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The Consequences of Doing Nothing" Inaction Inertia as Avoidance of Anticipated Counterfactual Regret

Orit E. q~ykocinski Ben Gurion University

Thane S. Pittman Gettysburg College

When an attractive action opportunity has been forgone, individuals tend to decline a substantially less attractive current opportunity in the same action domain, even though, in an absolute sense, it still has positive value. The hypothesis that continued inaction (inaction inertia ) occurs in the service of avoiding anticipated regret was tested. In Experiments 1 and 2, when repeated contact with the forgone opportunity (and, hence, the experience of regret) was made unavoidable, the tendency toward subsequent inaction decreased. The inaction inertia effect was also reduced when avoidance costs were increased (Experiment 3) or when the initial reason for avoidance was removed (Experi- ment 4). Experiment 4 included a thought-listing task that provided direct evidence for the role of regret in producing inaction inertia.

The things that people do not do far outnumber the things that they do. Although the effects o f actions on subsequent actions have been the subject o f a great deal o f psychological research, however, investigations into the consequences o f non- action or inaction have only recently become a research topic o f interest, q'~kocinski, Pittmun, and Tuttle (1995) outlined the potential benefits o f an explicit study o f the effects o f inaction and presented the results o f several studies on one particular consequence o f inaction: inaction inertia.

Inaction inertia occurs when forgoing an attractive action op- portunity (initial inaction) decreases the likelihood that subse- quent action will be taken in the same domain. The research on this phenomenon shows that inaction inertia occurs when the second action opportunity is in some sense " w o r t h " substan- tially less than the initial opportunity, even though the current action opportunity still has positive value in an absolute sense. Having passed up one opportunity to gain, the person becomes more likely to pass up another opportunity to gain but gain less. For example, in Tykocinski et al.'s (1995) Experiment 2, the participants were asked, in a scenario methodology, how likely they would be to j o i n a frequent flier program before a trip they were currently planing to take, The number o f miles that could be gained by joining at the time was the same for all o f the research participants. In the two experimental conditions, the effects o f a previous inaction were manipulated. The participant was said to have considered joining this program once before

Orit E. Tykocinski, Department of Behavioral Sciences, Ben Gurion University, Beer-Sheva, Israel; Thane S. Pittman, Department of Psychol- ogy, Gettysburg College.

We wish to thank Danielle Mikesell, Tzahi Stein, Anat Vangerko, and Miri Avital for their help with Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively; Charles Stangor for his assistance in obtaining participants for Experi- ment 1; and Zvi Safra for acting as a second coder for Experiment 4.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Orit E. Tykocinski, Department of Behavioral Sciences, Ben Gurion University, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel.

prior to a previous trip, but she or he did not do so. The number o f miles that would have been accumulated if the participant had j o i n e d at the first opportunity was manipulated. In the large- difference condition, the number o f miles that would have been gained if the participant had j o i n e d initially was substantially greater than in the small-difference condition. In the control condition, participants had no initial opportunity but were sim- ply presented with the current action possibility. We found that participants in the large-difference condition were significantly less likely to j o i n the program than the participants in both the small-difference condition and the control condition, who did not differ significantly.

Tykocinski et al. (1995) tested for several possible explana- tions for the inaction inertia effect. Explanations based on a straightforward contrast effect between the initial and current opportunity, a self-perception analysis (participants may have inferred a lack o f interest in the behavior based on their inaction in the large-difference conditions), or cognitive dissonance pro- cesses (to justify their initial inaction, large-difference partici- pants may have convinced themselves that they did not really care about that action domain a n y w a y ) did not seem to be able to account for the results o f several o f the reported studies.

A first hint about the process underlying inaction inertia was suggested by the last study reported by "Pykocinski et al. (1995). A framing manipulation was used to demonstrate that individu- als who had missed an attractive action opportunity thought o f their initial inaction in terms o f a loss o f attractive outcomes. For example, in the frequent flier example, the frequent flier miles that could have been gained but were not are thought o f as lost. The results o f this experiment further suggested that this loss framing is an integral part o f the inaction inertia process; changing participants to a gain frame eliminated the inaction inertia effect. This finding directed our attention to the possibil- ity that the observed decreased likelihood o f action is, in fact, an attempt to distance oneself from a situation that has acquired aversive psychological properties through loss framing. This ex- planation was the subject o f the present research.

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608 TYKOCINSKI AND PITTMAN

One way of viewing the phenomenon of inaction inertia is to see the decrease in likelihood of acting after inaction as avoid- ance of action in that domain. That is, initial inaction leads to avoidance of similar but less attractive action opportunities. Because a key factor in the process of avoidance is the anticipa- tion of a negative experience, one needs to ask, What are the negative aspects of missing an attractive opportunity that would be sufficiently potent to cause avoidance of a subsequent similar and still objectively positive opportunity?

The situations in which inaction inertia is observed have prop- erties that make them highly likely to produce both regret and unpleasant thoughts about what might have been. According to Landman (1993), situations in which people clearly know that superior outcomes could have resulted from making a different decision or from taking an alternative route of action are highly likely to produce regret, an unpleasant psychological experience that involves an interplay of emotion and cognition. Among the cognitive processes involved in regret is thinking about alterna- tive scenarios that would have produced better outcomes. In the literature on counterfactual thinking, such scenarios are referred to as upward counterfactuals (Markman, Gavinski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993). In general, situations that have negative out- comes are likely to activate counterfactual thinking, and the content of these thoughts (i.e., whether they will focus on better or on worse worlds) is susceptible to comparison standards and contrast effects (Roese, 1994, 1997). The participants in the large-difference condition in our experiments were faced with outcomes they perceived to be negative, that is, attractive actions that had been forgone. In addition, the contrast between the forgone outcomes and those still obtainable would be likely to trigger upward counterfactual thoughts: alternative scenarios in which participants imagine how things would be if only they had acted on time and obtained the better outcomes. Thus, parti- cipants in the large-difference condition in these studies were probably entertaining upward counterfactual thoughts such as " I f only I had joined the frequent flier program before my first trip, by now I could have been close to getting a free ticket." Such upward counterfactuals are clearly unpleasant, provoking the experience of regret.

One characteristic of unpleasant situations is that people try to avoid them if they can (Brendl & Higgins, 1996). We propose that declining the subsequent action opportunity, with its inferior outcomes, represents an attempt to prevent or to put an end to the unpleasant psychological experience of regret (a topic we discuss further in the General Discussion section). As long as one is entertaining the thought of engaging in the current action opportunity, and as long as one is going through the motions of taking the subsequent action (i.e., making telephone calls to airline companies or studying brochures of different frequent flier programs), one is likely to continue entertaining upward counterfactual thoughts and experiencing regret. By quickly turning down the subsequent action opportunity, however, one can avoid thinking about the inferior current opportunity that triggers the perception of a loss. For example, after missing the opportunity to purchase a stereo system for a reduced price, one is likely to experience this inaction as a bitter loss while writing a check for the full price, but such an experience is much less likely if one decides not to buy a stereo system at all.

Thus, we argue that the driving power that motivates continued inaction is the anticipation of the negative experience of count- erfactual regret. By avoiding actions that resemble the initial lost opportunity, one avoids wandering into treacherous and potentially painful thought domains. Declining the subsequent action opportunity may appear to be illogical because this op- portunity is still attractive in an absolute sense, but it also may be psychologically rewarding because it mitigates the unpleasant experience of regret produced by dwelling on a perceived loss.

The major goal of the current research was to explore the role of avoidance of counterfactual regret in inaction inertia. To determine whether inaction inertia indeed is a form of avoid- ance, we created situations in which avoidance was made im- possible (Experiments 1 and 2), costly (Experiment 3), or un- necessary (Experiment 4). In each case, inaction inertia effects should be reduced or eliminated if avoidance of regret is a prime underlying cause of the inaction inertia effect.

The avoidance analysis of inaction inertia implies that the subsequent reduced likelihood of action is instrumental in the sense that it provides protection from the negative psychological experience of regret anticipated to be experienced if the subse- quent, less attractive action opportunity is taken. But what if declining the current opportunity is not likely to be effective as an avoidance tool? If the inaction inertia effect represents, in part, an avoidance process, the effect should be attenuated once it is made clear that effective avoidance through inaction is not really possible.

Experiments 1 and 2 were designed to test this analysis. In Experiment 1, we used one of the scenarios from Tykocinski et al. (1995) and added a set of conditions in which it was clear that the individual would be reminded frequently of the initial missed opportunity. In Experiment 2, we created a new scenario and conducted the study in another country and another lan- guage. In addition to determining whether the inaction inertia effect could be replicated under these conditions, we also in- cluded again a set of conditions in which participants were given to understand that they would be reminded of the initial forgone opportunity whether or not they took the currently available action. We predicted that if the preceding analysis is correct, then, in both experiments, addition of the new information about unavoidability should make it clear that avoidance through inac- tion was not a feasible option. Also, if a major reason for inac- tion inertia is avoidance, then this material should attenuate or eliminate the inaction inertia effect.

E x p e r i m e n t 1

Method

Participants

One hundred twenty-one (52 male and 69 female) introductory psy- chology students at the University of Maryland and Gettysburg College participated in this experiment on a voluntary basis.

Procedure

The experimental session was conducted in several small classes. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four groups in a 2 x

INACTION INERTIA 6 0 9

2 design with two levels of difference in relative attractiveness of the initial opportunity versus the current one (small-difference and large- difference conditions) and two levels of avoidability (avoidable and unavoidable). The participants were given the appropriate stimulus ma- terial, and, after reading the material, they responded to the dependent measure question concerning the likelihood of taking the current opportunity.

M a t e r i a l s

The stimulus material consisted of a short paragraph concerning the possibility of becoming a member of a fitness club located 30 minutes away. The participant could have joined another center closer to home, but having neglected to act quickly, the opportunity was missed. In the large-difference condition, the center that by now had closed its membership roll was said to be located 5 rain away from the participant's home versus 25 min away in the small-difference condition.

In the large-difference condition, this paragraph read as follows (the value for the small-difference condition is shown in brackets):

Imagine the following scenario: you spend the summer at home. You took on a summer job that keeps you very busy from Monday to Thursday. You think that on the days that you don't work you would like to exercise at a Fitness Center. Your friend tells you that there are two new Fitness Centers in town. One is located 5 [25] minutes away from your house, but your friend tells you that they are only taking a few more members, so you better hurry up or it might be too late to join. By the end of the week, you haven't gotten around to picking up a membership application, but then your friend tells you it is too late because their membership roils had just closed. The second Fitness Center is located 30 minutes away from your house.

As a means of manipulating the avoidability of the opportunity, one sentence was added to the preceding paragraph in the unavoidable condi- tion. This sentence, added immediately after the third sentence in which the friend mentioned that there are two new fitness centers in town, read as follows: "In fact, each time you drive to work you pass by these two centers." We expected that the addition of this sentence would imply that avoiding thinking about the missed opportunity would not be possi- ble because the fitness centers would be seen every day on the way to work. Participants were then asked to indicate the likelihood that they would join the second fitness center (the one located 30 min away) on an ll-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (extremely likely).

R e s u l t s

T h e m e a n likelihood o f action ratings are s h o w n in Table 1. A t w o - w a y analysis o f variance ( A N O V A ) on likelihood o f

Table 1 Likelihood o f A c t i o n Ratings as a Function o f Difference Size a n d Avoidability: E x p e r i m e n t 1

Large difference Small difference

Avoidability M n SD M n SD

Avoidable 4.16 31 2.15 7.27 30 2.32 Unavoidable 5.90 29 2.69 7.29 31 2.36

Note. Participants indicated the likelihood that they would join a sec- ond fitness center (located 30 min away) on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (extremely likely).

action y i e l d e d a significant main e f f e c t for difference size, F ( 1, 117) = 27.71, p < .0001, replicating the basic inaction inertia effect. Participants in the l a r g e - d i f f e r e n c e condition r e p o r t e d b e i n g less likely to j o i n the second fitness center than did those in the small-difference condition ( m e a n s o f 5.00 vs. 7 . 2 9 ) . A significant main e f f e c t was also found f o r avoidability, F ( 1, 117) = 4.06, p < .05. W h e n the fitness centers w e r e u n a v o i d - able, participants were m o r e likely to sign up for the second fitness center ( m e a n s o f 6.61 vs. 5 . 6 8 ) . T h e s e main effects w e r e qualified, however, by a significant interaction, F ( 1 , 117) = 3.91, p < .05. A n analysis o f s i m p l e effects indicated that a v o i d - ability caused a significant increase in the likelihood o f action in the large-difference condition, F ( 1, 5 8 ) = 7.96, p < .005, but not in the small-difference condition, F < 1. This pattern o f results is consistent with the a v o i d a n c e analysis o f inaction inertia.

D i s c u s s i o n

A s e x p e c t e d o n the basis o f the a v o i d a n c e interpretation o f inaction inertia, inability to a v o i d the entity associated with a " l o s s " increased the likelihood that the subsequent, less attrac- tive action opportunity w o u l d b e taken, eliminating the inaction inertia e f f e c t otherwise found in the large-difference condition. I f declining the subsequent opportunity serves as a m e a n s o f a v o i d i n g a situation that is likely to p r o d u c e regret, continued inaction is less likely o n c e it is n o l o n g e r instrumental in a v o i d i n g the regret-eliciting situation.

However, there is a possible, although perhaps unlikely, alter- native e x p l a n a t i o n for these findings that cannot b e r u l e d out entirely. It c o u l d be argued that although participants were ex- plicitly i n f o r m e d that they were busy during the w e e k and in- tended to e x e r c i s e on weekends, those in the u n a v o i d a b l e condi- tion m a y have thought that because the fitness center was on their w a y to work, they might' find a w a y to squeeze in a q u i c k w o r k o u t during the week. Such reasoning w o u l d increase their willingness to j o i n the second fitness center, not because o f an inability to a v o i d regret but because its distance b e c a m e less o f an i m a g i n e d disadvantage f o r this group. This line o f reasoning leads to an e x p e c t a t i o n o f a main e f f e c t f o r the u n a v o i d a b i l i t y manipulation; that is, the second fitness center should be m o r e attractive in both the large-difference and small-difference con- ditions according to this hypothetical line o f reasoning. B u t the o b t a i n e d significant interaction makes it c l e a r that u n a v o i d a b i l - ity had its e f f e c t only in the large-difference condition, h a v i n g no e f f e c t w h a t s o e v e r in the small-difference condition. To rule out this alternative explanation entirely, however, w e c o n d u c t e d another e x p e r i m e n t i n v o l v i n g a different scenario. In this scenario, u n a v o i d a b i l i t y was m a n i p u l a t e d in a w a y that c o u l d not affect the perceived availability o f the f o r g o n e action opportunity.

In E x p e r i m e n t 2, w e created a new scenario in H e b r e w and c o n d u c t e d the study at a university in Israel. In addition to p r o v i d i n g a test o f the external validity o f the inaction inertia p h e n o m e n o n with a m e t h o d o l o g y not open to the possible alter- native e x p l a n a t i o n d e s c r i b e d earlier, w e were able to test again the prediction that m a k i n g the f o r g o n e opportunity u n a v o i d a b l e w o u l d m i t i g a t e o r e l i m i n a t e the inaction inertia effect.

610 TYKOCINSKI AND PITTMAN

E x p e r i m e n t 2

M e t h o d

P a r t i c i p a n t s

Seventy-eight introductory psychology students (14 men and 64 women) at Ben Gurion University participated in this study on a volun- tary basis. 1

P r o c e d u r e

The experimental session was conducted in several small classes. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four groups in a 2 × 2 design with two levels of difference between the initial and the current offer (small difference and large difference) and two levels of avoidabil- ity (avoidable and unavoidable). Participants were given the appropriate stimulus material, and, after reading the scenario, they responded to the dependent measure.

The scenario consisted of a short paragraph concerning renting an apartment. In the large-difference condition, this paragraph read as fol- lows (the value for the small-difference condition is shown in brackets):

Imagine the following scenario: You are interested in renting an apartment. Because you do not own a car you are looking for an apartment in the close vicinity of the university. You have already looked at several apartments which were advertised in the newspa- per but didn't like any of them. At last you find an apartment you like. It is in excellent condition, newly renovated, sunny, and the price is reasonable. It is located just across from the university main entrance, two minutes [ten minutes] walking distance. Now you are waiting for your friend, with whom you intend to share the apartment, to see it and give his approval so you can sign the contract. Your friend is expected to arrive tomorrow morning. The owner of the apartment suggests that you better make up your mind quickly, because several other students had already approached him about the apartment and seemed interested. The next morning, when your friend arrives, you hurry to the apartment. The owner of the apartment tells you that the apartment had already been rented out. He suggests that you get in touch with his cousin who is also looking for tenants for an apartment he owns. You and your friend walk together to see this other apartment. This apartment is also in an excellent condition, sunny, and reasonably priced. It is located twelve minutes walking distance from the university. 2

To manipulate unavoidability, we added a sentence to this scenario for half of the participants in the large-difference condition and half of the participants in the small-difference condition. The sentence read:

You realize that each day on your walk to the university you pass by the large sunny veranda of the apartment you missed, just before entering the main gate. 3

Participants were asked to indicate the likelihood that they would rent the apartment located 12 min away from the university. They indicated their responses on an l l - p o i n t scale ranging from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (extremely likely).

R e s u l t s

T h e m e a n l i k e l i h o o d o f a c t i o n r a t i n g s are s h o w n i n T a b l e 2. A t w o - w a y A N O V A o n l i k e l i h o o d o f a c t i o n y i e l d e d a s i g n i f i c a n t m a i n e f f e c t f o r d i f f e r e n c e size, F ( 1, 7 4 ) = 2 5 . 0 3 , p < .0001, r e p l i c a t i n g t h e b a s i c i n a c t i o n i n e r t i a effect. P a r t i c i p a n t s i n the

T a b l e 2 Likelihood o f Action Ratings as a Function o f Difference Size and Avoidability: Experiment 2

Large difference Small difference

Avoidability M n SD M n SD

Avoidable 6.40 20 2.89 9.11 19 0.94 Unavoidable 8.00 20 1.59 9.37 19 0.96

Note. Participants indicated the likelihood that they would rent the second apartment (located 12 rain away) on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (extremely likely).

l a r g e - d i f f e r e n c e c o n d i t i o n r e p o r t e d b e i n g less likely to r e n t the m o r e d i s t a n t a p a r t m e n t t h a n d i d p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e s m a l l - d i f f e r - e n c e c o n d i t i o n ( m e a n s o f 7 . 2 0 vs. 9 . 2 4 ) . A s i g n i f i c a n t m a i n e f f e c t w a s a l s o f o u n d f o r a v o i d a b i l i t y , F ( 1 , 7 4 ) = 5.24, p < .02. W h e n a d a l l y e n c o u n t e r w i t h t h e f o r g o n e a p a r t m e n t was u n a v o i d a b l e , p a r t i c i p a n t s w e r e m o r e likely to r e n t the m o r e d i s t a n t a p a r t m e n t ( m e a n s o f 8.67 vs. 7 . 7 2 ) . T h e i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n c e size a n d a v o i d a b i l i t y w a s m a r g i n a l , F ( 1 , 7 4 ) = 2.70, p < .10. A n a n a l y s i s o f s i m p l e e f f e c t s i n d i c a t e d t h a t a v o i d a b i l i t y c a u s e d a s i g n i f i c a n t i n c r e a s e i n t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f a c t i o n i n t h e l a r g e - d i f f e r e n c e c o n d i t i o n , F ( 1, 3 8 ) = 7.93, p < .006, b u t n o t i n t h e s m a l l - d i f f e r e n c e c o n d i t i o n , F < 1. T h e s e r e s u l t s are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h o s e o f E x p e r i m e n t 1.

D i s c u s s i o n

T h e r e s u l t s o f E x p e r i m e n t s 1 a n d 2, i n v o l v i n g t w o d i f f e r e n t s c e n a r i o s , are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e a v o i d a n c e a n a l y s i s o f i n a c t i o n inertia. W h e n p a r t i c i p a n t s w e r e m a d e to r e a l i z e t h a t t h e y w o u l d b e e x p o s e d t o a c o n s t a n t r e m i n d e r o f a m i s s e d o p p o r t u n i t y , t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o t a k e t h e s u b s e q u e n t a c t i o n o p p o r t u n i t y i n c r e a s e d . A c o n s t a n t r e m i n d e r o f the m i s s e d o p p o r t u n i t y i m p l i e s t h a t c o u n t e r f a c t u a l r e g r e t is b o u n d to b e e x p e r i e n c e d r e g a r d l e s s o f w h e t h e r o n e d e c i d e s to take o r n o t t o take t h e s u b s e q u e n t o p p o r - tunity, a n d i n t h a t c a s e e v e n t h e l a r g e - d i f f e r e n c e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e y w o u l d t a k e t h e c u r r e n t opportunity. I n addi- tion, b e c a u s e t h e s a m e p h e n o m e n a w e r e f o u n d in t w o d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s , s o m e a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e f o r t h e g e n e r a l i t y o f the i n a c - t i o n i n e r t i a e f f e c t w a s o b t a i n e d .

1 In Experiments 2, 3, and 4, the number of male and female partici- pants differed dramatically as a result of similar distributions in the classes from which the participants were obtained. There were not enough male participants in these studies to assess potential effects of gender. In Experiment 1, this analysis was possible, and no effects of gender were found.

2 The original stimulus materials for Experiments 2, 3, and 4 were written in Hebrew and have been translated into English here by Orit E. 1~ykocinski.

3 Because of the physical layout of the grounds and access gates at Ben Gurion University, as well as the relation to the main gate of the closest dwellings and the buildings that might constitute first arrival at the university, this addition to the scenario was plausible in both the small-difference and large-difference conditions.

INACTION INERTIA 6 1 1

In cases in w h i c h the initial opportunity, can in fact, b e a v o i d e d , taking an i n f e r i o r action o p p o r t u n i t y after missing an attractive o n e often does have a cost. T h e cost is e x p e r i e n c i n g counterfactual regret. W h e n the less attractive action is taken, the " l o s s " o f superior o u t c o m e s is actualized, and o n e m a y e x p e r i e n c e regret. However, a v o i d i n g this negative e x p e r i e n c e b y r e j e c t i n g the subsequent o p p o r t u n i t y has its costs as well. I n the a v o i d a b l e version o f the scenario d e s c r i b e d earlier, rejecting the second apartment w o u l d m e a n continuing the search for an apartment. I f the market o f rental apartments is limited, the search has been g o i n g o n f o r a while, o r o n e is in a hurry to find an apartment b e c a u s e school is about to start, the cost o f a v o i d a n c e m a y b e high. A t s o m e point, the cost o f a v o i d a n c e m a y b e h i g h e n o u g h to e x c e e d the p s y c h o l o g i c a l cost o f antici- pated regret. U n d e r these conditions, o n e w o u l d e x p e c t that the tendency t o w a r d subsequent inaction w o u l d b e decreased. To test this analysis, w e c r e a t e d a scenario in w h i c h the cost o f a v o i d a n c e was manipulated. W e e x p e c t e d that when the cost o f a v o i d a n c e is substantial, the tendency t o w a r d continued inaction should decrease.

E x p e r i m e n t 3

M e t h o d

P a r t i c i p a n t s

Eighty-eight introductory psychology students (10 men and 78 women) at Ben Gurion University participated in this study on a volun- tary basis.

P r o c e d u r e

The experimental session was conducted in several small classes. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four groups in a 2 × 2 design with two levels of difference between the initial and the current opportunity (small difference and large difference) and two levels of avoidance cost (high and low). Participants were given the appropriate stimulus material, and, after reading the scenario, participants responded to the dependent measure (likelihood of action ). Division of participants into the four groups resulted in 22 participants in each group.

The scenario consisted of a short paragraph concerning shopping at the local mall. Avoidance cost was manipulated by varying the amount of time left in which to make a desired purchase. In the large-difference- high-cost condition, this paragraph read as follows (the values for the small-difference condition and the low-cost condition are shown in brackets):

Imagine the following scenario: You are in the supermarket at the local mall doing your weekend shopping when you hear over the mall's loudspeaker system an announcement declaring that the mall's " G o l f " clothing store is now holding a special sale. 4 During the next half hour all merchandise will be sold with a 50% [10%] price reduction. The timing is good because in the past few days you were thinking about purchasing a suit for your friend's wedding that will take place two days from now [a month from now]. You hurry to the check-out line, but because of the typical Thursday evening long queues, you are held up, and by the time you reach the " G o l f " store, the salesperson tells you that the sale was just finished. Maybe out of kindness she lets you know discreetly that the store will hold another sale all day tomorrow: 5% off of all merchandise in the store.

Table 3 Likelihood o f Action Ratings as a Function o f Difference Size and Avoidance Cost: Experiment 3

Large difference Small difference

Avoidance cost M SD M SD

Low 2.45 1.45 5.00 2.37 High 4.05 2.57 5.32 2.48

Note. Participants indicated the likelihood that they would go to the store the next day for the 5%-off sale on an 1 I-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (extremely likely), n = 22.

Participants were asked how likely they would be to go to the store the next day for this sale. They indicated their responses on an 1 l-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (extremely likely).

R e s u l t s

The m e a n likelihood o f action ratings are s h o w n in Table 3. A t w o - w a y ANOVA o n likelihood o f action ratings y i e l d e d a significant main e f f e c t for difference size, F ( 1, 8 4 ) = 15.62, p < .0002. Consistent with the basic effect, participants in the small-difference condition r e p o r t e d being m o r e likely to g o to the store the next day than did participants in the large-differ- ence condition ( m e a n s o f 5.16 vs. 3.25). A significant main e f f e c t was also found f o r a v o i d a n c e cost, F ( 1, 8 4 ) = 3.91, p < .05. Participants in the high a v o i d a n c e cost condition r e p o r t e d being m o r e likely to take advantage o f the next-day sale than did participants in the l o w a v o i d a n c e cost condition ( m e a n s o f 4.68 vs. 3 . 7 2 ) . T h e interaction b e t w e e n difference size and a v o i d a n c e cost was n o t significant, F ( 1, 84) = 1.74, p < .2. However, s i m p l e c o m p a r i s o n s testing f o r the p r e d i c t e d pattern r e v e a l e d that the increase in a v o i d a n c e costs was associated with a significant increase in likelihood o f action in the large- difference condition, F ( 1, 4 2 ) = 5.42, p < .03, but not in the small-difference condition, F ( 1, 4 2 ) = .22, p > .64, the pattern that was predicted.

D i s c u s s i o n

S o m e t i m e s p e o p l e are f a c e d with h a v i n g to choose b e t w e e n t w o unattractive courses o f action. W h a t makes the situation d e s c r i b e d in the p r e v i o u s scenario s o m e w h a t different is that the individual is choosing b e t w e e n e m b r a c i n g the costs o f action o r the costs o f inaction. The fact that enlarging the m a g n i t u d e o f a v o i d a n c e costs r e d u c e d the inaction inertia e f f e c t c o u l d be interpreted in t w o different ways. O n e w a y o f understanding this finding is as the result o f a w e i g h i n g process in w h i c h the costs o f a v o i d a n c e (i.e., not h a v i n g a suit r e a d y on t i m e ) o u t w e i g h e d the costs o f action (i.e., e x p e r i e n c i n g regret o v e r missing o u t on an e x c e l l e n t sale p r i c e ) . However, it is also possible that, b y increasing the m a g n i t u d e o f a v o i d a n c e costs, w e simply m a d e these costs m o r e noticeable. A c c o r d i n g to the

4In Israel, Golf clothing stores are a chain popular with college students.

612 TYKOCINSKI AND PITTMAN

feature positive effect, p e o p l e e x p e r i e n c e greater difficulty in p ro c es s ing n o n o c c u r r e n c e s than in p r o c e s s i n g o c c u r r e n c e s ( A l - lison & Messick, 1988; Fazio, Sherman, & Herr, 1982; N e w m a n , Wolff, & Hearst, 1980). It is possible, then, that p e o p l e are also relatively less likely to notice the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f inaction than they are to notice the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f action. B y making a v o i d - ance costs high, w e m a y have simply attracted attention to the fact that inaction has its costs as well.

For the f o u r t h experiment, w e r e a s o n e d that i f indeed inaction inertia represents an attempt to a v o i d counterfactual regret, the e f f e c t should b e attenuated i f o n e finds o u t that the m i s s e d action opportunity was not as attractive as it had s e e m e d originally. I f the loss was n o t significant, d w e l l i n g o n it is unlikely to p r o d u c e counterfactual regret, and a v o i d i n g a similar opportunity as a m e a n s o f a v o i d i n g the negative p s y c h o l o g i c a l e x p e r i e n c e o f re- gret w o u l d b e unnecessary. To test this analysis, w e created a n e w scenario in w h i c h participants first m i s s e d an opportunity to j o i n a tour to Tuscany for a r e d u c e d p r i c e and were c o n t e m - plating j o i n i n g a similar but m o r e expensive tour. T h e difference b e t w e e n the p r i c e o f the first tour and the p r i c e o f the o n e currently available was v a r i e d to create t w o relative difference conditions: a large-difference condition in w h i c h the difference b e t w e e n the p r i c e o f the m i s s e d tour and that o f the tour that was still available was substantial and a small-difference condition in w h i c h the difference in attractiveness o f the m i s s e d and the available tour opportunities was relatively small. In addition, h a l f o f the participants in e a c h condition d i s c o v e r e d that the tour that they had m i s s e d was not as attractive as it had s e e m e d when they m i s s e d it.

W e p r e d i c t e d that, relative to participants in the small-differ- ence condition, participants in the large-difference condition w o u l d b e less likely to j o i n the m o r e expensive tour. However, this inaction inertia effect was e x p e c t e d to b e attenuated for participants w h o discovered that the tour that was no longer available was less attractive than they had previously i m a g i n e d it to be. W e predicted that this change in the initial attractiveness o f the f o r g o n e alternative w o u l d have an e f f e c t o n the likelihood o f current action in the large-difference but not the small-differ- ence condition.

In addition, w e i n c l u d e d in E x p e r i m e n t 4 a question d e s i g n e d to p r o b e directly for self-reported thoughts related to regret o r other aspects o f the scenario. I f participants are a w a r e o f their o w n thoughts about regret o r anticipated regret, then w e e x - p e c t e d that, in the large-difference condition ( i n w h i c h w e e x - pected inaction inertia to o c c u r ) , participants' thoughts w o u l d i n c l u d e a substantial p r o p o r t i o n o f regret-related content.

E x p e r i m e n t 4

M e t h o d

P a r t i c i p a n t s

Eighty-four introductory psychology students (12 men and 72 women) at Ben Gurion University participated in this study on a volun- tary basis.

P r o c e d u r e

The experimental session was conducted in several small classes. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four groups in a 2 ×

2 design with two levels of difference between the price of an initial and a current tour offer (small difference and large difference) and two levels of new information about the original opportunity (new guide and no information). Participants were given the appropriate stimulus material, and, after reading the scenario, they responded to the dependent measure (likelihood of signing up for the current tour). The last page of the booklet asked participants to explain their reasons for their likelihood decision.

M a t e r i a l s

The scenario consisted of a short paragraph concerning a tour abroad. In the large-difference condition, this paragraph read as follows (the value for the small-difference condition is shown in brackets):

Imagine the following scenario: At last you have graduated. Before you start looking for a job, you intend to go on a short vacation. A week ago you saw a travel agency newspaper ad promoting a special, time limited deal: a tour to Italy called "The magic of Tuscany" for $400 [$800] instead of the regular price of $1,000. Although you thought about the deal, and it sounded good, you did not manage to get to the travel agency quickly enough, and by the time you got there, all tickets for this tour were already sold. A few days later you encounter another ad of the same travel agency offering a similar tour called "The wonders of Tuscany." This tour is scheduled to leave two days after the tour you had missed, and is priced at $900 instead of the $1,000 regular price.

To manipulate the additional information (new guide) conditions, we added the following sentence for approximately half of the participants in the large-difference condition and half of the participants in the small- difference condition:

Your friend who is aware of your plans calls to tell you that he had heard that the guide for "The magic of Tuscany" tour, the tour that is no longer available, fell ill and was replaced by a guide who is inexperienced, boring, humorless, and unfamiliar with the route of the tour.

All participants were then asked to rate the likelihood that they would join the wonders of Tuscany tour, the one that was still available. Partici- pants indicated their responses on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (extremely likely). After indicating the likelihood that they would join the tour, participants were asked on a separate page to list the reasons that had led them to their decision.

R e s u l t s

L i k e l i h o o d o f A c t i o n

M e a n likelihood o f action ratings are s h o w n in Table 4. A n ANOVA o n the likelihood o f action ratings y i e l d e d a significant

Table 4 Likelihood o f Action Ratings as a Function o f Difference Size and Presence o f Guide Information: Experiment 4

Large difference Small difference

Guide information M n SD M n SD

No information 4.00 22 2.43 7.40 22 2.06 New guide 6.20 20 2.17 7.32 20 2.15

Note. Participants indicated the likelihood that they would join the wonders of Tuscany tour on an 1 l-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (extremely likely).

INACTION INERYIA 613

main effect for difference size, F ( 1, 80) = 22.93, p < .0001, replicating the basic inaction inertia effect. In comparison with participants in the small-difference condition, those in the large- difference condition reported being significantly less likely to j o i n the wonders o f Tuscany tour (means o f 7.36 vs. 5.05). A significant main effect was also found for guide information, F ( 1, 80) = 5.58, p < .02. Participants who had discovered the change o f guides for the magic o f Tuscany tour reported being more likely to j o i n the more expensive wonders o f Tuscany tour (means o f 6.80 vs. 5.65). These main effects were qualified by a significant Difference × Guide Information interaction, F ( 1, 80) = 4.81, p < .03. An analysis o f simple effects indicated that the new guide information caused a significant increase in the likelihood o f action in the large-difference condition, F ( 1, 40) = 10.38, p < .001, but not in the small-difference condition, F ( 1, 40) = 0.01. This pattern o f results is consistent with the regret-avoidance analysis o f the inaction inertia effect.

Content Analysis of Reasons for Action Rating

After indicating the likelihood that they would j o i n the tour, participants were asked to list, on a separate page, the reasons that had led them to their decision. These thoughts were content analyzed by means o f a 10-category coding scheme. The follow- ing are the categories that were used, with an example of an actual scored response corresponding to each category:

1. Thoughts suggesting anticipated regret (e.g., "Joining the more expensive tour now would make me feel like a sucker" ).

2. Thoughts suggesting no experience o f regret (e.g., " I am not disappointed that I missed the tour that had c l o s e d " ) .

3. Positive thoughts about the idea o f taking a tour (e.g., " I would like to go abroad after I g r a d u a t e " ) .

4. Negative thoughts about the idea o f taking a tour (e.g., " I have been to Italy, I d i d n ' t like it; I w o u l d n ' t want to go there a g a i n " ).

5. Thoughts suggesting that the decision was affected by the difference in price between the first and the second tour opportunity (e.g., " I decided not to j o i n because the price now is more than d o u b l e " ) .

6. Thoughts suggesting that the difference in price did not affect the decision (e.g., " I d o n ' t mind spending money on things I enjoy; I would go even though it cost m o r e " ) .

7. Thoughts suggesting that the guide information affected the decision (e.g., " T h e fact that the guide in the other tour is not good is a kind o f consolation for missing out on a cheap d e a l " ).

8. Thoughts suggesting that the guide information did not affect the decision (e.g., " I n m y experience, having a good time on a tour is only partly determined by the quality o f the guide. It is where you go and what you see that c o u n t s " ) .

9. Deciding to look for another deal (e.g., " I n s t e a d o f taking this tour, I will do some research. I am sure I can find a good deal with other c o m p a n i e s " ).

10. Mistrusting the agency (e.g., " I d o n ' t trust this travel agency; I think that the initial price they advertised was j u s t a trick to attract customers" ). Participants' responses were scored according to the frequency o f thoughts listed in each category. The thought protocols were

scored independently by two judges unaware o f experimental condition. The rate o f agreement between judges was 86%. In cases o f disagreement, the final coding was determined by the two judges through discussion.

After this initial categorization, four indexes were created, each reflecting a difference score between two related but oppo- site categories. A regret index was obtained by subtracting thoughts suggesting no experience o f regret (Category 2) from thoughts suggesting regret (Category 1 ). Higher scores on this index would thus suggest greater regret. Similarly, Categories 3 and 4 were summed into a tour index, with higher difference scores suggesting more positive thoughts toward the idea o f taking a tour. Categories 5 and 6 were summed into a price index, with higher scores suggesting that the price difference tended to affect o n e ' s decision regarding the tour. Finally, Cate- gories 7 and 8 were summed to create a guide index, with higher scores indicating that the guide information tended to affect o n e ' s decision regarding the tour. Table 5 shows the mean fre- quency content scores for the 10 coding categories and the four indexes. Except for the guide index referring to the effect o f the guide information, which was relevant for only two o f the groups, the content scores for Categories 9 and 10 (looking for another deal and mistrusting the agency) and the three remaining indexes (regret, tour, and price) were analyzed in a two-way ANOVA. These analyses revealed no significant differences for the looking for another deal and mistrusting the agency catego- ries. In addition, an analysis comparing the two new guide information groups revealed no significant differences in terms o f guide index scores. Analyses did, however, reveal significant effects on the regret, price, and tour indexes, as reported subsequently.

Regret. A two-way ANOVA on the regret index yielded a significant main effect for the change o f guide information, F ( 1, 80) = 7.33, p < .008. Thoughts suggesting regret were more frequent in the protocols o f participants in the no-information condition than in the protocols of participants in the new guide condition (means o f 0.204 vs. - 0 . 0 7 5 ) . A significant main effect was also found for difference size, F ( 1 , 80) = 7.68, p < .007. Participants in the large-difference condition tended to score higher on the regret index than participants in the small- difference condition (means o f 0.214 vs. - 0 . 0 7 1 ).

The interaction between the guide information condition and the difference size condition was not significant, F ( 1 , 80) = 1.57. However, the pattern of results did follow the predicted pattern. It was hypothesized that, generally, participants in the large-difference condition would be likely to experience more regret than participants in the small-difference condition be- cause o f the difference in the magnitude o f the ' 'loss." However, in the new guide conditions, the participants found out that the guide had been changed, information that was hypothesized to decrease the anticipation o f regret. Thus, in comparison with the other groups, the large-difference control group, which re- ceived no new information about the guide, was expected to score the highest on the regret index. As a means of testing this hypothesis, a specific comparison was conducted comparing this group with all others. Consistent with the preceding prediction, the large-difference-no-information group scored higher on re- gret than all o f the other groups combined (means o f 0.409 vs.

6 1 4 TYKOCINSKI AND PrITMAN

Table 5 Mean Frequency Scores for Responses in Each Content Coding Category: Experiment 4

Large difference

New guide No guide information information

Category M SD M SD M SD M

Small difference

New guide No guide information information

1. Anticipated regret 0.10 0.31 0.41 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.29 2. No anticipated regret 0.10 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.37 0.09 0.29 3. Positive thoughts about

tour 0.25 0.44 0.23 0.43 0.40 0.50 0.54 0.51 4. Negative thoughts about

tour 0.25 0.44 0.18 0.39 0.10 0.31 0.09 0.29 5. Decision affected by

price 0.15 0.37 0.64 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.39 6. Decision not affected by

price 0.35 0.49 0.18 0.39 0.55 0.51 0.77 0.43 7. Decision affected by

guide 0.35 0.49 0.35 0.49 8. Decision not affected by

guide 0.15 0.37 0.25 0.44 9. Looking for another deal 0.20 0.52 0.23 0.43 0.10 0.31 0.09 0.29

10. Mistrusting the agency 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.29 0.t5 0.37 0.09 0.29 Regret index 0.00 0.46 0.41 0.59 -0.15 0.37 0.00 0.44 Price index -0.20 0.70 0.45 0.86 -0.55 0.51 -0.59 0.73 Tour index 0.00 0.73 0.04 0.58 0.30 0.57 0.45 0.67 Guide index 0.20 0.70 0.10 0.79

- 0 . 0 0 2 ) , F ( 1, 8 0 ) = 15.31, p < .0002. Furthermore, there was no significant difference in regret index scores among the three groups c o m b i n e d for this analysis, F < 1.

To assess the relation b e t w e e n overt expressions o f regret and the likelihood o f taking the current opportunity, we split the l a r g e - d i f f e r e n c e - n o - i n f o r m a t i o n group (the only o n e that ex- pressed a significant a m o u n t o f regret ) into those who expressed regret and those who did n o t a n d compared their likelihood ratings. Although those who expressed regret had lower likeli- hood ratings than those who did n o t ( m e a n s of 3.25 vs. 4 . 4 3 ) , this difference was n o t significant, F ( 1, 2 0 ) = 1.21, perhaps as a result o f the small n u m b e r o f participants available for the analysis.

Price. The price index was designed to capture the extent to which the difference in price between the first and the second tour offers affected the decision to j o i n the second tour. A two- w a y ANOVA on the price index scores revealed a significant m a i n effect for difference size, F ( t , 8 0 ) = 20.95, p < .0001. Participants i n the large-difference c o n d i t i o n tended to score higher o n the price index t h a n participants in the small-differ- ence condition ( m e a n s o f 0.142 vs. - 0 . 5 7 0 ) . A m a i n effect was also found for guide information, F ( 1, 80) = 3.86, p < .05. Participants in the n o - i n f o r m a t i o n condition tended to be more affected by the price differences than those in the n e w guide i n f o r m a t i o n c o n d i t i o n ( m e a n s o f - 0 . 0 6 8 vs. - 0 . 3 7 5 ) . These m a i n effects were qualified b y a significant Difference × G u i d e I n f o r m a t i o n interaction, F ( 1, 8 0 ) = 4.95, p < .02. A n analysis of simple effects indicated that the n e w guide information caused a significant decrease in price index score in the large- difference condition, F ( 1, 80) = 8.77, p < .004, b u t n o t in the

small-difference c o n d i t i o n ( F < 1 ). I n c o m p a r i s o n with all o f the other groups c o m b i n e d , participants in the l a r g e - d i f f e r e n c e - n o - i n f o r m a t i o n c o n d i t i o n were more c o n c e r n e d with the price difference ( m e a n s of - 0 . 4 5 1 vs. 0 . 4 5 4 ) . This difference was highly significant, F ( 1, 8 0 ) = 25.79, p < .0001. No significant difference was found a m o n g the three groups c o m b i n e d for this analysis, F ( 2 , 5 9 ) = 2.19, p < .13.

Tour. A two-way ANOVA o n the tour index reflecting gen- eral thoughts about the idea o f a tour yielded a significant m a i n effect for difference size, F ( 1, 8 0 ) = 6.57, p < .01. Participants in the large-difference condition were less enthusiastic about the idea o f taking a tour t h a n participants in the small-difference c o n d i t i o n ( m e a n s o f 0.020 vs. 0 . 3 7 8 ) . N o other significant ef- fects for the tour index were found.

Discussion

Formal logic m i g h t suggest that i n f o r m a t i o n regarding the quality o f the tour guide for a tour that is n o longer available should n o t affect a p e r s o n ' s willingness to j o i n a different tour. Even if o n e assumes that this i n f o r m a t i o n m a y reflect negatively on the travel agency in general, it then should reduce the willing- ness to j o i n tours offered b y this c o m p a n y rather than enhance it. Yet, the results clearly indicate that this i n f o r m a t i o n attenu- ated the inaction inertia effect a n d i n c r e a s e d the willingness o f participants in the large-difference c o n d i t i o n to j o i n the more expensive wonders o f Tuscany tour. C o n c e p t u a l i z i n g inaction inertia as an attempt to avoid counterfactual regret b y avoiding opportunities similar to the o n e missed is consistent with this finding. The discovery that the missed opportunity was n o t as

INACTION n ~ l ~ r I A 615

attractive as one had imagined " a b s o l v e s " one o f anticipated regret, thus removing the problematic feature that otherwise decreased the likelihood that similar action would be taken.

The preceding interpretation is consistent with the results o f the content analysis. The only condition in which we found significant expressions o f regret was the one in which the inac- tion inertia effect was obtained (large d i f f e r e n c e - n o new infor- mation). But adding the information about the new guide to the large-difference condition was associated with a reduced frequency o f thoughts o f regret, as well as with a reduced ten- dency to consider the price difference. It is the realization that the price is so much higher that spells out " l o s s " and invites regret, but the inclusion o f a compelling psychological reason suggesting that no " r e a l " loss was accrued seemed to allow participants to take the subsequent action opportunity without fear o f " f e e l i n g like a sucker."

G e n e r a l D i s c u s s i o n

The goal o f the current work was to test the idea that inaction inertia is motivated by anticipated counterfactual regret. We suggested that the inferior current action opportunity provided a readily available criterion to be unfavorably compared with the superior outcomes that could have been obtained if the initial action opportunity had been taken. The psychological juxtaposi- tion o f the superior but forgone outcome and the inferior, still available outcome provides fertile ground for a sense o f loss and the generation o f unpleasant counterfactual thoughts leading toward and being a part o f the experience o f regret. Thus, the decrease in the likelihood o f subsequent action was conceptual- ized as avoidance o f action in that domain in an attempt to save oneself the pangs o f regret.

The four studies reported here supported this analysis. The first and second experiments demonstrated that when confronta- tions with the situation involved in the initial inaction could not be successfully avoided (thus making the use o f avoidance- based tactics pointless), the inaction inertia effect was indeed attenuated. If people know that, regardless o f whether they take or decline the current action opportunity, they will be repeatedly reminded o f their initial failure to act, then there is little reason to try to avoid the experience o f regret by continued inaction. The third experiment demonstrated that inaction as an avoidance tactic is likely to be relinquished when avoidance costs become too high. The benefits o f preventing the experience o f regret can lose their appeal when they clearly are pitted against very high costs o f continued avoidance.

Finally, the last experiment demonstrated that the effect is attenuated with a reduction in magnitude o f anticipated regret. If the " l o s s " is not significant, less regret is anticipated, and continued inaction as a means o f escape or avoidance o f antici- pated regret become unnecessary. This last experiment also pro- vided more direct evidence that, indeed, regret plays an im- portant role in inaction inertia. In looking at how the participants themselves accounted for their action decisions, it became clear that anticipation o f regret was indeed a motive for many o f the participants in the large-difference condition when they were not armed with the " n e w g u i d e " information.

The experience o f regret, as described by Landman (1993),

is an interplay between cognitions and emotions. In inaction inertia, the cognitions involved are upward counterfactuals. No doubt these thoughts are unpleasant in their own right, but they do not imply necessarily an affective experience identical to that o f regret. If one is thinking that " p a y i n g the full price for something I could have had for much less would make me feel like a sucker," one is anticipating regret rather than experiencing it. In this situation, continued inaction would represent avoid- ance o f anticipated regret, an attempt to stop o n e ' s thoughts from wandering in a direction expected, on the basis o f o n e ' s past experience, to become painful. However, one could also be thinking " H o w stupid I was for not acting sooner." Such thoughts suggest that regret is actually experienced rather than anticipated. In this case, continued inaction would represent an attempt to escape regret rather than avoid it.

A t this stage, we cannot say which o f these two processes, escape or avoidance, motivates inaction inertia; it may very well be that both are operating for different individuals. There is some indirect evidence that seems to favor the avoidance rather than the escape option. Research conducted by Gilovich and his colleagues (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Gilovich, Medvec, & Chen, 1995) indicates that when one inquires about the kinds o f things people regret, inaction is much less likely to be regret- ted than is action in the short term. It is thus possible that, at least in the short term, people may be able to evade the actual negative experience o f regret through continued inaction. How- ever, the research by Gilovich and his colleagues also shows that, in the long term, inactions may be regretted more than actions, suggesting that the long-run outcomes o f such avoid- ance strategies may be negative. Perhaps in the long run people become more and more aware o f the costs accrued by continued inaction and at some point choose to stop avoiding, even though such a choice is likely to " a c t u a l i z e " the anticipated regret.

The extent to which people can successfully avoid the experi- ence o f regret may vary with different individuals. Some people may be quicker to " s e l f - r e c r i m i n a t e " and experience regret than others. People also seem to vary in their tendency to ruminate and come up with counterfactual scenarios (Josephs, Larrick, Steele, & Nisbett, 1992; Landman, 1993). In explaining why he would not join the more expensive Tuscany tour, one o f our more imaginative participants wrote " W i t h my luck we will probably end up staying at the same hotel in Tuscany with people from the other g r o u p - - t h a t would really make me feel lousy." Not everyone is b l e s s e d - - o r , in this case, c u r s e d - - w i t h the same vivid imagination.

The protocols o f participants in the l a r g e - d i f f e r e n c e - n o new guide information condition o f Experiment 4 also suggested that people differ in the extent to which they are aware o f their own escape or avoidance motives. Although those who expressed regret were least likely to take subsequent action, those who did not express regret still showed the inaction inertia effect. Thus, it seems that some individuals may be less aware or less willing to report thoughts suggesting regret. In a sense, being fully aware that what one is doing is attempting to avoid regret may defeat the purpose o f continued inaction as a regret management technique, because then one may also become more aware o f the fact that this avoidance behavior has its costs.

The notion that people use avoidance to save themselves

616 TYKOCINSKI AND PITTMAN

p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i s c o m f o r t is, o f course, not new. For e x a m p l e , the dissonance literature on selective e x p o s u r e shows that p e o p l e actively a v o i d materials that are likely to b e dissonance produc- ing (Festinger, 1957; Frey, 1986), and the kinds o f a v o i d a n c e that appear to underlie the inaction inertia e f f e c t are apparently motivated b y similar considerations. O n e can still wonder, how- ever, about the ultimate effectiveness o f these a v o i d a n c e tech- niques. D o e s declining the subsequent action opportunity indeed make o n e regret free? T h e answer m a y depend, in part, on the action domain. S o m e action opportunities that have been for- g o n e can b e put aside indefinitely, but others m a y be lurking in the background as a constant r e m i n d e r o f o n e ' s initial failure to act.

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