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Introduction

Virtually every ethnography and report states that FGM [female genital

mutilation] is defended and transmitted by the women. The mothers who

have this done to their daughters love their children and want the best for

them.

—Gerry Mackie, ‘‘Ending Footbinding and Infibulation,’’ 1996

Female genital cutting (FGC) is an issue that touches on many of the

complexities of politics in the modern international system. It sparks

debate over gender equality, cultural autonomy, and human rights

and has lead to charges of postcolonial imperialism. It has been the

object of international mobilization since the late 1970s, and its eradi-

cation is an international goal. State responses to FGC are therefore

an important illustration of how policymaking and resistance play out

in the context of global cultural conflict.

Indeed, one of the clearest implications of the controversy over

FGC is that cultural conflict is global. In the modern world, activ-

ists and policymakers do not simply identify and correct problems in

their own neighborhood, city, or nation. They also address problems

in other parts of the world. They align themselves with international

organizations and circulate their messages around the globe. Certain

principles are assumed to be universal: the world will be flawed until

they are fully implemented everywhere. Thus, governments in the

modern world take action with many principles and pressure groups

in mind, acting in response to pressure that extends well beyond the

territorial boundaries of their countries.

As a result, even in countries where nearly all families engage in

FGC, states uniformly oppose it. Because state actors in these coun-

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us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 9/30/2015 4:26 PM via WRIGHT STATE UNIV - MAIN AN: 75623 ; Boyle, Elizabeth Heger.; Female Genital Cutting : Cultural Conflict in the Global Community Account: s8400611

2 • F E M A L E G E N I T A L C U T T I N G

tries must appeal to the international community as much as to their

local populations, they find themselves caught between contradictory

perspectives toward FGC. These contradictions and their implications

frame the inquiry of this book. To date, nearly all research on FGC

has focused on the practice itself. I build on that research by pulling

back the lens to consider the broader global context of FGC—inter-

national activism, national policymaking, and individual attitudes and

beliefs about the practice.

Egypt is one nation caught between contradictory perspectives to-

ward FGC. The Egyptian case highlights the fact that national policy-

making does not simply mirror local values or conflicts. Both Muslims

and Coptic Christians circumcise their daughters in Egypt. Although

there are opponents to FGC in the country, the practice has been the

norm there. Two ethnographers provide this context: ‘‘In the rural

Egyptian hamlet where we have conducted fieldwork some women

were not familiar with groups that did not circumcise their girls. When

they learned that the female researcher was not circumcised, their re-

sponse was disgust mixed with joking laughter. They wondered how

she could have thus gotten married and questioned how her mother

could have neglected such an important part of her preparation for

womanhood. It was clearly unthinkable to them for a woman not to be

circumcised’’ (Lane and Rubinstein 1996, 35; see also Messing 1980).

Failing to circumcise one’s daughters—at least until recently—was tan-

tamount to child neglect in some Egyptian communities. Indeed, a

1996 survey determined that 97 percent of married Egyptian women

aged 15 to 49 had been circumcised (Carr 1997). If state policymak-

ing reflected local values, based on this background, one would ex-

pect Egyptian policies to encourage FGC or perhaps ensure the safe

implementation of the practice. They would not ban FGC. But this

is precisely the end result of Egypt’s contested political process. Its

ban on FGC stands in stark contrast to the attitudes of a large por-

tion of Egyptian citizens. Initially, the state was hesitant to publicly

address FGC (United Nations 1983, 1987, 1989). When international

pressure to eradicate the practice mounted, Egyptian authorities were

initially able to evade it. Egypt ratified the Convention for the Elimi-

nation of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in

1981, which obligated it to file periodic reports on its progress toward

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us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

I N T R O D U C T I O N • 3

gender equity. Egypt did not mention FGC in either of its first two re-

ports. In response to questions from the CEDAW committee in 1990,

Egypt’s representative implied that FGC was uncommon in Egypt and

was ‘‘gradually dying out’’ (United Nations 1990, 73). By 1994, how-

ever, Egypt was forced to take a position on FGC. In that year, CNN

broadcast live the circumcision of a ten-year-old girl in Cairo while

the city hosted an international population conference. A group of

American dignitaries met with Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak

immediately after the filming. According to Representative Constance

Morella (Republican-Maryland), ‘‘I asked him about female genital

mutilation, and he said that it does not happen, that it’s not legal in

Egypt. I said that [the law] must not be enforced . . . that I’d seen the

CNN film. [Mubarak] said it’s hard to get rid of the practice, but he

said he didn’t think it was happening any more in Egypt.’’ 1 The timing

of the telecast maximized international attention, and public outrage

soon followed.

Newspaper reports from all over the world disparaged the practice

and the Egyptian government for its inaction.2 Many individuals, even

some who had never been to Egypt and were unlikely to ever meet

a circumcised woman, felt a moral obligation to act. For example,

the film spurred Senator Henry Reid (Democrat-Nevada) to fight the

practice (Dillon 2000). After seeing the film, Senator Reid decided

to cosponsor a bill that would link U.S. foreign aid to FGC eradica-

tion efforts in countries where the practice occurred. In addition, the

CNN filming had a profound effect internationally. The strongest lan-

guage opposing FGC in the history of the U.N. system emanated from

the Cairo population conference (Smith 1995).

Swept up in the international uproar but still immersed in a na-

tional culture that generally supported FGC, the Egyptian govern-

ment floundered. The state’s immediate response to the international

attention was to arrest the freelance television producer who arranged

the filming, accusing him of damaging Egypt’s reputation.3 When this

action met with international criticism, Egypt released the producer,

arrested the circumcisor, and pledged to pass a law banning FGC.4

The controversy was far from over. One of the most prominent

Islamic clerics in the country, Sheikh Gad el-Haqq, issued a religious

decree ( fatwa) stating that FGC, although not required by Islam, was

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us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

4 • F E M A L E G E N I T A L C U T T I N G

a religious ritual and an honorable deed for women. The fatwa rec-

ommended that local clerics encourage families to circumcise their

daughters, just as they encourage individuals to pray.5 Formal legis-

lation was further impeded when a task force formed by the health

minister denounced the idea of criminalizing FGC (Dillon 2000). A

prominent FGC opponent in Egypt summarized this perspective: ‘‘For

us, the struggle against FGM involves promoting the welfare of women

and their right to take full control of their lives, not conducting a

battle against women who circumcise their daughters’’ (Seif El Dawla

1999, 134).6

When it became clear that the Egyptian parliament was unwill-

ing to entertain a law against FGC, President Mubarak dealt with the

problem administratively.7 His health minister extended a 1959 health

decree to ban FGC in public hospitals. This did not last long. Sheikh

Gad el-Haqq’s criticism of the hospital ban led the Egyptian health

minister to establish a compromise policy of setting aside one day a

week to perform circumcisions in public hospitals. The health min-

ister told reporters that if people were allowed to come to hospitals,

they would be convinced by doctors that FGC is unwise and ‘‘go back

home without insisting on the circumcision.’’8

Although the health minister’s effort pacified Islamic fundamen-

talists, it outraged activists opposed to the practice. The Egyptian

Organization for Human Rights sued Sheikh Gad el-Haqq, claiming

$150,000 for damages caused by his fatwa. The group claimed that

Gad el-Haqq was encouraging the government to execute activists op-

posed to the practice.9 The suit also charged Gad el-Haqq with mis-

representing the sayings of the Prophet Mohammed by equating the

circumcision of girls with that of boys.10 Eventually, a court dismissed

the suit, ruling that the members of the Egyptian Organization for

Human Rights had no standing.

Five months after the health minister’s compromise position was

announced, another human rights group, Equality Now, disputed his

claim of reducing FGC. The group argued that hospitals were per-

forming circumcisions daily instead of once a week, that doctors were

competing for opportunities to perform the procedure because of the

fees involved, and that no advisory committees were present to dis-

suade parents against the practice.11 That same month, hospitals were

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us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

I N T R O D U C T I O N • 5

informed privately that they were to refuse to circumcise any more

girls.12

Around the same time, the United States passed the legislation

linking foreign aid to anti-FGC policies. Under Senator Reid’s bill,

cosponsored by Senator Patricia Schroeder (Democrat-Colorado),

states in countries where FGC occurred would have to develop poli-

cies to eliminate the practice or face reductions in foreign aid from

the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Around the

same time, Macro International released its findings that 97 percent

of Egyptian women had been circumcised. According to one re-

searcher involved in the administration of the survey, ‘‘The Egyptians

thought this was a dying custom and . . . this was much, much higher

than they had expected.’’13 Faced with nearly irrefutable evidence that

FGC was persisting, the Egyptian health minister reversed his posi-

tion again and forbade FGC in any government medical facility. Al-

though representatives of Sheikh Gad el-Haqq challenged the new

health ministry decree in court, ultimately the highest Egyptian court

found in favor of the health minister. The Egyptian government has

also publicly announced its commitment to eradication efforts: ‘‘The

state is tireless in its efforts to eradicate female circumcision, by ex-

tending education, combating illiteracy and directing the media to

draw attention to the damaging effects of the practice’’ (United Na-

tions 1996, x). When Egypt found itself caught between international

approbation and local cultural assumptions, in the end it succumbed

to international pressure—at least formally. The long-term effect of

Egypt’s new policies has yet to be determined.

Theoretical Background

There are two very different perspectives on globalization. One group

of theories sees globalization as a phenomenon that occurs from the

ground up: Cultural change comes about as individuals are exposed

to the ideas of a vast variety of cultures and, peacefully or through

conflict, sort out which mix of cultural values will govern future ac-

tion. A contrasting theory that has become increasingly important

in the social sciences sees globalization as a top-down process. This

theory is sociological neoinstitutionalism (see Frank, Schofer, and

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us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

6 • F E M A L E G E N I T A L C U T T I N G

Hironaka 2000; Boyle and Meyer 1998; Meyer et al. 1997; Powell and

DiMaggio 1991; Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1987). According to this

perspective, historically derived ‘‘realities’’ are institutionalized in the

international community and shape action and beliefs around the

world. The consequence is that individuals and organizations aspire

(or know they ought to aspire) to a standard set of ideals. The focus,

then, is on homogenizing influences in the modern world.

Neoinstitutional theory is a contrast to traditional social science

theories that often miss the tremendous amount of conformity that

characterizes global reform by assuming the naturalness of institu-

tionalized principles. Taking the principles themselves for granted,

proponents of these theories see a need to explain deviation from the

principles. For example, proponents of these theories might pose the

question ‘‘Why hasn’t China achieved gender equality?’’ This ques-

tion, typical of such theorists, fails to acknowledge that the assump-

tion—gender equality is a good thing—is itself a monumental global

accomplishment. Only a century ago, public consensus over such an

aspiration would have been inconceivable. For example, as recently as

1929, the British legal system was still debating whether the term ‘‘per-

son’’ included women (Berkovitch 1999, 1), and as recently as 1970,

women could not vote in Switzerland (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shana-

han 1997). There are a vast number of other historical examples that

suggest the idea of gender equality would have been difficult to even

formulate, let alone agree upon, one hundred years ago. The criticism

against traditional theories is that they must delve more deeply into

the social construction of those assumptions that guide the global

community.

On the other hand, neoinstitutionalism also has shortcomings.

Neoinstitutionalists tend to bracket what actually happens on the

ground, while other theoretical perspectives tend to have exactly the

opposite problem. Neoinstitutionalists emphasize that over long peri-

ods of time reform does tend to occur, because individuals, like

nation-states, are part of the institutionalized structures and beliefs.

Thus, neoinstitutionalists focus on policy aspirations and rarely take

differences in individual reactions to policies seriously (but see Brin-

ton and Nee 1998). ‘‘Decoupling,’’ or a lack of connection between

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I N T R O D U C T I O N • 7

policy and action, is natural because policies reflect what the world

ought to be rather than what it is.

In fact, it is a mistake to take either the institutionalized principles

or decoupling from them for granted. It is time for a theoretical per-

spective that critically evaluates both the reality of the institutional-

ized principles and real actions on the ground. In other words, so-

cial science needs to examine the interaction of homogeneous global

policy with heterogeneous local actions. As Robertson notes, the true

problem is ‘‘spelling out the ways in which homogenizing and hetero-

genizing tendencies are mutually implicative’’ (1995, 27). In this way,

systematic connections between the two ‘‘spheres of reality’’ can be

bridged.

Throughout this book, I develop three arguments. First, I argue

that global institutionalized principles drive national policies as much

as local constituents do. For example, the Egyptian case challenges

the assumption underlying most current models of policymaking: that

politics is primarily a local phenomenon. Nation-states do not nec-

essarily develop policies autonomously. Local elections, local social

movements, and local political coalitions may not be the primary driv-

ing forces behind policy reform. Nations are also responding to global

discourse and sometimes direct international pressure. Nation-states

are linked not only to their local populations but also to a global com-

munity of nation-states. Building on a long literature in sociological

neoinstitutionalism, I show that anti-FGC policies diffused rapidly in

the 1990s (chapter 5). The nature of those policies suggests that local

factors were less important than global norms in spurring and shaping

reform.

Second, I contend that particular institutions affect particular

groups in different but predictable ways. In an important article, Jep-

person (1991) argued that institutions and institutionalization vary

across places and levels. For example, one might claim that voting is

institutionalized in the United States but not in Haiti. Voting is em-

bedded in many supportive and reproducing practices in the United

States and is not highly dependent on repeated international inter-

vention for its deployment. The same is not necessarily true of voting

in Haiti. Thus, a practice may be institutionalized in one location but

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8 • F E M A L E G E N I T A L C U T T I N G

not in another. Perspective is also important in understanding insti-

tutions. The stock market is an institution to most Americans. To an

investment banker, however, the overarching concept ‘‘stock market’’

may not be very meaningful; such a person may consciously reflect

on each of the complex components that constitute the stock market.

Thus, processes institutionalized for some are not necessarily taken

for granted by all.

Building on this theme, I argue that the structural location of dif-

ferent groups in the international system affects their enactment of

institutions in predictable ways. I demonstrate that the institution-

alized precept of sovereign autonomy interacted with the structural

location of different actors to uniquely affect the anti-FGC strategies

they adopted (chapter 4). Nation-states and international governmen-

tal organizations favored assimilative reforms because of their struc-

tural connection to sovereignty. In contrast, nongovernmental orga-

nizations—less constrained or impressed by notions of sovereignty

—initially tended toward coercive reform. Over time, as consensus

developed that international intervention was appropriate, coercive

strategies became less common throughout the global community.

The same theme of predictable variation in the effect of institu-

tions is borne out in chapter 8. There I show that social context greatly

influences the explanations women give for opposing FGC. For ex-

ample, international organizations emphasize human rights as their

basis for opposing FGC. Nevertheless, in areas where both Islam and

FGC are institutionalized, women are more likely to articulate a medi-

cal explanation than a human rights explanation if they oppose the

practice. Because a medical discourse is perceived as narrow and neu-

tral, it is less threatening to local institutions than a human rights dis-

course. Once again, where one stands in relation to institutionalized

principles determines whether and how those principles will be de-

ployed.

Third, I argue that institutional conflict creates spaces for reform

and resistance. This is important because critics argue that theories

emphasizing institutions cannot explain change. In the case of FGC,

change has occurred at the points where institutions contradict. I

show how contradictions between institutionalized individualistic dis-

courses and the institution of national autonomy led to ‘‘apolitical’’

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us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

I N T R O D U C T I O N • 9

medical intervention to reduce the incidence of FGC (chapter 3). This

reframing of intervention technically preserved both individual rights

and national sovereignty. Later, a similar result ensued when ‘‘indi-

vidual rights’’ clashed with ‘‘family autonomy.’’ In both cases, I argue

that the individualistic discourse dominated and that both nation and

family had to be reconceptualized to fit the new compromises.

I also consider the implications of these contradictions within dif-

ferent countries (Egypt, Tanzania, and the United States) (chapter 6).

I show that relevance and resources have combined to fuel resistance

to national reform when institutions disagree. Resistance is also im-

portant at the individual level (chapter 7). At the international and

national level, contradictions arise between institutions within the

same general Western meaning system (e.g., national autonomy, rep-

resentative democracy, family autonomy, medicine, human rights).

Resistance is much more powerful when these institutions contradict

principles (Islam) or practices (FGC) institutionalized in alternative

meaning systems. The most effective resistance to FGC reform efforts

occurs in locations where alternative meaning systems are well devel-

oped and legitimated. I elaborate upon these three arguments below.

I begin with a more detailed discussion of institutions.

Institutions

Many institutions figured prominently in debates over FGC: the

nation-state and national autonomy, Western medicine, democracy,

human rights, the family and family autonomy (privacy), Islam, and

the practice of FGC itself. Institutions are social patterns or belief

systems that accrete over human history, persist without active inter-

vention, and are not eliminated when individuals fail to comply or

agree with them. The origins of institutions are often unclear or un-

known because institutions are age-old practices and beliefs. Their

correctness is taken for granted. In fact, people remain true to insti-

tutions without any conscious reflection. For example, Americans get

dressed every morning, drive on the right side of the road, and shake

hands when they meet people. These actions are habitual—individu-

als do not consciously reflect on whether to do any of them; they simply

do them. In terms of beliefs, institutions include both concepts (e.g.,

the United States) and values (e.g., human rights, democracy). Thou-

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10 • F E M A L E G E N I T A L C U T T I N G

sands of years of history—particularly Western history—lay the foun-

dation for the assumptions and actions currently institutionalized in

the international system.

Violating an institutionalized principle is likely to generate shock

and anger among community members. Consequently, the ability of

any individual to affect the institutionalized practices and beliefs in a

profound way is slight. The failure to conform to an institution is seen

as a defect in the actor, not the institution. Individuals may reflect

on and disagree with institutions, but the institutions persist. For ex-

ample, individuals may disagree with the assumptions of capitalism,

but capitalism continues unabated. A more trivial example would be

a woman in the United States who dislikes shaking hands because she

fears the spread of germs. Her refusal to shake hands would raise eye-

brows and cause her to be labeled ‘‘odd.’’ It would not undermine the

institutionalized practice of shaking hands. Institutions persist with-

out active reflection by individuals and often despite active resistance

by some individuals.

At one level, FGC is (or was until recently) institutionalized. Over

time, the practice became so culturally embedded in some areas that

individuals today cannot remember how it originated. It persists be-

cause these individuals take the practice for granted and do not ac-

tively reflect on whether to do it. If some individuals reject FGC

(such as American and European ethnographers), the community is

shocked and disgusted by those individuals. Their deviation from the

institutionalized practice reflects poorly on them, not on the practice.

Thus, the practice has all the components of an institution: it origi-

nated historically, its value is assumed, and individual deviations from

it say more about the deviants than about the practice itself.

At the same time, at the international level other institutionalized

ideas directly contradict the practice of FGC. Within international

organizations, the idea that individuals are efficacious actors is taken

for granted. Individuals are assumed to be self-directed, autonomous,

and (incidentally) sexually capable and interested. Because these

characteristics of individuals are so fundamental to the healthy func-

tioning of society, they need special protection; hence the notion of

human rights is critically important in the system. Further, it is as-

sumed that individuals will value and guard their autonomy and in-

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us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

I N T R O D U C T I O N • 11

violability, and that they will develop and express their sexual ener-

gies and passions fully and responsibly. When individuals fail to do

this, it is evidence of their defectiveness or false consciousness, not evi-

dence that these fundamental assumptions are incorrect. Because of

the presumed universality of these individual characteristics, differ-

ences across cultures are considered shocking and defined as prob-

lematic.

The assumptions of universalism and rationality embedded in mod-

ern Western thought fuel these misunderstandings. As many others

have noted, the institutions embedded in the international system

stem from the culture of the Catholic Church, which itself carried on

the traditions of the Roman Empire. Other universal religious tradi-

tions could have generated a different institutionalized system under

favorable circumstances, but Western traditions, diffused through co-

lonialism and other forms of hegemony, ended up playing this role.

Over time, the rise of the state destroyed the organizational authority

of the Church but absorbed and became dependent on a secularized

version of the Church’s principles. Now existing apart from a higher

spiritual being, these universal secular principles nevertheless con-

tinue to define what ought to be, what is possible, and even what is.

The argument, then, is that historically derived institutionalized

systems frame the collective mobilization of individuals. Unfortu-

nately, most social scientists begin their analyses taking the West-

ern assumptions for granted rather than critically reflecting on them.

They assume that various sets of individuals have different mobilizing

‘‘interests.’’ Successful mobilization is the result of a complex inter-

action of many factors, including resources, political opportunity, and

status. Moral entrepreneurs are those individuals who are particularly

effective at getting the world to notice ‘‘their’’ problems. History plays

no part in these processes—rather, it seems as if individuals have the

power to recreate the world from scratch every day. Further, failing to

act in accordance with one’s interests is considered problematic and

puzzling.

On the other hand, even those who take institutions seriously have

run into problems. These theorists tend to privilege the Western-

oriented institutions embedded in the international system. Typically,

they study only the effects of these international institutions and not

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12 • F E M A L E G E N I T A L C U T T I N G

the process through which those institutions come to influence recal-

citrant nation-states and local communities. They rarely recognize the

importance of local institutions such as FGC. The assumption is that

‘‘aberrant’’ institutions like FGC will inevitably disappear and there-

fore do not deserve much attention. Even if that were true—and I

am not sure that it is—regard for local institutionalized practices is

critically important in understanding globalization.14 National poli-

cies will have little meaning in countries where their underlying spirit

cannot be enacted. Giving women the right to vote is meaningless

in a country where women are unable to move about freely. More

to the point of this text, national laws banning FGC may be useless

in countries if nearly all families in these countries continue to ex-

cise the genitals of their female children. Although it is true that in

the long run reforms do tend to influence individuals, understanding

why, when, and how this happens is essential. It provides insight into

why and how Western ideologies are constantly expanding and where

the limits to this expansion might be.

Institutions and National Policymaking

Institutions provide the starting point for this work’s three theoreti-

cal contributions. Principles institutionalized in the international

system are as important in shaping policy as the local political land-

scape of any particular country. (Local political landscapes are con-

stituted by largely the same institutions as the result of centuries of

institutional diffusion, but as I demonstrate here, some uniqueness

persists and matters.) To understand why international institutions

are so important for national policymaking, it is useful to think

broadly about nation-states. Most local populations did not create a

territorially bounded state from the ground up. Rather, early interna-

tional actors (such as the Roman Empire, the Catholic Church, and

colonial authorities) shaped the contours of current nation-states,

especially outside of Europe. Even in places where there is a historical

nexus between the local population and the modern state, that rela-

tionship often developed through the conversion of a formerly auto-

cratic authority (e.g., monarchy, empire) into a representative gov-

ernment. The consequence is that there are no ‘‘natural,’’ preexisting

polities associated with most governments in the world. Historically,

Co py ri gh t © 2 00 2. J oh ns H op ki ns U

ni ve rs it y Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s re se rv ed . Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m wi th ou t pe rm is si on f ro m th e pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir

us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

I N T R O D U C T I O N • 13

nation-states are just as likely to have been constructed by external

forces as at the behest of local groups. The imagined link between

local populations and local governments is based on a romanticized

view of national histories. There may be much less connection than is

commonly assumed.

Today, the extranational focus of nation-states is perpetuated by

international organizations (Boli 1999). These organizations bolster

a sense of community and commonality among nation-states. They

define appropriate action for nation-states, based on the assumption

that nation-states have similar concerns that can be worked out col-

lectively. They operate on a logic of international equality, at least for-

mally. For example, every nation-state, no matter how small or how

poor, gets one vote in the U.N. General Assembly. States are allowed

into the international ‘‘club’’ not on the basis of their links to local

interests but rather because they are associated with a piece of ter-

ritory that at some point was deemed a nation. When the United

Nations accepts national representatives based on existing national

borders, for example, in Africa, it perpetuates Africa’s current geo-

graphic layout (see Rosberg and Jackson 1982). In essence, represen-

tation of people within particular territorial boundaries is assumed;

except in egregious cases, it need not be demonstrated as a condition

of acceptance.

Belonging to this global community has important implications for

what nation-states say and do. Nations, and presumably people, take

actions because those actions are, or at least could be interpreted as,

‘‘good’’ or ‘‘legitimate.’’ In other words, actors are not driven solely

by selfish interests; sometimes they are motivated by a historically

derived sense of what is right. This is certainly true in the case of

FGC; interest-based accounts have a hard time explaining why West-

ern individuals would be interested in the practice at all. From a neo-

institutionalist perspective, nation-states—like individuals—are so-

cialized by the international community to value certain ends, take

certain actions, and refrain from taking others (Finnemore 1996;

Risse and Sikkink 1999).

This explains why the Egyptian state was willing to adopt a law

against FGC despite considerable local opposition. Egypt—as a rep-

resentative of the nation-state system—is an important carrier of the

Co py ri gh t © 2 00 2. J oh ns H op ki ns U

ni ve rs it y Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s re se rv ed . Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m wi th ou t pe rm is si on f ro m th e pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir

us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

14 • F E M A L E G E N I T A L C U T T I N G

historically embedded principled ideas of that system. It is therefore

not surprising that state actors in Egypt condemn the practice of

FGC.

The Egyptian case also demonstrates that national policymaking

is not simply a reaction to international pressure. International, na-

tional, and local cultures are inextricably intertwined. For example,

for decades the international system presented no opposition to FGC.

At the same time, opposition to FGC within Egypt dates back to at

least the 1920s. In the recent period, the local Egyptian Organization

for Human Rights and several Egyptian feminist organizations have

been central in criticizing the practice. It would be greatly inaccurate

to characterize all local Egyptians as supportive of FGC and all inter-

national actors as opposed to the practice. Even among those who

agree that FGC should be eradicated, the explanations for that posi-

tion vary dramatically. Not all opponents of FGC are ‘‘progressive’’;

not all advocates are ‘‘traditional.’’ Further, ‘‘global’’ and ‘‘local’’ cul-

tures are highly interpenetrated and mutually constitutive.15

Not surprisingly, then, national policymaking arises out of a com-

plex interplay between ‘‘local’’ and ‘‘international’’ considerations. Al-

though Egypt, like many other countries, did adopt an anti-FGC pol-

icy, its policymaking process looked quite different from those of

other countries. Furthermore, the meaning of the policy, and re-

actions to it, took on unique qualities because of Egypt’s national con-

text. Egypt reacted to international pressure, but in a manner that

distinguished it from other nation-states. An integrated theoretical

perspective is necessary to fully explain global institutions, the inter-

penetration of global/local cultures, and the international/national

impetus for national policymaking.

FGC is hardly an isolated example that supports the argument that

local politics are driven by international concerns. There are many

other examples. Strong military powers voluntarily limit their ability

to use chemical weapons (Price 1997). Nations eager to spur more in-

dustrialization nevertheless voluntarily adopt stringent environmen-

tal laws (Frank, Schofer, and Hironaka 2000). Countries that derive

substantial profits from the international drug trade subscribe to the

war on drugs, even to the point of spraying harmful defoliants on

much of their land. Often, a nation-state’s authority is at least partly

Co py ri gh t © 2 00 2. J oh ns H op ki ns U

ni ve rs it y Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s re se rv ed . Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m wi th ou t pe rm is si on f ro m th e pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir

us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

I N T R O D U C T I O N • 15

dependent on the legitimating power derived from linking into insti-

tutionalized beliefs. However, nations also tend to adopt policies con-

sistent with global institutions because they are immersed within and

constituted by those very institutions (Ramirez and McEneaney 1997;

Frank and McEneaney 1999). In this context, the appropriateness of

such actions is taken for granted. Global institutions determine what

matters.

Structure and Perspective in Institutional Analysis

As noted above, this work also seeks to theorize how roles and struc-

ture influence the meaning and use of institutions. People around the

globe see things very differently, even things as fundamental as what it

means to be an individual. Agency is not something that can be taken

for granted; it is a social construction linked uniquely to modernity

and the West (Boyle and Meyer 1998; Meyer and Jepperson 2000).

For example, the characters in Homer’s Iliad did not see themselves as

unique, self-motivated individuals but as internally fragmented beings

whose actions were determined by gods (Friedland and Alford 1991).

As this suggests, individuals were not always perceived as the funda-

mental building blocks of society, even in the West. In some societies

today there is no conception of an abstract individual who exists and

has value apart from particular social contexts.

To understand institutions and institutionalization, it is necessary

to study areas of the world where individuality and individualism are

not assumed. Because they construct individuals in ways that contrast

with modern notions, these regions can provide the basis for a critical

analysis of modernity. They also provide an important locus for test-

ing neoinstitutionalism’s premise that the conception of individuals

is constantly expanding to include more actors and claims. Focusing

on these areas of the world facilitates an understanding of the nature

of ‘‘resistance’’ to modernizing trends.

A straightforward look at global changes over the course of the

last century suggests that global institutions have enveloped individu-

als as well as nations. Individuals tend to embrace the same issues as

those that concern international organizations: human rights, the en-

vironment, and so forth. Individuals who oppose mobilization around

these issues are viewed as corrupt or ignorant by the rest of the world.

Co py ri gh t © 2 00 2. J oh ns H op ki ns U

ni ve rs it y Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s re se rv ed . Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m wi th ou t pe rm is si on f ro m th e pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir

us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

16 • F E M A L E G E N I T A L C U T T I N G

Nevertheless, one would expect more idiosyncrasy and resistance

to institutionalized ideas among individuals than among nations.

Global institutions are linked to the West and notions of modernity.

They exalt individualism and the international structure of autono-

mous nation-states. Because nations are themselves part of the mod-

ern project, it makes sense that they would take the global institu-

tions for granted. The same is unlikely to be true among individuals

whose historical cultural milieu contrasts with or even opposes the

principles of Western modernity. The case of FGC provides an oppor-

tunity to trace the meaning of the expansion of the global system for

all individuals.

The Importance of Institutionalized Contradictions

Studying FGC also provides empirical insight into another aspect of

the global system: the interrelationship between institutionalized

principles. Global institutions are historically derived social construc-

tions, and although perceived as universal, institutions often contra-

dict each other. For example, in the case of FGC, although the institu-

tionalized notion of individualism emphasizes human rights and calls

for international organizations to intervene in national politics, the

institutionalized system of sovereignty advises the opposite. Further-

more, if human rights is an institution internationally, certainly FGC

itself is an institution locally in some parts of the world. Exploring

the nature of these institutions and their interaction promises greater

theoretical leverage to explain globalization processes.

One key principle—the idea of sovereign autonomy, i.e., local rule

without outside interference—deserves special attention. This prin-

ciple is ubiquitous but unique. It has become the legitimate basis for a

counterargument to any international reform. Nations cannot argue

that they favor FGC—any more than they can argue that they favor

pollution, slavery, or torture.16 However, nations can and do argue

that FGC and these other issues do not warrant international inter-

vention. Consequently, the idea of sovereign autonomy appears again

and again in international debates. Whether and how the principle of

sovereign autonomy affects international mobilization are key ques-

tions in any study of global cultural conflict.

ni ve rs it y Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s re se rv ed . Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m wi th ou t pe rm is si on f ro m th e pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir

us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

I N T R O D U C T I O N • 17

The significance of sovereign autonomy is clear from its continued

importance in organizing international intervention against FGC. Al-

though it ‘‘lost’’ to the principle of universal human rights in the battle

over FGC—international organizations did intervene to eradicate the

practice—the principle of national autonomy still carried significant

weight. It figured prominently in the strategies employed by interna-

tional actors to bring nation-states into conformity with the anti-FGC

norm. Certain types of international organizations were more influ-

enced by the ideal of sovereign autonomy than others because of their

structural linkage to the system of sovereign nation-states.

Contradictions inevitably arise in the everyday instantiations of

substantive principles. Often, procedural principles define how those

contradictions ought to be resolved. The contradictions between prin-

ciples take on unique contours at different levels of analysis. At the

international and national levels, the debate over FGC has been pri-

marily procedural—whose moral vision would govern local actors? At

the international level, national sovereignty and the somewhat related

principle of cultural autonomy have sometimes been invoked to allow

local governments to regulate local practices. Even when these insti-

tutionalized precepts were followed in the case of FGC, they merely

allowed states to take unique positions on FGC; the principle did

not privilege the substance of the varied positions. The ideal of sov-

ereign autonomy protected unique local attributes not because they

were substantively correct but because local authorities had juris-

diction. The sovereign autonomy ideal did not encourage debate or

compromise among conflicting value systems. Even when commit-

ment to sovereign autonomy was at its peak, the international com-

munity condemned FGC; it merely refused to act on that conviction.

The key international question was procedural—whether the interna-

tional community should be involved.

There was never any debate over the costs and benefits of the prac-

tice in the international system or any serious attempt to reach a

compromise between contrasting cultures. The very idea of compro-

mise was repugnant to most activists. Some Westerners might take

this inability to compromise for granted, seeing no basis on which

a compromise could occur. This is a mistake. In fact, compromise is

possible and occurs frequently at the national and individual levels.

ni ve rs it y Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s re se rv ed . Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m wi th ou t pe rm is si on f ro m th e pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir

us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

18 • F E M A L E G E N I T A L C U T T I N G

For example, rather than abandoning the practice altogether, many

individuals are adopting milder forms of FGC in Sudan (Gruenbaum

2001, 182–83). Some individuals advocate banning the practice for

children but making it legal for adults (Atoki 1995). Many alterna-

tives to complete eradication exist. These have not been endorsed by

international actors but may be important nationally and locally.

Another institutionalized conflict mirrored the conflict between

sovereign autonomy and universal human rights. Representative de-

mocracy is also an institutionalized procedure. The actual laws pro-

duced by representative democracy are markedly less important than

the process itself. In the case of FGC, this once again created a conflict

because the democratic systems in some countries were not leading

to a ban on FGC. For example, in Egypt, the parliament was unwilling

to pass an anti-FGC law. Once again, a procedural principle failed to

promote a substantive principle. The ideal of representative democ-

racy was standing in the way of universal human rights. Ultimately,

in both cases, the substantive institutionalized principle proved more

powerful. International organizations decided to intervene locally to

eradicate the practice, and national governments adopted anti-FGC

policies with or without support from parliaments and legislatures.

At the national level, cultural conflict has fueled the decoupling

of state policy from action and caused seemingly similar policies to

have very different meanings, depending on the countries adopting

them. The brief history of Egypt’s actions illustrates how states came

to view their roles in eradication efforts very differently over time.

In 1990, the Egyptian government expressed opposition to FGC but

claimed the practice was not its responsibility. By 1996, the Egyptian

government was an active player in eradication efforts. This change

in the government’s position resulted from the complex interplay be-

tween all forms of international actors: international governmental

organizations; nongovernmental organizations, including the media

and religious organizations; and states. At the national level, sover-

eign autonomy acquires more substance and becomes a concrete basis

for decoupling policy from action. The conflict between rights and

culture directly influences the effectiveness of national policies.

At the individual level, the unique national attributes privileged

ni ve rs it y Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s re se rv ed . Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m wi th ou t pe rm is si on f ro m th e pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir

us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

I N T R O D U C T I O N • 19

but not explored in international arenas have their greatest impact.

These attributes provide a specific alternative meaning system to the

one carried by the international system (for example, Islam in some

communities). Although the influence of these alternative meaning

systems at the international level is merely procedural, at the indi-

vidual level there is no such limitation; for at least some Muslim com-

munities, the effect at this level is substantive. Cultural conflict mani-

fests itself as powerful alternative meaning systems at the individual

level, with profound implications for how individuals view FGC as well

as themselves. Using Demographic and Health Survey data, I demon-

strate that religious background has an important impact on attitudes

toward FGC and whether women circumcise their daughters. Even

more important, in some African countries, being Islamic mediates

the effects of other variables, such as exposure to institutions based

on Western principles. This is true despite the agreement among most

Islamic clerics that Islam does not condone FGC (Bashir 1996).

Institutional contradictions can provide the basis for massive shifts

in values and beliefs (Friedland and Alford 1991). How does this hap-

pen? When activists can demonstrate inconsistencies in the applica-

tion of principled ideas—which is possible when the ideas contradict

—they have more leverage to push for reform. Since World War II,

the international debate over FGC has centered on the authority of

nations, science, and individuals. Although initially FGC was a mat-

ter of sovereign autonomy, Western feminists were able to exploit the

contradiction between the idea of autonomy and the idea of indi-

vidual human rights to create a ‘‘space’’ for anti-FGC mobilization.

Over time, as the links between FGC and human rights were clari-

fied, the balance in ideals shifted to favor individual human rights and

international intervention.

The issue of FGC has been highly contested because it touches on

many different issues: the sacredness of the family; women’s rights as

human rights; state obligations in the ‘‘private’’ sphere; human sexu-

ality; gender inequality; race; the arrogance of the West toward other

cultures; the West’s view of people in other cultures as ‘‘exotic others’’;

postmodern colonialism; and cultural autonomy (see Gunning 1990–

91; Silbey 1997). Precisely because of this intense conflict, FGC can

ni ve rs it y Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s re se rv ed . Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m wi th ou t pe rm is si on f ro m th e pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir

us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

20 • F E M A L E G E N I T A L C U T T I N G

provide unique insights into the operation of global-local connections

in the international system.

This book is not so much about FGC as about the international, na-

tional, and individual responses to the practice. The book is organized

by levels of analysis, beginning with the ‘‘macro’’ international level,

moving next to the national level, and concluding at the ‘‘micro’’ indi-

vidual level of analysis. Chapter 2 provides background information

on the practice of FGC. It explains the variety of physical procedures

that come under that heading. It traces the history of the practices

and looks at the social contexts in which they occur today. Chapter 2

also describes the medical implications of the different forms of FGC

and compares them with male circumcision. Finally, the chapter de-

scribes early eradication efforts.

Chapters 3 through 8 explain the unique development and impact

of the debate over FGC at each of three levels of analysis—the inter-

national, national, and individual levels.

Chapters 3 and 4 focus primarily on the international level. They

pick up on the historical development of opposition to FGC, address-

ing the question of what made a radical change in perspective pos-

sible. As time passed, the relative weight of institutionalized prin-

ciples shifted so that concern for individuals took precedence, first

over national autonomy and later over the inviolability of the family.

This historical trajectory is interesting because discourses that were

rejected out of hand during early time periods later became domi-

nant. This also hints at a pattern that may be common across a num-

ber of issues: new obligations may simultaneously undermine the au-

tonomy of collectivities while increasing their durability. Chapter 3, in

a theme echoed throughout the book, concludes that global institu-

tions such as national sovereignty do not disappear but that the rela-

tionship between institutions can change dramatically over specified

time periods.

Chapter 4 demonstrates how certain types of international orga-

nizations were more influenced by the idea of sovereign autonomy

than others (Boyle and Preves 2000; Boyle and Liu 2002). Organiza-

tions’ varying linkages to the system of sovereign nation-states influ-

ni ve rs it y Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s re se rv ed . Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m wi th ou t pe rm is si on f ro m th e pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir

us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

I N T R O D U C T I O N • 21

enced their choice of mobilizing strategies. Specifically, the greater

its dependence on the sovereignty system, the more weight an actor

assigned to sovereign autonomy. The chapter also illustrates the pro-

cedural character of the debate at this level; the idea of sovereign au-

tonomy protected unique local attributes but provided no support for

those local attributes to be substantively persuasive in discussions of

global values.

Linking international mobilization with national policymaking,

chapter 5 explores the diffusion of anti-FGC policies during the 1990s.

Recent international activism attacking FGC has been very successful

in getting countries to adopt policies against FGC. A few key coun-

tries adopted these policies in the 1980s and then, over the course

of a decade, other countries in the world followed suit. International

organizations played an important role in reaching this result.

Moving to the national level, chapter 6 focuses particularly on the

cases of Egypt, Tanzania, and the United States to illustrate the na-

tional policy extension of the international debate over FGC (Boyle,

Songora, and Foss 2001). At this level, culture becomes a key factor in

the decoupling of policy and action in countries where anti-FGC poli-

cies are most relevant. For example, after CNN internationally broad-

cast the 10-year-old girl’s circumcision in Cairo, President Mubarak

found himself in the uncomfortable position of proposing anti-FGC

legislation to an unsympathetic Egyptian parliament. When the legis-

lation failed, Mubarak’s health minister adopted a decree limiting

the practice. Although the decree was a compromise between local

interests and international pressure, allowing FGC in limited circum-

stances, it was very controversial both locally and internationally. Its

enforcement will be contested.

My argument is that functionality of a proposed policy and na-

tional standing in the international system combine to influence the

level of contestation generated by reform efforts. Specifically, I ar-

gue that, all else being equal, policies will be more contested when

the reform serves a concrete function locally—that is, when it is rele-

vant to local individuals. Further, among countries where a policy has

local relevance, a nation’s standing in the international system will

also be critically important. I theorize that conflict over new policies

ni ve rs it y Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s re se rv ed . Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m wi th ou t pe rm is si on f ro m th e pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir

us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

22 • F E M A L E G E N I T A L C U T T I N G

will be greater in countries with more leverage in the international

system. These nations have more ability to actually shape rather than

simply receive policy edicts. In addition, individuals in these nations

are likely to have more resources on average, which provides more

ability to mobilize opposition to international norms. At the national

level, sovereign autonomy acquired more substance and became a

concrete basis for decoupling policy from action. The conflict be-

tween rights and culture directly influenced the effectiveness of na-

tional policies.

Chapters 7 and 8 explore the individual level, where the unique na-

tional attributes privileged but not explored in international arenas

have their greatest impact (Boyle, McMorris, and Gómez 2002; Boyle,

Hoeschen, and Carbone 2002). These attributes, sometimes including

a commitment to Islam, provide a specific alternative meaning sys-

tem to the one carried by the international system. Using case studies

from the literature and Demographic and Health Survey data, I dem-

onstrate that religious and cultural backgrounds have an important

impact on attitudes toward FGC and whether women circumcise their

daughters. Even more important, these factors mediate the effects of

other variables, such as exposure to Western principles.

Ultimately, the central focus of this book is exploring, at differ-

ent levels of analysis, the varied meaning of anti-FGC policies. The

evidence is both qualitative and quantitative, including an analysis

of existing academic articles and books, the activist literature, re-

ports of international organizations, and interviews. It also includes a

comprehensive data set of more than one thousand articles on FGC

from international newspapers. For evidence at the individual level

of analysis, Demographic and Health Survey data from six African

countries and detailed case studies from the existing literature pro-

vide information on individual attitudes and behavior.

FGC became a celebrated cause internationally despite early hesi-

tance to act and pockets of opposition to eradication efforts. The prac-

tice has existed for more than two thousand years, and 130 million

women alive today have experienced it. Nevertheless, in a short span

of decades, FGC has become a source of embarrassment in the nation-

state system, and those nation-states whose citizens engage in FGC

ni ve rs it y Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s re se rv ed . Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m wi th ou t pe rm is si on f ro m th e pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir

us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

I N T R O D U C T I O N • 23

have gone to considerable lengths to demonstrate their disdain for it.

The transformation of approaches to FGC is thus a critical example

of profound social change occurring in the context of globalization.

It provides an important starting point for linking theoretical ideas

across international, national, and individual spheres of reality.

ni ve rs it y Pr es s. A ll r ig ht s re se rv ed . Ma y no t be r ep ro du ce d in a ny f or m wi th ou t pe rm is si on f ro m th e pu bl is he r, e xc ep t fa ir

us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.