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C H A P T E R 6PRESIDENTIALNOMINATING POLITICS
CHAPTER CONTENTS
Methods of Delegate Selection
• State Delegate Selection Procedures Must Conform to National Party Rules
• Presidential Primaries
• State Party Caucuses and Conventions
• Combination Presidential Primary and Caucus Systems
• Automatic Unpledged Delegates
Phases of the Nomination Process
• Phase 1: Laying the Groundwork and Preliminary Skirmishing: The “Invisible Primary”
• Phase 2: Delegate Selection: The Early Contests and the Consequences of Front-Loading
• Phase 3: Delegate Selection: The Later Primaries and Caucuses
• Phase 4: The Convention: Ratifying the Decision of the Primaries and Kicking Off the General Election Campaign
The Ongoing Process of Party Reform
• The Reformed Democrats
• The Unreformed Republicans
• Campaign Finance: The Federal Election Campaign Act
Participation in Presidential Nominating Politics
• Voter Turnout in Presidential Primaries
• Participation in Caucuses/Conventions
• National Convention Delegates
143
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Media Politics in Presidential Nominations
A Lengthy, Candidate-Centered, Primary-Focused, Participatory, and Media-Oriented Process
Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey won the 1968 Democratic presidential nomi- nation even though he did not open his campaign until March of that year or enter a single presidential primary. Instead, he depended upon his support among party leaders. If 2008 had been like 1968, there is little doubt that Hillary Clinton would have been the Democratic Party s nominee for president. Indeed, as early as 2004, it was clear that Hillary Clinton would compete for the presidential nomination in 2008 and she spent the next two years quietly building a sizeable campaign organi- zation that raised enormous sums of money and attracted widespread support from party leaders. By the end of 2007, Clinton was well ahead of the field in the polls and even farther ahead when it came to endorsements from the Democratic Party elite. But it was first-term Senator Barack Obama who would accept the Democratic Party s nomination at the national convention in Colorado nine months later.
Such is the nature of the modern presidential nomination system. A process once heavily dominated by party leaders, who influenced the selection of national conven- tion delegates, is now more candidate centered. A process that once relied upon inter- nal party procedures to select delegates through caucuses and conventions now relies primarily upon presidential primaries to determine the allocation of delegates among contenders for a party s nomination. Participation was once restricted to party regu- lars in the caucus and convention states and to primary voters in a few primary states. Today, the competition for the presidential nomination is an open and participatory process characterized by mass citizen involvement in primaries and open access to party caucuses. Now that the presidential primaries and some caucuses receive satura- tion media coverage, the media has far-reaching influence concerning who ultimately wins a nomination. Presidential nominating politics of the twenty-first century is can- didate centered, primary focused, participatory, and media intensive.
METHODS OF DELEGATE SELECTION
The national nominating conventions held in the summer of presidential election years are the culmination of a long season of campaigning to select national con- vention delegates. The delegates, meeting in convention, nominate the party s candi- dates for president and vice president, adopt a platform, and approve rules that will govern the party. The composition of the convention, of course, determines the nature of the decisions the convention will make on the nominations, platform, and rules. The processes of delegate selection, therefore, are critical to the outcomes of the convention.
There are three principal methods of delegate selection: (1) the presidential pri- mary; (2) the party caucus/convention process; and (3) automatic selection by virtue of the party or elected position an individual holds. Both parties use the presidential primary and caucus/convention selection processes, but only the Democrats have automatic delegates (see Figure 6.1). The various states are free to devise their
144 CH A PTER 6
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own methods of delegate selection as long as those methods conform to guidelines contained in the rules of the national Republican and Democratic parties. The pro- cedures for selection of delegates are frequently set forth in state statutes, which may be supplemented by state party rules. In the absence of state statutes governing delegate selection, state parties may adopt rules to determine how delegates will be chosen. Because each state legislature and/or state party organization is involved in devising the procedures for delegate selection, practices followed within the states vary widely.
STATE DELEGATE SELECTION PROCEDURES MUST CONFORM TO NATIONAL PARTY RULES Although the states have some latitude in determining how their delegates to na- tional conventions will be chosen, the procedures they devise must be in strict con- formity with national party rules. In other words, national party rules take precedence over state statutes and state party rules in matters of delegate selection. A state delegation that is not chosen in conformity with national party rules runs the risk of not having its delegation seated at the national convention a severe sanction that the national party can impose.
The most celebrated instance of conflict between a state party and its national organization over the delegate selection procedures took place in Wisconsin. In 1903, Wisconsin was the first state to adopt a presidential primary law, but it was a law that also provided for conducting the presidential primary under open primary procedures. After 1974, Democratic national party rules forbad selecting delegates through open primary procedures, and thus Wisconsin s law was out of conformity with national party rules. Wisconsin sought to maintain its open primary, but the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the right of a national party organi- zation to determine delegate selection procedures.1 Wisconsin Democrats, there- fore, were forced in 1984 to abandon the open presidential primary for selecting their convention delegates and adopt caucus procedures that satisfied the national Democratic Party. In an effort to put this often bitter controversy behind it and prepare for the 1988 elections, the Democratic National Committee in 1986 agreed to permit states with open primary traditions (Wisconsin and Montana) to use open presidential primaries. While making this accommodation to Wisconsin, the DNC continued to assert its power to regulate delegate selection procedures.
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES The largest share of convention delegates is chosen through procedures that involve presidential primaries. In 2008, thirty-six Democratic presidential primaries were used to allocate delegates among presidential candidates while the Republicans used primaries in 38 states. These primaries determined the allocation of over two- thirds of the delegates selected to either convention. The number of states and terri- tories using the presidential primaries has increased significantly since 1968, when fifteen Republican and Democratic primaries were used in the selection of 39.1 per- cent of the delegates (see Figure 6.2). However, the number of primaries held in any
146 CH A PTER 6
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given presidential election year has been subject to considerable variation depending on political conditions. For example, in 2004, there were only thirty-one primaries used to select Republican delegates due to the fact that George W. Bush was unop- posed for his party s nomination.
Most presidential primaries are funded and operated by the state governments. However, facing budget shortfalls in 2004, seven states that had previously funded presidential primaries passed legislation canceling that funding for the 2004 campaign. Parties in these states were forced to either fund and operate their own primaries (as the state Democratic parties in Michigan, Utah, and South Carolina do) or change their process to a caucus system (which happened in Colorado, Kansas, Maine, and North Dakota). Therefore, despite having a highly competitive nomination campaign in 2004, there were fewer Democratic presidential primaries compared to 2000.
With the largest share of the delegates selected through procedures that involve presidential primaries, it has become imperative for presidential candidates to enter virtually all of the primaries in order to win sufficient delegates to gain a conven- tion majority. The importance of the primaries, however, goes beyond the number of delegates that are at stake in these contests. The results of primaries constitute an ostensibly objective indicator of a candidate s ability to win the election. Primaries are thus particularly important because of the image of candidate popularity, elect- ability, and momentum they can convey.
The mechanics of the presidential primaries vary from state to state depending upon applicable state laws and party rules. For example, in some states the names of
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Democratic Delegates
Republican Delegates
FIGURE 6.2 | NUMBER OF STATES HOLDING PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES, 1912 2008 Source: C. C. Euchner, J. Maltese, and M. Nelson (2002). Development of the Presidential Electoral Process: The Primary System. In Guide to the Presidency (vol. 1). Washington: CQ Press. Information for 2004 and 2008 comes from DNC and RNC.
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS 147
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individuals who are running for delegate positions are on the ballot and voters vote directly for delegates. In other states, the names of the presidential candidates are on the ballot, but the names of persons seeking to be delegates are not. There is normally a contest for delegates in each congressional district and an additional contest to deter- mine how the delegates who will represent the state at large will be allocated among the presidential candidates. A presidential candidate, therefore, can lose the statewide vote and fail to win any at-large delegates and still pick up delegates by making a strong showing in the primaries of individual congressional districts within a state.
Depending upon state laws and party rules, the states also vary in terms of which voters are allowed to participate in the primaries. These rules governing primary par- ticipation can affect the outcome of primaries. National Democratic rules mandate that Democratic primaries must be closed (only registered Democrats can vote) or semi-open (only Democrats or those registered as independents can vote). National Republican rules impose no such limitations on participation, and states are free to use open (any registered voter can vote), closed, or semi-open primaries. In 2008, the
BOX 6.1 MICHIGAN AND ARIZONA TAKE PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES ONLINE
In 2004, the Michigan State Democratic Party invited citizens to cast their ballots for the party-run presidential primary in person, by mail, or over the Internet. It was only the second time that Internet voting had been offered in a binding statewide primary, the first being the Arizona Democratic primary in 2000, which was not competitive since it was held after Bill Bradley left the race. While Howard Dean and Wesley Clark embraced Internet voting in Michigan, many of the other candidates opposed the option, at least partly because they believed it favored Dean, whose campaign was considered the most Internet-savvy. Yet once the DNC agreed to allow Michigan to offer the Internet option, the candidates did their best to take advantage of it. Some candidates arranged to have laptops brought to the workplaces of their union supporters to have them apply for Internet ballots during their lunch breaks. Most of the contenders included links on their Web sites to allow supporters to easily apply for their Internet ballots. Voters casting ballots by mail or online could cast their ballots at any time before the official primary date on February 7.
Ultimately, 46,543 voters cast their ballots online, which was over one-fourth of the total electorate for the primary. This was nearly twice as many voters as those who cast their ballots by mail, though more than half of all votes were cast in person. While the experiment in Internet voting was largely viewed as a success because of the lack of any serious reported problems, some detractors continued to question the fairness of the method. These concerns largely relate to the digital divide in the United States poorer citizens are less likely to have access to the Internet than those who are more wealthy. As Al Sharpton explained prior to the Michigan primary, If someone can vote in the warmth of their living room, but a grandmother has to go down four flights of stairs and out into the cold, that s not an even playing field. The Michigan Democratic Party scrapped its online voting program for the 2008 primary, leaving the fate of Internet voting in doubt for the near future.
Source: Katharine Q. Seelye, Michigan s Online Ballot Spurs New Strategies for Democrats, New York Times, January 10, 2004.
148 CH A PTER 6
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fact that New Hampshire has a semi-open primary had a significant effect on the Re- publican contest. Senator John McCain (Ariz.) needed a victory in New Hampshire to sustain his campaign and build momentum. Exit polls indicated that McCain was able to defeat Mitt Romney in the primary largely because independents made up more than one-third of the electorate and he easily carried that group. Romney appeared to narrowly win among self-identified Republicans, indicating that McCain may have lost if the state held a closed primary.
STATE PARTY CAUCUSES AND CONVENTIONS Until the 1972 conventions, a majority of the states used state party caucuses and conventions to select delegates. For example, in 1968 almost two-thirds of the dele- gates to national conventions were chosen via party caucuses and conventions. This procedure involves a relatively small proportion of the electorate. It is party mem- bers and activists who normally have the interest, motivation, and knowledge to participate in the series of party meetings that culminate in the congressional district and state party meetings to choose delegates.
In caucus/convention states, the process of delegate selection involves a progres- sion of party meetings starting at the local level, running through the congressional district, and culminating in a state party convention. The process normally begins with local caucuses at either the precinct or county level. Party members and activists attend these meetings, often after having been mobilized by presidential candidate or- ganizations or interest groups. Local caucus participants register their candidate prefer- ences and also elect representatives to the congressional district caucus, the next level of party meetings in the process. At the congressional district caucus, representa- tives chosen by the various local caucuses meet to (1) register their preference for the party s presidential nominee; (2) elect delegates to the national convention to represent the congressional district; and (3) elect delegates to the state party convention. The national convention delegates selected to represent the congressional district at the national convention are chosen to reflect the extent of support candidates for the pres- idency have among the congressional district caucus participants. Delegates from the various congressional districts in a state then meet in a state party convention to elect national convention delegates to represent the state at large.
Because the caucus system is an internal party process, it places a premium on a candidate having dedicated supporters the type of people who are willing to spend evenings and weekends taking part in lengthy party meetings. It also requires an effec- tive organization to mobilize people to turn out and support the candidate at each stage in the process. It is essential that a presidential candidate s organization have in- timate knowledge of the state laws and party rules for delegate selection and of intra- party politics. Whereas presidential primaries are media oriented in order to appeal to a mass electorate, the caucus/convention process is more of an intraparty affair that requires an efficient organization.
COMBINATION PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY AND CAUCUS SYSTEMS Some states use a combination of the presidential primary and party caucus to choose their national convention delegates. In 2008, the Texas Democrats held a presidential
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS 149
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primary during the day on March 4th, and then party caucuses that evening. Approximately two-thirds of the delegates were allocated according to the results of the primary, which Hillary Clinton narrowly won. An additional one-third of the de- legates were allocated according to the results of the caucuses, which Barack Obama captured. Occasionally, states hold presidential primaries that are purely popularity contests and that have no binding effect on delegate selection, because the delegates are actually chosen in party caucuses and conventions. In 2004, the District of Columbia held the first primary of the presidential campaign on January 13th, but it was purely non-binding and had no effect on the selection of delegates.
AUTOMATIC UNPLEDGED DELEGATES In an effort to increase convention participation by party leaders and elected officials, the Democrats for their 1984 convention made provision in their rules for granting automatic delegate status to major party leaders and elected officials. These delegates are not officially pledged to any presidential candidate, though they may choose to informally announce their intention to vote for a particular candidate. Under Demo- cratic rules, national committee members, state party chairs and vice chairs, and Democratic governors are automatically convention delegates, as are Democratic members of the U.S. House and Senate. Designation of the congressional delegates is made by the House and Senate Democratic caucuses. In 2008, about one-fifth of the Democratic delegates were such super delegates. There are no automatic delegates to Republican national conventions. Republican Party leaders and elected officials must go through the regular primary and caucus procedures in order to become delegates.
Reporter Roger Simon wrote in 2008 that At the beginning of the 2008 cam- paign, very few people even knew what a super delegate was. It was like the Electoral College before the 2000 election. Who cared? 2 Of course, the 2008 Democratic nomination campaign changed all of that. As I discuss later in this chapter, neither Barack Obama nor Hillary Clinton was able to win enough elected delegates in pri- maries and caucuses to clinch a majority of Democratic delegates. Thus, automatic delegates were ultimately responsible for breaking the stalemate, with most pledging their support for Obama, who had won a majority of the elected delegates. While these automatic delegates played a decisive role in the 2008 campaign, few relished having to publicly decide between two prominent figures in the party. The Demo- cratic rank-and-file were no more happy about a system that gave party leaders such influence. Thus, in 2009, the Democratic National Committee began the process of revising their rules to remove the voting rights of automatic delegates. Automatic delegates may continue to be invited to Democratic conventions in future presidential election years, but their role will be to watch the voting, not to take part in it.
PHASES OF THE NOMINATION PROCESS
Achieving a presidential nomination has become a full-time, often four-year, en- deavor. The lengthy and often intense schedule of the presidential nominating pro- cess can be broken down into a series of phases that culminate with the national convention.3
150 CH A PTER 6
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BOX 6.2 ATTENTION TO DETAIL: HOW UNDERSTANDING THE RULES HELPED OBAMA WIN THE NOMINATION IN 2008
One of the important stories of the 2008 race for the Democratic nomination was the ability of the Obama campaign to develop a sophisticated strategy for maximizing the number of delegates he would win in every state. This excerpt from Roger Simon s review of the campaign tells part of that story:
[Obama advisors Jeffrey] Berman, and [David] Plouffe [had] been making very spe- cific plans since April 2007 about winning delegates. They both knew the media would concentrate on states won: Who would win Iowa? Who would win New Hampshire? That often determined the outcome right there. One candidate wins and knocks out the others, who run out of money, Berman said. But you don t know in advance if there will be a knockout. By the end of January 2008, there was going to be no early knockout. The candidates were splitting victories and defeats (though some were more dramatic than others), and the status of Michigan and Florida was going to remain in limbo.
[ ]
The Obama campaign decided it would not contest every state at stake on Super Tuesday. It saw no point in making an effort in Bill Clinton s home state of Arkansas, for example. But in one of the most crucial decisions of the campaign, the Obama forces decided winning wasn t everything. We determined how to contest the states we expected to lose, Berman said. [ ] We took a look at the congres- sional districts, projected winning margins and competed where we thought we could limit her margins to what we could live with, Berman said. We wanted to hold Hillary s margin to the smallest number of delegates possible. She would win a state, but not achieve a large delegate advantage.
Illinois and New York, the two home states of the candidates, were a good test of this strategy. Both candidates would, of course, win their home states. New York had 232 delegates at stake and Illinois had 153 delegates at stake, which meant that Hillary had what seemed to be a 79-delegate advantage going into Feb. 5. But that s not how it came out. We got 197 delegates out of the two states, and she got 188, Berman said. This was quite an accomplishment.
Now take two other Feb. 5 states, Idaho and New Jersey. Idaho? Did the Clinton campaign care from Idaho? It did not. To the Clinton campaign, Idaho was an odd place that had more potatoes than people, and it was also a caucus state, which the Clintons hated. New Jersey was a different matter. It bordered New York, it was a primary state and it was Clinton Country. But the Obama campaign targeted key congressional districts in New Jersey to keep Hillary s victory margin there as small as possible. In Idaho, we had a 15-3 win in terms of delegates, and in New Jersey, she had a 59-48 win, Berman said. Do the math. Obama gets a 12-delegate net win out of Idaho tiny, weird, potato-infested Idaho and Hillary gets only an 11-delegate net win out of New Jersey. So we got a greater net gain out of Idaho than she got in New Jersey, Berman said.
Source: Roger Simon, Relentless Politico (August 25, 2008): http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0808/ 12732.html
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS 151
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PHASE 1: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK AND PRELIMINARY SKIRMISHING: THE INVISIBLE PRIMARY During the period following a presidential election, prospective candidates for a presidential nomination four years hence begin the planning and preparations for their campaigns. This frequently involves recruiting a professional staff experienced in national politics, creating a political action committee (PAC) and tax-exempt foundation to fund candidate activities, and developing a campaign plan. Candidates crisscross the nation making appearances before the state party conventions, civic groups, trade associations, unions, and other candidates fund-raisers in an attempt to gain media attention and make contacts with party leaders. Iowa and New Hampshire are inevitable and are frequent stops on the campaign itinerary of presidential candidates, because these states hold critical early events in the national convention delegate selection process.
The extent of early campaign preparations and activity were already evident as early as 2005 among prospective candidates for the nominations in 2008.4
Since his loss to Bush in 2000, John McCain had been targeting 2008 as his oppor- tunity to emerge as the front-runner for the Republican nomination. He was a con- stant presence on television in 2005 and 2006, appearing more than any other potential presidential candidate. McCain also gave the commencement speech at Reverend Jerry Falwell s Liberty University in 2006, an act seemingly aimed at courting religious conservatives in the Republican Party. Massachusetts Gover- nor Mitt Romney, also considered a contender for the 2008 Republican nomina- tion, spent 2005 and 2006 traveling extensively to the three states thought to be most pivotal for securing the nomination New Hampshire, Iowa, and South Carolina.
On the Democratic side, the early assumed front-runner was Senator Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.). Clinton s first task was to win an easy reelection as New York s senator in 2006; a tough reelection campaign would signal weakness for her presi- dential aspirations. To accomplish this, however, she had to avoid any overt indica- tions that she was campaigning for the Democratic nomination; thus, she carefully avoided traveling to Iowa and New Hampshire in 2005 and 2006. In the meantime, however, she concentrated on raising massive amounts of money for her reelection campaign over $50 million despite the fact that her Senate race was not expected to be competitive. Any money not spent on her reelection could be trans- ferred and used for her presidential campaign, a fact that put her well ahead of other potential candidates for the nomination in fund-raising. John Edwards also sought to capitalize on his good showing in the 2004 Democratic primaries and his presence on the 2004 Democratic ticket by becoming a frequent visitor to New Hampshire and Iowa during 2005 and 2006.
The pace of presidential campaigning intensifies during the year of the midterm elections, as the candidates seek to play a prominent role in assisting their parties in congressional, senatorial, and state elections. There are appearances at fund-raisers for party candidates from Maine to California. Most of the major contenders have their own personal PACs, which fund their campaign forays and provide contribu- tions to state and congressional candidates. Hillary Clinton s HILLPAC donated over $100,000 to thirty-one Democratic House candidates and $170,000 to
152 CH A PTER 6
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twenty-one Senate candidates in 2006. The strategy is to create a sense of obligation among officeholders that can be converted later into commitments of support for the presidential nomination.
During the year preceding the presidential election, the pace of campaigning accelerates, with frequent visits to key primary states. One of the staples of this phase of the campaign has been appearances at state party conventions, which oc- casionally conduct straw polls informal votes of candidate popularity among the delegates. These tests of popularity among party activists are used by the candidates to demonstrate support for the nomination. Of course, they carry little real value when it comes to judging the prospects of a candidate. After all, Ron Paul fared quite well in many straw polls held before the 2008 Republican nomination race; yet, he flopped when actual votes were cast, winning just thirty-five delegates.
It is also essential in the year before the presidential primaries begin for candi- dates to raise serious money for their nomination campaigns. Two types of candidates have special advantages in raising campaign war chests candidates with national stature and those who can compensate for a lack of national stature through access to well-heeled constituencies. For example, Hillary Clinton s visibility and sta- tus as former first lady and the senator of one of the largest states gave her a fund- raising advantage in the run-up to the 2008 Democratic nomination battle, and of course President Obama can be expected to take full advantage of his position to har- vest early money for his renomination and reelection campaigns in 2012.
The importance of early fund-raising is clear: From 1980 to 2000, no candidate that had led their competitors in fund-raising on December 31 of the year before the presidential election failed to go on to win the nomination. Yet, while raising large sums of money is still important, recent history suggests that it might not be critical to lead in fund-raising. Howard Dean led the fund-raising race among Democrats at the end of 2003, but ended up losing the nomination to John Kerry in 2004. At the end of 2007, Hillary Clinton led all Democrats in money raised while Mitt Romney was ahead of the Republican field. Neither candidate won his or her party s nomination.
It appears as though raising large sums of money is a necessity for mounting a serious campaign for the party s nomination, but it is no guarantee of success. Clinton built a substantial war chest prior to entering the presidential race in 2007 and continued to add substantial sums through the rest of the year. But Obama was raising large sums as well, albeit in a very different way. While Clinton was relying mostly on traditional Democratic donors who could give the maximum contribu- tion to her campaign ($2,300 per donor for the primary campaign), Obama was attracting large numbers of small donors. When the first campaign finance reports were filed in April, 2007, the Washington Post reported that Obama had stunned political observers by keeping pace with Clinton s fund-raising during the first three months of the invisible primary. Obama s early fund-raising success did not fade either. In fact, Obama continued to keep pace with Clinton throughout the year and by the fall it was clear that the Democratic nomination would effectively be a two candidate race, with both candidates boasting tremendous war chests. Despite their own credentials, John Edwards and Bill Richardson were simply not able to keep up with Obama and Clinton, which served to diminish the seriousness of their candidacies (see Figure 6.3).
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS 153
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PHASE 2: DELEGATE SELECTION: THE EARLY CONTESTS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF FRONT-LOADING The early contests for delegates are important not only because of the number of delegates at stake but also because of the benefits that attach to doing well in these events. Events of critical importance are the Iowa caucuses, the first major delegate selection event of the season, and the New Hampshire primary, which is by state statute the first in the nation. Each normally receives saturation news coverage. The results of these early contests establish front-runners for the nomination and begin the process of narrowing the field of candidates. Those who do well in these events gain publicity, standing in the polls, increased fund-raising capacity, and support from influential party leaders. Those who falter in the early contests find that their poll ratings, fund-raising, and support from prominent leaders all dimin- ish, and many are forced to drop out of the race.
The early stage of the primary and caucus season has been described as the me- dia fishbowl phase of the presidential nominating campaign.5 It is a time when the electronic and print media have their greatest impact through their allocation of cov- erage to the candidates and their assessments of who won and who lost delegate se- lection contests. These assessments help to winnow the field of candidates. What matters most in the early contests is how the results of the primaries and caucuses are interpreted. Specifically, candidates seek to meet or exceed the expectations
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FIGURE 6.3 | FUNDRAISING BY CANDIDATES FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIALNOMINATION IN 2007 Source: Federal Election Commission.
154 CH A PTER 6
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that have been set by the news media. In 2004, Howard Dean s campaign never recovered from his failure to meet the media s high expectations for him in Iowa. Alternatively, John Kerry and John Edwards exceeded expectations in Iowa by finishing first and second in the caucuses, and, accordingly, they became front- runners for the Democratic nomination. In 2008, the failure of either Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama to meet the news media s expectations in Iowa and New Hampshire, respectively, led to a protracted six-month nomination struggle.
THE IOWA CAUCUSES AND NEW HAMPSHIRE PRIMARY In the lore of presidential nominating politics, the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary, normally the opening events of the delegate selection season in a presidential election year, are seen as an opportunity for candidates to establish momentum for winning their party s nomi- nation. These events have also been viewed as an opportunity for underdog and lesser-known candidates to focus resources on small states and, if they are suc- cessful, to use the media attention and jump in their poll standings to gain the support needed to win future primaries. The classic example of a little-known, underdog candidate who used the momentum gained from his early successes in Iowa and New Hampshire to win future primaries and his party s 1976 nomina- tion was the then-former Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter. More recently, how- ever, winning the Iowa caucuses and/or the New Hampshire primary has not necessarily been the ticket to a presidential nomination. Indeed, Hillary Clinton won the New Hampshire primary in 2008, but eventually lost her bid for the Democratic nomination. The decline in importance of the Iowa caucuses, and especially the New Hampshire primary, is attributable mostly to front-loading the concentrating of state presidential primaries and caucuses that select the bulk of the convention delegates during February and March of presidential election years.
The concentration of primaries and caucuses resulting from front-loading means that candidates must be equipped to compete in quick succession in a series of multistate primaries across the country after the New Hampshire primary. It is no longer possible to use the momentum of a win in Iowa and New Hampshire to create the support needed to win a nomination. The organizational and financial resources essential to compete in a primary-packed schedule from February through March must already be in place before the New Hampshire primary. (See the dis- cussion of front-loading and its effects later.) Thus, Barack Obama s 2008 victory in Iowa was critical to eventually propelling him to the Democratic nomination, but he was only able to fully capitalize on his caucus victory because he already had signifi- cant financial resources and a well-developed campaign organization.
Instead of predicting the winner of a nomination, the New Hampshire primary, as well as other early primaries, has played a role in winnowing the number of can- didates in the race; those who do poorly drop out for lack of support.6 Former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee s surprise victory in Iowa in 2008 vaulted him into prominence and allowed him to finish second for the Republican Party s nomination. At the same time, Mitt Romney s failure to win either Iowa or New Hampshire effectively toppled him the frontrunner position he had earned during the invisible primary period. And on the Democratic side, John Edwards chances of winning the nomination in 2008 were also thwarted when he failed to finish first in Iowa.
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS 155
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Iowa also played a pivotal role in the 2004 nomination campaign. Howard Dean entered the Iowa caucuses as the clear front-runner in public opinion polls, fund-raising, endorsements, and media coverage. On the other hand, John Kerry s campaign was struggling, and he concentrated his resources in Iowa in hopes of making a strong showing there. Kerry succeeded in scoring an unexpected victory by capturing 38 percent of the vote. Dean finished a disappointing third and made a bad night worse when the television stations kept replaying an awkward
scream that he unleashed during his concession speech. The consequences of the result in Iowa were clear in New Hampshire, where Kerry s prospects for vic- tory quickly improved and Dean s diminished. Dean held an 8 percent lead over Kerry on the day of the Iowa caucuses, but three days later he trailed Kerry by 13 points. Ultimately, Kerry won the New Hampshire primary and eventually secured the nomination by defeating Dean and John Edwards, who had also benefited by finishing second in Iowa. But the effect that Iowa had on the cam- paign in 2004 was clear: Kerry won a majority of convention delegates, followed by Edwards and Dean; the same order the candidates finished when the first votes were cast in Iowa on January 19th.
FRONT-LOADING THE PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES In 2008, more and more states engaged in a competition to move ahead the dates of their primaries in an effort to give their states electorates greater influence over the selection of presidential nominees. This process of bunching the primaries early in a presidential year has been dubbed front-loading. Thus, in 2008, following fast after New Hampshire s first-in-the-nation primary on January 8th, a series of single-state and multistate primaries followed in quick succes- sion, so that less than a month after the New Hampshire primary more than 50 per- cent of the delegates had been selected (Table 6.1 shows the high level of front-loading in 2008). This front-loading has become far more pronounced during recent decades. Figure 6.4 presents the percentage of Democratic Party delegates decided with each successive week after the New Hampshire primary in 1976, 2000, and 2004. Note that in 1976, the increase in delegates was gradual and a majority of delegates had not been chosen until ten weeks after the New Hampshire primary. In 2000 and 2004, a majority of the delegates were decided in half that time.
TABLE 6.1 FRONT-LOADING OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES, 2008
Date State Primary Number of Delegates at Stake
January 8 New Hampshire 23
January 15 Michigan 78.5
January 26 South Carolina Florida
46 105.5
John Edwards Withdraws
February 5 Super Tuesday Alabama Arizona Arkansas
53 57 36
continued
156 CH A PTER 6
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Date State Primary Number of Delegates at Stake
January 8 New Hampshire 12
January 15 Michigan 30
January 19 South Carolina 24
January 29 Florida 57
Date State Primary Number of Delegates at Stake
California Connecticut Delaware Georgia Illinois Massachusetts Missouri New Jersey New York Oklahoma Tennessee Utah
375 49 16 89
156 95 74
109 236 39 70 24
Majority of Convention Delegates Were Chosen by February 5 ———
February 9 Louisiana 57
February 12 Maryland Virginia
72 85
February 19 Wisconsin 76
March 4 Ohio Rhode Island Texas Vermont
143 22
198 16
March 11 Mississippi 34
April 22 Pennsylvania 161
May 6 Indiana North Carolina
74 117
May 13 West Virginia 29
May 20 Kentucky Oregon
52 53
June 3 Montana South Dakota
17 16
REPUBLICAN PRIMARIES
TABLE 6.1 FRONT-LOADING OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES, 2008 continued
continued
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Date State Primary Number of Delegates at Stake
Rudolph Giuliani Withdraws
February 5 Super Tuesday Alabama Arizona Arkansas California Connecticut Delaware Georgia Illinois Massachusetts Missouri New Jersey New York Oklahoma Tennessee Utah
48 53 34
173 30 18 72 70 43 58 52
101 41 55 36
Majority of Convention Delegates Were Chosen by February 5
Mitt Romney Withdraws
February 9 Louisiana 47
February 12 Maryland Virginia
37 63
February 19 Wisconsin Washington
40 40
March 4 Ohio Rhode Island Texas Vermont
88 20
140 17
Mike Huckabee Withdraws
McCain Wins a Majority of Convention Delegates
March 11 Mississippi 39
April 22 Pennsylvania 74
May 6 Indiana North Carolina
57 69
May 13 West Virginia 30
May 20 Kentucky Oregon
45 30
May 27 Idaho 32
June 3 New Mexico South Dakota
32 27
Note: Only primaries are listed.
TABLE 6.1 FRONT-LOADING OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES, 2008 continued
158 CH A PTER 6
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Front-loading of the primary process has the effect of favoring candidates who have the following characteristics:
They have public visibility and name recognition. They are well organized on a nationwide basis and thus are capable of mounting primary campaigns in a number of states simultaneously and in quick succession. They have ample financial resources.
The importance of these traits was clearly evident in 2008, when both Obama (on the Democratic side) and Huckabee (on the Republican side) finished better than expected in Iowa. But it was Obama who was able to capitalize on this suc- cess, largely because he possessed far greater financial resources and national orga- nization than Huckabee did.
The Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary feature retail politics direct selling of candidates through extensive personal contact with voters. But after New Hampshire s primary, the nominating terrain changes dramatically, and the style of campaigning becomes wholesale politics reaching the mass electorate through heavy reliance on media advertising in a number of states simultaneously as groups of states hold their primaries in rapid succession. Candidates with limited resources who focus their efforts on a single early contest such as Iowa s caucuses can at times achieve victories (e.g., Mike Huckabee in 2008). But in a heavily front- loaded system, these victories can seldom be sustained, because the candidates are not equipped to compete on a nationwide basis against their better organized and financed opponents.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
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109876543210 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Weeks after New Hampshire Primary
Pe rc
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D ec
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2000
1976
FIGURE 6.4 | COMPARISON OF FRONT-LOADING IN THE 1976, 2000, AND 2004DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION CAMPAIGNS Source: Democratic National Committee.
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS 159
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The 2004 Democratic nomination campaign demonstrated that front-loading has often caused nominations to be decided early in the delegate selection process. Despite having several qualified candidates in the field, it took only five weeks after the New Hampshire primary for Kerry to force his only serious competitors out of the race. Indeed, the race was decided before more than twenty states had even held either primaries or caucuses to select national convention delegates. Similarly, the 1996 and 2000 nominations were clinched by the eventual nominees before mid- March. As Table 6.2 shows, there has been a trend toward early clinching of nomi- nations as front-loading of the primaries and caucuses has intensified. But Table 6.2 also points to the anomaly of the 2008 Democratic nomination, which was not decided until the final states cast their votes in June.
In 2008, the national parties paid a great deal of consideration to the issue of their nomination calendars. The Democratic National Committee ruled that their nomination calendar would begin on February 5, but they made exceptions to allow Iowa and New Hampshire to hold their elections in January. The DNC also allowed
TABLE 6.2 TREND TOWARD EARLY CAPTURE OF PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS: THE DATES ON WHICH PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES GAINED A MAJORITY OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION DELEGATES, 1972 2008
Year Candidate and Party Date
2008 John McCain (Rep.) Barack Obama (Dem.)
March 4 June 3
2000 George W. Bush (Rep.) Al Gore (Dem.)
March 14 March 14
1996 Bill Clinton (Dem.) Bob Dole (Rep.)
March 12 March 26
1992 George H. W. Bush (Rep.) Bill Clinton (Dem.)
April 28 June 2
1988 George H. W. Bush (Rep.) Michael Dukakis (Dem.)
April 26 June 7
1984 Ronald Reagan (Rep.) Walter Mondale (Dem.)
May 8 June 5
1980 Ronald Reagan (Rep.) Jimmy Carter (Dem.)
May 26 June 3
1976 Jimmy Carter (Dem.) Gerald Ford (Rep.)
July 14 (at the convention) August 19 (at the convention)
1972 George McGovern (Dem.) Richard Nixon (Rep.)
July 12 (at the convention) August 22 (at the convention)
Sources: Associated Press, Dates on Which Candidates Clinched the Nomination for the Presidency in Their Parties, March 15, 2000 (Lexis-Nexis); Ceci Connolly, Bush, Gore Clinch Nominations, Washington Post, March 15, 2000, p. A6; Adam Nagourney, Texas and Ohio to Clinton; McCain Is In as Choice for the G.O.P, New York Times, March 5, 2008, p. A1; Dan Balz and Anne E. Kornblut, Obama Claims Nomination, Washington Post, June 4, 2008, p. A1.
160 CH A PTER 6
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Nevada and South Carolina to hold their events before February 5th to address con- cerns about the regional and racial/ethnic representativeness of the early state electo- rates. South Carolina has a large African American population while Nevada has a significant proportion of Hispanics. While this action quelled some complaints about the nomination calendar, it also upset party leaders in other states who were not sanc- tioned by the DNC to hold earlier primaries or caucuses. In a brazen challenge to the national party, both Michigan and Florida moved their primaries into January essen- tially daring the DNC to penalize two crucially important swing states.
The DNC held its ground and announced that neither state would receive any de- legates at the national convention. Most of the candidates for the nomination agreed not to campaign in either state and several, including John Edwards and Barack Obama, even took their names off of the ballot in Michigan. Neither the DNC nor the states party leaders could have foreseen the ramifications that their decisions would ultimately have on the race for the nomination. Clinton won both
BOX 6.3 WHAT S SO HARD ABOUT SCHEDULING PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES?
After almost every presidential election year, both parties consider a variety of proposals about how to reform the way that primaries and caucuses are scheduled. But how easy is it for either party to influence when states hold their primaries? The answer to this question reveals the extent to which political parties are nonhierarchical entities and subject to regulations imposed by state governments. Consider the following factors that must be considered:
Primaries and caucuses are run by the state government in some states and by the state parties in others. The DNC and RNC can penalize a state party by reducing the size of its delegation if those delegates were decided outside of the window (the period during which states are allowed to hold primaries or caucuses). But state parties may be less con- cerned with the size of their delegation than their ordering on the calendar. Iowa and New Hampshire comprise fewer than 5 percent of either party s delegates; their influence has little to do with the size of their delegation at the convention. In 2008, the DNC allowed Iowa and New Hampshire to hold their events before February 5, but the RNC threatened to penalize either state s delegation if their events were held prior to February 5. Therefore, the DNC and RNC calendars were inconsistent. Iowa state law mandates that both parties caucuses be held on the same day. The law also stipulates that the Iowa caucuses are to be held eight days before any other state s primary or caucus. New Hampshire state law mandates that its primary must be held seven days before any other state s primary. These laws essentially force the Iowa and New Hampshire Republican parties to break the rules set by the RNC. In 2008, the DNC allowed Nevada and South Carolina to hold their primaries or caucuses earlier than February 5, a move that violated state laws in Iowa and New Hampshire and forced those states to move their events ever earlier. The Iowa caucuses were ultimately held on January 3rd, the earliest date yet for a delegate selection event.
Source: Democratic National Committee s Commission on Presidential Nomination Timing and Scheduling.
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS 161
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primaries and ultimately advocated for both states delegates to be given full vot- ing rights at the convention. The Obama campaign vigorously opposed such a plan, particularly given that Obama s name had not even appeared on the ballot in Michigan. In June, before either candidate had received a majority of delegates, the DNC rules committee agreed to allow each state to bring their full delegations to the convention, but each of the delegates received only a half vote. However, when it became clear that Obama would become the nominee, he pushed for both state s delegations to receive full voting rights at the convention, a move that the convention s credentials committee ratified.
PHASE 3: DELEGATE SELECTION: THE LATER PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES While Michigan and Florida ultimately received full voting rights at the Democratic convention, it seems clear that by violating DNC rules the state s party leaders for- feited a great deal of influence for their states in the 2008 nomination process. The early primaries and caucuses traditionally establish who is the front-runner, which candidates are still serious contenders, and even indicate who is going to be the nominee. In John Kessel s phrase, a mist clearing occurs after these initial contests.7 This generally means that primaries held after mid-March are little more than formalities, since the front-runners had already amassed enough delegates to be assured of winning their parties nominations.
However, 2008 proved a significant exception to this rule. Over half of the states had held Democratic primaries or caucuses by the end of Super Tuesday in 2008, yet Obama and Clinton finished the day nearly even in the delegate count and neither candidate was close to clinching a majority of the delegates. As a result, states holding their contests later in the calendar received enormous amounts of attention from the candidates. In particular, states like Pennsylvania (April 22nd), Indiana, and North Carolina (both on May 6th) received inordinate attention because they were the only populated states left on the calendar after early March. And even small states like Montana and South Dakota, which held the final primaries on June 3rd, made it into the limelight as they provided the necessary delegates for Obama to finally clinch the nomination.
Although it usually becomes clear who the presidential nominees will be dur- ing the later primaries and caucuses, this stage in the nominating process can have crucial and long-term implications for the outcome of the general election. Lengthy, contentious, acrimonious primary campaigns cost the eventual nominee valuable time and money needed for intraparty fencemending, media advertising, and planning of general election campaign strategy. However, the theory that divisive presidential primaries cause general election defeats is open to serious doubt. For example, vulnerable incumbents (e.g., Ford in 1976, Carter in 1980, and Bush in 1992) almost inevitably engender serious challengers for renomination. But these vulnerable incumbents were in serious electoral trouble even before they faced intraparty challenges for the nomination. And no nomination contest in recent mem- ory was more prolonged or acrimonious than the 2008 campaign for the Democratic nomination; yet, Obama still had plenty of time to win back most disgruntled Clinton supporters in time for a relatively easy general election victory.
162 CH A PTER 6
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PHASE 4: THE CONVENTION: RATIFYING THE DECISION OF THE PRIMARIES AND KICKING OFF THE GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN National conventions are no longer deliberative bodies whose delegates weigh the competing claims of rival candidates for the nomination. Conventions ratify the decisions of the preconvention campaign fought out in presidential primaries and caucuses. The principal significance of the modern-day national convention, therefore, is that it is the kickoff of the general election campaign. It is an opportu- nity for the party and its nominee to set the themes of the campaign and to project a favorable candidate image during a period when the party will have a virtual monopoly on television news coverage. The Washington Post s respected national politics reporter Dave Broder summarized the significance of conventions as fol- lows: Convention week is important, not because it marks the end of the nominat- ing period, but because it is the start of the general election. It is the time when most voters take their first serious look at the candidates and their parties and begin to focus on the choice they will make in November. 8
The nominations now are made on the first ballot. No convention has gone beyond the first ballot in selecting a nominee since the 1952 Democratic convention, which chose Adlai Stevenson on the third ballot. Even though the actual nomination may have been decided well in advance of the convention, what happens at the convention and how it is presented in the news media can have important implications for the campaign.
During the first two days of a convention, the major items on the agenda are the reports of the convention committees Credentials, Permanent Organization, Rules, and Resolutions (Platform). The full convention must consider these reports and then adopt or amend them before the convention can proceed to the nomina- tion stage of its schedule.
The Credentials Committee makes recommendations to the full convention concerning which delegates from a given state should be seated in those instances where there is a dispute about who are the bona fide and properly chosen delegates. In 2008, it was the Democratic Credentials Committee which restored the full voting rights of Michigan and Florida s delegations. The Committee on Permanent Organization, now largely a pro forma group, nominates persons to serve as the permanent officers (e.g., permanent chair, secretary, parliamentarian, sergeant at arms). The Rules Committee recommends the procedures under which the convention will operate. The Resolutions Committee drafts the party platform.
In the past, the tone of a convention was heavily influenced by the strength of the coalitions supporting the various candidates for the nomination. A convention where the candidates were relatively close in delegate strength was apt to be conten- tious and potentially divisive (e.g., Republicans in 1976). But even under these con- ditions, divisive conventions appear to be a thing of the past. Even following the long and occasionally acrimonious nomination campaign experienced by Democrats in 2008, the Democratic National Convention put forward a unified front in support- ing the nominee. Both Hillary and Bill Clinton gave rousing speeches to rally support for Obama at the convention and it was Hillary Clinton who, in a moment staged for
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS 163
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television, called for the convention to halt the ceremonial roll call and instead accept Obama as the nominee by acclamation. Thus, the 2008 Democratic convention dem- onstrated that in the modern era of presidential nominations, a convention following an extended hard-fought nomination campaign is difficult to distinguish from one nominating a candidate whose nomination was not even contested.
Nevertheless, the convention provides the nominee with an opportunity to unify the party by making overtures to the various factions of the party, especially those that lost the presidential nomination. In 2008, Obama did this by supporting the full seating of the Michigan and Florida delegations at the convention and allowing a roll call vote to proceed so that some ballots could be cast in Clinton s favor.
The vice-presidential nomination is also often used to unify the party and broaden the presidential nominee s electoral support. In 2004, John Kerry s selection of John Edwards was an attempt to appeal to moderate Democrats, especially south- erners, who may have been more uneasy with a nominee from Massachusetts. Four years later, John McCain picked little-known Alaskan Governor Sarah Palin in an attempt to appeal to both women and social conservatives within his own party.
The vice-presidential choice can also be used to reinforce campaign themes of the presidential nominee or to address specific problems facing the nominee. For example, one of Obama s potential weaknesses in the general election was his inexperience, particularly on matters of national security. This inexperience was particularly noticeable when contrasted with John McCain, a candidate with impec- cable credentials on foreign policy. Thus, many onlookers speculated that Obama s selection of Senator Joseph Biden was made at least partly to mitigate any concerns that voters might have about Obama s experience.
While candidates can occasionally be upstaged at their convention by another speaker (i.e., Sarah Palin in 2008), the climax of the convention is the nominee s accep- tance speech, a major media event that provides an opportunity to bind up wounds within the party, portray the candidate in a highly favorable manner, and present the themes of the campaign. This was perhaps best captured at the 2008 Democratic National Convention, when the final night s proceedings were taken out of the con- vention hall and over to Invesco Field where 84,000 onlookers watched Obama accept his party s nomination. Generally, nominees have received a postconvention bounce in the polls. Since 1964, the Gallup Poll has found that presidential
nominees on average receive a 6 percentage-point bounce from the conventions (see Table 6.3).9 In 2008, both Obama and McCain received post-convention bounces, though an unconventional vice presidential choice led McCain s bounce to be a bit bigger.
THE ONGOING PROCESS OF PARTY REFORM
Political rules are never neutral. They always benefit some and disadvantage others. Nowhere is this truism more apparent than in the rules governing presi- dential nomination politics. These rules, therefore, have been and continue to be points of contention among the various party factions struggling to control presi- dential nominations. The immediate causes of the latest surge of nomination reforms were the divisive 1968 and 1972 Democratic conventions and the Water- gate scandal of the early 1970s. These events, plus attempts to remedy problems
164 CH A PTER 6
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in the nominating process that were perceived to have contributed to the Democrats losing five of six presidential elections between 1968 and 1988, created a powerful impetus for an ongoing process of reform within the Demo- cratic Party.
THE REFORMED DEMOCRATS
The 1968 Democratic Convention was widely held to have been unrepresentative of the sentiments of Democratic voters. Many believed that party leaders had used un- fair tactics in securing the nomination for Hubert Humphrey. In an effort to placate the dissidents and confident that a mainline Democrat, Senator Edmund Muskie (Maine), would be the nominee in 1972, party regulars readily agreed to the refor- mers demand for a commission to overhaul Democratic rules of delegate selection. This commission came to be known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission after the men who served as its chairs, Senator George McGovern (S. Dak.) and Representative Donald Fraser (Minn.). The commission proceeded to propose a series of major changes in the Democrats nomination process that were put into effect for 1972. Suc- cessive reform commissions and the DNC continued to reformulate and refine the
TABLE 6.3 PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES POSTCONVENTION BOUNCE IN THE GALLUP POLL OF VOTERS CANDIDATE PREFERENCES (PERCENTAGE OF POINTS GAINED IN THE GALLUP POLL)
Candidate s Party
Year/Candidates Dem. Rep.
2008 Obama vs. McCain 4 6
2004 Kerry vs. Bush 0 2
2000 Gore vs. Bush 8 4
1996 Clinton vs. Dole 5 11
1992 Clinton vs. Bush 16 5
1988 Dukakis vs. Bush 7 6
1984 Mondale vs. Reagan 9 4
1980 Carter vs. Reagan 10 8
1976 Carter vs. Ford 9 5
1972 McGovern vs. Nixon 0 7
1968 Humphrey vs. Nixon 2 5
1964 Johnson vs. Goldwater 3 5
1960 Kennedy vs. Nixon 6 14
Average, 1960 2008: 6 6
Source: Gallup Poll Monthly, Aug. 2000 and Sept. 2004; Stephen J. Wayne, The Road to the White House 2000 (New York: Bedford/St. Martin s, 2000), p. 181; Gallup Daily, McCain s Bounce Gives Him 5-Point Lead, September 8, 2008.
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS 165
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rules governing the party s nominating process so that today they constitute an elabo- rate and codified set of procedures that are rigorously enforced by the DNC.10 Among the most salient features of these reformed rules are the following:
Openness. State parties must have written rules of delegate selection, give pub- lic notice of all meetings, and have uniform statewide times and dates for meetings; mandatory assessments of delegates are banned; and requirements that a state party can impose in order for a person to become a candidate (e.g., the number of signatures on a petition) for delegate have been eased. Proportional Representation. Delegates must be chosen through presidential primaries, and party caucuses must be allocated among the candidates based upon their share of the vote. A minimum threshold of 15 percent of the vote in a primary or caucus is required before a candidate can be awarded delegates. All types of winner-take-all primaries are banned. Ban on Open Primaries. Open presidential primaries are banned, with special exemptions granted to Wisconsin and Montana because of their open primary traditions. Automatic (Super) Delegates. Automatic, unpledged (uncommitted) delegate status is granted to the following Democratic Party officials and public office- holders: the president and vice president; members of the House and Senate; members of the Democratic National Committee; Democratic governors; and former presidents, vice presidents, speakers of the House, Senate majority lea- ders, and former DNC chairs. Affirmative Action. State parties are required to encourage participation and representation of minorities and traditionally underrepresented groups. Equal Division. State delegations must be composed of an equal number of men and women. Three-fourths of a state s delegates must be selected through either primaries or caucuses at the congressional district level; that is, all of a state s delegates cannot be selected on the basis of a statewide primary.
These rules changes have transformed the nomination process most signifi- cantly by reducing the ability of party leaders to influence or control the delegate selection process. Traditional party-dominated systems of delegate selection were abolished. Caucus systems that involved party officials coming together to start the process of delegate selection were banned or replaced by participatory caucuses in which any professed Democrat could participate. Also prohibited were the dele- gate primaries used in Pennsylvania and New York. In these primaries, party notables ran for delegate under their own names without indicating on the ballot their preferred presidential candidate. Both the party-official-dominated caucuses and delegate primaries had assured party leaders of a dominant voice in delegate selection within their states. Byron Shafer, a leading analyst of Democratic reforms, has noted that these changes put party officeholders at an active disadvantage and meant that the guaranteed role of the regular party has been discarded. 11
The Democratic reforms also encouraged the proliferation of presidential pri- maries and thereby made the nomination process highly participatory, candidate centered, and media oriented. Rather than risk using caucus/convention procedures that might run afoul of vigorously enforced national Democratic Party rules and
166 CH A PTER 6
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result in a state s delegates not being seated at the convention, many of the states opted for the presidential primary as a safe alternative. The presidential primary also had widespread appeal because of its participatory nature and seemingly repre- sentative character. Thus, between 1968 and 1976 the number of Democratic pri- maries jumped from fifteen to twenty-seven.
Although the immediate impetus for changes in delegate selection procedures occurred within the Democratic Party, the Democratic reforms had a spillover effect on the GOP. State legislatures, in revising their statutes to make them conform to national Democratic rules, frequently adopted the same or similar rules for both the Democrats and Republicans. The number of Republican primaries, therefore, also increased after 1968.
The influence of party leaders has been enhanced by the trend since 1992 to- ward heavy front-loading of the primary and caucus schedule. The support of party officials, donors, and officeholders has become increasingly important in determin- ing nomination contests because candidates require the resources they can provide when confronted with the daunting task of running in a series of multistate pri- maries that occur in quick succession during February and March of the delegate selection season. Although one perceptive observer described the 2000 nomination process as The Return of the Party Leaders, their influence remains substantially reduced from what it was in the prereform era.12
Kamark and Goldstein argue that in addition to making the nomination process more open and participatory, less party centered and more candidate centered, and more media oriented, the reform process has had two disadvantageous consequences for the Democratic Party.13 First, proportional representation encourages a predispo- sition of the Democratic Party to break down into factions because various elements of the party can be assured of winning delegates for their standard bearer under a pro- portional system. Second, proportional representation is apt to prolong the divisiveness of the nomination battle and make achieving party unity more difficult. That is, second- and third-place finishers in the primaries some of whom may be leaders of the more ideologically extreme elements in the party may be encouraged to stay in the race because proportional representation enables them to keep on acquiring dele- gates in the primaries. This is less of a problem for the Republican Party, which relies primarily upon winner-take-all primaries rather than proportional representation.
The 2008 nomination contests provide a useful case in support of this point. On Super Tuesday, McCain won six states with less than 50 percent of the vote; yet, he took nearly all of the delegates from those states. Because Democrats allocate their delegates proportionally, there is little difference between winning a state by a few percentage points or losing it by a few. For example, in California, McCain won just 42 percent of the primary vote, but because of the Republican rules, he received 158 of the 170 Republican delegates (or 93 percent) at stake in the state. Clinton won 51 percent of the vote in California s Democratic primary, but that gave her just 204 of the 370 (or 55 percent) Democratic delegates up for grabs. Figure 6.5 presents the rates at which candidates for each party s nomination accumulated delegates in 2008. Because of the Republican s winner-take-all rules, McCain was able to clinch a majority of Republican delegates by March 3rd. Obama s victory was not secure until the final votes were cast in Montana and South Dakota on June 3rd.
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS 167
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Democratic Race
0 1-Jan 1-Feb 1-Mar 1-Apr 1-May 1-Jun
June 3rd, Obama Clinches Majority
Feb. 12-Obama takes delegate lead
Feb. 5-Super Tuesday
2118
Clinton Obama
FIGURE 6.5 | DELEGATE ACCUMULATION IN THE 2008 DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICANNOMINATION RACES Source: CNN Delegate Tracker. Democratic tally includes automatic ( super ) delegates.
Republican Race
3-Jan 18-Jan 2-Feb
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0 17-Feb 3-Mar
Feb. 5-Super Tuesday
March 4-McCain Clinches Majority
McCain Huckabee Romney
168 CH A PTER 6
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Understanding that their proportional rules would allow for extended (and potentially divisive) nomination contests, Democrats created an additional class of automatic delegates that are commonly referred to as super delegates. This dele- gate pool is comprised of all Democratic members of Congress, every Democratic governor, all members of the Democratic National Committee, former Democratic presidents and vice presidents, former Democratic House and Senate leaders, and ex-DNC chairs. In 2008, there were more than 800 Democratic super delegates; this is more than the number of elected delegates that were at stake in California, New York, and Illinois combined.
Part of the impetus for creating these automatic delegates was to allow party leaders to bring a nomination race to a relatively quick conclusion once a clear frontrunner had been established. However, in 2008, super delegates created more confusion among Democratic voters and activists than they did clarity. Because the race between Obama and Clinton was so close, it eventually became clear that nei- ther candidate would be able to clinch the nomination based on elected delegates alone. Due to her prominence in the party, Hillary Clinton was able to attract sup- port from over one-hundred super delegates before the Iowa caucuses. Thus, Obama trailed far behind Clinton in super delegate endorsements for much of the campaign. However, as Obama started winning, he also started accumulating super delegate support. At the same time, super delegates were no longer eager to endorse Clinton once it seemed as though she would not become the party s nominee. After Obama won an impressive victory over Clinton in North Carolina on May 6th, he overtook her in super delegate support and on the day of the last two primaries in Montana and South Dakota, super delegates flocked to Obama s side to give him the delegate total he needed to clinch the Democratic nomination.
While super delegates did eventually put Obama over the top, they did not help to prevent a protracted nomination campaign. Instead, they became a lightning rod for criticism about the party s nomination process as many wondered how such a close nomination contest could ultimately be decided by the party elites. For their part, most super delegates did not relish their influential positions as evidenced by the fact that many held off endorsing either candidate for as long as possible for fear of alienating the person who might become the eventual nominee. By April, DNC Chair Howard Dean had to publicly urge super delegates to make their pre- ferences known and even then, hundreds maintained their silence.
The Democratic Party s 2008 nomination experience is sure to provide the impetus for even more reforms of the nomination system. By the end of 2009, the party was already beginning the process of formally eliminating the voting rights of super delegates, a reform that seems almost certain to pass. There were also renewed discussions about determining how to discourage the substantial front-loading and calendar violations (i.e., Florida and Michigan) that occurred in 2008.
THE UNREFORMED REPUBLICANS Reform of party rules has been an almost quadrennial activity and frequent source of intense controversy within the Democratic Party, as contending interests, factions, and candidates seek to shape the rules for the next nominating contest to their
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS 169
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advantage. The Republicans have followed a quite different strategy and have sought to maintain the basic party structure and rules that evolved prior to the era of the McGovern-Fraser Commission.14 Party rules of delegate selection have not been a major source of controversy within the GOP the way they have been for the Demo- crats. In fact, the intense ideological element of the Republican Party has not found the rules a barrier to party influence and ascendancy. As far back as 1964, the con- servative wing of the party demonstrated the permeability of the party structure and succeeded in nominating its candidate, Senator Barry Goldwater (Ariz.).
Republican rules differ from those used by the Democrats in several ways:
Republican Rules Are Harder to Change. It is not possible under Republican rules for the RNC to promulgate rules changes affecting an upcoming national convention in the way the DNC can.15 The normal method of rules change in the GOP is for the RNC Rules Committee to recommend changes to the full national committee, which in turn makes recommendations to the national convention rules committee. The committee then makes a report to the convention, which must give final approval to a proposed rules change. This lengthy procedure imposes major obstacles to any major revisions of GOP rules and prevents tampering with the rules between conventions. There are also significant substantive differences between the rules of the two parties. Delegate Apportionment. The GOP uses a significantly different formula to apportion delegates among the states. The Republican formula is weighted to reflect the electoral votes and the extent of Republican voting strength in the state. It does not reflect population to the extent that the Democratic formula does. Republican conventions are also somewhat smaller in terms of total de- legates than Democratic conventions. In 2008, there were 4,418 Democratic delegates and 2,380 Republican delegates. Maintaining the Confederate Character of the Party. The Democratic rules changes that culminated in the adoption of the party charter in 1974 signifi- cantly strengthened the national party organization at the expense of the state parties in matters of delegate selection. The national Democratic Party has an elaborate set of rules governing these matters that it vigorously enforces upon the state parties. By contrast, the Republican rules give the state parties wide latitude in matters of delegate selection, and the RNC has adopted a permis- sive attitude toward its state parties. Republican rules contain no mandates banning open primaries, requiring affirmative action programs or equal divi- sion of the sexes in state delegations, setting threshold requirements or pro- visions for proportional representation, or stipulating the percentage of state delegations that must be selected at the congressional district level. Further evidence of the party s commitment to maintenance of its confederate char- acter is the requirement of equal state representation on all convention com- mittees. One man and one woman delegate from each state, regardless of state size, are required for each convention committee. The Democrats, by contrast, allocate committee seats in accordance with a more complicated formula that takes into account state population and support for the Demo- cratic ticket.
170 CH A PTER 6
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No Automatic Delegates. The Democrats have sought to increase the partici- pation in their conventions by party and elected officials by granting them automatic delegate status, but the Republicans have consistently resisted such proposals. The provision for automatic delegates by the Democrats was be- lieved to be necessary because the reforms caused the number of party and elected official delegates to fall off dramatically. The highly structured Demo- cratic rules frequently required such officials to run against their own constitu- ents if they wished to become delegates. This was an undertaking in which few wished to engage. The less restrictive GOP rules governing delegate selection by state parties have meant that it has been easier within the Republican Party to
BOX 6.4 IN 2008, PEOPLE FLOCKED TO GOOGLE TO FIND OUT WHAT S A SUPER DELEGATE?
The extended race for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2008 exposed citizens to the inner workings of Democratic Party rules governing delegate selection. Of course, most citizens were unfamiliar with these rules and went to the Internet to find some answers. Consider the case of Democratic super delegates. The figure below shows the frequency with which people searched for the terms super delegate or superdelegate during 2008 relative to how frequently they had done so in 2004. The first large spike in the chart shows that following Super Tuesday, people searched for information on super delegates about sixteen times more frequently than they had in 2004. Searches on the topic continued to significantly out-pace the 2004 traffic until the first week in June, when Hillary Clinton conceded the nomination to Obama.
Source: Google Trends.
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PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS 171
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designate party leaders as delegates. As a result, there is no strong pressure in the GOP for giving party leaders automatic delegate status.
The differences between the largely unreformed GOP and the reformed Demo- cratic Party, however, should not obscure the basic similarities in the nomination process as it operates within both parties. In both parties, the bulk of the delegates are selected through presidential primaries, and it is the early primaries for both Republicans and Democrats that have disproportionate influence upon the choice of a nominee. The process is highly participatory, even in caucus/convention states, because party rules and state laws permit participation by even the most nominal of partisans. The media play a major role in screening the candidates and in interpret- ing the results of caucuses and primaries. Party organizations and leaders are no longer as dominant as in the prereform era. Their place has been taken by the orga- nizations of the candidates and the media.
CAMPAIGN FINANCE: THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT The Watergate revelations of campaign finance irregularities in 1972 led the Con- gress to enact campaign finance reforms, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) Amendments of 1974. The key provision of the act, as it pertains to presi- dential nominating campaigns, is that relating to public funding. In 2002, Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which left in place the FECA s provisions for public funding but amended contribution limits. Candidates for major-party nominations are eligible to receive federal matching funds for their campaigns, provided they comply with the following conditions:
Raise at least $5,000 in individual contributions of $250 or less in each of twenty states. Only individual contributions of up to $2,000 can be accepted, and only the first $250 counts toward the federal match. Abide by an overall expenditure limit that is adjusted prior to each election to account for inflation. In 2004, the overall expenditure limit was $37 million, plus an additional 20 percent to cover fund-raising costs. Abide by individual state expenditure limits based upon a formula of $0.16 cents per voter, plus an inflation adjustment. Disclose all contributions and expenditures of $200 or more to the Federal Election Commission.
Candidates for presidential nominations are not required to accept federal matching funds for their campaigns, and candidates who decline public funding need not abide by the FECA expenditures limits. Between 1976 and 1996, only two serious candidates, former Governor John Connally of Texas in 1980 and multimillionaire publisher Malcolm (Steve) Forbes in 1996, declined federal fund- ing. However, refusing public funding has become so common in recent years that some have asked whether the era of public financing is over. George W. Bush re- fused public funding in both 2000 and 2004, Howard Dean and John Kerry did so in 2004, and John Edwards was the only major candidate from either party to accept public funds in 2008. The decisions of recent contenders to forego public
172 CH A PTER 6
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funding and the spending restrictions that went with it were based upon the fol- lowing considerations:
Successful early fund-raising that made matching funds unnecessary. The expectation that other candidates would also forego the limits and spend well above the spending limits in key states. Foregoing public funding would project strength to the press strong during the invisible primary. The fact that front-loading required high levels of early expenditure and the FECA s overall expenditure limits for candidates accepting public funding could leave his campaign hitting the overall limit in the middle of the pri- maries, or worse, out of money before crucial primaries in large states. Finally, candidates were also concerned about what would happen after they se- cured their party s nomination. In 1996, Bob Dole accepted public funding and sewed up the GOP nomination early, but he had been forced to spend heavily in the process. This caused him to hit the overall spending limit in April, months in ad- vance of the Republican convention. The Republican National Committee tried to fill this financial void by running issue ads featuring Dole, but this was not sufficient to compete with the Clinton-Gore ad campaign, which helped give the Democrats a substantial and enduring lead in the polls.16 As Bush noted, I m mindful of what happened in 1996 and I m not going to let it happen to me. 17 Similar difficulties faced Al Gore in 2000, since he accepted public funding while Bush did not.
Because of these considerations, it is unlikely that serious future contenders for either party s nomination will elect to accept matching funds. The restrictions for accepting public funding are simply too limiting for the realities of present-day cam- paigns. While individual contribution limits have doubled after the BCRA, matching funds have not, and spending limits have also increased only with inflation. Candi- dates particularly complain that state spending limits based on population size do not accurately reflect the importance of states in the nomination process. For example, in 2008, the spending limit for New Hampshire was just $841,000, a paltry amount given the importance of this primary. Although state-by-state spending limits have been breached through candidate machinations and FEC implementation of the FECA, the relatively low national spending limits are enforced for candidates who accept federal matching funds. In 2008, the national spending limit for the nomination period was $42.1 million. By comparison, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama spent more than twice that amount in 2007 alone. In addition, a candidate is put at a seri- ous disadvantage, both with regard to spending and perception of strength, when his or her opponent declines public funding. Thus, any candidate accepting public funding in the future is unlikely to be considered a serious contender by the media, activists, or potential contributors. As campaign finance expert Michael Malbin wrote after the election, The public funding system for presidential elections collapsed in 2008. The policy question for the future will be whether to revive it at all and, if so, how. 18
PARTICIPATION IN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS
The extent of popular participation in candidate selection has been a continuing concern of those who have shaped the rules governing presidential nominating
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS 173
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politics. A basic tenet of the Progressives, who developed the presidential primary early in this century, was a belief that the citizenry should make presidential nomi- nating decisions, not party leaders. The presidential primary was, therefore, an ele- ment in the Progressive reform agenda. Latter-day reformers, who pushed for the McGovern-Fraser Commission reforms and for greater use of the presidential pri- mary, were also committed to participatory democracy. These reformers believed that more participation in the process would result in more representative conven- tions, nominees who would have a higher level of legitimacy with the public, and more public support for the political system.19 In practice, however, participation rates in presidential nominating politics remain quite low.
VOTER TURNOUT IN PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES Voter turnout in primaries has consistently lagged substantially below that in gen- eral elections. The proliferation of primaries since 1968 has meant that in absolute terms the number of people voting in presidential primaries has increased signifi- cantly. In 1968, there were fifteen Republican and Democratic primaries in which 12 million voters participated. With thirty-eight Republican and thirty-six Demo- cratic primaries in 2008, the total turnout was over 58 million people, an all-time high. As the case of 2008 illustrates, the number of persons voting in presidential primaries is subject to considerable variation from one election year to another depending upon the number of primaries being held and whether one or both par- ties nominations are hotly contested.20 Thus, Democratic primary turnout was twice as high in 2008 as it had been in 2004.
A major point of contention between proponents and opponents of presidential primaries relates to the representativeness of the primary voters. That is, do they distort the choice of nominees because they are not representative of party rank-and-file voters? All studies of primary turnout demonstrate that the actual vot- ing electorate in presidential primaries tends to be weighted in favor of those who are older, better educated, and more well-to-do. These findings concerning the demographic unrepresentativeness of presidential primary voters are similar to those for general elections and gubernatorial and congressional primaries.
Those who do participate in presidential primaries tend to be more partisan (i.e., have a strong commitment to their party) than nonvoters, irrespective of their party preferences. Regarding the ideological representativeness of presidential pri- mary voters, political scientists have produced conflicting conclusions depending upon the methodology employed. When primary voters were compared to all eligi- ble voters21 or general election voters,22 they were shown to be ideologically unrep- resentative; that is, Republican primary voters were more conservative and Democratic primary voters were more liberal. However, when voters in Democratic and Republi- can primaries were compared to their respective party followings (general election vo- ters who identified with the party or voted for its nominee), primary voters were not shown to be unrepresentative.23 Nonetheless, the distinctive partisan and ideological orientations of Republican and Democratic primary voters do have a profound impact upon presidential nominating politics. With Republican primary voters tending to be conservative and Democratic primary voters weighted on the liberal side, candidates strategies are affected. Indeed, all successful Republican nominees since 1964 have
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sought to demonstrate that they had strong conservative credentials, and no candidate who has campaigned openly as a moderate or liberal has been successful. The Demo- cratic picture is almost a mirror image of the Republicans. Successful Democrats in the modern era have generally sought to demonstrate their liberal credentials.
PARTICIPATION IN CAUCUSES/CONVENTIONS Because caucuses require participants to attend meetings that are often lengthy, con- tentious, and, in many states, held in the midst of winter, citizen participation in caucuses is substantially low commonly around 2 percent of the eligible voters.24
However, because of their special importance as the major presidential nominating event prior to the New Hampshire primary, the Iowa caucuses do normally attract higher levels of turnout 14 to 20 percent of the registered voters.25 Like turnout in primaries, the Iowa caucus turnout is affected by whether or not there is a contest for the nomination in one or both parties and whether the candidates strategies involve targeting Iowa.
Caucus participants, like primary voters, tend to be middle class and upper- middle class, better educated than average, and older. They also tend to be strongly partisan and often have intense ideological commitments. More ideologically extreme candidates, therefore, normally do better in caucuses than in primaries. For example, Mike Huckabee, whose background as an ordained Baptist minister endeared him to many religious conservatives, was able to claim a surprising victory in the Iowa cau- cuses. McCain, whose occasional ideological moderation generated skepticism among the religious right, performed twice as well in primaries than he did in caucuses.
Candidates with strong organizations capable of mobilizing their supporters to turn out at the caucuses also tend to do well. Barack Obama used his impressive campaign organization to consistently out-perform Hillary Clinton in Democratic caucuses in 2008. While Clinton narrowly edged Obama in the total primary vote, Obama won more than two-thirds of the delegates selected at caucuses. On Super Tuesday, Hillary Clinton won the primary states with the most delegates, such as California and New York. On the other hand, Obama won with much bigger margins in smaller caucus states like Alaska, Idaho, and North Dakota. Thanks to Obama s ability to carry caucuses by wide margins, Super Tuesday was essentially a draw, which ultimately benefited Obama.
NATIONAL CONVENTION DELEGATES National convention delegates are not a representative cross-section of either their parties rank-and-file voters or the adult population (see Table 6.4). Status as a con- vention delegate is a reward that is given to only the most intensely involved candi- date supporters and party workers. Reflecting the general American patterns of participation in party politics, national convention delegates are drawn primarily from well-educated, middle- and upper-middle-class strata of society. It is these peo- ple who have the time, leisure, money, and interest to participate actively in politics. There are, however, differences in the composition of Republican and Democratic conventions, with the Democrats having higher proportions of blacks, Hispanics, Catholics, and union members.
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS 175
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The most striking differences between Republican and Democratic delegates are not in their socioeconomic characteristics but in their political philosophies and positions on public-policy issues (see Table 6.4). Republican delegates are strongly conservative in their orientation, whereas the Democrats tend toward a liberal position. It is also clear that the delegates from both parties are some- what ideologically unrepresentative of both their own party s rank-and-file voters and the total adult population. Democratic delegates are more liberal than their party rank-and-file and the general public, whereas Republican dele- gates are more conservative than their party s voters and the general public. These are the inevitable consequences of the tendency of party activists to be drawn from the most politically committed elements of society and the processes through which delegates are chosen. Participation is skewed toward the extreme
TABLE 6.4 2008 DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION DELEGATES AND VOTERS COMPARED (PERCENTAGE)
Democratic Delegates
Democratic Voters
All Voters
G.O.P. Voters
G.O.P. Delegates
Men 51 42 46 44 68
Women 49 58 54 56 32
White 65 72 83 93 93
Black 23 23 12 2 2
Asian American 3 3 2 2 2
Hispanic (may be of any race)
11 9 8 10 5
Political ideology
Very liberal 19 15 8 2 *
Somewhat liberal 22 34 18 4 *
Moderate 50 34 36 30 26
Somewhat conservative 2 10 20 33 28
Very conservative * 6 15 30 40
Member of a labor union 24 10 10 6 5
College graduate 26 17 21 28 31
Postgraduate 55 13 12 11 50
Family income
Under $50,000 10 43 39 31 5
$50,000 $75,000 17 21 23 22 22
Over $75,000 70 26 31 39 66
*Less than 1 percent.
Source: New York Times/CBS Poll.
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ends of each party s dominant ideological tendency, and the convention delegates reflect this bias.
MEDIA POLITICS IN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS
The media have always played a significant role in presidential nominating politics because reporters and commentators are inevitably forced to make decisions about which candidates deserve extensive coverage, which candidates did well or poorly in the primaries and caucuses, which candidates are the front-runners, and which candidates are surging or fading. The decisions that the media make on such issues have significant effects on the nominating campaign and can influence how the field of candidates is narrowed to a small number of serious contenders. With the open- ing up of the caucuses and the proliferation of the primaries, the role of party lea- ders as the arbiters of presidential nominations has declined, while the role of the media has been expanded.
The media s crucial role in influencing the public s perception of the candi- dates was evident in the 2004 Democratic nominating contest. In the 2004 cam- paign, Howard Dean at first benefited but ultimately suffered from media attention. During 2003, Dean was the favorite of the national media because of his fund-raising prowess and the distinction of being the anti-war candidate among the Democratic field. Appearing on the cover of news magazines helped propel Dean into front-runner status, but this status also put him under a more critical lens. Prior to the Iowa caucuses, Dean s coverage on network newscasts was far more critical than that of the competitors who were trailing him. After Dean s poor showing in Iowa and his scream captured on television at his cam- paign rally that evening, the news media were especially critical of Dean, continu- ously replaying the unflattering footage of his scream and criticizing his campaign in general. As Dean himself explained, [The media] played a role in the rise and they played a role in the fall. They defined me as the front-runner, and then their idea was to attack the front-runner as much as possible. 26 Less than 40 percent of his coverage on network news programs was positive follow- ing the Iowa caucuses, while John Kerry (71 percent positive) and John Edwards (86 positive) became media favorites, helping to make them the new front- runners for the Democratic nomination.27
Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton both experienced the fickle nature of the news media during the 2008 campaign. As the upstart challenger, Obama received wildly positive coverage following his early victories while the narrative about Clinton focused largely on negative themes about how she had mismanaged her campaign. The perceived disparity in coverage was so significant at one point that a Saturday Night Live skit portrayed reporters grilling Clinton (played by Amy Poehler) with tough questions during a debate while Obama (played by Fred Armisen) was asked Are you comfortable? Can we get you anything? However, a study of primary coverage conducted by the Project for Excellence in Journalism concluded that while Obama initially received more favorable coverage than Clinton, he eventually took his lumps from the media as well and both candidates received relatively similar proportions of negative and positive coverage during the campaign.
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS 177
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In recent campaigns, the Internet has become an increasingly important part of the campaign for the nomination. In 2004, during the period between the New Hampshire primary and Super Tuesday (March 2), one-fourth of all Democratic pri- mary voters reported going online to get information about the campaign. Of these voters who used the Web for information, nearly three-quarters went to news Web sites for that information, while one-fourth accessed the candidates Web sites.28
Howard Dean s campaign, specifically, was largely supported by liberal bloggers who viewed the candidate favorably largely because of his willingness to oppose the war in Iraq. Ironically, however, Dean became a punchline when the video of his scream in Iowa was circulated widely and synchronized with music.
The Internet played an even greater role in the 2008 nomination campaigns. Hillary Clinton announced her candidacy with a video posted to her Web site. And nearly one in four Americans reported that they received frequent e-mails asking them to support a candidate during the campaign.29 But Obama clearly out-paced the efforts of other candidates in using the Internet as an innovative grassroots organizing tool. The candidate s custom built site, my.barackobama.com, allowed users to easily build their own communities and network with other Obama supporters. Obama used the platform to raise enormous sums of money during the primary (over $500 million raised online, according to some estimates), to organize supporters so efficiently that he dominated caucus events, and to create
BOX 6.5 DID THE DIVISIVE PRIMARY COST BARACK OBAMA VOTES?
As the Democrats long nomination campaign dragged on, many in the party were concerned that the hard-fought race would hurt the eventual nominee in the general election. Prominent Democratic strategist Donna Brazile noted during the campaign that People were excited; now they re exhausted. [ ] In the beginning, they liked one
candidate and respected the other; now they love one and hate the other. Indeed, a Gallup poll conducted in the midst of the nomination campaign found that 28 percent of Clinton supporters said they would vote for McCain if Obama won the nomination while 19 percent of Obama supporters said they would defect if Clinton prevailed. But did the campaign really hurt Obama s chances in November?
On one hand, general election exit polls found that only 14 percent of those voting in November claimed to have wanted Clinton to win the nomination, and 83 percent of that group ultimately voted for Obama. On the other hand, the real effects of the nomination campaign may have been in diminishing the extent to which Clinton supporters participated in the general election campaign. Indeed, in their study of voters in Franklin County, Ohio, Todd Maske and Anand E. Sokhey found that, To different degrees (and in different ways), Clinton supporters in Franklin County, Ohio, defected, stayed home from the polls, and participated less vigorously in the campaign relative to their fellow Democrats. Ultimately, the divisive nomination race did not keep Obama from winning the presidency, but it may have diminished the size of his victory
Source: Katharine Q. Seelye and Julie Bosman, Carrying Primacy Scars Into the General Election, New York Times, April 1, 2008; Todd Makse and Anand E. Sokhey, Revisiting the Divisive Primary Hypothesis: 2008 and the Clinton-Obama Nomination Battle, American Politics Research 38 (2010).
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a loyal block of activists who could be mobilized cheaply and efficiently. As Arianna Huffington noted, Were it not for the Internet, Barack Obama would not have been the nominee. 30
A LENGTHY, CANDIDATE-CENTERED, PRIMARY-FOCUSED, PARTICIPATORY, AND MEDIA-ORIENTED PROCESS
The American system for nominating presidents is primary focused, open and par- ticipatory, candidate centered, and media oriented. It is a process that confounds most European observers, who are accustomed to a leadership selection process that is dominated by party leaders. The leaders of political parties in most Western-style democracies except the United States are chosen by their parties members in the lower house of the national legislature. The remarkable 2008 cam- paign for the Democratic nomination highlighted all of the characteristics that make the American system unique. Clinton and Obama officially announced their candi- dacies in early 2007, but the eventual nominee did not become clear until June of the following year. During that period, the candidates combined to spend over half a billion dollars and more than 32 million citizens participated in the process by voting in caucuses and primaries. Clinton began the campaign with the support of much of the party s leaders, but Obama was able to win the nomination anyway. And despite the fact that both candidates developed large bases of energetic and loyal followers, the factions ultimately joined together to support the party s nomi- nee in the general election. Never has it been clearer that the modern-day presiden- tial nomination campaign is a lengthy, costly process that is generally won on mass appeal rather than the support of the party establishment.
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS WEB SITES The Federal Election Commission provides information on campaign finance regu- lations and information on candidate fund-raising and expenditures. http://www.fec.gov
The Note is ABC News daily political update. They track potential presidential candidates closely and, in the past, have maintained an Invisible Primary ranking of the contenders. http://blogs.abcnews.com/thenote/
National Journal s Hotline On Call is a blog used by the Hotline staff to post polit- ical news of interest, with an emphasis on tracking presidential contenders. http://hotlineblog.nationaljournal.com/
Similar to The Note, MSNBC s First Read also tracks politics on a daily basis, and focuses particularly on presidential nominating campaigns from the Invisible Pri- mary through the conventions. http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/
The Polling Report compiles public opinion surveys tracking support for the 2012 presidential candidates. http://www.pollingreport.com/2012.htm
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS 179
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NOTES
1. Democratic Party of the United States of America v. Bronson C. LaFollette, 449 U.S. 897 (1981). For a detailed account of the efforts of the national Democratic Party to close the Wisconsin primary, see Gary D. Wekkin, Democrat versus Democrat (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1984).
2. Roger Simon, Why Believe the Super- delegates? Politico (August 25, 2008): http://www.politico.com/news/stories/ 0808/12732.html.
3. For a detailed analysis of presidential nominating politics, see Stephen J. Wayne, The Road to the White House, 2000 (New York: Bedford/St. Martin s, 1997), pp. 103 186.
4. For perspective accounts of the early activities in the 2000 nominating pro- cess, see Harold W. Stanley, The Nominations: The Return of Party Lea- ders, in Michael Nelson, ed., Elections 2000 (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001), ch. 2; and William G. Mayer, The Presidential Nominations, in
Gerald M. Pomper, ed., The Election of 2000 (New York: Chatham House, 2001), ch. 2.
5. Rhodes Cook, The Nomination Process, in Michael Nelson, ed., The Elections of 1988, Washington: CQ Press, 1989, pp. 45 46.
6. Barbara Norrander, The End Game in Post-Reform Presidential Nominations, Journal of Politics 62 (Nov. 2000): 999 1011.
7. John Kessel, Presidential Campaign Politics, 4th ed. (Pacific Grove, Calif.: Brooks/Cole, 1992), p. 34.
8. David S. Broder, A Chance to Be Presidential, Washington Post, July 15, 1984, p. 8.
9. Gallup Daily, McCain s Bounce Gives Him 5-Point Lead, September 8, 2008. http://www.gallup.com/poll/110110/ Gallup-Daily-McCains-Bounce-Gives- Him-5Point-Lead.aspx
10. On Democratic reforms, see David E. Price, Bringing Back the Parties
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1984), chs. 6 and 7. On the postreform nomi- nation process, see Leon D. Epstein, Presidential Nominations since Party
Reform, American Review of Politics 14 (Summer 1993): 149 162.
11. Byron E. Shafer, Quiet Revolution: The Struggle for the Democratic Party and the Shaping of Post-Reform Politics (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1983), p. 526.
12. Stanley, The Nominations, p. 27. 13. Elaine Ciulla Kamarck and Kenneth
M. Goldstein, The Rules Do Matter: Post-Reform Presidential Nominating Politics, in The Parties Respond, 2nd ed., ed. L. Sandy Maisel (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), pp. 186 189.
14. The differing approaches of the Repub- lican and Democratic parties to party reform are described in John F. Bibby, Party Renewal in the National Repub-
lican Party, in Gerald Pomper, ed., Party Renewal in America: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 102 115.
15. The differences between Republican and Democratic Party rules are described in more detail in Robert J. Huckshorn and John F. Bibby, National Party Rules and Delegate Selection in the Republi- can Party, P.S. 16 (Fall 1983): 656 666.
16. Stanley, The Nominations, pp. 31 32.
17. Don Van Natta, Jr., Bush Foregoes Federal Funds and Has No Spending Limits, New York Times, July 16, 1999.
18. Michael Malbin, Small Donors, Large Donors and the Internet: The Case for Public Financing after Obama, Cam- paign Finance Institute Working Papers, April 22, 2009.
19. Austin Ranney, Participation in Ameri- can Presidential Nominations, 1976 (Washington, D.C.: American Enter- prise Institute, 1977), p. 14.
180 CH A PTER 6
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20. For an analysis of the factors affecting voter turnout in presidential primaries, see Barbara Norrander and Greg Smith, Type of Contest, Candidate Strategy,
and Turnout in Presidential Primaries, American Politics Quarterly 13 (Jan. 1985): 28 50; and Barbara Norrander, Selective Participation: Presidential
Primary Voters as a Subset of General Election Voters, American Politics Quarterly 14 (Jan. 1986): 35 53.
21. William Crotty and John S. Jackson, Presidential Primaries and Nominations (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1985), pp. 91 93.
22. Kamark and Goldstein, The Rules Do Matter, p. 184.
23. John C. Geer, Assessing the Represen- tativeness of Electorates in Primary Elections, American Journal of Politi- cal Science 32 (Nov. 1988): 929 945; see also Barbara Norrander, Ideologi- cal Representativeness of Presidential Primary Voters, American Journal of Political Science 33 (Aug. 1989): 570 587; and Larry M. Bartels, Presi- dential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 140 148.
24. Ranney, Participation in American Presidential Nominations, 1977, p. 15.
25. Walter J. Stone, Alan I. Abramowitz, and Ronald B. Rapoport, How Representa- tive Are the Iowa Caucuses? in Peverill Squire, ed., The Iowa Caucuses and the Presidential Nominating Process (Boul- der, Colo.: Westview, 1989), pp. 11 12.
26. Jane Hall, Burned by the Spotlight, Columbia Journalism Review, September/October, 2004.
27. Center for Media and Public Affairs News Release, Network News Focus: Flubs, Fluff Not Functional, February 9, 2004.
28. Kenneth Winneg and Talia Jomini, The Internet as a Source of Campaign Information: An Analysis of Its Use in the 2004 Democratic Primary Cam- paign, Paper presented to the 59th Annual Conference of the American Association of Public Opinion Research, May 15, 2004.
29. Lee Rainie and Aaron Smith, The Internet and the 2008 Election, Pew Internet and American Life Project, June 15, 2008.
30. Claire Cain Miller, How Obama s Internet Campaign Changed Politics, New York Times, BITS Blog, November 7, 2008: http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/ 2008/11/07/how-obamas-internet- campaign-changed-politics/.
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS 181
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