nigeria analytical paper

Journal of Social Development in Africa (2000), 15. 1,61-78

Ethnic Conflict and Democracy in Nigeria: The Marginalisation Question EDL YNE E ANUGWOM*

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the issue of ethnic conl1icts and thcir implications for democracy in Nigeria. Ethnic conflict and distrust is identified as the bane of former democratic experiments in Nigeria. Moreover, since the late 1980s, ethnicity in Nigeria has assumed disturbing new dimensions. The most crucial of these arc the issues of marginalisation and agitations by ethnic minorities. Marginalisation breeds suspicion, distrust, heightens ethnic tensions and may eventually lead to conl1ict over the sharing and allocation of power and national resources. Democratic tradition, which is imperative lor development, cannot blossom in the context of ethnic conflict. Thus,marginalisation, whether apparent or real, has the potential for disrupting the drive towards democracy. With cries for marginalisation so rife among ethnic groups, a need arises to address the issue squarely. This is particularly important given that Nigeria is presently engaged in another attempt at democracy. Ethnic conflicts in whatever form need to be resolved in order to allow for democracy to thrive. This paper examines ways in which ethnic problems in Nigeria may be resolved through the creation of a realistic and workable federalism modelled largely on the American model.

Introduction

Ethnic conflict has been rightly defined as one of the greatest obstacles to meaningful development in Africa (see The Courier 1993). In Nigeria, this sort of competition and rivalry among various ethnic groups is seen as a product of colonial contact. The ethnic factor, however, did not diminish with the advent of independence; rather, it bccame a yardstick for measuring contribution to the national development effort and especially for allocating and distributing power and national resources. As Nigeria is c urrentl y engaged in another exercise aimed at establishing a sustainable form of democracy, there is urgent need to address

*Lccturer, Department of Sociology, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria; email: [email protected].

62 Edlyne E Anugwom

perceived factors that may militate against the success of this endeavour. In certain quarters, the annulment of the dl.:mocratic transition programme by the military in 1993 at the conclusion of the presidential polls, is believed to have been motivated by ethnic sentiments.

On a sim ilar note, the 30- month senseless slaughter occasioned by the Nigerian civil war from 1967 to 1970 was anchored on ethnic rivalry. This was due to the efforts on the part of thL' prl.:dominantly Igbo peoples in the south-eastern region to carve out an indcpen(knt nation for themsel ves. In fact, the history of present- day Nigeria is prl.:valent with cases of ethno-rcIigious conflicts. Since the annulment of the 1993 elections, there have been increased demands and counter- demands for marginalisa1ion by various ethnic groups in the country (see The Nsukka Analyst 1(94). These allegations have worsened because the various ethnic groups see themselves as the victims and point accusing fingers at one another.

In view of this, as well as the implications of pronounced conflict over power- sharing and resource allocation, the ethnic question demands continuous exami- nation if efforts to achieve a beLler Nigeria arc to succeed. In addition, this type of analysis may go a long way in preventing ethnic conflict, since it proffers suggestions on how to lessen ethnic tensions and resolve contentious issues.

Feasible solutions to ethnic problems can only emanate from well-grounded examinations of the phenomenon itself. Ethnic conflict obviously affcclS the development of a society, since this can only take place within a peaceful and democratic context thaI is devoid of rancour.

There is a dire need for elTcctive devclopmcnt in Nigl.:ria and Africa in general. And as Kankwenda (1004) has posikd, African nations arl.: currently engaged in what may bl.: considerL'd 'trafficking' in development i(kologies. This scenario evolved from the realisation that (kspile several decades of independence, African nations arc still faced with SI.:\'L'feproblems of underdevelopment.

Olukoshi (I (96) contends, u ..'refore, that it is high time efforts were made to resolve thL~lingcring political and social crisis in Nigeria by groups and individu- als inside and outside the country.

This paper examines the nature of ethnicity and ethnic conllicts in Nigeria, a~ well as its implications f()r democracy, particularly with regards to perceptions of marginalisation by ethnic groups. In this way, suggestions on how toameliorate ethnic conflicts in the emerging democratic tradition in Nigeria arc proffered.

Ethnicity in PCI'spective

A seminal work onethnicily in Nigeria has been done by Nnoli (l97R). In his

Ethnic COfiflict and Democracy in Nigeria 63

work, Nnoli views ethnic rivalry as a product of the colonial contact situation. Ethnicity may be seen as the latter-day version of the concept of tribalism in Africa. The term "tribalism" has its roots in the colonial experience and was used pejoratively to denigrate Africans ami things African. The use of this term lacked intellectual purpose and scientific leaning. lLs main purpose was to represent African people in the colonial myth as primitive and barbaric, needing the "redeeming" inlluence of colonial experience to embrace civilisaLion.

The intellectual sterility imbued in the concept of tribalism was succinctly unmasked by rvlafeje (1971). He sees it as an anachronistic misnomer which impedes cross-cultural analysis by drawmg invidious and highly suspect distinc- tions between Africans and othcr peoples. Therefore, it over-simplifies and obscures the very nature of economic and power consolidation among Africans and between Africans and others. Tribalism, as it were, rcrerred to distinct socio- cultural groups in pre-independent Africa, but also implied that these groups were living a hrutish, short, nasty and barharous l'Xistence reminiscent of the dark ages. In this light, I'vlaguhane's (1969) assertion that because tribalism is rooted in human nature and primordial identities, African societil's will always be wrecked by irremediabk, internal conflicts; becoll1l's suspect. Such an assertion is not only illogical, hut it may stifle acadcmic allempts to ameliorate ethnic conflicts in Africa.

The use of the term "'tribalism" is now considered to be unacademic and as implying neo-impl'rialistic revisionisttendellcies. The term "ethllicity", on the other hand, tends to cut across continental boundaril's and capture contemporary African realities and socio-cultural processes. Till' concept of ethnicity is there- fore prefe.rred in any allemptto capture thl' nature of differences and contlicts among socio-culLurally distinct groups in Nigeria.

Ethnicity should be regarded as a complex phemHl1l'non ami extremely Iluid reality. !\:noli (197X) defiIll's ethnicity as a soeial phenomenon that is associated with interaetions among membl'fs of difre.rent ethnic groups. Ethnic groups, from his perspective, arc social formations distinguished by the communal nature of their boundaries. Such groups may be distinct in terms of language, culture, or both. According to Nnoli, language has clearly been the most crucial dividing factor in Africa. Although in Nigeria, the present ethnic conflicts may be seen as lying also in what !\:noli called the sub-ethnic group or the so-called ethnic minorities, which are groups with minor linguistic and cultural dilTerences, yet are members of one big geographic group. Thl' Ogoni problem in Nigeria, therefore, is basically an ethnic issue, due to similar cultural and linguistic patterns with other groups in the south-eastern riwrine arl'a. However, one may not easily perceive it as thus. Thl're is often a tl'Illk'ncy to classify all minor ethnic groups as one, in the proccss forgl,tling that thl'rl' arl' significant difre.rcnccs between

64 Edlyne E Anugwom

them. The definition of ethnicity according to the three main ethnic and geographic

groups in Nigeria viz the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo, or North, South-West and South-East; may be one of the reasons why tlle Ogoni problem has remained intractable.

Ethnicity should be seen as arising in any situation where a group of people, no maLlerhow small, with different cultural and linguistic attributes from those of its neighbours; uses this as the basis of solidarity and interaction with others. In so doing, the group sees iL~elfnot only as distinct, but as a "group in itself and for itseIr'. In other words, socio-cultural consciousness of oneness develops and forms the basis of interaction with and participation in other socio-cultural processes, especially in power and resource allocation, within a larger social group or state. And this consciousness is most crucial in the definition of an ethnic group.

Ethnicity implies the fact that the group feels ethnocentric towards others; that is, it sees other groups as relatively inferior and more or less as rivals. This feeling brings about certain attitudes, which distort reality and breed subjectivity in the evaluation and perception of events.

Ethnicity is also characterised by a common consciousness of being. And this factor, more than any other, defines the boundary of the group that is relevant for understanding ethnicity at any point in time (Nnoli 1978: 6). Ethnicity, in addition, often contains an obscured class component. In this sense, it becomes a tool for the elite members of society to hold on to their privileges.

The class bias often imbued in ethnicity has been well articulated by Sklar (1967). Sklar views ethnicity as implying the fact that in Africa, ethnic move- ments may be created and instigated to action by privileged men in a bid to further their own interests. Such men of power may be seen as the emerging elites of society who may use ethnic sentiments to consolidate their power base and further their own selfish interesL~.

In fact, NnoIi (1978) sees ethnicity as a class phenomenon, which emerged from the desire of the colonisers to exploit the colonised. In NnoIi's words, "ethnicity in Africa emerged and persisted either as a mechanism for adaptation to the imperialist system or as an instrument for ensuring a facile and more effecti ve domination and exploitation of the colonised." (1978: 5) Thus Ibrahim and Pereira (1993) see this form of ethnic control as having repercussions in terms of distribution of national resources, ultimately leading to ethnic tension.

The end of the colonial era, however, does not mean that the objective realities upon which ethnicity was built have disappeared. The selfish need for the privileged classes to further their interests and subjugate the underprivileged by instigating and intensifying etlmic sentiments, stilI abounds. At best, one privi-

Ethnic Conflict and Democracy in Nigeria 65

leged group, the white colonisers, has been replaced by another privileged group, the indigenous agents of ileo-imperialism. A brief examination of colonial administrative processes, would have made this occurrence easily predictable. In fact, the selective access to education which colonialism favoured, created an elite which was able to collude with the colonial power (see Drayton 1995) even after colonial rule. And this may be the case in many African nations now.

When colonial rule ended in 1960, this elite group took charge of affairs and ensured the maintenance of the status quo. This explains why, in spite of the negative consequences of ethnicity in Nigeria, the ruling class has not seriously confronted the factors that create and deepen ethnic cleavages. One of these is the issue of marginalisation.

Marginalisation, whether apparent or real, has the potential for disrupting the socio-cultural fabric of a society, particularly when several ethnic groups single but one group alone as the perpetrator.

The Ethnic Composition of Nigeria

Any effort at unravelling the precise ethnic composition of Nigeria, is inevitably fraught with the problem of what to take into account and what to exclude. In fact, it was during the colonial era that the British introduced some measure of "order" by amalgamating the various ethnic and social groups in Nigeria under one umbrella. Before this, however, the various socio-ethnic groups in Nigeria were engaged in one form of exchange or the other. This exchange facilitated interac- tion. In addition, the virtual non-existence of unsurmountable natural barriers boosted inter-group migration. Olukoju (1997), howe\er, sees the mistake of the colonial masters as lying in the fact that their unification exercise took no cognizance of the existing pattern of inter-group relations.

In other words, this unification was not only externally imposed, but intro- duced some discontinuity in the hitherto existing inter-group dynamics. This discontinuity not only introduced new elements, but ironically, sharpened the distinctions between these groups. Thus, the British exercise at unification was over-ambitious and showed little regard for the so-called natural boundaries. This has led to the popular belief among Nigerians that Nigeria is no less than a geographical expression created by colonialism. This opinion has received various forms of intellectual endorsement (see Adejuyibe 1983) . . In view of the fact that new ethnic groups are still being "discovered" in Nigeria, the British attempt at unification may be seen as a genuine effort to use constitutional power to overcome a socio-linguistic problem. Nigeria's diversity, both in "tongue" and "tribe" makes it a very difficult region to subject to precise

66 Edlyne E Anugwom

classification. This has led to the tendency among many scholars to focus on the three major

ethnic or geographic zones in the country viz the Hausa-Fulani (Northern Nigeria), the Yoruba (Western Nigeria) and the Igbo (Eastern Nigeria).

These geographic zones arc not in any way solely occupied by the three ethnic groups. A plethora of smaller socio-ethnic groups may be located in these zones. The persistent problems of the minority ethnic groups indicate the futility of this type of scholarship, as the focus on the three major ethnic groups leads to the neglect of other ethnic minorities.

All the same, no authentic claim can be made for complete documentation of ethnic groups in Nigeria. The fact that over three hundred identified language groups exist in Nigeria, has created some confusion as one may equate each language group with an ethnic group (see Adejuyibe 1983) and thereby arrive at over three hundred ethnic groups.

As Iwaloye and Ibeanu (1997) and Anugwom (1997) have argued, however, languages and ethnic groups do not necessarily COIncide.One language may be spoken by more than one ethnic group and one ethnic group may have linguistic variations of the same root language.

Moreover, while language may be one of the important factors for defining an ethnic group, some ethnic groups in Nigeria may have lost their original linguistic roots, while retaining their identity, as a result of intense interaction with larger socio-ethnic groups. And in the same vein, many ethnic groups may use the same language to case communication, as is the case of the smaller ethnic groups in the North of Nigeria, where Hausa has become more or less a lingua franca. Therefore, there is no direct relationship betwccn language and ethnic group in Nigeria.

With this in mind, the 56 ethnic groups identified by Iwaloye and Ibeanu (1997) as the existing ethnic groups in contemporary Nigeria arc adopted. Itis important to point out, however, that the ethnic groups in Nigeria may exceed this number by far, though these 56 groups arc both visible and easily identifiable. The 56 ethnic groups arc presented in the table below.

As the table shows, quite a number of minority ethnie groups exist in Nigeria. However at a rough estimate, one may regard the Hausa-Fulani as making up approximately 35% of the population, the Yoruba and the IgOO,25% and 20% respectively, while the remaining 20% is made up of the minorities spread all over the country. This is only an informed estimate as mentioned above.

Ethnic Conflict and Democracy in Nigeria 67

'1. Yoruba 15. Dulawa 29. Buri 43. Migili

2. Ora 16. Kamaku 30. Balta 44. Eggon

3. Yekhee 17. Ebira 31. Kanuri 45. Bokyi

4. Edo 18. Nupe 32. Margi 46. Ekon

5. Bassawa 19. Gwari 33. Delta Minorities 4/. Agoi

6. Igala 20. Tiv 34. Gwadara 48. Efik

7. Idoma 21. Jukun 35. Chamba-Daka 49. Ibibio

8. Igbo 22. Chomo-karim 36. Mambila 50. Annang

9. Ijo 23. Jarwa 37. Katang 51. Mumuye

10. Isoko 24. Angas 38. Berom 52. Waja

11. Urhobo 25. Hausa-FuIani 39. Kadara 53. Busa

12. Itshekiri 26. Karekare 40. Kurama 54. Dendi

13. Baatonum 27. Eloyi 41. Mada 55. Buduma

14. Karnbari 28. Gade 42. Alago 56. Shuwa

Adopted from Iwaloye and Ibcanu (1997)

Ethnic Conflict and Democracy

According to Nnoli (1978), conl1ict as an aspect of ethnicity is more pronounced in societies where the inter-ethnic competition for scarce resources is the rule, particularly when inequality is accepted as agiven and weaILhis greatly esteemed. In this type of set-up, no group wants to be consigned to the bottom of the ladder. Hence groups exploit every means in a bid to remain at the top. In a democratic society, where the fight to choose is a guiding principle, ethnic groups may show undue interest in who gets what, how and when. In other words, democratic traditions in ethnically plural societies may be influenced by keen competition, ethnic rivalries and jostling for power and resources. These societies, therefore, may witness social protest which often takes the form of ethnic conflicts (see Ismagilova 1978). While the spirit of competition may be seen as heaILhy for democracy, anchoring this competition on ethnicity or ethnic factors may be counterproductive to the move towards democracy.

The expansion of democracy began in the mid 1970s in Southern Europe (see Lipset 1994). This wave of change reached the African continent for the most part in the late 1980s, alLhough many of these early attempts came to a standstill. Authoritarian one-party rule and military juntas replaced such movements. Since

68 Edlyne E Anugwom

the early 1990s, however, democracy and strong democratic sentiments have emerged across the globe. And this has greatly inl1uenced the African continent, which along with Latin America, has been a late starter in popular democracy. In fact, Nnoli (1994) argues that the historical struggle of African people for democracy reached a critical stage in 1989.

It may be correct to argue that one of the greatest appeals of democracy is the prospect it offers for guaranteeing individual and group rights. This can only occur, however, where democracy is not burdened with negative inl1uences such as conl1ict. Neither can it be achieved where largely primordial ethnic sentiments arc placed above the ideals of democracy. Such situations debilitate any attempts at creating a democracy and furthering the development of society. Democracy, in the opinion of Schumpeter (1950), is the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions, in which individuals acquire the power to decide, by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote. While this definition may be considered broad, it emphasises one salient fact about democracy. It involves keen competition. In this type of competition, individuals can exploit whatever loopholes they perceive in their opponents' political strategy and thereby rise to power. Despite this, democracy can be perceived as government by the people, in which supreme power is retained and exercised by them, either directly, as in pure or absolute democracy of the Greek city states, or indirectly, as in representative democracy of modern times. Thus Blair (1972) argues that democracy should be based on four basic principles viz majority rule, minority rights, political equality and regular elections.

In other words, democracy provides constitutional opportunities for the people to freely exercise their franchise in the selection of their representatives and leaders. In this type of exercise, no group or individual is singled out for exclusion by undue manipulation of socio-cultural and biological factors. Generally speak- ing, democracy in its orthodox and original Greek or pure version is no longer feasible. Hence the ideal nowadays is representative democracy. In representative democracy, the people do not gather every day to make decisions by casting votes on matters of state, but delegate this power to representatives who exercise it overtly in the interest of the people. According to Elekwa (1995: 56) "represen- tation is a workable compromise that avoids both the dangers of selfperpctuating leaders and the difriculties of participatory democracy." Obviously, as he aptly argued, in a plural society or any modern society at that, it may be impossible for all citizens to come together in order to make important political decisions.

As a result of the imperative of representation, any democracy must meet three basic requisites or conditions. These are free and extensive competition among individuals and groups for power and positions (group as used here refers to a political party); exhaustive participation of citizens in the process of leader

Ethnic Conflict and Democracy in Nigeria 69

selection and policy options, mainly through the ballot box which should be free, fair and regular; and a significant level of political liberties and civil rights (see Woolley and Keller 1994, Diamond et ai. 1988) . . The link between ethnic conflict and democracy is especially crucial in view of the popular assumption that democracy engenders development. Much histori- cal evidence shows, however, that development has not been possible where there are marked divisions or intense conflicts between groups in a given society. Therefore, ethnic conflicL<;negate the developmental function of democracy and may ultimately attack the roots of democracy in a society. Ethnic conflicts, according to Osaghae (1994), are conl1icts arising from situations in which people from varying ethnic groups decide to employ their differences in the pursuit of competing interests. Osaghae sees the crucial word in the above definition as "decide". This is because ethnicity comes into play a<;a conscious ploy by the actors. In as much as the above argument is plausible, it obscures the fact that it may be more characteristic of the major ethnic groups, who might use the advantage of numbers to exploit others. But in the case of minor ethnic groups, ethnicity may be deliberately brought into play, in order to ensure fair treatment in the ensuing distribution of resources and allocation of power. The Ogoni dilemma in Nigeria may be interpreted in part from this perspective.

One could, however, regard ethnic conl1icts as existing in a continuum, in which minimal ethnic rivalry may be considered as healthy for the development of the society. From such a perspective, ethnic rivalry could be seen as prevalent throughout the sociopolitical history of even the most developed nations of the world. But when this conflict goes beyond the minimal level, it becomes a threat to the survival of the social entity concerned. In this sense, the kind of ethnic conl1ict ravaging African countries can be appropriately situated at an extreme position in the continuum. Ethnicity, as experience ha<;shown, is not a phenom- enon that can be totally eradicated. As Osaghae (1994) pointed out, it may be delusive to expect ethnicity to die out: ethnic cleavages simply do not die out in this way.

Hence the existence of at least minimal ethnic conflicts or rivalry in ethnically plural societies is to be expected. When these conflicL<;are minimal or dissociated, they may be regarded as dynamic forces which help to propel the development of a society. Dahrendorf (1976) identified such conflicts as one of the principal variables for explaining social change in society. On the other hand, when these ethnic conflicts become extreme, either as a factor for impeding democracy like in Nigeria, oras the basis for senseless violence as in Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, etc.; it becomes a major disintegrating force in society.

70 Edlyne E Anugwom

Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria

Since independence from British colonial rule in 1960, Nigeria has experimented three times with democracy and is presently engaged in the fourth attempt. The first two democracies were derailed by coup d' etats, while the third one hardly got off the ground before it was again overruled by the military. According to Ungar (19H9), the first five years of Nigeria's post-indcpendence were chaotic and bloody, ending with two coups in 1966 which eventually brought Yakubu Gowon to power.

The bitterness and infighting which characterised these five years, was due to the fact that Nigeria had been a federation of three large regions before independ- ence; so when this all changed, ethnic rivalries became exacerbated. The demo- cnnic experience of the 1960s was not only derailed by the military, there were severe ethnic rivalries due to competition for power and national resources. A strong senseofethnic consciousness, resulting oftcn in unhealthy competition had also becn deliberately machinated by British colonial rule before the 1960s.

As Ibrahim and Pereira (1993) have argued, during the colonial period, linguistic groups were categoriscd as tribes and dilTerences between them were emphasised. Hence severe ethnic rivalry, distrust and fierce competition for power and resources, could bc regarded as a colonial carryover. This eventually corroded the first attempt at democracy in the country.

Faiola (1986) pointed out, for example, that the Yoruba speaking people never perceived themselves to be a single sociopolitical unit during the precolonial era. According to Faiola, the consciousness and manipulation of a pan- Yoruba identity only began in the 19thcentury. This was heightened and intensified in the 20th century through colonial politics and the politicisation of ethnicity following Nigeria's independence. This argument has also been put forward by NnoH (1978). Historical evidence points to the fact that precolonial Yorubaland was made up of different kingdoms, which were involved in internecine wars and boundary skirmishes with one another.

The same can be said of the Igbo, who never achieved any significant measure of unity or exclusiveness. The Hausa-Fulani group did not consider itself to be a distinct ethnic group either, before the advent of colonial rule. As a matter of fact, the Fulanis were originally a religious group led by Othman Dan Fodio in an Islamic evangelisation of pagan Hausaland. Even after the Jihad, which enabled Islam to become a state religion, the Hausa-Fulani kingdoms were not united as one until the era of colonialism.

Ethnic Conflict and Democracy in Nigeria 71

The First Republic Ethnic factors may be seen as responsible for the confusion and distrust that marked this first attempt at democracy, especially towards the end of 1965. Given the intensity of ethnic sentiments and sectionalism, the first republic was destined to a brieflife. In fact, the first republic was based mainly on ethnic considerations. The three main political parties: Nigeria Peoples' Congress (NPC), National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), and the Action Group (AG), were all ethnically based, as were their leaders. In effect, no single party was broadly based or cut across ethnic lines. In this way, ethnicity soon became the bane of the first republic (see Ismagilova 1978). The alliance between the NPC and the NCNC following independence, was merely a marriage of convenience, lacking in any significant political cohesiveness. Meanwhile, the AG consolidated its ethnic ground, i.e., Yorubaland, and became the official opposition, viewing all govern- ment aetions and policies through an ethnic prism. Itis not surprising that less than twenty-four months after the NPC/NCNC central alliance, the two parties resorted to intensifying their own ethnic hold to power. The NPC was fully aware of its large basis of support in the Hausa-Fulani in the North and had deliberately formed an alliance with the NCNC, in order to completely dominate the central legislature. The same ethno-regionalism informed the NCNC's unassailable position in the Eastern region. Against this background, the evenL<;of 1966 and 1967 can be regarded as ofl-shoots of the ethnic basis of partisan polities in Nigeria. The next attempt at partisan politics did not escape either what Joseph (1981) called the "cthnic trap".

The Second Republic During the next republic (1979-83), one would have hoped that the politicians had learnt a few lessons from the errors made in the 1960s. This was not to be, for the second republic was also debilitated by ethno-regional conOict(seeJoseph 1987). The three major political parties: National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), and Nigeria Peoples' Party (NPP), were all ethnic and regional in outlook. They were ethno-regional in nature first and foremost, rather than central or national political parties. As a result, the ultimate decay of the second republic was not hard to foresee. While ethnicity mired the policies of both the first and second republics; the second republic was characterised, in addition, by the immaturity of its politicians and the absurdity of their politics. This became so bad, that in the end, the politicians themselves were calling upon the military to take control.

Other factors such as widespread corruption, mismanagement of the economy, worsening social infrastructure, etc., certainly added to the predictable demise of

72 Edlyne E Anugwom

the republic. As the military junta who took over were to argue, the corruption, the deplorable state of the economy and mass unemployment featuring the Shagari- led second republic were too high a price to pay for democracy. All the same, the ethnic factor and its twin evil of "do or die politics" can arguably be considered as the basis upon which all other negative elements rested.

The Third Republic The Buhari-Idiagbon junta, needless to say, heeded the calls of the politicians and annexed the government in a bloodless coup d' etat. Another attempt at democracy that was to be the third republic, thus never came to fruition. This was preceded with the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections by a military order. Prior to this, the official results so far released and others predicted by competent observers, indicated that Moshood Abiola was easily in the lead. Moshood Abiola would have been the first Southerner to win a presidential election in Nigeria. Incidentally, the military junta that annulled the election process was headed by a Hausa-Fulani, Ibrahim Babangida. Moreover, international observers monitor- ing the election, saw it as the fairest and most free election ever conducted in Nigeria. In this context, it was felt in certain quarters that the annulment was nothing but an attempt to ensure the perpetuation of the Hausa-Fulani hegemony in power, and hence ethnically motivated.

While a lot of dissension has been expressed by the Northerners or the Hausa- Fulani over the annulment, the plausibility of an ethnic rationale behind it still appears to be strong. Once more, Nigeria is currently on its way towards a sustainable form of democracy, yet the ethnic factor is still rearing its ugly head. This time the catch-phrase is "marginalisation" of ethnic groups in the power process and allocation of resources. The fear of marginalisation, whether real or perceived, is anchored in the belief that ethnic orientation determines one's access to crucial resources and power.

Marginalisation and Democracy in Nigeria

The new men created seven new states, most of them in the ethnic majority areas of the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba, increasing thereby their access to the oil revenue while exacerbating ethnic tension. They went further to revise the oil revenue allocation formula agreed before independence, so as to give the ethnic majorities an even greater share. The regions involved in oil extraction were now forced to accept twenty percent instead of fifty percent of the proceeds of mining rents and royalties (Saro- Wiwa 1992:85).

The above contention made by Saro-Wiwa dearly captures the increasing

Ethnic Conflict and Derrwcracy in Nigeria 73

complexity of the ethnic phenomenon in Nigeria. Whereas ethnic rivalry and schism had previously been between the three dominant ethnic groups; sinee the late eighties, the minority ethnic groups have started to redefine the ethnic terrain of Nigeria. What emerges from this is that even after the bitter civil war, the ethnic question remains a crucial one in the development scheme of the nation. In this context of ethnicity, feelings of marginalisation arise and become strong among a given group.

Marginalisation, which stems from a people's perception of their treatment in the allocation or distribution of power and resources, may be real and apparent. For instance, a case of marginalisation may be made for the Ogoni, who despite "having provided the nation with an estimated $30,000 million in oil revenues, their people had no pipe borne water or electricity, and lacked edueation, health and other social facilities: it is intolerable that one of the richest areas of Nigeria should wallow in abject poverty and destitution" (Saro-Wiwa 1992:97). In this light, the Ogoni ethnic group has concrete rea<;onsto consider itself marginalised, especially since these facilities can be found in other ethno-regional areas of Nigeria. However, some cases of marginality may result from the shortcomings of the in-group and are not due to acts of deliberate aggression on the part of other groups. Thus, the ca'ie of fewer people from Northern Nigeria than those from the South gaining admission to tertiary institutions, based on examinationsconductcd by a central examination body (see The Sentinel 1994), may be seen as a case of marginality. This kind of disadvantage occurs, as it were, from the inability of these students from the North to meet the requirements of the examination board.

Adedeji (I993) sees marginality as the relative or absolute lack of power to influence a defined social entity, while being a recipient of the exercise of power by other parts of that entity. In this sense, the sub-social entity lacks the sociopolitical or natural ability to influence significant others, who are in charge of the allocation of power and resources in the larger social entity. According to The Nsukka Analyst (I994: 1), "marginalisation is the deliberate disempowerment of a group of people in a federation politically, economically, socially and militarily by another group or groups which during the relevant time frame wield power and control the allocation of materials and financial resources at the centre of the federation". In as mush as one may acknowledge the insightful nature of the above definition, it may also be necessary to add that marginalisation is usually more apparent than real. Therefore, it hinges more on feelings, perceptions (which may be selective) and attitudinal orientations. In fact, it is these features that confuse marginalisation with marginality. Marginalisation exists when an ethnic group or any other kind of group feels disenchanted with the working of things in a society of which it is a constituent part. There is a sense that the status quo ante is imbued with obvious disadvantages to it as a group, resulting from the exercise

74 Edlyne E Anugwom

of crucial privileges by an external group. The group feels that it occupies an inferior or disadvantageous position in the

process of power allocation, distribution of amenities, and access to societal resources. These valuable resources, access to power and amenities are perceived as being unfairly used by some other group in control. Such feelings, especially within ethnic groups, tend to lead to various forms of protest, agitation and conOic.:twith other groups or the group that is seen to be ,he perpetrator. As The Nsukka Analyst (1994) point., out, marginalisation presupposes the existence of an agent, group or groups with the capacity to disempoweror disadvantage others. Therefore, it sees marginalisation as "exogenously" imposed, while marginality is "endogenously" imposed. In Nigeria today, feelings of marginal isat ion are rife in the society. Almost all the ethnic groups have accused one another of acts of marginalisation. After the June 12, 1993 presidential election annulment, how- ever, most ethnic groups now regard the Hausa-Fulani, who have wielded central power for most of Nigeria's independent existence, as the main perpetrator of marginalisation against others.

The Nsukka Analyst (1994), in fact, has made use of some interesting statistics to make a case of marginalisation against the Igbo ethnic group in Nigeria. It argues that since 1970, the Igbo have been jointly marginalised by the Hausa- Fulani and Yoruba ethnic groups. To prove this, it states that in 1989, out of 154 officers of the rank of Brigadier and above in the army, only 8 were Igbo, while 37 and 51 were Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani respecti vely. This is a disproportionate representation even if one argues that the North is equal to the West added to the East. However, it is particularly skewed against the Igbo, who, despite their considerable numbers in the army, have only eight high-ranking officers to show for it. Protests againstmarginalisation have also been taken up by the Yoruba, who see the annulment of the 1993 election, which was won by a Yoruba, as a move by the Hausa-Fulani militocraey to maintain power at all cost. Even minor ethnic groups, particularly the Ogoni, have cried out against marginalisation. In fact, the "supposed" plight of the Ogoni has attracted intcrnational attention. As a result, the hanging of the prominent Ogoni activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, for alleged involvement in the murder of four of his kinsmen, attracted severe international reprisals in the last three years.

Even the supposcdly "privileged" Hausa-Fulani have raised questions of marginal isation in the areas of education and the private sector economy, although their "disadvantages" in these areas have been seen by the other groups as self- innicted or a case of marginality (see The Nsukka Analyst 1994). The serious threat of marginalisation to the survival of democracy in Nigeria and the use of ethnicity as a class weapon remains a fact, as expressed by Musa (1994:24), "the clique from the North which dominated and still dominates political power, is

Ethnic Conflict and Democracy in Nigeria 75

selfish, shorL<;ighted, unpatriotic and corrupt, just like its counterpart in the South."

Conclusion: Towards a Resolution

Itis clear that democracy in Nigeria can only endure if perceptions of marginalisation and acts portending the marginalisation of ethnic groups are directly confronted. In this sense, the present attempts at democracy as a form of sustainable socio- cultural formation in Nigeria, can only be attained iffears of ethnic marginalisation are erased. While ethnic cleavages may endure, practices and actions that give the impression that an ethnic group is being marginalised or singled out for discrimi- nation should be curbed. It is in this vein, that means and ways of doing this need to be examined.

One way of tackling ethnic connict is by adopting a political culture that makes adequate provision for all the interests and groups in a given society. Nigeria should therefore learn from the experiences of multi-ethnic developed nations. As Woolley and Keller (1994) rightly pointed out, African countries should emulate one of the fundamental principles of American democracy, which is the notion of majority rule and its complementary precept of minority rights. Federalism as a form of goverument and political arrangement is a viable way of achieving the above. Federalism may help to ameliorate ethnic rivalry where it is implemented to the letter. In this sense, federalism in Nigeria should be geared towards the American system. Woolley and Keller view federalism as ideal for the multi- ethnic and religious character of most African states, where certain national rights are established for all citizens, while at the same time allowing regional govern- ments to make laws, rules and regulations that do not conflict with national codes.

This kind of thinking must have informed the provision made in the new draft constitution in Nigeria for a representation formula, addressing the core ethno- geographical zones in the country. Itrecommends that the six most powerful and prestigious positions in central government should be zoned towards the six different geographical regions of the country. While this is a step in the right direction, it nevertheles~ falls short of matching the representational formula through strict rotation. In this case, it would be illegal for any region to corner one position indefinitely for itself, such as the presidency.

Another way of confronting the ethnic question, is through the elimination of hitherto accepted practices which invariably reinforce ethnic differences. One of these, is the so-called federal character principle or quota system. Ironically, the federal character principle emerged as an ethnicity management method. Accord- ing to Ekeh and Osaghae (1989), it is a distributive principle which is aimed at

76 Edlyne E Anugwom

preventing the domination of government and its resources by one group or a few groups, thereby guaranteeing every group access to power and resources. Un- doubtedly, this principle was not without its merits, particularly in the early days of independence. Up until now, however, its implementation has bred mediocrity and heightened ethnic competition. The quota system should be discarded in favour of meritocracy, or it may be modified to lackie issues of ethnic rivalry. In fact, its perverse nature was aptly captured by Osifeso (1997:9) when he argued that, "ethnic purity under the guise of the obnoxious federal character clause has become the hackneyed word in education, employment and housing."

In addition, there is urgent need to confront the realities of ethnic minorities, who have thus far been neglected in the dynamics of the Nigerian power and resource game. Ethnic minorities are full members of the Nigerian federation and should be treated as thus. The Ogoni debacle brought to the fore, that minority geographical areas often form the basis of the Nigerian economy. Hence in allocating power and resources, they should be treated as equally important. In this era of Nigeria's almost total dependence on petrodollars, it may be wise to treat fairly the people from whose soil oil flows. This makes it necessary to redefine the revcnue allocation systcm in such a way that a reasonable percentage is allocated for the purpose of tackling environmental problems, which oil exploitation causes in these areas, as well as improving general living conditions.

In addition to the above, other clements of the sociopolitical system reinforc- ing the ethnic divide, need to be addressed. The use of forms for employment, university admission, contract bids/tender, lease applications, election, etc., with unnecessary questions as to the state of origin rather than residence should be minimised. While some of these may well be innocuous in themselves, they are often utilised by ethnically parochial bureaucrats and government functionaries in perpetuating ethnic cleavages and marginalisation in Nigerian society. Only proof and length of residence in a state should be made crucial, especially for the purpose of politics and clectoral privileges. Even though the solutions given above are by no means exhaustive, we may rest our case at this point with the following insightful comment made by Ismagilova (1978: 178):

"The objective circumstances for solving ethnic problem~ will seemingly be more favourable in those states that have adopted the objective of reconstructing African society by democratic methods relying on the broad popular masses. And in which the movement for economic inde- pendence and social progress is led by national democratic parties and organisations. "

Ethnic Conflict and Democracy in Nigeria 77

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