

products were placed in overheads in areas away from their display locations.¹ Previously, an associate would walk down the aisle and manually write down out-of-stocks from the shelves, take them to the computer room, generate a report with a "pick list," and then pick those products from the shelves at the locations. With the new ordering cart, associates could walk down the aisles and scan any product in an empty space in order to electronically create a pick list. If additional stock of the missing product was present in the store, it was included in the pick list so that associates would know the location as in a storage location and would look for it. In the case of a discrepancy between what was in the store had in stock and what actually was in stock, associates could make adjustments.¹⁰⁰ That is, associates could change the inventory levels in the computer system to reflect the physical quantities at the stores.

Tools to improve labor scheduling Nardelli invested in tools for Home Depot's store managers to better forecast staffing needs and to schedule labor. The new computerized workload management system allowed store managers to see what activities were scheduled to take place at the store and historical and future trends to inform decision-making about hiring, staffing and scheduling. Flexibility for scheduling labor at stores, Home Depot announced it would extend benefits to all store staff. The company tried to increase the number of part-time employees, from 15% of the workforce to 50%.¹⁰³ Although a negative reaction to this caused top management to backpedal on the plan, part-timers hired, the net increase of part-timers was still significant.¹⁰⁴

Changes in management The arrival of Nardelli resulted in significant changes for employees at the corporate and store level. Within 90 days of Nardelli's arrival, 22 of the company's top 29 managers left.¹⁰⁶ Between 2001 and 2002, Home Depot's 170 top executive positions changed hands, and over half of the new hires came from outside the company.¹⁰⁷

To recruit new managers and train them in the new management approach, Nardelli recruited John Donovan—a former GE executive whom Nardelli recruited to join Home Depot as his chief financial officer—developed a two-year intensive program to fast-track new store managers. The program carefully selected participants and aimed to train newcomers in company management practices, analytics methodologies and culture.

Of the 1,142 future managers hired from outside the company had military experience.¹⁰⁹ Nardelli believed that the company was seeking "people who deliver results, act strategically, and are results-driven," in contrast to traditional store managers who were frequently experts in hardware, customer service, he said. "They inspire achievement, they live [with] integrity, they build strong relationships, and they create an environment of inclusion. Junior military officers are the best candidates." A former Navy Lieutenant who in 2005 was Home Depot's director of operations, a position created to standardize processes at Home Depot—agreed. "Military is a great model for how our stores are structured," he said. "A store manager is basically the captain of a ship. You've got a leadership team under you, and I think the relationships between your hourly and management associates are critical." Nardelli's

Analyzing Metrics and Making Plan

Nardelli also introduced discipline through data analysis and performance evaluation. Store managers were required to "make plan" by achieving weekly and monthly sales or other performance targets. All personnel were ranked according to four "performance metrics": financial, operational, customer, and people skills.¹¹³ Nardelli and Donovan placed Human Resource managers in every store to track these metrics.¹¹⁴ One market analyst gave the new discipline a positive review, saying Home Depot was becoming "much more disciplined, more numbers-oriented and more accountable for everything."¹¹⁵ To reinforce the new discipline and to better communicate with employees and store managers, Nardelli established an internal TV Channel (Home Depot TV, or "HDTV") that piped in messages to stores.¹¹⁶ Every Monday night, EVPs for marketing and merchandising delivered the store staff's "marching orders for the week" through a 25-minute live program named "The Same Page."¹¹⁷ At other times, HDTV ran segments reminding staff of key messages and policies.

Under Nardelli, Home Depot developed personnel incentive plans with the aim of better tying incentives to employee performance. In 2002, the "Success Sharing" program debuted, specifically targeting hourly workers.¹¹⁸ The program linked employee performance on the new metrics used for evaluation with bonus payments. In 2004, payouts from the program totaled nearly \$90 million.¹¹⁹

The whole cloth culture change that Nardelli introduced, symbolized by the focus on analytics, did not always lead to the desired results. Managers had to monitor their store numbers, reducing the time they spent on the floor. Former Chief Information Officer Ron Griffin expressed his frustration at having to demonstrate a "return on every nickel."¹²⁰ Several stores responded to the "inventory velocity" metric requirement by reducing the amount of inventory coming in, leading to stockouts.¹²¹ A former Home Depot merchandising executive explained, "On paper, all these changes make sense. Unfortunately, they don't work on the floor of the stores."¹²² And employees resented the sensation that Big Brother was watching, generated by Home Depot TV. They surreptitiously dubbed it "Bobaganda."¹²³

Reactions from Wall Street

Wall Street's initial reaction to the changes introduced by Nardelli was mostly positive. There was widespread agreement with Nardelli's assessment that what had made Home Depot successful in its first 20 years was unlikely to continue to work as the company aimed for \$100 billion in revenues.¹²⁴ Although some analysts noted that Home Depot under Nardelli opted for a more centralized structure at a time when retailers were devolving more autonomy to stores, many agreed that in Home Depot's case, centralization was a necessary move.¹²⁵ Analysts approved of Nardelli's investment in information systems infrastructure, improved supply chain logistics, the strengthened opportunities for economies of scale through the centralization of merchandising, and Nardelli's introduction of greater analytics as a basis for decision-making.¹²⁶ Home Depot's strategic alliances with John Deere and others were also cited as strengths.¹²⁷ While analysts noted the disgruntlement of present and former employees with the changing culture at Home Depot, the course of the company's transformation was seen as a necessary one.