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Terrorism Author(s): John Deutch Source: Foreign Policy, No. 108 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 10-22 Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149086 Accessed: 12-12-2015 03:45 UTC

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TERRORISM

A I V 9I

Terrorism, like the plague in the Middle Ages, frightens both leaders and citi- zens. It is a disease that is spreading, its cure is unknown. Controlling terrorism will require new mechanisms of cooper- ation-both nationally and internation- ally-between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Effective action must be simultaneously defensive and offensive and inevitably requires some compromise of civil liberties.

by John Deutch

In the last few years, there has been a dramatic surge in terrorist activity--much of it

targeted against the United States. Yes and no. First, the good news. International terrorism has

declined steadily since the late 1980s. Last year represented a 25-year low, with reported incidents down from a peak of 665 in 1987 to 296 in 1996. Although the United States' unique position as a political, economic, and military world leader will always make it a choice tar- get for terrorists, statistics reveal that nations everywhere share this burden. In 1996, less than 25 percent of reported terrorist incidents tar- geted the United States or its citizens abroad. More than 30 other countries were victimized, with some of the worst attacks occurring in Great Britain, Israel, Peru, and Sri Lanka.

While the latest State Department report on terrorism cites statis- tics going back a quarter of a century, terrorism has been around for

J o H N D E U T C H is an institute professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for- mer director of central intelligence and deputy secretary of defense, and a member of the edito- rial board of FOREIGN POLICY.

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much longer, whether in the Balkans, Tsarist Russia, or in Palestine during the British mandate. But today the changing methods that ter- rorists employ have added a "new" dimension to an old threat.

First, terrorists are operating increasingly on an international level, not just in one region or country. The dawn of the modem age of ter- rorism could be dated at September 5, 1972, with the Palestinian ter- rorist attack on the Israeli Olympic team in Munich. This was followed by a period of commercial airline hijacking, which culminated with the destruction of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.

The second "new" aspect of terrorism is the growing possibility that terrorists will seek more bang for the buck and make use of weapons of mass destruction-nuclear, chemical, or biological. The intelligence community has received more than 100 reports alleging the diversion of nuclear components from the former Soviet Union over the last few years. Fortunately, to date most of this reporting has proved untrue. Nevertheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of Russian society and its economic difficulties have subjected the nuclear security system of the former Soviet Union to stresses and risks that it was not designed to withstand. Thousands of individuals employed within the Russian nuclear complex-many of whom have knowledge and access to nuclear materials-receive salaries that are barely at sub- sistence level, raising the possibility that they might be susceptible to offers from anyone in the market to buy nuclear components.

Moreover, governments have yet to consider seriously the threat of chemical weapons and biological toxins. Both of these types of weapons are easy to manufacture and can have horrifying conse- quences for civilian populations. The first concrete example was the introduction of sarin nerve gas into the Tokyo subway system by the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo.

For years, the conventional wisdom stated that weapons of mass destruction did not serve the goals of terrorists. Mass murder, it was argued, would only prompt a global backlash against the cause that the terrorists claimed to serve. It has been noted that "terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead." Regrettably, Aum Shin- rikyo proved to be the exception to that rule. In fact, we see a disturb- ing new trend occurring across the globe. More and more terrorists are using powerful explosives to attack mass-civilian targets. So despite last year's decline in terrorist incidents, there was a drastic increase in casu- alties (311 people killed and 2,652 wounded).

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ii

....

A Changing Cast of Characters: (left to right) Carlos the Jackal, infamous free- lance terrorist of the 1970s and 1980s; Shoko Asahara, Aum Shinrikyo cult leader responsible for nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995; and British whiz kid Richard Pryce who hacked into computer systems operated by the U.S. Air Force and the Lockheed Martin Corporation.

The third aspect is really new--cyberterror. It is all too easy techni- cally to penetrate the telecommunications and computer systems of nations and private organizations and to introduce "foreign" computer codes that will cause systems to go haywire or to fall under the control of the intruder. Such cyberterrorists could not only divert funds elec- tronically from banks but also could create havoc with a nation's air traffic or power plant control systems. Likewise, they could introduce "morphed" images and messages into a country's radio and television systems, spreading lies and inciting people to violence.

So while terrorism is an age-old phenomenon, and historic tech- niques of assassination and conventional explosives remain the meth- ods of choice, new elements of terrorism challenge the determination and patience of established states.

Terrorism is best defined as acts of violence committed against innocent persons or noncom-

batants that are intended to achieve political ends through fear and intimidation.

Yes, but with some qualifiers. While quantifying terrorist incidents is simple, it is often difficult to characterize the terrorist threat. To help understand the true nature of terrorism today, I divide terrorist acts into several categories.

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The first, and most dangerous, category is state-sponsored terrorism. The United States has designated Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as countries that have sponsored terrorism. The relocation of the notorious Saudi-born extremist, Usama bin Ladin, to Afghanistan reinforces the likelihood that this country could be added to the list next. In the past, much, but not all, state-sponsored terrorism has been directed against the United States. External events, international pressure, economic sanctions, and the threat of U.S. mil- itary retaliation have curbed activity in recent years by Cuba, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, although these countries harbor some known terrorists and have both the potential and ideological inclination to advance their objectives through terrorism. Although not formally on this list, other countries that may provide assistance and sanctuary to terrorist groups deserve close scrutiny.

In my opinion, the most serious question regarding state-sponsored terrorism today is the degree to which Iran is sponsoring terrorism worldwide. Tehran's support for Hizballah training and subsequent mil- itary operations conducted in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon stands out as a noteworthy example. Likewise, Iran has been implicated in the assassination of dissident Iranians throughout the world (at least eight during 1996). The April 1997 German court decision that found high- ranking members of the Iranian leadership responsible for the 1992 gangland-style murders of four Kurdish dissidents in a Berlin restaurant should help to move many governments to a stronger consensus on the consequences of Iranian conduct-a prerequisite for their greater polit- ical engagement in U.S. efforts to contain Iran.

The second category is terrorism carried out by groups trying to overthrow their own governments or to achieve independence. Here we find the largest number of incidents. For example, the bloodiest act of 1996 occurred when the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam blew up an explosive-laden truck in Colombo, Sri Lanka, killing 90 people and wounding more than 1,400 others. The PKK, a Kurdish sep- aratist group, continues to commit terrorist acts against Turkey, and the al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya seeks the overthrow of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak through terrorism. There is also the IA in Northern Ireland, the Aum Shinrikyo and Japanese Red Army of Japan, the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, as well as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army in Colombia. The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) extremists held

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International Terrorist Incidences over Time, 1977-96

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

1977 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1996; U.S. Department of State.

hostages in the Japanese ambassador's residence in Lima, Peru, for 125 days. The terrorism in this second category is not usually directed against the United States.

Drawing the line between terrorism and insurgency can be difficult. In Mexico, for example, dissident groups such as the Popular Revolu- tionary Army in Guerrero and the Zapatista National Liberation Army in Chiapas seek to change the country's political and economic system.

A third category is terrorism committed by Islamic groups, which for the most part operate in the Middle East. These groups pose the most dangerous threat to the United States, and many worry that their activities are on the rise. Some, notably Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIj), are dedicated to the overthrow of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state. Hamas was responsible for an outbreak of terrorism in early 1996 that led to the March 1996 "Summit of Peacemakers" held in Sharm al-Sheik in the Sinai, where 29 world leaders gathered to pledge stronger efforts to fight interna- tional terrorism. Some terrorist groups share some common goals with Hamas and the PIj, although not their ideology. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, for instance, also seeks the destruction of the state of Israel but is a secular, leftist organization.

Yet another set of Middle Eastern terrorists has a broader extremist Islamic agenda, which includes direct action against American inter- ests, as embodied by the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York. Many of these groups, although based in the Middle East, have

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nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict but reflect activity that more properly belongs in the second "dissident" category. The terror- ists suspected of blowing up the al-Khobar military barracks in Saudi Arabia, for example, want to topple the Saudi monarchy. American citizens frequently become a target for this category of terrorists simply because the United States is out front as a world leader, with a forward presence in the region, and is associated with established regimes such as those in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Frequently, the rise of fundamentalist Islamic movements is equated with extremist Islamic terrorism. Indiscriminately linking the two oversimplifies and distorts the complex and diverse Islamic world and should certainly make one "think again." The largest religion in the world, Islam reaches from Indonesia to Central Asia and Turkey, and across the Middle East into much of Africa. Islam is far from mono- lithic. The recent resurgence of Islamic movements often stems from local economic and social conditions. These groups seek to portray themselves as viable alternatives to an established system that they view as corrupt and inefficient.

The United States government is effectively orga- nized to address the terrorist threat.

Ha, ha. There is probably no U.S. government activity that earns an uncritical response. But terrorism is a serious matter, and if we are going to mount an effective program to combat it, we must clarify the roles and missions of various government agencies.

As it stands now, the responsibility for counterterrorist initiatives is divided among a host of government agencies, including the Depart- ment of Defense, the FBI, the cIA, the State Department, and the Fed- eral Aviation Administration. Making use of several government agencies is, in itself, not a bad idea. Consider the spectrum of terrorist threats with which we must contend: protection of the president and government leaders; protection of the nation's communications infra- structure; protection of our military forces deployed abroad at bases and embassies; protection of U.S. businesses and citizens abroad; and secu- rity for air travel and commerce.

With regard to domestic acts of terrorism, the law enforcement community is clearly in charge. However, once terrorism crosses national borders-as in the case of Pan Am 103 and al-Khobar--it

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Casualties of International Terrorist Incidents, 1991-96

2000

1900 1996

1800 1995

1700 1994

1600 1993 1993

1500 1992

1400 *NOTE SCALE BREAK 1400 1991

1300

1200

1100 10

1000

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200 O

100 ,o

0 Africa Asia Eurasia Europe Latin America Middle East North America

Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1996; U.S. Department of State.

becomes a national security issue and should be entrusted to the national security apparatus. The question then becomes: Who should be in charge?

Certainly not the FBI. Yet the United States responded to the al- Khobar bombing as if it were a domestic law enforcement matter. Louis Freeh, the highly capable head of the FBI, was designated the point man for an investigation involving U.S. military forces deployed over- seas. This despite the fact that the FBI's mission is to collect evidence that can be introduced in a U.S. court. Moreover, we witnessed the

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International Incidents over Time by Region, 1991-96

300

1996

1995

250 1994

* 1993

1992

200 1991

150

100

50

0

Africa Asia Eurasia Europe Latin America Middle East North America

Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1996; U.S. Department of State.

faintly ridiculous spectacle of Freeh, an individual with impeccable law enforcement credentials, who has successfully battled crime in the United States, being stiffed repeatedly by the Saudis when he request- ed coequal status in their internal investigation, and expected treat- ment of suspects and evidence according to American standards. Fat chance-the Saudi royal family's conception of justice is quite differ- ent from our own. In any case, if the situation were reversed, it is high- ly unlikely that we would let foreign law enforcement officials play a significant role in a sensitive internal investigation of an incident that

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occurred on U.S. soil. If not the FBI, then what about the State Department? The State

Department sponsors and participates in international conferences that discuss terrorism, but it has little capability to plan, fund, and exe- cute any serious counterterrorist program. Diplomats cannot chat with terrorists at embassy receptions.

How about the Department of Defense? The Pentagon must have a principal focus on protection of its troops and facilities abroad, but fighting terrorism is generally not a military matter.

Modesty prevents me from recommending the director of central intelligence. In any event, the intelligence community should not play the role of policymaker. That being said, it is important to know that the intelligence community's Counter Terrorist Center (CTC), estab- lished in 1986, is a model of effective interagency cooperation. The CTC, which reports directly to the CIA's director, was designed to bring all elements of the intelligence community together to collect and ana- lyze information from all over the world about terrorist groups--how they train and operate, who supports them, and where they may find sanctuary. Today, the cTc has professional officers from 10 different agencies, including the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the FBI, and the State Department. Rec- ognizing that a foreign government sometimes may have better infor- mation about terrorist groups operating in its own neighborhood, the CTC attempts to access this information through liaison relationships.

Some loss of civil liberty inevitably accompa- nies measures to combat terrorism.

Unfortunately, this is true. Protecting individuals and society from those who operate outside the rules frequently calls for compromise. The security measures now in place for air travel are an excellent example. We require people to identify themselves, submit baggage and person to search, and spend more time waiting in lines to provide partial protection and deterrence against terrorists who seek to hijack or destroy commercial airlines.

Many countries that believe they are threatened by foreign terrorists anticipate situations where responsive action may be required. Some are establishing so-called "hostage rescue teams" (HRTs) that are para- military special forces units trained for, and capable of, immediate

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response. The trouble with these types of units is that in less democra- tic countries political rulers may use them to suppress legitimate dissi- dent groups. For example, during the Peruvian government's 15-year war against the Shining Path, security forces were implicated in a series of politically motivated killings. It is also not unknown for HRTs to try to overthrow their own governments.

But even long-established democracies face complex issues that go to the core of their identity, especially those nations that have tradi- tionally maintained open borders and granted political asylum to for- eign nationals. In countries around the world, Middle Eastern foreign resident communities are increasingly subject to surveillance by local authorities and often with justification. Many capitals around the world have foreign resident communities that support or harbor terror- ists. For example, Canadian authorities recently arrested a Saudi Shia dissident living in Canada, who allegedly had a role in the al-Khobar bombing. This heightened monitoring of high-risk foreign resident communities has obvious civil liberty issues, as it contrasts with past tolerance, perhaps excessive, for dissident individuals who lived in or visited Western Europe. British law may have protected the notorious terrorist financier Usama bin Ladin on his occasional shopping trips to London. As the terrorist threat grows, countries need to recalibrate the balance between protection of individual liberties and their under- standable interest in keeping track of what is happening within high- risk foreign resident communities.

Communications surveillance is another area where democratic nations might see civil liberties put to the test. In the United States, communications surveillance-intercepts or wiretapping-can be done only with a court order, but that is not true in most countries of the world. There is no doubt that such surveillance is increasing world- wide, based on the justification that it combats the foreign terrorist threat. This is also true in the United States, where the FBI now has access to digital telecommunications (with a court order).

The globalization of electronic communications has made it easier for exile groups to support terrorists. The response of authorities will raise civil liberties concerns, as with Germany's recent efforts to con- trol Intemrnet use by Angela Marquardt, a member of the successor party to the East German Communist Party who sought to maintain an elec- tronic link to the Radikal, a newspaper considered to encourage terror- ism. Some Intemrnet users have even embarked upon their own form of

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freelance counterterrorism. The San Francisco-based Institute for Global Communications was forced to terminate its link with the Basque People's Journal after outraged Spaniards sabotaged the compa- ny's computer system by overloading it with a barrage of junk e-mail.

But the big battle internationally is over the liberalization of rules for use of hard-to-penetrate codes or encryption in private and com- mercial communications. On the one hand, the increase in electron- ic commerce points to the need for secure international communications, most notably with regard to financial transfers. On the other hand, law enforcement and security services are reluctant to permit easy access to strong encryption because it will make it simpler for terrorist and criminal elements to ride on, and take advantage of, the information highway.

Technology already permits any determined party to employ encryp- tion as desired; the question is whether encryption will become so readily available that there is no practical prospect of listening to the conversations of criminals or terrorists. The U.S. government is lead- ing the effort for a "key recovery" system that would permit law enforcement officials-as authorized by the judicial systems of individ- ual countries-to have access to encrypted records or communications. I believe a key recovery system can be constructed in a fashion that serves the needs of both business managers and law enforcement offi- cials to access encryption keys. But it is by no means clear that the key recovery initiative will be successful.

The world is effectively organized to address the terrorist threat.

The fight against transnational terrorism cannot be conducted by countries on an individual basis. Yet, a coherent international effort is more appearance and sentiment than reality. Differences among nations over how to treat countries that sponsor terrorism frequently have been a source of friction. In 1986, Europeans protested in the streets following the U.S. bombing of Libya in retaliation for a terror- ist attack that killed two American servicemen in Germany. During the recent terrorist standoff in Peru, Uruguay complicated negotiations with the MRTA when it broke ranks and released MRTA prisoners short- ly before the release of its own ambassador from the Japanese com- pound. Today, the most important example is the difference in

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attitudes between Europe and the United States toward Iran. Future success requires greater exchange of information on threats, adoption of common policies on how to negotiate with terrorists and their support- ers, and common action to find and dismantle terrorist organizations.

Considerable differences also exist in policies and practices for deal- ing with terrorist incidents and groups. For example, many countries have a stated policy of "no negotiations with terrorists," yet clearly negotiations go on-between the British and the IRA, Israel and the PLO, and Peru and the MRTA. Such ambiguity is essential in dealing with terrorists. The central principle during a crisis should be to mini- mize risks to hostages until the situation is resolved and control is established. From that point extraordinary efforts must be taken to destroy the terrorist group.

No combination of imaginable or affordable measures will give com- plete protection from terrorist threats. Nor should this be expected; after all, large armies do not stop all war, and effective police depart- ments do not detect all crimes before they are committed. But it is rea- sonable to ask what protection can be employed against the range of threats. Not so long ago, the world endured a seemingly unstoppable sequence of airplane hijackings. The international community sought common ground, improved airline security, and found it possible to deter and limit such terrorist incidents. A disciplined and sustained international effort by intelligence and law enforcement agencies worldwide is required to impede terrorist threats. Due to established channels of international cooperation, now we can be reasonably sure that any terrorist group can be identified and tracked (here the issue of sanctuary looms large). But in the longer run, efforts must include defensive measures, effective prosecution of perpetrators of terrorist acts, and offensive action against groups that are engaged in interna- tional terrorism until it is the terrorist who must "think again."

WANT To KNOW MORE? The changing face of terrorism is challenging law enforcement and national security officials alike to develop new strategies. Many congressional hearings provide valuable insight into the issues now under debate, including "The Future of U.S. Antiterrorism Policy," Subcommittee on International Secu- rity (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March and July

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1993); "Terrorism, Asylum Issues, and U.S. Immigration Policy," Sub- committee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1993); "U.S. Counterterrorism Policy," Subcommittee on International Security (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office, March 1994); and "Terrorism-Looking Ahead: Issues and Options for Congress," the proceedings of a seminar held by the Congressional Research Service (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print- ing Office, July 1996).

In his article "Be Very Afraid" (The New Republic, May 1, 1995), Robert Wright discusses the possible future use of weapons of mass destruction by ter- rorists. For a concise summary of the information warfare debate, see "Cyber Threat Expands with Unchecked Speed" (Aviation Week and Space Technol- ogy, July 8, 1996). Walter Laquer examines the nature of terrorism-past, pre- sent, and future-in his article "Postmodern Terrorism" (Foreign Affairs, September/October 1996).

Terrorists are not the only ones who can make use of the Internet. A plethora of information exists for would-be researchers. The Terrorism Research Center, a "virtual institute," has an extensive online database. Also, FOREIGN POLICY readers can download the State Department's "Patterns of Global Terrorism" and other resources through www.foreignpolicy.com.

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