple reifications of individual moti- vational processes. Some, however, dismiss the social disorganization per- spective simply because its findings do not (and usually cannot) lead to predictions concerning individual behavior. Although such criticisms are based on an inappropriate standard of evaluation (for a similar position, see
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McBride and McCoy, 1981), they are understandable given an important his- torical trend in the orientation of criminological research.
Many of the early sociological theories of crime and delinquency assumed that a full understanding of the etiology of illegal behavior was only possible through an examination of the social structure, the individual, and proximate social contexts (such as primary groups) that mediated between the individ- ual and that structure. Given the macrosocial thrust of the broader frameworks upon which these approaches were based, however, the individ- ual-level aspects of these theories were only roughly developed. For example, although Merton’s presentation of strain theory is concerned with the per- ceived disjuncture between an individual’s goals and the ability to reach those goals through legitimate means, his emphasis was primarily on how this frus- tration was resolved by social groups rather than the potential sources of indi- vidual variation in that resolution (Merton, 1938). The revisions of his model that followed, in particular the work of Cohen (1955) and Cloward and Ohlin (1960), assumed that the intraclass variation in these adaptations could be explained by other group contexts, such as the gang or the neighborhood. Similarly, Thrasher’s (1927) research on gangs and Sutherland‘s differential association perspective (Sutherland and Cressey, 1955) clearly focused on the group nature of illegal behavior. The social disorganization approach of Shaw and McKay was an important part of this group-oriented tradition.
In recent years, however, the traditional emphasis on group dynamics and organization has given way to a concern with the sources of individual moti- vation. This is perhaps most apparent in the resurgence of deterrence research in the discipline and its relatively recent concern with individual perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment. Yet, it is also true of other theoretical perspectives that at one time strongly emphasized group dynamics. The influential reformulation of control theory by Hirschi (1969), for example, is basically an individual decision-making model of delinquency, in which one weighs the benefits of an illegal activity against the potential costs of losing investments one has made in conventional behaviors, institu- tions, and persons. This reorientation is even more striking in the recent revi- sions made to the theory of differential association. Although Sutherland’s original learning theory of crime and delinquency was framed in terms of cultural transmission (i.e., a group process), the most important recent devel- opments in the area have emphasized the psychological process of operant conditioning (see Akers, 1985; Akers et al., 1979). As Arnold and Brungardt (1983) have argued, the group dynamics implicated in this newer formulation are not fully specified.
This disciplinary trend had a particularly devastating effect on the develop- ment of the social disorganization approach with the publication of Robin- son’s (1950) classic article on ecological correlation. The basic thrust of
SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION 523
Robinson’s argument concerned the problematic nature of making individ- ual-level inferences on the basis of aggregate data; nowhere in the paper does he suggest that an aggregate level of measurement is inappropriate for the investigation of all theoretical issues. Yet, as Borgatta and Jackson (1980: 8) observe, “the caution became, for many, a rigid taboo on the use of aggre- gated data.”
In this regard, Robinson’s use of the term “ecological” was especially unfortunate for the development of the theory of social disorganization given its historical identification with Park and Burgess’s (1924) theory of human ecology. As noted by Brantingham and Brantingham (1981: 17), many researchers (especially those who were interested in finding the causes of criminal motivation) used Robinson’s findings to conclude that ecological models of crime were fairly meaningless (see Baldwin, 1979). This sentiment resulted in an important shift in the orientation of spatial research from mod- els that emphasized social disorganization to “opportunity models” of crime, which focus on the geographic distribution of targets of crime and the means of crime commission, the routine activities of people that may lead to an increased likelihood of crime and victimization, and the situations in which crime takes place (see, e.g., Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981; &hen and Felson, 1979; Cohen et al., 1981; Harries, 1980; Messner and Tardiff, 1985; Pyle et al., 1974; Roncek, 1981). Even though such models often used aggre- gate data in their analyses, the ensuing inferences had a very individualistic flavor until relatively recently.
The increased focus on individual motivation provided a necessary balance to the previous overemphasis on group processes and resulted in important theoretical modifications and developments. The discipline has, however, in a sense, overcompensated in that the group aspects of criminal behavior have almost ceased to be examined and at times are virtually ignored. As Stark (1987: 894) laments, “poor neighborhoods disappeared to be replaced by indi- vidual kids with various levels of family income.” That is, most of our theo- ries became more social-psychological than sociological (see Erickson and Jensen, 1977; Johnstone, 1978).
Some criminologists have strongly resisted the reincorporation of group dynamics (especially those pertaining to social disorganization) into models of crime and delinquency, even when the focus of an analysis is on the neigh- borhood. At best, many believe that such considerations should occupy a distinctly secondary position since “a test of the significance of area research requires study of individuals” (Nettler, 1984: 117). Group- and individual- level dynamics, however, are actually complementary components of a com- prehensive theory of crime. This is well illustrated in Stark’s (1987) paper, in which several of the propositions concerning the volume of crime that he deduces on the basis of community characteristics converge in a very interest- ing manner with those developed by those opportunity theorists who have
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focused on individual motivational processes. In fact, Reiss (1986: 7-8) argues that a full understanding of many criminological issues is only possible through the linkage of the two traditions. As will be discussed below, one of the most important recent extensions of the theory of social disorganization has used contextual analysis to examine the relative effects of individual and community characteristics on the likelihood of illegal behavior. In addition, as will be shown, such an integration has greatly broadened the scope of traditional theories of victimization.
In sum, the group orientation of the social disorganization perspective is not in itself a valid basis for criticism. Rather, it emphasizes certain social processes that have tended to become somewhat marginal to “mainstream” criminology over the years. Yet, Bookin-Weiner and Horowitz (1983) have noted periodic shifts in the dominant theoretical orientations to juvenile crime, and there appears to be a resurgence of interest in group dynamics in their own right. Unfortunately, other, very serious criticisms of social disor- ganization have hindered its general reacceptance as a theoretical model.
CRITICISM 11: THE ASSUMPTION OF STABLE ECOLOGICAL STRUCTURES
The concept of social disorganization is grounded in the human ecology theory of urban dynamics, in which the notions of change and adaptation are central. Thus, the full set of dynamics that may lead to such disorganization can only be discerned when long-term processes of urban development are considered. Luckily, Shaw and McKay had access to a unique set of data that enabled them to analyze the relationship between ecological change and delinquency over a period of several decades. Without such a research strat- egy, it would have been impossible for them to document their central finding that local communities tend to retain their relative delinquency character despite changing racial and ethnic compositions (see the discussion of Stark, 1987). The compilation of such information over an extended period of time is often extremely difficult and costly, however. With the important excep- tion of Schmid (1960a, 1960b), the subsequent studies in this tradition were typically forced to rely on cross-sectional data. Since it is impossible to study change in such a design, cross-sectional studies must assume that local com- munities are not undergoing a redefinition of their role in the ecological sys- tem, i.e., the spatial distribution of crime and delinquency rates is relatively stable. Yet, as Schuerman and Kobrin (1983, 1986) have argued, the ecologi- cal stability assumed to exist by Shaw and McKay disappeared after World War 11, when an acceleration in the rate of decentralization in urban areas significantly altered the character of urban change.5 The effects of such
5 . McKay notes in his afterword to the 1969 edition of Juvenile Delinquency and Urbon Areas that he and Shaw could also not foresee other important trends, such as the
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developments on the distribution of crime and delinquency are impossible to detect without longitudinal data. Thus, the cross-sectional models of social disorganization were grounded in a basic assumption of stability that was simply not justified by historical evidence.
The reappearance of the social disorganization perspective has been accom- panied by a renewed emphasis on the dynamics of urban change and their reflection in changing spatial distributions of crime and delinquency. Bursik (1984, 1986a; Bursik and Webb, 1982), for example, has shown that the eco- logical structure of Chicago was relatively stable between 1930 and 1940, but dramatic changes in that structure began to appear after 1940. The redefini- tion of the ecological position of Chicago’s local neighborhoods was accom- panied by significant changes in the relative levels of delinquency found in those areas. Bursik and Webb (1982) attribute this pattern to changes in the dominant forms of population invasion and succession that characterized northern urban centers after World War 11.
Schuerman and Kobrin (1983, 1986) have examined in detail the sequence of ecological changes involved in the transition of an area from a low-crime to high-crime neighborhood in Los Angeles. Changes in land-use patterns from predominantly owner-occupied dwellings to rental units led to changes in the population composition, population turnover, and socioeconomic composi- tion of an area. The culmination of this process was a decrease in the prevail- ing controls in the area (i.e., the degree of social disorganization), which in turn increased the likelihood of crime and delinquency.
The changing role of communities within an ecological system has also been the subject of intensive examination by Lyle Shannon and his associates (1982, 1984), who argue that there was little evidence of a significant relation- ship between the amount of change in the characteristics of an area and related changes in the local arrest rates of Racine, Wisconsin, between 1950 and 1970. This finding has several possible interpretations from a social dis- organization perspective. It is possible that local community adaptations to changes in urban dynamics stabilized much earlier in Racine than in larger urban areas. Or, it is possible that the effects of those changes were simply much less pronounced in Racine than elsewhere, although Shannon does point out that there were major processes of decentralization in Racine simi- lar to those that characterized Chicago and Los Angeles.
The apparent incompatibility of the Racine findings with those for Chicago and Los Angeles highlights an important drawback of these data sets: they pertain to particular ecological units with sometimes unique social histories of development. Thus, the degree to which the findings found in, say, Chicago
effects of open housing decisions and the greatly expanded role of urban planning programs.
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can be generalized to other cities is unclear. However, the number of avail- able longitudinal ecological data sets for the testing of social disorganization models within various urban areas has been increasing in recent years. In addition to the Chicago, Los Angeles, and Racine material, for example, research is beginning to appear that examines the relationship between eco- logical change and crime and delinquency rates in Cleveland and San Diego (Roncek, 1987a, 1987b) and Baltimore (Covington and Taylor, 1988; Taylor and Covington, 1987). As the number of cities for which such data are avail- able increases, much more confidence can be placed in the inferences that can be made concerning the general dynamics of social disorganization.
CRITICISM 111: THE MEASUREMENT OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION
OPERATIONALIZING SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION
A good indication of the confusion that the concept of social disorganiza- tion has generated is the existence of at least four extended efforts to explain the assumptions of the Shaw and McKay approach (Finestone, 1976; Kobrin, 1971; Kornhauser, 1978; Short, 1969). Of the four, Kobrin’s is the most his- torically interesting because it was an internal memo at the Institute for Juve- nile Research (which had housed the Shaw and McKay research) written while McKay was still employed there. This suggests that Shaw and McKay’s model may not have been completely clear even to those people working with them.
Two specific sources of confusion concerning social disorganization have been especially recurrent. First, and most basically, Shaw and McKay some- times did not clearly differentiate the presumed outcome of social disorgani- zation (i.e., increased rates of delinquency) from disorganization itself. This tendency led some to equate social disorganization with the phenomena it was intended to explain, an interpretation clearly not intended by Shaw and McKay and their associates (1929: 205-206). For example, Lander (1954: 10) concluded that the value of the social disorganization construct “is dubi- ous in view of the fact that social disorganization itself has to be defined as a complex of a group of factors in which juvenile delinquency, crime, broken homes . . . and other socio-pathological factors are included.” Thus, Lander defined delinquency us social disorganization and focused his research efforts on determining the other community characteristics that should be included in this general complex. It must be noted that Shaw and McKay were not totally responsible for this muddled distinction. Pfohl (1985: 167) has pointed out that the classic social disorganization theorists in general often used a single indicator, such as a delinquency rate, as “both an example of disorganization and something caused by disorganization” (see his example concerning Faris and Dunham, 1939).
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The common confounding of cause and effect added a great deal of confu- sion to the evaluation of the Shaw and McKay model. Yet, as Berry and Kasarda (1977: 55-56) note, the ecological model of Park and Burgess (1924), which provided the intellectual context for the work of Shaw and McKay, was an early version of the systemic approach to local community structure, which considers a neighborhood to be a complex system of friend- ship and kinship networks and associational ties. Drawing from this orienta- tion, a recent body of work has attempted to clarify the unique conceptual status of social disorganization by defining it in terms of the capacity of a neighborhood to regulate itself through formal and informal processes of social control. Such an operational definition has made it much easier to differentiate social disorganization conceptually from the ecological processes that make internal self-regulation problematic and from the rates of crime and delinquency that may be a result.6
This current formulation of social disorganization assumes that the breadth and strength of local networks directly affect the effectiveness of two forms of community self-regulation. The first reflects the ability of local neighbor- hoods to supervise the behavior of their residents. The dynamics of this dimension of local community social control have been most fully developed in the work of Greenberg and her colleagues (1982a, 1982b, 1985), who iden- tify three primary forms:
1. Informal surveillance: the casual but active observation of neighbor- hood streets that is engaged in by individuals during daily activities.
2. Movement-governing rules: avoidance of areas in or near the neigh- borhood or in the city as a whole that are viewed as unsafe.
3. Direct intervention: questioning strangers and residents of the neighborhood about suspicious activities. It may also include chas- tening adults and admonishing children for behavior defined as unacceptable (1982b: 147-148).
Sampson (1986, 1987) has provided an excellent discussion of the causal dynamics by which these processes of informal control mediate between gen- eral ecological change and delinquency in the overall social disorganization model. As he argues (1987: 102), rapid rates of population turnover and increases in structural density lead to a greater proportion of strangers in a neighborhood, who are less likely to intercede on behalf of local residents in crime-related situations (see the related argument of Stark, 1987).
It is important to note that informal processes of social control are the
A large literature is developing that applies the systemic formulation of social disorganization to the analysis of energy-dependent boomtowns. Since this research does not focus on local neighborhood differentiation within those towns, this paper does not discuss that body of work. Interested readers are urged to consult Albrecht (1982), Fin- sterbusch (1982), Freudenburg (1984), or Wilkinson et al. (1982).
6.
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central elements of Sampson’s (1987) discussion of the supervisory capacity of local communities. Although he recognizes that rapid ecological change can decrease the level of participation in local formal organizations (1986: 26; see also Bursik, 1986a; Bursik and Webb, 1982), he argues that “they are in large part controlled by city, state and national networks of power” (1987: 102). Thus, although such institutions can have important effects on the pre- vention of delinquency, much of their effectiveness is determined by sources outside the local community.
There is no question that externally determined funding priorities and pro- gram requirements are an important set of contingencies that shape the role of local institutions as supervisory agencies in a community (see the discus- sion of Spergel and Korbelik, 1979: 109). Yet, the existence of certain types of formal local organizations is a direct reflection of a neighborhood‘s attempt to regulate itself. For example, local neighborhood associations with commu- nity crime prevention as a primary goal have arisen in many areas. As Greenberg et al. have argued (1982b), these groups provide a forum in which such developments are discussed and evaluated, thereby increasing the sensi- tivity of the residents to the risks involved in the commission of crime in that area. Although the empirical evidence is somewhat ambiguous due to some important methodological problems (see the discussion of Greenberg et al., 1985: Ch. 9), there is a growing body of evidence that indicates that such programs do in fact have a significant effect on crime rates.’
The systemic formulation of social disorganization does not assume that networks of affiliation and association have solely a supervisory effect on local rates of crime and delinquency. In fact, to concentrate exclusively on this form of self-regulation would seriously distort the original argument of Shaw and McKay for, as Kornhauser (1978: 38) has argued, they were centrally concerned with the “effectiveness of socialization in preventing deviance.’’ Shaw and McKay (1969: 172) argued, for example, that children living in areas of low economic status “are exposed to a variety of contradictory stan- dards and forms of behavior rather than to a relatively consistent and conven- tional pattern.” Such a statement obviously indicates that there are subcultural aspects to the general Shaw and McKay model. In fact, they eventually concluded that certain neighborhoods were characterized by a “coherent system of values supporting delinquent acts” (1969: 173). This aspect of their model has been extensively discussed by Kornhauser (1978), who concludes that the cultural assumptions are not a necessary component of the social disorganization model. Rather, she argues that it is more consis- tent with the control-theoretic assumptions of their general model to focus on
7. There is some evidence that local churches may also have important functions as local agencies of social control, although the relationship has not been examined in detail in the recent literature (see Guest and Lee, 1987).
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variability in the effectiveness of local structures of conventional socialization. Current models of social disorganization have also downplayed the notion of subcultural variability and have emphasized the viability of the institutions of socialization imbedded in the local networks of association and affiliation. Thus, the second form of community self-regulation implicit in the notion of social disorganization reflects the socializing, rather than supervisory, capa- bilities of a neighborhood (for an excellent discussion of these capabilities, see Janowitz, 1978: 283-300).
Few criminologists would dispute the contention that the family represents one of the key socializing agencies in our society, and many studies have examined the relationship between the distribution of family structures and crime/delinquency rates within local communities (see, for example, Samp- son, 1986). The educational system also has played an increasingly important role in the socialization of children in the United States and has been a central component of other macrosociological theories of delinquency (such as the strain/subcultural model of Cohen, 1955). Social disorganization models, however, have generally failed to consider the degree to which the socializing capabilities of local schools are a source of neighborhood self-regulation, although it has been shown that rates of high school suspension are related to the neighborhood contexts in which the schools are imbedded (see Hellman and Beaton, 1986).
The recent ethnographic work of Schwartz (1987) has suggested that the failure to consider the role of educational institutions within the larger con- text of the neighborhood may seriously limit our understanding of the processes of internal self-regulation. For example, he notes the example of Parsons Park, in which the local schools serve as “the cultural battleground of the community” (p. 50); in this neighborhood, it is primarily through the educational system that ethnic traditions, religious faith, family patterns, and other community standards are “woven into the fabric of local institutions.” Yet, in a second neighborhood located in the same city, the local high school is characterized as generally disorganized and “is experienced in the class- room as having little connection with the larger society’s goals and values” (p. 222). It is no coincidence that these two areas also have very different rates of juvenile delinquency; the second, for example, has a heavy concentra- tion of gang activity.*
Given the central role of educational systems in our society, social disor- ganization models will not be fully specified until the role of such institutions is integrated into the larger conceptualization of community self-regulation.
8. Two studies have examined the relationship of school location and the areal distri- bution of crime (see Roncek and Faggiani, 1985; Roncek and LoBosco, 1983). This research, however, has emphasized the opportunities for crime provided by such institu- tions rather than the organizational characteristics of the neighborhoods in which they are located.
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However, this will be a very complicated task for several reasons. First, neighborhoods are rarely served by a single school; rather, the children of local residents attend a varying mixture of public and private schools. Sec- ond, due to busing, the existence of “magnet” schools, and so forth, many of the schools attended by these youths are outside the local community. Third, school districts (both public and private) rarely correspond to the boundaries of local communities. Finally, and not inconsequentially, a consideration of local educational systems entails the collection of a dramatically different kind of data concerning the structure and characteristics of those systems; in some areas, this information may be very difficult to gather. Nevertheless, future research within the social disorganization framework must begin to pay greater attention to the role of educational institutions.
THE TRADITIONAL STUDY DE~IGN
In addition to the confusion that has surrounded the conceptualization of social disorganization, the perspective has been characterized by a second major problem pertaining to the empirical deficiencies of the study designs typically used in such research. Most studies have used the population of local community areas within a given urban context as the unit of analysis. Shaw and McKay, for example, analyzed the distribution of delinquency in 140 square-mile areas of Chicago. More often, census boundaries (or some rearrangement of those boundaries) are used to demarcate the local commu- nity areas.9 Arrest and/or court referral records are then geographically aggregated and the corresponding rates are computed. The compilation of such records in itself is a formidable task, but the information is usually housed in a central location and the costs of data collection (especially if the records are in a computerized form) are not especially high.
It is fairly easy to derive measures of the ecological dynamics pertinent to the social disorganization model (i.e., socioeconomic composition, population turnover, and population heterogeneity) from published census materials. This is not the case for the concept of social disorganization itself, however, except to the extent that it is reflected in the distribution of family structures in a community (see Sampson, 1986). The collection of relevant data would entail a very intensive series of interviews, surveys, and/or fieldwork within each of the local neighborhoods in the urban system. The logistic and eco- nomic problems of such an approach are obvious in large metropolitan areas, which may have over a hundred locally recognized communities. Thus, even the most recent studies of entire urban systems (such as the research dis- cussed in the preceding section) have been forced either to rely on very crude
9. The determination of socially meaningful neighborhood boundaries is not as straightforward as is sometimes implied in the literature. See the discussion of Hunter (1974), Shannon (1982), and Bursik (1986a).
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indicators of social disorganization or to concentrate on the relationship bet ween ecological processes and crime/delinquency, assuming that this cen- tral unmeasured process intervened between the two (see Bursik, 1986a).
As might be expected, such a state of affairs has compounded the confusion that already existed concerning the measurement and conceptualization of social disorganization (see Byrne and Sampson, 1986: 13-17). It becomes hard to distinguish the various components of the Shaw and McKay model and, because only the ecological indicators appear in most models, the social disorganization framework may therefore appear to many to implicitly assume that lower class neighborhoods with a large proportion of black or foreign-born residents are disorganized. Yet, it is important to emphasize that this is definitely not an inherent assumption of the theory. Rather, the degree to which these ecological processes are associated with the ability of a community to regulate itself is an empirical question. This is especially clear in McKay’s later work (1967: 115), in which he interpreted the decline in the delinquency rates of several black communities in Chicago as representing a movement toward institutional stability in those areas (see also Bursik, 1984, 1986; Bursik and Webb, 1982; Schuerman and Kobrin, 1983, 1986).
The theoretical status of social disorganization also suffered from a devel- opment that followed the publication of Lander’s (1954) research. His defini- tion of delinquency us social disorganization led him to focus his research efforts on the identification of other related community characteristics that should also be considered to represent social disorganization. Such an emphasis represented an additional impetus away from the dynamic causal processes found in the Shaw and McKay model and toward a concern with simple, cross-sectional associations.
Because Lander’s results apparently contradicted the model of Shaw and McKay, an important series of replications were conducted (Bordua, 1958-59; Chilton, 1964, Gordon, 1967; Rosen and Turner, 1967). Although these studies verified the zero-order predictions of Shaw and McKay, the inability to directly measure social disorganization meant that the full impli- cations of the Shaw and McKay model could not be addressed (see also Polk, 1957-58; Quinney, 1964). Given the somewhat confusing presentation of the social disorganization concept by Shaw and McKay in the first place, such research was taken by many to mean that the concept of social disorganiza- tion was equivalent to the ecological indicators used in the analysis. Thus, it was erroneously assumed that neighborhoods characterized by low socioeco- nomic status and high degrees of minority composition were, by definition, disorganized (see the discussion of Pfohl, 1985: 167).
To date, the only feasible way to obtain relatively direct indicators of social disorganization in order to analyze the full Shaw and McKay framework has been to concentrate on a relatively few communities. Kapsis (1976, 1978), for example, conducted an extensive series of interviews with adults, adolescents,
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and community leaders who resided in three neighborhoods in the Rich- mond-Oakland area. His results suggest that communities with broad net- works of acquaintanceship and organizational activity have lower rates of delinquency, even when the racial and economic composition of the area would predict otherwise. The effects of such controlling networks are most striking in his discussion of each neighborhood's response to a local racial disturbance that occurred in 1969. There were significant increases in law- violating behavior in the less organized neighborhoods, but the crime rate actually decreased in the most organized one as an indigenous citizen patrol committee emerged. Kapsis cautions (1978) that his findings are drawn from a limited number of communities from one geographic region and that the full implications of the similarities and differences among those neighbor- hoods are not clear. Nevertheless, his studies do indicate that the level of social disorganization may have an important mediating effect between the ecological composition of a community and its delinquency rate.
Recently, Simcha-Fagan and Schwartz (1986) have published the results of a very ambitious attempt to measure social disorganization on a larger scale, based on the study of 553 adolescent males residing in 12 New York City neighborhoods. In addition to collecting the traditional census materials for each of the neighborhoods, Simcha-Fagan and Schwartz (1986: 676-677, Appendix) also administered survey questionnaires to each of the adolescents and their mothers. Included in the survey were a series of items directly analogous to those implicated in a systemic approach to social disorganiza- tion: the extent of informal neighboring, the level of neighborhood attach- ment, the size and breadth of local networks, neighborhood organizational involvement, and the extent of local personal ties. Given the very limited number of areas included in the study, it is impossible to determine reliably the extent to which the mean values of the variables are related to a neighbor- hood's delinquency rate. Significant effects were found at the individual level, however.
Overall, it has not been possible to collect appropriate data concerning social disorganization for all of the neighborhoods in an ecological system due to some very practical limitations. Unfortunately, a full test of the model on the scale of the traditional studies will be impossible without an enormous outlay of funds for data collection by an interested funding agency. Never- theless, the results of these smaller scale analyses are very supportive of the predictions made by the Shaw and McKay model.
CRITICISM IV: THE MEASUREMENT OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY Despite the problems inherent in the measurement of social disorganiza-
tion, other theories have faced similar problems and still have remained cen- tral perspectives in the discipline. Research guided by the differential
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association framework, for example, continues to appear with some frequency in the literature, although some of its theoretical components were not speci- fied with much more clarity by Sutherland than social disorganization was by Shaw and McKay. This section and the one following address two criticisms particularly associated with the social disorganization model that seriously question the findings of such studies even when the model has been com- pletely and correctly specified.
The first criticism focuses on the official nature of the data that have been typically used to compute the rates of crime and delinquency for the local community areas. As early as 1936, Robison criticized the use of official records in the Shaw and McKay research, arguing that systematic biases existed in the juvenile justice system that gave rise to the differences among local community areas and that the “actual” distribution of delinquency would be more evenly dispersed throughout the city (see the discussion of Gold, 1987). Shaw and McKay were very aware of the less-than-ideal nature of their official data sources. They noted, for example, the possibility that areal variations in delinquency may only reflect variations in the number of offenders that are apprehended, raising the question “Is there not just as much real delinquent behavior in areas of low rates as there is in areas of high rates?’ (Shaw et al., 1929: 199).
It is interesting that Shaw and McKay foresaw one aspect of the individ- ual-level resolution of the official record versus self-report debat-the ability of each approach to measure behaviors of varying seriousness-by stating “there is not evidence to show that the children living in areas of low rates are involved in such serious behavior . . . if they were involved in such offenses, it is certain that their names would appear in the records of juvenile probation officers.” Studies that have examined the relative validity and reliability of these data sources, however, have primarily concentrated on characteristics of individuals (such as class, race, and gender; see Elliott and Ageton, 1980; Hindelang et al., 1981) or changes in police organizational priorities (such as DeFleur, 1975; Peterson and Hagan, 1984) that may lead to differential han- dling by the justice system. Very few studies have examined the extent to which neighborhoods themselves are a consideration in police and court deci- sions, although DeFleur’s argument strongly suggests that such biases exist.
There are two important exceptions to this general state of neglect. A very interesting study by Hagan et al. (1978) suggests that a significant degree of community-specific bias may exist within police departments. Not only did they find that police impressions concerning the distribution of delinquency among 72 Canadian neighborhoods were more strongly related to the socio- economic status and residential density of those areas than to the actual rates of citizen complaints to the police, but those impressions were more strongly associated with variation in the official delinquency rate than with the rate of
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complaints. As Hagan et al. admit, the findings can only be considered tenta- tive given the nature of the city, which they describe as “over-policed.” In addition, some questions can be raised concerning the reliability of the “police impression” variable because it is based on the responses of six officers who worked in the youth bureau, and not the impressions of more general officers making arrests in the field. Nevertheless, the findings of Hagan et al. suggest that the official rates analyzed in traditional social disorganization research are not free of systematic bias (see DeFleur, 1975). Rather, they may represent a mixture of differentials in neighborhood behavior patterns, neighborhood propensities to report behavior, and neighborhood-specific police orientations.
The findings of the Hagan et al. study are also supported by the recent research of Smith (1986). In his analysis of police behavior in 60 neighbor- hoods under the jurisdiction of 24 metropolitan police departments, Smith found that the probability of arrest is highest in areas of low socioeconomic status even after controls are imposed for the nature of the offense, character- istics of the suspect, and the dispositional preferences of the complainant. These findings should be considered with some caution because the study design implicitly assumes that the relationship between police contact and arrest is constant across all 24 agencies used in the analysis. Nevertheless, they again highlight the potential error of assuming that the sole sources of variation in neighborhood delinquency rates are the factors implicated in the social disorganization model.
To date, the degree to which the relative distribution of neighborhood rates of crime and delinquency is an artifact of police decision-making practices has not been extensively examined due to the limited availability of the appro- priate data. The ideal situation would entail the collection of alternative indicators of neighborhood delinquency rates (based on self-reported meas- ures or victimization data) to be used in conjunction with the official records as multiple indicators of this construct (see the argument of Austin, 1976). It would then be possible to separate the mutual covariation of these indicators (i.e., the degree to which each reflects the single underlying construct of a crime or delinquency rate) and the variation unique to each indicator that is not related to neighborhood behavioral patterns. Unfortunately, this resolu- tion faces the same practical problems that were previously discussed con- cerning the collection of direct indicators of social disorganization.
The limited work that has been done indicates that, despite the possibility that systematic bias in police records may distort the actual spatial distribu- tion of crime and delinquency, social disorganization is still an important determinant of this distribution. The Kapsis and Simcha-Fagan and Schwartz research discussed earlier in this section analyzed both official records and self-reported data and found patterns in accordance with those
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predicted by social disorganization. In addition, the victimization rates ana- lyzed by Sampson (1985, 1986) also provide strong support for the viability of the perspective. Thus, although only a few studies have examined alternative indicators, evidence has been consistently presented that officially based dis- tributions of neighborhood crime and delinquency rates are not primarily an artifact of police decision-making biases. Nevertheless, the full examination of the extent to which the two alternative sources of variation account for the spatial distribution should be an important part of the future research agenda in the area of social disorganization.
CRITICISM V: THE NORMATIVE ASSUMPTIONS OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION
The definition of social disorganization as the inability of a local commu- nity to regulate itself in order to attain goals that are agreed to by the resi- dents of that community implies that the notion of consensus is a central component of the model. With the increasing emphasis in the criminological literature on the dynamics of power, the political ramifications of crime con- trol, and the relativistic nature of definitions of behavior as crime, the norma- tive assumptions of the social disorganization framework appear to many to be insensitive to the realities of political and social life.
In one respect, this aspect of social disorganization is not nearly as restric- tive an assumption as it may appear. As Janowitz argues (1976: 9-10), a normative approach to social control (i.e., community self-regulation) does not necessarily mean rigid control and social repression. Rather, noncon- formity in an area can be tolerated as long as it does not interfere with the attainment of a commonly accepted goal. In this regard, all that has to be demonstrated is that the residents of an area value an existence relatively free of crime; it is not necessary to accept the assumptions of the other “universal human needs” that Komhauser detects in the work of Shaw and McKay, such as economic sufficiency, education, and family stability (Kornhauser: 63). The widely replicated findings of the body of research on the perceived seriousness of crime (Rossi et al., 1974; Sellin and Wolfgang, 1964) indicate that the assumption that residents desire a life-style at least free from the threat of serious crimes (such as index offenses) is reasonable.
Nevertheless, the social disorganization framework does not seem suitable for the study of all behaviors that have been designated as criminal. This inability arises from two sources. First, the findings of the research on the perceived seriousness of crime show that for many, less serious offenses a strong degree of consensus does not exist. It would be inappropriate to examine a community’s ability to attain a mutual goal of minimizing the inci- dence of such crimes within its boundaries when such general agreement can- not be demonstrated.
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In addition, for certain extremely serious crimes the social disorganization model may not provide an especially powerful explanation. Schrager and Short (1980), for example, compare the perceptions of seriousness for organi- zational crimes (such as manufacturing and selling drugs known to be harm- ful, selling contaminated food, overcharging for credit, selling unsafe cars, and price-fixing) and crimes more commonly analyzed in social disorganiza- tion models (such as homicide, burglary, robbery, and theft). They present strong evidence that organizational and common crimes with the same type of social impact (either physical or economic) are rated very similarly (pp. 25-26). Thus, since organizational offenses are considered to be a serious as the types of “street crime” discussed by Shaw and McKay, it might be rea- sonable to expect the social disorganization approach to provide a viable explanation of their distribution in neighborhoods.
Unfortunately, as noted by Pfohl (1989, the social disorganization frame- work has not generally been applied to white collar crime. Thus, to some extent, the applicability of the perspective is still unknown. There are reasons to expect, however, that the framework as it has traditionally been used would not successfully predict rates of such crime. Janowitz (1967) and Suttles (1972) have described modem local neighborhoods as “communities of lim- ited liability,” i.e., characterized by the partial and differential involvement of their residents. Thus, “action on behalf of the community of limited liability becomes specialized and self-consciously oriented toward limited issues” (Suttles, 1972: 59). Street crime committed within the boundaries of an area presents an immediate threat to the members of that community and provides a focus on which the residents can unite. At times, as for example in the case of a price-gouging supermarket or landlord, white collar crime might also generate enough perceived common threat to set the processes of self-regula- tion into action. On the other hand, white collar crime committed by resi- dents of the community but having no widespread impact on that community may not be subject to the same internal processes of social control.
The caveat concerning the traditional emphasis of the model reflects its ongoing concern with local community processes. If the notion of the “group” is expanded from the neighborhood to any collectivity with an inter- est in self-regulation, then white collar crime might easily be explained within a similar framework. In this respect, the notion of the organization would supplant the notion of the community. It would then be possible to deter- mine the extent to which high rates of employee turnover and employee het- erogeneity affect the ability of the organization to regulate itself and, in turn, whether this ability is related to white collar crime. Such research would appear to be a fruitful extension of the social disorganization framework in the future.
In addition to the obvious considerations concerning the feasibility of assuming that a consensus exists concerning the control of crime within a
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neighborhood, a much more subtle normative assumption is imbedded in the Shaw and McKay model that is even more problematic. Shaw and McKay at least implicitly assume that the ecological distribution and movement of populations within an urban area reflect the “natural” market of housing demand; they did not discuss in any detail the degree to which population turnover, population heterogeneity, and social disorganization could in fact be manipulated by nonmarket mechanisms. Suttles (1972: 41), for example, has noted that modem neighborhoods not only reflect the economic processes considered by Shaw and McKay but also “politics and some cultural image of what the city ought to be like” (see the criticism of their model by Snodgrass, 1976). Thus, as Finestone (1976) has shown, the primary thrust of Shaw and McKay’s model gives the impression that the composition and internal organization of local communities are relatively independent of the broader political and economic dynamics of the city (see also Bursik, 1988).
Skogan (1986: 206-207), for example, has highlighted four key factors with sources outside the local community that can affect neighborhood stability: disinvestment, demolition and construction, demagoguery (i.e., real estate panic peddlers and politicians) and deindustrialization. The effects of such processes on the distribution of populations within Chicago have been strongly documented by Hirsch (1983), who presents evidence suggesting that the activities of slumlords in Chicago’s traditional Black Belt may have accel- erated movement out of that area over what might have been expected given the economic status of the residents.
Such market manipulation has not been solely determined by private initia- tive. As Guest notes (1984: 293), large bureaucracies have arisen since World War I1 that “undoubtedly have important influences over the political processes in determining the allocation of land.” One of the reasons for the increase of such bureaucracies is that with the rise of suburbanization and the resulting decline in the population of the central cities, local governments are finding themselves facing extreme fiscal strain, i.e., an imbalance between government spending or debt and the resources of the private sector (such as reflected in the median family income, tax bases, and property values; see Clark, 1981). A common response to this crisis has been the creation of zon- ing regulations that attempt to maximize the tax yield from the properties in an area and simultaneously minimize the public dollars necessary to service the community (Foley, 1973: 11 1).
In addition, as Suttles (1972: 82-86) has indicated, incentives have been offered to potential builderddevelopers that were not necessary in the past. As he argues, current decisions to develop are not simply based on an eco- nomical use of land, but also on expectations concerning the future potential of adjacent property (p. 86). Because few developers or realtors are large enough to control such a large block of land and because many private firms are reluctant to risk a major investment in an area in which the future is
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problematic, the local government is forced to provide inducements to such developments, such as the financing of construction, the clearance and sale of land, and the establishment of standards for builders (p. 82).
Such developments external to the local community can have three kinds of effects on the relative distribution of crime and delinquency rates. First, they may directly affect those rates by providing inducements to high-risk populations to move into a specific neighborhood. Bottoms and Wiles (1986: 103), for example, have shown that the allocation of housing in the public rental sector of Great Britain had very pronounced effects on the distribution of offenders.
Second, these developments may indirectly affect the rates of crime and delinquency by accelerating (or decelerating) the degree of residential stabil- ity in a neighborhood. Bursik (1988), for example, shows that the construc- tion of new public housing projects in Chicago between 1970 and 1980 was associated with increased rates of population turnover, which in turn were related to changes in local delinquency rates. It is important to note that this relationship did nor reflect the effect of changing racial compositions.
A third, and somewhat surprising, effect is also possible. Suttles (1972: 35) has given the label of “defended community” to areas in which residents attempt to maintain a stable neighborhood identity in the context of changes that appear to be imposed on them by city planners, realtors, politicians, and industry. In such neighborhoods, gang activities are often seen as a protec- tion of local residents from a perceived threat of invasion from “undesirable” residents of nearby communities. Thus, the increased level of internal organi- zation of the community may in fact result in higher rates of crime and delin- quency. Research in support of this proposition in Chicago has been presented by Heitgerd and Bursik (1987).
Thus, in an important sense, the social disorganization model that has tra- ditionally appeared in the literature is conceptually incomplete. A full speci- fication will require a broadening of the perspective to include the broader economic, historical, and political dynamics in which the development of local communities is imbedded. This will be much more feasible than it has been in the past in that the reappearance of longitudinal data sets will make it possible to examine these processes in detail.
Such a development reflects the recent broad efforts in criminology to inte- grate apparently disparate theoretical orientations in an attempt to obtain a more complete understanding of a phenomenon (see Elliott et al., 1985; Liska et al., 1988). There is nothing wrong with the social disorganization frame- work in particular for failing to have successfully completed such an integra- tion. Thus, the preceding arguments do not imply that the model as it has generally been used in the past should be rejected in any way; rather its focus should simply be expanded.
SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION 539
NEW EXTENSIONS OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION
As the preceding sections have indicated, a great deal of effort has been expended in recent work to deal with the important criticisms that have been made of the social disorganization perspective. By and large, the resolutions of the various problems are still in a period of formulation. Those attempts, however, have also opened up new avenues of investigation that were not traditionally considered by disorganization theorists. Three in particular are especially worth noting.
THE NEIGHBORHOOD AS A CONTEXT FOR INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR
It was noted earlier in this paper that the classic criminological theorists recognized the necessity of linking individual and group-level dynamics into a single “grand” theory. Yet historically, as also noted, research has been char- acterized by a shifting emphasis on only one of these dynamics. One of the most exciting developments in social disorganization research has been the appearance of efforts to achieve the linkage of these two traditions (Reiss, 1986). Stark (1987), for example, has presented a series of theoretically derived propositions that can easily form the basis of a research agenda aimed at understanding the effects of neighborhood contexts on motivational processes that may lead to the commission of a delinquent or criminal act. Unfortunately, since such study designs require extensive data at both the individual and community level, they are not yet common. Two basic approaches to the contextual-effects issue have emerged, however.
The first approach integrates individual-level official records with aggregate statistics pertaining to the community or residence (see Bursik, 1983; Gottf- redson and Taylor, 1983). Since the existence of such an individual record indicates that some official court or police action has taken place in response to that person’s illegal behavior, these studies have primarily focused on the likelihood of recidivism within particular neighborhood contexts. Bursik (1983), for example, examines variations in the effectiveness of juvenile court sanctions that are associated with the crime-related characteristics of a youth’s community. He finds that the effect of these sanctions on recidivism is not consistent across communities: it differs according to the rate of crime in the area and the likelihood that illegal behavior in that community receives official handling by the police and courts.
Gottfredson and Taylor (1983, 1986) have examined the effects of more general aspects of the community on the likelihood of arrest after release from prison. They present evidence that the neighborhood context not only has a significant effect on the likelihood of recidivism (1986: 151-152), but it
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also has an additional effect through an interaction with individual character- istics. Those offenders with an extensive past history of criminal involve- ment, for example, were more likely to be rearrested if released from prison into socially disorganized neighborhoods.
The second solution to the design of such contextual analyses does not restrict itself to the use of official records in its characterization of the individ- ual; although such information may be used, it is supplemented by other data collected through self-reported techniques. This added source of information significantly increases the power of such studies. Not only does it broaden the types of problematic behavior that can be examined, but it also increases the types of social data that can be collected pertaining to individual processes.
Although the costs of such an approach are generally large, several impor- tant studies have appeared. Johnstone (1978) has examined the degree to which the economic structure of a youth’s community affects the relationship between family socioeconomic status and delinquency; he found that low- status youths tend to be more delinquent if their families live in relatively affluent communities rather than poor ones. The work of Shannon (1982, 1984) is even more ambitious, for he collected longitudinal data from three birth cohorts and examined how neighborhood dynamics shaped the nature of individual careers in delinquency. Although he found a significant degree of variation in typical career patterns among different communities, those patterns were not consistently related to the structure and organization of the neighborhood.
A more recent contextual analysis within the framework of social disorgan- ization appears in the Simcha-Fagan and Schwartz (1986) article discussed earlier in this paper. Recall that they collected extensive information con- cerning the formal and informal networks of control within a set of neighbor- hoods in New York City. Not only do many of the various dimensions of the neighborhood context continue to have significant effects on the rate of delin- quency after controlling for individual characteristics, but Simcha-Fagan and Schwartz also provide evidence of important indirect effects.
To date, such contextual research has appeared rarely in the literature, and much of it has an admittedly exploratory quality. Only the Simcha-Fagan and Schwartz piece tests an explicitly developed theory of the contextual effects of social disorganization. Such studies, however, provide a clear indi- cation of the role that social disorganization can play in the development of a “full” criminology. The continuation of such research is essential to the vital- ity of the ecological approach.
SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION 541
SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION AND VICTIMIZATION
Reiss (1986) has argued that one of the clearest areas in which the individ- ual and community traditions in criminology can be linked is in the area of victimology. At first glance, this may seem to be an unusual extension of social disorganization, which has almost without exception focused on the group regulation of offending behavior. The formal and informal dynamics of social control that have been discussed throughout this paper, however, are very similar to the notion of guardianship developed by Felson and Cohen (1980) within their “routine activities” approach. If, as they argue, the spa- tial structure of a city partially determines the rate at which motivated offenders meet criminal opportunities, then the degree to which a local com- munity is disorganized should be reflected in its ability to supervise the inter- action of potential offenders and opportunities and, therefore, affect the rate of victimization. This is the approach to victimization taken by Sampson in a recent pair of papers (1985, 1986). As he argues, areas with high levels of organization are able to take note of or question strangers, watch over prop- erty, supervise youth activities, and intervene in local disturbances.
Unfortunately, although the theoretical connection is fairly straightfor- ward, victimization data at the local community level are extremely limited. The sampling design of the National Crime Survey (NCS), for example, does not warrant the analysis of victimization rates in such small geographic units. Sampson has attempted to overcome this limitation by cleverly aggregating the NCS data into pseudoneighborhoods with similar ecological characteris- tics (1985, 1986). Although his analysis indicates that proxy measures of social disorganization are related to the victimization rates in such groupings, the aggregation makes it impossible to examine the full dynamic implications of the disorganization model.
An important exception to the general lack of suitable alternatives to the NCS data can be found in the recent work of Smith and Jarjoura (1988). The data set used in that analysis, reflecting the patterns of victimization in 57 neighborhoods, has two great advantages over the traditional NCS victimiza- tion data.10 First, the sampling design enables robust estimates of neighbor- hood-level effects. Second, Smith and Jajoura are able to distinguish between all acts of victimization and those that occur within the boundaries of the local community. This second group of victimizations is the one most pertinent to the notion of community guardianship and social control.
Smith and Jarjoura use these data to examine the main and conditional effects of poverty, residential mobility, and heterogeneity (as well as several other structural variables) on rates on victimization in the 57 neighborhoods.
10. This is the same data set analyzed in Smith (1986).
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Their findings are very consistent with the predictions of social disorganiza- tion for burglary victimizations, but for violent crimes they find that the effect of residential mobility depends on the level of poverty in a neighborhood. This leads them to conclude that a community’s capacity for social control “must be viewed in relation to other community characteristics that can facil- itate criminal activity” (p. 46).
The social disorganization-based approaches of Sampson and Smith and Jarjoura represent important extensions of our understanding of victimiza- tion. In addition, such work has the exciting potential to integrate fully two perspectives (social disorganization and opportunity theories) that have been traditionally seen as competing, alternative explanations of the spatial distri- bution of crime and delinquency. The continuation of this work in the area of victimology will be an important component of future research in the area of social disorganization.
THE NONRECURSIVE ASPECTS OF THE SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION MODEL
The research discussed in this paper has generally focused on the extent to which rates of crime and delinquency depend on the ability of local communi- ties to regulate themselves. It may be, however, that most models of social disorganization are substantively incomplete by failing to consider the degree to which rates of crime and delinquency may also affect a community’s capac- ity for social control.
The rationale for the consideration of a reciprocal relationship between crime and social disorganization has been most thoroughly developed by Sko- gan (1986) in his discussion of neighborhood feedback loops. As Skogan argues, the level of crime in a neighborhood has a marked (although imper- fect) effect on the fear of crime experienced by the residents of that area. High levels of fear, in turn, may result in the following:
1. Physical and psychological withdrawal from community life. 2. A weakening of the informal social control processes that inhibit
crime and disorder. 3. A decline in the organizational life and mobilization capacity of the
neighborhood. 4. Deteriorating business conditions. 5 . The importation and domestic production of delinquency and
deviance. 6. Further dramatic changes in the composition of the population.
In turn, these conditions can increase the existing level of crime. Such nonrecursive implications of the social disorganization model have
not been completely ignored in the literature. Shannon (1982), for example,
SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION 543
investigated the possibility that delinquency rates have an effect on the com- position of a neighborhood. Although he concludes that such effects are “not only weak, but inconsistent over time” (p. 25), it is not clear how well his findings from Racine can be generalized to other areas. In fact, other evi- dence exists in support of the nonrecursive nature of the social disorganiza- tion model. For example, Bursik (1986b) found that the rate of increase in the nonwhite population in Chicago’s local communities between 1960 and 1970 was significantly related to simultaneous increases in the delinquency rate. The magnitude of the effect of racial change on delinquency change, however, was not nearly so great as that for the effect of changes in delin- quency rates on concurrent changes in the racial composition of an area. Such findings suggest that a large part of the traditionally high association between race and crime may reflect processes of minority groups being stranded in high-crime communities from which they cannot afford to leave. Schuerman and Kobrin (1986) also provide evidence in support of the nonrecursive nature of the social disorganization model in their study of Los Angeles between 1950 and 1970. On the basis of cross-lagged correlation and regression analyses, they concluded that increases in the crime rate are fol- lowed by shifts (in turn) in local land uses, population and socioeconomic composition, and normative structures.
Given the very few nonrecursive models that have examined the social dis- organization perspective, such results should be accepted only tentatively. A great deal of work must be done concerning the identification of these models, appropriate methods of estimation, the selection of instrumental variables, and so forth. But they do represent the source of potentially important revi- sions of the social disorganization models in the future.
CONCLUSION
This paper has addressed some serious criticisms that have been leveled at social disorganization models of crime and delinquency. The framework is currently undergoing a significant reformulation from that presented by Shaw and McKay and many problems remain to be resolved. Yet, the findings that are emerging from this work are sufficiently relevant to the current issues facing criminology to ensure a revived appreciation of the model within the discipline.
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Smith, Douglas A. and G. Roger Jaqoura 1988
Snodgrass, Jon 1976
Spergel, Irving A. and John Korbelik 1979
Stark, Rodney 1987 Deviant places: A theory of the ecology of crime. Criminology 25: 893-909.
Principles of Criminology. 5th ed. New York: Lippincott.
Suttles, Gerald D. The Social Construction of Communities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sutherland, Edwin H. and Donald R. Cressey 1955
1972
Taylor, Ralph B. and Jeanette Covington 1987 Gentrification and crime in Baltimore neighborhoods. Unpublished final
report. Department of Criminal Justice, Temple University, Philadelphia.
SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION 55 1
Thomas, William I. and Florian Znaniecki 1920 The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. Volume IV. Boston: Gorham
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Tittle, Charles R. 1927 The Gang. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1983 Social class and criminal behavior: A critique of the theoretical foundation. Social Forces 62: 334-358.
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Unnever, James D. 1987
1982
Robert J. Bursik, Jr. is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Oklahoma. He and Harold Grasmick are currently involved in a longitudinal study of neighborhood crime rates in Oklahoma City.
10 paged paper instructions/reading1.pdf
FOUNDATION FOR A GENERAL STRAIN THEORY OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY*
ROBERT AGNEW Emory University
This paper presents a general strain theory of crime and delinquency that is capable of overcoming the criticisms of previous strain theories. In the first section, strain theory is distinguished from social control and dif- ferential association/social learning theory. In the second section, the three major types of strain are described: (1) strain as the actual or antici- pated failure to achieve positively valued goals, (2) strain as the actual or anticipated removal of positively valued stimuli, and (3) strain as the actual or anticipated presentation of negatively valued stimuli. In the third section, guidelines for the measurement of strain are presented. And in the fourth section, the major adaptations to strain are described, and thcwe factors influencing the choice of delinquent versus nondelinquent adaptations are discussed.
After dominating deviance research in the 196Os, strain theory came under heavy attack in the 1970s (Bernard, 1984; Cole, 1975), with several promi- nent researchers suggesting that the theory be abandoned (Hirschi, 1969; Kornhauser, 1978). Strain theory has survived those attacks, but its influence is much diminished (see Agnew, 1985a; Bernard, 1984; Farnworth and Lei- ber, 1989). In particular, variables derived from strain theory now play a very limited role in explanations of crime/delinquency. Several recent causal models of delinquency, in fact, either entirely exchde strain variables or assign them a small role (e.g., Elliott et al., 1985; Johnson, 1979; Massey and Krohn, 1986; Thornberry, 1987; Tonry et al., 1991). Causal models of crime/delinquency are dominated, instead, by variables derived from differ- ential association/social learning theory and social control theory.
This paper argues that strain theory has a central role to play in explana- tions of crime/delinquency, but that the theory has to be substantially revised to play this role. Most empirical studies of strain theory continue to rely on the strain models developed by Merton (1938), A. Cohen (1955), and Cloward and Ohlin (1960). In recent years, however, a wealth of research in several fields has questioned certain of the assumptions underlying those the- ories and pointed to new directions for the development of strain theory. Most notable in this area is the research on stress in medical sociology and psychology, on equity/justice in social psychology, and on aggression in psy- chology-particularly recent versions of frustration-aggression and social
* I would like to thank Helene Raskin I’’hite and Karen Hegtvedt for their comments.
CRIMINOLOGY VOLUME 30 NUMBER 1 1992 47
48 AGNEW
learning theory. Also important is recent research in such areas as the legiti- mation of stratification, the sociology of emotions, and the urban underclass. Certain researchers have drawn on segments of the above research to suggest new directions for strain theory (Agnew, 1985a; Bernard, 1987; Elliott et al., 1979; Greenberg, 1977), but the revisions suggested have not taken full advantage of this research and, at best, provide only incomplete models of strain and delinquency. (Note that most of the theoretical and empirical work on strain theory has focused on delinquency.) This paper draws on the above literatures, as well as the recent revisions in strain theory, to present the outlines of a general strain theory of crime/delinquency.
The theory is written at the social-psychological level: It focuses on the individual and his or her immediate social environment-although the macroimplications of the theory are explored at various points. The theory is also written with the empirical researcher in mind, and guidelines for testing the theory in adolescent populations are provided. The focus is on adoles- cents because most currently available data sets capable of testing the theory involve surveys of adolescents. This general theory, it will be argued, is capa- ble of overcoming the theoretical and empirical criticisms of previous strain theories and of complementing the crime/delinquency theories that currently dominate the field.
The paper is in four sections. In the first section, there is a brief discussion of the fundamental traits that distinguish strain theory from the other two dominant theories of delinquency: social control and differential association/ social learning theory (in the interest of brevity, the term delinquency is used rather than crime and delinquency). In the second section, the three major sources of strain are described. In the third section, guidelines for the mea- surement of strain are provided. And in the final section, the major adapta- tions to strain are listed and the factors influencing the choice of delinquent versus nondelinquent adaptations are discussed.
STRAIN THEORY AS DISTINGUISHED FROM CONTROL AND DIFFERENTIAL
ASSOCIATION/SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY
Strain, social control, and differential association theory are all sociological theories: They explain delinquency in terms of the individual’s social rela- tionships. Strain theory is distinguished from social control and social learn- ing theory in its specification of (1) the type of social relationship that leads to delinquency and (2) the motivation for delinquency. First, strain theory focuses explicitly on negative relationships with others: relationships in which the individual is not treated as he or she wants to be treated. Strain theory has typically focused on relationships in which others prevent the individual
A GENERAL STRAIN THEORY 49
from achieving positively valued goals. Agnew (1 985a), however, broadened the focus of strain theory to include relationships in which others present the individual with noxious or negative stimuli. Social control theory, by con- trast, focuses on the absence of significant relationships with conventional others and institutions. In particular, delinquency is most likely when (1) the adolescent is not attached to parents, school, or other institutions; (2) parents and others fail to monitor and effectively sanction deviance; (3) the adoles- cent’s actual or anticipated investment in conventional society is minimal; and (4) the adolescent has not internalized conventional beliefs. Social learn- ing theory is distinguished from strain and control theory by its focus on positive relationships with deviant others. In particular, delinquency results from association with others who (1) differentially reinforce the adolescent’s delinquency, (2) model delinquent behavior, and/or (3) transmit delinquent values.
Second, strain theory argues that adolescents are pressured into delinquency by the negative afective states-most notably anger and related emotions- that often result from negative relationships (see Kemper, 1978, and Morgan and Heise, 1988, for typologies of negative affective states). This negative affect creates pressure for corrective action and may lead adolescents to (1) make use of illegitimate channels of goal achievement, (2) attack or escape from the source of their adversity, and/or (3) manage their negative affect through the use of illicit drugs. Control theory, by contrast, denies that outside forces pressure the adolescent into delinquency. Rather, the absence of significant relationships with other individuals and groups frees the adoles- cent to engage in delinquency. The freed adolescent either drifts into delin- quency or, in some versions of control theory, turns to delinquency in response to inner forces or situational inducements (see Hirschi, 1969:3 1-34). In differential association/social learning theory, the adolescent commits delinquent acts because group forces lead the adolescent to view delinquency as a desirable or at least justifable form of behavior under certain circumstances.
Strain theory, then, is distinguished by its focus on negative relationships with others and its insistence that such relationships lead to delinquency through the negative affect-specially anger-they sometimes engender. Both dimensions are necessary to differentiate strain theory from control and differential association/social learning theory. In particular, social control and social learning theory sometimes examine negative relationships- although such relationships are not an explicit focus of these theories. Con- trol theory, however, would argue that negative relationships lead to delin- quency not because they cause negative affect, but because they lead to a reduction in social control. A control theorist, for example, would argue that physical abuse by parents leads to delinquency because it reduces attachment to parents and the effectiveness of parents as socializing agents. Likewise,
50 AGNEW
differential associatiodsocial learning theorists sometimes examine negative relationships-even though theorists in this tradition emphasize that imita- tion, reinforcement, and the internalization of values are less likely in nega- tive relationships. Social learning theorists, however, would argue that negative relationships-such as those involving physically abusive parents- lead to delinquency by providing models for imitation and implicitly teaching the child that violence and other forms of deviance are acceptable behavior.
Phrased in the above manner, it is easy to see that strain theory comple- ments the other major theories of delinquency in a fundamental way. While these other theories focus on the absence of relationships or on positive rela- tionships, strain theory is the only theory to focus explicitly on negative rela- tionships. And while these other theories view delinquency as the result of drift or of desire, strain theory views it as the result of pressure.
THE MAJOR TYPES OF STRAIN
Negative relationships with others are, quite simply, relationships in which others are not treating the individual as he or she would like to be treated. The classic strain theories of Merton (1938), A. Cohen (1955), and Cloward and Ohlin (1960) focus on only one type of negative relationship: relation- ships in which others prevent the individual from achieving positively valued goals. In particular, they focus on the goal blockage experienced by lower- class individuals trying to achieve monetary success or middle-class status. More recent versions of strain theory have argued that adolescents are not only concerned about the future goals of monetary success/middle-class sta- tus, but are also concerned about the achievement of more immediate goals- such as good grades, popularity with the opposite sex, and doing well in ath- letics (Agnew, 1984; Elliott and Voss, 1974; Elliott et al., 1985; Empey, 1982; Greenberg, 1977; Quicker, 1974). The focus, however, is still on the achieve- ment of positively valued goals. Most recently, Agnew (1985a) has argued that strain may result not only from the failure to achieve positively valued goals, but also from the inability to escape legally from painful situations. If one draws on the above theories-as well as the stress, equity/justice, and aggression literatures-one can begin to develop a more complete classifica- tion of the types of strain.
Three major types of strain are described-ch refemng to a different type of negative relationship with others. Other individuals may (1) prevent one from achieving positively valued goals, (2) remove or threaten to remove pos- itively valued stimuli that one possesses, or (3) present or threaten to present one with noxious or negatively valued stimuli. These categories of strain are presented as ideal types. There is no expectation, for example, that a factor analysis of strainful events will reproduce these categories. These categories,
A GENERAL STRAIN THEORY 51
rather, are presented so as to ensure that the full range of strainful events are considered in empirical research.
STRAIN AS THE FAILURE TO ACHIEVE POSITIVELY VALUED GOALS
At least three types of strain fall under this category. The first type encom- passes most of the major strain theories in criminology, including the classic strain theories of Merton, A. Cohen, and Cloward and Ohlin, as well as those modem strain theories focusing on the achievement of immediate goals. The other two types of strain in this category are derived from the justicdequity literature and have not been examined in criminology.
STRAIN AS THE DISJUNCTION BETWEEN ASPIRATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS/ACTUAL ACHIEVEMENTS
The classic strain theories of Merton, A. Cohen, and Cloward and Ohlin argue that the cultural system encourages everyone to pursue the ideal goals of monetary success and/or middle-class status. Lower-class individuals, however, are often prevented from achieving such goals through legitimate channels. In line with such theories, adolescent strain is typically measured in terms of the disjunction between aspirations (or ideal goals) and expecta- tions (or expected levels of goal achievement). These theories, however, have been criticized for several reasons (see Agnew, 1986, 1991b; Chard, 1964; Hirschi, 1969; Kornhauser, 1978; Liska, 1987; also see Bernard, 1984; Farnworth and Leiber, 1989). Among other things, it has been charged that these theories (1) are unable to explain the extensive nature of middle-class delinquency, (2) neglect goals other than monetary success/middle-class sta- tus, (3) neglect barriers to goal achievement other than social class, and (4) do not fully specify why only some strained individuals turn to delinquency. The most damaging criticism, however, stems from the limited empirical support provided by studies focusing on the disjunction between aspirations and expectations (see Kornhauser, 1978, as well the arguments of Bernard, 1984; Elliott et al., 1985; and Jensen, 1986).
As a consequence of these criticisms, several researchers have revised the above theories. The most popular revision argues that there is a youth sub- culture that emphasizes a variety of immediate goals. The achievement of these goals is further said to depend on a variety of factors besides social class: factors such as intelligence, physical attractiveness, personality, and athletic ability. As a result, many middle-class individuals find that they lack the traits or skills necessary to achieve their goals through legitimate chan- nels. This version of strain theory, however, continues to argue that strain stems from the inability to achieve certain ideal goals emphasized by the (sub)cultural system. As a consequence, strain continues to be measured in
52 AGNEW
terms of the disjunction between aspirations and actual achievements (since we are dealing with immediate rather than future goals, actual achievements rather than expected achievements may be examined).
It should be noted that empirical support for this revised version of strain theory is also weak (see Agnew, 1991b, for a summary). At a later point, several possible reasons for the weak empirical support of strain theories focusing on the disjunction between aspirations and expectations/achieve- ments will be discussed. For now, the focus is on classifying the major types of strain.
STRAIN AS THE DISJUNCTION BETWEEN EXPECTATIONS AND ACTUAL ACHIEVEMENTS
As indicated above, strain theories in criminology focus on the inability to achieve ideal goals derived from the cultural system. This approach stands in contrast to certain of the research on justice in social psychology. Here the focus is on the disjunction between expectations and actual achievements (rewards), and it is commonly argued that such expectations are existentially based. In particular, it has been argued that such expectations derive from the individual’s past experience and/or from comparisons with referential (or generalized) others who are similar to the individual (see Berger et al., 1972, 1983; Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961; Jasso and Rossi, 1977; Mickelson, 1990 Ross et al., 1971; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). Much of the research in this area has focused on income expectations, although the above theories apply to expectations regarding all manner of positive stimuli. The justice literature argues that the failure to achieve such expectations may lead to such emo- tions as anger, resentment, rage, dissatisfaction, disappointment, and unhap- piness-that is, all the emotions customarily associated with strain in criminology. Further, it is argued that individuals will be strongly motivated to reduce the gap between expectations and achievements-with deviance being commonly mentioned as one possible option. This literature has not devoted much empirical research to deviance, although limited data suggest that the expectations-achievement gap is related to anger/hostility (Ross et al, 1971).
This alternative conception of strain has been largely neglected in criminol- ogy. This is unfortunate because it has the potential to overcome certain of the problems of current strain theories. First, one would expect the disjunc- tion between expectations and actual achievements to be more emotionally distressing than that between aspirations and achievements. Aspirations, by definition, are ideal goals. They have something of the utopian in them, and for that reason, the failure to achieve aspirations may not be taken seriously. The failure to achieve expected goals, however, is likely to be taken seriously since such goals are rooted in reality-the individual has previously exper- ienced such goals or has seen similar others experience such goals. Second,
A GENERAL STRAIN THEORY 53
this alternative conception of strain assigns a central role to the social com- parison process. As A. Cohen (1965) argued in a follow-up to his strain the- ory, the neglect of social comparison is a major shortcoming of strain theory. The above theories describe one way in which social comparison is important: Social comparison plays a central role in the formation of individual goals (expectations in this case; also see Suls, 1977). Third, the assumption that goals are culturally based has sometimes proved problematic for strain theory (see Kornhauser, 1978). Among other things, it makes it difficult to integrate strain theory with social control and cultural deviance theory (see Hirschi, 1979). These latter theories assume that the individual is weakly tied to the cultural system or tied to alternative/oppositional subcultures. The argu- ment that goals are existentially based, however, paves the way for integra- tions involving strain theory. 1
STRAIN AS THE DISJUNCTION BETWEEN JUSTIFAIR OUTCOMFS AND ACTUAL OUTCOMES
The above models of strain assume that individual goals focus on the achievement of specific outcomes. Individual goals, for example, focus on the achievement of a certain amount of money or a certain grade-point average. A third conception of strain, also derived from the justice/equity literature, makes a rather different argument. It claims that individuals do not necessar- ily enter interactions with specific outcomes in mind. Rather, they enter interactions expecting that certain distributive justice rules will be followed, rules specifying how resources should be allocated. The rule that has received the most attention in the literature is that of equity. An equitable relationship is one in which the outcome/input ratios of the actors involved in an exchange/allocation relationship are equivalent (see Adams, 1963, 1965; Cook and Hegtvedt, 1983; Walster et al., 1978). Outcomes encompass a broad range of positive and negative consequences, while inputs encompass the individual's positive and negative contributions to the exchange. Individ- uals in a relationship will compare the ratio of their outcomes and inputs to the ratio@) of specific others in the relationship. If the ratios are equal to one another, they feel that the outcomes are fair or just. This is true, according to equity theorists, even if the outcomes are low. If outcome/input ratios are
1. One need not assume that expectations are existentially based; they may derive from the cultural system as well. Likewise, one need not assume that aspirations derive from the cultural system. The focus in this paper is on types of strain rather than sources of strain, although a consideration of sources is crucial when the macroimplications of the theory are developed. Additional information on the sources of positively valued goals- including aspirations and expectations-can be found in Alves and Rossi, 1978; Cook and Messick, 1983; Hochschild, 1981; Jasso and Rossi, 1977; Martin and Murray, 1983; Mes- sick and Sentis, 1983; Mickelson, 1990; and Shepelak and Alwin, 1986.
54 AGNEW
not equal, actors will feel that the outcomes are unjust and they will experi- ence distress as a result. Such distress is especially likely when individuals feel they have been underrewarded rather than overrewarded (Hegtvedt, 1990).
The equity literature has described the possible reactions to this distress, some of which involve deviance (see Adams, 1963, 1965; Austin, 1977; Wal- ster et al., 1973, 1978; see Stephenson and White, 1968, for an attempt to recast A. Cohen’s strain theory in terms of equity theory). In particular, inequity may lead to delinquency for several reasons-all having to do with the restoration of equity. Individuals in inequitable relationships may engage in delinquency in order to (1) increase their outcomes (e.g., by theft); (2) lower their inputs (e.g., truancy from school); (3) lower the outcomes of others (e.g., vandalism, theft, assault); and/or (4) increase the inputs of others (e.g., by being incorrigible or disorderly). In highly inequitable situations, individuals may leave the field (e.g., run away from home) or force others to leave the field.* There has not been any empirical research on the relation- ship between equity and delinquency, although much data suggest that ineq- uity leads to anger and frustration. A few studies also suggest that insulting and vengeful behaviors may result from inequity (see Cook and Hegtvedt, 1991; Donnerstein and Hatfield, 1982; Hegtvedt, 1990; Mikula, 1986; Sprecher, 1986; Walster et al., 1973, 1978).
It is not difficult to measure equity. Walster et al. (1978:23&242) provide the most complete guide to measurement.3 Sprecher (1986) illustrates how
2. Theorists have recently argued that efforts to restore equity need not involve the specific others in the inequitable relationship. If one cannot restore equity with such spe- cific others, there may be an effort to restore “equity with the world” (Austin, 1977; Ste- phenson and White, 1968; Walster et al., 1978). That is, individuals who feel they have been inequitably treated may try to restore equity in the context of a totally different rela- tionship. The adolescent who is inequitably treated by parents, for example, may respond by inequitably treating peers. The concept of “equity with the world” has not been the subject of much empirical research, but it is intriguing because it provides a novel explana- tion for displayed aggression. It has also been argued that individuals may be distressed not only by their own inequitable treatment, but also by the inequitable treatment of others (see Crosby and Gonzalez-Intal, 1984; Walster et al., 1978.) We may have, then, a sort of vicarious strain, a type little investigated in the literature.
The equity literature has been criticized on a number of points, the most promi- nent being that there are a variety of distribution rules besides equity-such as equality and need (Deutsch, 1975; Folger, 1984; Mikula, 1980; Schwinger, 1980; Utne and Kidd, 1980). Much recent research has focused on the factors that determine the preference for one rule over another (Alves and Rossi, 1978; Cook and Hegtvedt, 1983; Deutsch, 1975; Hegtvedt, 1987, 1991a; Hochschild, 1981; Lerner, 1977; Leventhal, 1976; Leventhal et al., 1980; Schwinger, 1980; Walster et al., 1978). Also, the equity literature argues that individuals compare themselves with similar others with whom they are involved in exchange/alloca- tion relations. However, it has been argued that individuals sometimes compare themselves with dissimilar others, make referential (generalized) rather than local (specific) compari- sons, make internal rather than external comparisons, make group-to-group comparisons,
3.
A GENERAL STRAIN THEORY 55
equity may be measured in social surveys; respondents are asked who contrib- utes more to a particular relationship and/or who “gets the best deal” out of a relationship. A still simpler strategy might be to ask respondents how fair or just their interactions with others, such as parents or teachers, are. One would then predict that those involved in unfair relations will be more likely to engage in current and future delinquency.
The literature on equity builds on the strain theory literature in criminol- ogy in several ways. First, all of the strain literature assumes that individuals are pursuing some specific outcome, such as a certain amount of money or prestige. The equity literature points out that individuals do not necessarily enter into interactions with specific outcomes in mind, but rather with the expectation that a particular distributive justice rule will be followed. Their goal is that the interaction conform to the justice principle. This perspective, then, points to a new source of strain not considered in the criminology litera- ture. Second, the strain literature in criminology focuses largely on the indi- vidual‘s outcomes. Individuals are assumed to be pursuing a specific goal, and strain is judged in terms of the disjuntion between the goal and the actual outcome. The equity literature suggests that this may be an oversimplified conception and that the individual’s inputs may also have to be considered. In particular, an equity theorist would argue that inputs will condition the individual’s evaluation of outcomes. That is, individuals who view their inputs as limited will be more likely to accept limited outcomes as fair. Third, the equity literature also highlights the importance of the social com- parison process. In particular, the equity literature stresses that one’s evalua- tion of outcomes is at least partly a function of the outcomes (and inputs) of
. those with whom one is involved in exchange/allocation relations. A given outcome, then, may be evaluated as fair or unfair depending on the outcomes (and inputs) of others in the exchange/allocation relation.
or avoid social comparison altogether (see Berger et al., 1972; Hegtvedt, 1991b; Martin and Murray, 1983; see Hegtvedt, 1991b, and Suls and Wills, 1991, for a discussion of the factors affecting the choice of comparison objects). Finally, even if one knows what distribution rule individuals prefer and the types of social comparisons they make, it is still difficult to predict whether they will evaluate their interactions as equitable. Except in unambiguous situations of the type created in experiments, it is hard to predict what inputs and outcomes individuals will define as relevant, how they will weight those inputs and outcomes, and how they will evaluate themselves and others on those inputs and outcomes (Austin, 1977; Hegtvedt, 1991a; Messick and Sentis, 1979, 1983; Walster et al., 1973, 1978). Fortunately, however, the above three problems do not prohibit strain theory from taking advantage of certain of the insights from equity theory. While it is difficult to predict whether individu- als will define their relationships as equitable, it is relatively easy to measure equity after the fact.
56 AGNEW
SUMMARY: STRAIN AS THE FAILURE TO ACHIEVE POSITIVELY VALUED GOALS
Three types of strain in this category have been listed: strain as the dis- junction between (1) aspirations and expectations/actual achievements, (2) expectations and actual achievements, and (3) just/fair outcomes and actual outcomes. Strain theory in criminology has focused on the first type of strain, arguing that it is most responsible for the delinquency in our society. Major research traditions in the justice/equity field, however, argue that anger and frustration derive primarily from the second two types of strain. To complicate matters further, one can list still additional types of strain in this category. Certain of the literature, for example, has talked of the disjunc- tion between “satisfying outcomes” and reality, between “deserved” out- comes and reality, and between “tolerance levels” or minimally acceptable outcomes and reality. No study has examined all of these types of goals, but taken as a whole the data do suggest that there are often differences among aspirations (ideal outcomes), expectations (expected outcomes), “satisfying” outcomes, “deserved” outcomes, fair or just outcomes, and tolerance levels (Della Fave, 1974; Della Fave and Klobus, 1976; Martin, 1986; Martin and Murray, 1983; Messick and Sentis, 1983; Shepelak and Alwin, 1986). This paper has focused on the three types of strain listed above largely because they dominate the current literature.4
Given these multiple sources of strain, one might ask which is the most relevant to the explanation of delinquency. This is a difficult question to answer given current research. The most fruitful strategy at the present time may be to assume that all of the above sources are relevant-that there are several sources of frustration. Alwin (1987), Austin (1977), Crosby and Gon- zalez-Intal (1984), Hegtvedt (1991b), Messick and Sentis (1983), and Torn- blum (1977) all argue or imply that people often employ a variety of standards to evaluate their situation. Strain theorists, then, might be best advised to employ measures that tap all of the above types of strain. One might, for example, focus on a broad range of positively valued goals and, for each goal, ask adolescents whether they are achieving their ideal outcomes (aspirations), expected outcomes, and just/fair outcomes. One would expect strain to be greatest when several standards were not being met, with perhaps greatest weight being given to expectations and just/fair outcomes.5
4. To add a still further complication, it has been suggested that anger may result from the violation of procedural as well as distributive justice rules (Folger, 1984, 1986; Lind and Tyler, 1988). Procedural justice does not focus on the fairness of outcomes, but rather on the fairness of the procedures by which individuals decide how to distribute resources. A central issue in procedural justice is whether all individuals have a “voice” in deciding how resources will be distributed. One might, then, ask adolescents about the fairness of the procedures used by parents, teachers, and others to make rules.
This strategy assumes that all standards are relevant in a given situation, which 5 .
A GENERAL STRAIN THEORY 57
STRAIN AS THE REMOVAL OF POSITIVELY VALUED STIMULI FROM THE INDIVIDUAL
The psychological literature on aggression and the stress literature suggest that strain may involve more than the pursuit of positively valued goals. Cer- tain of the aggression literature, in fact, has come to de-emphasize the pursuit of positively valued goals, pointing out that the blockage of goal-seeking behavior is a relatively weak predictor of aggression, particularly when the goal has never been experienced before (Bandura, 1973; Zillman, 1979). The stress literature has largely neglected the pursuit of positively valued goals as a source of stress. Rather, if one looks at the stressful life events examined in this literature, one finds a focus on (1) events involving the loss of positively valued stimuli and (2) events involving the presentation of noxious or nega- tive stimuli (see Pearlin, 1983, for other typologies of stressful life events/ conditions).6 So, for example, one recent study of adolescent stress employs a life-events list that focuses on such items as the loss of a boyfriend/girlfriend, the death or serious illness of a friend, moving to a new school district, the divorce/separation of one’s parents, suspension from school, and the presence of a variety of adverse conditions at work (see Williams and Uchiyama, 1989, for an overview of life-events scales for adolescents; see Compas, 1987, and Compas and Phares, 1991, for overviews of research on adolescent stress).’
Drawing on the stress literature, then, one may state that a second type of strain or negative relationship involves the actual or anticipated removal (loss) of positively valued stimuli from the individual. As indicated above, numerous examples of such loss can be found in the inventories of stressful life events. The actual or anticipated loss of positively valued stimuli may lead to delinquency as the individual tries to prevent the loss of the positive stimuli, retrieve the lost stimuli or obtain substitute stimuli, seek revenge
may not always be the case. In certain situations, for example, one may make local com- parisons but not referential comparisons (see Brickman and Bulman, 1977; Crosby and Gonzales-Intal, 1984). In other situations, social comparison processes may not come into play at all; outcomes may be evaluated in terms of culturally derived standards (see Folger, 1986).
6. The stress literature has also focused on positive events, based on the assumption that such events might lead to stress by overloading the individual. Accumulating evi- dence, however, suggests that it is only undesirable events that lead to negative outcomes such as depression (e.g., Gersten et al., 1974; Kaplan et al., 1983; Pearlin et al., 1981; Thoits, 1983).
Certain individuals have criticized the stress literature for neglecting the failure of individuals to achieve positively valued goals. In particular, it has been charged that the stress literature has neglected “nonevents,” or events that are desired or anticipated but do not occur (Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend, 1974; Thoits, 1983). One major distinction between the strain literature in criminology and the stress literature in medical sociology, in fact, is that the former has focused on “nonevents” while the latter has focused on “events.”
7.
58 AGNEW
against those responsible for the loss, or manage the negative affect caused by the loss by taking illicit drugs. While there are no data bearing directly on this type of strain, experimental data indicate that aggression often occurs when positive reinforcement previously administered to an individual is with- held or reduced (Bandura, 1973; Van Houten, 1983). And as discussed below, inventories of stressful life events, which include the loss of positive stimuli, are related to delinquency.
STRAIN AS THE PRESENTATION OF NEGATIVE STIMULI
The literature on stress and the recent psychological literature on aggres- sion also focus on the actual or anticipated presentation of negative or nox- ious stimuli.* Except for the work of Agnew (1985a), however, this category of strain has been neglected in criminology. And even Agnew does not focus on the presentation of noxious stimuli per se, but on the inability of adoles- cents to escape legally from noxious stimuli. Much data, however, suggest that the presentation of noxious stimuli may lead to aggression and other negative outcomes in certain conditions, even when legal escape from such stimuli is possible (Bandura, 1973; Zillman, 1979). Noxious stimuli may lead to delinquency as the adolescent tries to (1) escape from or avoid the negative stimuli; (2) terminate or alleviate the negative stimuli; (3) seek revenge against the source of the negative stimuli or related targets, although the evi- dence on displaced aggression is somewhat mixed (see Berkowitz, 1982; Ber- nard, 1990; Van Houten, 1983; Zillman, 1979); and/or (4) manage the resultant negative affect by taking illicit drugs.
A wide range of noxious stimuli have been examined in the literature, and experimental, survey, and participant observation studies have linked such stimuli to both general and specific measures of delinquency-with the exper- imental studies focusing on aggression. Delinquency/aggression, in particu- lar, has been linked to such noxious stimuli as child abuse and neglect (Rivera and Widom, 1990), criminal victimization (Lauritsen et al., 1991), physical punishment (Straus, 199 l), negative relations with parents (Healy and Bon- ner, 1969), negative relations with peers (Short and Strodtbeck, 1965), adverse or negative school experiences (Hawkins and Lishner, 1987), a wide range of stressful life events (Gersten et al., 1974; Kaplan et al., 1983; Linsky
8. Some researchers have argued that it is often difficult to distinguish the presenta- tion of negative stimuli from the removal of positive stimuli (Michael, 1973; Van Houten, 1983; Zillman, 1979). Suppose, for example, that an adolescent argues with parents. Does this represent the presentation of negative stimuli, (the arguing) or the removal of positive stimuli (harmonious relations with one’s parents)? The point is a valid one, yet the distinc- tion between the two types of strain still seems useful since it helps ensure that all major types of strain are considered by researchers.
A GENERAL STRAIN THEORY 59
and Straus, 1986; Mawson, 1987; Novy and Donohue, 1985; Vaux and Rug- giero, 1983), verbal threats and insults, physical pain, unpleasant odors, dis- gusting scenes, noise, heat, air pollution, personal space violations, and high density (see Anderson and Anderson, 1984; Bandura, 1973, 1983; Berkowitz, 1982, 1986; Mueller, 1983). In one of the few studies in criminology to focus specifically on the presentation of negative stimuli, Agnew (1985a) found that delinquency was related to three scales measuring negative relations at home and school. The effect of the scales on delinquency was partially mediated through a measure of anger, and the effect held when measures of social con- trol and deviant beliefs were controlled. And in a recent study employing longitudinal data, Agnew (1989) found evidence suggesting that the relation- ship between negative stimuli and delinquency was due to the cuusul effect of the negative stimuli on delinquency (rather than the effect of delinquency on the negative stimuli). Much evidence, then, suggests that the presentation of negative or noxious stimuli constitutes a third major source of strain.
Certain of the negative stimuli listed above, such as physical pain, heat, noise, and pollution, may be experienced as noxious largely for biological rea- sons (i.e., they may be unconditioned negative stimuli). Others may be condi- tioned negative stimuli, experienced as noxious largely because of their association with unconditioned negative stimuli (see Berkowitz, 1982). Whatever the case, it is assumed that such stimuli are experienced as noxious regardless of the goals that the individual is pursuing.
THE LINKS BETWEEN STRAIN AND DELINQUENCY Three sources of strain have been presented: strain as the actual or antici-
pated failure to achieve positively valued goals, strain as the actual or antici- pated removal of positively valued stimuli, and strain as the actual or anticipated presentation of negative stimuli. While these types are theoreti- cally distinct from one another, they may sometimes overlap in practice. So, for example, the insults of a teacher may be experienced as adverse because they (1) interfere with the adolescent’s aspirations for academic success, (2) result in the violation of a distributive justice rule such as equity, and (3) are conditioned negative stimuli and so are experienced as noxious in and of themselves. Other examples of overlap can be given, and it may sometimes be difficult to disentangle the different types of strain in practice. Once again, however, these categories are ideal types and are presented only to ensure that all events with the potential for creating strain are considered in empirical research.
Each type of strain increases the likelihood that individuals will experience one or more of a range of negative emotions. Those emotions include disap- pointment, depression, and fear. Anger, however, is the most critical emo- tional reaction for the purposes of the general strain theory. Anger results when individuals blame their adversity on others, and anger is a key emotion
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because it increases the individual’s level of felt injury, creates a desire for retaliationhevenge, energizes the individual for action, and lowers inhibi- tions, in part because individuals believe that others will feel their aggression is justified (see Averill, 1982; Berkowitz, 1982; Kemper, 1978; Kluegel and Smith, 1986: Ch. 1 0 Zillman, 1979). Anger, then, affects the individual in several ways that are conducive to delinquency. Anger is distinct from many of the other types of negative affect in this respect, and this is the reason that anger occupies a special place in the general strain theory.9 It is important to note, however, that delinquency may still occur in response to other types of negative affect-such as despair, although delinquency is less likely in such cases. 10 The experience of negative affect, especially anger, typically creates a desire to take corrective steps, with delinquency being one possible response. Delinquency may be a method for alleviating strain, that is, for achieving positively valued goals, for protecting or retrieving positive stimuli, or for terminating or escaping from negative stimuli. Delinquency may be used to seek revenge; data suggest that vengeful behavior often occurs even when there is no possibility of eliminating the adversity that stimulated it (Berkowitz, 1982). And delinquency may occur as adolescents try to manage their negative affect through illicit drug use (see Newcomb and Harlow, 1986). The general strain theory, then, has the potential to explain a broad range of delinquency, including theft, aggression, and drug use.
Each type of strain may create a predisposition for delinquency or function as a situational event that instigates a particular delinquent act. In the words of Hirschi and Gottredson (1986), then, the strain theory presented in this paper is a theory of both “criminality” and “crime” (or to use the words of Clarke and Cornish [1985], it is a theory of both “criminal involvement” and “criminal events”). Strain creates a predisposition for delinquency in those cases in which it is chronic or repetitive. Examples include a continuing gap
9. The focus on blame/anger represents a major distinction between the general strain theory and the stress literature. The stress literature simply focuses on adversity, regardless of whether it is blamed on another. This is perhaps appropriate because the major outcome variables of the stress literature are inner-directed states, like depression and poor health. When the focus shifts to outer-directed behavior, like much delinquency, a concern with blarne/anger becomes important.
Delinquency may still occur in the absence of blame and anger (see Berkowitz, 1986; Zillman, 1979). Individuals who accept responsibility for their adversity are still subject to negative affect, such as depression, despair, and disappointment (see Kemper, 1978; Kluegel and Smith, 1986). As a result, such individuals will still feel pressure to take corrective action, although the absence of anger places them under less pressure and makes vengeful behavior much less likely. Such individuals, however, may engage in inner- directed delinquency, such as drug use, and if suitably disposed, they may turn to other forms of delinquency as well. Since these individuals lack the strong motivation for revenge and the lowered inhibitions that anger provides, it is assumed that they must have some minimal disposition for deviance before they respond .o their adversity with outer- directed delinquency (see the discussion of the disposition to delinquency).
10.
A GENERAL STRAIN THEORY 61
between expectations and achievements and a continuing pattern of ridicule and insults from teachers. Adolescents subject to such strain are predisposed to delinquency because (1) nondelinquent strategies for coping with strain are likely to be taxed; (2) the threshold for adversity may be lowered by chronic strains (see Averill, 1982:289); (3) repeated or chronic strain may lead to a hostile a t t i t udea general dislike and suspicion of others and an associated tendency to respond in an aggressive manner (see Edmunds and Kendrick, 1980:2 1); and (4) chronic strains increase the likelihood that individuals will be high in negative affect/arousal at any given time (see Bandura, 1983; Ber- nard, 1990). A particular instance of strain may also function as the situa- tional event that ignites a delinquent act, especially among adolescents predisposed to delinquency. Qualitative and survey data, in particular, sug- gest that particular instances of delinquency are often instigated by one of the three types of strain listed above (see Agnew, 1990; also see Averill, 1982, for data on the instigations to anger).
MEASURING STRAIN As indicated above, strain theory in criminology is dominated by a focus
on strain as goal blockage. Further, only one type of goal blockage is typi- cally examined in the literature-the failure to achieve aspirations, especially aspirations for monetary success or middle-class status. The general strain theory is much broader than current strain theories, and measuring strain under this theory would require at least three sets of measures: those focus- ing on the failure to achieve positively valued goals, those focusing on the loss of positive stimuli, and those focusing on the presentation of negative stimuli. It is not possible to list the precise measures that should be employed in these areas, although the citations above contain many examples of the types of measures that might be used. Further, certain general guidelines for the mea- surement of strain can be offered. The guidelines below will also highlight the limitations of current strain measures and shed further light on why those measures are typically unrelated to delinquency.
DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF NEGATIVE RELATIONS
Strain refers to negative or adverse relations with others. Such relations are ultimately defined from the perspective of the individual. That is, in the final analysis adverse relations are whatever individuals say they are (see Berkowitz, 1982). This does not mean, however, that one must employ an idiosyncratic definition of adverse relations4efining adverse relations anew for each person one examines. Such a strategy would create serious problems for (1) the empirical study of delinquency, (2) the prediction and control of delinquency, and (3) efforts to develop the macroimplications of the general
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strain theory. Rather, one can employ a strategy similar to that followed by stress researchers.
First, one can draw on theory and research to specify those objective situa- tions that might reasonably be expected to cause adversity among adoles- cents. This parallels stress research, which relies on inventories of stressful life events, and several standard inventories are in wide use. The items in such inventories are based, to varying degrees, on the perceptions and judg- ments of researchers, on previous theory and research, and on reports from samples of respondents (see Dohrenwend, 1974). In developing inventories of strainful events, criminologists must keep in mind the fact that there may be important group differences in the types of strain or negative relations most frequently encountered. A list of negative relations developed for one group, then, may overlook certain negative relations important for another group (see Dohrenwend, 1974). It may eventually be possible, however, to develop a comprehensive list of negative relations applicable to most samples of adolescents.
Second, criminologists must recognize that individuals and groups may experience the strainful events in such inventories differently (see Thoits, 1983). Limited data from the stress literature, for example, suggest that the impact of family stressors is greatest among young adolescents, peer stressors among middle adolescents, and academic stressors among old adolescents (Compas and Phares, 1991). Stress researchers have responded to such find- ings not by abandoning their inventories, but by investigating those factors that determine why one group or individual will experience a given event as stressful and another will not. And researchers have identified several sets of variables that influence the perception and experience of negative events (e.g., Compas and Phares, 1991; Pearlin, 1982; Pearlin and Schooler, 1978). Many of the variables are discussed in the next section, and they represent a major set of conditioning variables that criminologists should consider when exam- ining the impact of strainful events on delinquency.
EXAMINING THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF NEGATIVE RELATIONS In most previous strain research in criminology, the impact of one type of
negative relation on delinquency is examined with other negative relations ignored or held constant. So, for example, researchers will examine the impact of one type of goal blockage on delinquency, ignoring other types of goal blockage and other potential types of strain. This stands in sharp con- trast to a central assumption in the stress literature, which is that stressful life events have a cumulative impact on the individual. Linsky and Straus (1986: 17), for example, speak of the “accumulation theory,” which asserts that “it is not so much the unique quality of any single event but the cumulu- tion of several stressful events within a relatively short time span” that is
A GENERAL STRAIN THEORY 63
consequential. As a result, it is standard practice in the stressful life-events literature to measure stress with a composite scale: a scale that typically sums the number of stressful life events experienced by the individual.
The precise nature of the cumulative effect, however, is unclear. As Thoits (1983:69) points out, stressful events may have an additive or interactive effect on outcome variables. The additive model assumes that each stressor has a fixed effect on delinquency, an effect independent of the level of the other stressors. Somewhat more plausible, perhaps, is the interactive model, which assumes that “a person who has experienced one event may react with even more distress to a second that follows soon after the first . . . two or more events . . . results in more distress than would be expected from the simple sum of their singular effects.”
Whether the effect is additive or interactive, there is limited support for the idea that the level of stredstrain must pass a certain threshold before nega- tive outcomes result (Linsky and Straus, 1986; Thoits, 1983). Below that level, stresdstrain is unrelated to negative outcomes. Above that level, stredstrain has a positive effect on negative outcomes, perhaps an additive effect or perhaps an interactive effect.
Given these arguments, one should employ a composite index of strain in all analyses or examine the interactions between strain variables. Examining interactions can become very complex if there are more than a few indicators of strain, although it does allow one to examine the differential importance of various types of strain. If stressors have an interactive effect on delinquency, the interaction terms should be significant or the composite index should have a nonlinear effect on delinquency (see the discussion of interactions and non- linear effects in Aiken and West, 1991). If the effect is additive, the interac- tion terms should be insignificant or the composite index should have a linear effect on delinquency (after the threshold level is reached). These issues have received only limited attention in the stress literature (see the review by Thoits, 1983), and they should certainly be explored when constructing meas- ures of strain for the purpose of explaining delinquency. At a minimum, however, as comprehensive a list of negative events/conditions as possible should be examined.
There is also the issue of whether positive events/experiences should be examined. If prior stressors can aggravate the negative effect of subsequent stressors, perhaps positive events can mitigate the impact of stressors. Lim- ited evidence from the stress literature suggests that lists of negative events predict better than lists examining the balance of negative and positive events (usually negative events minus positive events) (see Thoits, 198358-59; Wil- liams and Uchiyama, 1989:lOl; see Gersten et al., 1974, for a possible excep- tion). This topic, however, is certainly in need of more research. In addition to looking at the diference between desirable and undesirable events,
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researchers may also want to look at the ratio of undesirable to desirable events.
I t should be noted that tests of strain theory in criminology typically examine the disjunction between aspirations and expectations for one or two goals and ignore all of the many other types of strain. The tests also typically assume that strain has a linear effect on delinquency, and they never examine positive as well as negative events. These facts may constitute additional rea- sons for the weak empirical support given to strain theory in criminology.
EXAMINING THE MAGNITUDE, RECENCY, DURATION, AND CLUSTERING OF ADVERSE EVENTS
Limited research from the stress and equity literatures suggest that adverse events are more influential to the extent that they are (1) greater in magnitude or size, (2) recent, (3) of long duration, and (4) clustered in time.
MAGNITUDE
The magnitude of an event has different meanings depending on the type of strain being examined. With respect to goal blockage, magnitude refers to the size of the gap between one’s goals and reality. With respect to the loss of positive stimuli, magnitude refers to the amount that was lost. And with respect to the presentation of noxious stimuli, magnitude refers to the amount of pain or discomfort inJlicted.11 In certain cases, magnitude may be mea- sured in terms of a standard metric, such as dollars or volts delivered. In most cases, however, there is no standard metric available for measuring magnitude and one must rely on the perceptions of individuals (see Jasso, 1980, on quality versus quantity goods). To illustrate, researchers in the stress literature have asked judges to rate events according to the amount of readjustment they require or the threat they pose to the individual (see Thoits, 1983, for other weighting schemes). Such judgments are then aver- aged to form a magnitude score for each event. There is evidence, however, of subgroup differences in weights assigned (Thoits, 198353 -55).
Magnitude ratings are then sometimes used to weight the events in com- posite scales. A common finding, however, is that lists of life events weighted by magnitude do not predict any better than unweighed lists (e.g., Gersten et al., 1974). This is due to the fact that the correlation between lists of
1 1 . As Empey (1956) and others have pointed out, magnitude may also be measured in relative terms. For example, suppose an individual earning $10,OOO a year and an indi- vidual earning $lOO,OOO both lose $100 in a burglary. In absolute terms, the magnitude of their loss is the same. Relative to their current income, however, the magnitude of their loss is quite different. In most cases, it would be difficult to develop precise measures of relative magnitude. Nevertheless, researchers should at the very least be sensitive to this issue when analyzing and interpreting data.
A GENERAL STRAIN THEORY 65
weighted and unweighted events is typically so high (above .90) that the lists can be considered virtually identical (Thoits, 1983). Williams and Uchiyama (1989:99-1OO) explain this high correlation by arguing that severe life events, which are heavily weighted, have a low base rate in the population and so do not have a significant impact on scale scores. Studies that consider major and minor events separately tend to find that major events are in fact more conse- quential than minor events (Thoits, 1983:66).
It should be noted that the previous research on strain theory has paid only limited attention to the dimension of magnitude, even in those cases in which standard metrics for measuring magnitude were available. Samples, in fact, are often simply divided into strained and nonstrained groups, with little con- sideration of variations in the magnitude of strain.
RECENCY
Certain data suggest that recent events are more consequential than older events and that events older than three months have little effect (Avison and Turner, 1988). Those data focus on the impact of stress on depression, and so are not necessarily generalizable to the strain-delinquency relationship. Nev- ertheless, the data suggest that the recency of strain may be an important dimension to consider, and findings in this area might be of special use in designing longitudinal studies, in which the issue of the appropriate lag between cause and effect is central (although the subject of little research and theory).
DURATION
Much theory and data from the equity and stress literatures suggest that events of long duration (chronic stressors) have a greater impact on a variety of negative psychological outcomes (Folger, 1986; Mark and Folger, 1984; Pearlin, 1982; Pearlin and Lieberman, 1979; Utne and Kidd, 1980). Some evidence, in fact, suggests that discrete events may be unimportant except to the extent that they affect chronic events (Cummings and El-Sheikh, 1991; Gersten et al., 1977; Pearlin, 1983). Certain researchers in the equity/justice literature have suggested that the expected duration of the event into the future should also be considered (Folger, 1986; Mark and Folger, 1984; Utne and Kidd, 1980 see especially the “likelihood of amelioration” concept).
CLUSTERING
Data from the stress literature also suggest that events closely clustered in time have a greater effect on negative outcomes (Thoits, 1983). Such events, according to Thoits (1983), are more likely to overwhelm coping resources than evmts spread more evenly over time. Certain data, in particular, trace
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negative outcomes such as suicide and depression to a series of negative events clustered in the previous few weeks (Thoits, 1983).
ADAPTATIONS TO (COPING STRATEGIES FOR) STRAIN
The discussion thus far has focused on the types of strain that might pro- mote delinquency. Virtually all strain theories, however, acknowledge that only some strained individuals turn to delinquency. Some effort has been made to identify those factors that determine whether one adapts to strain through delinquency. The most attention has been focused on the adoles- cent’s commitment to legitimate means and association with other strained/ delinquent individuals (see Agnew, 199 lb).
The following discussion builds on this effort and is in two parts. First, the major adaptations to strain are described. This discussion points to a number of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral coping strategies that have not been considered in the criminology literature. Second, those factors that influence whether one adapts to strain using delinquent or nondelinquent means are described. This discussion also expands on the criminology literature to include several additional factors that affect the choice of adaptation.
ADAPTATIONS TO STRAIN
What follows is a typology of the major cognitive, emotional, and behav- ioral adaptations to strain, including delinquency.
COGNITIVE COPING STRATEGIES
Several literatures suggest that individuals sometimes cognitively reinter- pret objective stressors in ways that minimize their subjective adversity. Three general strategies of cognitive coping are described below; each strat- egy has several forms. These strategies for coping with adversity may be summarized in the following phrases: “It’s not important,” “It’s not that bad,” and “I deserve it.” This typology represents a synthesis of the coping strategies described in the stress, equity, stratification, and victimization liter- atures (Adams, 1963, 1965; Agnew, 1985b; Agnew and Jones, 1988; Averill, 1982; Della Fave, 1980; Donnerstein and Hatfield, 1982; Pearlin and Schooler, 1978; Walster et al., 1973, 1978). The stress literature, in particu- lar, was especially useful. Stress has been found to have a consistent, although weak-to-moderate, main effect on outcome variables. Researchers have tried to explain this weak-to-moderate effect by arguing that the impact of stressors is conditioned by a number of variables, and much of the atten- tion has been focused on coping strategies (see Compas and Phares, 1991; Thoits, 1984).
A GENERAL STRAIN THEORY 67
Ignore/Minimize the Importance of Adversity. The subjective impact of objective strain depends on the extent to which the strain is related to the central goals, values, and/or identities of the individual. As Pearlin and Schooler (1978:7) state, individuals may avoid subjective strain “to the extent that they are able to keep the most strainful experiences within the least val- ued areas of their life.” Individuals, therefore, may minimize the strain they experience by reducing the absolute and/or relative importance assigned to goaWvalues and identities (see Agnew, 1983; Thoits, 1991a).
In particular, individuals may claim that a particular goal/value or identity is unimportant in an absolute sense. They may, for example, state that money or work is unimportant to them. This strategy is similar to Merton’s adapta- tions of ritualism and retreatism, and it was emphasized by Hyman (1953). Individuals may also claim that a particular goal/value or identity is unim- portant in a relative sense-relative to other goaldvalues or identities. They may, for example, state that money is less important than status or that work is less important than family and leisure activities.
The strategy of minimizing strain by reducing the absolute and/or relative emphasis placed on goals/values and identities has not been extensively examined in the strain literature. Certain evidence, however, suggests that it is commonly employed and may play a central role in accounting for the limited empirical support for strain theory. In particular, research on goals suggests that people pursue a wide variety of different goals and that they tend to place the greatest absolute and relative emphasis on those goals they are best able to achieve (Agnew, 1983; McClelland, 1990; Rosenberg, 1979:265-269; Wylie, 1979).
Maximize Positive Outcomes/Minimize Negative Outcomes. In the above adaptation, individuals acknowledge the existence of adversity but relegate such adversity to an unimportant area of their life. In a second adaptation, individuals attempt to deny the existence of adversity by maximizing their positive outcomes and/or minimizing their negative outcomes. This may be done in two ways: lowering the standards used to evaluate outcomes or dis- torting one’s estimate of current and/or expected outcomes.
Lowering one’s standards basically involves lowering one’s goals or raising one’s threshold for negative stimuli (see Suls, 1977). Such action, of course, makes one’s current situation seem less adverse than it otherwise would be. Individuals may, for example, lower the amount of money they desire (which is distinct from lowering the importance attached to money). This strategy is also related to Merton’s adaptations of ritualism and retreatism, and many of the critics of strain theory in criminology have focused on it. Hyman (1953) and others have argued that poor individuals in the United States are not strained because they have lowered their success goals-bringing their aspira- tions in line with reality. The data in this area are complex, but they suggest
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that this adaptation is employed by s o m e b u t not all-lower-class individu- als (see Agnew, 1983, 1986; Agnew and Jones, 1988; see Cloward and Ohlin, 1960, and Empey, 1956, for data on “relative” aspirations).
In addition to lowering their standards, individuals may also cognitively distort their estimate of outcomes. As Agnew and Jones (1988) demonstrate, many individuals exaggerate their actual and expected levels of goal achieve- ment. Individuals with poor grades, for example, often report that they are doing well in school. And individuals with little objective chance of attending college often report that they expect to attend college. (See Wylie, 1979, for additional data in this area.) In addition to exaggerating positive outcomes, individuals may also minimize negative outcomes+laiming that their losses are small and their noxious experiences are mild.
The self-concept literature discusses the many strategies individuals employ to accomplish such distortions (see Agnew and Jones, 1988; Rosen- berg, 1979). Two common strategies, identified across several literatures, are worth noting. In “downward comparisons,” individuals claim that their situ- ation is less worse or at least no worse than that of similar others (e.g., Brick- man and Bulman, 1977; Gruder, 1977; Pearlin and Schooler, 1978; Suls, 1977). This strategy is compatible with the equity literature, which suggests that one’s evaluation of outcomes is conditioned by the outcomes of compari- son others. Temporal comparisons may also be made, with individuals claim- ing that their situation is an improvement over the past. Recent research on the social comparison process suggests that individuals often deliberately make downward comparisons, especially when self-esteem is threatened (Gruder, 1977; Hegtvedt, 1991b; Suls, 1977). In a second strategy, “compen- satory benefits,” individuals cast “about for some positive attribute or circum- stance within a troublesome situation . . . the person is aided in ignoring that which is noxious by anchoring his attention to what he considers the more worthwhile and rewarding aspects of experience” (Pearlin and Schooler, 1978:&7). Crime victims, for example, often argue that their victimization benefited them in certain ways, such as causing them to grow as a person (Agnew, 1985b).
Accept Responsibility for Adversity. Third, individuals may minimize the subjective adversity of objective strain by convincing themselves that they deserve the adversity they have experienced. There are several possible rea- sons why deserved strain is less adverse than undeserved strain. Undeserved strain may violate the equity principle, challenge one’s “belief in a just world” (see Lerner, 1977), and-if attributed to the malicious behavior of another- lead one to fear that it will be repeated in the future. Such reasons may help explain why individuals who make internal attributions for adversity are less distressed than others (Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Mirowsky and Ross, 1990).
A GENERAL STRAIN THEORY 69
Drawing on equity theory, one may argue that there are two basic strate- gies for convincing oneself that strain is deserved. First, individuals may cog- nitively minimize their positive inputs or maximize their negative inputs to a relationship. Inputs are conceived as contributions to the relationship and/or status characteristics believed to be relevant to the relationship (see Cook and Yamagishi, 1983). Second, individuals may maximize the positive inputs or minimize the negative inputs of others. Della Fave (1980) uses both of these strategies to explain the legitimation of inequality in the United States. Those at the bottom of the stratification system are said to minimize their own traits and exaggerate the positive traits and contributions of those above them. They therefore come to accept their limited outcomes as just (also see Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Shepelak, 1987).
BEHAVIORAL COPING STRATEGIES
There are two major types of behavioral coping: those that seek to mini- mize or eliminate the source of strain and those that seek to satisfy the need for revenge.
Maximizing Positive OutcomedMinimizing Negative Outcomes. Behavioral coping may assume several forms, paralleling each of the major types of strain. Individuals, then, may seek to achieve positively valued goals, protect or retrieve positively valued stimuli, or terminate or escape from negative stimuli. Their actions in these areas may involve conventional or delinquent behavior. Individuals seeking to escape from an adverse school environment, for example, may try to transfer to another school or they may illegally skip school. This rather broad adaptation encompasses Merton’s adaptations of innovation and rebellion, as well as those coping strategies described in the equity literature as “maximizing one’s outcomes,” “minimizing one’s inputs,” and “maximizing the other’s inputs.”
Vengeful Behavior. Data indicate that when adversity is blamed on others it creates a desire for revenge that is distinct from the desire to end the adver- sity. A second method of behavioral coping, then, involves the taking of revenge. Vengeful behavior may also assume conventional or delinquent forms, although the potential for delinquency is obviously high. Such behav- ior may involve efforts to minimize the positive outcomes, increase the nega- tive outcomes, and/or increase the inputs of others (as when adolescents cause teachers and parents to work harder through their incorrigible behavior).
EMOTIONAL COPING STRATEGIES Finally, individuals may cope by acting directly on the negative emotions
that result from adversity. Rosenberg (1990), Thoits (1984, 1989, 1990,
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1991b), and others list several strategies of emotional coping. They include the use of drugs such as stimulants and depressants, physical exercise and deep-breathing techniques, meditation, biofeedback and progressive relaxa- tion, and the behavioral manipulation of expressive gestures through playact- ing or “expression work.” In all of these examples, the focus is on alleviating negative emotions rather than cognitively reinterpreting or behaviorally alter- ing the situation that produced those emotions. Many of the strategies are beyond the reach of most adolescents (Compas et al., 1988), and data indicate that adolescents often employ illicit drugs to cope with life’s strains (Labouvie, 1986a, 1986b; Newcomb and Harlow, 1986). Emotional coping is especially likely when behavioral and cognitive coping are unavailable or unsuccessful.
It should be noted that individuals may employ more than one of the above coping strategies (see Folkman, 199 1). Also, still other coping strategies, such as distraction, could have been listed. It is assumed, however, that the above strategies constitute the primary responses to strain.
PREDICTING THE USE OF DELINQUENT VERSUS NONDELINQUENT ADAPTATIONS
The above typology suggests that there are many ways to cope with strain-nly some of which involve delinquency. And data from the stress literature suggest that individuals vary in the extent to which they use the different strategies (Compas et al., 1988; Menaghan, 1983; Pearlin and Schooler, 1978). These facts go a long way toward explaining the weak sup- port for strain theory. With certain limited exceptions, the strategies are not taken into account in tests of strain theory.
The existence of the above coping strategies poses a serious problem for strain theory. If strain theory is to have any value, it must be able to explain the selection of delinquent versus nondelinquent adaptations. This issue has, of course, been raised before. Critics contend that Merton and other strain theorists fail to explain adequately why only some strained individuals turn to delinquency. This issue, however, is all the more pressing when one considers the full range of nondelinquent adaptations to strain listed above. It is there- fore important to specify those factors that influence the choice of delinquent versus nondelinquent coping strategies.
The following discussion of influencing factors draws on the aggression, equity, and stress literatures (see especially Adams, 1965; Menaghan, 1982; Pearlin and Shooler, 1978; Walster et al., 1978). The aggression literature in psychology is especially useful. Adversity is said to produce a general state of arousal, which can facilitate a variety of behaviors. Whether this arousal results in aggression is said to be determined by a number of factors, many of which are noted below (see Bandura, 1973, 1983; Berkowitz, 1978, 1982).
A GENERAL STRAIN THEORY 71
Those factors affect the choice of coping strategies by affecting (1) the con- straints to nondelinquent and delinquent coping and (2) the disposition to engage in nondelinquent versus delinquent coping.
CONSTRAINTS TO NONDELINQUENT AND DELINQUENT COPING
While there are many adaptations to objective strain, those adaptations are not equally available to everyone. Individuals are constrained in their choice of adaptation(s) by a variety of internal and external factors. The following is a partial list of such factors.
Initial Goals/Values/Identities of the Individual. If the objective strain affects goals/values/identities that are high in absolute and relative impor- tance, and if the individual has few alternative goals/values/identities in which to seek refuge, it will be more difficult to relegate strain to an unimpor- tant are8 of one's life (see Agnew, 1986; Thoits, 1991a). This is especially the case if the goals/values/identities receive strong social and cultural support (see below). As a result, strain will be more likely to lead to delinquency in such cases.
Individual Coping Resources. A wide range of traits can be listed in this area, including temperament, intelligence, creativity, problem-solving skills, interpersonal skills, self-efficacy, and self-esteem. These traits affect the selec- tion of coping strategies by influencing the individual's sensitivity to objective strains and ability to engage in cognitive, emotional, and behavioral coping (Agnew, 1991a; Averill, 1982; Bernard, 1990; Compas, 1987; Edmunds and Kendrick, 1980; Slaby and Guerra, 1988; Tavris, 1984). Data, for example, suggest that individuals with high self-esteem are more resistant to stress (Averill, 1982; Compas, 1987; Kaplan, 1980; Pearlin and Schooler, 1978; Rosenberg, 1990; Thoits, 1983). Such individuals, therefore, should be less likely to respond to a given objective strain with delinquency. Individuals high in self-efficacy are more likely to feel that their strain can be alleviated by behavioral coping of a nondelinquent nature, and so they too should be less likely to respond to strain with delinquency (see Bandura, 1989, and Wang and Richarde, 1988, on self-efficacy; see Thoits, 1991b, on perceived control).
Conventional Social Support. Vaux (1988) provides an extended discussion of the different types of social support, their measurement, and their effect on outcome variables. Thoits (1984) argues that social support is important because it facilitates the major types of coping. The major types of social support, in fact, correspond to the major types of coping listed above. Thus, there is informational support, instrumental support, and emotional support
72 AGNEW
(House, 198 1). Adolescents with conventional social supports, then, should be better able to respond to objective strains in a nondelinquent manner.
Constraints to Delinquent Coping. The crime/delinquency literature has focused on certain variables that constrain delinquent coping. They include (1) the costs and benefits of engaging in delinquency in a particular situation (Clarke and Cornish, 1985), (2) the individual’s level of social control (see Hirschi, 1969), and (3) the possession of those “illegitimate means” necessary for many delinquent acts (see Agnew, 1991a, for a full discussion).
Macro-Level Variables. The larger social environment may affect the probability of delinquent versus nondelinquent coping by affecting all of the above factors. First, the social environment may affect coping by influencing the importance attached to selected goals/values/identities. For example, certain ethnographic accounts suggest that there is a strong social and cul- tural emphasis on the goals of money/status among certain segments of the urban poor. Many poor individuals, in particular, are in a situation in which (1) they face strong economic/status demands, (2) people around them stress the importance of money/status on a regular basis, and (3) few alternative goals are given cultural support (Anderson, 1978; MacLeod, 1987; Sullivan, 1989). As such, these individuals should face more difficulty in cognitively minimizing the importance of money and status.
Second, the larger social environment may affect the individual’s sensitivity to particular strains by influencing the individual’s beliefs regarding what is and is not adverse. The subculture of violence thesis, for example, is predi- cated on the assumption that young black males in urban slums are taught that a wide range of provocations and insults are highly adverse. Third, the social environment may influence the individual’s ability to minimize cogni- tively the severity of objective strain. Individuals in some environments are regularly provided with external information about their accomplishments and failings (see Faunce, 1989), and their attempts at cognitively distorting such information are quickly challenged. Such a situation may exist among many adolescents and among those who inhabit the “street-comer world” of the urban poor. Adolescents and those on the street comer live in a very “public world”; one’s accomplishments and failings typically occur before a large audience or they quickly become known to such an audience. Further, accounts suggest that this audience regularly reminds individuals of their accomplishments and failings and challenges attempts at cognitive distortion.
Fourth, certain social environments may make it difficult to engage in behavioral coping of a nondelinquent nature. Agnew (1985a) has argued that adolescents often find it difficult to escape legally from negative stimuli, espe- cially negative stimuli encountered in the school, family, and neighborhood. Also, adolescents often lack the resources to negotiate successfully with
A GENERAL STRAIN THEORY 73
adults, such as parents and teachers (although see Agnew, 1991a). Similar arguments might be made for the urban underclass. They often lack the resources to negotiate successfully with many others, and they often find it difficult to escape legally from adverse environments-by, for example, quit- ting their job (if they have a job) or moving to another neighborhood.
The larger social environment, then, may affect individual coping in a vari- ety of ways. And certain groups, such as adolescents and the urban under- class, may face special constraints that make nondelinquent coping more difficult. This may explain the higher rate of deviance among these groups.
FACTORS AFFECTING THE DISPOSITION TO DELINQUENCY
The selection of delinquent versus nondelinquent coping strategies is not only dependent on the constraints to coping, but also on the adolescent’s dis- position to engage in delinquent versus nondelinquent coping. This disposi- tion is a function of (1) certain temperamental variables (see Tonry et al., 1991), (2) the prior learning history of the adolescent, particularly the extent to which delinquency was reinforced in the past (Bandura, 1973; Berkowitz, 1982), (3) the adolescent’s beliefs, particularly the rules defining the appropri- ate response to provocations (Bernard’s, 1990, “regulative rules”), and (4) the adolescent’s attributions regarding the causes of his or her adversity. Adoles- cents who attribute their adversity to others are much more likely to become angry, and as argued earlier, that anger creates a strong predisposition to delinquency. Data and theory from several areas, in fact, suggest that the experience of adversity is most likely to result in deviance when the adversity is blamed on another.12 The attributions one makes are influenced by a vari- ety of factors, as discussed in recent reviews by Averill (1982), Berwin (1988), R. Cohen (1982), Crittenden (1983, 1989), Kluegel and Smith (1986), and Utne and Kidd (1980). The possibility that there may be demographic and subgroup differences in the rules for assigning blame is of special interest (see Bernard, 1990; Crittenden, 1983, 1989).
A key variable affecting several of the above factors is association with delinquent peers. It has been argued that adolescents who associate with delinquent peers are more likely to be exposed to delinquent models and beliefs and to receive reinforcement for delinquency (see especially, Akers, 1985). It may also be the case that delinquent peers increase the likelihood that adolescents will attribute their adversity to others.
12. This is a major theme in the psychological research on aggression, in much of the recent research on equity, and in the emotions literature, and it is a central theme in Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) strain theory (e.g., Averill, 1982; Berkowitz, 1982; R. Cohen, 1982; Crosby and Gonzales-Intal, 1984; Garrett and Libby, 1973; Kemper, 1978; Leventhal, 1976; Mark and Folger, 1984; Martin and Murray, 1984; Weiner, 1982; Zillman, 1979).
74 AGNEW
The individual’s disposition to delinquency, then, may condition the impact of adversity on delinquency. At the same time, it is important to note that continued experience with adversity may create a disposition for delin- quency. This argument has been made by Bernard (1990), Cloward and Ohlin (1960), A. Cohen (1959, Elliott et al. (1979), and others. In particular, it has been argued that under certain conditions the experience of adversity may lead to beliefs favorable to delinquency, lead adolescents to join or form delinquent peer groups, and lead adolescents to blame others for their misfortune.
Virtually all empirical research on strain theory in criminology has neglected the constraints to coping and the adolescent’s disposition to delin- quency. Researchers, in particular, have failed to examine whether the effect of adversity on delinquency is conditioned by factors such as self-efficacy and association with delinquent peers. This is likely a major reason for the weak empirical support for strain theory.
CONCLUSION Much of the recent theoretical work in criminology has focused on the
integration of different delinquency theories. This paper has taken an alterna- tive track and, following Hirschi’s (1979) advice, has focused on the refine- ment of a single theory. The general strain theory builds upon traditional strain theory in criminology in several ways. First, the general strain theory points to several new sources of strain. In particular, it focuses on three cate- gories of strain or negative relationships with others: (1) the actual or antici- pated failure to achieve positively valued goals, (2) the actual or anticipated removal of positively valued stimuli, and (3) the actual or anticipated presen- tation of negative stimuli. Most current strain theories in criminology only focus on strain as the failure to achieve positively valued goals, and even then the focus is only on the disjunction between aspirations and expectations/ actual achievements. The disjunctions between expectations and achieve- ments and @/fair outcomes and achievements are ignored. The general strain theory, then, significantly expands the focus of strain theory to include all types of negative relations between the individual and others.
Second, the general strain theory more precisely specifies the relationship between strain and delinquency, pointing out that strain is likely to have a cumulative effect on delinquency after a certain threshold level is reached. The theory also points to certain relevant dimensions of strain that should be considered in empirical research, including the magnitude, recency, duration, and clustering of strainful events.
Third, the general strain theory provides a more comprehensive account of the cognitive, behavioral, and emotional adaptations to strain. This account sheds additional light on the reasons why many strained individuals do not
A GENERAL STRAIN THEORY 75
turn to delinquency, and it may prove useful in devising strategies to prevent and control delinquency. Individuals, in particular, may be taught those non- delinquent coping strategies found to be most effective in preventing delinquency.
Fourth, the general strain theory more fully describes those factors affect- ing the choice of delinquent versus nondelinquent adaptations. The failure to consider such factors is a fundamental reason for the weak empirical support for strain theory.
Most of the above modifications in strain theory were suggested by research in several areas outside of traditional criminology, most notably the stress research in medical sociology and psychology, the equity/justice research in social psychology, and the aggression research in psychology. With certain exceptions, researchers in criminology have tended to cling to the early strain models of Merton (1938), A. &hen (1955), and Cloward and Ohlin (1960) and to ignore the developments in related fields. And while these early strain models contdn much of value and have had a major influ- ence on the general strain theory in this paper, they do not fully exploit the potential of strain theory.
At the same time, it is important to note that the general strain theory is not presented here as a fully developed alternative to earlier theories. First, the macroimplications of the theory were only briefly discussed. It would not be difficult to extend the general strain theory to the macro level, however; researchers could focus on (1) the social determinants of adversity (for an example, see Bernard, 1990, on the urban underclass) and (2) the social deter- minants of those factors that condition the effect of adversity on delinquency. Second, the theory did not concern itself with the nonsocial determinants of strain, such as illness. It seems doubtful that adversity caused by nonsocial sources is a major source of delinquency because, among other things, it is unlikely to generate anger (see Averill, 1982). Nevertheless, nonsocial sources of adversity should be investigated. Third, the relationship between the general strain theory and other major theories of delinquency must be more fully explored. As hinted earlier, the relationship is rather complex. While the general strain theory is clearly distinct from control and differential association theory, strain may lead to low social control and association with delinquent others. Further, variables from the three theories may interact with one another in producing delinquency. Individuals with delinquent friends, for example, should be more likely to respond to strain with delin- quency. The general strain theory then, is presented as a foundation on which to build.
It is not possible to test the general strain theory fully with currently avail- able data sets, but it is possible to test core sections of the theory. Most data sets dealing with delinquency contain at least some measures of adversity and at least some measures of those factors said to condition the effect of adversity
76 AGNEW
on delinquency. Given this fact, researchers could focus on the following core hypotheses derived from the theory:
First, adverse relations with others will have a positive effect on both gen- eral and specific measures of delinquency, with measures of social control and differential association held constant. This is especially true of adverse rela- tions that are severe and that provide limited opportunities for nondelinquent coping. Prime examples, as discussed earlier, are adverse relations involving family, school, and neighborhood. It is hoped research will point to several measures of strain that are especially relevant to delinquency. Such measures can then be made a routine part of delinquency research, just as the elements of the social bond and measures of differential association are now routinely included in empirical studies.
Second, adverse relations will have a cumulative impact on delinquency after a certain threshold level is reached. Further, this cumulative impact will likely be interactive in nature; each additional increment in strain will have a greater impact than the one before.
Third, the impact of strain or adverse relations on delinquency will be con- ditioned by several variables, as listed above.
Strain theory is the only major theory to focus explicitly on negative rela- tions with others and to argue that delinquency results from the negative affect caused by such relations. As such, it complements social control and differential association/social learning theory in a fundamental way. It is hoped that the general strain theory will revive interest in negative relations and cause criminologists to “bring the bad back in.”
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Robert Agnew is Associate Professor of Sociology at Emory University in Atlanta, Geor- gia. His research focuses on the causes of delinquency, particularly strain and social con- trol theories. He is currently conducting an empirical test of the general strain theory with Helene Raskin White.