Syrian Revolution
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Syrian Revolution
The uprisings in the Arab world of the year 2011 are still unfolding and one can clearly see their effects on the current state of events in Middle East region. One of the most powerful and meaningful people uprisings that year was Syrian Revolution, which was only the prior stage to the Syrian Civil War. As reporting on Syrian conflict of 2011 was particularly dangerous and sabotaged by the Syrian government, there are contradicting views on what exactly was going on at that time in Syria and how did it effect further turn of events. Anyway, more than 250 thousands Syrians were killed in over four years’ armed conflict, which started with this powerful people uprising and then escalated into a full scale war, what makes this topic valuable and worth of thorough research.
Brief Historical Overview of the Syrian Uprising
Historical precondition to the eruption of democratic protests in March 2011 in Syria is reported to be an arrest and torturing of several Syrian teenagers who were painting some revolutionary slogans in a school premises in the city of Deraa in southern part of the country. A number of protesters gathered in the city to express their indignation of that outrageous act. This resulted in the security forces opening fire on demonstrators. Several of them were killed, but even more went out on the streets (BBC News, 2015, para.1). Syrian government appeared to learn nothing from similar uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and gave that spark in the south of the country to “get people out onto the streets” (Abbas, 2011, para.5). The city of Deraa, in this context, is very often called “the Cradle of the Revolution” (Oweis, 2011, para.3). Not in the long run, the explosion spread throughout the whole country, attracting more and more demonstrators who protested against the existing regime.
The protest movement in Syria started comparatively peacefully. But after the authorities aggressively confronted it, it turned into massive people uprising with more rigid and more radical measures: “As a result, there was an escalation within the movement, both in terms of the slogans being chanted and the descent of a very small part of it into violence” (Abbas, 2011, para.5). Even though the Asaad regime successfully suppressed pro-democratic protest in Deraa through massive and violent clearance operations, the conflict significantly progressed throughout the whole country (Holliday, 2011). The conflict’s center was replaced to the city of Homs due to its strategic location. In May 2011, Syran existing regime tried to quash Homs, but was unsuccessful, as a number of emergencies in other Syrian cities diverted the government’s attention and, respectively resources. The authorities, however, managed to prevent demonstrations from overrunning the downtown of Damascus (Dalacoura, 2013).
Syrian authorities consolidated their forces in control of the coastal region of the country and of the region over the Alawite. Successful clearing operations were conducted in Latakia, Tel Kalakh, Baniyas, and Sunni. The most significant armed resistance occurred in June, not far from the border with Turkey. At that time the armed forces pushed the resistance forces away from the region. However, already in October 2011, consistent resistance forces entered the territory again, while the armed authority forces chose to avoid direct confrontation. Eventually, “after nine months of conflict and despite mounting regional pressure, the Assad regime has not demonstrated its willingness to step down, let alone abandon its offensive security strategy” (Holliday, 2011, p.7). The Assad regime conducted a number of violent clearance operations, what left no possibility to potential negotiated settlement. This had led to Syrian upraising turning into full-scale Syrian Civil War.
The Assad Regime
Hafez ai-Assad, an influential Syrian statesman, had constructed “a quintessential autocratic regime” (Abbas, 2011, p.3) and had full control over its every detail. Syrian army, all Syrian security forces, and all members of Ba'ath Party were completely loyal to him. Due to his lengthy experience as Syrian politician, Prime Minister, and President, Hafez ai-Assad managed to create a perfect autocratic regime. The Assad regime’s security apparatus had a General Intelligence Directorate, Political Security Directorate, Air Force Intelligence Directorate, and Department of Military Intelligence (Holliday, 2011, p.10). Pro-regime paramilitary, called shabiha, were deeply involved in the overall security operations of the Assad regime and committed a lot of extremely violent actions against the demonstrators and the opposition.
The Assad regime had well-equipped, well-trained and highly loyal army with approximately 300,000 conscripts being Sunni and 200,000 conscripts being Alawites. The regime refused to employ army units other than those that were completely loyal to it. For this reason it was easy for the Assad regime to consolidate its forces while dealing with the rising protest movements. Another contributing factor to the regime’s superiority was that its opponents inside the country were predominantly unarmed demonstrators. Armed and more powerful resistance movement in Syria had developed by the end of the year 2011. At that time, the Free Syrian Army was formed (Holliday, 2011, p.11-12).
Hafez ai-Assad’ son, current Syrian President Bashar ai-Assad, appeared to be not qualified enough to maintain the inherited perfect autocratic structure. He did not manage to rule the regime singlehandedly and decided to bring up his family members to the center of the state power. In such a way he transformed “the entire regime from an autocratic regime of individual domination to one of "mafia-like" familial domination” (Abbas, 2011, p.3). This had led to appearance of the two political camps in the Syrian sate power, which were and remain “complementary and concurrent” (Abbas, 2011, p.3).
The Assad regime’s main strategy during Syrian Revolution in 2011 was to maintain full control over Syrian key lines of communication “from the Jordanian border, through Damascus to Aleppo in the north” (Holliday, 2011, p.12). The position of the city of Homs in this perspective was of tremendous importance, as it was situated on the intersection of the country’s coastal and interior highways. However, this particular area was under successful control of the resistance forces, as it was already mentioned. The scale of the rising demonstrations and protests in the country made it impossible for the Assad regime, governed by Bashar ai-Assad, to simultaneously push all the strategic lines of communication. Even though the consolidated regime’s forces showed good results in conducting large-scale operations in the country, they were able to conduct only one major operation on the territory of Syria at a time. That is why the Assad regime’s clearance operations were marked by slow pace. The biggest regime’s problem during Syrian uprising 2011 appeared to be the armed rebellion in Jisr al-Shughour in June and July (Holliday, 2011, p.12-13).
Armed Rebellion in Idlib Province
The first powerful armed resistance to the regime took place in the northern part of the province Idlib. This was “the major inflection point in the escalating struggle for Syria” (Holliday, 2011, p.21). A significantly large number of the Assad regime’s security forces were killed in the city of Jisr al-Shughour. A big part of the resistance armed forces remained chose Jisr al-Shughour for their residency, even after the city of Homs became the very center of the resistance movement.
The reason to such a severe violence outburst in the resistance forces was the incident, which happened on the 4th of July, 2011. That day, the Assad regime’s security forces opened fire at a funeral demonstration from the roof of the post office. This led the furious mourners to kill eight regime’s soldiers and set the building of the post office on fire. After that, the demonstrators broke into the local police station and obtained weapon. In the following few days the rage and the violence of the demonstrators escalated even more and a large number of soldiers from the security forced were killed. The outraged resistance forces members executed even those soldiers who refused to shoot in civilians. Shortly afterward, the security headquarters was overrun and the number of killed had risen dramatically. The final body count was not even estimated (Holliday, 2011, p.21).
In the light of the unexpected turn of events, the Assad regime summoned large military assets to the town and made the rebellions run through the hills on the border with Turkey. Nearly 200 military vehicles and helicopters were involved in the operation. The rebellions were surrounded from all the other directions and had no other choice than to cross the Turkish border. However, a few months later, in October 2011, the resistance forces returned to the area, killed a lot of the regime’s security officers and again obtained control over the territory. Free Syrian Army established its headquarters in Turkey and a lot of the other armed resistance forces continued to stay in Homs (Holliday, 2011, p.22).
Elements Involved in the Conflict, as Defined by Abbas (2011)
The first element of the Conflict between Syrian autocratic authorities and rebellion population, according to Abbas (2011), is a repressive apparatus, which consisted of Syrian state Army, the regime’s security forces, and the military groups called shabiha. Even now the Syrian Army is viewed as one of the most powerful armies in the whole Arab world, having approximately 450,500-500,000 conscripts. Due to the enormous efforts of Hafez aI-Assad Syrian state army is constructed on the principle of absolute loyalty and provides a solid protection to the regime. The most powerful parts of the Syrian Army are considered to be the Third and the Fourth Divisions. Furthermore, in conducting all the strategic operations Syrian army was supported and accompanied by a high percentage of the country’s security forces. Even though those security forces were not supposed to participate in military operations, they were actively involved in the military conflict in case of emergencies. The third part of the repressive apparatus, as it was stated above, were shabiha forces, which initially were restricted merely to the city of Lakatia, but then joined the army and the security forces and actively participated in the Syrian Revolution on the state scale.
The second relevant element of the Syrian Conflict, in Abbas’ opinion (2011), was the dissidents in the repressive apparatus. Logically, the increasing violence acts towards Syrian citizens made some soldier to reconsider their loyalty to the Assad regime, “especially as the violence has engulfed the entire country, not sparing the families of soldiers” (Abbas, 2011, p.5). in the early June, the Free Officers Movement was established by the dissident army officers and soldiers. Later it turned out that the movement was not strong and powerful enough, but very limited. In general, there were several Syrian splits that did not last long, but destabilized the situation from time to time.
The third relevant element was forces taking part in the uprising. These forces involved all the ordinary people who were harmed by the Assad regime and desired to overthrow this violent autocratic regime. Among different affiliations of these forces were groups of the youth who worked in the field of culture; groups of independent human right activists, independent political activists, and members of such influential organizations as the Damascus Declaration, etc.; groups of activists from the southern I1auran region and from the eastern region of Deir al-Zour; and some pieceful religious groups.
Finally, the fourth element, according to Abbas (2011), was “counter-violence”. Counter-violence was a logical response to the increasing violence of the regime forces. Counter-violence manifested itself in different ways: ranging from some minor forms of legitimate self-defense (like “smuggling rings”), through some tribal fanaticism arrangements, and till extended armed sectors of the country’s population.
The shifts in the four abovementioned element of Syrian Conflict in 2011 took place in the following order. At first, the regime’s repressive security forces escalated the level of violence in the society. Then several splits of the Syrian Army led to a range of internal military conflicts. Forces, which participated in the demonstrations, insisted on preserving peaceful character of the population protests. On the contrary, groups that called for violence occupied more influential positions in the population movements during the Syrian Revolution in 2011.
(Abbas, 2011, p.4-8)
International Concerns in the Region
Syria is situated in the very center of the Middle East region. Many researchers express grounded concerned that military instability in this country may lead to war eruption in the whole region. The long-lasting military conflict in Syria that followed the revolution of 2011, was not merely Syria’s internal business. It has always been about political competition between Syria, Turkey, Iran and the Gulf States. The Assad regime is an ally of the Iran’s regime and is totally supported by the Iran authorities. Turkey, on the other hand, is strongly against the Assad regime since the military conflict in Syria began. The Gulf States do not express some unanimous position towards Syrian conflict, but rather try to take advantage of the current state of matters and “curtail growing Persian influence through their leadership of the Arab League” (Holliday, 2011, p.23).
The latest Russian intervention to Syria has raised a lot of concerns in the international community, as it is hard to predict and foresee possible consequences of such actions.
Conclusion
Thus, Syria is one of the most influential states in the Arab world and continuous military action in the country put a threat to peace not only the Middle East, but also in the whole world. As rightfully noticed by Dalacoura (2013), “Within Syria itself, the gulf between the constituencies supporting and battling the regime is deepening and it is difficult to see how it can be bridged” (p.77). The continuous uprisings in the Arab countries bring a lot of challenges on the global agenda, and in order to deal with them one should start with the roots to the problem. Due to Syria’s geographical situation and influential political position, as well as current international exacerbation, the country comes to the primary attention of the world’s leading countries. Analysis of the causes and the main events of Syrian Revolution of 2011, which led to the Syrian Civil War, is an important thing to do, in order to cope with the problem.
References
Abbas, H. (2011). The Dynamics of the Uprising in Syria. Arab Reform Initiative, Arab Reform Brief, (51).
BBC News, (2015). Syria: The story of the conflict. BBC News. Retrieved 30 November 2015, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868
Dalacoura, K. (2013). The Arab uprisings two years on: ideology, sectarianism and the changing balance of power in the Middle East. Insight Turkey, 15(1), 75-89.
Holliday, J. (2011). The Struggle for Syria in 2011. Institute for the Study of War,13. Retrieved 30 November 2015, from http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Struggle_For_Syria.pdf
Oweis, K. Y. (2011). Fear barrier crumbles in Syrian kingdom of silence. Reuters. Retrieved 30 November 2015, from http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/22/us-syria-fear-idUSTRE72L3ME20110322#LeVqmeC1QEOFUOiU.97
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