for Tinsel Writer
C H A P T E R 5NOMINATIONS FOR STATE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES
C H A P T E R C O N T E N T S
The Evolution of the Direct Primary
• From Legislative Caucus to Party Convention
• The Direct Primary
• The Direct Primary and Progressivism
• The Direct Primary in the South
• Post–World War II Trends
State Regulation of the Direct Primary
• Nomination by Convention
• Party Affiliation Requirements for Voting
• Regulation of Candidacies and Cross-Filing
• Regulation of the Proportion of the Vote Required for Nomination: The Runoff Primary
• Regulation of Access to the General Election Ballot: “Sore Loser” Laws
• Regulating the Timing of Primaries
Preprimary Endorsements
• State Statutory Requirements for Endorsement
• Extralegal Endorsements
• Consequences of Preprimary Endorsements
Competition in Primaries
• The Impact of Interparty Competition
• The Impact of Nominating Procedures
117
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
Voter Turnout in Primaries
• Personal Characteristics and Turnout
• Party-Polarizing Potential of Unrepresentative Primary Electorates
• Political/Institutional Influences on Turnout
The National Party Organizations and Nominations in the States
The Direct Primary and the General Election
The Direct Primary and Political Parties
Although Americans pride themselves on having operated with free elections for over two hundred years, the voter s choice in general elections is severely limited. In most elections, citizens are faced with choosing between Republican and Demo- cratic nominees, or wasting their vote on a third-party candidate who has only the remotest chance of winning. The functioning of American democracy, therefore, is affected in critical ways by the decisions the two major parties make in selecting persons to bear their labels in the general election. As a result, controversy has sur- rounded the parties nomination decisions since the advent of political parties in the United States. For the party, the nomination process is a crucial part of its activities. It is this activity more than any other that distinguishes the political party from other political organizations such as the AFL-CIO, Americans for Democratic Action, Common Cause, the Chamber of Commerce, or Farm Bureau. Only political parties nominate candidates on their own labels and present them to the voters as their offi- cial representatives. The nomination is also critical for the parties because selecting the right candidate can determine whether a party will win or lose the general elec- tion. A candidate lacking in appeal to the party s traditional voters and independents, or one who divides rather than unites the party s electorate and workers, is not likely to gain public office. Finally, the nomination process is important to the party because control of the party is at stake. Influence over the selection of party nominees goes a long way toward determining which party factions will gain ascendancy in terms of the policy direction of the party and the rewards that elected officials bestow upon their supporters. The critical character of the nomination process for the parties was aptly summarized by the late E. E. Schattschneider:
Unless the party makes authoritative and effective nominations, it cannot stay in business. The nature of the nomination procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make nominations is the owner of the party. 1
In most Western democracies, the selection of candidates rests in the hands of the party organization the party officers and activists. Operating largely without govern- ment regulation, these leaders designate the party s candidates, and there is no appeal to the party-in-the-electorate of their decisions. The average voter participates only in the general election a contest between the parties and not in the intraparty contest to select nominees. Nominating processes in the United States, by contrast, not only involve party activists but also permit extensive participation by rank-and-file voters. Indeed, a persistent trend in the evolution of nominating practices in the United States has been toward increasing the opportunities for popular participation and weakening
118 C H A P T E R 5
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
the capacity of party organizational hierarchies to control candidate selection for local, state, and national offices. The American nomination process is unique not only for the amount of popular participation that it permits but also for the wide variety and high level of statutory regulation that governs it.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE DIRECT PRIMARY
FROM LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS TO PARTY CONVENTION
After the American Revolution, the legislative caucus evolved as the principal means of making nominations for state offices. The legislative caucus was an informal meeting of all the party s elected members of the state senate and house of representatives. A similar method of nomination the congressional caucus was used to select presi- dential candidates. The legislative caucus was not a particularly representative institu- tion, because it not only left citizens out of the process but also left unrepresented those districts that had elected opposition party legislators. To correct this problem, some of the states used a mixed caucus system, which permitted special delegates, represent- ing districts held by the opposition party, to participate in the caucus to nominate candidates.
Andrew Jackson s failure to gain the presidential nomination from the oligarchs of the congressional caucus in 1824 and the subsequent defeat of the caucus nomi- nee, William H. Crawford, contributed in a significant way to the demise of the cau- cus system. Jackson was a popular figure the hero of the Battle of New Orleans and a symbol of democracy and egalitarianism. His backers sought to discredit the caucus system. It was replaced by a convention system of nomination.
The convention process normally started with local or precinct caucuses that selected delegates to attend county conventions. The county conventions then selected delegates to a state party convention. The state conventions nominated the party s candidates for statewide office, such as governor, attorney general, and sec- retary of state. Courthouse candidates were nominated by the county conventions, and there were also congressional district conventions to select candidates for the United States House. Its supporters considered the convention system to be a demo- cratic reform designed to permit greater popular participation and improved repre- sentation for party rank-and-file voters. Like the legislative caucus, the convention nominating process fell into disrepute. The convention process was susceptible to manipulation and domination by party leaders and bosses, who were often under the influence of well-financed interests anxious to gain favorable concessions from state governments. It was charged that conventions too often selected candidates who were not the popular choice of party voters. There was also the further prob- lem of convention nominations being tantamount to election in one-party areas so that, in effect, the actual choice of public officials was being made at party conven- tions and not by the voters at the general election.
THE DIRECT PRIMARY Early in the twentieth century, the convention system was replaced in most states by the direct primary nomination of party candidates by the voters directly.
NOMINATIONS FOR STATE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES 119
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
The direct primary took power away from the party organization, thereby lessening the power of party leaders over elected officials. The primary permitted direct ex- pression of voter preferences and struck down the intermediate links between rank and file of the party and would-be candidates. 2
V. O. Key has concluded that despite the oratory about democracy, citizen par- ticipation, corrupt party machines, and special interests during the time when the direct primary was being adopted, the primary was at bottom an escape from one-partyism. 3 The Civil War and Reconstruction made the South a one-party Democratic area. The direct primary, therefore, evolved in the South as a means to permit popular government where interparty competition of a meaningful nature had ceased. The importance of a lack of interparty competition as an impetus to adoption of the direct primary is illustrated in Virginia and North Carolina, the southern states that held out the longest against instituting primaries. These were also the southern states with the highest level of interparty competition during the 1880s and 1890s, the decades preceding widespread adoption of the primary.4
The electoral realignments of the 1890s solidified Democratic one-party domi- nance of the South, but they also created one-party Republican areas in the North- east, Midwest, and West. The primary thus spread through these states as interparty competition diminished and GOP state convention nominations became tantamount to election. In 1903, Wisconsin was the first state to enact a compre- hensive direct primary law. In states with more established party systems and real two-party competition, such as New York, Delaware, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, the primary was adopted more slowly.
Although one of the reasons for instituting the direct primary was to deal with the problems created by one-partyism, there is evidence that the introduction of the direct primary frustrated and delayed the development of two-party competition. The primary weakened the minority party because it focused public attention upon contests within the dominant party. Voters were channeled into the primary of the dominant party because that was where the election was actually being decided. Persons with political ambitions also gravitated into the majority party because they saw little future in the minority party. In view of these patterns of behavior, V. O. Key concluded that primary competition tended to be substituted for general election competition; competition within parties for competition between parties. 5
He believed that without the direct primary, interparty competition would have come sooner to one-party areas of the North and South.
THE DIRECT PRIMARY AND PROGRESSIVISM The direct primary embodied an essential belief of the reformist Progressive move- ment of the early twentieth century. The Progressives believed intermediaries between the people and their government should be removed and that the voters should be able to choose nominees for office without encroachments on their sovereignty by party leaders. Robert M. La Follette, Sr., the leader of the Wisconsin Progressives, stated the case for the direct primary:
Under our form of government the entire structure rests upon the nomination of candi- dates for office. This is the foundation of representative government. If bad men control nominations we cannot have good government.
120 C H A P T E R 5
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
[We] must abolish the caucus and convention by law, place nominations in the hands of the people, and make all nominations by direct vote at a primary election.
With nominations of all candidates absolutely in the control of the people the public official who desires re-nomination will not dare to seek it, if he has served the machine and the lobby and betrayed the public trust.6
The Progressives fought for the direct primary not only because it was consis- tent with their democratic faith, but because it provided a means of challenging the power of established party leaders, achieving political power, and fulfilling personal ambition. La Follette in Wisconsin, Hiram Johnson in California, and other Pro- gressive leaders used the primary to strengthen their faction s influence within the dominant Republican Party of their states.
THE DIRECT PRIMARY IN THE SOUTH Whereas the direct primary in the North was designed to provide a forum for elec- toral competition and to advance the fortunes of the Progressive faction of the GOP, in the South the direct primary was designed to unify the Democratic Party under conservative leadership, weaken the Republican opposition, and prevent black voters from having electoral influence. Use of the primary to select Demo- cratic candidates, it was thought, would give greater legitimacy to the nominee than would selection by party conventions, and the party might thereby be unified. It was hoped that settling intraparty differences in the primary and presenting a united front in the general election would reduce the influence of the opposition parties and their voters mainly blacks, who up until the Depression of the 1930s were overwhelmingly Republican. Southern Democratic parties also adopted rules barring blacks from voting in party primaries in order to prevent any candidate or faction from making appeals to black voters in order to gain a party nomination.7
The advocates of the primary in the South were largely successful in achieving their goals. The Democratic primary became the only significant election; only in states with concentrations of Republicans in mountain areas was the GOP a force of modest significance (e.g., Tennessee, Kentucky, Virginia, North Carolina); and the white primary effectively excluded blacks from the electoral process.
POST WORLD WAR II TRENDS During the years after World War II, the primary was instituted in those states that had been holdouts. In 1976, Indiana adopted the primary for nominating statewide candidates and became the last of the holdout states to accept the primary. Other states that became primary states were Rhode Island (1947), Connecticut (1955), and New York (statewide offices, 1967). In enacting the primary laws, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York also made provision for preprimary endorsement of candidates by the party organizations.8
The nature of southern primaries has also changed with the demise of the whites-only primary, the enfranchisement of blacks, and the emergence of strong Republican parties. Blacks are now an increasingly larger proportion of the southern Democratic Party s supporters and active participants in the primaries as both voters and candidates. While it was only a minor force in southern state
NOMINATIONS FOR STATE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES 121
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
politics, the Republican Party frequently opted to take advantage of a provision in state law that permitted nominations via conventions. As the party has gained electoral strength in the region, it has shifted to use of the primary to nominate its candidates.9
STATE REGULATION OF THE DIRECT PRIMARY
There is tremendous diversity among the states in the operation of the direct pri- mary. The constitutional principle of federalism permits the states wide latitude in tailoring their election laws to fit state traditions, political conditions, and the pre- ferences of state leaders and voters.
NOMINATION BY CONVENTION Although the direct primary is the predominant method of nominating candidates, thirteen states either permit or require a role for party conventions. In Connecticut, for example, the winner of the party s endorsement at the state convention auto- matically becomes the nominee unless challenged in the primary by a candidate who received at least 15 percent of the convention votes. Several of the southern states (Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia) permit the parties to nominate either by primary or by convention. This option permits state parties to determine which method of nomination they wish to use based upon strategic con- siderations. For example, the Virginia Republicans have frequently opted for the convention method as a means of strengthening the influence of party leaders and conservative activists, who tend to dominate their party s conventions. The convention method of nomination, of course, enhances the influence that party leaders have over the nominating process because candidates cannot appeal effec- tively over the heads of party leaders to rank-and-file voters, as in a primary. The convention system also gives an advantage to candidates with strong organizations capable of mobilizing party activists.
PARTY AFFILIATION REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTING There is wide variation among the states in terms of the party affiliation require- ments imposed in order for a voter to participate in primaries. The states array themselves along a continuum regarding the severity of their party affiliation require- ments from those that restrict participation to registered partisans to others with no restrictions (see Table 5.1).
CLOSED PRIMARIES Fourteen states and the District of Columbia have closed pri- maries. In these states, voters must register as party affiliates in order to vote in a party primary. Participation is thus restricted to those who are willing to register publicly as partisans; those who register as independents are barred from voting. A voter who wishes to switch party registration must do so in advance of the pri- mary, normally twenty to thirty days prior to the primary. New York is particularly
122 C H A P T E R 5
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
TABLE 5.1 PARTY AFFILIATION REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTING IN DIRECT PRIMARIES
Closed: Party registration required; changes permitted within a fixed time period
Semi-Closed: Unaffiliated voters permitted to vote in a party primary; or voters may change their party registration at the polls
Semi-Open: Voters must publicly declare their choice of party ballot at polling place on Election Day
Open: Voter decides in which party primary to vote in privacy of voting booth
Nonparti- san : Top two primary votegetters, regardless of party, are nominated for general election
Connecticuta Arizonac Alabamaj Hawaii Louisiana
DC Californiad Arkansasj Idaho Washington
Delaware Coloradoe Georgiaj Michigan
Florida Iowaf Illinoisj Minnesota
Kentucky Kansasg Indianaj Missouri
Maine Massachusettsg Mississippij Montana
Marylandb New Hampshireg Ohioj North Dakota
Nebraskab New Jerseyg South Carolinaj Texas
Nevada North Carolinah Tennesseek Virginia
New Mexico Rhode Islandg Vermont
New York Utahg Wisconsin
Oregond West Virginiai
Oklahoma Wyomingl
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
aUnaffiliated voters can register with a party a day before the primary election. bParties have the option to permit unaffiliated voters to participate in their party primary. The parties generally do not exercise this option. cIndependent voters may choose either party ballot, which registers them. dUnaffiliated voters may vote in primaries, if permitted by party rule. eVoters may declare party affiliation at the polls, which enrolls them. fVoters may change party registration or declare party affiliation at the polls. gUnaffiliated voters may select a party ballot at the polls and choice automatically registers them with that party. hUnaffiliated voters may vote in either party primary and choice is recorded. iIndependent voters may vote in Republican primary. jVoter s choice of party ballot is recorded and parties have access to the lists. kNo record kept of voter s choice of a party ballot. lSame-day registration permits voter to declare or change party affiliation at the polls and reverse the change after voting.
Source: Federal Election Commission, Party Affiliation and Primary Voting 2000, Malcolm E. Jewell and Sarah M. Morehouse, Political Parties and Elections in American States (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001), p. 103.
NOMINATIONS FOR STATE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES 123
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
restrictive about changes in party registration. It requires that changes be made one year before the primary.
Thirteen states have created semi-closed primary systems. These states have loopholes in their closed primary laws that permit unaffiliated or independent voters to vote in party primaries. The ability of unaffiliated voters to participate in partisan primaries may be granted either by state law or by state party rules. In some states (e.g., Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island), independents who choose to vote in a party primary are then automatically regis- tered with that party, whereas in Utah no record is kept of the party primary in which an independent voted. Because the right of independents to vote in primaries is determined in some states by party rules, it is possible for one party to grant the right to participate while the other party operates a completely closed primary. Thus, in West Virginia, only the Republicans permit unaffiliated voters to take part in their primaries. This reflects the fact the Republicans are the state s minority party and therefore are in search of new adherents.
States may also operate semi-closed primaries by allowing unaffiliated voters to vote or by permitting voters to change their party registration on Election Day (e.g., Iowa, Kansas, and Utah). Wyoming is less restrictive. It allows election-day registra- tion, and voters may change their party registration at the polls and then reverse the change after voting.
The justification for the closed primary is that because primaries are the pro- cess through which party nominees are chosen, only party affiliates with a reason- ably stable commitment to the party should be permitted to vote. It is argued that the selection of a nominee is one of the most important decisions that a party makes and it should not be turned over to nonparty members or made vulnerable to raiding from outsiders who lack a long-term commitment to the party. Party organization leaders have traditionally preferred the closed primary system because it prevents cross-overs by voters from the opposition party, creates a known constituency to whom appeals for support can be made, and facilitates control of the nomination process.
PUBLIC STATEMENT OF PARTY PREFERENCE REQUIRED Nine states (mainly in the South) op- erate semi-open primary systems, in which voters are not required to register as party affiliates, but they are required to declare publicly in which party s primary they wish to participate. In most of these states a record is kept of the primary in which a person has voted and the parties have access to these lists. Voters are free to change their party preference at each primary. Some states require voters to submit their preference in writing, and a few states require voters to swear that they support the party if their participation in a primary is challenged. By requir- ing voters to publicly declare a party preference, the semi-open primary system denies voters the anonymity of their party preference that is provided by open pri- mary systems.
OPEN PRIMARY Eleven states have the open primary, in which no requirements concerning party affiliations are imposed upon persons voting in the primary. In open primary states, the voters decide in the privacy of the voting booth in which party s primary they wish to vote. As in the previously described types of primaries,
124 C H A P T E R 5
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
voters in open primary states are restricted to voting in only one party s primary. Particularly open primaries occur in states such as Wisconsin and Minnesota, which combine open primary laws with election-day registration at the polls. In these states, a voter need not be registered prior to the primary in order to vote, since registration is permitted at the polls on primary Election Day. And North Dakota does not require voter registration in any form.
The basic rationale for the open primary is that all voters should be permitted to participate in the crucial process of selecting nominees for public office and that such participation should not be restricted to those who publicly acknowledge a partisan preference. In addition, the advocates of the open primary stress that it protects the privacy of party preference and electoral choice.
NONPARTISAN /TOP TWO PRIMARY An unusual variation on the open primary was in- stituted in Louisiana in 1975. This process, instituted for every elected office in the state, calls for an initial primary in which all candidates run on the same ballot regardless of their party affiliation (the election is not truly nonpartisan since the party affiliations of the candidates do appear on the ballot). If a candidate receives a majority of the votes cast in the open primary, then that candidate is elected and no general election is held for that office. If no candidate wins a majority of the vote in the first election, then a runoff is held between the top two finishers. Since all can- didates run on the same ballot, two candidates from the same party could face each other in this runoff election and neither party is guaranteed a spot in the runoff.
This reform was introduced by Governor Edwin Edwards; despite other ratio- nalizations for the reform, the true reason for Edwards s proposal was electoral
BOX 5.1 PRIMARY RULES AND POLARIZATION
Primaries are an important polarizing force in American politics, and different types of primaries may exacerbate or reduce this effect. While candidates in general elections compete for votes among the entire electorate, in primaries they are competing over a smaller and more ideological group of voters. Strategically, candidates must take more extreme positions to win primaries than would be desirable for succeeding in the general election. However, the extent to which primaries cause candidates to take polarizing positions differs depending on the type of primary used by a state. In open primaries, candidates taking more moderate positions can still win by capturing the votes of independents and supporters of the other party. However, in closed primaries, more polarizing position-taking is necessary. Research conducted by Elisabeth Gerber and Rebecca Morton demonstrates the effect that this has on the ideologies of members of Congress. Their study found that House members from states with closed primary laws were more extreme on congressional roll call votes relative to the districts that they represented. Members representing districts in states with semi-closed and open primary laws were more moderate. Thus, the authors conclude that closed primaries contribute to greater polarization among officeholders.
Source: Primary Election Systems and Representation, Elisabeth R. Gerber and Rebecca B. Morton, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, vol. 14 (2).
NOMINATIONS FOR STATE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES 125
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
expediency. Democrats in Louisiana were annoyed with having to run in a party primary and, often, a runoff before facing a Republican candidate in the general election. This reform would cut back on at least one election in which a Democrat would have to compete, presumably lowering the costs of having to wage three separate campaigns. Democrats assumed that the first election would eliminate any Republican competition and that the runoff would decide which Democrat would take office. However, Republicans have gained strength in Louisiana, and runoff elections typically pit Democrats against Republicans. Washington passed a similar primary system in 2004, but because of a court challenge, the system was not used by the state until 2008. The impact of the law on party strength in Washington is not yet clear.
Since neither party holds its own primary, the procedure has resulted in a weak- ening of the state s political parties. Some argue that another consequence of this rule change has been the tendency of the system to generate runoff elections between candidates that take issue positions more ideologically extreme than most voters. The clearest example of this was in the 1991 gubernatorial election, when former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke made the runoff election against Edwards.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRIMARY LAWS Prior to its being declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2000, Alaska, California, and Washington used a blanket primary to nominate candidates. The blanket primary permits voters to take part in more than one party s primary by switching back and forth between parties from office to office. Under this system, it was possible for an elector to vote in the Republican primary for governor, the Democratic primary for United States senator, the Republican primary for a member of the House of Representatives, and then go back to the Democratic primary for state legislative candidates.
California s blanket primary was challenged by the Republican and Democratic parties, as well as by several minor parties, on the grounds that it violated the par- ties First Amendment rights of free political association. In the case of California Democratic Party v. Jones (2000), the Supreme Court declared that the state s blan- ket primary constituted a stark repudiation of political association that denied the parties the power to control their own nomination processes and define their own identities. California and the other states with blanket primaries were then forced to change their primary statutes to bring them into conformity with the Court s decision.
The California blanket primary case left open the question of whether or not open primaries are constitutional, since they also limit the ability of the parties to control their own nomination processes. This issue was not before the Court in the California case, but two dissenting justices stated that they believed that the decision cast doubt on the constitutionality of other forms of open primaries. However, a 2008 ruling by the Supreme Court in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party suggested that the court was not likely to rule against open primary laws in general. In that case, the state parties asked the court to strike down the top two primary law because they claimed it violated their First Amendment rights to determine which candidates represented them on the ballot. But the court dismissed this view and upheld the law, which had been supported by 60 percent of the public when it passed by initiative in 2004.
126 C H A P T E R 5
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
REGULATION OF CANDIDACIES AND CROSS-FILING In addition to regulating which persons may vote in a party primary, states decide the qualifications a candidate must meet in order to run. Most of the states permit a person to run in only one party s primary and only the most minimal tests of party membership are required. However, nine states permit candidates to be endorsed by more than one party. An interesting case of cross-filing exists in New York, where this system operates to encourage minor parties and to facilitate coalitions of the Democratic Party with the Liberal Party and the Republicans with the Conservative Party. New York permits parties that nominate candidates by convention the Liberals and Conservatives to nominate the same candidate as the major parties. It is therefore common for Democratic nominees to appear on the general election ballot in both the Democratic Party and Liberal Party columns, and for GOP nominees also to be listed as Conservative Party candidates. Thus, in 1994, Republican George Pataki upset Democratic Governor Mario Cuomo, even though Cuomo received more votes on the Democratic line than Pataki did on the GOP line. However, Pataki s 328,000 votes on the Conservative Party line and 54,000 on the Freedom Party line gave him a narrow 173,798-vote margin of victory. Interestingly, the Freedom Party was the creation of the state Republican Party and was designed to provide a means for non-Republicans to vote for Pataki without having to vote for him in either the Republican or Conservative columns.
The provision for cross-filing, or fusion tickets, in New York has created a powerful incentive for the creation and maintenance of minor parties and made them a critical element of the state s electoral politics. At the same time, the possi- bility of these parties refusing to nominate their coalition partner s candidate and instead running their own candidate, or even nominating the other major party s nominee, can pose a serious threat to their coalition partner s electoral prospects. The Liberal and Conservative parties are therefore in a position to exert leverage on the major parties to nominate candidates acceptable to the third parties. These maneuverings frequently have a major impact on the outcome of general elec- tions.10 Thus, Rudolph Giuliani, the Republican nominee for mayor of New York City, was aided in winning the 1993 and 1997 mayoral elections by receiving the Liberal Party nomination. The Liberal Party nomination of Giuliani demonstrates an important feature of minor parties. That is, their primary goal is maximizing their influence and not supplanting one of the major parties. In the case of Giuliani s election, the Liberal Party reaped substantial patronage rewards from the mayor and Republicans found themselves in competition with Liberal Party members for patronage positions in the city.11
Unlike New York, most of the states forbid fusion tickets, in which a candidate can become the nominee of more than one party. These anti-fusion laws were adopted as a means of disadvantaging third parties seeking leverage in the manner of New York s minor parties by nominating selected major-party candidates. Minnesota s ban on fusion tickets was challenged by a left-of-center third party that sought to nominate an incumbent Democratic Farmer-Labor legislator. In the case of Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party (1997), the Supreme Court upheld Minnesota s effort to strengthen the two-party system, noting that although a state may not completely insulate the two-party system from minor parties or
NOMINATIONS FOR STATE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES 127
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
independent candidates competition states may enact reasonable election regula- tions that favor the traditional two-party system.
REGULATION OF THE PROPORTION OF THE VOTE REQUIRED FOR NOMINATION: THE RUNOFF PRIMARY The normal practice in the states is for the nomination to go to the candidate who receives the most votes (a plurality) in the primary, even if that individual receives less than a majority of the votes cast. Consider the example of the 2010 Illinois Republican primary for governor, which included seven candidates. Bill Brady earned the party s nomination with just 20 percent of the primary vote, barely edging out Kirk Dillard (who also received 20 percent) by less than 400 votes. Thus, Brady won the Republican nomination despite the fact that four of every five Republican primary voters cast a ballot for somebody else.
In ten southern and border states plus South Dakota, a majority of the vote in the primary is required for nomination, and in North Carolina, 40 percent of the primary vote is required for nomination. If no candidate receives a majority, then a second or runoff primary is held between the top two finishers in the first primary. This system was instituted in the South during an era when the Democratic Party was dominant and its nomination was tantamount to election. To assure that the person nominated (and thus elected ) in the Democratic primary had the support of a majority of Democratic voters, the runoff primary was instituted. The potential for a second primary diminishes the internal party pressures for preprimary coalition formation and therefore tends to increase the number of candidates in the initial primary. The runoff can also result in a different candidate winning the nomination than led in the first primary.
REGULATION OF ACCESS TO THE GENERAL ELECTION BALLOT: SORE LOSER LAWS The importance of a party nomination is enhanced if a candidate who loses a pri- mary is not permitted to run in the general election as an independent. In twenty- seven of the states, the legislatures have enacted sore loser statutes that prevent independent candidacies by persons who lost a primary nomination. The lack of such a law became important in Connecticut s 2006 Senate race, when Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) lost in the Democratic primary but won the general election as a third-party candidate. Such statutes are party-protective measures in that they limit the extent to which intraparty factional struggles can be carried over into the general election. Critics charge that these laws unduly limit candidacy. The Supreme Court, however, has upheld the constitutionality of sore loser statutes (Storer v. Brown, 1974).
REGULATING THE TIMING OF PRIMARIES Because party primaries are administered by state governments, each state sets the date for those primaries. There is a remarkable amount of variation in when states hold their party primaries (see Figure 5.1). For instance, in 2010, Illinois held its
128 C H A P T E R 5
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
primary on February 2nd, nine months before the general election. On the other hand, Hawaii held its primary on September 18th, only six weeks before the gen- eral election. When a primary occurs it may have important consequences for voters and candidates. Some argue that late primaries will increase turnout in the general election by focusing the electorate s attention for a shorter time period and that late primaries reduce campaign costs by compressing the electoral calendar. However, research commissioned by the Pennsylvania state legislature determined that these claims were not supported by evidence from the states. Rather, the commission found that officials in states that held late primaries generally found them to be problematic. These officials cited the lack of time for citizens to get to know the candidates before the general election and the potential benefit that this had for incumbents running for reelection. Related to this point was the concern that there was no time for candidates to regroup their campaigns for the general election. For many of these reasons, Washington s traditional late-September primary was moved to mid-August after 2006.12
PREPRIMARY ENDORSEMENTS
Clearly, the intent of the Progressive reformers and one of the consequences of the direct primary has been to reduce party organization control over nominations. Party organizational influence has not, however, been totally removed from the process, and this is especially true in those states that use preprimary endorse- ments by the party organizational leadership. Endorsements can be statutory man- dates, informal practices of the party organization, or a practice of party-affiliated organizations.
IL TX GA, OK
IN, NC, OH, NE, WV, AR, KY, OR,
PA, ID
AL, MS, NM, CA, IA, ME, MT, ND, NJ, NV, SC, SD,
VA, UT
KS, MI, MO, TN, CO, CT,
WA, WY, AK, AZ, FL, LA DE, MA, MD,
MN, NH, NY, RI, VT, WI, HI
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
MarchFebruary May June July August September Month
N um
be r o
f P rim
ar ie
s
FIGURE 5.1 | TIMING OF CONGRESSIONAL PRIMARIES IN 2010
NOMINATIONS FOR STATE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES 129
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
STATE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR ENDORSEMENT In seven states (Colorado, Connecticut, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Utah), state law provides for preprimary endorsement by party conventions. The existence of these statutory requirements for endorsing conventions reflects the ability of the party organizations in these states to retain a significant role in the nomination process even while the state legislatures were succumbing to the pressures for the direct primary. Endorsement frequently carries with it the right to have one s name placed on the primary ballot or to be listed first on the ballot. In Rhode Island, for example, endorsed candidates have an automatic right to a place on the primary ballot, but other candidates must qualify by circulating petitions. Access to the ballot may also be restricted by requiring that a candidate receive a fixed percentage of the convention delegate votes in order to enter the primary. The minimum convention vote required for getting one s name on the primary ballot is 30 percent in Colorado, 25 percent in New York, 20 percent in New Mexico, and 15 percent in Connecticut. These requirements have frequently prevented challenges to the party organizations preferred candidates. New Mexico s endorsing conven- tions have been used to achieve slates balanced between Hispanic and Anglo can- didates.13 In Utah, the convention designates for each office two candidates, whose names are placed on the primary ballot. However, if one candidate receives 70 percent of the convention vote, that individual is automatically declared the party nominee. A candidate in Colorado can avoid a primary and become the party s nominee if he or she receives the support of 50 percent of the convention delegates. It is possible in several of the states with statutory requirements for pre- primary endorsement of candidates to get on the primary ballot by securing the requisite number of signatures on a petition.
EXTRALEGAL ENDORSEMENTS In fifteen states, endorsements by one or both parties are allowed by party rules, with the endorsing done either by party conventions or by committees. For exam- ple, both parties in Illinois, Massachusetts, and Minnesota regularly endorse candi- dates, and California recently joined the list of states with endorsement permitted under state party rules. Other states that use party endorsement are Delaware, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Virginia, and Wisconsin. In New Jersey, county party organizations frequently endorse candidates in an effort to influence who will enter and win the primary. Behind the scenes, it is not unusual for party lea- ders to assist a favored candidate while discouraging others from getting into the race. There are also unofficial party endorsements by party-affiliated groups in California. These unofficial party affiliates, including the Republican Assembly and the California Democratic Council, seek to influence nominations through their group endorsements.
Extralegal endorsement practices often reflect a desire on the part of party acti- vists to select candidates committed to a particular political faith or faction. In Minnesota, for example, ideological concerns have played a major role in endorse- ment politics, as the Democratic Farmer-Labor Party has utilized endorsement to maintain a liberal policy orientation. The state Republicans, in their efforts to
130 C H A P T E R 5
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
further a conservative agenda, even went so far as to deny endorsement in 1994 to its moderate, pro-choice incumbent governor, Arne Carlson. Not all endorsement activities are motivated solely out of ideological concerns, however. An interest in maintaining political control, not ideology, has been a major motivation of the Illinois Democratic State Central Committee in its slate making. Other party inter- ests that can be advanced through endorsement are selecting the strongest candidate and avoiding a divisive primary that could split the party for the general election.
CONSEQUENCES OF PREPRIMARY ENDORSEMENTS REDUCED PRIMARY COMPETITION Preprimary endorsement reduces the amount of competition in primaries. Candidates who fail to gain endorsements often with- draw from the race and do not enter the primary. There is frequently competition in gubernatorial primaries, but it is much less common in states having party endorsement processes.14 In states having endorsement processes, there was com- petition in only one-half of the gubernatorial primaries between 1968 and 1998, whereas there was competition in three-fourths of the primaries in states without endorsement procedures.15 Preprimary endorsements have their greatest impact in reducing primary competition through the elimination of minor candidates. Major challengers, however, can normally mount effective primary campaigns even without endorsements.
Incumbent governors typically win renomination and face little or no meaning- ful opposition. For incumbent governors, party endorsements significantly reduce the likelihood of their being challenged in primaries. Between 1968 and 1998, endorsed Democratic incumbents were unchallenged in the primaries in 37 percent of the cases, whereas nonendorsed incumbents faced challenges 68 percent of the time. The pattern was similar for Republicans. Endorsed GOP incumbents faced primary opposition 27 percent of the time, whereas 56 percent of nonendorsed incumbents had primary opponents.16
DECLINING EFFECTIVENESS OF PREPRIMARY ENDORSEMENTS The ability of party organiza- tional endorsements to give the winning edge to their candidates has declined in recent years. Thus, endorsed candidates in states with both legally mandated and informal endorsement procedures won contested gubernatorial primaries in at least 80 percent of the cases from 1960 to 1980, but those winning percentages dropped to 53 percent between 1982 and 1998.17 Even in traditionally strong party organi- zation states such as Connecticut, a party endorsement is no longer tantamount to winning the nomination. While Lieberman easily captured the majority of votes that were necessary to win the state party endorsement in 2006, he eventually lost the Democratic primary to the wealthy challenger, Ned Lamont. In that same year, the candidate who won the Connecticut Democratic Party s endorsement for governor also lost the Democratic primary.
Although the impact of preprimary endorsements on primary outcomes appears to have declined in recent years, a comprehensive study conducted by Sarah McCally Morehouse found that preprimary endorsements do tend to lessen the impact of campaign spending. Endorsed candidates usually succeed in getting them- selves as well known as their challengers because the endorsement process requires
NOMINATIONS FOR STATE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES 131
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
them to engage in extensive face-to-face meetings with at least a thousand party activist delegates from across the state. The public visibility gained through the endorsement process thus helps to compensate for any campaign spending advantage their challengers may have. Further offsetting the impact of challenger spending in gubernatorial primaries are the resources of time and effort poured into the race by the party organizations on behalf of their endorsed candidates. By contrast, in states that do not use preprimary endorsing conventions, the candidates spending the most money normally have the best chance of winning the primary.18
COMPETITION IN PRIMARIES
It was the expectation of the reformers that the direct primary would stimulate competition among candidates for party nominations. This hope has not been ful- filled, however. In a substantial percentage of the primaries, nominations either go uncontested or involve only nominal challenges to the front-runner. The two key
BOX 5.2 AN OHIO WRITE-IN CANDIDATE BECOMES THE CENTER OF ATTENTION FOR BOTH PARTIES
When Representative Ted Strickland (D-Ohio) vacated his seat to run for governor in 2006, Democrats turned to state Senator Charlie Wilson to try to keep the seat in Democratic hands. There was only one problem: Wilson s name did not appear on the ballot for the Democratic primary. To appear on the primary ballot in Ohio, a congressional candidate need only collect 50 signatures from registered voters in his or her district, but Wilson did not clear even that low hurdle. His campaign collected only 98 signatures, 50 of which came from outside the district, leaving him 2 signatures shy of the requirement. Had his name appeared on the ballot, Wilson would likely have won easily without spending much money on the campaign for the nomination. But as a write-in candidate, things suddenly became much more expensive. The DCCC got involved in the race to help Wilson s campaign instruct voters on how to write his name in on the ballot. Altogether, more than $1 million was spent on behalf of Wilson s write-in candidacy for the nomination.
But Democrats were not the only party getting involved. Since the two Democrats who were on the ballot were political amateurs, Republicans knew that they would win the seat easily if Wilson did not receive the nomination. The NRCC s campaign to keep Wilson from receiving the Democratic nomination culminated with its advertisement attacking Bob Carr, one of the unknown Democratic candidates on the ballot. The logic behind this effort was to increase the visibility of Carr, which would lead more Democrats to vote for him. In fact, the ad attacked the candidate for being too liberal to work with Republicans in Congress, favoring environmental regulations, and opposing the extension of President Bush s tax cuts, attacks that publicized positions that Democratic primary voters would find desirable. Despite the involvement from the NRCC, Wilson won the nomination by receiving 44,367 write-in votes in the primary, twice as many votes as the two candidates whose names actually appeared on the ballot. But the episode demonstrated that both parties are likely to become very involved in primary campaigns when the stakes are high and the outcome is uncertain.
Source: Stephen Koff, Ohio Democrats Spell Mistake W-I-L-S-O-N, The Plain Dealer, April 20, 2006.
132 C H A P T E R 5
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
determinants of intraparty competition in the primaries are the extent of the inter- party competition and incumbency.
THE IMPACT OF INTERPARTY COMPETITION V. O. Key first demonstrated that competition in primaries is significantly influ- enced by the pattern of two-party competition that exists within a state or district. Competition in primaries is greatest where a party s prospects in the general elec- tion are the highest.19 The impact of general election prospects on primary compe- tition is evident in nominations for the U.S. House. In districts that are generally considered safe for one party, the dominant party normally has a contested primary often with more than two candidates when the incumbent is not seeking reelection. Of course, when the prospects of victory in the general election are dis- mal, there is little or no competition for party nominations. Indeed, in congressional districts that heavily favor the incumbent s party, it is frequently impossible for the minority party to induce anyone to enter the primaries. For example, in 2006 there was no major-party challenger for fifty-six House incumbents. Incumbency is a distinct advantage in nominating contests, and the presence of an incumbent in a primary is usually enough to ward off serious opposition. Because incumbents tend to scare off strong competitors in the primaries, they of course win renomination in overwhelming proportions. Between 2000 and 2008, sixty-seven incumbent governors sought renomination and sixty-three (94 percent) were successful. When no incumbent is running, however, the competition in the primary can be intense. For example, in Michigan in 2010, when the incumbent Democratic governor was facing term limits and the Democrats were facing a difficult political environment, more than a half- dozen candidates entered the primary for the GOP nomination.
The advantages of incumbency are particularly striking in nominations for the U.S. House of Representatives. Between 1980 and 2008, the percentage of incum- bent representatives renominated never dipped below 95 percent. The incidence of primary victories for incumbent senators was also high consistently above 90 per- cent (see Table 5.2). The tendency of incumbents to discourage strong primary opposition and win renomination is also prevalent in state legislative elections. Thus, for most members of Congress and state legislators, the primary is not unlike the common cold. It is a nuisance, but seldom fatal.
THE IMPACT OF NOMINATING PROCEDURES The type of nominating procedures used within a state also affects the extent of pri- mary competition. As noted previously, states that use preprimary endorsement procedures have lower levels of competition because of the ability of party organi- zations to restrict candidacies in these states. Runoff primaries tend to multiply the number of candidates in the initial primary, as do blanket primaries.20 Interestingly, studies of competition for nominations for governor and senator have not demon- strated that open primaries encourage a higher level of competition than closed pri- mary systems. Apparently, the absence of a requirement for party registration by voters is not a sufficient condition to produce intraparty nominating contests.
NOMINATIONS FOR STATE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES 133
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
VOTER TURNOUT IN PRIMARIES
Just as the reformers high hopes for competition in primaries have been largely unfulfilled, so too have their expectations concerning voter participation. An average of only about 30 percent of the voting-age population votes in guberna- torial primaries in years when both parties have contested primaries. If only one party has a major primary contest, voter participation is often substantially lower. When turnout is measured as a percentage of the voting-age population in all the states holding primaries, the turnout rate is often quite low an average of 24 percent in midterm elections from 1962 to 1994. It was only 18.22 percent in 1994 and 17 percent in 1998.21
There are regional variations in turnout rates, with several of the western states (e.g., Montana and Wyoming) having some of the highest levels of voter participa- tion. These are states that also have high turnout rates in general elections. Tradi- tionally, the primary turnout has been high in southern Democratic primaries. Indeed, because historically the Democratic primary was the real election in the South, there
TABLE 5.2 RENOMINATION RATES OF INCUMBENT UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATORS, 1980 2008
Incumbent Representatives Incumbent Senators
Year Seeking Renomination
Renom- inated Percent
Seeking Renomination
Renom- inated Percent
2008 390 387 99.2 29 29 100.0
2006 403 402 99.8 28 27 96.4
2004 401 401 100.0 26 26 100.0
2002 392 384 98.0 29 28 96.6
2000 403 400 99.3 28 28 100.0
1998 403 402 99.8 30 30 100.0
1996 384 382 99.5 21 20 95.2
1994 386 382 99.0 26 26 100.0
1992 368 349 94.8 28 27 96.4
1990 406 405 99.8 31 31 100.0
1988 408 407 99.8 27 27 100.0
1986 393 391 99.5 28 28 100.0
1984 395 392 99.2 26 26 100.0
1982 393 383 97.5 31 30 96.8
1980 398 392 98.5 27 25 92.6
Total 4,337 4,285 98.8 (Mean)
303 298 98.3 (Mean)
Source: CQ Voting and Elections Database.
134 C H A P T E R 5
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
was a pattern of higher turnout in primaries than in the general election. However, as general elections have become increasingly competitive between the Democrats and Republicans, the pattern of participation in southern primaries has changed dramati- cally. Overall, the percentage of the electorate participating in gubernatorial primaries has declined, the Democratic share of the popular vote in primaries has gone down, and the level of participation in Republican primaries has increased. With the frequen- tly low level of turnout that prevails in primary elections, questions naturally arise about the representativeness of primary voters.
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND TURNOUT The same sorts of personal characteristics that are associated with voting in gen- eral elections are operative in primaries. Primary voters tend to be better educated and older than nonvoters. They are also more knowledgeable concerning politics, more interested in campaigns, and have a greater sense of civic duty. Primary voters rank even higher than voters in general elections in these characteristics. Pri- mary turnout is also strongly affected by the strength of a person s party identifica- tion (i.e., one s psychological attachment to a political party). Political scientists have consistently demonstrated that the stronger an individual s party identification (e.g., being a strong Republican versus a weak Republican), the more likely that person is to vote. Jewell s study of primary voting has shown that party identifica- tion has an even stronger and more consistent impact on primary turnout than it does in general elections. He also found that party identification was especially important in determining which younger and less-interested voters will vote in primaries.22
BOX 5.3 WHEN IS THE PRIMARY?
Party primaries generally suffer from low turnout for a variety of reasons. Among these is the fact that different states hold their primaries at different times, making it less likely that citizens will be aware of when their own state primaries are to be held. Generally, individuals only start paying close attention a few weeks before the primary election date. This fact was clear when a survey firm asked Washington State voters if they knew when the state and congressional primaries would be held in their state. The survey was fielded in mid-July, but the primary was not to be held until August 19th. Despite the fact that respondents were given just three options to choose from in a multiple choice format, just 13 percent knew the date of the primary. That means that respondents did worse than if they had just guessed randomly! Forty-six percent chose one of the other two date options and 41 percent said that they were not sure when the primary was. Fortunately, more citizens in Washington state appeared to learn about the date of the primary as it approached, which was evidenced by the fact that 31 percent of the voting age population turned out to vote in the election.
Source: Survey USA.
NOMINATIONS FOR STATE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES 135
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
PARTY-POLARIZING POTENTIAL OF UNREPRESENTATIVE PRIMARY ELECTORATES The tendency of party activists to have higher rates of turnout in primaries and also to have stronger ideological orientations than rank-and-file voters has caused polit- ical scientists to consider whether patterns of voter turnout bias the outcomes of a primary.23 That is, do the patterns of primary turnout introduce a bias into the results of primaries, which in the Republican Party favors conservative candidates and in the Democratic Party helps liberal candidates?
There is evidence from recent political science research that suggests that because turnout in primaries is low and primary voters in both parties are more extreme in their views than are general election voters on the whole, members of Congress find that to protect their flanks they may have to play to noncentrist ele- ments in their constituencies. It is therefore believed that the primary election sys- tem is contributing to a polarization of the parties in Congress. In understanding this party-polarizing consequence of primaries, it is important to keep in mind that primaries are intraparty competitions, whereas general elections are inter- party competitions. Intraparty competition, or the potential for an intraparty challenger, means that those seeking party nominations must be attentive to the electorates they are likely to face in primaries electorates that are apt to be non- centrist on the whole.24
Because Republican primary voters are more conservative than general election Republican voters or independents, and Democratic primary voters are slightly more liberal than are their general election counterparts, candidates in competitive primaries find it necessary to adopt either highly conservative or highly liberal pol- icy positions. A candidate may also adopt relatively extreme policy positions to ward off potential challengers in the primary. Party activists, who are often moti- vated by their strong noncentrist views, constitute an additional force pushing pri- mary candidates to adopt highly conservative or liberal views. These activists are influential because they contribute money, run campaigns, and support candidates. Ideological interest groups play a similar role by supporting primary candidates with relatively polarized views. In addition, the candidates themselves tend to have views that are noncentrist. Although candidates tend to diverge from centrist posi- tions in part because of their primary electorates, there is also the potential for sub- stantial variability across the states and congressional districts in the extent to which primary electorates are unrepresentative. Turnout is likely to be affected by the particular mix of candidates on the ballot in any given state s primary. If a lib- eral Democratic incumbent is running against token opposition, moderate and con- servative partisans may have little incentive to vote, whereas a contest for an open seat between clearly identified liberal and conservative candidates could stimulate these people to vote in larger numbers.
POLITICAL/INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES ON TURNOUT There are a variety of political/institutional variables that affect turnout. These vari- ables relate to the statutory regulations surrounding the primary, the nature of the party system, and the levels of competition that exist in primary contests.
136 C H A P T E R 5
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
MAJORITY VERSUS MINORITY PARTY STATUS Turnout tends to be highest in the primary of the party that has the greatest likelihood of winning the general election, precisely because that party s contest is more likely to determine which person will eventually hold public office.
COMPETITION Competition for a party s nomination spurs voters to participate in pri- maries. In the absence of a real contest for a nomination, voter turnout diminishes. A party s share of the primary electorate may vary dramatically depending upon whether or not it has a red-hot contest in a given year. The extent of competition is influenced by such factors as endorsement and incumbency, both of which operate to depress competition and thus indirectly reduce turnout. Traditions of competition in state primaries, as in the one-party South, can have the effect of stimulating turnout.
CLOSED VERSUS OPEN PRIMARIES Because open primaries do not require voters to pub- licly disclose a partisan preference, open primaries tend to have higher levels of turnout than do closed primaries. Independents can be precluded from participa- tion in closed primary states.
THE NATIONAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS AND NOMINATIONS IN THE STATES
The recruitment and nomination processes within the states illustrate the tradition- ally decentralized character of the American party system. Despite the importance of congressional and senatorial nominations for the functioning of the national- level parties, the national party organizations traditionally played only a minor role in candidate recruitment and nomination. Recruitment was a matter of self- selection, with aspiring members of Congress determining on their own when the time was ripe for them to move from careers in statehouses, city halls, courthouses, or the private sector to the Congress. Aspiring representatives and senators put together personal organizations to contest first the primary and then the general election. Party leaders in Congress and occasionally the president sometimes gave informal encouragement to promising candidates, but it was traditional for the national party leadership to stay aloof from state nomination contests.
A classic example of national party weakness in influencing congressional nominations occurred in 1938, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to purge dissident conservatives in the primaries. Despite the fact that Roosevelt was at the zenith of his popularity during this period, his intervention in the primaries against incumbent senators in Oklahoma, Georgia, South Carolina, and Maryland failed. His inability to influence primary election outcomes paralleled the experience of President William Howard Taft and Senate Republican Leader Nelson Aldrich (R.I.), who sought to oust western Progressives in the Republican primaries of 1910. Usually, however, the president and national party leaders remained silent, even when their loyal supporters had been challenged in the primaries.
The traditional hands-off policy of national parties toward congressional and senatorial nominations changed in the late 1970s and early 1980s because of the realization that candidate quality is a major determinant of electoral success.
NOMINATIONS FOR STATE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES 137
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
The national party committees now aggressively recruit candidates to enter pri- maries and, just as aggressively, discourage others. These candidate recruitment efforts are concentrated in competitive constituencies. However, there are also at- tempts to find candidates in districts considered safe for the opposition party, in order to prevent the general election from going uncontested and to build a base of support for future elections when conditions may be more favorable (e.g., after an incumbent retires).25
National and regional party staff meet with state and local party officials to identify and encourage candidates to run. To entice potentially attractive candidates into the primaries, promises of campaign money and services, polls, and the persua- sive talents of party leaders, House and Senate members, and even presidents are used. The parties staffs also serve as liaison persons with PACs and campaign con- sultants, who have the financial resources and skills needed to run effective congres- sional campaigns. Despite these enticements, parties are not always successful in their efforts to convince quality candidates to run for office. For example, in 2008, the Republican Party found it difficult to recruit candidates to challenge Democratic
BOX 5.4 THE RISE OF PARTY PURITY GROUPS
In 2009 and 2010, scores of conservative activists organized themselves into something called the Tea Party Movement and worked to challenge Republicans who they thought were too moderate. While the movement attracted a great deal of attention from the news media, it was just the most recent example of what Michael H. Murakami has dubbed party purity groups. As he notes:
These organizations side ideologically with one [of] the two major political parties, but are frustrated with moderates, who seem to betray core party values by siding with the opposition, even if only on a narrow range of issues. Changes in communi- cation technology enable these groups to act on these growing frustrations stoked by the polarized political milieu. With the ability to garner large memberships, raise hundreds of millions of dollars, air attack ads, and recruit candidates, party purity groups are able to heavily influence party primary processes.
Murakami makes note of several recent examples where more ideologically extreme challengers have challenged incumbents in primary elections with the help of party purity groups like MoveOn.org and the Club for Growth. These efforts have met with some notable successes. For example, Senator Joseph Lieberman was defeated in the 2006 Connecticut Democratic primary by a challenger sponsored by MoveOn.org. And two incumbent members of the House of Representatives lost their renomination attempts to challengers supported by party purity groups in 2008. Even when these efforts fail and the incumbent is able to defeat these ideological challenges, the experience can still have a lasting impact. In 2004, Senator Arlen Specter narrowly defeated a conservative challenger in the Republican primary who was backed by the Club for Growth. Facing the near certainty of another such challenge in his 2010 re-election bid, Specter chose instead to switch parties and run for re-election as a Democrat.
Source: Michael H. Murakami. Divisive Primaries: Party Organizations, Ideological Groups, and the Battle over Party Purity, PS: Political Science & Politics (2008) 918 923.
138 C H A P T E R 5
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
members of Congress who had won their seats in 2006. This lack of quality chal- lengers allowed the Democratic Party to target more Republican-held seats rather than worry about defending seats they had picked up in 2006. As the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Chair noted at the time, The fact that [Republicans] have not been able to field candidates in a lot of these districts means we have not had to circle the wagons and play defense.
National party candidate recruitment activity is not without its risks. Conflicts can arise between national and state party leaders, and bitter resentments can build up among supporters of a candidate not favored by national party officials. These problems can damage the chances of the eventual nominee. As a result, the national party tends to stay neutral if there is more than one candidate in the primary. The major exceptions to the rule of neutrality in primaries tend to occur when an incumbent representative or senator is being seriously challenged. Thus, in 2002, with partisan control of the House of Representatives likely to be decided in just a handful of congressional districts, Representative Tom Davis (R-Va.), the chairman of the Republican congressional campaign committee, with the blessing of the White House, took the unusual step of taking sides in contested GOP primaries in Ohio and Kansas. Davis considered securing the strongest candidates in these races so important that he was willing to accept infuriating the local Republican leaders in Ohio and Kansas.26
The heavy involvement of the national parties in candidate recruitment in recent years is clearly a departure from past practices, but it has not done away with the dominant pattern of self-selected candidacies. However, the national par- ties continuing involvement in recruitment and high levels of candidate support in general elections may create a pool of successful candidates with strong ties to national party and congressional leaders. To the extent that these officeholders perceive national party support to have been a critical factor in their nomination and election, they may feel a sense of obligation to the leaders who helped them in their hour of need. That sense of obligation is a potential lever of influence for the congressional leaders in seeking to affect the voting of representatives and sena- tors in the halls of Congress. To date, however, the new activism of the congressional and senatorial campaign committees has not been used by party leaders in Congress to enforce discipline and unity. An aggressive future leader, however, could seek to expand influence over colleagues on the basis of campaign support that has been provided. Such a leader might also threaten to withhold it from dissident members.
THE DIRECT PRIMARY AND THE GENERAL ELECTION
The primary, of course, has significant implications for the general election. It nar- rows the field of candidates and choice available to the voter. The outcome of a primary may also affect a party s general election prospects enhancing those pro- spects if a strong candidate wins and diminishing the chances of winning if a weak candidate is nominated. Party leaders are frequently concerned about the potential divisiveness of a contested primary. They fear that a hotly contested primary will leave the party disunited for the general election. Preprimary endorsements are one method of seeking to prevent divisive primaries. Others include channeling financial
NOMINATIONS FOR STATE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES 139
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
and campaign support to a preferred candidate in an effort to discourage opposi- tion. There are many frequently cited examples of divisive primaries that have resulted in the party s nominee going down in defeat, but there is no consistent pat- tern demonstrating that contested primaries are necessarily damaging. Of course, one reason that primary contests do not consistently result in general election losses is that primary competition is most frequent within the stronger of a state s two parties.27 There are also circumstances when a contested primary may help the nominee. Battling for a party nomination normally generates substantial publicity for the candidates and keeps their names before the public. A tough primary fight may even enhance the image of the winning candidate as an attractive personality, skilled campaigner, and person who is knowledgeable about critical issues. The absence of a primary fight can push a candidate off the evening news programs and front pages of the papers in the crucial months of the spring and summer before an elec- tion. Such lack of publicity and testing of the candidate in a primary can be a serious liability in the general election.
Furthermore, candidates who have been tested in tough primary battles are apt to be improved campaigners, more able fund-raisers, and generally stronger candi- dates for the experience. Their organizations are more likely to be well established and ready to contest the general election than those of the candidates who ran unop- posed in the primaries. Candidates learn valuable lessons about what works and what does not work in the course of campaigning, and candidates who have survived intense primary fights are likely to have learned more than those who had no signifi- cant primary opposition.
THE DIRECT PRIMARY AND POLITICAL PARTIES
The institutionalization of the direct primary as the principal method of nominating state and congressional candidates in the United States is part of a long-term trend toward shifting power away from party leaders toward rank-and-file voters. In their effort to weaken the capacity of parties to control the selection of candidates for major elective office, the reformers of the Progressive Era were largely successful. In only a handful of jurisdictions are party organizations sufficiently strong that they can bestow their endorsement upon a candidate and assure the individual s nomination in a primary. Even the much-vaunted Cook County (Illinois) Demo- cratic organization can no longer control even mayoral nominations in Chicago. As Leon D. Epstein has observed, a distinct disadvantage flows from party organi- zations loss of the power to select candidates. There is less incentive to be a mem- ber of such an organization, in the usual dues-paying sense, if one can become a candidate selector merely by voting in a party primary. This is perhaps one of the reasons it has been harder for American than for European parties to build mass membership organizations.28
As the impact of preprimary endorsements and the influence of the national congressional campaign committees illustrates, however, party support can be help- ful to a candidate in gaining a nomination. Party organizational support is not irrel- evant in the primary process, but it is seldom sufficient to secure a nomination. Rather, the candidate must build a personal organization and following among the voters as well as a substantial war chest if the hurdle of the primary is to be cleared
140 C H A P T E R 5
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
successfully. The direct primary has therefore contributed to a candidate-centered type of politics in America, in contrast to the more party-centered politics of most Western-style democracies that do not utilize the primary for nominations.
Although the direct primary has contributed to a weakening of political parties organizationally, Leon D. Epstein believes that the primary helps to account for the extraordinary and continued electoral dominance of the Republican and Demo- cratic parties. He believes that the direct primary institutionalized the Republican and Democratic labels in electoral politics and encouraged a two-party system. The primary provides unusual opportunities for insurgents to win major-party nominations and thereby forego the normally self-defeating process of running as third-party candidates. Challengers to established party organizational leadership are thus encouraged to seek intraparty avenues to power, and voters become accus- tomed to choosing from among individuals and factions that are competing for a party label.
Epstein s argument, of course, is paradoxical. It asserts that while strengthening the parties electorally, the primary has weakened the party organization and the party in the government. The primary has thus by statute institutionalized the elec- toral looseness of American parties but in the process also has acted as a party pre- servative. But just as preservatives in food processing change the nature and quality of what is being preserved, the direct primary has left the parties as persistent elec- toral labels whose importance is frequently questioned after Election Day.29
NOTES
1. E. E. Schattschneider, Party Govern- ment (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942), p. 64.
2. V. O. Key, Jr., American State Politics: An Introduction (New York: Knopf, 1956), pp. 87 88.
3. Ibid., p. 88. 4. Ibid., p. 91. 5. Ibid., p. 117. 6. Ellen Torelle, ed., The Political Philoso-
phy of Robert M. La Follette (Madison, Wis.: Robert M. La Follette Co., 1920), pp. 29 31.
7. Malcolm E. Jewell, Parties and Pri- maries: Nominating State Governors (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 9 11.
8. Ibid., pp. 11 12. 9. Malcolm E. Jewell and Sarah M.
Morehouse, Political Parties and Elec- tions in American States, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001), p. 102.
10. For an analysis of the operation of New York s cross-filing system, see Howard A. Scarrow, Parties, Elections, and
Representation in the State of New York (New York: New York University Press, 1983), pp. 55 80; and Robert J. Spitzer, Multiparty Politics in New York, in
Paul S. Herrnson and John C. Green, eds., Multiparty Politics in America (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Little-field, 1997), pp. 125 137.
11. Spitzer, Multiparty Politics in New York, p. 133.
12. Primary Election Dates in Pennsylva- nia: An Analysis of Proposals for Change, Report of the Task Force and Advisory Committee on Primary Elec- tion Dates, November, 2000.
13. Sarah McCally Morehouse, The Gover- nor as Party Leader: Campaigning and Governing (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1998) pp. 22 23.
14. Jewell and Morehouse, Political Parties, pp. 109 110. For evidence of endorse- ments helping candidates with pri- maries, see James P. Melcher, The Party s Still Lively: New Findings about Statewide Preprimary Endorsements,
NOMINATIONS FOR STATE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES 141
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.
American Review of Politics 19 (Spring 1998): 53 56. See also Andrew D. McNitt, The Effect of Endorsement on Competition for Nominations: An Explanation of Different Nominating Systems, Journal of Politics 42 (Feb. 1980): 257 266; and Tom W. Rice, Gubernatorial and Senatorial Primary
Elections: Determinants and Conse- quences, American Politics Quarterly 13 (Oct. 1985): 434 435.
15. Jewell and Morehouse, Political Parties, p. 120.
16. Ibid., p. 119. 17. Ibid., p. 109 110. 18. Morehouse, The Governor as Party
Leader, pp. 121, 181 200. 19. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure
Groups, pp. 379 380; Key, American State Politics, pp. 107 111.
20. Rice, Gubernatorial and Senatorial Primary Elections, pp. 435 437; and Berry and Canon, Explaining Com- petitiveness, pp. 459 471.
21. Committee for the Study of the Ameri- can Electorate, press release, Sept. 23, 1995; Terry M. Neal, Primary Turnout Continues to Decline, Washington Post, Sept. 29, 1998, p. A4.
22. Jewell, Parties and Primaries, p. 176. 23. V. O. Key considered the consequences
of unrepresentative primary electorates in his American State Politics, pp. 153 165.
24. Barry C. Burden, The Polarizing Effects of Congressional Primaries, in Peter F. Galderisi, Michael Lyons, and Marni Ezra, eds., Congress Primaries in the Politics of Representation (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001); David Brady and Morris Fiorina, Congress in the Era of the Permanent
Campaign, in Norman J. Ornstein and Thomas E. Mann, eds., The Permanent Campaign and Its Future (Washington, D.C.: AEI and Brookings, 2000),
pp. 134 161; David Brady and Edward Schwartz, Ideology and Interests in Congressional Voting: The Politics of Abortion in the U.S. Senate, Public Choice 84 (1995): 25 48.
25. On national party recruitment activities, see the publications of Paul S. Herrnson, Congressional Elections: Campaigns at Home and in Washington, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000), pp. 47 48; and Party Campaigning in the 1980s (Cambridge: Harvard Uni- versity Press, 1988), pp. 48 54.
26. Richard L. Berke, G.O.P. Giving House Hopefuls Primary Help, New York Times (national edition), March 3, 2002, pp. 1, 22.
27. Jewell and Morehouse, Political Parties, pp. 138 139; see also Patrick J. Kenny, Sorting Out the Effects of Divisiveness
in Congressional and Senatorial Elec- tions, Western Political Quarterly 41 (1988): 756 777; Patrick J. Kenny and Tom W. Rice, The Relationship between Divisive Primaries and General Election Outcomes, American Political Science Review 31 (1987): 31 44; and Donald B. Johnson and James L. Gibson, The Divisive Primary Revisited: Party
Activists in Iowa, American Political Science Review 68 (1974): 67 77.
28. Leon D. Epstein, The American Party Primary, in Nelson W. Polsby and Raymond E. Wolfinger, eds., On Par- ties: Essays Honoring Austin Ranney (Berkeley: Institute of Government Press, University of California Berkeley, 1999), p. 50.
29. For a full exposition of Epstein s intriguing argument concerning the impact of the direct primary on parties, see Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in the American Mold (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), pp. 244 245; and his The American Party Primary, pp. 52 53.
142 C H A P T E R 5
C op
yr ig
ht 2
01 0
C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g. A
ll R
ig ht
s R
es er
ve d.
M ay
n ot
b e
co pi
ed , s
ca nn
ed , o
r du
pl ic
at ed
, i n
w ho
le o
r in
p ar
t. D
ue t
o el
ec tr
on ic
r ig
ht s,
s om
e th
ir d
pa rt
y co
nt en
t m
ay b
e su
pp re
ss ed
f ro
m t
he e
B oo
k an
d/ or
e C
ha pt
er (s
). E
di to
ri al
r ev
ie w
h as
d ee
m ed
t ha
t an
y su
pp re
ss ed
c on
te nt
d oe
s no
t m
at er
ia ll
y af
fe ct
t he
o ve
ra ll
l ea
rn in
g ex
pe ri
en ce
. C en
ga ge
L ea
rn in
g re
se rv
es t
he r
ig ht
t o
re m
ov e
ad di
ti on
al c
on te
nt a
t an
y ti
m e
if s
ub se
qu en
t ri
gh ts
r es
tr ic
ti on
s re
qu ir
e it
.