Research Paper

Abstract

This paper assesses the controversial and highly complex topic of the acceptance of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the EU and the US. In a comparative analysis, the three most prominent areas of research are applied to the case of genetically modified organisms, which are categorized as public opinion, lobbying, and institutional factors. The hypothesis in this analysis is that the lobbying factors affect the outcome of legislation for GMOs the most; this is based on logic as well as the proliferation of previous research regarding these particular influences. This analysis is supplemented by the quantitative analysis of a public opinion survey measuring acceptance of GMOs in the US; it tests the relationships between educational attainment, political affiliation, political ideology, and religious affiliation each with the acceptance of GMOs. The finding of the comparative analysis is that the lobbying factors, which are also closely related to the two other bodies of research, has the strongest influence of the acceptance of GMOs in a region. The survey yielded no specific conclusions other than possible relationships that existed in the data.

Table of Contents Introduction 4 The controversy over GMOs 5 Previous Research 5 Public Opinion on GMOs 7 Risk Perceptions and GMOs 9 Lobbying in GMOs 12 Lobbying in the US 12 Lobbying in the EU 14 GMO specific advocates and opposition 16 Institutional Influences 21 Precautionary Principle versus Promotion Principle 23 Product-based regulations or Process-based? 25 Research Design 28 Comparative Analysis of EU and US 28 Further Exploration into US Public Opinion 30 Survey Results 33 Assessing possible relationships in the acceptance of GMOs 34 Educational attainment 34 Political Affiliation 35 Political Ideology 36 Religious Affiliation 37 Conclusions & direction of further research 40 References 43 Appendices 47

Accepting Biotechnology: The Case of GMOs in the EU and US

Introduction

Biotechnology made its way into the agricultural world and into the food market as a new technology in the 1990s, and since has caused a great deal of controversy both at national and international levels. Genetic engineering of foods was accepted and promoted as a way to drastically improve food production and alleviate issues such as food insecurity and reducing crop loss, and to potentially revolutionize the agricultural industry. Crops were created to resist pests and droughts, and now are even being engineered to taste better and grow larger. These genetically modified organisms, as later they came to be known as, were promoted by some countries, but not all. In fact, many countries, both developing and developed, have taken action at community and governmental levels to resist genetically modified organisms from entering in their food supply.

This resistance has been driven by the uncertainty surrounding the technology, and led primarily by environmental groups and consumer activists. In countries like the US, Canada, Argentina, and China, biotechnology has been accepted and promoted. However, some countries have strict regulations in regards to GMOs because of the uncertainty of the new technology. Even still, some countries have gone to the point of banning imports, even those countries which receive food aid, as is the case in many African countries.

The most peculiar case is the difference between the EU acceptance of GMOs and the US acceptance of GMOs. Both are developed countries whose governing bodies tend to favor GMOs for economic competition in a newly arising biotechnology sector (Rosendal, 2005; Lofstedt 2002). The EU overall does not accept GMOs; however, within the EU there are significant variations in acceptance rates at the national level. In the US, the agribusiness sector is the undisputed leader in the agricultural biotechnology industry, and there has been an overall acceptance of GMOs.

The controversy over GMOs

Questions concerning GMOs entered the international political awareness as crises like the mad cow disease outbreak and other food scares occurred in Europe. Environmental and consumer activists began to label GMOs as “Frankenfoods,” often relating the new and uncertain foodstuffs to cloning (Falkner, 2007). These tactics were particularly effective in Europe, and raised questions as to whether or not GMOs were harmful to human health. No scientific evidence has confirmed these fears; yet, these fears still remain in areas where people generally do not accept genetically modified organisms. These concerns were not raised as early on in the US as it was in the EU. The remaining controversy lies with the potential effects GMOs have on allergenicity, toxicity, biodiversity and antibiotic resistance, which have been affirmed by scientists. These claims compete with the benefits presented about them initially, concerning the production, food security, and economic growth potential that this new technology could bring. These negative claims, again, have held significant influence in many European communities whereas the potential benefits have held a stronger impact in the U.S.

Previous Research

The previous political research surrounding this topic of genetically modified organisms identifies various influences in the acceptance of GMOs and the outcomes of legislation associated with it. Among these influences, the most prominent and researched factors are the risk uncertainty levels of the people in a region, the presence or absence of biotech sectors, and the use of the precautionary principle. The most prolific body of research concerns the effect that particular lobbyists have had in each region specifically, and also gives the most amount of evidence for a relationship. In each chapter, the bodies of research are assessed in greater detail.

These bodies of research on GMOs will be placed in the context of general research in which each falls, giving a holistic view to compare the differences between the EU and the US. Many comparative studies have been performed between the EU and the US with regard to the acceptance of GMOs in each region, and this tries to add to this body of research. In addition to this, the further assessment of public opinion in the US will be supplemented by a statistical analysis from a public opinion survey, using a convenience sample.

This research sets out to identify the three major influences on this acceptance of GMOs between the EU and the US, and analyze the most influential of these political forces in a general comparison. The three significant forces assessed here are public opinion, lobbying, and institutional factors; I hypothesize that the greatest influence (and therefore, difference) in the outcome of GMO legislation are the lobbying factors. Overall, there are many other factors that contribute to the public opinion and institutional forces, especially in the case of genetically modified organisms. The lobbying factors between the EU and the US demonstrate the most significant differences. Despite having institutions which would promote GMOs in order to promote economic competition, lobbyists on both anti-GMO and pro-GMO sides have successfully changed the outcome of legislation and the acceptance of GMOs depending on which lobbying sector is more prevalent in each of the regions.

Public Opinion on GMOs

Public opinion regarding the hugely complex issue of genetically engineered foods varies. The country which views GMOs most negatively is France, where 89% of the population believes that GMOs “are bad because of their potentially harmful effects on health and the environment,” (Pew Research Center, 2015). On the opposite side of the issue is the United States, where 55% of the population believes that GMOs are bad. France, although technically legal, has one of the strictest moratoriums against GMOs in the world. The United States instead has more lenient policies regarding GMOs and promotes them as a policy instead. Somewhere in the middle of these two stands Japan, where 76% of the population believes that GMOs are bad. This nation too has stricter policies regarding the existence of GMOs (Pew Research Center, 2015).

The differences and similarities in public opinion trends between the EU and the US are important to assess. In the EU, citizens “do not see the benefits of genetically modified organisms, consider genetically modified foods to be probably unsafe or even harmful and are not in favour of development of genetically modified food,” (Europa, 2010). Additionally, research demonstrates that people “feel somewhat strongly about biotechnology,” and overall have a greater awareness and salience regarding the topic than the US (Europa, 2010). The US generally has a low knowledge on the subject, and is not considered a salient political subject (Durant & Legge, 2005). Demographics such as religiosity and political ideology have been found to be a great influence of public opinion on GMOs, both in the EU and the US (Europa, 2010; Durant & Legge, 2005). On a left to right spectrum of political ideology, research suggests that the farther right on the spectrum, the greater the acceptance of GMOs. Additionally, as religiosity decreases, the acceptance of GMOs increases (Europa, 2010; Durant & Legge, 2005). So, although there are not significant differences in the public acceptance of GMOs (the US still has a majority public opinion that is opposed to GMOs) there is a significant difference in salience between the EU and the US. The differences between the EU and US regarding public opinion, as well as their respective regulatory choices, points to the further discussion of public opinion on this issue, and the possible factors that could contribute to these wide variations.

At the heart of contemporary public opinion research is how individuals process information to form opinions about different political issues. Factors that contribute to an individual’s decision-making process involve cultural values, religious values and ideologies, education, and social and economic status, as well as any other demographic. These values and experiences translate into public opinion when people with shared values act (Iyengar, 2011). In addition, the way in which public opinion is influenced by the media and the framing of information is examined. The availability of information and the use of heuristics influences individual perception and accumulation of information, based on both the frequency of the information received as well as the way in which it is presented (ie: positively or negatively) (Iyengar, 2011; Gowda, 1999). There is significant research that demonstrates that the way in which information is manipulated by the media influences public opinion (Iyengar, 2011) and instances where media attention focuses on particular subjects over others proves to become important political issues for the public. These factors influence political decision-making, and thus public opinion.

Since both the EU and the US are democratic, the idea is that public opinion influences the outcomes of legislation. In the EU where member states vote on the passing of EC legislation and the US where it is considered to be a representative democracy, public opinion should translate into legislation which is in agreement with the desires of the people. Public opinion, therefore, idealistically has a significant influence on the outcome and passage of legislation.

In contrast, there is research that demonstrates that public opinion actually has very little influence on legislation, which is important to discuss. In an analysis performed by Gilens and Page, (2014, p. 564-581) “When the preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized interest groups are controlled for, the preferences of the average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy,” which contradicts much of the accepted literature discussed earlier; however, it also does not account for the fact that much of public opinion is solely influenced by elite opinions on separate political issues (Iyengar, 2011, p. 245; McCanne, 2014). Furthermore, the way in which risk is perceived by individuals adds to the public perception of risk, and influences the importance of risk regulation by the government (Rosendal, 2005; Wohlers, 2010). These general concepts expressed and addressed by general public opinion research is applicable to the case of GMO legislation.

Risk perceptions and GMOs

Risk assessment and uncertainty tolerance levels are important gauges in how the public will respond to new technologies, and in this case, new agricultural technology. These factors strongly influence public opinion, which, in turn, influence regulatory measures that are put in place by government actors (Anker, 2009; Wohlers 2010). These concepts are considered to evaluate the cultural aspects of a society. Uncertainty tolerance levels are a measure of how “members of a society cope with anxiety by minimizing uncertainty” (Wohlers, 2010). Risk perceptions are a complex measure of how people perceive and have predispositions toward risk. The research on this topic categorizes risk perception as balanced, cautious opportunistic or indifferent. The uncertainty levels and risk perceptions of a nation are affected by what the culture as a whole values, and are used together in this theory. Strict and potentially ban-prone policies with respect to GMO legislation are correlated with political cultures with low uncertainty tolerance levels and cautious risk perceptions of their legislatures (Wohlers, 2010; Anker, 2009). Nations which fall under this category are primarily in the EU. In line with the cautious risk perception, the threat to the human health and the environment of the society is considered high risk and the belief is that there is little to gain when gambling. Law makers generally emphasize the risks of GMOs and downplay the potential benefits associated with GMOs in these areas. On the other hand, nations with high uncertainty tolerance levels, like the US, followed a mostly opportunistic risk perception model. Policymakers exaggerate the benefits and see little threat in the flaws of GMOs; this results in more lenient regulatory processes.

Public opinion in a nation is very important, and public opinion in terms of the use of GMOs is certainly influenced by public knowledge of the subject. Much of the research shows that both types of countries, ones with strict regulations on GMOs as well as ones with more lenient regulations on GMOs, had low public knowledge overall. In a study performed by Wohler (2010), each nation had different perceptions of the risks and benefits of GMOs, leading the majorities of the populations to vary in their opinions. However, throughout the research it is also evident that public knowledge increased, largely in part to the anti-GMO food campaigns throughout the 90s in the US, as well as the Mad Cow Disease outbreaks in Europe. In a study performed by Shanahan, Scheufele, and Lee, the authors show that high negative media coverage of GMOs from 1998 to 2000 resulted in increased public knowledge and more negativity toward GMOs (2001). Public knowledge of the issue rose from more than half who reported to have little or no knowledge of GMOs, to more than half reporting “at least some knowledge” of GMOs (Shanahan et al, 2001). As public knowledge increased, public opinion on GMOs became more pessimistic, and lead to more stringent legislation—even in countries which prior to the anti-GMO campaigns and the Mad Cow Disease outbreak had viewed GMOs more favorably (see also Anker; Shanahan). These studies show that public opinion and knowledge about GMOs are influenced by the media reporting of an issue, and the way people receive the information being given to them. This, in turn, influences the passing of legislation as discussed earlier.

Altogether, although public opinion is an excellent indicator of public knowledge and assessment of values and risk perception, it seems to be that it does not necessarily translate to appropriate legislation, and is itself influenced by outside factors like the media. Although it probably influences the acceptance of GMOs, there are many other factors to take into account. These public values do play an important role in the other two aspects of this analysis.

Lobbying in GMOs

Lobbying is the act of trying to influence legislation, regulation or any form of political action taken by government or representative officials. This most often manifests itself in the development of groups which lobby for particular interests, groups, or ideals; therefore, interest group politics and lobbying are almost synonymous, particularly in strong democratic regimes (Cigler, 1995; Mazey, 1993). These groups then create a cohesive mission and present to government officials and other political figures their particular interests; there is significant variation in the ways in which interest groups tend to go about this, and it varies also at which level of government they present their interests to. Although interest groups have a variety of purposes, they are most actively seen in the legislative process by physically appearing when drafting occurs, attempting to inform both active legislators and the public of where their interests lie (Petracca, 1992; Mazey, 1993). Actually passing legislation consists of many steps as well as several political actors, including the public, interest groups, campaign finances, and the administration in power. By assessing the influences of lobbying on the outcome of legislation, it will highlight complexities associated with interest groups in democracies, the government actors, and how these relate to the level of acceptance of GMOs in the EU and the US.

Lobbying in the US

In the system of the United States, although the Congress creates and writes the laws, the bureaucracy is responsible for implementing and somewhat defining the ambiguous laws. Bureaucracies often encounter such ambiguity in the writing of the law that they try to balance their own interests with the interests of stakeholders. Interest group theory demonstrates that interest groups indirectly influence passed regulations by having influence on the bureaucracy. Primarily, the interest groups offer outside resources that are not governmental in nature, like influencing public opinion through education of the public, which in turn allows them to influence the bureaucracy. Since the bureaucracies do not have the same political clout of other branches and do not have the same level of democratic backing, bureaucracies tend to be more receptive to the interests of interest groups (Cigler 1995; Yackee, 2006). These relationships can often form coalitions between industries and government officials (or government bodies in some cases), enabling them to gain wider support from the public and stronger influence in terms of legislative action (Cigler, 1995, p. 259). Therefore, interest groups influence both the public through education of issues as well as influence legislation through developing political relationships, creating a win-win for all actors involved.

Aside from the bureaucracy and their role in implementing policy, passing legislation consists of more than the mere implementation of it; what makes it to the table in Congress is a separate set of issues that are important to discuss on this topic of GMOs. As discussed earlier, public opinion can influence the success of legislation, but there have been studies to disprove this. Studies on interest group influence also show a lack of influence. One such study says, “Over-all, net interest group alignments are not significantly related to the preferences of average citizens. The net alignments of the most influential, business oriented groups are negatively related to the average citizen’s wishes,” demonstrating that although interest groups have influence, the influence does not necessarily relate to the public’s interests (Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, 2014).

The role and influence that lobbying has on legislation can also depend on the administration in power. Although lobbyists can ultimately influence individual actors, if a President does not favor groups and their interests, Presidents have the ability to steer away from these interests (Cigler, 1995, p. 303). Additionally, because the bureaucracy is essentially influenced by the executive branch, the bureaucracy also follows the President’s wishes; ultimately, this highlights that the greater significance is on how the administration in power will influence passing of legislation and not the lobbyists. The relationships between interest groups and government change, and therefore the political power of the whole system will shift as well (Petracca, 1992, p. 17).

Interested parties and individuals also influence the legislative process through campaign contributions. This highly controversial issue, particularly in the US, has transformed into a robust area of research on both sides of the issue. Some literature says that campaign finances enable people or organizations with money to have greater access to Congress people and/or committees, which in turn allows them to have greater influence on the outcome of legislation (Hojnacki and Kimball, 2001). There is also ample evidence to demonstrate that this is not the case, and that instead no relationship exists between campaign contributions and legislation (Petracca, 1992). The US has fewer regulations regarding campaigns contributions than most other nations, whereas the EU has significant time and quantity regulations on campaign contributions. This draws a significant difference between the capabilities that lobbyists have to influence legislation in the US and the EU.

Lobbying in the EU

In the European Union, most of the theories on lobbying in politics and through institutions are applicable and similar. The actual influence of interest parties is debatable but still strong, the institutional conflicts make the process complicated, and campaign contributions play a role. In the instances of campaign finance, the situation is not as severe as in the US; however, the institutional and administrative conflicts that arise in terms of the influence of lobbying become increasingly more complicated.

Because the EU is a supranational government, and only works with the participation from each individual member state, member states have significant control over the outcome of legislation. This is significant in terms of lobbying capabilities in this institution because if lobbyists are capable of influencing the officials representing each individual state, then they can influence legislation. If interested in influencing the outcome of the European Commission legislation (the separate institutions will be explored in depth in the institutional section), interest groups focus on the officials who draft legislative proposals (Mazey, 1993, p. 10). Because of the officials’ receptivity and accessibility at this level, it is easy for interest groups to be heard at this level and to have a say, particularly if their interests involve expert opinions (Mazey, 1993, p. 10). Additionally, lobbyists seek to influence the European Court of Justice; by bringing forward individual cases to be assessed by the EC of Justice, organized interests are assessed, and since it overrides any national legislation. National lobbying is easier to manage, but that EC law can override national law if interest groups are facing issues at the national level, demonstrating various ways for interest groups to act. This has created a proliferation in EC lobbying as opposed to national lobbying, especially in the case of women’s rights, and environmental advocacy, which is applicable to this research (Mazey, 1993; Pierce, 1992).

In the EU, however, money is not as much of a driving force in campaigns as it is in the US; they have stricter regulations on spending during campaigns, as well as grants that help with other costs of campaigns that are not always directly associated with campaigning (European Parliament, 2015). These funds are to be used explicitly for European parties and do not include paying for national parties. At the national level, campaign finance varies. This changes the influence that lobbyists are able to have; instead of supplying campaign resources as a way for lobbyists to influence government actors, some of the costs are taken care of and therefore have less of an influence in this respect of lobbying.

On the other hand, there are a significant number of factors that conflict with the influence of interest groups. First of all, the EC policy agenda is highly uncertain, and with the amount of people and agencies that are involved in the legislative processes and drafting, additional items tend to arise out of necessity (Mazey 11, 1993). The nature of lobbying in the EU is therefore, a “multi-lateral operation which requires interest groups to co-ordinate national and EC-level strategies,” and highly unpredictable (Mazey, 16, 1993). Lobbying involves many different institutions and actors, which complicates the ability for interest groups to influence the legislation. As suggested earlier, the general research that interest groups are not always in line with the public further proves this point (see page ).

Overall, lobbying can influence the outcome of legislation, and in many instances has done so; the contributing factors between each of the players are complex and vary depending on the situation. Lobbying for and against GMOs seems to have had interesting consequences in the EU and the US.

GMO specific advocates and opposition

Biotech sectors, which would promote the use of GMOs and less stringent regulations, are a particularly influential advocate on the outcome of GMO legislation. Researchers who analyze the influence of these companies in the EU and the US point toward several differences. In the EU, there are several countries with tremendous industries in niche and traditional farming—they concentrate on organically grown foods and regional specialties. The public here generally sees GMOs as a threat to their current way of living, as well as their cultural identity and superiority in food quality (Kurzer, 2007b). This not only shapes popular opinion, but it does not allow for a large presence of biotech industries in these nations. Anti-GMO groups are favorable in these countries or areas, and due to the public’s receptiveness toward the claims of environmental hazards and human health risks, people tend to vote to deny production of GMOs (Kurzer, 2007b).

In countries where there is a significant presence of the biotech sector, for example, the US, tend to vote for approvals of GMO production and scale down the legislation imposing stricter regulations on GMOs (Rosendal, 2005). The most puzzling question that these researchers tried to answer within this research is how the countries which have a substantial mix of both anti-GMO blocs and biotech sectors vote. Research found that when there was this strong presence of the opposite sides of the issue, that the countries either voted inconsistently on the issue (as in the EU), or they supported GMO production (Rosendal, 2005; Falkner, 2006; Bernauer, 2003).

Another aspect to this school of thought is the relationship between the biotech sector and the government, and the relationship between the green-green (anti-GMO) bloc and the government. The green-green coalition, which consists of NGOs for the environment and green-oriented industries who partner with the Green Party, exists in the EU and does not exist in the US. Furthermore, the existence of the biotech sector is strong and is opposed by virtually nothing equal to it in the US. Considering the fact that both the US and EU legislative institutions are sympathetic to the passing of GMOs, the presence of biotech sectors seem to have had a defining influence in these matters (Kurzer, 2007a). Rosendal and Bernauer acknowledge that the relationship between the green-green bloc in the EU is stronger because it has existed and capitalized on opportunity earlier than the biotech sectors in the areas, whereas DeChazournes (2011) and Kurzer (2007a) suggest the difference is willingness of the government to focus on economic pluses for corporations and put health and environmental hazards on the back burner (as in the US). Bernauer explains this phenomenon as the strength of the counterbalancing forces; the biotechnology early on “suffered from low credibility” and the anti-GMO promoted environmental and health issues which held significant influence among the population early on (2003). This way, the biotech sectors were not able to establish as large of a presence in the countries where environmental activist groups established themselves. In nations where the anti-GMO groups did not capitalize as early, the biotech sectors became more influential in legislation.

To assess the case of the EU even further, the influence of the green-green bloc was significant because of several structures set in place to allow the movement to exist. Because the EU legislature (consisting of the European Parliament and the Council) is sympathetic to the passing of GMOs for the enhancement of economic competition in the global market, significant implications on the consumer activism of the European people has been shown (Font, 2011; Schurman, 2004). Europe is not known for their ability to collectively act on a political cause, particularly since there is an overall lack of participation, and yet they effectively swayed legislation by not buying genetically engineered food (Kurzer, 2007a; Seifert, 2006). This in turn influenced the member states to not want to promote the use of GMOs; instead, the message of the health risks and the environmental hazards that the green-green bloc presented frequently and often to their individual countries was able to push action on both the legislative end as well as the public end, to change the outcome of the legislation of genetically engineered foods in their favor (Kurzer, 2007a). This demonstrates the influence that lobbying has had on the legislation in the EU.

As stated in the US analysis of lobbying, there are more lenient regulations in terms of the amount that PACs and related parties are able to donate to campaigns and this therefore highlights a powerful distinguishing factor. This is evident in the case of GMOs: the total amount of contributions given by individuals and political action committees was $126,498,021 for the agribusiness sector (OpenSecrets.org, 2014). Of this money, three-quarters of the contributions went to Republican candidates, potentially highlighting a correlation between political affiliation and promotion of GMOs, which will be tested in the other part of the research (OpenSecrets.org, 2014). The distinguishing factor here is that money holds more of an influence in the lobbying aspect in the US than it does in the EU, contributing more evidence that these interest groups play a great role in the outcome of legislation.

Overall, the lobbying influences that exist in both the US and EU are significant. General research regarding lobbying points to a strong argument for the power that interest groups can have in legislation. For the case of GMOs, the US has larger and more influential interest groups in the biotech sector, which has translated into the increased acceptance of GMOs, despite split public opinion. In the EU, social forces as well as the strong green-green coalition have decreased the acceptance of GMOs. It is also important to note that there is a general perception that GMO benefits outweigh the costs in both the institutions; this will be used for discussion later on. These differences in lobbying support the evidence that interest groups have played a substantial role in the acceptance of GMOs.

Public opinion and lobbying paints a very significant picture of the competing interests and influences at play in the case of GMOs; the most complex influence is the institutional factors that change the outcome of legislation concerning biotechnology in the EU and the US.

Institutional Influences

Tied to the influence of lobbying, institutional differences among nations can explain the differing outcomes of legislation in regards to genetically engineered crops. The US has a system of three separate and distinct branches; the judicial, the legislative, and the executive. The branches take care of their individual responsibilities, and there is no overlap among these institutions. The only overlap that exists in the US is between federal, state and local governments; however, here there is generally a hierarchy of power and designated roles that each level of government takes care of. In applying this to the case of GMOs, the federal government has allocated the assessment of GMOs to the Food and Drug Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Agriculture, which are technically part of the executive branch (MCHughen, 2009; Sheingate, 2006). Over the past several years, however, several individual states have taken legislative action either for or against GMOs in their states (McHughen, 2008). So, although the federal government in the executive branch has the responsibility to assess GMOs, state level governments have shown interest in using the legislative branch to be stricter than the agencies have been in assessing GMOs. A similar phenomenon can be seen in the EU, but manifested differently.

The EU was a new concept when it was first created; a new supranational governmental institution consisting of more than one nation. This has had a tremendous influence on the outcome of policy here; there are three supranational governmental agencies whose responsibilities often coincide with responsibilities between agencies. The Council and the Parliament are legislative in nature, and the Court has judicial responsibilities. The fourth institution, the Commission, acts as both the legislator and the implementer, as opposed to the implementer being the bureaucracy in the US (Anderson, 2014). Additionally, the intergovernmental Council of Ministers consists of representatives from each member state. Aside from this, each nation has their own individual national governments which also decide what their say will be in EU matters (Tsebelis, 2001). In terms of assessing GMOs, there are numerous branches and agencies that are involved in the decision-making: from the European Parliament, the Committee on the environment, public health and food safety; from the Council of the European Union, the Employment, social policy, health and consumer affairs; from the European Commission, Health and Food Safety, and Consumer affairs; from the European Economic and Social Committee, Agriculture, rural development and environment section; from the Committee of the Regions, Commission for natural resources (NAT); and from EU agencies, European Food Safety Authority (European Parliament/Legislative Observatory, 2015). Of particular importance are the actors in the European Commission, because they take particular interest in the Directives that are passed in the EU, which is applicable to the case of GMOs.

The complexity of both institutional set ups illustrate the complexity of the interplay between institutions and what is actually implemented; various levels of government structures include many different people who act in accordance to both their individual thoughts, differing interests of their states, and (in the case of the EU) balancing all of these with an overall legislative process at a supranational level.

As part of this institutional analysis, it is important to highlight the influence of risk regulation and how it applies to genetically engineered foods. As discussed earlier, risk assessment and uncertainty tolerances are influenced heavily by cultural values; the dynamics of institutions trying to regulate in coordination with the constituencies’ values influences the way in which the legislation is actually passed. These cultural values can include anything from religiosity versus secularism to how the public deals with risk; both are instrumental in the discussion of value, but as far as GMOs are concerned, mostly risk perceptions. Risk regulation is generally defined as “the field of regulation that attempts to identify and ameliorate adverse effects on health and environment that may be posed by technology,” (Anderson, 2014). The implementation and trend toward an “anti-scientific” approach, known as the precautionary principle, has been widely accepted as a rule (Forsman, 2004).

Precautionary Principle versus Promotion Principle

In the case of genetically modified food legislation, general research acknowledges the influence that the use of this precautionary principle has on the likelihood of acceptance of GMOs. Nations who use the precautionary principle in regards to regulating GMOs are more likely to hold stricter regulations and potentially ban GMOs, while those nations which do not use the precautionary principle as strictly are less likely to ban GMOs. The concept behind the precautionary principle is that “where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient” people in legislative or power positions take “precautionary” measures to ensure the safety of human, animal and plant health (Wohlers, 2010). It is the most widely accepted and employed method for environmental policy making, and in this case, Wohlers and Anker argue that several nations extend it to their food law. These nations prevent the further establishment, growth and sale of GMOs. According to Wohlers, this manifests itself by nations’ willingness to ensure that GMOs do not enter into certain food supplies—or within a predetermined amount--without proper labeling until further research concerning the health and environmental impacts of GMOs is verified. The EU is an excellent example of a set of countries which use the precautionary principle strictly. An example of this in the European Council is EC Directive 2001/18, “which governs the deliberate release of GMOs” (as cited in Anker, 2009). This directive allows for the deliberate but restricted release of GMOs into the market supply strictly for scientific experimentation.