Sociology Unit II

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When the powerful feels wronged: The legitimization effects of advantaged group members’ sense of being accused for harboring racial or ethnic biases

TAMAR SAGUY1*, LILY CHERNYAK-HAI2, LUCA ANDRIGHETTO3 AND JEFF BRYSON4 1Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Herzliya, Israel; 2Netanya Academic College, Netanya, Israel; 3Department of Educational Science, University of Genova, Genova, Italy; 4San Diego State University, San Diego, USA

Abstract

In this research, we investigated the psychological sense of feeling wronged as an advantaged group member. By feeling wronged, we refer to advantaged group members who experience themselves being unfairly accused for harboring racial or ethnic biases. Drawing on research on moral threat to the ingroup, we predicted that feeling wronged would lead advantaged group members to legitimize the social hierarchy they are benefiting from, which in turn can undermine their intentions to re- dress group-based inequality. Study 1 demonstrated that to the extent advantaged group members (both in Italy and the USA) felt wronged predicted their perceptions of group-based disparities as more legitimate, which in turn weakened their intentions to act for promoting social change. Study 2 replicated the effect using an experimental manipulation of unfair blame among a sample of Israeli-Jews. Results are discussed in light of relevant work on competitive victimhood and inverted relative deprivation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Traditionally, research on social change toward equality has focused on psychological processes on part of disadvantaged group members (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). This focus reflected the prevailing view that members of advantaged groups are motivated to maintain and legitimize group-based hierarchy whereas those belonging to disadvantaged groups are the likely agents of change (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). More recently, researchers have begun to investigate when and why would advantage group members be willing (or not) to take action that would advance social equality (Iyer & Leach, 2010; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009). This novel direction reflects the more nuanced understanding that individuals whose groups benefit from social inequality may also perceive it to be illegitimate and might sometimes intend to amend it (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002). Understanding such processes is of both theoretical and practical importance given the structural power that advantaged group members have to advance social change (van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009). The current research joins this emerging line of work by investigating factors that influence advantaged group members’ intentions (or lack thereof) to challenge the social inequality they themselves benefit from.

The research which has investigated advantaged group mem- bers’ commitment to equality has pointed to the central role of appraisals of ingroup advantage. People belonging to privileged groups can experience their advantaged status in different ways (Leach et al., 2002, 2006). Whereas some may deny that they are benefiting from group-based inequality altogether (Leach, Iyer,

& Pedersen, 2007), others acknowledge their advantage over other groups, but still vary in the extent to which this advantage is perceived to be legitimate (i.e., fair and earned; Leach et al., 2002). Not surprisingly, appraisals that give rise to tendencies to amend social inequality are those of illegitimate advantage. Perceiving one’s ingroup as unfairly advantaged can drive feel- ings of shame (Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004), guilt (Swim & Miller, 1999), and anger (Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Leach et al., 2006) over the ingroup’s actions, which can in turn shape willingness to act for redressing social inequality.

Our goal in the current work was to understand what may drive legitimacy appraisals, which play a pivotal role in predicting intentions to redress inequality. In particular, we focus on an understudied experience on part of those belong- ing to advantaged groups, the experience of feeling unfairly accused for harboring racial or ethnic biases. Such accusations may originate from a variety of societal sources such as the mainstream media, decision makers, and virtually anyone who accuses the advantaged group for harboring consequen- tial group-based biases. This experience, which we term “feel- ing wronged,” is succinctly reflected in the saying “No matter what I say, you’ll still call me a racist” (Stein, 2012), which communicates an almost hopeless sense of being wrongly accused for holding a negative group-based view (i.e., racism) that one feels she or he does not harbor. Our goal in this work is to present initial evidence that this psychological experience (i) exists among advantaged group members across different contexts and (ii) has potentially far-reaching consequences

*Correspondence to: Tamar Saguy, School of Psychology, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, PO Box 167, Herzliya 46150, Israel. E-mail: [email protected]

European Journal of Social Psychology, Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 43, 292–298 (2013) Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.1948

on the stability of social hierarchy. As such, this work joins re- search focusing on the experience of being socially advantaged, which has received relatively little attention particularly in com- parison to the work carried out on members of disadvantaged groups. As Leach et al. (2002) stated: “Understanding the ways in which advantage is experienced could go a long way in spec- ifying the political potential (and limits) of relative deprivation- based challenges to inequality” (p. 136).

Although relatively scarce, existing literature on the psy- chology of relative advantage has identified processes related to the experience of feeling wronged. One such process is inverted relative deprivation, measured as the extent to which members of an objectively advantaged group feel deprived relative to the (objectively disadvantaged) outgroup (Leach et al., 2007). Another related process is reflected in the experi- ence of competitive victimhood, claiming that one’s group has suffered more than the outgroup (Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012). Although being relevant, the experiences of inverted relative deprivation, and of competitive victimhood, are both conceptually different than the one we propose in this research. The key difference between feeling wronged and these processes is that in order to feel wronged, one does not need to engage in an intergroup comparison along a deprivation aspect (i.e., to conceive of one’s ingroup as being more deprived or victimized than a relevant outgroup). In fact, we define the sense of feeling wronged as one characterizing those who feel advantaged over other groups, but still falsely accused for harboring racial or ethnic biases. Because the sense of feeling wronged is focused on these accusations, and not on the relative standing of one’s ingroup in a structural sense, it can coexist with a sense of being relatively advantaged.

Given that the sense of feeling wronged is independent from inequality perceptions and does not “require” a strong sense of victimhood or deprivation, it can be easily instilled within mem- bers of advantaged groups and, as such, influence their percep- tions and actions related to social inequality. In particular, we propose that the experience of feeling wronged would lead members of advantaged groups to legitimize, or further legiti- mize, the social inequality they themselves benefit from. As documented by extensive research on threats to social identity, at a most basic level, group members are motivated to maintain a positive and worthwhile ingroup image (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Lickel et al., 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In the context of group-based hierarchy, when one group enjoys social privileges, members of advantaged groups were shown to be particularly sensitive to threats portraying them as immoral—a sensitivity that elicits a psychological need to restore the morally impaired ingroup image (Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009). When group-serving explana- tions for the ingroup’s actions are impossible to sustain, a range of moral emotions may come into play (e.g., shame or guilt about the ingroup’s actions; Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Lickel et al., 2004). Nevertheless, because they rely on some acceptance of the ingroup’s responsibility for immoral actions (Branscombe et al., 2002), in the case of feeling wronged, such moral emotions are unlikely to come about.

Instead, advantaged group members who feel wrongly accused for racial or ethnic biases are more likely to attempt to restore their impaired ingroup moral image by framing the social inequality, which their ingroup is benefiting from,

as legitimate and justified such that one’s privileges are consid- ered earned (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; see also Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003). For example, Knowles and colleagues have shown that when exposed to a threat associated with one’s privileged status, advantaged group members (White Americans) increased their support of ideolo- gies that legitimizes existing disparities (Knowles, Lowery, Ho- gan, & Chow, 2009). In line with these ideas, we propose that a sense of feeling wronged, involving little if any sense of ingroup responsibility, would lead advantaged group members to rein- force the perceived legitimacy of social disparities as a strategy to restore the threatened image of their ingroup. This argument does not rule out the possibility that those who view the inequal- ity as legitimate would also be more likely to feel wronged as advantaged group member. It does, however, suggests that feeling wronged, in and of itself, can drive (or further drive) the legitimization of the social inequality, which as stated earlier, can pose a serious barrier on people’s commitment to redressing the inequality (Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Leach et al., 2006).

These ideas, linking feeling wronged to both perceptions and behaviors that would legitimize the hierarchy, are further supported by research on an individual sense of being wronged, which occurs when people feel unfairly treated (Zitek, Jordan, Monin, & Leach, 2010). Zitek and colleagues reasoned that people who feel wronged perceive themselves as having already done their fair share of suffering—and consequently feel “entitled to spare themselves some of life’s inconveniences, such as being attentive to the needs of others.” (p. 245). Thus, contrary to what one would intuitively expect, an individual sense of being wronged does not lead people to redress other wrongs but, instead, drives them to act selfishly via a sense of entitlement to positive outcomes. Extending this reasoning to the group level, this sense of entitlement can be translated to a sense of deservingness to one’s ingroup privileges, which can in turn undermine willingness for actions that would redress social inequities.

We tested these ideas in three different intergroup contexts, which are characterized by vast social inequality. In Study 1, we employed a cross-sectional method in two different intergroup contexts (Italy and the USA) to test whether feeling wronged on part of advantaged groups predicts stronger perceptions of the hierarchy as legitimate and whether these perceptions in turn undermine intentions to partake in action for redressing inequality. Because these studies did not allow establishing the causal effect of feeling wronged on the predicted outcomes, Study 2, conducted among Israeli-Jews, included an experimental manipulation aimed at inducing a sense of feeling wronged, followed by measures of legitimacy perceptions and related action tendencies. Across these three contexts, all study materials were presented to participants in their native language.

STUDY 1

Study 1 was conducted among two samples of advantaged group members. Study 1a was conducted in Italy, in the context of relations between Native-Italians and African immigrants, and Study 1b was conducted among Whites in the USA in the context of relations between non-Latino Whites and Latino

When the powerful feels wronged 293

immigrants. Both in Italy (Giovannini & Vezzali, 2012) and in the USA (Pérez, Fortuna, & Alegría, 2008), the relations between the studied groups are marked by substantial inequality favoring the participants’ advantaged group. Our goal was to examine whether in these two intergroup contexts, the extent to which advantaged group members feel wronged predicts their perceptions of the disparities between their ingroup and the relevant outgroup as more legitimate, and whether these increased legitimacy perceptions in turn weakens their intentions to join action for redressing the social inequality.

Study 1a

Method

Sixty Native-Italian students (21 men and 39 women; Mage = 21.30 years, SD = 3.01) participated in the study in ex- change for partial course credit. All completed a questionnaire, which included measures of feeling wronged, perceptions of legitimacy, and intention to join action for redressing inequality. Unless otherwise indicated, responses to all items were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).

To assess a sense of feeling wronged, participants were asked to indicate their agreement with the following three items: “People from my group of Native Italians are often being accused of racism with no good reason,” “People like me are often unfairly accused of holding prejudiced views against immigrants,” and “Native-Italians are often unfairly blamed for immigration problems in this country” (a = .69). The perceived legitimacy of the inequality (legitimacy percep- tions) between Native-Italians and African immigrants was examined using three questions asking participants to indicate on a 7-point scale how unfair or fair, how unjustifiable or justifiable, and how illegitimate or legitimate are the differences in socioeconomic status (SES) between Native-Italians and African immigrants (Jost & Burgess, 2000; a = .86). To assess intention to join action for redressing inequality (action tenden- cies), we used a five-item measure of collective action (Leach et al., 2007), assessing individuals’ willingness to engage in five specific actions that would improve the social position of Afri- can immigrants (e.g., “Demonstrate against the treatment of im- migrants in Italy” and “Donate money to immigrant interest groups”; a = .76).

To separate our construct of feeling wronged from the related constructs of inverted relative deprivation (Leach et al., 2007), we further included the following item, which measures perceptions of inequality: “Do you think that today there is socio-economic inequality (differences in job opportunities, in education opportunities, etc.) in Italy between Native-Italians and African immigrants?” Responses ranged from 1 (there is strong social inequality favoring African immigrants) to 5 (there is strong social inequality favoring Native Italians) with 3 indicating equality between the groups. Finally, we assessed demographic information and ingroup identification, a construct found to predict perceptions of legitimate inequality among advantaged group members (Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008), with the following items: “Being an Italian is an important part of my self-definition,” “I often think of myself as an Italian,” “I feel strong ties with other Italians” and “The group of Italians is not important to me” (r) (a = .85).

Results

Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations among all measures are presented in Table 1. The measure assessing perceptions of inequality revealed that the vast ma- jority of participants indicated that Native Italians are advantaged relative to African immigrants either “to a very large extent” (30%) or “to some extent” (54%). Two percent saw the groups as equal, and the remaining, relatively small portion of the sample (13%), saw African immigrants as advantaged relative to Italians to some extent. Our composite measure of feeling wronged revealed that the majority of par- ticipants (77%) did not feel wronged (scored below 4 on the 7- point measure), whereas 23% felt wronged to a medium or large extent (scored 4 and above) suggesting, along with the relatively low mean on legitimacy perceptions (M = 2.81; SD = 1.07 on a 7-point scale), that this sample of Italian students was quite egalitarian.

To examine our predictions, we next tested a mediation model using Hayes’ (2012) PROCESS Macro. The independent variable was feeling wronged, the mediator was legitimacy perceptions, and the dependent variable was action tendencies. As expected, feeling wronged was associated with stronger perceptions of the inequality as legitimate (b = 0.41, SE= 0.14, t = 2.82, p = .007) and with less intentions to partake in action for redressing the inequality (b = �0.52, SE = 0.17, t = �3.06, p = .003), and legitimacy perceptions were associated with less action tendencies (b = �0.52, SE= 0.14, t = �3.70, p < .001). Supportive of our mediation hypothesis, the effect of feel- ing wronged on action tendencies was reduced after legiti- macy perceptions were entered into the model (b = �0.31, SE = 0.17, t = �1.89, p = .06) such that the indirect path through legitimacy perceptions was significant, a * b = �0.21, 95% CI [�0.05, �0.46].

We next examined whether this mediation model would remain significant after controlling for ingroup identification and inequality perceptions, which are both likely to be related to the outcome measures. To that end, we first examined whether the mediation model described earlier is moderated by either identification or inequality perceptions by considering each variable in a separate moderated mediation analysis (Hayes, 2012; Model 8). The analysis considering identification as a moderator revealed that the effect of feeling wronged on

Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations among variables in Study 1a

2 3 4 5

1. Inequality perceptionsa

(M = 3.95, SD = 1.09) �.20 �.15 .04 �.23

2. Feeling wrongedb

(3.27; SD = 0.91) .45** �.46** .35**

3. Legitimacy perceptionsb

(M = 2.81; SD = 1.07) �.55** .16

4. Action tendenciesb

(M = 3.86; SD = 1.28) �.22

5. Ingroup identificationb

(M = 4.25; SD = 1.20)

aRated on a 1–5 scale with higher numbers indicating advantage of Native Italians. bRated on a 1–7 scale. **p < .01.

294 Tamar Saguy et al.

legitimacy perceptions was not influenced by levels of identifica- tion (b = 0.20, SE= 0.13, t = 1.56, p = .12), nor was the effect of feeling wronged on action tendencies (b = �0.15, SE= 0.12, t = �1.21, p = .23). Indeed, the indirect effect from feeling wronged to action tendencies through legitimacy perceptions remained significant after considering identification as a control variable in the model (a * b = �0.19, 95% CI [�0.03, �0.50]).

Considering inequality perceptions as a moderator of the mediation model, we found no interaction between inequality perceptions and feeling wronged on action tendencies (b = �0.15, SE = 0.13, t = �1.14, p = .26). Nevertheless, for the legitimacy measure (which served as a mediator), results revealed a marginally significant interaction between inequal- ity perceptions and feeling wronged (b = 0.21, SE = 0.15, t = 1.84, p = .071). Follow-up analyses indicated that for those who scored at the mean of inequality perceptions or 1 SD above that mean (the mean of this measure was 3.95; SD = 1.09), namely those who saw Italians as advantaged, or strongly advantaged relative to African immigrants, the associa- tion between feeling wronged and action tendencies was medi- ated by legitimacy perceptions (a * b = �0.27, 95% CI [�0.07, �0.58] and a * b = �0.39, 95% CI [�0.08, �0.83], respec- tively). However, for those who scored 1 SD below the mean of inequality perceptions (i.e., saw the groups as rather equal), the association between feeling wronged and action tendencies was not explained by legitimacy perceptions (a * b = �0.15, 95% CI [0.004, �0.39]). Because the wording of the legitimacy perceptions measure specified an inequality favoring Native Italians, for those who do not see themselves as advantaged, the measure may have been interpreted differently than intended (and may have further elicited responses ranging from annoyance to misunderstanding)—which can account for why this variable did not mediate the relationship between feeling wronged and intentions to join action that would assist African immigrants.

Study 1b

Method

Participants were 196 White-American students (56 men and 139 women; Mage = 21.56 years, SD = 3.16), who completed an online questionnaire for partial course credit. All completed the items used in Study 1a, after these were adapted to reflect the US context: feeling wronged (measured on a 1–5 scale; a = .71), legitimacy perceptions1 r(195) = .66, p = .000, and action tendencies (a = .86). We further examined inequality perceptions with the same item as in Study 1a and ingroup identification (a = .84).

Results

Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations among all measures are presented in Table 2. Consistent with Study 1a, the measure assessing perceptions of inequality re- vealed that the vast majority of participants indicated that

Whites are advantaged in American society relative to Latinos “to a very large extent” (55%) or “to some extent” (41%). Three percent judged the groups as equal, and only one partic- ipant perceived Latinos as advantaged relative to Whites. Un- like Study 1a, a much larger portion of students in this sample (73%) saw themselves as somewhat wronged or largely wronged (scored 3 or above on the feeling wronged 5-point composite measure), whereas only 27% did not feel wronged (scored below 3), placing this sample on a different (higher) range on the feeling wronged scale.

To examine our predictions, we tested the same mediation model as in Study 1a. As expected, feeling wronged predicted stronger perceptions of the inequality as legitimate (b = 0.22, SE = 0.07, t = 3.10, p = .002) and with less intentions to partake in action for redressing the inequality (b = �0.19, SE = 0.07, t = �2.95, p = .004), and legitimacy perceptions were associ- ated with less action tendencies (b = �0.19, SE = 0.07, t = �2.79, p = .006). Moreover, the effect of feeling wronged on action tendencies was reduced in size after legitimacy per- ceptions were entered into the model (b = �0.15, SE = 0.07, t = �2.32, p = .020). Importantly, and consistent with Study 1a, the indirect path from feeling wronged to action tendencies through legitimacy perceptions was significant, a * b = �0.04, 95% CI [�0.008, �0.09].

As in Study 1a, we next examined whether this mediation model would remain significant after controlling for ingroup identification and inequality perceptions, by first examining their role as potential moderators of the mediation model described above. As in Study 1a, the analyses revealed that the effect of feeling wronged on action tendencies was not moderated by identification (b = �0.03, SE = 0.06, t = �0.46, p = .64), nor was the effect of feeling wronged on legitimacy perceptions (b = 0.02, SE = 0.06, t = 0.37, p = .71). Moreover, considering inequality perceptions as a moderator, there was no interaction between inequality perceptions and feeling wronged on action tendencies (b = �0.097, SE = 0.11, t = �0.86, p = .39), or on legitimacy perceptions (b = 0.17, SE = 0.12, t = 1.44, p = .15). The lack of the latter moderation (which was observed in Study 1a) can be explained by the fact that unlike Study 1a, the mean on the inequality perceptions measure in Study 1b indicated that all participants scoring between 1 SD below and 1 SD above the mean saw Whites as advantaged relative to Latinos. Thus, in this study, the legitimacy perceptions measure was likely interpreted to

1Because of technical problem, this measure included only two items assessing how unfair/fair and how unjustifiable/justifiable are the socioeconomic differ- ences between the groups.

Table 2. Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations among variables in Study 1b

2 3 4 5

1. Inequality perceptionsa

(M = 4.51, SD = 0.59) �.07 .11 �.21** .23**

2. Feeling wrongeda

(M = 3.45, SD = 0.93) .22** �.21** .03

3. Legitimacy perceptionsa

(M = 2.12, SD = 0.91) �.23** .23**

4. Action tendenciesa

(M = 2.12, SD = 0.87) �.16*

5. Ingroup identificationb

(M = 5.40, SD = 1.14)

aRated on a 1–5 scale (for 1, higher numbers indicate advantage of non-Latino Whites). bRated on a 1–7 scale. *p < .05; **p < .01.

When the powerful feels wronged 295

address the inequality between Latinos and non-Latino Whites, favoring the latter.

After establishing that they do not moderate the predicted mediation model, we next examined whether the model remains significant after considering both ingroup identification and in- equality perceptions as control variables. This analysis revealed that the indirect effect from feeling wronged to action tendencies through legitimacy perceptions remained significant after considering both control variables in the model (a * b = �0.17, 95% CI [�0.003, �0.08]).

Discussion

Study 1 lends initial support for the idea that feeling advantaged, yet wronged as a member of that advantaged group, is associated with stronger perceptions of the social inequality one’s group is benefiting from, as legitimate. Consistent with previous research (Iyer & Ryan, 2009), perceived legitimacy in turn undermined support for action aimed at redressing the inequality. The effects of feeling wronged on action tendencies remained significant after considering the influence of key variables such as inequality perceptions and ingroup identification. Indeed, in Study 1b, perceiving one’s ingroup as advantaged predicted less intention to act for redressing the inequality. Neverthe- less, even considering the significant impact of inequality perceptions, feeling wronged still had a unique contribution to explaining advantaged group members intentions to address inequality they themselves benefit from.

We do note, however, that although the findings from the US sample (Study 1b) are much in line with our predictions, the results from the Italian sample in Study 1a should be interpreted with caution given that the majority of Italian participants did not feel wronged to begin with (scored mainly below the midpoint of the 7-point scale). This can potentially drive a different angle of interpretation, according to which among a sample of egalitarian participants, the less one feels wrongly accused for ethnic biases, the more illegitimate she or he perceives the inequality to be, which in turn increases support for action toward group-based equality. This interpre- tation, considering the reversed meaning of the variables, does not negate our proposed model. In fact, it demonstrates how, although in different intergroup contexts there may be different levels of feeling wronged determined by reality constrains, variations in the sense of feeling wronged predict legitimacy perceptions and action tendencies in a consistent and systematic direction.

A related limitation of Study 1 is its cross-sectional nature, which does not allow establishing the predicted casual path between feeling wronged and legitimacy appraisals. As stated earlier, given that both processes, the one specifying feeling wronged as leading to legitimacy views and the one specifying legitimacy views as leading to feeling wronged are theoreti- cally plausible, the only way to determine whether indeed feeling wronged drives legitimacy perceptions is to manipulate it experimentally.2 Our goal in Study 2 was therefore to

establish the causal role of feeling wronged in predicting legit- imacy perceptions and action tendencies.

STUDY 2

In this study, we manipulated a sense of feeling wronged by emphasizing unfair blame directed toward the advantaged ingroup and examined whether this type of manipulation would cause less action tendencies through the mediating role of legitimacy perceptions. Our second aim in Study 2 was to extend our investigation to a non-student sample in a context that involves a more political and consequential conflict. To this end, Study 2 was conducted among a diverse sample of Israeli-Jews and focused on Jewish-Arab relations in Israel. Re- lations between Jews and Arabs in Israel are marked by vast in- equality and also by negative orientations associated with mutual anxiety and threat (Halperin, 2008), rendering it a rather fertile context for inducing a sense of feeling wronged.

Method

Participants

Participants were 55 Jewish-Israelis (25 men and 30 women; Mage = 33.77 years, SD = 14.11) who were passengers on a train. The majority of them indicated being of average SES (66%), 27% indicated being above average and the rest (7%) reported being lower than average. In terms of education, 2% indicated having an elementary level education, 36% of partic- ipants had a high school diploma, 44% had a BA, and 18% had a higher degree.

Procedure, Manipulation, and Measures

Participants were approached by an experimenter who asked them to fill out a short survey about social issues pertaining to education. Those who agreed to participate were randomly assigned to either the feeling wronged condition or the control condition. The questionnaire included a short introductory page followed by the manipulation, and all dependent measures.

To manipulate a sense of feeling wronged, we presented participants with an alleged article recently published in the mainstream media in which Arab organizations were de- scribed as blaming Israeli academic institutions for discrim- ination (e.g., “Academic institutions give unprecedented privileges to released soldiers, including tuition funds and housing opportunities, which are not available for Arabs who do not serve in the army”). These claims were followed by the universities’ response, which included several popular counter arguments aimed at instilling a sense of unfair blame among par- ticipants (e.g., “There are proven efforts to include Arabs in the academic institutions in Israel. . .The number of Arab students is increasing every year, and in some departments it reaches the number of Jewish students. . .The accusations are simply inaccu- rate when judged against reality”).

In the control condition, the article described the higher education system in Israel involving both universities and colleges, and provided information about the make-up of students in this system including Jewish students, Arab students, and

2When examining the reversed mediation model linking legitimacy percep- tions to action tendencies via a sense of feeling wronged, we found the indirect effect to be significant, although weaker in size than in the original analysis, for both Study 1a (a * b = �0.09, 95% CI [ �0.02, �0.24]) and 1b (a * b = �0.03, 95% CI [�0.004, �0.07]).

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foreign students. This way, in both conditions, participants read about higher education in Israel in the context of intergroup relations, but only in the feeling wronged condition they were further primed with the problem of discrimination for which their ingroup was unfairly blamed.

After reading the article, participants were asked to answer some general questions about the Israeli society. Legitimacy perceptions (a = .93) and action tendencies (a = .83) were measured with the same items used in Study 1a, adapted to the Israeli context. Following these outcome measures, we assessed the effectiveness of our manipulation with the following items: “Is there an attempts to blame the Israeli academia in enacting discrimination against Arabs?” and “Are the Israeli institutions unfairly blamed for being discrimina- tory?”, r(53) = .74, p < .001, followed by demographic information (age, sex, SES, and education).

Results and Discussion

As intended by our manipulation, participants in the feeling wronged condition perceived their group to be unfairly blamed for problems related to discrimination (M =5.03, SD= 1.84), more than participants in the control condition (M = 2.5, SD = 1.52), F(1, 51) = 29.79, p < .001, �2p = 0.37.

To test whether our manipulation of feeling wronged undermined action tendencies through legitimacy perceptions, we next tested the same mediation model as in Study 1, only that the independent variable was our manipulation (feeling wronged = 1; control = 0). Consistent with Study 1, feeling wronged predicted stronger legitimacy perceptions (M = 4.22, SD = 1.53 vs. M = 3.30, SD = 1.94; b = 0.92, SE = 0.47, t = 1.93, p = .059) and weaker action tendencies (M = 2.29, SD= 1.35 vs. M = 3.17, SD= 1.80; b = �0.88, SE= 0.44, t = �2.02, p = .048); legitimacy perceptions were associated with less in- tention to partake in action for redressing inequality (b = �0.52, SE = 0.16, t = �4.89, p = .000). Moreover, the effect of feeling wronged on action tendencies was reduced in size af- ter legitimacy perceptions were entered into the model (b = �0.41, SE = 0.38, t = �1.08, p = .284) such that the medi- ated path from feeling wronged to action tendencies through legitimacy perceptions was significant, a * b = �0.48, 95% CI [�1.18, �0.01]. Thus, Study 2 provided experimental sup- port for feeling wronged as driving legitimacy perceptions and, consequentially, action tendencies.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Whereas much of the research on the psychological experience of inequality has focused on members of disadvantaged groups (see Walker & Smith, 2002; van Zomeren et al., 2008, for reviews), far less is known about the psychological experience of relative advantage. In the current work, we join emerging research on the psychology of the advantaged (Iyer & Leach, 2010; Leach et al., 2002, 2006, 2007) by identifying a somewhat paradoxical, yet powerful, experience of feeling wronged, a sense of being unfairly blamed for harboring conse- quential group-based biases. This experience is paradoxical because it coexists with a clear acknowledgment of one’s group

social advantage, which implies privilege and better social treat- ment. Indeed, we showed that members of advantaged groups rate themselves as having a social advantage, and privileges, yet at the same time, many of them (particularly in the USA) experience their group as unfairly treated in society.

We found evidence for the experience of feeling wronged in vastly different intergroup contexts, USA, Israel, and to a lesser extent, Italy. Across these different contexts (and also in Italy where overall levels of feeling wronged were low), to the extent that members of advantaged groups felt wronged, they saw the inequality they benefit from as more legitimate and in turn had less intentions to partake in actions that would redress it. This process maps on perfectly to an individual sense of feeling wronged (Zitek et al., 2010), which was shown to cause a sense of entitlement to positive outcomes and, in turn, to drive selfish behavior. Importantly, our hypothesized process remained signifi- cant after controlling for potent predictors of support for equality, such as ingroup identification, and inequality perceptions. Moreover, we obtained evidence for the causal effect of feeling wronged on legitimacy perceptions and action tendencies.

These findings demonstrate that legitimacy appraisals and associated action intentions are not necessarily rooted in a sense of inverted relative deprivation (Leach et al., 2007; see also Pettigrew & Riley, 1971) or in a particular competition with the outgroup on who is more victimized (Noor et al., 2012). Indeed, we demonstrated that legitimacy appraisals and related action tendencies can be rooted in feeling advantaged, yet unfairly treated. Moreover, outgroup prejudice, which was shown to fuel a sense of inverted relative deprivation and is much related to competitive victimhood, may become less rele- vant for driving a sense of feeling wronged—which can be instigated by a variety of social forces (not necessarily the outgroup) who accuses the advantaged group for racism or ethnocentrism. As such, feeling wronged does not “require” a sense of deprivation, competitive victimhood, or hostility to- ward a particular outgroup—but is rather focused on accusations that are experienced as unfair.

In turn, feeling wronged drives legitimacy perceptions because framing the hierarchy as legitimate can serve to protect the threat- ened image of the ingroup—a threat that is elicited by feeling falsely accused for being racist. By viewing the hierarchy, and one’s associated privileges, as legitimate, advantaged group members can counteract accusations portraying them as essen- tially immoral. Because the sense of feeling wronged is focused on unfair accusations, and has little to do with the position of a rel- evant outgroup, it can be rather easily instilled within members of advantaged groups and may further shape relevant opposition for government redress. For example, politicians can emphasize a sense of unfair treatment among members of (undoubtedly) dominant social groups and as a result legitimize the ingroup’s dominance and stabilize the status quo. This can serve as an explanation for why in different contexts, the political discourse about race and immigration strategy seems to emphasize unfair treatment toward members of the relatively advantaged race/ ethnicity (e.g., the Tea Party in the USA; McGarthy, 2010).

Indeed, given the potential strategic function of the sense of feeling wronged, one of the most important next steps in future research would be to understand what might drive this experience in the first place. We suspect that one set of variables lies in general orientation toward hierarchy, as can be measured by

When the powerful feels wronged 297

social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Specifically, believing that it is acceptable to have some groups dominate others could exacerbate the feeling that one’s group is unfairly blamed for racial or ethnic problems— perceptions which may in turn feed into the further legitimization of the hierarchy. Another antecedent that could be explored refers to a history of victimhood among the advantaged group (e.g., Jews in Israel)—groups who have a general psychological sense of victimhood may be more susceptible to experience themselves as currently wronged. A different set of variables that may shape the feeling wronged experience relate to a focus on the experience of the outgroup as a disadvantaged party. The sense of feeling wronged seems to be powerful because of its inward focus. ndeed, because it is not rooted in a comparative sense of victimhood or deprivation, it might exist without even know- ing the disadvantages that the outgroup endures. It could be useful to examine whether focusing attention on the outgroup’s position (Richard & Wright, 2010) would undermine a sense of feeling wronged.

In conclusion, in the current work, we point to a unique psychological experience among those belonging to socially advantaged groups. We show that in the same way that individ- uals who feel unfairly treated become entitled and selfish, group members who perceive their group as unfairly treated become entitled to their advantages and less active for redressing in- equality. Our findings complement and extend recent theories in the area of the advantaged groups’ psychology (Leach et al., 2002; Iyer & Leach, 2010) and have implications for informing interventions aimed at motivating individuals to support and join efforts that could delegitimize and thereby challenge existing social inequalities.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research was supported by Marie Curie FP7 Reintegra- tion Grant awarded by the European Union to the first author. Portions of this data were presented at the 2012 EASP Small Group Meeting on Intergroup Reconciliation, Sarajevo, Bos- nia and Herzegovina.

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