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The construction of China’s climate politics: transnational NGOs and the spiral model of international relations

Miriam Schroeder Potsdam University/DFG Research Center 700

Abstract This article investigates how transnational NGO cooperation can influence the official Chinese stance on climate change politics. Drawing on the constructivist approach to international relations, the so-called ‘spiral model’, developed by Risse et al (1999) for the human rights field, is applied to environmental politics for the first time. The model is tested by process tracing the historical development of the Chinese position on climate change and by analysing the roles and impacts of different actors in different phases of norm internalization. The model is complemented by an in-depth analysis of present transnational NGO campaigns in China. Although results show that international and Chinese NGOs have an influence on Chinese climate politics, the model’s assumption about the causes for a norm internalization could only partly be confirmed: instead of the pressurizing strategies of the transnational advocacy network, instruments of sharing information seem to be more effective in changing Chinese climate politics.

Introduction

In the inglorious ranking list of the world’s top greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters, China is catching up rapidly. According to recent publications, China has overtaken the United States’ (US) CO2 emissions by 14 per cent in 2007 and has become the world’s largest CO2 emitter, making up 24 per cent of the world’s total CO2 emissions (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 2008). As China is becoming one of the crucial factors for the advancement of the international regime on climate change, it is challenged by both state and nonstate actors to curb its growing GHG emissions. Although China—in concert with other developing countries—still adheres to the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, one can recognize substantial transformations in China’s climate change politics at both the international and national level. China ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, and the Chinese government is increasingly designing and implementing national-level policies with positive (side-)effects for climate protection. These measures to curb GHG emissions are, at least rhetorically, justified by the objective of climate protection, although many authors warn of a growing gap between ambitious rhetoric and ineffective policy implementation on the ground (Economy 2006, 2007; Turner and Linden 2007).

This article takes a constructivist approach and argues that the transformations in Chinese climate change politics can be explained by an internalization of the

Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 21, Number 4, December 2008

ISSN 0955-7571 print/ISSN 1474-449X online/08/040505–21 q 2008 Centre of International Studies

DOI: 10.1080/09557570802452821

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norm of climate protection by the Chinese government. The research question guiding this analysis is: how has the norm of climate protection become internalized in Chinese politics?

The focus of the analysis is on the role of Chinese and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) as norm advocates, the impact of their transnational cooperation on norm transfer and ultimate transformation of Chinese climate politics. Several structural causes, most prominently the rise of the market economy, decentralization and a ‘greening’ of the Chinese state (Yang 2005; Ho and Vermeer 2006) have provided a space for the emergence of environmental NGOs. Part of their success lays in the cooperation with international NGOs and scientific communities that also work for environmental protection. Although previous articles have already provided accounts of the patterns of cooperation which can be observed between INGOs and environmental NGOs (for example, Morton 2007; Yang 2005), this policy-field specific analysis of transnational NGO impacts on Chinese climate politics should provide theoretical lessons for constructivist explanatory approaches as well as practical considerations on effective NGO cooperation for climate protection.

In the first part of the article the constructivist approach of norm inter- nalization is briefly introduced. The so called ‘spiral model’—developed by Risse et al (1999) as a causal explanation for the transnational cooperation between NGOs—has proven valuable to understanding the human rights field. The model will be described and adopted for its application to the field of climate politics; thus testing the model to check whether its validity can be extended towards other fields of politics in which norms also impact political decisions. The second part of this article is empirical; in it the revised spiral model is applied to process trace the impact of international and Chinese NGOs on Chinese climate politics. As a complement to the longitudinal analysis, the article focuses on the present modes of interaction between INGOs and Chinese NGOs. The article concludes with some theoretical findings from the application of the spiral model to climate politics and draws lessons-learnt for the role of environmental NGOs in countries with a restricted civil society, especially in regard to their possibilities to link up with international civil society.

Taking a constructivist approach in explaining change in national climate

politics: norm internalization

The assumption that a change in Chinese climate politics has been induced by an internalization of the international norm of climate protection marks this article as part of a constructivist approach to international relations. Typical for the constructivist approach is the assumption that norms are defining the interests of actors, thus providing the starting point for actions. The causal priority of norms for the explanation of interests is derived from the constructivist image of an actor and her impetus for acting. In contrast to rationalist schools of international relations, the constructivist approach conceptualizes a person as a homo sociologicus, an actor that is guided in his or her behaviour by the logic of appropriateness and a bounded rationality. Behaviour according to the logic of appropriateness means acting according to one’s own perceived identity and the expectations of one’s norm community (March and Olsen 1989, 160 – 162).

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In all cases of norm internalization, but especially in cases where international and national norms collide, norm entrepreneurs play an important role as actors transmitting and enforcing the international norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 896). Every entity of a norm community can act as a norm entrepreneur, but within the field of environmental politics, international organizations, epistemic communities1 and nongovernmental organizations are the most common. All of these actors can be part of a transnational advocacy network, defined as ‘those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and a dense exchange of information and services . . . ’ (Risse et al 1999, 18; similar approaches in Risse-Kappen 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998, 2). If domestic advocators of a norm cooperate with actors of the international norm community, the likelihood increases that this transnational advocacy network is able to make the norm-violating state succumb to the international norm (see Figure 1).

It is important to note the different strategies actors of the transnational advocacy network employ to transfer and enforce a norm. The spiral model mainly envisages norm entrepreneurs as using a mixture of pressure and shaming tactics, but other norm advocacy strategies such as information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics and accountability politics are also an option (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 6). Which strategy is chosen and proves most successful depends on the framing of the topic under discussion, the campaigning history of the norm entrepreneur and the domestic institutional conditions of the country under consideration. For example, climate change framed either as an environmental or as an energy issue appeals to different audiences and calls for different types of advocacy strategies.

Introduction to the spiral model of transnational norm diffusion

Starting from the research interest to explain the variance of changes in human rights politics on the national state level, the spiral model assumes a five-phase pathway of how norm internalization works in practice. These five phases are in theory sequential to each other, but may overlap in practice.

. Phase One—repression and activation of network. Facing a strong violation of a behavioural norm, a transnational network of actors forms for advocacy. Once the transnational network of norm entrepreneurs is activated, pressure tactics are used to force the repressive state into dialogue by imposing material pressure (for example in the form of trade sanctions) and/or by imposing social pressure (for example through shaming-tactics). It is assumed that the target state will respond with instrumental adaptation.

Hypothesis for the transition to Phase Two: Only if and when the transnational advocacy network succeeds in gathering sufficient information on the norm violation by the target state, can it put the norm-violating state on the international agenda, thus moving the situation to Phase Two.

1 Epistemic communities are defined according to Haas (1992, 3) as ‘a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authorative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’.

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. Phase Two—denial. Domestic norm entrepreneurs enter the scene and lobby together with their international counterparts for the norm under consider- ation. In this phase, denial of the validity of the norm is regarded as progress since it signals the target state beginning to be involved in a dialogue. Entering a dialogue might either be motivated by social or material vulnerability.

Hypothesis for the transition to Phase Three: If the strength of the transnational advocacy network and the vulnerability of the target state facing international pressure are large enough, the target state makes first tactical concessions.

. Phase Three—tactical concessions. This phase is characterized by rhetoric and practical norm acknowledgements by the target state. Due to these—in most cases tactical—concessions, a window of opportunity is opened for the transnational advocacy network to increase its pressure. Once trapped in its rhetorical norm acknowledgements, the state has to continue on the involuntarily chosen path of norm internalization.

Hypothesis for the transition to Phase Four: If faced with a fully mobilized domestic opposition, linked up with transnational networks for which the norm under consideration has reached consensual status, norm-violating governments no longer have many choices and usually become self-entrapped into argumentative behaviour in favour of the norm.

. Phase Four—prescriptive status. This phase describes a situation in which the target state justifies its own behaviour in accordance with the norm, so that its validity is no longer disputed, even if norm violations might still happen in some instances. One difficulty in identifying this phase is the problem of how to measure norm change, especially how to distinguish norm internalization due to real persuasion from rhetorical and instrumental adaptation. Risse et al (1999) take a pragmatic view by arguing that true beliefs of actors are not crucial as long as the actors are consistent in their verbal utterances and their words and deeds ultimately match.

Hypothesis for the transition to Phase Five: If the pressure from the domestic civil society and the transnational advocacy network remain constant, the target

Figure 1. The transnational advocacy network

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state holds on to its concessions leading to long-term norm-consistent behaviour.

. Phase Five—rule-consistent behaviour. If the pressure from international and national norm entrepreneurs is continuing, the final state of the norm internalization process—in which international norms are fully institutiona- lized domestically and norm compliance becomes a habitual practice of actors and is enforced by the rule of law—is reached.

The authors of the spiral model provide several intervening variables that might influence the norm internalization process. For the present analysis of climate change politics, only one of them—world time—is relevant: it describes the intervening impact of the international cascade of a norm upon the national level. If an international norm is followed by an increasing number of members of the international community, the ease and likeability increases of it becoming internalized by any other state.

Applying the spiral model to environmental politics

The spiral model has been developed as ‘a theory of the stages and mechanisms through which international norms can lead to changes in behaviour’ (Risse et al 1999, 2) in order to explain the influence of international norms on national human rights politics. Because we can also identify norms in the field of environmental politics, it seems plausible to transfer the model from human rights to the environmental politics field. This should also be what the developers intended, since they state that the model could be used for any sociopolitical processes of change involving norms independent from its geographical region and national setting (238).

For a long time conflicts in the field of environmental politics have been primarily discussed as interests and distribution conflicts about absolute and relative goods with ‘tragedies of the commons’2 and ‘collective action problems’3

being the keywords of the debate. Like in other fields of politics the shortcomings of such rationalist approaches lay in their inability to explain a change in behaviour due to the change of norms. Rationalist approaches are also facing the difficulty of explaining the creation and change of preferences in the field of environmental politics. An increasing number of authors are now looking at the impact of international and national norms as reasons behind actions taken in environmental politics (for example Keck and Sikkink 1998; Stokke 1998). An explanatory approach focused on the internalization of norms seems fruitful, especially for the explanation of a long-term change of national and international behaviour in the field of environmental politics.

If one compares different cascades of norms, the norm of climate protection has been one of the most prominent in the last decades. Climate protection first

2 ‘Tragedies of the common’ describes a situation in which damage caused by the action of one actor to the whole community surpasses the utility of the action for the actor causing it (Hardin 1968).

3 ‘Collective action problems’ exist when a cooperative solution to a problem is beneficial to all actors but would open the possibility for one or several actors to free-ride on the actions (and benefits) carried out by only a few actors.

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became widely recognized at the first World Climate Conference in 1979, from this date onwards a very dynamic international cascade of the norm of climate protection can be observed. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has become the universal agreement of 154 countries. The norm to protect the climate is spelled out as ‘achiev[ing] stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a low enough level to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ (article 2), and is comparable in its scope to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Both norms are comparable in their development—human rights have reached earlier consensus but still face violations, just like the norm of climate protection. Precise measurement is difficult for all instances of norm change, because rhetoric and behaviour do not always match. For the following case study, norm change is measured in two steps: first, through changes in rhetoric by leading Chinese governmental officials in national and international discourses, and second, by changes in national and international policies relevant to climate change.

Case study: explaining national change in Chinese climate politics

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a prominent example for national politics that reflected rivalry between national and international norms for decades. It thereby also fulfils the two criteria, provided by Risse et al (1999, 273), required for the applicability of the spiral model in other political fields. First, a state needs to adhere to a particular set of public norms that have become embedded in its laws, institutions and policies; and second, these state norms need to be challenged by a contradictory set of international norms promoted by an emerging transnational advocacy network. As outlined above, the contrasting international norm of environmental protection can be regarded as an international consensus since 1972, and the norm of climate protection has occurred on the political agenda since 1979. Therefore it makes sense to begin the analysis of Chinese climate politics— embedded in the overarching field of energy and environmental politics—from that date in order to trace changes in behaviour and impacts of the transnational advocacy network. The following paragraphs provide a brief summary of the different phases of norm internalization in China arranged according to the spiral model.

Process tracing the impact of the transnational advocacy network on Chinese climate-change politics

Phase of ‘no debate’ (1949–1986)

At the end of the 1970s, when the topic of climate change was first raised on the international agenda, China had been in a state of struggle against nature since almost three decades, advocating a development strategy of resource-intensive growth. The Maoist negligence of nature can be partly explained by the utopian urgency during the Great Leap Forward which rapidly advanced industrializ- ation and agricultural production, and partly by the communist credo that environmental problems are the creations of capitalist countries and are therefore, by definition, nonexistent in China (Ross 1988, 8; Duan et al 2000, 7). Driven by the urge for economic growth, energy prices were heavily subsidized (Hatch 2001, 9) leading to a doubling of energy demand in comparison to economic growth in the

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period 1949 – 1979 (Levine 1999, 6). With Deng Xiaoping’s opening politics after 1978, the emphasis continued to be on resource-intensive economic growth, but its ideological targets shifted towards a modest prosperity for the whole society. One can therefore conclude that the national norm of how to approach natural and energy resources stood in stark contrast to the emerging international norm of climate protection, which calls for a sustainable use of natural and, especially, energy resources.

On the international stage, China did not participate in the first World Climate Conference in 1979. However, China did send a delegation to the first UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, where Chinese delegates voiced their opinion that communist countries do not face any environmental problems, while they blamed imperialist countries for their resource exploitation. The delegates reinforced their demand that the international norm of ‘sovereignty with no interference in internal affairs’ should be applied to environmental matters as well (Ross 1988, 137).

China’s official stand in environmental negotiations changed slightly in 1973 with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai opening China’s first National Conference on Environmental Protection and the establishment of the Environmental Protection Leadership Group, which would later become the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA)—the forerunner of the Ministry of Environmental Protection. According to Elizabeth Economy (1997, 22) the Prime Minister had been impressed by the report of the UN Conference on the Human Environment. At the second National Environmental Conference, members of NEPA already began to call for a drastic emission reduction in soot and sulphur dioxide to avoid further air pollution (Ross 1988, 143).

Phase of denial (1987–1990)

In 1987 the first sign of a Chinese engagement in the international debate on climate change can be detected; on 19 August an agreement between the US Department of Energy and the Chinese Academy of Science was signed for a joined research program about the impacts of carbon dioxide on climate change. As a consequence of this agreement, the United States of America (USA)-PRC Committee for the Joint Study of Global Change was founded and an exchange of scientists began to take place. In contrast to the causal mechanisms set forth by the spiral model, not advocacy organizations but scientists were the first to put the topic of climate change on the Chinese agenda. This can be explained partly by the issue itself, partly by the lacking strength of the transnational advocacy network in the 1970s.

In line with the bilateral scientific exchange, a Chinese National Climate Committee was founded in 1987 to coordinate Chinese research and examine the effects of a possible climate change for China. China even took part in the first meeting of the International Panel on Climate Change, but still denied all responsibility and need for action (Economy 1997, 29). Shortly before the Second World Climate Conference in 1990, an internal debate about China’s official position took place. There were differences among the conservative Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Planning Commission and the Energy Ministry, and the rather progressive representatives of the State Science and Technology Commission and

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NEPA. Although the arguments on the conservative side reflected the traditional line, voices from the progressive fraction—for the first time—raised the factor of a possible image boost by a constructive Chinese position, which the country was in need of after its heavy loss of reputation due to the 1989 Tiananmen incident.4

The debate was further intensified by the results of the report of Working Group II of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which placed China among the most vulnerable countries to climate change, but also listed possible positive effects for agriculture yields in Northern China. The debate was ultimately decided by the intervention of Deng Xiaoping, Leader of the Communist Party of China, and Li Peng, Premier of the State Council, who favoured the con- servative position that regarded energy security as China’s utmost priority (Economy 1997, 28). The phase of denial ended with China’s signing up to the Montreal Protocol for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1990. This participation can be seen as the first cooperative move of the Chinese government in its contribution to the international endeavour of climate protection. On the national level, the eighth five-year plan (1991 – 1995) included—for the first time—the term of climate change when it called for a research project on the ‘changes in the life- supporting environment in the next 20 to 50 years . . . ’ (CSCPRC et al 1992, 16). This transition from the denial phase to the phase of tactical concessions cannot be explained by the actions of the transnational advocacy network (which at that time did not work in or on China). Instead, information shared by scientists, for example the results of the IPCC Working Group II about possible negative outcomes of a climate change for China, as well as China’s urge for an improved image on the international stage can be detected as the main driving factors behind China’s changing position on climate change.

Phase of tactical concessions (1991–2001)

On the international level, China began to switch to an active role in the climate negotiations, hosting the Beijing Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development in developing countries on 18 – 19 June 1991. The focus of this conference was indeed a debate on norms, ‘[to] discuss in depth the challenges faced by the international community in establishing norms of cooperation for the enhancement of environment and development, particularly the implications for the developing countries . . . ’ (Beijing Review 1991, 9). However, the Declaration of the Beijing Conference still reflects the traditional viewpoint of developing countries—that climate change is the sole responsibility of developed countries and developing countries should not face any demands for action on climate protection. The consolidation of the developing countries’ positions can be regarded as a prime purpose of the conference, with developing countries speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, with China no longer being in an isolationist position (Economy 1997, 34). There was, however, a switch from an opportunistic position towards a more pragmatic one of the middle ground, signalling some willingness to cooperate. China signed the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change as the tenth country and ratified the convention on 2 November 1992. However, the fact that the State Meteorological Agency was

4 This assessment is shared by Johnston (1998, 558) and Hatch (2001, 22).

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assigned as the implementing agency reflects the Chinese handling of the climate change issue as merely a natural science phenomenon and not a political problem with severe social and economic consequences.

The UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 brought another stimulus to the debate about the appropriate path for China’s development. With arguments ranging from deep ecology to ‘no interference in sovereign matters’, the debate within academia tended towards a more sustainable development strategy.5 Even if most articles opted for a sustainable development strategy out of reasons of national interest—for example advocating that a decoupling of economic growth from energy demand would lead to improved energy security—some scientists also stressed the responsibility of China, as a growing superpower, to do its part for the solution of global environmental problems. This shift of opinion within the Chinese academia can be attributed to their increasing cooperation with international epistemic commu- nities working on the climate issue. Many exchange programmes and events took place in the 1990s, often sponsored and organized by scientific institutes and international NGOs. For example, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) organized an international seminar on global warming in China (Johnston 1998, 571); the Climate Institute coordinated a meeting between Chinese and international scientists (CSCPRC et al 1992, 190); and representatives of the Chinese State Science Commission cooperated with the UN Centre for Science and Technology Development (Johnston 1998, 571). Information and arguments provided by the international scientific community have helped to frame the climate issue in a way conducive to Chinese scientists and decision-makers, some of whom had become increasingly aware of the deteriorating state of the Chinese environment and its consequences for the overall well-being of the country. The intersection between the Chinese epistemic communities and political decision- makers is hard to follow from the outside, but China experts agree that the flow of information and arguments between the two communities can be considered high and influential on policy-making (Heggelund 2007, 169).

Concerning the participation of civil society in the Chinese environmental and climate politics, two trends are identifiable for the early 1990s. First, the Chinese government launched educational campaigns to strengthen the public’s environmental awareness and knowledge; worldwide environmental events such as Earth Day and the World Environmental Day were introduced. The media coverage of official environmental activities and conferences was also enhanced by press campaigns such as ‘Environmental Campaigns to the New Century’ (Wen 1998, 39). Second, the first domestic environmental NGOs appeared on the Chinese scene. The ‘Friends of Nature’ (FON) were founded as China’s first nature conservation organization in 1993. In the late 1990s several other civil-society- based organizations emerged in China, mainly focusing on public education campaigns for nature conservation. At present, China does not have an NGO solely dedicated to climate protection, but many NGOs have climate-related campaigns.

5 Different positions on the question of whether to substitute the traditional Chinese development model with a model of sustainable development can be found in Xiao (1995), Cai (1997a, 1997b), Zhao (1998) and Liu (1995).

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The phase of tactical concessions can be said to end with the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on 30 August 2002. Although China as a developing country has no obligations for GHG emission reductions, the signing and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is one indicator that the norm of climate protection has become inscribed in Chinese politics.

Phase of prescriptive status (2002–present)

The late 1990s also saw the uptake of emission reductions into the national legislation. Examples are the 1995 revision of the regulation on avoidance and control of air pollution, in the ninth five-year plan, which called for a decoupling of economic growth and environmental degradation and the tenth five-year plan, which included the target to reduce CO2 emissions by 10 per cent in 2005 compared to 2000 levels (IEA 2007, 310). Although policies like these show a shift in Chinese policy-making towards emission reductions, they have not been linked rhetorically to climate protection but to domestic problems of air pollution and energy shortages. In line with industrial modernization, energy intensity had dropped during most of the 1980s and 1990s, but started to rise again between 2002 and 2004 (261). An official report estimated environmental degradation to have caused a 3 per cent loss of GDP in 2004 (NBS 2006). Putting a stop to environmental degradation and increasing energy efficiency has thus climbed to the top position of the political agenda, culminating in the target of the 11th five-year plan to reduce energy intensity by 20 per cent until 2015, and to increase the share of renewable energies in electricity generation from 8 per cent in 2005 to 10 per cent in 2010, and 16 per cent in 2020 (Zhang 2005). In addition, the law for the promotion of renewable energies came into force on 1 January 2006, and governmental institutions with relevance for climate governance, for example the former National Environmental Protection Agency were upgraded into the State Environmental Protection Agency, which now enjoys ministerial status.

On the international level, China has become the leading country for projects of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol, has issued its National Climate Change Programme and set up the National Leading Group on Climate Change with Premier Wen Jiabao as its director in June 2007. The Chinese delegation engaged constructively in negotiations on the post-2012 Kyoto regime during the last Conference of the Parties (COP)/MOP6 13 meeting in Bali and the government welcomes the Bali Roadmap (Foreign Ministry of the PRC 2007). In addition to the Kyoto Protocol, China has also joined climate-related initiatives such as the Asian-Pacific-Partnership on Clean Development and Climate in January 2006 and the Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change in September 2007. In contrast to the assumptions of the spiral model, it had been government representatives from Organisation for Economic Develop- ment and Cooperation (OECD) countries and not the transnational advocacy network who from the mid-2000s started to press the Chinese government to accept further obligations under the Kyoto protocol. This mainly took the form of

6 The COP is comprised of countries that have ratified or acceded to the UNFCCC and is the supreme governing body of the UNFCCC. The COP/MOP is comprised of Parties to the UNFCCC who are also Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.

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addressing the topic of climate change during state visits, for example EU Commission President Barroso, Germany’s Chancellor Merkel, and France’s President Sarkozy all addressed climate change during their state visits to China in 2007. Allegedly, this pressuring strategy paid off, as one interviewee explained,

Every time foreign leaders come to China, they want to discuss climate change. Every time Hu Jintao goes abroad, foreign leaders want to discuss climate change. It is really getting on his nerves. The Chinese delegation submitted this very constructive proposal to the Bali COP/MOP, because the leader had said ‘you must do something to reduce the pressure on my shoulders’.7

Even if the trend in Chinese climate politics goes towards internalization of the norm of climate protection, the phase of norm-consistent behaviour has not yet been reached as several indicators, such as mechanisms for citizens to complain about norm-inconsistent behaviour, are established but not used (People’s Daily Online 2006) and the reliance on laws to deliver environmental governance is still in an initial stage. Although there has not been much change in the official Chinese position in international negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol— China, in line with other developing countries, is not willing to take up any legally binding GHG emission reduction commitments—China is increasing its climate protection measures on the national level, although these are embedded in the discourse on energy security and local air pollution and not in that of global climate protection.

Focus on the role of transnational NGO cooperation

This section complements the previous historical process tracing of Chinese climate politics with a more in-depth analysis of how INGOs and Chinese NGOs can presently influence climate-related policy-making in China. The first part briefly outlines the situation of Chinese environmental NGOs and their positioning in climate politics; the second provides an analysis of NGO impacts on Chinese policy-making, which is based on 12 interviews with four international and eight Chinese NGOs conducted in early 2008.

The Tsinghua NGO Research Centre estimates the number of unregistered NGOs in China to be between 1.6 – 3 million (Brie and Pietzcker 2004, 7; Kuhn 2006). The border line between an NGO and government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) is vague because even an NGO that is financially independent from the government requires its support for its daily operations, creating almost a ‘symbiotic situation’ (Ho 2007, 198), in which NGO leaders and politicians are mutually dependent on each other. The Chinese government considers the actions of its domestic NGOs as acceptable as long as these are in line, or even supporting, official policies, such as a public education campaign on energy saving behaviour. Although the rules for the establishment and the registration for nongovernmental organizations originating from 1989 were revised twice, in 1996 and 1998, these revisions did not necessarily ease the launching of NGOs. Due to the difficult registration procedures, many Chinese NGOs choose to register as businesses or not to register at all. Consequently,

7 Confidential interview with representative of International NGO E, 16 January 2008, Beijing.

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Yang (2005, 50) differentiates between seven different types of environmental NGOs in China: registered NGOs, nonprofit enterprises (which operate as nonprofit organizations but are registered as business enterprises), unregistered voluntary groups, web-based groups, student environmental associations, university research centres and government-organized NGOs (GONGOs).

Environmental NGOs in China started as nature conservation organizations and watchdogs for local air and water pollution. The All China Environmental Foundation (ACEF), a GONGO working as a network for Chinese environmental NGOs, states the current number of environmental NGOs to be 2,768 (ACEF 2006). Out of these, interview partners were selected by two criteria: (a) the visibility of their climate-related activities on websites and conferences, based on the assum- ption that NGO visibility is one indicator for its soft power of influencing policy- makers, and (b) their recommendation by other NGOs based on the assumption that the circle of NGOs active in climate-related matters is small and mainly based in Beijing, as their target for influence is the central government (see Figure 2, which is the result of a mapping exercise conducted with the interview partners).

Figure 2. Mapping of NGOs and research institutes in China with climate-related activities Source: Interviews 2007/2008. *Interviewed organizations: Environmental Defense Fund (www.edf.org); Greenpeace (www.greenpeace.org/china); WWF ¼ World Wide Fund for Nature (www.wwfchina.org); TNC ¼ The Nature Conservancy (www.nature.org/china); CI ¼ Conservation International (www.conservation.org); FON ¼ Friends of Nature (www.fon.org.cn); GVB ¼ Global Village Beijing (www.gvbchina.org); CYCAN ¼ China Youth Climate Action Network (www.cycan.org); Green Camel Bell (www.gcb.ngo.cn); Fuping Institute (www.fdi.ngo.cn); GEI ¼ Global Environmental Institute (www.geichina.org); Energy Foundation (www.ef.org); ERI ¼ Energy Research Institute (www.eri.org.cn); CASS ¼ Chinese Academy of Social Science (bic.cass.cn); CAF ¼ Chinese Academy of Forestry (www.forestry.ac.cn); ACEF ¼ All China Environmental Federation (www.acef.com.cn); CANGO ¼ China Association for NGO Cooperation (www.cango.org); HBF ¼ Heinrich Boell Foundation China (www.boell-china.org)

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The quantitative parts of the interviews are represented in the graphs (Figures 3 – 5), displaying absolute numbers of statements given in one answer category. In order to trace developments in transnational NGO cooperation over time, interviewees were asked to compare their present situation in 2008 with the situation five years ago in 2003. However, since some of the organizations interviewed were not yet established in 2003, data on this comparison remains sketchy. Despite the small number of interviews conducted, the interview statements give a first impression of what NGOs with climate-related activities perceive to be successful campaigns and replicable pathways of transnational cooperation.

The process tracing has revealed a change in the official Chinese position on climate change, which culminated in the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 and in the energy saving and emission reduction target of the 11th five-year plan in 2005. This shift in governmental approach towards climate politics also made it easier for Chinese NGOs to address the issue openly: in the beginning of the millennium, NGOs framed their activities as energy saving campaigns, because the issue of climate change was still considered to be a sensitive political issue by the government, but since the mid-2000s several NGOs re-framed some of their activities as climate protection campaigns.8

Concerning the strategic choices for climate-related activities, China-based NGOs are actively using the media, publicizing own research material and conducting education campaigns to raise public awareness on climate change (compare Figure 3). Even if the framing of activities in the context of climate change has become politically feasible, most NGOs still prefer to frame their activities in the context of energy saving, because they feel they can more easily transfer this message to the public.9 One of the best examples for the coordinated work of Chinese NGOs in the field of raising consumers’ awareness of climate change and influencing their individual behaviour is the ‘26 Degree Campaign’. China usually experiences a peak in electricity consumption in the summer months during which air conditioners run at full power to cool down hotels, offices and private homes. The ‘26 Degree Campaign’ was initiated in the summer of 2004 by six Chinese NGOs asking public and private enterprises as well as individuals to set their air conditioners to a minimum of 26 degrees. The achievements of the ‘26 Degree Campaign’ has been a saving of 350,000 to 550,000 tons of CO2 and the launch of ‘The announcement about strictly implementing the standard of temperature control in air conditioners in public buildings’ by the State Council in 2007, which was celebrated by the NGOs as partly being a result of their campaign.10

Cooperation among Chinese NGOs and international NGOs (INGOs) began in the late 1990s. The simplest form of transnational NGO cooperation is the funding of Chinese NGO activities by like-minded INGOs. This way, INGOs can have some decision-making power on local campaigns, but they do not need to go through the hassle to set up their own branches or found NGOs in China. Thus

8 Confidential interviews with representatives of Chinese NGOs D and F, 16 and 21 January 2008, Beijing.

9 Confidential interviews with representatives of Chinese NGOs D and F, 16 and 21 January 2008, Beijing.

10 Confidential interview with representative of Chinese NGO K, 1 February 2008, Beijing.

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funding is quite a substantial form of transnational NGO cooperation, since only limited funding is available from Chinese individuals, for example FON stated that 58 per cent of their funding came from foreign sources in 2006. Other forms of cooperation are joint campaigns, publications, statements and exchange visits.

One landmark so far in transnational NGO cooperation has been the first joint position paper ‘A warming China: thoughts and actions for the Chinese civil society’ (FON et al 2007) at the Bali COP/MOP 13 in December 2007. Four Chinese and four international NGOs organized this survey based on responses by over 40 Chinese NGOs. The joint position taken, which was introduced at the Oxfam International side event at the COP/MOP 13, is conservative and in accordance with the Chinese government’s position. Chinese NGOs regard this position paper as a first step, although some consider it ‘boring’, ‘unsubstantial’ and remark that ‘no Western NGO would have published such a position. There is nothing to advocate about, because it is realized already’.11 In contrast to the assumptions of the spiral model, one interviewee said that it was actually INGOs that advised them to take a moderate stand instead of raising points that go beyond the government’s position. Another issue raised in interviews is the present lack of knowledge on climate change among most Chinese NGOs, which are not taking up energy- or climate-related campaigns themselves. This existing lack of knowledge and capacity is especially significant in relation to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. Despite the booming Chinese CDM market, only four (three INGOs and one Chinese NGO) out of 12 interviewed NGOs have CDM-related activities. These NGOs are active in CDM project development, provide CDM capacity development, and the WWF has launched a ‘Go for Gold’ campaign in which it asks athletes and spectators of the

Figure 3. Climate-related campaigns Source: Interviews with 8 Chinese NGOs and 4 INGOs with China offices, of which 6 were already operating in 2003. Beijing/Yunnan/Gansu: April 2007 and December 2007 – February 2008

11 Confidential interviews with representatives of Chinese NGOs D and K and international NGO E, 16 January 2008 and 1 February 2008, Beijing.

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Beijing Olympics 2008 to offset their flights by Gold Standard CDM projects. When

asked about their preferred partners for climate-related campaigns, NGOs in China

mainly look to local and international NGOs, and to some extent also for

governmental counterparts (see Figure 4).

Cooperation with international climate networks is in an initial stage. The Bali

COP/MOP 13 was the first time Chinese NGOs participated in an international

climate conference. Besides providing a great learning opportunity, Chinese NGO

representatives could also get in touch with climate networks—such as the Climate

Action Network (CAN) or Youth-based climate networks—and exchange ideas

with the official Chinese delegation. Seven out of 12 interviewed organizations

stated that participation in international conferences is a good method of getting

international exposure, which in turn might increase their national reputation and

status vis-à-vis the government. For example, one interviewee stated,

Although we do not have much influence within the country, if we go to international

meetings, we represent China, so it can influence their [the government’s] position,

what we do think. So the government is interested in what we think.12

Joining international networks on climate change is also seen as an opportunity to

tap their vast knowledge on the issue.

If NGOs are a network, then they will be more influential, then you can put all your

intelligence together and come up with something. For an individual NGO it is difficult

to catch up, they do not have enough capacity. Within the CAN network, you can even

borrow international intelligence, ask your international partners, it is a bridge.13

Figure 4. Cooperating partners for climate-related campaigns in 2003 and 2008 Source: Interviews with 8 Chinese NGOs and 4 INGOs with China offices, of which 6 were already operating in 2003. Beijing/Yunnan/Gansu: April 2007 and December 2007 – February 2008

12 Confidential interview with representative of international NGO E, 16 January 2008, Beijing.

13 Confidential interview with representative of Chinese NGO J, 24 January 2008, Beijing.

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Grasping this opportunity to gain voice, two networks are currently forming in China: one will be CAN China, a network of Chinese NGOs active in climate- related campaigns; the other is China Youth CAN (CYCAN), a joint initiative of seven green student organizations. Although these two networks also have connections to international networks, they see their main focus of work at the national and even local level, CYCAN, for example, wants to initiate carbon inventories in 24 Chinese universities.

Asked about advantages and disadvantages of transnational NGO cooperation, most interviewees stressed funding, information exchange, mutual learning and easy access to expertise on climate change via their international partners as advantages, while three interviewees experienced ‘cultural differences’ and ‘lack of understanding of the Chinese situation’ as disadvantages. ‘Mutual learning’ has been named as one great expectation for transnational cooperation as Chinese NGOs begin to tap into the expertise of INGOs, while they also hope to convey information about the environmental situation in China— which is of better quality than information provided by the media—to INGOs and the western public. Eventually the exchange of knowledge and capacity appears to only be successful when happening at the right pace and on an equal footing: Chinese NGOs have stated to have felt pushed by INGOs towards ideas they did not fully support (for example how to set up joint networks) and also to have been hampered by INGOs, which displayed far more conservative points of view than the Chinese NGOs themselves (for example for joint declarations). Another issue for debate seems to be the focus of campaigns: INGOs are said to be targeting national and broad policy changes right away, whereas Chinese NGOs give priority to local projects for piloting policy changes.14

When asked to evaluate their campaign strategies for effectiveness on policy change, NGOs in China rated media and information sharing campaigns as the best way to make their positions heard by policy-makers (compare Figure 5). In most cases, this included organizing conferences or workshops for the dissemination of research results to which government officials were invited (see also Wexler et al 2006, 26). Depending on the sensitive nature of the research, these were either held internally, or with the participation of researchers, other NGOs, journalists and/or the interested public. Although their communication channels with decision-makers were not officially recognized, many NGOs had informal contacts (for example they have mobile numbers of their governmental counterparts working on climate change) and exchanged views via emails. All NGOs agreed that western NGO-style shaming strategies were not an option for them. Instead of critical campaigns, they preferred to give out positive incentives for behavioural change, for example assigning awards to city or local level governments which have made exceptional progress in energy saving measures.15

Overall, the Chinese NGO community (to the extent that it is represented in the interviews) is modest but optimistic about its impact on climate-related policies. Most interviewees observe an increasingly positive acknowledgement of their work by the Chinese government, and they also state that the major influence on

14 Confidential interview with representative of Chinese NGO G, 21 January 2008, Beijing.

15 Confidential interviews with representatives of Chinese NGOs F and K, 21 January 2008 and 1 February 2008, Beijing.

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climate policies comes from Chinese research institutions. Major players among the Chinese research institutions that specialize on climate-related policy research, like the Chinese Academy of Social Science and the Energy Research Institute, can be considered as governmental think tanks with direct and official communication channels to political decision-makers (see also Heggelund 2007, 189).16

Discussion of results

The process analysis of Chinese climate politics tested the assumptions of the spiral model of norm internalization for the new issue area of climate politics. Using the case study of China, several assumptions could be verified: indeed, the change of Chinese climate politics happened gradually and can be conceptualized in different phases. The hypotheses of the spiral model on factors that trigger a transition from one phase to another could only be partly verified.

The influence of the transnational advocacy networks, which has the dominant role in pressuring for change in the spiral model, seemed to have less influence in the case study on climate change. Although some vulnerability of the target state could be identified for the 1990s, when China suffered from the loss of international reputation after the Tiananmen incident, pressuring occurred not until the mid- 2000s, when representatives of OECD-governments started to address the issue of climate change regularly during state visits. Instead of pressuring tactics by a transnational advocacy network, the framing of the issue seemed to be important: climate change was denied as long as it was seen as an attribute of industrialized countries, but turned into a relevant topic once its impacts to China and its linkage

Figure 5. Strategies to influence climate-related policies Source: Interviews with 8 Chinese NGOs and 4 INGOs with China offices, of which 6 were already operating in 2003. Beijing/Yunnan/Gansu: April 2007 and December 2007 – February 2008

16 Confidential interviews with representatives of international NGO E and Chinese NGOs F, G and J, 16 January 2008, 21 February 2008 and 24 February 2008, Beijing.

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to alarming domestic environmental degradation was realized. However, the conveyers of the message, the ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in constructivist terms, do not seem to have been the transnational advocacy network of like-minded NGOs, but rather scientists that shared information with policy-makers. An explanation for this difference in advocacy strategies of human rights and climate advocates appears to be the role of science. In the field of human rights, appropriateness of behaviour, but hardly knowledge, shape a norm. In the field of climate politics, climate change has become a social and political problem due to the cause – effect relationships detected by natural science. Thus one can expect epistemic communities such as the IPCC to play a larger role in climate politics than in the human rights field.

The norm internalization process itself has relied more on the diffusion of knowledge and arguments than on shaming strategies (similar observations on strategies used by Chinese NGOs were made by Wexler et al 2006). Interviews with Chinese NGOs revealed that shaming strategies are not regarded as an option for them, because they prefer to take a ‘constructive role’ in which they only voice criticism if they can also provide solutions and instead tend to give positive incentives for behavioural change. Economic and social vulnerability and the urge for improving one’s reputation could be detected as factors motivating the Chinese government to switch to a position closer to the international dominant norm. The notion of a learning process might therefore be a more appropriate description of a situation in which the target state was, at least partly, voluntarily getting involved in dialogue and action about climate protection, especially after it learned that this would be in its national interest. ‘Complex learning’ would be a fitting concept to describe a learning process which took part in a situation of uncertainty in which the actor is neither sure about her own identity, nor values guiding her behaviour (further discussed in Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 908).

Conclusion

This article employed a constructivist approach, using the spiral model to track steps of norm internalization. Although we were able to trace changes in how the norm of climate protection was first denied, then debated and ultimately incorporated into national policies, the independent variables—meaning the factors and actors catalysing this change—were different from those of the original case. Two of the fundamental assumptions of the spiral model could not be confirmed: the transnational advocacy network did not use pressuring tactics, nor have INGOs been the main actors leading to a behavioural change of the Chinese government. Instead of a transnational advocacy network using shaming and pressuring strategies, we detected information sharing as the main trigger for a shift in climate politics. In contrast to the assumptions of the spiral model it had been epistemic communities, not NGOs, who had been the main conveyers of information. The message itself—high costs due to the impact of climate change and a growing challenge to achieving energy security—might have been the ultimate trigger for a change in Chinese climate politics. Norm internalization seemed to have grown with the realization of the costs of climate change, so that

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neither a constructivist nor a rationalist explanatory approach alone, but only one that intertwines both is able to account for a shift in Chinese climate politics.

For the international community advocating a certain norm, the experiences made in Chinese climate politics seem to recommend that a change in behaviour guided by norms can be best attained if the target state is convinced and not forced into the internalization of the norm. But the power of persuasion has its limits. In the case of climate protection, the international as well as the Chinese cascade of the norm of climate protection has so far found its limits in the debate about the appropriate level of economic development. As long as measures for climate protection have positive effects on economic development, or at least pose no regret options, governments are keen to position themselves as climate protectors. Yet as soon as norms limit actions and have negative effects on the economy, enthusiasm for climate protection is severely restricted.

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