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CHAPTER 5

Police Tactics for Homeland Security

One must change one’s tactics every ten years if one wishes to maintain one’s superiority.

Napoleon Bonaparte

INTRODUCTION The tactical level of policing is about how the police are deployed. It is where police op- erations, after developing its operational plan, puts the plan into motion in support of the overall strategy. It is no longer the process of strategizing or planning, but one of action. This is the level that deals with the police officer on the street, the special tactical units available, and any other asset that can be deployed by the operational command to work an actual incident. Police tactics should be determined by the strategic goals of the organization and based on the operational planning for the possible incidents that may occur. Through good police intelligence, combined with threat and risk assessments, the tactics necessary for homeland security may continually change and need updating. If Al-Qaeda no longer looks to airports and airplanes as a viable means of attack, but in- stead adopts simultaneous suicide bombings in train and metro stations, the type of tac- tics necessary to defeat this threat will change. As the opening quote insinuates, one will have to change tactics to stay prepared for changing threats.

To change tactics and adapt to emerging threats in an era of homeland security, po- lice departments will have to continually give consideration to changing its tactics, but more importantly, it will have to give consideration to changing and updating its training. To change one’s tactics, one must learn new knowledge, new skills, and train to perfect both. Changes in tactics are good and beneficial to an organization, but it must be able to adequately deploy these tactics. Consideration must be given to the line officer’s edu- cation, training, skills, capabilities, and equipment. Once the proper tactical changes are identified, then training and exercises must become part of the process of preparing an agency for homeland security.

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A recent recommendation by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) highlights the necessity to change tactics to adapt to new threats, but it also highlights the need for certain knowledge, skills, equipment, and training on the part of the police. In the wake of the London train bombings by suicide bombers in July of 2005, there was a defini- tive acknowledgment to the fact that Al-Qaeda was beginning to target trains and under- ground transportation systems through suicide bombers. The IACP recommended that police officers confronting suicide bombers should take a head shot, rather than tradition- ally aiming for the torso.1 Their reasoning was to prevent the detonation of bombs through a shot to the torso because that is generally where the bombs are strapped to the body. In addition, a shot to the head stands a greater chance of immediately disabling the bomber, thus preventing them from self-detonating the bomb. Bruce Hoffman, a terrorist expert at the Rand Corporation, has pointed out that “the police standard operating procedure of ad- dressing a suspect and telling him to drop their weapon and put their hands up or freeze, is not going to work with a suicide bomber.”2 He tersely concludes that officers who use this tactic will essentially be signing their own death warrant.3

The IACP has also offered information on potential details that may identify possi- ble suicide bombers, such as suspicious individuals wearing heavy clothing, walking with an unusual gait, evident irritability, excessive sweating, or obvious tunnel vision.4 These types of clues may provide law enforcement with the means of identifying potential ter- rorists and give them the advantage of recognizing a threat in advance of the terrorist act.

The recognition of new threats is beneficial to law enforcement operations. Provid- ing the means of identifying possible suicide bombers and how to appropriately deal with them is assuredly beneficial for adjusting police tactics in response to suicide bombings. Yet, what will become critical in this case is instructing officers on this tactical change, training them to adapt to this new threat, and ensuring that they are exercised on this re- alistic scenario. Officers must be trained on the cues of what to look for, to understand the methods the suicide bombers are using, and to be aware of multiple threats and si- multaneous or near-simultaneous attacks. Therefore, they must be trained to act quick and respond to other potential locations that are at risk. In addition, they must be trained on how to accurately take a head shot, which is not something police have traditionally been trained to do. Repetitive training on this specific tactic is critical to the police abil- ity to respond to such a terrorist threat. Finally, it should be noted that scenarios and ex- ercises should also be used to allow officers the opportunity to test their abilities in these new tactics to ensure that if the real case presented itself, they would make the proper decision and perform this new tactic efficiently and effectively.

This chapter, then, is about the consideration of police tactics necessary for line offi- cers to carry out police operations in support of the homeland security strategy. To this end, the tactics reviewed here are those tactics that are derived directly from the police operations chapter (Chapter 4) as conceptualized by the overall homeland security strat- egy (Chapter 5). It should be clear that these tactics are only considerations for state, lo- cal, and tribal police and do not, and essentially cannot, cover all the police tactical considerations for homeland security because the current environment is far too dynamic to create a definitive list. The purpose of this chapter is to consider police tactics in light of police operations and the overall strategy for homeland security. Therefore, this chap- ter will first define what is meant by police tactics more fully and then discuss various tactical considerations to draw attention to those areas in need of improved police tac- tics for this era of homeland security.

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172 CHAPTER 5 Police Tactics for Homeland Security

BOX 5-1

TACTICAL INTERVENTION CONSIDERATIONS

Jurisdictions seeking to improve “intervention” to stop terrorists before they can execute a threat should

1. Train personnel to recognize threats and threatening cues and to respond appropriately to suspects preparing for attacks.

2. Train law enforcement personnel in tactical capabilities with special teams of law enforcement, emergency response, and military resources to respond quickly and appropriately in a potential terrorism event with the objective of intervening in an impending attack.

3. Articulate and disseminate the legal criteria for making cases, conducting wiretaps, and conducting surveillance on suspected WMD terrorists through general training and specific tactical training within law enforcement to ensure familiarization with: conspiracy statutes, search and seizure requirements, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) requirements, established legal criteria and procedures for intervention in suspicious circumstances and events, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for observing people and targets at high threat locations, laws that protect public safety information, and contact lists and contact information for legal opinions and assistance.

4. Establish preservice and in-service training in legal, tactical, and strategic aspects of policing in the WMD terrorism environment to enhance the ability to apprehend terrorists.

5. If indicated in an analytical risk management model, develop plans for preboarding searches for mass transit vehicles in the event of a credible threat.

6. As indicated in an analytical risk management model, establish plans and needs assessments for deployment of resources to meet known or anticipated threats to preempt or deter events.

7. Facilitate a prosecutorial and judicial structure, process, collaboration, and expertise that enhances successful prosecution of WMD terrorism.

8. Exercise processes for collecting and entering investigative intelligence and retrieving information, to result in the successful intervention and arrest of terrorists.

9. Articulate the legal requisites for authorities to isolate and decontaminate to reduce spread of suspected diseases or agents.

10. Include in risk management plan the collateral implications to the private sector in a WMD event intervention and have plans to coordinate mitigation.

Source: Office of Domestic Preparedness. (2003). The Office For Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security June 2003: Prevention and Deterrence. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

TACTICS DEFINED Tactics is the employment of police assets into critical incidents. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of police officers in relation to each other, the terrain, and the threat to engage the police to quickly restore order. It is also the realm of close fights, where

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police officers are in direct and immediate confrontation with suspects. In policing for homeland security, it should be the operational-level staff command that sets the term of the type of tactical response and provides the resources necessary to achieve success. Tactical success is then measured by the ability to restore order and how well the action achieved the operational intent and plan.

Police tactics have also been described as a means of achieving “operational strat- egy.”5 According to P. K. Manning, a long-respected scholar of American policing, “tac- tics are the specifics of strategies, techniques for gaining control in face-to-face encounters or issue-oriented team situations.”6 He further explains that “tactics implies a degree of cognitive preconception of the stages or steps by which a given general line of action is implemented.”7 What Manning is delineating here are the relationships between strat- egy, operations, and tactics. Moving strategy to operational planning and then to tactical action is the key to successful implementation of a homeland security strategy. What Manning is essentially echoing are the ancient writings of Sun Tzu, who stated in his trea- tise on war that “strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory,” whereas “tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.”8 Police tactics for Homeland Security, then, must be driven by the overall strategy to properly prepare the police for using homeland security tactics. And, it is critical that the police are prepared tactically to take on the chal- lenges of protecting the homeland to defeat the terrorist threat. Therefore, like the open- ing quote by Napoleon suggests, it is time for the police to update their tactics in preparation for their role in homeland security.

Because tactics do fall into the realm of police action, police tactics should focus specifically on the education, training, and equipping of line police officers. Tactical considerations should focus on the numerous terrorist scenarios that police officers may face and train them to react accordingly. A suicide bomber at a train station is going to necessitate a very specific response, including the recognition of the threat, an elimina- tion of that threat, and the awareness that there may be other attacks that will occur si- multaneously or near-simultaneously. Compared with a sarin attack on a subway system, as occurred in Tokyo in 1995, this will necessitate a different type of response. Here of- ficers will need to have the ability to recognize the attack for what it is, be properly equipped to respond to the attack so as not to become a victim themselves, and know what to look for in terms of investigatory evidence. Various considerations regarding the tactics necessary for the police to learn will be considered throughout the rest of this chapter; however, it should be noted that it is not the intent of this chapter to provide the full breadth and depth of knowledge necessary under homeland security. It is merely aimed at serving to highlight various factors that police officers must consider based on a general understanding of police strategy and operations for homeland security.

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BOX 5-2

TACTICAL AWARENESS

In August of 2004, a Charlotte-Mecklenberg police officer noticed an individual filming an in- tersection in the city who, on spotting the officer, stopped filming and walked away.The offi- cer had the presence of mind to stop the individual and inquire as to his destination. After

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174 CHAPTER 5 Police Tactics for Homeland Security

some questioning, the individual, by the name of Kamran Akhtar, agreed to be questioned at the local FBI office.Akhtar claimed to be in the United States legally and was a tourist. It turns out Akhtar had been requested to leave the country in 1998 because he had illegally entered the United States, by way of Mexico, in 1991. Investigators watched the video that was in the recorder Akhtar was using and found 40 minutes of video showing banks, high-rise buildings, and light rail facilities in Houston, Dallas, Atlanta, New Orleans, and Charlotte, North Car- olina, where he was stopped. After arresting him for immigration charges, a warrant was se- cured to search his apartment, where additional video of buildings and dams from Las Vegas to Austin were found. As this tactically aware officer demonstrates, police officers are truly on the front line of tactical intelligence gathering.

Source: Lezon, D. (2004).“Man Who Filmed Sites in U.S. Cities to Stay in Custody.” Houston Chronicle, August 14: A13.

Kanas City TAC team (Source: 911 Pictures. Photo by Mikael Karlsson)

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THREAT AWARENESS The early identification of a terrorist event utilizing a weapon of mass destruction is critical to the protection of police officers and other first responders and their ability to save the lives of those people directly affected by the attack.9 This early identification requires all persons involved in the initial response (911 operators, dispatchers, police officers, and su- pervisors) to be well informed and alert to the key indicators of a biological, chemical, or radiological attack.

The first source of information will most likely come in the form of information pro- vided via emergency calls to 911.10 The 911 operators should be alerted by any of fol- lowing types of information: large volumes of calls reporting sick or injured persons with no known reason; numerous persons reporting similar illness, signs, and symptoms; nu- merous calls from the same general geographic area or large gathering of people such as a sporting event; symptoms indicative of an exposure such as drooling, tearing, shortness of breath, difficulty breathing, irritation of eyes, nose, throat, and/or skin; report of an ex- plosion with no structural damage; reports of unexplained liquids; reports of unusual odors such as mowed grass, garlic, bitter almonds; reports of a release of a spray or aerosol; unexplained dead animals; and/or discarded Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) such as masks and gloves.

Police officers responding to any mass casualty scene need to be alert for key indica- tors that a weapon of mass destruction has been used.11 These key indicators are the same as those indicated earlier and include multiple casualties with similar signs/symptoms, multiple casualties with no visible injuries other than being sick, widely dispersed casual- ties indicating a possible aerial dispersal of an agent, and unusual odors in the area. If police officers identify any of these indicators on scene, they must be trained to move away from the scene, something that generally runs counter to police officer instinct, until they can don PPE, otherwise they will become victims of the agent, thus inhibit- ing rather than succoring an adequate response. As Buerger and Levine pointed out, “officer safety at the point of discovering a suspected biological, chemical, or nuclear device reflects a new dimension.”12 This is clearly not a routine element of a patrol officer’s du- ties, but an area where training officers will become critical if they are to know how to respond to such a scenario.

One key aspect of officer safety is the recognition that terrorists often use coordi- nated attacks. According to Houghton and Schachter, “since 1983, half of the 14 terror- ist incidents with 100 or more fatalities were coordinated ones.”13 To educate officers on this threat, Houghton and Schachter stated that coordinated terrorist attacks tend to “fall into three main categories: (1) parallel device attacks, where participants use more than one device simultaneously or almost simultaneously in the same location; (2) secondary attacks, where the initial assault is followed by one or more additional attacks in the same location, typically targeting responders; and (3) multiple dispersed attacks, where groups stage simultaneous or near-simultaneous ones at different locations.”14 They make sev- eral recommendations to deal specifically with this reality. The first is to avoid centraliz- ing equipment, but rather decentralizing it across a police agency’s jurisdiction. This provides more flexibility in responding and avoids the possible liability of the centralized equipment site becoming a target or compromised by being close to ground zero. In ad- dition, they, like others, make the tactical recommendation that the organization prevent

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176 CHAPTER 5 Police Tactics for Homeland Security

the deployment of all resources—officers and equipment—to a terrorist scene to avoid a significant loss to a secondary device or from a dispersed weapon of mass destruction. This is the key to an incident command center controlling the deployment of police re- sources at all times (see Chapter 4).

Law enforcement officers should also be observant for possible methods of dissemi- nating a weapon of mass destruction. In the case of either a biological or chemical attack, there are multiple ways in which these agents can be disseminated. The only two key char- acteristics of a biological or chemical dissemination device are an agent source (any type of container capable of holding a liquid, gas, or powder) and a dissemination mechanism. Dissemination mechanisms can vary from the very crude to the sophisticated. Examples include the normal evaporation of a liquid (the method used in the Tokyo subway attack), a blower or fan to aid in the spread and evaporation of an agent, a pressurized spray- release similar to pesticide canisters, or an explosive device. Because there is no spe- cific profile of what a dissemination device looks like, police officers should be alert to certain visual indicators such as unusual liquids, damp or wet items abandoned, out of place items such as a pesticide sprayer in a subway, or items with spray nozzles.

The early identification of a weapons of mass destruction attack is essential to officer safety and survival. Failure to recognize an attack can result in the first responding officers becoming casualties themselves. No police call can produce a more urgent response than one of an officer down or in need of assistance; however, failure to recognize the incident for what it is can result in additional officers racing to the scene to become casualties. Key is- sues to consider include the immediate loss of contact with officers already on the scene, of- ficers reporting signs or symptoms of agent exposure, distress calls indicating medical problems rather than some type of physical attack, and automatic distress signals such as the panic button on a radio, especially when this comes from the area of a 911 call.

The actions of the first law enforcement officer on the scene sets the stage for the remainder of the response, including the safety of all responding officers. The first pri- ority must be self-protection.15 Officers arriving on a mass casualty scene where a weapon of mass destruction was used must notify dispatch and the police command staff for them to begin mobilizing the necessary resources. The officers must protect themselves with PPE prior to entering the area, and they should consider maintaining a safe distance and approaching from upwind, so as to avoid contamination. Once PPE is donned, the offi- cers should be careful when moving about the scene to avoid breaches in the PPE and possible exposure to the agent, such as walking through a liquid contaminant. If this should happen, officers should be decontaminated immediately, which necessitates a de- contamination center being established relatively quickly. If officers become casualties, again, proper protection by the responding officers should be donned prior to assisting the officer, otherwise, additional officers will become casualties, thus multiplying the im- pact of the attack.

First responding officers must quickly define the perimeter of the attack and isolate the area. Both an inner perimeter and an outer perimeter should be established. The outer perimeter will most likely be quite large and will necessitate police to serve a traffic control function as well as security for the decontamination site. The inner perimeter will still be a large area and will consist of the initial isolation area around the site of the attack, but will have to be expanded to include all areas downwind of the site. Law enforcement will most likely perform crowd control, access into and out of the area, providing security for the

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decontamination corridor, will prevent those contaminated from leaving the area until de- contaminated, and will coordinate with both EMS and the local fire department. Consid- eration must also be given to those working inside the inner perimeter, as the ability to work long term in the full PPE is limited. Rotations should be quickly established to ensure seamless police functions inside both perimeters.

Additional considerations for local law enforcement include the designation of a col- lection area for victims that must be identified and located far enough away from the con- taminated area. In addition, law enforcement officers must identify an area for law enforcement officers to stage that is upwind of the incident scene. It must be far enough away that neither the contaminated area nor the victim collection area intrudes on its safety, otherwise cross contamination will render all of these officers ineffective. In ad- dition, the decontamination site must be located in an area far enough away from the inner perimeter to avoid continued exposure after decontamination, but it must be close enough to be able to control the movement of individuals who have been exposed. A de- contamination corridor should be established to move people to the decontamination site and, once processed through, to move them into a safe area.

Police command and control, as well as security, will be critical at the decontami- nation site. Although decontamination will be conducted by others, the crowd control and security of the site will be the responsibility of the police.16 Law enforcement will have to assist in the collection of contaminated individuals and the movement of these people to the decontamination site. Once there, the collection of their personal be- longings will potentially fall to the police. As the decontamination process will require full disrobement, the police will have to enforce this, as many people will refuse to dis- robe or place their valuables in another’s possession. Police will also have to screen for evidence, as individuals in the contaminated crowd may be potential suspects. If any ev- idence is collected, decisions must be made of how best to secure the item and whether or not to decontaminate, which could possible destroy some of the evidence. In addition, screening for secondary devices must also be conducted at this time. Police officers will also have to consider their own personal belongings and equipment and how such items as their firearms will be secured during the decontamination process and how they will be reequipped. Moreover, how officers will secure new PPE for reentry into the con- taminated area must also be considered in advance.

Up to this point, most of the focus in the event of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack, such as a chemical or biological attack, has been on securing the scene and handling the victims. One of the primary functions of law enforcement is to con- duct criminal investigations, and that will also have to be considered in light of the dif- ficult situation such an attack will create. Police officers must also be looking for perpetrators. Field interviews will have to be done as quickly as possible, but will be difficult under the circumstances. Witness statements will be crucial in helping to identify possible suspects. There is also the potential that the key suspect or suspects may be in the crowds that form after an attack. It is most likely that if any of them sur- vived, they will be the most severely injured or ill individuals, as they will have been at ground zero. Officers will also have to consider asking questions that relate to the type of explosions, liquids, or mists that witnesses saw and the types of symptoms peo- ple are experiencing to assist in the identification of the type of attack. Moreover, of- ficers will have to try to identify any individuals that left the scene prior to being

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178 CHAPTER 5 Police Tactics for Homeland Security

decontaminated, as they will become a risk to anyone with whom they come in con- tact. Finally, officers should consider the collection of any audiovisual devices that may have captured the suspects and the actual attack.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) In relation to threat awareness, it is not only critical that police officers, police staff, and police leaders be familiar with the threat of weapons of mass destruction, but they must also have a grounded knowledge in the different types, their capabilities, delivery sys- tems, and how an actual attack would likely progress. This knowledge is key for many elements of the homeland security strategy, ranging from prevention and preparedness to response and recovery. Although space is limited here to provide the full range of knowledge and education on WMD, a brief overview can demonstrate some of the tac- tical knowledge that is necessary to prepare police officers to respond, work, and survive in a WMD environment.

The term weapons of mass destruction is actually a former Soviet military term that was euphemistically used to denote nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.17 It is now widely used, despite debate over its appropriateness, and its definition has broadened to include radiological weapons. In addition, toxin weapons are sometimes included as a separate category or as part of either the biological or chemical categories. A brief review of these different types of WMD follows.

Biological weapons are pathogens that cause disease and illness in infected hu- mans.18 Because the pathogens multiply within the victim, a small initial amount of pathogen is sufficient to cause infection. As a consequence, biological weapons require much less material than chemical weapons to produce equivalent causalities and gen- erally take longer to produce side effects. Biological weapons include diseases that are primarily incapacitating, such as Q fever, as well as those that are lethal, such as small- pox. Some biological weapons are contagious pathogens, such as smallpox, and have the potential to spread the effects of an attack by traveling from victim to victim. The symp- toms from a biological weapon attack would require some time to develop, so a covert biological attack might not be recognized for several days.

Toxin weapons are primarily illness-inducing chemicals formed from living crea- tures, such as bacteria, fungi, plants, and animals.19 Toxins range in effect from disabling to acutely toxic. The most deadly compound currently known, botulinum toxin, is a bac- terial toxin. Toxins are more potent than chemical weapons, requiring less material to produce equivalent casualties, but they are not self-reproducing, so more material is re- quired than for a biological weapon. Symptoms from toxin exposure typically occur on a timescale intermediate between chemical and biological weapons, generally appearing over the course of several hours.

Chemical weapons are chemical compounds that have a strong, deleterious effect on the human body, even when encountered in small doses.20 The different types of chemical weapons include vesicants, which blister and burn on contact; choking agents, which cause lung damage; and nerve agents, which interfere with the nervous system and may lead to death. The effects from chemical weapons may occur very quickly after exposure, on the order of minutes to hours. Military planners categorize chemical

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WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) 179

BOX 5-3

CHEMICAL AGENTS

Physical Signs & Type Agent State Symptoms Odor Decontamination Persistence

Nerve GA/GB/GD Liquid Pinpoint pupils Fruity Remove all clothing; Minutes–days Salivation flush with soap Tearing & volumes of water Vomiting Twitching Convulsions

Nerve VX Oily S/a Sulfur S/a Days–weeks Blister mustard Liquid Eye pain Garlic S/a Days–years

Reddened skin Large blisters

Blister lewisite Liquid Eye pain Geraniums S/a Hours–days Burning lungs Bee sting blisters Gray skin

Blood hydrogen Gas Bright red lips Bitter S/a Minutes cyanide Red skin almonds

Headache Gasping Nausea

Blood cyanogen Gas S/a S/a S/a S/a cloride

Choking phosgene Gas Coughing New mown S/a S/a Choking hay Pneumonia

Choking chlorine Gas Coughing Bleach S/a S/a Choking

Source: U.S. Army Solider and Biological Chemical Command’s Improved Respond Program. (2003). Law Enforcement Officers Guide for Responding to Chemical Terrorist Incidents. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Solider and Biological Chemical Command, Homeland Defense Business Unit. Available online at http://www.mipt.org/pdf/leofficersguideChemicalIncidents.pdf; downloaded June 2004.

agents into four classes: nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents.21 This categorization groups chemicals by the effects they cause to those exposed to them. The nerve and blister agents are predominately only manufactured and used by militaries as weapons, but both choking agents and blood agents include chemicals widely used in industrial processes.

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Chemical weapons affecting the nervous system are called nerve agents.22 Nerve agents do not occur naturally. Rather, they are man-made compounds that require manufacture and isolation for high toxicity and purity. Most nerve agents belong to a group of chemicals called organophosphates. Organophosphates have a wide range of toxicity, and some are commercially employed as insecticides, though these are significantly less toxic than those developed as chemical weapons. Nerve agents are mainly liquids.

The first nerve agent developed for military use, called Tabun or GA, was made in Germany in the 1930s. Following this discovery, a series of nerve agents similar to Tabun was developed. This series, known as the G-series, includes the weapons sarin (GB) and Soman (GD). In the late 1940s, another series of nerve agents, the V-series, was invented in England. Both the British and the U.S. chemical weapons programs investigated these compounds. The United States manufactured and stockpiled VX. A related compound, V-gas, was manufactured and stockpiled by the Soviet Union. Military use of nerve agents has been rare. Nerve agents were not used during World War I or World War II. During the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war, Iraq used nerve agents against Iranian troops and later against members of the Kurdish population in northern Iraq.

National chemical weapons programs have produced nerve agents for decades. The technological barriers for a terrorist group to synthesize these agents might be overcome by using commercially available equipment, though there would be appreciable danger to the manufacturer due to the extreme toxicity of these compounds. Nerve agent pro- duction requires the use of toxic chemicals during synthesis and specialized equipment to contain the nerve agent produced. Of the nerve agents, VX has been identified as the most difficult to manufacture.

Nerve agents are extremely dangerous and can enter the body through the lungs or by skin contact, though for the G-series nerve agents, the inhalation toxicity is signifi- cantly greater than the dermal toxicity. Of the nerve agents, VX is the most deadly and Tabun is the least deadly, though all are exceedingly toxic.

Nerve agents interfere with the nervous system, causing overstimulation of mus- cles. Victims may suffer nausea and weakness and possibly convulsions and spasms. At high concentrations, loss of muscle control, nervous system irregularities, and death may occur. The action of nerve agents can be irreversible if victims are not quickly treated.

Two drugs, atropine and pralidoxime chloride, are used as antidotes for nerve agents. Atropine prevents muscle spasms and allows the body time to clear the nerve agent. Prali- doxime chloride limits the effects of nerve agent exposure by reversing the agent’s action. Both of these drugs were issued to U.S. troops during the Persian Gulf War in the form of an antidote kit called the Mark I. Diazepam (Valium) may be used to reduce convulsions and seizures brought on by exposure to nerve agents.

The treatment window for nerve agent exposure is agent-dependent. Some agents quickly and irreversibly react to enzymes within the body, whereas others require a much longer time to permanently bind to these enzymes. The most effective treat- ment occurs before such permanent binding has taken place. Soman, for example, is permanently bound within minutes, whereas Tabun is not and can be treated up to several hours after exposure. Prophylactic use of some compounds, such as pyri- dostigmine bromide, may create a larger window for effective treatment for some nerve agents.

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Blister agents, also known as vesicants, are chemicals that cause painful blistering of the skin. Although such blistering is not generally lethal, the excruciating pain caused by the blister agents requires full body protection against these chemicals. Militarily, blister agents produce casualties and reduce the combat effectiveness of opposing troops by re- quiring them to wear bulky protective equipment. The most common blister agent is mus- tard agents, which include nitrogen- and sulfur-based compounds. Mustard agents are oily liquids that range in color from a very pale yellow to dark brown, depending on the type and purity, and have a faint odor of mustard, onion, or garlic. These liquids evaporate quickly, and their vapors are also injurious.

Blister agents are not naturally occurring compounds. Mustard agents, for example, were first developed in the late 1800s. During World War I, both sides in the conflict used these weapons against their enemies, and the mustard-type blister agent produced the greatest number of chemical casualties during World War I, though fewer than 5 percent of these casualties died. Many countries have stockpiled blister agents in their chemical weapon inventories. Mustard agent was also reportedly used in the Iraq–Iran war. The United States is currently destroying its stockpile of blister agents.

Production of blister agents is considered less complicated than that of nerve agents. Like nerve agents, it requires the use of some toxic chemicals and specialized equipment to contain the agent produced. The most common blister agents have many different methods for their production published in the open literature.

Blister agents can enter the body through the lungs or by contact with the skin or eyes. Some can penetrate through normal clothing material, causing burns in areas that were covered by cloth. Although blister agents react quickly on skin contact, their symp- toms may be delayed. In the case of mustard agent, damage occurs within one to two minutes of exposure, but symptoms do not manifest for several hours. As even low con- centrations of vaporized blister agent quickly causes damage, it is unlikely that agents will be removed from the skin prior to injury.

The initial symptoms of blister agent exposure are a reddening of the skin, resem- bling sunburn, combined with pain in the effected area. Swelling, blisters, and lesions may then develop, depending on the degree of exposure. Systemic symptoms such as malaise, vomiting, and fever may also develop in extreme cases. Exposure to large amounts of liquid mustard agent may prove fatal.

The eyes are also very sensitive to blister agents. At high vapor exposures, great pain, corneal damage, and scarring between the iris and lens may occur. The most severe eye damage is often caused by liquid agent, either from contact with airborne droplets or by self-contamination of the eyes from contaminated clothing or body parts.

Victims inhaling blister agents may suffer damage to their lungs. Although a single, low-level exposure will likely produce only temporary impairment, high concentrations or repeated exposures may cause permanent damage. Inhalation victims may have symp- toms ranging from mild bronchitis to blistering of the lungs.

Damage from blister agent exposure, lesions, and other skin irritations is symptomati- cally treated. Hospitalization may be required for respiratory tract injuries. Victims who suf- fer severe lung damage may require mechanical ventilation. An additional complication after exposure to large amounts of mustard agent is a general weakening of the whole immune system. Because of these systemic effects, special precautions must be taken against oppor- tunistic infections in the case of exposure to high concentrations of mustard agent.

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Chemicals that act on the lungs, causing difficulty in breathing and, potentially, per- manent lung damage are known as choking agents. Examples of choking agents include chlorine, ammonia, and phosgene. Choking agents have historically been used during wartime and are sometimes encountered during industrial accidents. Choking agents are generally gases that have marked odors and may color the surrounding air.

Many choking agents are dual-use chemicals with both a civilian and a military pur- pose. Chlorine and ammonia are both used in large quantities for commercial applications, whereas phosgene is used within the chemical industry. Methods for producing choking agents are well known, but may be technically challenging. Choking agents require spe- cialized equipment to produce, compress, and contain them. Choking agents were also manufactured for wartime use and were extensively used during World War I. The first ma- jor, successful, chemical attack of the war used chlorine gas at Ypres in 1915. Chlorine gas was later supplemented by phosgene use, which caused greater casualties.

Choking agents injure their victims through inhalation, with a comparatively mild effect on the skin. Exposure to low chemical concentrations causes chest discomfort or shortness of breath, irritation of nose and throat, and tearing eyes. High agent concentrations may quickly cause swelling of the lungs, respiratory failure, and possibly death. Symptoms of lung damage can occur up to 48 hours after inhalation of moderate concentrations and often do not manifest themselves until the lungs are aggravated by physical effort.

Victims of choking agents are generally treated symptomatically. Because lung damage may be exacerbated by exercise, victims are kept at rest until the danger of fluid in the lungs is past. Symptoms such as tightness of the chest and coughing are treated with immediate rest and comfort. Shallow breathing and insufficient oxygen may require supplemental oxygen.

Swelling and accumulation of fluids in the lungs are likely after exposure to a high dose of choking agent. Administration of corticosteroids has been recommended in cases of fluid accumulation, but their beneficial effects have not been proven. Rest, warmth, sedation, and oxygen are still the primary treatments, even in the case of marked edema.

Blood agents are chemicals that interfere with oxygen utilization at the cellular level. Hydrogen cyanide and cyanide salts are agents in this group. Hydrogen cyanide is a very volatile gas, smelling of almonds, whereas cyanide salts are odorless solids.

Hydrogen cyanide was considered for use as a chemical warfare agent, but was rarely used in military situations because its effectiveness was limited by its quick dispersion. The French manufactured hydrogen cyanide as a military agent during World War I. Hydrogen cyanide use has been attributed to both sides during the Iran–Iraq war.

Hydrogen cyanide and cyanide salts are now used as industrial chemicals, having applications in the chemical, electroplating, and mining industries. As with choking agents, methods for producing blood agents are relatively well known. However, the gaseous nature of hydrogen cyanide complicates the production and storage.

Blood agents act through inhalation or ingestion and impair cellular oxygen use. The central nervous system is especially susceptible to this effect, and blood agents usually cause death through oxygen starvation of brain cells. The symptoms of blood agent ex- posure depend on the agent concentration and the duration of exposure. In mild cases, there may be headache, dizziness, and nausea for several hours, followed by complete spontaneous recovery. Higher concentrations or longer exposure may lead to powerful gasping for breath, violent convulsions, and cardiac failure within a few minutes.

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The effects of blood agents are reversed through treatment with specific antidotes— either amyl or sodium nitrite combined with sodium thiosulfate. The combination of these two chemicals removes cyanide, the active compound in blood agents, from the body. When symptoms such as convulsions or depressed breathing are present, ventila- tion with oxygen and administration of anticonvulsants are used. Cyanide is metabolized more readily than most chemical weapons; with prompt treatment, victims may recover from otherwise-fatal doses.

Many experts believe that it would be difficult for terrorist groups to use chemical agents as weapons of mass destruction.23 Even VX, the most lethal of nerve agents, would require tons, spread uniformly and efficiently, to kill 50 percent of the people in a 100- kilometer area. On the other hand, chemical agents might be effectively used as weapons of terror in situations where limited or enclosed space might decrease the required amounts of chemicals. That is, the use of the weapon itself, even if casualties are few, could cause fear that would magnify the attack’s effect beyond what would be expected based solely on the number of casualties.

There have been few examples of successful chemical terror attacks. In 1995, Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese apocalyptic cult, used sarin on the Tokyo subway. The attack killed 12 people and sent more than 5,000 to the hospital with some degree of injury. This same cult reportedly carried out an attack in Matsumoto as well, where 7 people were killed and over 200 injured. Both of these attacks used G-series nerve agents, which are more toxic through inhalation than by contact. V-series agents employed in a similar manner might have caused greater fatalities.

In comparison, blister agents would likely be less lethal, but more injurious, if used in a similar manner. Blister agents are dermally active, so inhalation of the agent would not be necessary to cause injury. Additionally, because mustard agent vapor penetrates most fabrics, victims near the point of release might suffer grievously. Blister agents, although not likely to cause mass destruction, might cause mass terror and injury.

Choking agents are no longer considered to be useful military weapons, as chemi- cal suits and masks provide high protection. As a weapon of mass destruction used against civilians, the comparatively low lethality of choking agents complicates their use because very large volumes would be needed. On the other hand, the industrial avail- ability of some choking agents provides opportunities for acquisition and subsequent use of potentially very large volumes of such agents. For example, the United States pro- duces approximately one billion pounds of chlorine a year for use in water treatment facilities. The potential vulnerability for chlorine-filled rail tank cars, by which chlorine is primarily transported, has been noted. Terrorist attack on industrial stores at chemi- cal or water treatment facilities or during shipment has been raised as another potential source of concern.

Blood agents may be difficult to use as weapons of mass destruction for many of the same reasons as choking agents. The quick dispersal of blood agents, combined with the large amounts necessary to cause mass casualties, make such agents difficult to use on a mass scale. Even those blood agents that are industrially manufactured are often used on- site without being shipped. However, terrorist groups seem to be increasingly interested in these agents, perhaps because of criminal use of them.

Ramzi Yousef, convicted of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, stated he had in- tended to include sodium cyanide in that bomb to create a cloud of cyanide gas. Although

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a small amount of cyanide was found in the supplies of the bombers, there was no evidence that this had been done. In 1995, following the sarin attack, members of Aum Shinrikyo attempted an attack in Tokyo by setting fire to a plastic bag of sodium cyanide positioned next to a bag of an acid. A similar combination of chemicals was discovered the following month in another station. Both devices were successfully disarmed. In 2002, Italian police arrested four Moroccan men possessing potassium ferrocyanide. It was reported that the men arrested planned to poison the water supply using the potassium ferrocyanide. It is questionable how effective this would have been, considering the volume of the water sup- ply and the amount of potassium ferrocyanide found in their possession. A group calling itself September 11 threatened the use of cyanide to disrupt the America’s Cup boat race in New Zealand.

It is believed that the Al-Qaeda terrorist group has produced and developed plans for the use of chemical weapons, including hydrogen cyanide. Osama bin Laden has stated that Al-Qaeda has a chemical capability. Ahmed Ressam, convicted in a plot to bomb the Los Angeles Airport, testified that he had received training in the use of hydrogen cyanide in Afghanistan at an Al-Qaeda training camp. The training described included the pro- duction of hydrogen cyanide using cyanide salts and acids, demonstrations of effec- tiveness of the agent by exposing dogs to it, and introducing the agent into building ventilation systems by placing a source near the air intakes. CNN also located and re- trieved videotapes from Afghanistan that portray the results of testing of unknown chemical agents on dogs. It has been suggested that the chemical agent used in those videotapes was a blood agent, most likely hydrogen cyanide.

The use of chemical, biological, or toxin weapons in terror attacks could complicate emergency response due to the need to establish special care facilities for the victims, such as decontamination areas, and the need to protect first responders from the weapon’s ef- fects.24 If first responders became victims through inadequate PPE (see following) or contamination of emergency vehicles, increased casualties and greater social disruption could result.

A nuclear weapon is the most destructive of all weapons of mass destruction, but ob- taining one poses the greatest difficulty for terrorist groups.25 The key obstacle to build- ing such a weapon is the availability of a sufficient quantity of fissile material—either plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Some experts believe that if allowed access to the necessary quantities of fissile material, extraordinary capable groups could build a crude nuclear weapon.

Some experts point to Iraq’s efforts to acquire a nuclear capability—a nation with economic resources, technical expertise, and motivation—to demonstrate the signifi- cant difficulty of building even a crude nuclear weapon. State sponsors of terrorists have been considered unlikely to turn over control of such weapons, once developed, to terrorist groups because of possible international retaliation or concern that the groups might leave their control. However, the problem of “loose nukes” (i.e., the pos- sible leakage of nuclear weapons material and technical know-how from the former Soviet states) remains a cause of concern that some believe increases the likelihood of a terrorist group obtaining a nuclear capability. It is important to note that even if a terrorist group were to get hold of an assembled nuclear weapon covertly, the built-in safeguards and self-destruction mechanisms would pose a serious challenge to deto- nating the weapon. In addition, the size of most nuclear weapons makes them rather

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hard to transport, especially clandestinely. The most likely means for such transport is judged to be commercial shipping.

A much less difficult nuclear option is a radiological weapon, which uses conventional high explosives to disperse any type of radioactive material. These are officially known as a radiological dispersal device (RDD), but often referred to by the media and popular culture as a “dirty bomb.” A “dirty bomb” is actually one type of RDD, in which explosives disperse the radioactive material, but in general RDDs do not require explosives.26 Though unlikely to cause mass casualties, radiological weapons could still have very significant radiation con- tamination effects if well targeted.27 Research indicates that RDDs have little effectiveness as military weapons because of their inability to incapacitate prepared soldiers. RDDs may pose a greater threat in a civilian setting. Although there may be few immediate health ef- fects from the dispersed radiological material, long-term health risks, such as cancer, may increase, and there may be significant economic damage if there is an unwillingness to live or work in an area with a higher radiation level. Many experts contend that there is terrorist interest in constructing and using RDDs. No RDD has been used by a terrorist group, so it is not known how potent an RDD might be as a terror weapon.

Terrorist use of RDDs would most likely depend on public fear of any radiation rather than actual levels of radiation.28 Terrorists could try to achieve several goals with RDDs in the following sequence: (1) Death and injuries. Any prompt casualties would most likely come only from the explosion of a dirty bomb; many experts believe these would be few in numbers. (2) Panic. Small amounts of radioactive material might cause as much panic as larger amounts. (3) Recruitment. The worldwide media coverage of an RDD attack would be a powerful advertisement for a terrorist group claiming responsibility. (4) Asset denial. Public concern over the presence of radioactive material might lead people to abandon a subway system, building, or university for months to years. (5) Economic disruption. If a port

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) 185

BOX 5-4

HOMELAND SECURITY TACTICS BY EXAMPLE:THE IDAHO BUREAU OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Phillip Davis, Sam Houston State University

Regional Response Teams

Idaho’s Regional Response Teams were designed as support units for hazmat incidents that exceed the resources of local response agencies. These specially trained teams are available to provide 24-hour coverage, seven days per week and are presently located in fire depart- ments of Boise, Nampa/Caldwell, Lewiston, Pocatello, Coeur d’Alene, Magic Valley, and Idaho Falls/Jefferson County.

Services

Each Hazardous Materials Regional Response Team consists of three five-person response team units who provide 24-hour coverage seven days a week. Each unit consists of a team leader, assistant leader, intensive care paramedic, and two firefighters. Three alternates are on standby.The teams can provide the following services:

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Provide emergency response anywhere in the state of Idaho or on special request to ad- joining states; capable of both ground response or fly-in response and can be in almost any part of Idaho within a few hours.

Provide from 2 to 5 specialized technical support personnel and up to 10 on special re- quest for serious releases.

Provide specialized equipment, resource information, and instrumentation to assist local responders.

Sample unknown chemicals remotely and safely and do field testing for identification with immediate results.

Contain, neutralize, overpack, and prepare for disposal many isolated spilled chemicals. Transfer loads up to 100 gallons per minute or assist transfer teams in larger operations

from unsafe storage containers. Provide advanced life support to victims of releases, including rescuers, on scene and pre-

pare them for transport without contaminating ambulances or medical facilities. Provide expertise on the latest wet or dry decontamination techniques for both men and

equipment at incidents. Provide and set up booms for spills in waterways. Assist in training, emergency planning, and disaster drills for industry and communities. Assist in the cleanup of spills requiring the highest levels of protection; assist with obtain-

ing contractors for cleanup. Provide technical expertise that includes specialists, chemists, and resource people to

assist in on-scene operation setup for local responders.

Source: Idaho Bureau of Homeland Security. Regional Response Teams. Retrieved from http://www.bhs.idaho.gov/agency/ops/rrt.htm

or the central area of a city were contaminated with radioactive material, commerce there might be suspended. (6) Long-term casualties. Inhalation of radioactive material or expo- sure to gamma sources could lead to such casualties, probably in small numbers.

PERSONAL PROTECTION EQUIPMENT (PPE) The police response to a WMD attack is mostly contingent on adequate prevention of officers becoming casualties themselves and the level of preparedness officers have for these events. One police officer in a conference related to this topic described the police response to a WMD attack and the wearing of PPE this way:

It’s a timeliness issue. Are we saving a person’s life now or going to get the equipment to put on first? What wins? The person does. It’s as simple as that.29

Despite there being an element of truth to this statement, as police officers are trained that life is most important, this type of mentality must be overcome. If police favor a per- son’s life over donning their protective gear first, they may not only be jeopardizing the person’s life, but their own as well. Becoming part of the problem is not part of the solu- tion. Training for these types of attacks is critical to preparing officers to work in this en- vironment, and much of this is contingent on the officers having the proper PPE to be able to work and survive under these conditions.

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The U.S. Conference of Mayors, in the aftermath of 9-11, addressed a key concern regarding the fielding of proper and adequate PPEs. The argued that “cities of all sizes have consistently raised concerns about the lack of availability of equipment such as pro- tective suits, gas masks, detection devices, or protective drugs for first responders.”30 At the same time as the U.S. Conference of Mayors released their white paper on safety, the Rand Corporation sponsored a conference to analyze the experience of first responders, not only to the events of 9-11, but also of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building bomb- ing in Oklahoma City and the anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001.31 The most important conclusion of the Rand Corporation’s report was when they explained that “the definition and roles of an emergency responder expanded greatly in the wake of the terrorist attacks, but few of the responders had adequate PPE, training, or information for such circum- stances.”32 The Rand Corporation conference revealed that first responders, especially law enforcement, did not have the proper level of PPE available to them in their response to these terrorist attacks, they were inadequately trained or not trained at all to respond to such attacks, and they lacked the requisite knowledge to know how to effectively respond.

One realization about the terrorist attacks was that for first responders, they must un- derstand the magnitude of the attacks and that like 9-11, there were multiple threats and multiple attacks.33 Taken further, it should be recognized that although each of these attacks only lasted a short time, the response to the attacks was a long-term campaign. The term first responders is perhaps misleading. It sounds as if these individuals respond first and that someone will come in eventually to relieve them. In the case of 9-11, that couldn’t have been further from the truth. Therefore, law enforcement should be thinking long-term responses to these types of attacks and must be prepared to implement rotation plans.

Another realization from the terrorist attacks was that when a WMD is used, it creates a hazardous environment above and beyond the contamination itself. Other considerations must be made for the rubble, debris, dust, smoke, heat, and stress of working long term in this type of environment. Although protective gear is assuredly needed for the biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear attacks, they are also needed for operating in the hazardous environment that is created by a large-scale attack.

For law enforcement, however, having PPE in the first place is perhaps the first critical hurdle to overcome. Most police officers do not carry, have available, or have the necessary training on how to properly wear PPE.34 Assuming they do have the PPE available, issues arise as to the condition of the PPE, whether or not it is the right PPE for the environment, and whether or not it is compatible for police duties. As the panelists of the conference hosted by RAND noted, “Most PPE is not designed or manufac- tured with the law-enforcement mission in mind.”35 In addition, the panelists noted that when police officers do carry PPE with them, it is usually stored in the trunk of the car, along with a large amount of other equipment, thus the packaging is exposed to possible tearing. Once the packaging is torn, the protection offered by the PPE is only 60 to 90 more days. Moreover, the panelists mentioned that police officers do not generally have the proper footwear, gloves, eye protection, hearing protection, or head protection for responding to these events and surviving in them during the af- termath. As one law enforcement official said, “You’ve got to understand what you’re dealing with . . . we can equip our first responders to a certain level . . . but as man- agers, we have to understand what risks they are capably of dealing with or what haz- ards . . . if we put them in the wrong outfit and something happens to them, then we’re going to get sued.”36 More importantly, officers may die.

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Another area that police tend to be lacking in both equipment and training is in the proper protective masks. Simple painting masks and respirators are better than nothing, but in a WMD environment they are useless. Although many police departments secured military-style protective masks in the early 1990s, the rubber in them cracks, the filters must be replaced, and they must be maintained. In addition, even if these preventative measures have been taken, if officers do not have the masks readily available to them or do not know how to properly don and wear the protective masks, they quickly become casualties themselves.

Perhaps an even larger concern is the police ability to coordinate a WMD scene, pre- vent individuals from leaving, and moving all those contaminated to a decontamination site. One only has to watch the BBC movie Dirty War to quickly grasp the complexities

BOX 5-5

HOMELAND SECURITY TACTICS BY EXAMPLE:THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT

Phillip Davis, Sam Houston State University

The Los Angeles Police Department has implemented several tactics with respect to homeland security following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001.Their strategy has focused on three areas: Training, Interdiction, and Response.

Training:

All Department personnel have received an eight-hour block of training on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The training included information on the root of domestic and foreign Terrorism, recognition of precursor chemicals and equipment used in WMDs and response to WMD incidents. All field personnel have been issued protective equipment in- cluding nuclear, biological, and chemical protective gas masks. Training has been delivered to allied agencies at the Airport and Port of Los Angeles in unified operations.This training will continue until all parts of the City are integrated.

Currently in development are expanded training in response to WMD attacks, using the issued protective equipment, cooperative training for Law Enforcement and Fire De- partment managers in unified operations, training in terrorism awareness and suspicious activities reporting for the private sector and interactive first responder training based on the U.S. Marine Corps simulation technology.

Interdiction:

The Department’s ability to investigate and interdict a terrorist act before it is carried out has been enhanced through the Department’s involvement in the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group, the Los Angeles Task Force on Terrorism, and the establishment of a Terror- ism Threat Assessment Center. The department’s surveillance and analysis assets have been expanded to identify and disrupt active terrorist cells in the Los Angeles area before they can cause harm to our communities.

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FITNESS 189

Response:

Bomb Squad, HazMat, SWAT and Air capabilities have been enhanced through training and tech- nological advances. Real-time information is now available to responders via microwave links to the City’s information backbone, allowing incident commanders to access critical information from the field. The Los Angeles Police Department is continuing to develop capabilities and de- ploy innovative technologies to keep Los Angeles the safest big city in the United States.

The LAPD has also undertaken operations such as Operation Archangel, in an effort to predict vulnerabilities.

Operation Archangel and DHS:

Archangel is a partnership between the City and County of Los Angeles, the California De- partment of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Designed to identify critical locations in Los Angeles and develop a multiagency response. Archangel is geared toward facilitating the management of information and resources for the prevention, deterrence, response, and mitigation to major incidents. It develops interactive electronic tar- get folders for critical locations in Los Angeles.

Source: LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT PRESS RELEASE.Thursday, July 8, 2004.“Counter Terrorism And The LAPD” http://www.lapdonline.org/press_releases/2004/07/pr04369.htm

of a WMD scene and how quickly police resources can become overwhelmed in trying to channel people to a decontamination site. In addition, working in this type of envi- ronment with the PPE can be exhausting and fatiguing and replacements may not come quick enough. Moreover, the decontamination of the officers and the issuance of fresh PPE becomes critical to the police department’s ability to properly respond. The key is obviously training. And, unfortunately the RAND panel “agreed that law enforcement is ‘behind the curve,’ compared with other emergency responders, in terms of receiving PPE training or information.”37

FITNESS A highly related aspect of responding to a catastrophic event is officer fitness and well- ness. Although PPE is important on scene for officers, the ability to survive in the PPE in this environment will take an individual who is physically capable of handling the long-term exertions caused not only by the event, but also by working in the PPE. Al- though many have argued that police officers are more fit today than they were 20 or 30 years ago, there is the realization that once officers pass the physical fitness tests of the hiring process and graduate from the academy, there is little concern by most departments for the physical fitness of the officers.38 Poor physical fitness can lead to the body’s inability to handle stress and overexertion, leading to cardiovascular incidents that “are significant causes of injuries and death among police and EMS responders.”39

In addition, response to such large-scale events or terrorist encounters can lead to heavy emotional tolls on police officers. This is not only true of actual incidents, but it is

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also true of placing police officers on numerous alerts where they are working long shifts with no time off until the alert levels are reduced. This is causing both physical and mental fatigue on officers and in some cases is causing burnout and rises in sick days being used.40 Physical fitness and mental fitness are highly related with one an- other, and therefore neither should be overlooked.

Police departments, if concerned with homeland security, must not only prepare its de- partment in a number of ways, such as training and equipping its officers in new ways, but it must also physically prepare its officers to be able to work in this environment. Therefore, police departments should establish more incentives for officers to remain in good physical shape, they should provide training on proper nutrition, diet, and exercise; provide the fa- cilities for officers to exercise; and provide the time to perform such exercise. Exercise, both anaerobic (e.g., weightlifting) and aerobic (e.g., running, martial arts), should be a continual part of the officers’ in-service training. This should not be relegated to the fitness officer, the SWAT team, or the academy instructors, but rather a routine part of all officers’ duties. In addition, to compliment the focus on the physical, police departments should develop stress programs for officers and their families.41

ANTITERRORISM UNITS In many countries around the world, unlike in the United States, the threat of terrorism has been a very consistent part of policing. Police officers are often the first to respond to ter- rorist threats and attacks and are often the actual targets of the terrorists themselves.42 Ac- cording to a report by Raymond E. Foster, “The data indicates that police officers worldwide

SWAT team members (Source: PhotoEdit Inc. Photo by Dwayne Newton)

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ANTITERRORISM UNITS 191

are on the front line in the war against terror,” and that “they are the ones making arrests, guarding critical facilities and responding to the scenes of terrorist acts.”43 In fact, according to Foster’s data, worldwide there were over 3,000 terrorist incidents in 2004 with over 1,000 officers being killed and another 1,300 wounded.44 As Foster explained, “A closer look at ter- rorist acts reveals that among the incidents involving police officers, fatalities occur during attempts to arrest terrorists, guard duty of critical facilities, response to situations, the con- ducting of routine operations, such as traffic control, and off-duty ambushes.”45 Although the numbers remain almost nonexistent in the United States, this does not mean that police departments should not be thinking about their capabilities for affecting the arrest of ter- rorists or responding to an ongoing terrorist incident.

The response to these threats in other countries has been the development of an- titerrorism units. Although these units are similar to America’s special weapons and tac- tics (SWAT) teams, they are specifically trained to deal with terrorist incidents. Examples include the half-dozen antiterrorism units of the Polish police or the Nucleo Operativo Centrale di Sicurezza of the Italian National Police. These units bear some resemblance to the American SWAT teams, such as uniforms, weapons, and tactical training, but their sole focus is on the response to terrorist or potential terrorist incidents. Whereas the typ- ical SWAT response may work well for a bank robber, a hostage situation, or high-risk warrant execution against gang members or common criminals, they may not be as ef- fective against terrorists who have different motives, training, and capabilities. Hence the training of antiterrorism units must be tailored to a terrorist response.

SWAT teams in the United States have expanded over the past 30 years since their early development in the late 1960s. Recent research has found that in 1980, approx- imately 55 percent of police departments serving populations over 50,000 had SWAT teams.46 By the 1990s, that number had risen to an estimated 90 percent.47 Recent scholarship has taken to calling this the “militarization” of policing, arguing that in- creased SWAT teams demonstrates that police are becoming more militarylike in their response to crime.48 Although the adoption of SWAT teams by America’s police de- partments hardly qualifies the police as becoming more like the military, this frivolous argument aside, what is needed under policing for homeland security is a unit that is highly prepared to respond to terrorist incidents or intervene in terrorist operations. If this means America’s police must become more “militarylike,” then so be it.

Large-city police departments, having the luxury of greater resources and more SWAT teams already in place, should pick the best, brightest, and most capable team to begin developing it as an antiterrorism unit (ATU). For medium to large agencies that cannot afford this luxury, the existing SWAT teams should begin receiving training on how a response to terrorism will change the police tactics of the SWAT team, so that they can be better prepared to respond to these types of situations. Tactical training should focus on scenarios in specific terrorist threat locations, including airplanes, subway sys- tems, train stations, and large stadium events. The most advanced weapons and tech- nology should be dedicated to this unit for its preparation. In addition, opportunities for training should be seized and made available to the ATU, especially through training and association with other ATUs in the United States, such as the FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and the U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team (CAT), but also with in- ternational ATUs throughout the world, including the aforementioned Polish and Ital- ian ATUs and others. In addition, training with America’s special forces group should be

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encouraged, as the terrorist situations these units have actually responded to can provide enormous insight into a police ATU that is going to have far less real-world experience.

COMMUNITY One other aspect of police tactics for homeland security that should be considered is the role of the community. Although there has been much talk and rhetoric regarding how homeland security can be achieved through community policing, little has been paid to the specifics.49 The general argument for why homeland security can be achieved through the auspices of community policing has to do with the ties created with the community by the police under this philosophical approach to policing. It is envisioned that these strong ties will allow for an open communication between citi- zens and police and that when coming across terrorists, citizens will report them to the police. The argument contains a number of assumptions. The first is that under com- munity policing, the community and police have built strong ties. In many cases, com- munity policing has been weakly implemented, and strong ties with the community are lacking. Assuming that where community policing has been successful, the police and citizens do have strong ties, there is another assumption that citizens will know what to look for in terms of suspicious terrorist behavior. In general, citizens will not be able to identify terrorists because if terrorists are successful in their mission, they will blend into the local community. Like the response after the discovery of many serial killers, the discovery that certain people were terrorists is typically along the lines of, “He was a nice neighbor or a very quiet individual.” In fact, taken further, it is most likely that citizens, in identifying individuals as potential terrorist suspects, will draw more heav- ily on racial and ethnic profiling than would the police, as this is most likely all they will have to go on.

This is not to say that the community cannot play a role in homeland security or that community policing practices should be entirely dropped in favor of homeland security. It is merely saying that citizens will most likely play a very different role. The role that would be most fitting under homeland security is that of citizen volunteers reestablishing a civil de- fense role, one that local police could draw on in case of not only terrorist attacks, but natu- ral disasters as well. Citizens, working with the police on a volunteer basis, should begin collaborating in preparation for possible terrorist attacks and different scenarios that may oc- cur based on threat.

A perfect example for the potential collaboration between police and citizens comes from a legitimate threat and an innovative means of preparing to deal with such a threat. The bombings of train/metro stations in both Spain and England highlighted a very real threat to America’s infrastructure, its railways. Police responded with beefed up patrols, but that is a severe drain of resources. Under community policing, the concept of police and citizen col- laboration may be to have citizens riding the subway be the “eyes and ears” for the police on their individual trains. Although this is not inherently a bad idea, as with cell phone tech- nology today, these “eyes and ears” can communicate in a rapid manner. However, more than likely, as in the Spain and England bombings, there will be no warning signs that even trained citizens will be prepared for. Once the bomb is detonated, other than contacting the local police at that point, the concepts of community policing essentially end.

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COMMUNITY 193

Under the old civil defense model, updated to homeland security, a very important function of the citizen–police collaboration would begin. Citizens, trained by the police, would begin securing the area, attending to those injured, evacuating the subways, and helping people to the rail platforms, where they can receive medical attention. They would be trained to recognize whether or not the bomb was a conventional bomb or a WMD. Quickly understanding the nature of the incident would help not only the police, but also all first responders in understanding what they are dealing with, whether or not they need to secure a large area, and whether or not decontamination is necessary. If de- contamination is going to be required, having citizens onboard the trains assists in the process would create a more orderly situation.

This is, in fact, what the Washington D.C., Metropolitan Transit Authority Police did under a program financed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and through the cooperation of surrounding police departments.50 Citizens who regularly rode the metro subway in the Washington, D.C., area were asked to serve as citizen volunteers by undergo- ing 20 hours of training and learning how to navigate the tracks in a dark subway tunnel (keeping in mind that the third rail is electrified). According to Lyndsey Layton, a reporter for the Washington Post, “Members of the community emergency response teams were given backpacks, or ‘go-bags,’ that include a yellow Day-Glo safety vest, a green hard hat, safety goggles, gloves, a medical mask, flashlight, duct tape and other supplies.”51 This team is encouraged to carry these “go-bags” with them when they ride the metro. In addition, it is the intent of the Metro transit police to begin training regular riders who would volunteer for preparation training. As Captain Delinsky of the Metro police explained, “We know there’s a demand for the public to be involved.”52 This is the type of involvement that would serve the community best under a police–community partnership for homeland security and is reminiscent of the original concept of civil defense.

This would not be limited to trains and subways, but could be expanded to all types of transit systems. In addition, any type of location identified through both threat and risk assessments, especially those identified as particularly vulnerable, could benefit from this

BOX 5-6

HOMELAND SECURITY TACTICS BY EXAMPLE: CITY OF WHITE PLAINS NEW YORK

Since 9-11, the City of White Plains Public Safety has taken a proactive stance in preparing its agency for homeland security. It has ensured its officers are adequately trained in a variety of areas that support the both the Homeland Security Strategy and Police Operations. The fol- lowing are examples of the types of training received:

WMD Hazmat Technicians Course, Anniston, Alabama, July 2003 Members of both the Police and Fire Bureaus attended training in Anniston, Alabama, hosted by the Department of Justice Office of Domestic Preparedness. The training included working in a live WMD environment, collecting specimens, analyzing air and agent quality, collection of evidence, full-scale evacuations and large-scale decontami- nation. Members worked with live VX and GB nerve agents and practiced with level

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A and C protective suits as well as SCBA and APR respirators. Some members who underwent the training have received certification as Office of Domestic Preparedness WMD instructors.

Water Rescue Technician Course, July 2003 With the opening of Liberty Park in White Plains, members of both the Police and Fire Bureaus were trained as Water Rescue Technicians.Training included all aspects of water rescue, including drowning victims, unconscious persons in the water, capsized boats, use of flotation devices, fire equipment utilization, and rescue boat operations.

Basic SWAT Training, November 2003 Select members of the Police Bureau received 40 hours of SWAT training, which was in- structed by members of the National Tactical Officers Association. Members were intro- duced to basic SWAT tactics and techniques which included, but were not limited to: historical overview of SWAT, team organization and structure, resolution of barricaded sus- pect situations, covert individual and team movement, searches and room clearing, chemi- cal agents, less-lethal options, high-risk warrant service, and multiple field training exercises.

Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings, Soccoro, New Mexico, March 2004 Police members traveled to New Mexico in March of 2004 to attend an awareness level course developed by the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology in association with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Course studies included the recogni- tion and identification of explosives and incendiaries, incident response, first responder priorities, rescue and recovery, medical treatment and evacuation, fire suppression, and evidence recovery. The course focused on all types of explosive devices, ranging from small pipe bombs to large (500-lb.) car bombs. Students learned intricacies of these de- vices by constructing them themselves. Explosives were detonated and mock crime scenes established for evidence collection practice.

Volunteer Division CERT Training, April 2004 All White Plains Volunteer Division members have been asked to complete the Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) training program. The CERT program is administered by the New York State Emergency Management Office.The goal of the CERT program is to pro- vide volunteers with basic skills needed to respond to the community’s immediate needs in the aftermath of a natural or man-made disaster. CERT represents a vital component of the Department’s mission to ensure the safety of our residents and visitors.The 20-hour course encompasses nine training units: Emergency Preparedness, Fire Safety, Emergency Medical Operations I, Emergency Medical Operations II, Light Search and Rescue Operations, CERT Organization, Disaster Psychology,Terrorism and CERT, and Disaster Simulation.

Thirty-five Volunteer Firefighters and 8 Auxiliary Police Officers have completed the first CERT training program.The second CERT training program started in the beginning of June of 2004 with a goal of training another 60 volunteers by December 15, 2004. A database listing CERT personnel has been established with emergency contact informa- tion. A call-out procedure has been developed for CERT members and was tested in a limited call-out of Volunteer Fire Officers. The Volunteer Division is also developing mo- bilization procedures for CERT.

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WMD/Nuclear Responder Operations Course, April 2004. Members of both the Police and Fire Bureaus attended a four-day Weapons of Mass De- struction/Nuclear Responder Operations Course, which was held in downtown White Plains. The course, hosted by Bechtel Nevada Counter Terrorism Operations Support, was delivered to municipalities and jurisdictions throughout the United States and its territories approved by the Office for Domestic Preparedness.

Training focused on basic radiological detection, survey instruments, risk-based response, crime-scene preservation, personal protective equipment,radiological de- contamination, and mitigation of radiological incidents. The course consisted of both classroom instruction and scenario-driven, hands-on, performance-oriented practical exercises. The exercises provided realistic weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sce- narios with a culmination exercise that included radiological sources, smoke, py- rotechnics, emergency response vehicles and role players.

Interview and Interrogation Training, May 2004 All members of the Criminal Investigations Division attended an Interview and Interro- gation Course instructed by Special Agents of the U.S. Justice Department’s Drug En- forcement Administration. Many interview and interrogation techniques were discussed and demonstrated. Other subject matter included environmental preparation and how to differentiate types of nonverbal behavior.

Source: White Plains Public Safety. (2005). White Plains Public Safety Homepage. Available online at http://www.ci.white-plains.ny.us/safety/counter.htm; downloaded December 7, 2005.

program. If the police and other first responders could identify the location, then work together to identify the regulars and secure volunteers, citizen involvement in homeland security would create an added layer of preparedness and enhance capabilities for an ordered response. For instance, regular season ticket holders at stadiums across the United States could be identified and trained for emergency preparedness. Regular office workers in high-rise buildings could also be identified and trained. These and other locations could benefit from having these citizens prepared to help in the event of not only a terrorist attack, but any type of attack or natural disaster for that matter. Ad- ditional training could also enhance the citizens’ ability to identify suspicious behaviors or events and report them to the police. Essentially these would be trained “eyes and ears,” rather than encouraging the public-at-large to identify sleeper cells of Al-Qaeda living among us.

TRAINING Training is critical in all areas of policing for homeland security. Earl Sweeney has pointed out that the key to tactical intelligence is the line officer.53 Police officers on a daily basis come across numerous people through calls-for-service, traffic stops, and rou- tine patrol. However, as Sweeney laments, “This country has a largely untapped and un- recognized source of intelligence on terrorists and potential terrorist acts: the local police

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BOX 5-7

LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE UNIT

On March 29, 1956, representatives from 26 law enforcement agencies met in San Francisco and formed the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU). LEIU records and exchanges confidential criminal information that is not available through regular police communication channels.

LEIU has performed a valuable coordinating function among law enforcement agencies throughout the United States,Canada, and Australia. Its membership is divided geographically into four zones: the Eastern Zone, Central Zone, Northwestern Zone, and Southwestern Zone. Each zone has a chairperson and a vice chairperson.The governing body of LEIU is the executive board, which established police and oversees the admission of law enforcement agencies applying for membership. The board is composed of national officers, zone officers, the past general chair- person, a legal advisor, and a representative from the California Deparment of Justice (which is the Central Coordinating Agency for LEIU).

LEIU membership is open to state and local law enforcement agencies that have a criminal intelligence function. Applicants must be sponsored by a current member. LEIU has approximately 250 members.

LEIU holds one annual training conference on general matters and one on gaming issues. It has a central repository pointer index that its members can query confidentially. LEIU produces publications on intelligence issues of interest to its members. It also offers a gam- ing index containing names and identifiers of individuals applying for gaming licenses. An analyst is available to respond to members’ inquiries for information on suspected crimi- nals and their activities.

Source: Peterson, M. (2005). Intelligence-Led Policing:The New Intelligence Architecture. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Assistance, p. 31; Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit. (2005). Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit Homepage. Available online at http://www.leiu-homepage.org/index.php; downloaded December 7, 2005.

officer, the county deputy sheriff, and the state trooper or highway patrol officer.”54

Sweeney explained that officers can become a crucial element to America’s gathering of intelligence, but that the “challenge is to train them in what to look for, what to report, and how and to whom to report it, ensuring that appropriate follow-up occurs and that these officers receive feedback and appreciation for this efforts.”55

Sweeney advocates a number of proposals for law enforcement to play a major role in the prevention of terrorism. He advocates education and training of law enforcement to un- derstand the modus operandi of terrorists. He also encourages an international and com- parative perspective to learn how terrorists have plied their trade in other countries and to educate themselves on what has worked with other law enforcement agencies across the globe in preventing terrorism. Training on terrorism must, like all other police training, be- gin in the academy, become part of the standard roll-call training, and should be made avail- able for officer annual recertification training. In addition, police departments must consider sending their officers to both state- and nation-sponsored training on terrorism, as well as those seminars sponsored by terrorism think tanks, law enforcement institutes, and colleges and universities. Moreover, Sweeney advocates the use of nontraditional approaches to IS

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BOX 5-8

MAIL FRAUD

Paul M. Klenowski,Thiel College

Mail fraud is a unique form of white-collar crime that can range from very simple forms of deceptive mail schemes to very elaborate scams in which many perpetrators are involved in various different countries. As a result, there are few law enforcement agencies with re- sources in place that are tasked to gauge the true prevalence and scope of these types of crimes. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) collects same data on mail fraud, but the statistics are mixed in with various other types of fraud offenses, making it impossible to decipher exactly how many instances of mail fraud were reported for any given year. To get the most accurate picture of mail fraud, it is then necessary to turn to the agency mandated by Congress to investigate and prosecute these types of offenses, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service is the law enforcement branch of the U.S. Postal Service, sanctioned by Congress and guided by federal statutes and regulations to enforce and investigate any law violation that specifically deals with the use of the U.S. Postal services. As it currently stands, there are well over 200 federal statutes related to crimes against the Postal Service and its distribution of the mail.

There are currently over 1900 postal inspectors in the United States who investigate any instance in which the U.S. mail is used to carry out various forms of crime. Of these 1900 investigators, 300 are specifically tasked to deal with fraudulent cases involving the mail. Also, the Postal Inspection Service has also created a new unit called the Deceptive Mail Enforcement Team, which seeks to identify those individuals or companies who ad- minister false promotions and sweepstakes offerings that defraud customers by promising items (i.e., vacations, jewelry, cars) in exchange for personal information or coercing the in- dividual into buying their product. Postal inspectors also work very closely with state and local law enforcement organizations and federal regulatory agencies to assist in combating the problem of mail fraud.

Postal inspectors base their case investigations on the quantity, frequency, pattern of ac- tivity, and various other facts regarding complaints received from the general public. In 2003 alone, the Postal Service took over 80,000 customer complaints resulting in roughly 1,500 criminal arrests.

According to the Postal Inspection Service statistics, on average, the inspectors in- vestigate well over 3,000 mail fraud cases a year. In fiscal year 2003 alone, the number of cases investigated by inspectors was 3,150 and the number of mail fraudsters arrested and convicted was 1,453. Also, a great majority of these cases involved suspected international terrorist groups who were attempting to procure resources (money, weapons, identities, and passports) to further their illicit activities. With the skill and proficiency of the crimi- nals becoming more refined coupled with new technological advances, the number of these cases will indeed continue to increase with each passing year. As a result, better means of prevention, detection, and prosecution coupled with research and analysis of how these crimes are committed is drastically needed to truly begin to understand the scope and prevalence of mail fraud in the United States.

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antiterrorism training such as CDs, DVDs, and Web-based tutorials, as well as satel- lite broadcasts. The more educated officers can become on terrorism, antiterrorism, and counterterrorism, the better prepared they will be to protect the homeland.

Sweeney recognizes the limitations of classroom training and advocates practical train- ing that can be conducted on a regular basis because, as he put it, “the skills needed to com- bat terrorism are perishable.”56 He cited that “some academies recently have added terrorist scenarios to their firearms training and vehicular pursuit simulators,” whereas “oth- ers have included them in their officer survival scenarios in their basic and in-service pro- grams.”57 These terrorist drills provide a coordinated, supervised activity that can test a single function within an agency.58 In the two cases listed, it provides training to officers on deadly force encounters with terrorists and special concerns related to vehicle pursuits of terrorist suspects. These tactical drills can also teach officers how to react to suicide bombers, weapon of mass destruction detonation/dispersal, or crowd control at a deconta- mination site. The benefit is they are narrowly focused, provide instant feedback to the of- ficers, can be performed in a realistic environment, and evaluate performance in isolation of other factors.

Another type of training that can benefit police officers is scenario-based training. Scenario-based training is essentially “an amalgamation of knowledge and skills-based training”59 and is perhaps most critical for training in anti- and counterterrorism, as the number of actual situations will be extremely rare, thus limiting the amount of exposure an officer will have to tactical decision making in these events. These types of training exercises allow officers to employ their drill training to see how the various drills work in concert with one another. These can still remain on a limited scale, but are not relegated to the narrow focus of one specific skill.

Finally, the full-scale exercise is the most complex of the training exercises. These ex- ercises are often multiagency and multijurisdictional exercises that can test many facets of emergency response and recovery.60 They include many first responders operating under the incident command system (ICS) or unified command system (UCS) to effectively and efficiently respond to, and recover from, an incident. A full-scale exercise focuses on im- plementing and analyzing the plans, policies, and procedures previously developed to test

BOX 5-9

TOPOFF NATIONAL EXERCISE SERIES

TOPOFF (Top Officials National Exercise Series) is a congressionally mandated, national, bi- ennial exercise series designed to assess the nation’s capability to prevent, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. It examines relationship among federal, state, and local juris- dictions in response to a challenging series of integrated, geographically dispersed terrorist threats and acts. Participation in TOPOFF is by application and subsequent invitation. De- partment of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) manages the design, planning, conduct, and evaluation of the exercises. This exercise series is typically codirected by DHS/ODP and other federal agencies or departments.TOPOFF 2000 was codirected by DHS/ODP and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

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their capabilities and adjust them accordingly. The events are projected through a scripted exercise scenario with built-in flexibility to allow updates to drive activity. It is conducted in a real-time, stressful environment that closely mirrors a real event. First responders and re- sources are mobilized and deployed to the scene where they conduct their actions as if a real incident had occurred. The full-scale exercise simulates the reality of operations in multiple functional areas by presenting complex and realistic problems requiring critical thinking, rapid problem solving, and effective responses by trained personnel in a highly stressful environment. The benefits of conducting a full-scale drill is that they allow agencies to assess organizational as well as individual performance, evaluate interagency cooperation, determine how best to allocate resources and personnel, assess equipment capabilities, work through the process of activating personnel and equipment, exercise the public infor- mation system, test communication systems and procedures, and analyze the effectiveness of memorandums of agreement, standard operating procedures (SOPs), plans, policies, and the overall strategy. A good example of these full-scale exercises is the federal govern- ment’s TOPOFF exercise, which has consisted of not only federal responders, but state and local responders as well.

Although drills and scenario-based training can be developed and executed with relative ease, as they are dealing with more limited concepts and resources, larger scale, mutijurisdictional exercises, whether they are command staff training or full-scale exer- cises, require far more detailed planning and preparation. The planning process includes managing the project, convening a planning team, conducting planning conferences, iden- tifying exercise design objectives, developing the scenario and documentation, assign- ing logistical tasks, and identifying the evaluation methodology.61 As the tactical value for such an exercise is high, it is important to understand the process for building such an exercise.

To establish a foundation for designing, developing, conducting, and evaluating an ex- ercise, project management is essential and involves the following tasks: developing a proj- ect management timeline and establishing milestones, identifying a planning team, and scheduling planning conferences. Timelines should be established through a memo- randum of agreement by all vested parties and should begin with the actual exercise date that is between one and two years out. Utilizing backward planning, the specific

TOPOFF 2, completed in May 2003, was codirected by DHS/ODP and the U.S. Department of State. TOPOFF 3 was a full-scale exercise that took place from April 4–8, 2005, and in- volved more than 10,000 participants representing more than 200 federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, and international agencies and organizations and volunteer groups. The ven- ues for the exercise included a simulated chemical attack in New London, Connecticut, and a simulated biological attack in Union and Middlesex Counties, New Jersey.The exercise took place over several days allowing police officers to respond to the initial 911 calls, fire per- sonnel to conduct search and rescue operations, and hospitals to treat the injured (played by role players).

Source: Office of Domestic Preparedness. (2004). Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program. Vol. 1: Overview and Doctrine. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, p. 8.

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BOX 5-10

IDENTITY THEFT

Paul M. Klenowski,Thiel College

What Is Identity Theft?

The crime of identity theft occurs when individuals without permission transfer, take, or use the private information of others for their own personal and financial benefit. The types of information sought by these thieves include Social Security numbers, driver’s li- cense information, military records, passport and citizenship information, insurance records, tax returns, credit card numbers, and other types of financial account informa- tion. Identity theft is considered a “gateway” crime because it literally is used to open the gate of criminal activity to commit various other types of criminal offenses (e.g., passport fraud, credit card fraud, mail fraud, and embezzlement).

Prevalence

Today, the crime of identity theft is the fastest growing crime in the United States. In fact, accord- ing to the Federal Trade Commission in fiscal year 2003 alone, it had been estimated that over 10 million Americans had their identity stolen. Over a five-year period, the federal govern- ment has estimated that nearly 30 million American citizens have had their identities stolen and used for the commission of various forms of crime.

Law Enforcement Response

The need for stronger law enforcement efforts against identity theft is evident in the fact that only about 1 in 700 federal cases and 1 in 5,000 state and local cases results in the capture and successful prosecution of offenders by federal and state law enforcement officials. One of the most pressing issues facing law enforcement is the lack of training and re- sources available to aid in detection and investigation of these often complex cases of identity theft.

Today, all 50 U.S. states along with the federal government have established both laws and specialized investigative divisions to aid in the investigation and prosecution of identity theft cases. The U.S. Department of Justice now recognizes that all identity theft cases are serious offenses, even when no money is actually taken from a victim. On the federal level, violations of federal identity theft statutes are examined and investigated by the U.S. Secret Service (i.e., the only law enforcement agency in the country mandated by Congress to in- vestigate all cases of identity theft), the Postal Inspector Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.These federal cases tend to be high-dollar, high-profile cases that cross state and sometimes international lines and that fall under the auspices of federal jurisdiction. For ex- ample, many of the individuals that the Department of Justice and the Department of Home- land Security are still holding in conjunction with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, are currently being incarcerated under federal identity theft and passport fraud statutes.

State and local cases, on the other hand, are usually investigated by specialized members of a multiagency task force within a particular region or state.These task forces are usually spear- headed by local and state district attorneys who look to collectively assemble experts in the

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various areas of detection, investigation, and prosecution of identity theft cases.These task force members usually have had numerous training courses and practical work experience in dealing with various forms of identity theft and fraud. It should also be mentioned that a majority of these state and local task forces have now joined with federal investigators and prosecutors to attempt to make a unified stance against these types of crimes. For example, the U.S. Secret Ser- vice has assisted in creating regional identity theft task forces that bring together various levels of law enforcement, prosecutorial staff, research analysts, scholars, and other government offi- cials to join efforts in combating identity theft in America.The first task force of its kind created by the U.S. Secret Service began its operations in 1995 and was called the Electronic Crimes Task Force of New York.Today, every region of the United States has a task force of this type, and it has started to make a noticeable impact against identity theft in this country. Unfortu- nately, however, the victimization rate in United States continues to grow, ultimately meaning that more funding, training, and resources must continue to be funneled into our nation’s efforts against the new crime epidemic of identity theft.

requirements can be detailed by specific dates as deadlines, thus creating the neces- sary milestones needed to work toward the final exercise. Once the various actors are all identified and a memorandum of agreement is signed to enter into the planning process, an exercise planning team should be identified.

The exercise planning team is responsible for designing, developing, conducting, and evaluating all aspects of an exercise. The planning team determines exercise design objectives, tailors the scenario to jurisdictional needs, and develops documents used in exercise evaluation, control, and simulation. Planning team members also help with de- veloping and distributing preexercise materials and conducting exercise briefings and training sessions. Due to this high level of involvement, planning team members are ideal selections for observer/controllers and evaluators during the exercise itself.

The exercise planning team is managed by an exercise director. The team should be a manageable size and include a representative from each major participating jurisdiction and response agency. The membership of an exercise planning team should be modified to fit the type or scope of an exercise. The exercise planning team should use the ICS structure, so that the exercise, as it develops, will include perspectives from all the key ICS players. This helps it define each member’s role, responsibilities, and functional area skills during the planning and execution of the exercise.

A series of planning conferences should be utilized throughout the planning process to ensure that the exercise remains on schedule and that all the vested parties have a chance to have their needs and concerns voiced. The first meeting is to develop the memorandum of agreement that an agency will be signing on and committing to the exercise. This concept and objectives meeting should be used to identify the type, scope, objectives, and purpose of the exercise. This is typically attended by the spon- soring agency, lead exercise planner, and senior officials from the various agencies that have signing authority.

Once the concept meeting results in a signed agreement, the initial planning con- ference (IPC) should be scheduled. The IPC lays the foundation for exercise develop- ment. It is used to gather input from the exercise planning team on the scope, design,

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objectives and scenario variables (e.g., hazard selection, venue). The IPC obtains the planning team’s input on exercise location, schedule, duration, and other details required to develop exercise documentation. Planning team members should be assigned respon- sibility for the tasks outlined in the meeting.

At the halfway point between the initial planning conference and the exercise, there should be a midterm planning conference (MPC). The MPC presents an additional op- portunity in the planning timeline to settle logistical and organizational issues that arise during planning such as staffing concepts, scheduling, logistics, administrative require- ments, and reviewing draft documentation.

As the exercise approaches, a final planning conference (FPC) should be conducted, usually one to two weeks prior to the exercise. This is a forum to review the process and procedures for conducting the exercise, final drafts of all exercise materials, and all logistical requirements. There should be no major changes made to either the design or the scope of the exercise or to any supporting documentation.

Building on the exercise foundation, the design and development process should focus on identifying objectives, designing the scenario, creating documentation, coordinating logistics, planning exercise conduct, and selecting an evaluation and improvement method- ology. The first of these, exercise objectives, defines specific goals, provides a framework for scenario development, guides individual organizational objective development, and pro- vides exercise evaluation criteria. Generally, planners will limit the number of exercise ob- jectives to enable timely execution, facilitate design of a reasonable scenario, and adequately support successful completion of exercise goals.

The actual scenario used provides the backdrop and story line that drives an exercise. The first step in designing the scenario is determining the type of threat/hazard (e.g., chem- ical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive, cyber, or other). Thought should be given to creating a scenario that involves local incidents and local facilities and is based on exercise objectives derived from the jurisdiction’s risk and vulnerability assessments (see Chapter 4). For example, if the risk and vulnerability assessment identified a crit- ical infrastructure at a local facility (such as a refinery, chemical plant, sport stadium) as a vulnerable target, the scenario could describe a terrorist event at that facility. Each type of hazard presents its own stengths and weaknesses for evaluating different aspects of prevention, response, and recovery and is applicable to different exercise objectives. Scenarios should not, however, include an “everything but the kitchen sink approach,” in that they must be realistic.

The next step is to determine the venue (facility or site) that the scenario will affect. Venue selection should be based on the type of hazard used. For example, if a nonpersis- tent chemical agent (e.g., sarin) is selected, the venue should not be an open-air facility (e.g., a sport stadium) because of the agent’s dissipating characteristics. Once this is com- pleted, the next step is to begin collecting information to create a number of documents. These documents are often generated in concert together so that issues, as they relate to each other, are adequately identified. The five documents to be developed include the exercise plan, the controller and evaluator handbook, the master scenario events list, the exercise evaluation guidelines, and exercise policies.

The exercise plan (EXPLAN) is typically used for operations-based exercises. It provides an exercise synopsis and is published and distributed prior to the start of the exercise. In addition to addressing exercise objectives and scope, the EXPLAN assigns

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tasks and responsibilities for successful exercise execution. The EXPLAN should not contain detailed scenario information, such as the hazard to be employed. This docu- ment is generally intended for exercise players and observers.

The controller and evaluator handbook (C/E Handbook) supplements the EX- PLAN, containing more detailed information about the exercise scenario and de- scribing exercise controllers’ and evaluators’ roles and responsibilities. Because the C/E handbook contains information on the scenario and exercise administration, it should only be distributed to those individuals specifically designated as controllers and evaluators.

The master scenario events list (MSEL) is a chronological timeline of expected ac- tions and scripted events to be injected into exercise play by controllers to generate or prompt player activity. It ensures necessary events happen so that all objectives are met.

The exercise evaluation guidelines (EEGs) are to help with exercise evaluation. These guides incorporate the critical tasks that should be completed in the exercise. The EEGs have been developed for use by experienced exercise evaluators, as well as by practitioners who are subject matter experts but have little or no exercise evaluation experience. EEGs provide evaluators with information on what they should expect to see, space to record observations, and questions to address after the exercise as a first step in the analysis process.

Finally, the exercise policies are developed to provide guidance or parameters of ac- ceptable practices for designing, developing, conducting, and evaluating exercises. They are designed to prevent or, at a minimum, mitigate the impact of an action that may cause bodily harm to participants, destruction of property, or embarrassment to the local com- munity and participating agencies. Agencies should develop policies appropriate to the type of exercise that address safety, media, cancellation, weather, and weapons safety.

After the design and development tasks are completed, the exercise takes place. Exercise conduct details include setup, briefings, facilitation/control, and wrap-up ac- tivities. In regard to setup, the planning team should visit the exercise site at least one day, if not several days, prior to the event to set up the site. On the day of the exer- cise, planning team members should arrive early before the scheduled start to handle any remaining logistical or administrative items pertaining to setup and to arrange for registration. Facilities must be available for presentations and briefings of all the ex- ercise participants to discuss exercise policies and safety. In addition, for an opera- tions-based exercise, planners must consider the assembly area, response routes, response operations area, parking, registration, observer/media accommodations, and a facility for the various volunteers playing roles in the exercise. Restrooms and water should be available to all participants, observers, and actors. All individuals permitted at the exercise should be wearing some form of identification. Perimeter security and site safety during both setup and the exercise are essential.

Once assembled, presentations and briefings should be used as a tool for deliver- ing information to all participants. This may include briefings from controllers/evalua- tors, hospitals, actors, players, and observer/media. This is also the time to distribute exercise documentation, provide necessary administrative information, and answer any last-minute questions.

In the operations-based exercise, controllers will manage exercise play, set up and op- erate the exercise incident site, and possibly take the roles of response individuals and

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BOX 5-11

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC)

Paul M. Klenowski,Thiel College

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, also known as FLETC, is a law enforcement partnership funded by the federal government and operating under the Department of Homeland Security. FLETC’s mission is to offer high-quality professional law enforcement training at cost-efficient prices. This federal training center provides both federal law en- forcement officers (excluding Federal Bureau of Investigation officers and agents) and state, local, and international police officers and agents with a multitude of training courses on a va- riety of different basic and specialty law enforcement topics.

Mission and Operations

As previously stated, FLETC was created to serve as a high-quality training center for federal law enforcement officers. Since its inception, the mission has expanded to include law en- forcement officers at various levels throughout the United States and abroad. Currently, FLETC offers over 200 training programs and courses ranging from basic to advanced polic- ing and investigative techniques to international courses regarding global terrorism. All these programs are continually evaluated and assessed through curriculum meetings and student evaluation reports to ensure that the quality of instruction remains extremely high, profes- sional, and efficient. Based on the needs of a particular agency, FLETC officials also offer a unique selection of technical, clerical, and managerial support services to enhance the overall training needs of the participating agency.

FLETC instructors are experienced and highly trained professionals who have at least five years of law enforcement or investigative experience. Instructors range from federal officers and investigators on assignment from their respective agencies to state and local police officers who have specialized skills in a particular area (i.e., fingerprint analysis, forensic investigation) to civil instructors who have particular training in a law enforcement–related field (e.g., hand-to-hand combat, behavioral profiling, fraud investigation). Instructors include both full- and part-time fac- ulty who are complemented by a full-time support staff.

It is also important to note that because both the Oklahoma City Federal building bombing and the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Federal Training Center has seen a tremendous increase in issues involving terrorism. As a result, the need to create more specific courses centering on in- ternational and domestic terrorism has become one of the new operating goals of FLETC.With respect to international terrorism, FLETC has become an important venue for international offi- cers and government officials to learn about the potential concerns regarding global terrorism.

History

FLETC officially took shape on March 2, 1970, and began its official operations in Washington D.C. Later in 1975, the center was relocated to its present headquarters near Brunswick, Georgia, in the small town of Glynco.The creation of FLETC was the result of a 1968 study conducted by an interagency task force comprised of various federal law enforcement agen- cies.The results of the study indicated that federal law enforcement officers reporting to the various federal agencies had no consistency in their formal law enforcement training. One of

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the major concerns with the study’s findings centered on the fact that most federal law en- forcement officers lacked the appropriate training, knowledge, and specific skill sets to do their job at even a minimum level of efficiency. In fact, most federal law enforcement training up to 1970 was conducted by part-time instructors, in dilapidated facilities, and with no consistent schedule of training courses or particular subject material.

To address this problem, the interagency task force proposed that a central Federal Law Enforcement Training Center be established.This proposed recommendation called for a cen- trally located state-of-the-art training facility that was to be operated and managed by a full-time staff that looked to offer high-quality programs ranging from basic law enforcement courses to highly specific investigative classes on a wide array of topics (e.g., money laundering investiga- tion, drug identification, fraud investigation). Finally, in 1970, the federal interagency task force signed a federal Memorandum of Understanding for the Establishment of the Consolidated Fed- eral Law Enforcement Training Center. It was further decided that the U.S.Treasury Department would provide both managerial and administrative support for the new facility because the de- partment had already established a successful interbureau training organization known as the Treasury Law Enforcement Training School. At the conclusion of its first year of operation in 1970, FLETC graduated 848 police officers from the center. By the end of 1975, the number of graduates had climbed to well over 5,000 officers. Since 1970, more than 325,000 federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement officers have successfully graduated from one of the many training courses and programs that FLETC has offered.

Organization

Today, FLETC is part of the Department of Homeland Security with a director who specifically answers to the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security. FLETC is governed by an eight-person interagency board of directors representing various federal law enforcement agencies throughout the country. Assisting the FLETC director is an executive staff comprising one deputy director, six assistant directors, a team of legal counsel, and a chief-of-staff operations.

Today, FLETC offers training to a majority of federal officers and agents from more than 80 different federal agencies.Along with federal law enforcement training, the center also pro- vides instruction to hundreds of state, local, and international police agencies. On average, FLETC graduates more than 50,000 officers a year from their numerous training programs with an annual budget of more than $200 million. Currently, FLETC’s 1,500-acre training cen- ter is now the largest in the United States and is now considered to be one of the elite train- ing facilities in the world. Along with its main center in Glynco, Georgia, the center now has four satellite training campuses that offer a vast array of law enforcement courses. These FLETC centers are located in Cheltenham, Maryland, Charleston, South Carolina, Artesia, New Mexico, and Gaborone, Botswana, Africa.

agencies not actually participating in the exercise. For instance, if the agencies on scene re- quest support from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is not a participant in the ex- ercise, the controller/evaluators will serve as the representatives of this agency. Controllers also give key data to players and may prompt or initiate certain player actions based on the MSEL to ensure that objectives are met and the exercise maintains continuity. Controllers are the only participants who should provide information or direction to the players. All con- trollers should be accountable to one senior controller, who serves as the exercise director.

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If the exercise proceeds well and the mission is being accomplished, the exercise should continue to play out and follow the MSEL. If certain agencies are not perform- ing as expected and are deviating heavily from a standard response, the exercise can be halted for a midpoint debriefing or hot wash (see Assessment, following). Once a review of what is going well and what is going poorly is made, recommendations for improve- ments can be made prior to continuing with the exercise. Once the exercise is completed, both a debrief and hot wash should occur immediately, which should then be followed by an after-action analysis and formal report.

ASSESSMENT After any major event, such as those that occurred on 9-11, agencies should conduct eval- uations to determine what went well and what went poorly, and more specifically, how best to improve in the future. An after-action review, which is a professional discussion of an event, focused on performance standards, helps police officers to discover for them- selves what happened, why it happened, and how to sustain strengths and improve on weaknesses. Ultimately, what should be produced from the more informal after-action review is a formal after-action report, such as the one published by the Arlington County Police Department, based on their response to the attack on the Pentagon on 9-11.62 The most important element of the after-action report is the improvement plan. It should identify weaknesses in the response to the significant event and offer means to improve. This improvement plan should then become part of the operational plan to improve standard operating procedures, update or change the methods for deploying technology, or identify specific tactical training or changes to current training necessary.

Recognizing, however, that most agencies will not experience such major events as the Arlington County Police Department (The ACPD had also responded to the Air Florida Crash into the 14th Street Bridge on January 13, 1982), operational exercises can provide the necessary means of identifying strengths and weaknesses in an agency’s ability to respond to a major incident, terrorist or natural, and improvement plans can be identified through debriefings and hot washes after these exercises. Therefore, any exercise should also use some form of evaluation and assessment, as well as after-action reports, to identify areas of improvement.

As evaluated practice activities, exercises provide a process for continuous improve- ment.63 Evaluation is the cornerstone of exercises; it documents strengths and opportunities and improvement in a jurisdiction’s preparedness. The evaluation process for all exercises includes a formal exercise evaluation, integrated analysis, and an after-action report and im- provement plan that should begin with exercise planning and end when improvements have been implemented and validated through subsequent exercises. The methods used include debriefings, hot washes, after-action reports, and improvement plans.

A debrief is a forum for planners, facilitators, controllers, and evaluators to review and provide feedback on an exercise. It should be a facilitated discussion that allows each person an opportunity to provide an overview of the functional area they observed and document both strengths and areas for improvement. The debrief should be facilitated by the lead exercise planner or the exercise director. The results of the debriefing should be captured by a recorder for inclusion in the after-action report.

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A hot wash occurs immediately following an exercise and allows players/responders the opportunity to provide immediate feedback. It enables controllers and evaluators to capture the events while they remain fresh in players’ minds. The first aspect of the hot wash should focus on the scenario and the response to the exercise. It should explore what went well and what went poorly in the response to the exercises incident. The sec- ond aspect of the hot wash should attempt to ascertain players’ level of satisfaction with the exercise and determine any issues or concerns and proposed improvement items. Again, like the debrief, every hot wash should have a recorder to capture the information for the after-action report.

The after-action report is used to provide feedback to participating jurisdictions on their performance during the exercise. The after-action report summarizes what happened and analyzes performance of the tasks identified through the planning process as critical and the demonstrated capacity to accomplish the overall exercise goal. The AAR includes recommendations for improvements based on the analysis, which will be addressed in the improvement plan.

To prepare the report, the exercise evaluation team will analyze data collected from the hot wash and debriefings, participant evaluations, and other sources (e.g., plans, procedures) and compare the actual results with the intended outcome. The level of detail in an AAR reflects the type and size of the exercise. AARs describe the exercise sce- nario, player activities, preliminary observations, major issues, and recommendations for improvement.

The improvement plan, which can be part of the AAR or separate, converts les- sons learned from the exercise into concrete, measurable steps that result in im- provement response capabilities. It is developed by the jurisdiction and specifically details the actions that will be taken to address each recommendation in the AAR, who or what agency will be responsible for taking the action, and the timeline for comple- tion. This review process may identify needs for additional equipment, training, exer- cises, coordination, plans, and procedures that can be addressed through the homeland security strategy and operations.

CONCLUSION In a forum related to the future of policing in the March–April 2005 issues of The Fu- turist, a panel of experts all agreed that homeland security has become the overriding strategy of policing.64 They acknowledged the threat of terrorism, both international and domestic, as being a continued threat in the future, and they also stated a fear that do- mestic criminals may learn from the terrorists and begin employing their tactics. To best respond to these threats, the panelists agreed that police tactics, complimented by ad- vances in technology, and better educated and trained officers will adequately prepare them for this new role. However, all the panelists were concerned about the availability of funding to adequately meet this new mission. In fact, one of the panelists, Judith Lewis, lamented that “the expectations of law enforcement as first responder for home- land security have put an almost unachievable burden on local law enforcement.”65 Al- though this burden may be heavy, to meet the demands of homeland security, it is imperative that policing focus on the police tactics necessary to accomplish the mission.

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A homeland security strategy for police should drive police operations and ulti- mately police tactics. It is imperative that police tactics evolve and change to meet the demands. Policing must learn to prevent future terrorist attacks by applying intelli- gence gathering to its standard operating procedures. It must be adequately prepared to deal with large-scale events, WMD, officer safety, and a whole host of other prepara- tory concerns. In addition, it must be ready to respond by continually assessing its tech- nology, training, and education on anti- and counterterrorism measures. But most important, it must ensure that tactically, police officers are prepared for their home- land security role. Remembering the words of Sun Tzu that “strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory”66 should mobilize police departments to concentrate much of their resources on police tactics for homeland security. However, it must also ensure that strategy ultimately drives tactics, for as the other part of Sun Tzu’s utter- ance states: “Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.”67

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