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CHAPTER 1

The Era of Homeland Security

Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack. We will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans.

Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies, as well as state and local governments, have responsibilities affecting homeland security.

President George W. Bush, September 20, 2001 (See Appendix B for full speech)

INTRODUCTION On September 11, 2001, policing entered the era of homeland security. Prior to the attack on America by Osama bin Laden and his terrorist group, Al Qaeda, on that fateful day, policing in America recognized that various crime problems had international implications, but there was little acknowledgment of how these crimes would impact state and local po- lice directly. Issues such as international and transnational crimes, particularly organized and white-collar crime, and both drug and human trafficking, were issues of concern, but generally concerns for either the federal government and their criminal justice assets or for the international community. The realization that global concerns, such as terrorism, were indeed a state and local concern changed on September 11, 2001. That day policing in America moved out of the community policing era and into the era of homeland security.

To understand how this came about, it is important to first review the threat that Osama bin Laden and his terrorist organization, Al Qaeda, posed to America prior to September 11th. In addition, reviewing the actual events of the attack helps place the significance of that day in better context. Perhaps more importantly, reviewing how the local police responded to the attacks provides us some insight into what the era of Homeland Security means for policing. Therefore, this chapter will review the threat, the attack, and the response to better understand the significance of the threat, see how that attack moved American policing into the era of Homeland Security, and provide the context for understanding the role state and local police will play in this new era.

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BOX 1-1

TERRORISM TIME LINE (ABBREVIATED) PRIOR TO FIRST WORLD TRADE CENTER (1993)

Kidnappings of U.S. Citizens in Colombia, January 31, 1993: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) terrorists kidnapped three U.S. missionaries.

Kidnapping of U.S. Businessmen in the Philippines, January 17–21, 1992: A senior official of the corporation Philippine Geothermal was kidnapped in Manila by the Red Scorpion Group, and two U.S. businessmen were seized independently by the National Liberation Army and by Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

Sniper Attack on the U.S. Embassy in Bonn, February 13, 1991: Three Red Army Faction members fired automatic rifles from across the Rhine River at the U.S. Embassy Chancery. No one was hurt.

Attempted Iraqi Attacks on U.S. Posts, January 18–19, 1991: Iraqi agents planted bombs at the U.S. ambassador to Indonesia’s residence and at the USIS library in Manila.

U.S. Soldiers Assassinated in the Philippines, May 13, 1990: The New People’s Army (NPA) killed two U.S.Air Force personnel near Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines.

U.S. Embassy Bombed in Peru, January 15, 1990: The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement bombed the U.S. Embassy in Lima, Peru.

Assassination of U.S.Army Officer, April 21, 1989: The New People’s Army (NPA) assassinated Colonel James Rowe in Manila.The NPA also assassinated two U.S. government defense contractors in September.

Pan Am 103 Bombing, December 21, 1988: Pan American Airlines Flight 103 was blown up over Lockerbie, Scotland, by a bomb believed to have been placed on the aircraft by Libyan terrorists in Frankfurt,West Germany. All 259 people on board were killed.

Attack on U.S. Diplomat in Greece, June 28, 1988: The defense attaché of the U.S. Embassy in Greece was killed when a car bomb was detonated outside his home in Athens.

Naples USO Attack, April 14, 1988: The Organization of Jihad Brigades exploded a car bomb outside a USO club in Naples, Italy, killing one U.S. sailor.

Kidnapping of William Higgins, February 17, 1988: U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel W. Higgins was kidnapped and murdered by the Iranian-backed Hizballah group while serving with the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) in southern Lebanon.

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INTRODUCTION 3

Servicemen’s Bar Attack, December 26, 1987: Catalan separatists bombed a Barcelona bar frequented by U.S. servicemen, resulting in the death of one U.S. citizen.

Bus Attack, April 24, 1987: Sixteen U.S. servicemen riding in a Greek Air Force bus near Athens were injured in an apparent bombing attack, carried out by the revolutionary organization known as November 17.

Berlin Discothèque Bombing, April 5, 1986: Two U.S. soldiers were killed and 79 American servicemen were injured in a Libyan bomb attack on a nightclub in West Berlin, West Germany. In retaliation U.S. military jets bombed targets in and around Tripoli and Benghazi.

Aircraft Bombing in Greece, March 30, 1986: A Palestinian splinter group detonated a bomb as TWA Flight 840 approached Athens air- port, killing four U.S. citizens.

Airport Attacks in Rome and Vienna, December 27, 1985: Four gunmen belonging to the Abu Nidal Organization attacked the El Al and Trans World Airlines ticket counters at Rome’s Leonardo da Vinci Airport with grenades and automatic rifles.Thirteen persons were killed and 75 were wounded before Italian police and Israeli security guards killed three of the gunmen and captured the fourth. Three more Abu Nidal gunmen attacked the El Al ticket counter at Vienna’s Schwechat Airport, killing three persons and wounding 30. Austrian police killed one of the gunmen and captured the others.

Egyptian Airliner Hijacking, November 23, 1985: An EgyptAir airplane bound from Athens to Malta and carrying several U.S. citizens was hijacked by the Abu Nidal Group.

Achille Lauro Hijacking, October 7, 1985: Four Palestinian Liberation Front terrorists seized the Italian cruise liner in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, taking more than 700 hostages. One U.S. passenger was murdered before the Egyptian government offered the terrorists safe haven in return for the hostages’ freedom.

Attack on a Restaurant in El Salvador, June 19, 1985: Members of the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) fired on a restau- rant in the Zona Rosa district of San Salvador, killing four Marine security guards assigned to the U.S. Embassy and nine Salvadorean civilians.

TWA Hijacking, June 14, 1985: A Trans-World Airlines flight was hijacked en route to Rome from Athens by two Lebanese Hizballah terrorists and forced to fly to Beirut.The eight crew members and 145 passengers were held for seventeen days, during which one American hostage, a U.S. Navy sailor, was murdered.After being flown twice to Algiers, the aircraft was returned to Beirut after Israel released 435 Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners.

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Kidnapping of U.S. Officials in Mexico, February 7, 1985: Under the orders of narcotrafficker Rafael Caro Quintero, Drug Enforcement Adminis- tration agent Enrique Camarena Salazar and his pilot were kidnapped, tortured, and executed.

Restaurant Bombing in Spain, April 12, 1984: Eighteen U.S. servicemen were killed and 83 people were injured in a bomb attack on a restaurant near a U.S. Air Force base in Torrejon, Spain.

Kidnapping of Embassy Official, March 16, 1984: The Islamic Jihad kidnapped and later murdered Political Officer William Buckley in Beirut, Lebanon. Other U.S. citizens not connected to the U.S. government were seized over a succeeding two-year period.

Naval Officer Assassinated in Greece, November 15, 1983: A U.S. Navy officer was shot by the November 17 terrorist group in Athens, Greece, while his car was stopped at a traffic light.

Bombing of Marine Barracks, Beirut, October 23, 1983: Simultaneous suicide truck-bomb attacks were made on American and French com- pounds in Beirut, Lebanon. A 12,000-pound bomb destroyed the U.S. compound, killing 242 Americans, while 58 French troops were killed when a 400-pound device destroyed a French base. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

Naval Officer Assassinated in El Salvador, May 25, 1983: A U.S. Navy officer was assassinated by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front.

Bombing of U.S. Embassy in Beirut, April 18, 1983: Sixty-three people, including the CIA’s Middle East director, were killed and 120 were in- jured in a 400-pound suicide truck-bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

Colombian Hostage-taking, April 8, 1983: A U.S. citizen was seized by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and held for ransom.

Murder of Missionaries, December 4, 1981: Three American nuns and one lay missionary were found murdered outside San Salvador, El Salvador.They were killed by members of the National Guard, and the killers are cur- rently in prison.

Assassination of Egyptian President, October 6, 1981: Soldiers who were secretly members of the Takfir Wal-Hajira sect attacked and killed Egyptian President Anwar Sadat during a troop review.

U.S. Installation Bombing, August 31, 1981: The Red Army exploded a bomb at the U.S. Air Force Base at Ramstein, West Germany.

Grand Mosque Seizure, November 20, 1979: 200 Islamic terrorists seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, taking hundreds of pilgrims hostage. Saudi and French security forces retook the shrine after an intense battle in which some 250 people were killed and 600 wounded.

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Iran Hostage Crisis, November 4, 1979: After President Carter agreed to admit the Shah of Iran into the United States, Iranian radicals seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took 66 American diplomats hostage.Thir- teen hostages were soon released, but the remaining 53 were held until their release on January 20, 1981.

Ambassador to Afghanistan Assassinated, February 14, 1979: Four Afghans kidnapped U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs in Kabul and demanded the re- lease of various “religious figures.” Dubs was killed, along with four alleged terrorists, when Afghan police stormed the hotel room where he was being held.

Assassination of Former Chilean Diplomat, September 21, 1976: Exiled Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier was killed by a car bomb in Washington.

Domestic Terrorism, January 27–29, 1975: Puerto Rican nationalists bombed a Wall Street bar, killing four and injuring 60; two days later, the Weather Underground claims responsibility for an explosion in a bathroom at the U.S. Department of State in Washington.

Ambassador to Cyprus Assassinated, August 19, 1974: U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Rodger P. Davies and his Greek Cypriot secretary were shot and killed by snipers during a demonstration outside the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia.

Attack and Hijacking at the Rome Airport, December 17, 1973: Five terrorists pulled weapons from their luggage in the terminal lounge at the Rome airport, killing two persons. They then attacked a Pan American 707 bound for Beirut and Tehran, destroying it with incendiary grenades and killing 29 persons, including 4 senior Moroccan officials and 14 American employees of ARAMCO.They then herded 5 Italian hostages into a Lufthansa airliner and killed an Italian customs agent as he tried to escape, after which they forced the pilot to fly to Beirut. After Lebanese authorities refused to let the plane land, it landed in Athens, where the terrorists demanded the release of 2 Arab terrorists. In order to make Greek authorities comply with their de- mands, the terrorists killed a hostage and threw his body onto the tarmac.The plane then flew to Damascus, where it stopped for two hours to obtain fuel and food. It then flew to Kuwait, where the terrorists released their hostages in return for passage to an un- known destination. The Palestine Liberation Organization disavowed the attack, and no group claimed responsibility for it.

Consul General in Mexico Kidnapped, May 4, 1973: U.S. Consul General in Guadalajara,Terrence Leonhardy, was kidnapped by members of the People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces.

Ambassador to Sudan Assassinated, March 2, 1973: U.S. Ambassador to Sudan, Cleo A. Noel, and other diplomats were assassinated at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum by members of the Black September organization.

Munich Olympic Massacre, September 5, 1972: Eight Palestinian “Black September” terrorists seized eleven Israeli athletes in the Olympic Village in Munich,West Germany. In a bungled rescue attempt by West German authorities, nine of the hostages and five terrorists were killed.

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“Bloody Friday,” July 21, 1972: An Irish Republican Army (IRA) bomb attack killed eleven people and injured 130 in Belfast, Northern Ireland. Ten days later, three IRA car bomb attacks in the village of Claudy left six dead.

U.S. Agency for International Development Adviser Kidnapped, July 31, 1970: In Montevideo, Uruguay, the Tupamaros terrorist group kidnapped AID Police adviser Dan Mitrione; his body was found on August 10.

Ambassador to Brazil Kidnapped, September 3, 1969: U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Charles Burke Elbrick was kidnapped by the Marxist revolu- tionary group MR-8.

Ambassador to Japan Attacked, July 30, 1969: U.S. Ambassador to Japan, A. H. Meyer, was attacked by a knife-wielding Japanese citizen.

Ambassador to Guatemala Assassinated, August 28, 1968: U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala, John Gordon Mein, was murdered by a rebel faction when gunmen forced his official car off the road in Guatemala City and raked the vehi- cle with gunfire.

First U.S. Aircraft Hijacked, May 1, 1961: Puerto Rican born Antuilo Ramierez Ortiz forced at gunpoint a National Airlines plane to fly to Havana, Cuba, where he was given asylum.

Source: U.S. Army—Timeline of Terrorism,Available online at http://www.army.mil/terrorism

THE THREAT—AL QAEDA Thomas Friedman, a columnist for the New York Times, argued in an op-ed piece that America in the 1990s experienced the growth of three bubbles, all of which burst at the beginning of the twenty-first century.1 The three bubbles included the stock market, corporate governance, and terrorism. The first bubble burst when the various dot-com organizations became greatly inflated in the 1990s, and the stock market simply adjusted their values downward in 2000. The second bubble burst at about the same time, when a number of ethical lapses were allowed to go unchecked throughout the 1990s until the illegal activities of corporate firms Enron and Arthur Andersen were revealed. The third bubble burst on September 11, 2001, and resulted from the terrorism bubble that was allowed to grow during the 1990s.

The terrorism bubble, Friedman asserted, “started with the suicide bombings against U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, was followed by attacks on the U.S. Embassies in East Africa and on the USS Cole, then ballooned with the rise of Palestinian suicide ter- rorism in Israel and finally peaked with Al Qaeda’s attack on 9/11.”2 Friedman traced most of what led up to the third bubble as being the result of Osama bin Laden and the terrorist organization Al Qaeda’s ability to grow in power unchecked during the 1990s. He explained that like the other two bubbles, “the terrorism bubble was the product of a kind of temporary insanity, in which basic norms were ignored and excessive behavior IS

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was justified by new theories.”3 The threat of Al Qaeda was ultimately what led to the bubble bursting and ushering in the post–September 11th world, or as Friedman calls it, the “post-bubble world.”4 Understanding the origin of this threat, namely Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network Al Qaeda, and how this threat developed is important to understanding what led us into the era of Homeland Security.

The Bubble Forms Al Qaeda was founded by Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1988.5 Osama bin Laden was born in July 1957, the seventeenth of twenty sons of a Saudi construction magnate of Yemeni origin. Many Saudis were conservative Sunni Muslims, and bin Laden adopted militant Islamist views while studying at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. There he studied Islam under Muhammad Qutb, brother of Sayyid Qutb, the key idealogue of a major Sunni Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood.6 Another of bin Laden’s instructors was a major figure in the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brother- hood, Dr. Abdullah Azzam. Azzam has been identified by some experts as the intellectual architect of the jihad against the 1979–1989 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and ultimately of Al Qaeda itself;7 he cast the Soviet invasion as an attempted conquest by a non-Muslim power of sacred Muslim territory and people.

Bin Laden went to Afghanistan shortly after the December 1979 Soviet invasion and joined Azzam there. He reportedly used some of his personal funds8 to establish himself as a donor to the Afghan mujahedin and a recruiter of Arab and other Islamic volunteers for the war. In 1984 Azzam and bin Laden structured this assistance by establishing a net- work of recruiting and fund-raising offices in the Arab world, Europe, and the United States. That network was called the Maktab al-Khidamat (Services Office), also known as Al Khifah; many experts consider the Maktab network to be the organizational forerun- ner of Al Qaeda. Another major figure who utilized the Maktab network to recruit for the anti-Soviet jihad was Umar Abd al-Rahman (also known as “the blind shaykh”), the spir- itual leader of radical Egyptian Islamist group Al Jihad. Bin Laden also fought in the anti- Soviet war, participating in a 1986 battle in Jalalabad and, more notably, a 1987 frontal assault by foreign volunteers against Soviet armor. Bin Laden has said he was exposed to a Soviet chemical attack and slightly injured in that battle.9

During this period, most U.S. officials perceived the volunteers as positive contrib- utors to the effort to expel Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and U.S. officials made no ap- parent effort to stop the recruitment of non-Afghan volunteers for the war. U.S. officials have repeatedly denied that the United States directly supported the volunteers, al- though the United States did covertly finance (about $3 billion during 1981–1991) and arm (via Pakistan) the Afghan mujahedin factions, particularly the Islamic fundamentalist Afghan factions, fighting Soviet forces. At this time, neither bin Laden, Azzam, nor Abd al-Rahman was known to have openly advocated, undertaken, or planned any di- rect attacks against the United States, although they were critical of U.S. support for Israel in the Middle East.

In 1988, toward the end of the Soviet occupation, bin Laden and Azzam began contemplating how, and to what end, to utilize the Islamist volunteer network they had organized. U.S. intelligence estimates of the size of that network was about 10,000 to 20,000, although not all of these necessarily supported or joined Al Qaeda terrorist

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activities.10 Azzam reportedly wanted this “Al Qaeda” (Arabic for “the base”) organiza- tion to become an Islamic “rapid reaction force,” available to intervene wherever Mus- lims were perceived to be threatened. Bin Laden differed with Azzam, hoping instead to dispatch the Al Qaeda activists to their home countries to try to topple secular, pro-Western Arab leaders, such as President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s royal family. Some attribute their differences to the growing influence on bin Laden by the Egyptians in his inner circle, such as Abd al-Rahman, who wanted to use Al Qaeda’s resources to install an Islamic state in Egypt. Another close Egyptian confidant was Dr. Ayman al- Zawahiri, operational leader of Al Jihad in Egypt. Like Abd al-Rahman, Zawahiri had been imprisoned but ultimately acquitted for the October 1981 assassination of Egypt- ian President Anwar Sadat, and he permanently left Egypt for Afghanistan in 1985. There, he used his medical training to tend to wounded fighters in the anti-Soviet war. In November 1989, Azzam was assassinated, and some allege that bin Laden might have been responsible for the killing to resolve this power struggle. Following Azzam’s death, bin Laden gained control of the Maktab’s funds and organizational mechanisms. Abd al-Rahman later came to the United States and was convicted in October 1995 for terrorist plots related to the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. Zawahiri stayed with bin Laden to serve as bin Laden’s main strategist; he is believed to still be serving in that role today.

The Bubble Grows The August 2, 1990, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait apparently turned bin Laden from a de facto U.S. ally against the Soviet Union into one of its most active adversaries.11 Bin Laden had returned home to Saudi Arabia in 1989 after the completion of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan that February. While back home, he lobbied Saudi officials not to host the 500,000 U.S. combat troops that defended Saudi Arabia from the Iraqi invasion and ultimately expelled Iraq from Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm (January 17–February 28, 1991). He argued instead for the raising of a “mujahedin” army to oust Iraq from Kuwait, but his idea was rebuffed as impractical, causing a falling out with Saudi leaders. He relocated to Sudan in 1991, buying property there that he used to host and train Al Qaeda militants—this time, for use against the United States and its interests, as well as for jihad operations in the Balkans, Chechnya, Kashmir, and the Phillipines. He re- mained there until the Sudanese government, under U.S. and Egyptian pressure, ex- pelled him in May 1996; he then returned to Afghanistan and helped the Taliban gain and maintain control of Afghanistan. The Taliban would capture the capital, Kabul, in September of 1996.

Bin Laden and Zawahiri apparently believed that the only way to bring Islamic regimes to power was to oust from the region the perceived backer of secular regional regimes, the United States. During the 1990s, bin Laden and Zawahiri transformed Al Qaeda into a global threat to U.S. national security by engaging in a number of attacks against the United States and its interests. In 1992, Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for bombing a hotel in Yemen where 100 U.S. military personnel were awaiting deployment to Somalia for Operation Restore Hope. No one was killed. However, Al Qaeda was re- sponsible for the tragedy that subsequently followed during this operation in Somalia. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for arming Somali factions, who battled U.S. forces there

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BOX 1-2

TERRORISM TIME LINE (ABBREVIATED) FIRST WORLD TRADE CENTER (1993) TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

Philippines Hostage Incident, May 27, 2001: Muslim Abu Sayyaf guerrillas seized 13 tourists and 3 staff members at a resort on Palawan Island and took their captives to Basilan Island.The captives included three U.S. citizens: Guellermo Sobero and missionaries Martin and Gracia Burnham. Philippine troops fought a series of battles with the guerrillas between June 1 and June 3, during which nine hostages escaped and two were found dead.The guerrillas took additional hostages when they seized the hospital in the town of Lamitan. On June 12, Abu Sayyaf spokesman Abu Sabaya claimed that Sobero had been killed and beheaded; his body was found in Octo- ber.The Burnhams remained in captivity until June 2002.

Manila Bombing, December 30, 2000: A bomb exploded in a plaza across the street from the U.S. Embassy in Manila, injuring nine persons. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front was likely responsible.

Helicopter Hijacking, October 12, 2000: In Sucumbios Province, Ecuador, a group of armed kidnappers led by former members of defunct Colombian terrorist organization the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) took hostage 10 employees of Spanish energy consortium REPSOL.Those kidnapped included five U.S. citizens, one Argentine, one Chilean, one New Zealander, and two French pilots, who escaped four days later. On January 30, 2001, the kidnappers murdered American hostage Ronald Sander.The remaining hostages were released on February 23 following the payment of $13 million in ransom by the oil companies.

Attack on USS Cole, October 12, 2000: In Aden,Yemen, a small dinghy carrying explosives rammed the destroyer USS Cole, killing seventeen sailors and injuring 39 others. Supporters of Osama bin Laden were suspected.

Church Bombing in Tajikistan, October 1, 2000: Unidentified militants detonated two bombs in a Christian church in Dushanbe, killing seven persons and injuring 70 others.The church was founded by a Korean-born U.S. citizen, and most of those killed and wounded were Korean. No one claimed responsibility.

Kidnappings in Kyrgyzstan, August 12, 2000: In the Kara-Su Valley, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan took four U.S. citizens hostage. The Americans escaped on August 12.

ELN Kidnapping, June 27, 2000: In Bogota, Colombia, ELN militants kidnapped a five-year-old U.S. citizen and his Colombian mother, demanding an undisclosed ransom.

RUF Attacks on U.N. Mission Personnel, May 1, 2000: On May 1 in Makeni, Sierra Leone, Revolutionary United Front (RUF) militants kidnapped at least 20 members of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and surrounded and opened fire on a UNAMSIL facility, according to press reports.The

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militants killed five UN soldiers in the attack. RUF militants kidnapped 300 UNAMSIL peacekeepers throughout the country, according to press reports. On May 15 in Foya, Liberia, the kidnappers released 139 hostages. On May 28 on the Liberia and Sierra Leone border, armed militants released unharmed the last of the UN peacekeepers.

PLA Kidnapping, December 23, 1999: Colombian People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces kidnapped a U.S. citizen in an unsuc- cessful ransoming effort.

Burmese Embassy Seizure, October 1, 1999: Burmese dissidents seized the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok,Thailand, taking 89 persons hostage, including one U.S. citizen.

AFRC Kidnappings,August 4, 1999: An Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) faction kidnapped 33 UN representa- tives near Occra Hills, Sierra Leone. The hostages included one U.S. citizen, five British soldiers, one Canadian citizen, one representative from Ghana, one military officer from Russia, one officer from Kyrgystan, one officer from Zambia, one officer from Malaysia, a local bishop, two UN officials, two local journalists, and 16 Sierra Leonean nationals.

Shell Platform Bombing, June 27, 1999: In Port Harcourt, Nigeria, armed youths stormed a Shell oil platform, kidnapping one U.S. citizen, one Nigerian national, and one Australian citizen and causing undetermined dam- age. A group calling itself “Enough is Enough in the Niger River” claimed responsibility. Further seizures of oil facilities followed.

ELN Hostage-taking, May 30, 1999: In Cali, Colombia, armed ELN militants attacked a church in the neighborhood of Ciudad Jardin, kidnapping 160 persons, including six U.S. citizens and one French national. The rebels released approximately 80 persons, including three U.S. citizens, later that day.

ELN Hostage-taking, March 23, 1999: Armed guerrillas kidnapped a U.S. citizen in Boyaca, Colombia. The National Liberation Army (ELN) claimed responsibility and demanded $400,000 ransom. On 20 July, ELN rebels released the hostage unharmed following a ransom payment of $48,000.

Hutu Abductions, March 1, 1999: 150 armed Hutu rebels attacked three tourist camps in Uganda, killed four Ugandans, and abducted three U.S. citizens, six Britons, three New Zealanders, two Danish citizens, one Australian, and one Canadian national. Two of the U.S. citizens and six of the other hostages were subsequently killed by their abductors.

FARC Kidnappings, February 25, 1999: FARC kidnapped three U.S. citizens working for the Hawaii-based Pacific Cultural Con- servancy International. On March 4, the bodies of the three victims were found in Venezuela.

Ugandan Rebel Attack, February 14, 1999: A pipe bomb exploded inside a bar, killing five persons and injuring 35 others. One Ethiopian and four Ugandan nationals died in the blast, and one U.S. citizen working for

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USAID, two Swiss nationals, one Pakistani, one Ethiopian, and 27 Ugandans were injured. Ugandan authorities blamed the attack on the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).

Angolan Aircraft Downing, January 2, 1999: A UN plane carrying one U.S. citizen, four Angolans, two Philippine nationals, and one Namibian was shot down, according to a UN official. No deaths or injuries were reported. Angolan authorities blamed the attack on National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels. UNITA officials denied shooting down the plane.

Armed Kidnapping in Colombia, November 15, 1998: Armed assailants followed a U.S. businessman and his family home in Cundinamarca De- partment and kidnapped his 11-year-old son after stealing money, jewelry, one automo- bile, and two cell phones.The kidnappers demanded $1 million in ransom. On January 21, 1999, the kidnappers released the boy.

Colombian Pipeline Bombing, October 18, 1998: A National Liberation Army (ELN) planted bomb exploded on the Ocensa pipeline in An- tioquia Department, killing approximately 71 persons and injuring at least 100 others.The pipeline is jointly owned by the Colombia State Oil Company Ecopetrol and a consor- tium including U.S., French, British, and Canadian companies.

U.S. Embassy Bombings in East Africa, August 7, 1998: A bomb exploded at the rear entrance of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, killing 12 U.S. citizens, 32 Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs), and 247 Kenyan citizens. Ap- proximately 5,000 Kenyans, 6 U.S. citizens, and 13 FSNs were injured.The U.S. Embassy building sustained extensive structural damage. Almost simultaneously, a bomb deto- nated outside the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam,Tanzania, killing 7 FSNs and 3 Tanzanian citizens, and injuring 1 U.S. citizen and 76 Tanzanians. The explosion caused major structural damage to the U.S. Embassy facility. The U.S. Government held Osama bin Laden responsible.

Somali Hostage-takings, April 15, 1998: Somali militiamen abducted nine Red Cross and Red Crescent workers at an airstrip north of Mogadishu.The hostages included a U.S. citizen, a German, a Belgian, a French, a Norwegian, two Swiss, and one Somali.The gunmen were members of a subclan loyal to Ali Mahdi Mohammed, who controlled the northern section of the capital.

FARC Abduction, March 21–23, 1998: FARC rebels kidnapped a U.S. citizen in Sabaneta, Colombia. FARC members also killed 3 persons, wounded 14, and kidnapped at least 27 others at a roadblock near Bogota. Four U.S. citizens and one Italian were among those kidnapped, as well as the acting pres- ident of the National Electoral Council (CNE) and his wife.

Murder of U.S. Businessmen in Pakistan, November 12, 1997: Two unidentified gunmen shot to death four U.S. auditors from Union Texas Petroleum Corporation and their Pakistani driver after they drove away from the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi.The Islami Inqilabi Council, or Islamic Revolutionary Council, claimed responsi- bility in a call to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi. In a letter to Pakistani newspapers, the Aimal Khufia Action Committee also claimed responsibility.

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Yemeni Kidnappings, October 30, 1997: Al-Sha’if tribesmen kidnapped a U.S. businessman near Sanaa.The tribesmen sought the release of two fellow tribesmen who were arrested on smuggling charges and several public works projects they claim the government promised them. They released the hostage on November 27.

Israeli Shopping Mall Bombing, September 4, 1997: Three suicide bombers of HAMAS detonated bombs in the Ben Yehuda shopping mall in Jerusalem, killing eight persons, including the bombers, and wounding nearly 200 others. A dual U.S./Israeli citizen was among the dead, and 7 U.S. citizens were wounded.

Hotel Nacional Bombing, July 12, 1997: A bomb exploded at the Hotel Nacional in Havana, injuring three persons and causing minor damage. A previously unknown group calling itself the Military Liberation Union claimed responsibility.

FARC Kidnapping, March 7, 1997: FARC guerrillas kidnapped a U.S. mining employee and his Colombian colleague, who were searching for gold in Colombia. On November 16, the rebels released the two hostages after receiving a $50,000 ransom.

ELN Kidnapping, February 24, 1997: National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas kidnapped a U.S. citizen employed by a Las Ve- gas gold corporation, who was scouting a gold mining operation in Colombia. The ELN demanded a ransom of $2.5 million.

Empire State Building Sniper Attack, February 23, 1997: A Palestinian gunman opened fire on tourists at an observation deck atop the Empire State Building in New York City, killing a Danish national and wounding visitors from the United States, Argentina, Switzerland, and France before turning the gun on himself. A handwritten note carried by the gunman claimed this was a punishment attack against the “enemies of Palestine.”

Venezuelan Abduction, February 14, 1997: Six armed Colombian guerrillas kidnapped a U.S. oil engineer and his Venezuelan pilot in Apure,Venezuela.The kidnappers released the Venezuelan pilot on February 22. Accord- ing to authorities, the FARC is responsible for the kidnapping.

Egyptian Letter Bombs, January 2–13, 1997: A series of letter bombs with Alexandria, Egypt, postmarks were discovered at Al-Hayat newspaper bureaus in Washington, New York City, London, and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Three similar devices, also postmarked in Egypt, were found at a prison facility in Leav- enworth, Kansas. Bomb disposal experts defused all the devices, but one detonated at the Al-Hayat office in London, injuring two security guards and causing minor damage.

Tupac Amaru Seizure of Diplomats, December 17, 1996: Twenty-three members of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) took sev- eral hundred people hostage at a party given at the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima, Peru. Among the hostages were several U.S. officials, foreign ambassadors, and other diplomats, Peruvian Government officials, and Japanese businessmen.The group demanded

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the release of all MRTA members in prison and safe passage for them and the hostage takers.The terrorists released most of the hostages in December but held 81 Peruvians and Japanese citizens for several months.

Abduction of US. Citizen by FARC, December 11, 1996: Five armed men claiming to be members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom- bia (FARC) kidnapped and later killed a U.S. geologist at a methane gas exploration site in La Guajira Department.

Paris Subway Explosion, December 3, 1996: A bomb exploded aboard a Paris subway train as it arrived at the Port Royal station, killing two French nationals, a Moroccan, and a Canadian and injuring 86 persons.Among those injured were one U.S. citizen and a Canadian. No one claimed responsibility for the at- tack, but Algerian extremists are suspected.

Red Cross Worker Kidnappings, November 1, 1996: In Sudan a breakaway group from the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) kid- napped three International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) workers, including a U.S. citizen, an Australian, and a Kenyan. On December 9 the rebels released the hostages in exchange for ICRC supplies and a health survey for their camp.

PUK Kidnapping, September 13, 1996: In Iraq, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) militants kidnapped four French workers for Pharmaciens Sans Frontieres, a Canadian United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) official, and two Iraqis.

Sudanese Rebel Kidnapping, August 17, 1996: Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels kidnapped six missionaries in Mapourdit, including a U.S. citizen, an Italian, three Australians, and a Sudanese.The SPLA released the hostages 11 days later.

Khobar Towers Bombing, June 25, 1996: A fuel truck carrying a bomb exploded outside the U.S. military’s Khobar Towers hous- ing facility in Dhahran, killing 19 U.S. military personnel and wounding 515 persons, in- cluding 240 U.S. personnel. Several groups claimed responsibility for the attack.

Zekharya Attack, June 9, 1996: Unidentified gunmen opened fire on a car near Zekharya, killing a dual U.S./Israeli citizen and an Israeli.The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was suspected.

AID Worker Abduction, May 31, 1996: A gang of former Contra guerrillas kidnapped a U.S. employee of the Agency for Inter- national Development (AID) who was assisting with election preparations in rural north- ern Nicaragua. She was released unharmed the next day after members of the international commission overseeing the preparations intervened.

West Bank Attack, May 13, 1996: Arab gunmen opened fire on a bus and a group of Yeshiva students near the Bet El set- tlement, killing a dual U.S./Israeli citizen and wounding three Israelis. No one claimed re- sponsibility for the attack, but HAMAS was suspected.

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Dizengoff Center Bombing, March 4, 1996: HAMAS and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) both claimed responsibility for a bombing outside Tel Aviv’s largest shopping mall that killed 20 persons and injured 75 others, in- cluding 2 U.S. citizens.

HAMAS Bus Attack, February 26, 1996: In Jerusalem, a suicide bomber blew up a bus, killing 26 persons, including three U.S. citi- zens, and injuring some 80 persons, including three other U.S. citizens.

ELN Kidnapping, February 16, 1996: Six alleged National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas kidnapped a U.S. citizen in Colombia. After nine months, the hostage was released.

Athens Embassy Attack, February 15, 1996: Unidentified assailants fired a rocket at the U.S. Embassy compound in Athens, causing mi- nor damage to three diplomatic vehicles and some surrounding buildings. Circumstances of the attack suggested it was an operation carried out by the 17 November group.

IRA Bombing, February 9, 1996: An Irish Republican Army (IRA) bomb detonated in London, killing 2 persons and wound- ing more than 100 others, including 2 U.S. citizens.

Tamil Tigers Attack, January 31, 1996: Members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rammed an explosives-laden truck into the Central Bank in the heart of downtown Colombo, Sri Lanka, killing 90 civil- ians and injuring more than 1,400 others, including 2 U.S. citizens.

Kidnapping in Colombia, January 19, 1996: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas kidnapped a U.S. citizen and demanded a $1 million ransom.The hostage was released on May 22.

Saudi Military Installation Attack, November 13, 1995: The Islamic Movement of Change planted a bomb in a Riyadh military compound that killed one U.S. citizen, several foreign national employees of the U.S. government, and over 40 others.

Attack on U.S. Embassy in Moscow, September 13, 1995: A rocket-propelled grenade was fired through the window of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, ostensibly in retaliation for U.S. strikes on Serb positions in Bosnia.

Jerusalem Bus Attack, August 21, 1995: HAMAS claimed responsibility for the detonation of a bomb that killed 6 and injured over 100 persons, including several U.S. citizens.

Kashmiri Hostage-taking, July 4, 1995: In India six foreigners, including two U.S. citizens, were taken hostage by Al-Faran, a Kash- miri separatist group. One non–U.S. hostage was later found beheaded.

Bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, April 19, 1995: Right-wing extremists Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols destroyed the Federal Build- ing in Oklahoma City with a massive truck bomb that killed 166 and injured hundreds more in what was up to then the largest terrorist attack on American soil.

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Attack on U.S. Diplomats in Pakistan, March 8, 1995: Two unidentified gunmen killed two U.S. diplomats and wounded a third in Karachi, Pakistan.

FARC Hostage-taking, September 23, 1994: FARC rebels kidnapped U.S. citizen Thomas Hargrove in Colombia.

Hebron Massacre, February 25, 1994: Jewish right-wing extremist and U.S. citizen Baruch Goldstein machine-gunned Moslem worshippers at a mosque in the West Bank town of Hebron, killing 29 and wounding about 150.

Attempted Assassination of President Bush by Iraqi Agents, April 14, 1993: The Iraqi intelligence service attempted to assassinate former U.S. President George Bush during a visit to Kuwait. In retaliation, the U.S. launched a cruise missile attack two months later on the Iraqi capital Baghdad.

World Trade Center Bombing, February 26, 1993: The World Trade Center in New York City was badly damaged when a car bomb planted by Islamic terrorists exploded in an underground garage. The bomb left 6 people dead and 1,000 injured.The men carrying out the attack were followers of Umar Abd al-Rah- man, an Egyptian cleric who preached in the New York City area.

Source: U.S.Army—Timeline of Terrorism, Available on-line at http://www.army.mil/terrorism

in October 1993 and who killed 18 U.S. special operation forces in Mogadishu in October 1993, as depicted in the book and movie by the same title, Black Hawk Down.

Earlier that same year, Al Qaeda was involved in a more direct attack on the United States and its first on American soil. A growing body of information about central figures in the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City, particularly the reputed key bomb maker Ramzi Ahmad Yusef, suggests possible Al Qaeda involve- ment. As noted earlier, Abd Al-Rahman was convicted for plots related to this attack.

The next attack by Al Qaeda came in June of 1995, in Ethiopia, when operatives of Al Qaeda allegedly aided the Egyptian militant Islamic Group in a nearly successful as- sassination attempt against the visiting Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. That fall, Al Qaeda would strike America in Saudi Arabia. The four Saudi nationals who confessed to a November 1995 bombing of a U.S. military advisory facility in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, claimed on Saudi television to have been inspired by bin Laden. Five Americans were killed in that attack. In addition, it is commonly believed that another attack on Ameri- cans in Saudi Arabia that occurred the next year was also by Al Qaeda. Specifically, the 9/11 Commission report indicates that Al Qaeda might have had a hand in the June 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers complex near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, although FBI of- ficials have attributed the attack primarily to Shiite Saudi dissidents working with Iran- ian agents. Nineteen U.S. airmen were killed.

The next attack that Al Qaeda is alleged to have been responsible for was the August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed about 300. On Au- gust 20, 1998, two weeks after the attacks, the United States launched a cruise missile strike against bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan, reportedly missing him by a few

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hours. In July 1999 President Clinton imposed a ban on U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and froze Taliban assets in the United States. Then, in December 1999, U.S. and Jordanian authorities separately thwarted related Al Qaeda plots against religious sites in Jordan and apparently against the Los Angeles International Airport. This prompted the issuance of UN Security Council Resolution 1333, on December 19, 2000, which banned any arms shipments or provision of military advice to the Taliban. The Clinton administration also pursued a number of covert operations against bin Laden during this same time frame of 1999–2000. Later, after President Bush entered the White House in January of 2001, nine months before the attacks of September 11th, his administration considered some new options, which included arming anti-Taliban opposition groups.12

The last significant attack by Al Qaeda before September 11th occurred in October 2000, when Al Qaeda activists attacked the USS Cole in a ship-borne suicide bombing while the Cole was docked at the harbor in Aden, Yemen. The ship was damaged, and 17 sailors were killed. The next attack and the bursting of the terrorism bubble came with the September 11, 2001, attacks. By this time, Al Qaeda had become a coalition of factions of radical Islamic groups operating throughout the Muslim world, mostly groups opposing their governments. Cells and associates have been located in over 70 countries, according to U.S. officials. Among the groups in the Al Qaeda coalition, vir- tually all of which are still active today, are the Islamic Group and Al Jihad (Egypt), the Armed Islamic Group and the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Algeria), the Is- lamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Jemaah Islamiyah (Indonesia), the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (Libyan opposition), and Harakat ul-Majahedin (Pakistan, Kashmiri).

THE ATTACK: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 Tuesday September 11 dawned temperate and nearly cloudless in the eastern United States.13 Millions of men and women readied themselves for work. Some made their way to the Twin Towers, the signature structures of the World Trade Center complex in New York City. Others went to Arlington, Virginia, to the Pentagon. Across the Potomac River, the U.S. Congress was back in session. At the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, people began to line up for a White House tour. In Sarasota, Florida, President George W. Bush went for an early morning run.

For those heading to an airport, weather conditions could not have been better for a safe and pleasant journey. Among the travelers were Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz al Omari, who arrived at the airport in Portland, Maine.

Boston: American 11 and United 175 Atta and Omari boarded a 6:00 a.m. flight from Portland to Boston’s Logan International Airport.

When he checked in for his flight to Boston, Atta was selected by a computerized prescreening system known as CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening Sys- tem), created to identify passengers who should be subject to special security measures. Under security rules in place at the time, the only consequence of Atta’s selection by

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CAPPS was that his checked bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that he had boarded the aircraft. This did not hinder Atta’s plans.

Atta and Omari arrived in Boston at 6:45 a.m. Seven minutes later, Atta apparently took a call from Marwan al Shehhi, a longtime colleague, who was at another terminal at Logan Airport. They spoke for three minutes. It would be their final conversation.

Between 6:45 and 7:40, Atta and Omari, along with Satam al Suqami, Wail al Sherhi, and Waleed al Shehri, checked in and boarded American Airlines Flight 11, bound for Los Angeles. The flight was scheduled to depart at 7:45 a.m.

In another Logan terminal, Shehhi, joined by Fayez Banihammad, Mohand al Shehri, Ahmed al Ghamdi, and Hamza al Ghamdi, checked in for United Airlines Flight 175, also bound for Los Angeles. A couple of Shehhi’s colleagues were obviously unused to travel; according to the United ticket agent, they had trouble understanding the stan- dard security questions, and she had to go over them slowly until they gave the routine, reassuring answers. Their flight was scheduled to depart at 8:00 a.m.

The security checkpoints through which passengers, including Atta and his col- leagues, gained access to the American 11 gate were operated by Globe Security under a contract with American Airlines. In a different terminal, the single checkpoint through

The Collapse of the World Trade Center Building, September 11, 2001. (Source: AP Wide World Photos.)

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which passengers for United 175 passed was controlled by United Airlines, which had contracted with Huntleigh USA to perform the screening.

In passing through these checkpoints, each of the hijackers would have been screened by a walk-through metal detector calibrated to detect items with at least the mental content of a .22 caliber handgun. Anyone who might have set off that detector would have been screened with a hand wand—a procedure requiring the screener to identify the metal item or items that caused the alarm. In addition, an X-ray machine would have screened the hijackers’ carry-on belongings. The screening was in place to identify and confiscate weapons and other items prohibited from being carried onto a commercial flight. None of the checkpoint supervisors recalled the hijackers or reported anything suspicious regarding their screening.

As Atta had been selected by CAPPS in Portland, three members of his hijacking team—Suqami, Wail al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri—were selected in Boston. Their selection affected only the handling of their checked bags, not their screening at the checkpoint. All five men cleared the checkpoint and made their way to the gate for Amer- ican 11. Atta, Omari, and Suqami took their seats in business class. The Shehri brothers had adjacent seats in row 2, in the first-class cabin. They boarded American 11 between 7:31 and 7:40. The aircraft pushed back from the gate at 7:40.

Shehi and his team, none of whom had been selected by CAPPS, boarded United 175 between 7:23 and 7:28. Their aircraft pushed back from the gate just before 8:00.

Washington Dulles: America 77 Hundreds of miles southwest of Boston, at Dulles International Airport in the Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C., five more men were preparing to take their early morning flight. At 7:15, a pair of them, Khalid al Mihdhar and Majed Moqed, checked in at the American Airlines ticket counter for Flight 77, bound for Los Angeles. Within the next 20 minutes, they would be followed by Hani Hanjour and two brothers, Nawaf al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi.

Hani Hanjour, Khalid al Mihdhar, and Majed Moqed were flagged by CAPPS. The Hazmi brothers were also selected for extra scrutiny by the airline’s customer service repre- sentative at the check-in counter. He did so because one of the brothers did not have photo identification nor could he understand English, and because the agent found both of the pas- sengers to be suspicious. The only consequence of their selection was that their checked bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that they had boarded the aircraft.

All five hijackers passed through the main terminal’s west security screening check- point; United Airlines, which was the responsible air carrier, had contracted out the work to Argenbright Security. The checkpoint featured closed-circuit television that recorded all passengers, including the hijackers, as they were screened. At 7:18, Mihdhar and Mo- qed entered the security checkpoint.

Midhar and Moqed placed their carry-on bags on the belt of the X-ray machine and proceeded through the first metal detector. Both set off the alarm, and they were directed to a second metal detector. Mihdhar did not trigger the alarm and was permitted through the checkpoint. After Moqed set it off, a screener wanded him. He passed this inspection.

About 20 minutes later, at 7:35, another passenger for Flight 77, Hani Hanjour, placed two carry-on bags on the X-ray belt in the main terminal’s west checkpoint and proceeded, IS

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without alarm, through the metal detector. A short time later, Nawaf and Salem al Hazmi entered the same checkpoint. Salem al Hazmi cleared the metal detector and was permit- ted through; Nawaf al Hazmi set off the alarms for both the first and second metal detectors and was then hand-wanded before being passed. In addition, his over-the-shoulder carry-on bag was swiped by an explosive trace detector and then passed. The video footage indicated that he was carrying an unidentified item in his back pocket, clipped to its rim.

When the local civil aviation security office of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) later investigated these security screening operations, the screeners recalled noth- ing out of the ordinary. They could not recall that any of the passengers they screened were CAPPS selectees. The 9/11 Commission asked a screening expert to review the videotape of the hand-wanding, and he found the quality of the screener’s work to have been “marginal at best.” The screener should have “resolved” what set off the alarm; and in the case of both Moqed and Hazmi, it was clear that he did not.

At 7:50, Majed Moqed and Khalid al Mihdhar boarded the flight and were seated in 12A and 12B coach. Hani Hanjour, assigned to seat 1B (first class), soon followed. The Hazmi brothers, sitting in 5E and 5F, joined Hanjour in the first-class cabin.

Newark: United 93 Between 7:03 and 7:39, Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmed al Nami, Ahmad al Haznawi, and Ziad Jarrah checked in at the United Airlines ticket counter for Flight 93, going to Los Angeles. Two checked bags; two did not. Haznawi was selected by CAPPS. His checked bag was screened for explosives and then loaded on the plane.

The four men passed through the security checkpoint, owned by United Airlines and operated under contract by Argenbright Security. Like the checkpoints in Boston, it lacked closed-circuit television surveillance, so there is no documentary evidence to in- dicate when the hijackers passed through the checkpoint, what alarms may have been triggered, or what security procedures were administered. The FAA interviewed the screeners later; none recalled anything unusual or suspicious.

The four men boarded the plane between 7:39 and 7:48. All four had seats in the first-class cabin; their plane had no business-class section. Jarrah was in seat 1B, closest to the cockpit; Nami was in 3C, Ghamdi in 3D, and Haznawi in 6B.

The 19 men were aboard four transcontinental flights. They were planning to hijack these planes and turn them into large guided missiles, loaded with up to 11,400 gallons of jet fuel. By 8:00 a.m. on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, they had defeated all the security layers that America’s civil aviation security system then had in place to prevent a hijacking.

The Hijacking of American 11 American Airlines Flight 11 provided nonstop service from Boston to Los Angeles. On September 11, Captain John Ogonowski and First Officer Thomas McGuinness piloted the Boeing 767. It carried its full capacity of nine flight attendants. Eighty-one passen- gers boarded the flight with them (including the five terrorists).

The plane took off at 7:59. Just before 8:14, it had climbed to 26,000 feet, not quite its initial assigned cruising altitude of 29,000 feet. All communications and flight profile

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data were normal. About this time the Fasten Seatbelt sign would usually have been turned off, and the flight attendants would have begun preparing for cabin service.

At that same time, American 11 had its last routine communication with the ground when it acknowledged navigational instructions from the FAA’s air traffic control (ATC) center in Boston. Sixteen seconds after that transmission, ATC instructed the aircraft’s pilots to climb to 35,000 feet. That message and all subsequent attempts to contact the flight were not acknowledged. From this and other evidence, the 9/11 Commission be- lieves the hijacking began at 8:14 or shortly thereafter.

Reports from two flight attendants in the coach cabin, Betty Ong and Madeline “Amy” Sweeney, tell us most of what we know about how the hijacking happened. As it began, some of the hijackers—most likely Wail al Shehri and Waleed al Shehri, who were seated in row 2 in first class—stabbed the two unarmed flight attendants who would have been preparing for cabin services.

The 9/11 Commission does not know exactly how the hijackers gained access to the cock- pit; FAA rules required that the doors remained closed and locked during flight. Ong specu- lated that they had “jammed their way” in. Perhaps the terrorists stabbed the flight attendants to get a cockpit key, to force one of them to open the cockpit door, or to lure the captain or first officer out of the cockpit. Or the flight attendants may just have been in their way.

At the same time or shortly thereafter, Atta—the only terrorist on board trained to fly a jet—would have moved to the cockpit from his business-class seat, possibly accom- panied by Omari. As this was happening, passenger Daniel Lewin, who was seated in the row just behind Atta and Omari, was stabbed by one of the hijackers—probably Satam al Suqami, who was seated directly behind Lewin. Lewin had served four years as an offi- cer in the Israeli military. He may have made an attempt to stop the hijackers in front of him, not realizing that another was sitting behind him.

The hijackers quickly gained control and sprayed Mace, pepper spray, or some other irritant in the first-class cabin to force the passengers and flight attendants toward the rear of the plane. They claimed they had a bomb.

About five minutes after the hijacking began, Betty Ong contacted the American Air- lines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina, via an AT&T airphone to report an emergency aboard the flight. This was the first of several occasions on 9/11 when flight attendants took action outside the scope of their training, which emphasized that in a hijacking they were to communicate with the cockpit crew. The emergency call lasted approximately 25 minutes, as Ong calmly and professionally relayed information about events taking place aboard the airplane to authorities on the ground.

At 8:19, Ong reported: “The cockpit is not answering, somebody’s stabbed in busi- ness class—and I think there’s Mace—that we can’t breathe—I don’t know, I think we’re getting hijacked.” She then told of the stabbings of the two flight attendants.

At 8:21, one of the American employees receiving Ong’s call in North Carolina, Nydia Gonzalez, alerted the American Airlines operations center in Fort Worth, Texas, reaching Craig Marquis, the manager on duty. Marquis soon realized this was an emergency and in- structed the airline’s dispatcher responsible for the flight to contact the cockpit. At 8:23, the dispatcher tried unsuccessfully to contact the aircraft. Six minutes later, the air traffic control specialist in American’s operation center contacted the FAA’s Boston Air Traffic Control Center about the flight. The center was already aware of the problem.

Boston Center knew of a problem on the flight in part because just before 8:25 the hijackers had attempted to communicate with the passengers. The microphone ISB

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was keyed, and immediately one of the hijackers said, “Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you’ll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.” Air traffic controllers heard the transmission; Ong did not. The hijackers proba- bly did not know how to operate the cockpit radio communication system correctly and thus inadvertently broadcast their message over the air traffic control channel instead of the cabin public-address channel. Also at 8:25, and again at 8:29, Amy Sweeney got through to the American Flight Services Office in Boston but was cut off after she reported someone was hurt aboard the flight. Three minutes later, Sweeney was reconnected to the office and began relaying updates to the manager, Michael Woodward.

At 8:26, Ong reported that the plane was “flying erratically.” A minute later, Flight 11 turned south. American also began getting identifications of the hijackers, as Ong and then Sweeney passed on some of the seat numbers of those who had gained unauthorized access to the cockpit.

Sweeney calmly reported on her line that the plane had been hijacked; a man in first class had his throat slashed; two flight attendants had been stabbed—one was seriously hurt and was on oxygen whereas the other’s wounds seemed minor; a doctor had been re- quested; the flight attendants were unable to contact the cockpit; and there was a bomb in the cockpit. Sweeney told Woodward that she and Ong were trying to relay as much information as they could to people on the ground.

At 8:38, Ong told Gonzalez that the plane was flying erratically again. Around this time Sweeney told Woodward that the hijackers were Middle Easterners, naming three of their seat numbers. One spoke very little English, and one spoke excellent English. The hijackers had gained entry to the cockpit, and she did not know how. The aircraft was in a rapid descent.

At 8:41, Sweeney told Woodward that passengers in coach were under the impres- sion that there was a routine medical emergency in first class. Other flight attendants were busy at duties such as getting medical supplies while Ong and Sweeney were re- porting the events.

At 8:41, in America’s operations center, a colleague told Marquis that the air traffic controllers declared Flight 11 a hijacking and “think he’s [American 11] headed toward Kennedy [airport in New York City]. They’re moving everybody out of the way. They seem to have him on a primary radar. They seem to think that he is descending.”

At 8:44, Gonzalez reported losing phone contact with Ong. About this same time Sweeney reported to Woodward, “Something is wrong. We are in a rapid descent . . . we are all over the place.” Woodward asked Sweeney to look out the window to see if she could determine where they were. Sweeney responded: “We are flying low. We are fly- ing very, very low. We are flying way too low.” Seconds later she said, “Oh my God we are way too low.” The phone call ended.

At 8:46:40, American 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. All on board, along with an unknown number of people in the tower, were killed instantly.

The Hijacking of United 175 United Airlines Flight 175 was scheduled to depart for Los Angeles at 8:00. Captain Victor Saracini and First Officer Michael Horrocks piloted the Boeing 767, which had seven flight attendants. Fifty-six passengers boarded the flight.

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United 175 pushed back from its gate at 7:58 and departed Logan Airport at 8:14. By 8:33, it had reached its assigned cruising altitude of 31,000 feet. The flight attendants would have begun their cabin service.

The flight had taken off just as American 11 was being hijacked, and at 8:42 the United 175 flight crew completed their report on a “suspicious transmission” overheard from another plane (which turned out to have been Flight 11) just after takeoff. This was United 175’s last communication with the ground.

The hijackers attacked sometime between 8:42 and 8:46. They used knives (as re- ported by two passengers and a flight attendant), Mace (reported by one passenger), and the threat of a bomb (reported by the same passenger). They stabbed members of the flight crew (reported by a flight attendant and one passenger). Both pilots had been killed (reported by one flight attendant). The eyewitness accounts came from calls made from the rear of the plane, from passengers originally seated further for- ward in the cabin, a sign that passengers and perhaps crew had been moved to the back of the aircraft. Given similarities to American 11 in hijacker seating and in eye- witness reports of tactics and weapons, as well as the contact between the presumed team leaders, Atta and Shehhi, the 9/11 Commission believes the tactics were similar on both flights.

The first operational evidence that something was abnormal on United 175 came at 8:47, when the aircraft changed beacon codes twice within a minute. At 8:51, the flight deviated from its assigned altitude, and a minute later New York air traffic controllers be- gan repeatedly and unsuccessfully trying to contact it.

At 8:52, in Easton, Connecticut, a man named Lee Hanson received a phone call from his son Peter, a passenger on United 175. His son told him: “I think they’ve taken over the cockpit—An attendant has been stabbed—and someone else up front may have been killed. The plane is making strange moves. Call United Airlines—Tell them it’s Flight 175, Boston to LA.” Lee Hanson then called the Easton Police Department and relayed what he had heard.

Also at 8:52, a male flight attendant called a United office in San Francisco, reaching Marc Policastro. The flight attendant reported that the flight had been hijacked, both pilots had been killed, a flight attendant had been stabbed, and the hijackers were probably flying the plane. The call lasted about two minutes, after which Policastro and a colleague tried unsucessfully to contact the flight.

At 8:58, the flight took a heading toward New York City. At 8:59, Flight 175 passenger David Sweeney tried to call his wife, Julie. He left a

message on their home answering machine that the plane had been hijacked. He then called his mother, Louise Sweeney, told her the flight had been hijacked, and added that the passengers were thinking about storming the cockpit to take control of the plane away from the hijackers.

At 9:00, Lee Hanson received a second call from his son Peter:

It’s getting bad, Dad—A stewardess was stabbed—They seem to have knives and Mace—They said they have a bomb—It’s getting very bad on the plane—Passengers are throwing up and getting sick—The plane is making jerky movements—I don’t think the pilot is flying the plane—I think we are going down—I think they intend to go to Chicago or someplace and fly into a building—Don’t worry, Dad—If it happens, it’ll be very fast—My God, my God.

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The call ended abruptly. Lee Hanson had heard a woman scream just before it cut off. He turned on a television, and in her home so did Louise Sweeney. Both then saw the second aircraft hit the World Trade Center.

At 9:03:11, United Airlines Flight 175 struck the South Tower of the World Trade Center. All on board, along with an unknown number of people in the tower, were killed instantly.

The Hijacking of American 77 American Airlines Flight 77 was scheduled to depart from Washington Dulles for Los Angeles at 8:10. The aircraft was a Boeing 757 piloted by Captain Charles F. Burlingame and First Officer David Charlebois. There were four flight attendants. On September 11, the flight carried 58 passengers.

American 77 pushed back from its gate at 8:09 and took off at 8:20. At 8:46, the flight reached its assigned cruising altitude of 35,000 feet. Cabin service would have begun. At 8:51, American 77 transmitted its last routine radio communication. The hijacking began between 8:51 and 8:54. As on American 11 and United 175, the hijackers used knives (re- ported by one passenger) and moved all the passengers (and possibly crew) to the rear of the aircraft (reported by one flight attendant and one passenger). Unlike the earlier flights, the Flight 77 hijackers were reported by a passenger to have box cutters. Finally, a passen- ger reported that an announcement had been made by the “pilot” that the plane had been hijacked. Neither of the firsthand accounts mentioned any stabbings or the threat or use of either a bomb or Mace, though both witnesses began the flight in the first-class cabin.

At 8:54, the aircraft deviated from its assigned course, turning south. Two minutes later the transponder was turned off, and even primary radar contact with the aircraft was lost. The Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center repeatedly tried and failed to contact the aircraft. American Airlines dispatchers also tried, without success.

At 9:00, American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerald Arpey learned that communications had been lost with American 77. This was now the second American air- craft in trouble. He ordered all American Airlines flights in the Northeast that had not taken off to remain on the ground. Shortly before 9:10, suspecting that American 77 had been hijacked, American headquarters concluded that the second aircraft to hit the World Trade Center might have been Flight 77. After learning that United Airlines was missing a plane, American Airlines headquarters extended the ground stop nationwide.

At 9:12, Renee May called her mother, Nancy May, in Las Vegas. She said her flight was being hijacked by six individuals who had moved them to the rear of the plane. She asked her mother to alert American Airlines. Nancy May and her husband promptly did so.

At some point between 9:16 and 9:26, Barbara Olson called her husband, Ted Olson, the Solicitor General of the United States. She reported that the flight had been hijacked, and the hijackers had knives and box cutters. She further indicated that the hijackers were not aware of her phone call, and that they had put all the passengers in the back of the plane. About a minute into the conversation, the call was cut off. Solicitor General Olson tried unsuccessfully to reach Attorney General John Ashcroft.

Shortly after the first call, Barbara Olson reached her husband again. She reported that the pilot had announced that the flight had been hijacked, and she asked her hus- band what she should tell the captain to do. Ted Olson asked for her location and she

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replied that the aircraft was then flying over houses. Another passenger told her they were traveling northeast. The Solicitor General then informed his wife of the two previ- ous hijackings and crashes. She did not display signs of panic and did not indicate any awareness of an impending crash. At that point, the second call was cut off.

At 9:29, the autopilot on American 77 was disengaged; the aircraft was at 7,000 feet and approximately 38 miles west of the Pentagon. At 9:32, controllers at the Dulles Ter- minal Radar Approach Control “observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed.” This was later determined to have been Flight 77.

At 9:34, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport advised the Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White House. American 77 was then 5 miles west-southwest of the Pentagon and began a 330-degree turn. At the end of the turn, it was descending through 2,200 feet, pointed toward the Pentagon and downtown Washington. The hijacker pilot then advanced the throttles to maximum power and dove toward the Pentagon.

At 9:37:46, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon, traveling at ap- proximately 530 miles per hour. All on board, as well as many civilian and military per- sonnel in the building, were killed.

The Battle for United 93 At 8:42, United Airlines Flight 93 took off from Newark (New Jersey) Liberty International Airport bound for San Francisco. The aircraft was piloted by Captain Jason Dahl and First Officer Leroy Homer, and there were five flight attendants. Thirty-seven passengers,

BOX 1-3

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT AFTER TWO PLANES CRASH INTO WORLD TRADE CENTER EMMA BOOKER ELEMENTARY SCHOOL SARASOTA, FLORIDA SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, 9:30 A.M.

THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, this is a difficult moment for America. I, unfortunately, will be going back to Washington after my remarks. Secretary Rod Paige and the Lt. Gover- nor will take the podium and discuss education. I do want to thank the folks here at Booker Elementary School for their hospitality.

Today we’ve had a national tragedy.Two airplanes have crashed into the World Trade Cen- ter in an apparent terrorist attack on our country. I have spoken to the Vice President, to the Governor of New York, to the Director of the FBI, and have ordered that the full resources of the federal government go to help the victims and their families, and to conduct a full-scale investigation to hunt down and to find those folks who committed this act.

Terrorism against our nation will not stand. And now if you would join me in a moment of silence. May God bless the victims, their

families, and America.Thank you very much.

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THE ATTACK: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 25

including the hijackers, boarded the plane. Scheduled to depart the gate at 8:00, the Boe- ing 757’s takeoff was delayed because of the airport’s typically heavy morning traffic.

The hijackers had planned to take flights scheduled to depart at 7:45 (American 11), 8:00 (United 175 and United 93), and 8:10 (American 77). Three of the flights had actu- ally taken off within 10 to 15 minutes of their planned departure times. United 93 would ordinarily have taken off about 15 minutes after pulling away from the gate. When it left the ground at 8:42, the flight was running more than 25 minutes late.

As United 93 left Newark, the flight’s crew members were unaware of the hijackings of American 11. Around 9:00, the FAA, American, and United were facing the stagger- ing realization of apparent multiple hijackings. At 9:03, they would see another aircraft strike the World Trade Center. Crisis managers at the FAA and the airlines did not yet act to warn other aircraft. At the same time, Boston Center realized that a message transmitted just before 8:25 by the hijacker pilot of American 11 included the phrase, “We have some planes.”

No one at the FAA or the airlines that day had ever dealt with multiple hijackings. Such a plot had not been carried out anywhere in the world in more than 30 years, and never in the United States. As news of the hijackings filtered through the FAA and the airlines, it does not seem to have occurred to their leadership that they needed to alert other aircraft in the air that they too might be at risk.

United 175 was hijacked between 8:42 and 8:46, and awareness of that hijacking be- gan to spread after 8:51. American 77 was hijacked between 8:51 and 8:54. By 9:00, the FAA and airline officials began to comprehend that attackers were going after multiple aircraft. American Airlines’ nationwide ground stop between 9:05 and 9:10 was followed by a United Airlines ground stop. FAA controllers at Boston Center, which had tracked the first two hijackings, requested at 9:07 that Herndon Command Center “get messages to airborne aircraft to increase security for the cockpit.” There is no evidence that Hern- don took such action. Boston Center immediately began speculating about other aircraft that might be in danger, leading them to worry about a transcontinental flight—Delta 1989—that in fact was not hijacked. At 9:19, the FAA’s New England regional office called Herndon and asked that Cleveland Center advise Delta 1989 to use extra cockpit security.

Several FAA air traffic control officials told the 9/11 Commission that it was the air carrier’s responsibility to notify their planes of security problems. One senior FAA air traf- fic control manager said that it was simply not the FAA’s place to order the airlines what to tell their pilots. The Commission believes that such statements did not reflect an ade- quate appreciation of the FAA’s responsibility for the safety and security of civil aviation.

The airlines bore responsibility, too. They were facing an escalating number of con- flicting and, for the most part, erroneous reports about other flights, as well as a contin- uing lack of vital information from the FAA about the hijacked flights. The 9/11 Commission found no evidence, however, that American Airlines sent any cockpit warn- ings to its aircraft that day. United’s first decisive action to notify its airborne aircraft to take defensive action did not come until 9:19, when a United flight dispatcher, Ed Ballinger, took the initiative to begin transmitting warnings to his 16 transcontinental flights: “Beware any cockpit intrusions—Two a/c (aircraft) hit World Trade Center.” One of the flights that received the warning was United 93. Because Ballinger was still re- sponsible for his other flights as well as Flight 175, his warning message was not transmitted to Flight 93 until 9:23.

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By all accounts, the first 46 minutes of Flight 93’s cross-country trip proceeded rou- tinely. Radio communications from the plane were normal. Heading, speed, and altitude ran according to plan. At 9:24, Ballinger’s warning to United 93 was received in the cockpit. Within two minutes, at 9:26, the pilot, Jason Dahl, responded with a note of puzzlement: “Ed, confirm latest mssg plz—Jason.”

The hijackers attacked at 9:28. While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. Eleven seconds into the descent, the FAA’s air traf- fic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the air- craft. During the first broadcast, the captain or first officer could be heard declaring “Mayday” amid the sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit. The second radio trans- mission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing. The captain or first of- ficer could be heard shouting: “Hey get out of here—get out of here—get out of here.”

On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93—33 in addition to the 4 hijackers. This was below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001. But there is no evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation.

The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11 operated in five- man teams. They initiated their cockpit takeover within 30 minutes of takeoff. On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff, and there were only four hijackers. The operative likely intended to round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida’s Or- lando International Airport in August.

Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight. FAA rules allow use of this seat by documented and approved individuals, usually air carrier or FAA personnel. The 9/11 Commission found no evidence indicating that one of the hijackers, or anyone else, sat there on this flight. All the hijackers had assigned seats in first class, and they seem to have used them. It is more likely that Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not have been visible to the passengers.

At 9:32, a hijacker, probably Jarrah, made or attempted to make the following an- nouncement to the passengers of Flight 93: “Ladies and Gentlemen: Here the captain, please sit down keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board. So, sit.” The flight data recorder (also recovered) indicates that Jarrah then instructed the plane’s autopilot to turn the aircraft around and head east.

The cockpit voice recorder data indicate that a woman, most likely a flight attendant, was being held captive in the cockpit. She struggled with one of the hijackers who killed or otherwise silenced her.

Shortly thereafter, the passengers and flight crew began a series of calls from GTE airphones and cellular phones. These calls between family, friends, and colleagues took place until the end of the flight and provided those on the ground with firsthand ac- counts. They enabled the passengers to gain critical information, including the news that two aircraft had slammed into the World Trade Center.

At 9:39, the FAA’s Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center overheard a second announcement indicating that there was a bomb on board, that the plane was returning

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to the airport, and that passengers should remain seated. Although it apparently was not heard by the passengers, this announcement, like those on Flight 11 and Flight 77, was intended to deceive them. Jarrah, like Atta earlier, may have inadvertently broadcast the message because he did not know how to operate the radio and the intercom. To the 9/11 Commission’s knowledge, none of them had ever flown an actual airliner before.

At least two callers from the flight reported that the hijackers knew that passengers were making calls but did not seem to care. It is quite possible Jarrah knew of the success of the assault on the World Trade Center. He could have learned of this from messages being sent by United Airlines to the cockpits of its transcontinental flights, including Flight 93, warn- ing of cockpit intrusion and telling of the New York attacks. But even without them, he would have certainly understood that the attacks on the World Trade Center would already have unfolded, given Flight 93’s tardy departure from Newark. If Jarrah did know that the pas- sengers were making calls, it might not have occurred to him that they were certain to learn what had happened in New York, thereby defeating his attempts at deception.

At least 10 passengers and 2 crew members shared vital information with family, friends, colleagues, or others on the ground. All understood the plane had been hijacked. They said the hijackers wielded knives and claimed to have a bomb. The hijackers were wearing red bandanas, and they forced the passengers to the back of the aircraft.

Callers reported that a passenger had been stabbed and that two people were lying on the floor of the cabin, injured or dead—possibly the captain and first officer. One caller reported that a flight attendant had been killed.

One of the callers from United 93 also reported that he thought the hijackers might possess a gun. But none of the other callers reported the presence of a firearm. One re- cipient of a call from the aircraft recounted specifically asking her caller whether the hi- jackers had guns. The passenger replied that he did not see one. No evidence of firearms or of their identifiable remains were found at the aircraft’s crash site, and the cockpit voice recorder gives no indication of a gun being fired or mentioned at any time. The 9/11 Commission believes that if the hijackers had possessed a gun, they would have used it in the flight’s last minutes as the passengers fought back.

Passengers on three flights reported the hijackers’ claim of having a bomb. The FBI told the 9/11 Commission they found no trace of explosives at the crash sites. One of the passengers who mentioned a bomb expressed his belief that it was not real. Lacking any evidence that the hijackers attempted to smuggle such illegal items past the security screening checkpoints, the 9/11 Commission believes the bombs were probably fake.

During at least five of the passengers’ phone calls, information was shared about the attacks that had occurred earlier that morning at the World Trade Center. Five calls de- scribed the intent of passengers and surviving crew members to revolt against the hi- jackers. According to one call, they voted on whether to rush the terrorists in an attempt to retake the plane. They decided and acted.

At 9:57, the passenger assault began. Several passengers had terminated phone calls with loved ones to join the revolt. One of the callers ended her message as follows: “Everyone’s running up to first class, I’ve got to go. Bye.”

The cockpit voice recorder captured the sounds of the passenger assault muffled by the intervening cockpit door. Some family members who listened to the recording report that they could hear the voice of a loved one among the din. The 9/11 Commission could not identify whose voices can be heard. But the assault was sustained.

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BOX 1-4

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT UPON ARRIVAL AT BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE, LOUISIANA

THE PRESIDENT: I want to reassure the American people that the full resources of the fed- eral government are working to assist local authorities to save lives and to help the victims of these attacks. Make no mistake:The United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts.

I’ve been in regular contact with the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the na- tional security team and my Cabinet.We have taken all appropriate security precautions to protect the American people. Our military at home and around the world is on high alert status, and we have taken the necessary security precautions to continue the functions of your government.

We have been in touch with the leaders of Congress and with world leaders to assure them that we will do whatever is necessary to protect America and Americans.

I ask the American people to join me in saying a thanks for all the folks who have been fighting hard to rescue our fellow citizens and to join me in saying a prayer for the victims and their families.

The resolve of our great nation is being tested. But make no mistake:We will show the world that we will pass this test. God bless.

In response, Jarrah immediately began to roll the airplane to the left and right, at- tempting to knock the passengers off balance. At 9:58:57, Jarrah told another hijacker in the cockpit to block the door. Jarrah continued to roll the airplane sharply left and right, but the assault continued. At 9:59:52, Jarrah changed tactics and pitched the nose of the airplane up and down to disrupt the assault. The recorder captured the sounds of loud thumps, crashes, shouts, and breaking glasses and plates. At 10:00:03, Jarrah stabilized the airplane.

Five seconds later, Jarrah asked, “Is that it? Shall we finish it off?” A hijacker re- sponded, “No. Not yet. When they all come, we finish it off.” The sounds of fighting con- tinued outside the cockpit. Again, Jarrah pitched the nose of the aircraft up and down. At 10:00:26, a passenger in the background said, “In the cockpit. If we don’t we’ll die!” Sixteen seconds later, a passenger yelled, “Roll it.” Jarrah stopped the violent maneuvers at about 10:01:00 and said, “Allah is the greatest! Allah is the greatest!” He then asked another hijacker in the cockpit, “Is that it? I mean, shall we put it down?” to which the other replied, “Yes, put it in it, and pull it down.”

The passengers continued their assault and at 10:02:03, a hijacker said, “Pull it down! Pull it down!” The hijackers remained at the controls but must have judged that the pas- sengers were only seconds from overcoming them. The airplane headed down; the control wheel was turned hard to the right. The airplane rolled onto its back, and one of the hijack- ers began shouting, “Allah is the greatest! Allah is the greatest!” With the sounds of the

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passenger counterattack continuing, the aircraft plowed into an empty field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at 580 miles per hour, about 20 minutes’ flying time from Washington, D.C.

Jarrah’s objective was to crash his airliner into symbols of the American Republic, the Capitol or the White House. He was defeated by the alerted unarmed passengers of United 93.

THE RESPONSE: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 New York, NY The World Trade Center (WTC) complex was built for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.14 Construction began in 1966, and tenants began to occupy its space in 1970. The Twin Towers came to occupy a unique and symbolic place in the culture of New York City and America.

The WTC actually consisted of seven buildings, including one hotel, spread across 16 acres of land. The buildings were connected by an underground mall (the concourse). The Twin Towers (1 WTC, or the North Tower, and 2 WTC, or the South Tower) were the signature structures, containing 10.4 million square feet of office space. Both towers had 110 stories, were about 1,350 feet high, and were square; each wall measured 208 feet in length. On any given workday, up to 50,000 office workers occupied the towers, and 40,000 people passed through the complex.

In New York City, the city government had ready at their disposal a number of plans for critical incidents that may have potentially occurred in the city, with the Office of Emergency Management and Interagency Preparedness (OEM) established to coordi- nate the workings of such agencies as the New York Police Department (NYPD), the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD), and the Fire Department of New York (FDNY). In 1996 Mayor Rudolph Giuliani created the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management, which had three basic functions. First, OEM’s Watch Command was to monitor the city’s key communications channels—including radio frequencies of FDNY dispatch and the NYPD—and other data. A second purpose of the OEM was to improve New York City’s response to major incidents, including terrorist attacks, by planning and conducting ex- ercises and drills that would involve multiple city agencies, particularly the NYPD and the FDNY. Third, the OEM would play a crucial role in managing the city’s overall re- sponse to an incident. After OEM’s Emergency Operations Center was activated, desig- nated liaisons from relevant agencies, as well as the mayor and his or her senior staff, would respond there. In addition, an OEM field responder would be sent to the scene to ensure that the response was coordinated.

The OEM’s headquarters was located at 7 WTC. Some questioned locating it both so close to a previous terrorist target (the 1993 bombing) and on the 23rd floor of a build- ing (difficult to access should elevators become inoperable). There was no backup site. The site was activated shortly after the first plane hit the North Tower. However, after the South Tower was hit, an evacuation order was issued. Prior to its evacuation, no out- side agency liaisons had reached OEM.

The NYPD on September 11 stood at 40,000 police officers and was led by Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik, whose duties were not primarily operational but who re- tained operational authority. Much of the NYPD’s operational activities were run by the

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chief of department. In the event of a major emergency, a leading role would be played by the Special Operations Division. This division included the Aviation Unit, which pro- vided helicopters for surveys and rescues, and the Emergency Services Unit (ESU), which carried out specialized rescue missions. The NYPD had specific and detailed stan- dard operating procedures for the dispatch of officers to an incident’s depending on the incident’s magnitude.

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department consisted of 1,331 officers, many of whom were trained in fire suppression methods as well as in law enforcement. The PAPD was led by a superintendent. There was a separate PAPD com- mand for each of the Port Authority’s nine facilities, including the World Trade Center.

As of September 11, the Port Authority lacked any standard operating procedures to govern how officers from multiple commands would respond to and then be staged and utilized at a major incident at the WTC. In particular, there were no standard operating procedures covering how different commands should communicate via radio during such an incident.

At 8:46:40, the hijacked American Airlines Flight 11 flew into the upper portion of the North Tower, cutting through floors 93 to 99. Within minutes, New York City’s 911 system was flooded with eyewitness accounts of the events. Most callers correctly iden- tified the target of the attack. Some identified the plane as a commercial airliner.

Numerous NYPD officers saw the plane strike the North Tower and immediately re- ported it to NYPD communications dispatchers.

At 8:58, while en route, the NYPD Chief of Department raised the NYPD’s mobi- lization to level 4, thereby sending to the WTC approximately 22 lieutenants, 100 ser- geants, and 800 police officers from all over the city. The Chief of Department arrived at Church and Vesey at 9:00.

At 9:01, the NYPD patrol mobilization point was moved to West and Vesey to han- dle the greater number of patrol officers dispatched in the higher-level mobilization. These officers would be stationed around the perimeter of the complex to direct the evacuation of civilians. Many were diverted on the way to the scene by intervening emer- gencies related to the attack.

At 8:50, the Aviation Unit of the NYPD dispatched two helicopters to the WTC to report on conditions and assess the feasibility of a rooftop landing or of special rescue op- erations. En route, the two helicopters communicated with air traffic controllers at the area’s three major airports and informed them of the commercial airplane crash at the World Trade Center. The air traffic controllers had been unaware of the incident.

At 8:56, an NYPD ESU team asked to be picked up at the Wall Street heliport to ini- tiate rooftop rescues. At 8:58, however, after assessing the North Tower roof, a helicop- ter pilot advised the ESU team that they could not land on the roof because “it is engulfed in flames and heavy smoke conditions.”

Two on-duty NYPD officers were on the 20th floor of the North Tower at this time. They climbed to the 29th floor, urging civilians to evacuate, but did not locate a group of civilians trapped on the 22nd floor.

Just before 9:00, an ESU team began to walk from Church and Vesey to the North Tower lobby, with the goal of climbing toward and setting up a triage center on the up- per floors for the severely injured. A second ESU team would follow them to assist in re- moving those individuals.

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Numerous officers responded to help injured civilians and to urge those who could walk to vacate the area immediately. Putting themselves in danger of falling debris, sev- eral officers entered the plaza and successfully rescued at least one injured, nonambula- tory civilian, and attempted to rescue others.

Also by about 9:00, transit officers began shutting down subway stations in the vicin- ity of the World Trade Center and evacuating civilians from those stations.

Around the city, the NYPD cleared major thoroughfares for emergency vehicles to access the WTC. The NYPD and PAPD coordinated the closing of bridges and tunnels into Manhattan.

The Port Authority’s on-site commanding police officer was standing in the con- course when a fireball erupted out of elevator shafts and exploded onto the mall con- course, causing him to dive for cover. The on-duty sergeant initially instructed the officers in the WTC Command to meet at the police desk in 5 WTC. Soon thereafter, he instructed officers arriving from outside commands to meet him at the fire safety desk in the North Tower lobby. A few of these officers from outside commands were given WTC Command radios.

One Port Authority police officer at the WTC immediately began climbing stairwell C in the North Tower. Other officers began performing rescue and evacuation operations on the ground floors and in the PATH (Port Authority Trans-Hudson) station below the WTC complex.

Within minutes of impact, Port Authority police officers from the PATH, bridges, tunnels, and airport commands began responding to the WTC. The PAPD lacked writ- ten standard operating procedures for personnel responding from outside commands to the WTC during a major incident. In addition, officers from some PAPD commands lacked interoperable radio frequencies. As a result, there was no comprehensive coordi- nation of PAPD’s overall response.

At 9:00, the PAPD commanding officer of the WTC ordered an evacuation of all civilians in the World Trade Center complex because of the magnitude of the calamity in the North Tower. Also, at 9:00, the PAPD Superintendent and Chief of Department ar- rived separately and made their way to the North Tower.

In the 17-minute period between 8:46 and 9:03 a.m. on September 11, New York City and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey had mobilized the largest res- cue operation in the city’s history. Well over a thousand first responders had been de- ployed, an evacuation had begun, and the critical decision that the fire could not be fought had been made. Then the second plane hit.

At 9:03:11, the hijacked United Airlines Flight 175 hit WTC (the South Tower) from the south, crashing through the 77th to 85th floors. What had been the largest and most complicated rescue operation in city history instantly doubled in magnitude.

Immediately after the second plane hit, the Chief of Department of the NYPD or- dered a second Level 4 mobilization, bringing the total number of NYPD officers re- sponding to close to 2,000.

The NYPD Chief of Department called for Operation Omega, which required the protection of sensitive locations around the city. NYPD headquarters were secured, and all other government buildings were evacuated.

The ESU command post at Church and Vesey streets coordinated all NYPD ESU rescue teams. After the South Tower was hit, the ESU officer running this command post

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decided to send one ESU team (each with approximately six police officers) up each of the Twin Towers’ stairwells. While he continued to monitor the citywide SOD channel, which NYPD helicopters were using, he also monitored the point-to-point tactical chan- nel that the ESU teams climbing in the towers would use.

Initial responders from outside PAPD commands proceeded to the police desk in 5 WTC or to the fire safety desk in the North Tower lobby. Some officers were then assigned to assist in stairwell evacuations; others were assigned to expedite evacuation in the plaza, concourse, and PATH station. As information was received of civilians trapped above ground-level floors of the North Tower, other PAPD officers were instructed to climb to those floors for rescue efforts. Still others began climbing toward the impact zone.

At 9:11, the PAPD superintendent and an inspector began walking up stairwell B of the North Tower to assess damage near and in the impact zone. The PAPD chief and sev- eral other PAPD officers began ascending a stairwell to reach the Windows on the World restaurant on the 106th floor, from which calls had been made to the PAPD desk re- porting at least 100 people trapped.

The first NYPD ESU team entered the West Street–level lobby of the North Tower and prepared to begin climbing at about 9:15 a.m. They attempted to check in with the FDNY chiefs present, but were rebuffed. OEM personnel did not intervene. The ESU team began to climb the stairs. Shortly thereafter, a second NYPD ESU team entered the South Tower. The OEM field responder present ensured that they check in with the FDNY chief in charge of the lobby, as it was agreed that the ESU team would ascend and support FDNY personnel.

Many PAPD officers from different commands responded on their own initiative. By 9:03, the PAPD central police desk requested that responding officers meet at West and Vesey and await further instructions. In the absence of a predetermined command struc- ture to deal with an incident of this magnitude, a number of PAPD inspectors, captains, and lieutenants stepped forward at around 9:30 to formulate an on-site response plan. They were hampered by not knowing how many officers were responding to the site and where those officers were operating. Many of the officers who responded to this com- mand post lacked suitable protective equipment to enter the complex.

At 9:37, a civilian on the 106th floor of the South Tower reported to a 911 operated that a lower floor—the “90-something floor”—was collapsing. This information was con- veyed inaccurately by the 911 operator to an NYPD dispatcher. The dispatcher further confused the substance of the 911 call by telling NYPD officers at the WTC complex that “the 106th floor is crumbling” at 9:52, 15 minutes after the 911 call was placed. The NYPD dispatcher conveyed this message on the radio frequency used in precincts in the vicinity of the WTC and subsequently on the Special Operations Division channel, but not on City Wide channel 1.

A third ESU team subsequently entered the North Tower at its elevated mezzanine lobby level and made no effort to check in with the FDNY command post. A fourth ESU team entered the South Tower. By 9:59, a fifth ESU team was next to 6 WTC and prepar- ing to enter the North Tower.

By approximately 9:50, the officer running the ESU command post on Church and Vesey streets had a final radio communication with one of the ESU teams in the South Tower. The team then stated that it was ascending via stairs, was somewhere in the 20s, and was mak- ing slow progress because of the numerous descending civilians crowding the stairwell.

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Three plainclothes NYPD officers without radios or protective gear had begun as- cending either stairwell A or C of the North Tower. They began checking every other floor above the 12th for civilians. Only occasionally did they find any, and in those few cases they ordered the civilians to evacuate immediately. While checking floors, they used office phones to call their superiors. In one phone call an NYPD chief instructed them to leave the North Tower, but they refused to do so. As they climbed higher, they encountered in- creasing smoke and heat. Shortly before 10:00 they arrived on the 54th floor.

By 9:58, one PAPD officer had reached the 44th floor sky lobby of the North Tower. Also in the North Tower, one team of PAPD officers was in the mid-20s and another was in the lower 20s. Numerous PAPD officers were also climbing in the South Tower, in- cluding the PAPD ESU team. Many PAPD officers were on the ground floor of the complex—some assisting in evacuation, others manning the PAPD desk in 5 WTC or as- sisting at lobby command posts.

Throughout this period (9:03 to 9:59), a group of NYPD and Port Authority police officers, as well as two Secret Service agents, continued to assist civilians leaving the North Tower. They were positioned around the mezzanine lobby level of the North Tower, directing civilians leaving stairwells A and C to evacuate down an escalator to the concourse. The officers instructed those civilians who seemed composed to evacuate the complex calmly but rapidly. Other civilians exiting the stairs, who were either in- jured or exhausted, collapsed at the foot of these stairs; officers then assisted them out of the building.

When civilians reached the concourse, another NYPD officer stationed at the bot- tom of the escalator directed them to exit through the concourse to the north and east and then out of the WTC complex. This exit route ensured that civilians would not be en- dangered by falling debris and people on West Street, on the plaza between the towers, and on Liberty Street.

Some officers positioned themselves at the top of a flight of stairs by 5 WTC that led down into the concourse, going into the concourse when necessary to evacuate injured or disoriented civilians. Numerous other NYPD officers were stationed throughout the concourse, assisting burned, injured and disoriented civilians, as well as directing all civil- ians to exit to the north and east. NYPD officers were also in the South Tower lobby to assist in civilian evacuation. NYPD officers stationed on Vesey Street between West Street and Church Street urged civilians not to remain in the area and instead to keep walking north.

At 9:58:59, the South Tower collapsed in 10 seconds, killing all civilians and emer- gency personnel inside, as well as a number of individuals—both first responders and civilians—in the concourse, in the Marriott, and on neighboring streets. The building collapsed into itself, causing a ferocious windstorm and creating a massive debris cloud. The Marriott Hotel suffered signficant damage as a result of the collapse of the South Tower.

A member of the NYPD Aviation Unit radioed that the South Tower had col- lapsed immediately after it happened and further advised that all people in the WTC complex and nearby areas should be evacuated. At 10:04, NYPD aviation reported that the top 15 stories of the North Tower “were glowing red” and that they might col- lapse. At 10:08, a helicopter pilot warned that he did not believe the North Tower would last much longer.

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Immediately after the South Tower collapsed, many NYPD radio frequencies became overwhelmed with transmissions relating to injured, trapped, or missing officers. As a re- sult, NYPD radio communications became strained on most channels. Nevertheless, they remained effective enough for the two closest NYPD mobilization points to be moved further from the WTC at 10:06.

Just like most firefighters, the ESU rescue teams in the North Tower had no idea that the South Tower had collapsed. However, by 10:00 the ESU officer running the command post at Church and Vesey ordered the evacuation of all ESU units from the WTC complex. This officer, who had observed the South Tower collapse, reported it to ESU units in the North Tower in his evacuation instructions.

This instruction was clearly heard by the two ESU units already in the North Tower and the other ESU unit preparing to enter the tower. The ESU team on the 31st floor found the full collapse of the South Tower so unfathomable that they radioed back to the ESU officer at the command post and asked him to repeat his communication. He reit- erated his urgent message.

The ESU team on the 31st floor conferred with the FDNY personnel there to ensure that they, too, knew that they had to evacuate, then proceeded down stairwell B. During the descent, they reported seeing many firefighters who were resting and did not seem to be in the process of evacuating. They further reported advising these firefighters to evac- uate, but said that at times they were not acknowledged. In the opinion of one of the ESU officers, some of these firefighters essentially refused to take orders from cops. At least one firefighter who was in the North Tower has supported this assessment, stating that he was not going to take an evacuation instruction from a cop that morning. However, an- other firefighter reports that ESU officers ran past him without advising him to evacuate.

The ESU team on the 11th floor began descending stairwell C after receiving the evac- uation order. Once near the mezzanine level—where stairwell C ended—this team spread out in chain formation, stretching from several floors down to the mezzanine itself. They used their flashlights to provide a path of beacons through the darkness and debris for civilians climbing down the stairs. Eventually, when no one else appeared to be de- scending, the ESU team exited the North Tower and ran one at a time to 6 WTC, dodg- ing those who still were jumping from the upper floors of the North Tower by acting as spotters for each other. They remained in the area, conducting additional searches for civilians; all but two of them died.

After surviving the South Tower’s collapse, the ESU team that had been preparing to enter the North Tower spread into chain formation and created a path for civilians (who had exited from the North Tower mezzanine) to evacuate the WTC complex by de- scending the stairs on the north side of 5 and 6 WTC, which led down to Vesey Street. They remained at this post until the North Tower collapsed, yet all survived.

The three plainclothes NYPD officers who had made it up to the 54th floor of the North Tower felt the building shake violently at 9:59 as the South Tower collapsed (al- though they did not know the cause). Immediately thereafter, they were joined by three firefighters from an FDNY engine company. One of the firefighters apparently heard an evacuation order on his radio, but responded in a return radio communication, “We’re not fucking coming out!” However, the firefighters urged the police officers to descend because they lacked the protective gear and equipment needed to handle the increasing smoke and heat. The police officers reluctantly began descending, checking that the

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THE RESPONSE: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 35

lower floors were clear of civilians. They proceeded down stairwell B, poking their heads into every floor and briefly looking for civilians.

Other NYPD officers helping evacuees on the mezzanine level of the North Tower were enveloped in the debris cloud that resulted from the South Tower’s collapse. They struggled to regroup in the darkness and to evacuate both themselves and civilians they encountered. At least one of them died in the collapse of the North Tower. At least one NYPD officer from this area managed to evacuate out of 5 WTC, where he teamed up with a Port Authority police officer and acted as a spotter in advising the civilians who were still exiting when they could safely run from 1 WTC to 5 WTC and avoid being struck by people and debris falling from the upper floors.

At the time of the collapse of the South Tower, there were numerous NYPD officers in the concourse, some of whom are believed to have died there. Those who survived struggled to evacuate themselves in darkness, assisting civilians as they exited the con- course in all directions.

The North Tower collapsed at 10:28:25 a.m., killing all civilians alive on upper floors, an undetermined number below, and scores of first responders. The FDNY Chief of De- partment, the Port Authority Police Department Superintendent, and many of their sen- ior staff were killed. Incredibly, 12 firefighters, 1 PAPD officer and 3 civilians who were descending stairwell B of the North Tower survived its collapse.

On September 11, the nation suffered the largest loss of life—2,973—on its soil as a result of hostile attack in its history. The FDNY suffered 343 fatalities—the largest loss of life of any emergency response agency in history. The PAPD suffered 37 fatalities— the largest loss of life of any police force in history. The NYPD suffered 23 fatalities—the second-largest loss of life of any police force in history, exceeded only by the number of PAPD officers lost the same day.

Mayor Guiliani, along with the Police and Fire commissioners and the OEM direc- tor, moved quickly north and established an emergency operations command post at the Police Academy. Over the coming hours, weeks, and months, thousands of civilians and city, state, and federal employees devoted themselves around the clock to putting New York City back on its feet.

Arlington, VA At 9:37 a.m., the west wall of the Pentagon was hit by hijacked American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757. The crash caused immediate and catastrophic damage. All 64 people aboard the airliner were killed, as were 125 people inside the Pentagon. One hundred six people were seriously injured and would be transported to area hopitals.15

At approximately 9:37 a.m., Arlington County Police Department (ACPD) Corporal Barry Foust and Officer Richard Cox, on patrol in south Arlington, saw a large American Airlines aircraft in steep descent on a collision course with the Pentagon.16 They imme- diately radioed the Arlington County Emergency Communication Center (ECC). ACPD Headquarters issued a simultaneous page to all members of the ACPD with instructions to report for duty. Two-way pagers are standard issue only for the Emergency Response Team, hostage negotiators, members of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team, and several command officials. Media reports of the attack alerted those who did not re- ceive the pager message.

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BOX 1-5

REMARKS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN ASHCROFT; SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

Today America has experienced one of the greatest tragedies ever witnessed on American soil. These heinous acts of violence are an assault on the security of our nation and every Amer-

ican citizen. We will not tolerate such acts and we will expend every effort and devote all necessary

resources to bring the people responsible for these crimes to justice. Now is the time for us to come together as a nation and offer our support and prayers

for victims and their families, for the rescue workers and law enforcement, and for every one of us who has been changed forever by this horrible tragedy.

The following is a summary of the known facts surrounding today’s incidents: American Airlines flight 11 departed Boston for Los Angeles, was hijacked by suspects

armed with knives.This plane crashed into the World Trade Center. United Airlines flight 175 departed Boston for Los Angeles, was hijacked and crashed into

the World Trade Center. American Airlines flight 77 departed Washington Dulles for Los Angeles, was hijacked and

crashed into the Pentagon. United Airlines flight 93 departed Newark for San Francisco, was hijacked and crashed in

Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Crime scenes have been established by federal authorities in New York,Washington, D.C.,

Pittsburgh, Boston, and Newark. The full resources of the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Attorneys offices, the U.S. Mar- shals Service, the Bureau of Prisons, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Office of Justice programs, have been deployed to investigate these crimes and to assist victim survivors and victim families.

Thousands of FBI agents in all of the field offices across the country and in the interna- tional legats assisted by personnel from the other Department of Justice agencies are coop- erating in this investigation.

The FBI has established a website where people can report any information about these crimes.That address is www.ifccfbi.gov.

The FBI is also in the process of establishing a toll free 800 number for the same purpose. It takes courage to come forward in situations like this and I urge anyone with informa-

tion that may be helpful to the authorities to use these resources. The Office of Victims of Crime has established a toll free 800 for family and friends of

victims.They can call 800-331-0075 to leave contact information for a future time when more information is available, to find out information about a victim or to find out information about the rights of victims and the services available to victim survivors and victim families.

The determination of these terrorists will not deter the determination of the American people.We are survivors and freedom is a survivor.

A free American people will not be intimidated or defeated.We will find the people re- sponsible for these cowardly acts and justice will be done.

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THE RESPONSE: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 37

Local, regional, state, and federal agencies immediately responded to the Pentagon attack. In addition to county fire, police, and sheriff’s departments, the response was assisted by the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Fire Department, Fort Myer Fire Department, the Virginia State Po- lice, the Virginia Department of Emergency Management, the FBI, FEMA, a National Medical Response Team, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and numerous military personnel within the Military District of Washington.17

The ACPD response to the incident was also immediate, with the on-duty shift en- gaged in minutes and most ACPD officers arriving on the scene within the first three hours.18 Several ACPD senior officers were out of the county when the incident oc- curred. Chief Flynn was attending a conference in Atlantic City, New Jersey, where he was the featured speaker on the subject of racial profiling. Deputy Chief Holl was at a Virginia Police Corps meeting in Richmond, Virginia. Both Chief Flynn and Deputy Chief Holl immediately began driving back to Arlington. Deputy Chief John Haas was in Miami, Florida, participating in a police chief’s assessment program and was unable to arrange immediate transportation back to Arlington. This delay turned out to be fortu- itous. When Deputy Chief Haas reported for duty on Monday, September 17, he brought fresh leadership to a command section that had been continuously engaged for nearly a week.

Lieutenant Robert Medarios was the first ACPD command-level official to arrive on the scene; he assumed command of the ACPD response. Lieutenant Medarios quickly reached an agreement with a Defense Protective Service (DPS) official that the ACPD would assume responsibility for the outer perimeter. This was an important decision be- cause the DPS exercises exclusive federal legislative jurisdiction at the Pentagon and its surrounding grounds. In these instances, the federal government acquires all the au- thority usually reserved by the state.

Lieutenant Medarios, Lieutenant Brian Berke, and Sergeant Jim Daly quickly assessed the road network conditions and identified 27 intersections that required immediate police posting. Sergeant Daly began organizing the staging area at Fire Station 5 and the adjacent park. The parking lot and adjacent field were cordoned off and guards posted around the perimeter. By 11:00 a.m., more than 100 law enforcement personnel had reported to the staging area representing the ACPD, Arlington County Sheriff’s Office, Fairfax County Police Department, Alexandria Police Department, Arlington County Park Rangers, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Officers were assigned to a particular post for 2 or 3 hours, given an hour of relief, then assigned to a different post to minimize boredom.

Many ACPD officers attempting to reach the Pentagon, including detectives who were responding from headquarters, found themselves fully engaged in rerouting traffic and clearing a path for fire, rescue, and medical units. Although they had difficulty reach- ing their intended destination, these officers knew precisely what needed to be done and acted on their own initiative, radioing to ACPD Headquarters their respective locations and activities. Detectives from the ACPD Vice Control Section assumed general patrol of the county away from the incident site to augment remaining officers in the event of a major criminal incident.

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At 9:55, the incident commander ordered an evacuation of the Pentagon impact area because a partial collapse was imminent; it occurred at 9:57, and no first responders were injured.19

At about 10:15 a.m., Arlington County Fire Department Chief James Schwarz ordered a site-clearing evacuation because of the report of a second hijacked aircraft heading toward the Washington Metropolitan Area.20 This was the first of three evacuations caused by reports of incoming aircraft, and the evacuation order was well communicated and well coordinated.21 After this first evacuation, the ACPD incident command post (ICP) moved to an area beneath the I-395 overpass at Hayes Street and set up near the Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD) ICP to facilitate commu- nications and coordination.22

At ACPD Headquarters, Captain Rich Alt, Captain Mary Gavin, Lieutenant Karen Hechenroder, and Administrative Assistant Barbara Scott began organizing the de- partmentwide response. Officers were being deployed throughout the county, and information had to be gathered regarding their locations and times of arrival so re- placements could be scheduled and relief coordinated. The roll call room is a natural meeting place in the police department for gathering and distributing information. It became the home of the ACPD Incident Command System (ICS) staffing command for the duration of operations. The ACPD previously adopted the ICS as the appropriate response structure for large-scale incidents. Moreover, less than two weeks prior to the terrorist attack on the Pentagon, all ACPD command officers participated in routine re- curring ICS training.

Shortly after Lieutenant Medarios assumed initial command at the incident site on September 11, Captain Rebecca Hackney arrived and took over as Incident Comman- der. Captain Hackney sketched the initial ACPD ICS assignments on a notepad. Acting Chief James Younger arrived, reviewed Captain Hackney’s ICS assignments, then di- rected Captain Daniel Murray to be ACPD liaison to the ACFD ICP and Captain David Herbstreit to liaison with the FBI. By telephone, he spoke with Deputy Chief Holl, who was returning from Richmond, and requested that he respond directly to the incident site. Deputy Chief Holl arrived at about noon and took over as the ACPD incident com- mander. Deputy Chief Younger reported to the Arlington County Emergency Operation Center, as requested by the County Manager.

The ACPD loaned its mobile command post to the ACFD to serve as the initial ICP. The ACFD did not have a similar capability. Deputy Chief Holl worked out of the Watch Commander’s Ford Expedition. The ACPD formulated a plan to screen pedestrian and vehicular traffic and assign ACPD representatives to the ACPD ICP, the FBI Command Post, Emergency Medical Services Control, the Arlington County EOC, and the Emer- gency Communication Center. Captain Murray reported to the ACFD ICP and told Chief Edward Plaugher he would remain with the ACFD throughout the fire and rescue operations.

Recognizing that minute-to-minute activities would be all consuming, early in the af- ternoon of September 11, Deputy Chief Holl assigned Lieutenant Steve Broadhurst to forecast the issues that would confront the department during the next 6 to 12 hours. Captain Roy Austin was assigned responsibility for department routine operations away from the incident site.

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THE RESPONSE: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 39

The Arlington County Sheriff’s Office (ACSO) also immediately responded to the at- tack. Sheriff Beth Arthur and Chief Deputy Sheriff Mike Raffo were watching the World Trade Center attacks on television when they were notified that an airliner crashed into the Pentagon. They immediately headed to the Arlington County Emergency Operations Center (EOC). ACSO recall procedures were implemented, and an ICP was set up on the first floor of the courthouse building. The ICP was subsequently relocated to a large conference room in the Arlington County Detention Facility.

Some deputies not already on assignment rushed to the Pentagon, arriving in time to help rescue a few of the victims. Other deputies began directing traffic, as roadways became jammed.

One of the first actions taken by the ACSO was closing the courts and evacuating the judges and staff. This action was in consultation with the Arlington County judges, who approved the closure. This decision freed up approximately 20 deputies who were then able to assist with the response to the attack on the Pentagon.

Several factors facilitated the response to this incident and distinguished it from the far more difficult task in New York. There was a single incident, and it was not 1,000 feet above ground. The incident site was relatively easy to secure and contain, and there were no other buildings in the immediate area. There was no collateral damage beyond the Pentagon.23 In the end, the emergency response at the Pentagon repre- sented a mix of local, state, and federal jurisdictions and was generally effective.24 It overcame the inherent complications of a response across jurisdictions because the ICS, a formalized management structure for emergency response, was in place in the National Capital Region on 9/11.

BOX 1-6

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE NATION SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, 8:30 P.M.

THE PRESIDENT: Good evening.Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts.The victims were in air- planes, or in their offices; secretaries, businessmen and women, military and federal workers; moms and dads, friends and neighbors.Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, des- picable acts of terror.

The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness, and a quiet, unyielding anger.These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed; our country is strong.

A great people has been moved to defend a great nation.Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America.These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve.

America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and op- portunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining.

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UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT To understand the implications that the September 11th attacks had on policing, one must understand the threat behind the attack as well as the threat in a post–9-11 world. The threat that led to the September 11th attack, as previously detailed, came from Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network, Al Qaeda. This terrorist group was unique for the fact it was not a state-sponsored terrorist group, nor did it have a state to call its own. Although bin Laden had established his operations first in Sudan and later Afghanistan, political pressure removed him from the former, and military pressure removed him from the latter. Although it is believed that bin Laden has moved his op- erations into the mountains of Pakistan, Al Qaeda has continued to operate, increasing the number of its attacks by hitting “soft targets,” such as nightclubs, synagogues, and train/subway stations.25 In addition, most of the attacks since 9-11 have been on a much

Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature.And we responded with the best of America—with the daring of our rescue workers, with the caring for strangers and neighbors who came to give blood and help in any way they could.

Immediately following the first attack, I implemented our government’s emergency re- sponse plans. Our military is powerful, and it’s prepared. Our emergency teams are working in New York City and Washington, D.C. to help with local rescue efforts.

Our first priority is to get help to those who have been injured, and to take every precau- tion to protect our citizens at home and around the world from further attacks.

The functions of our government continue without interruption. Federal agencies in Washington which had to be evacuated today are reopening for essential personnel tonight, and will be open for business tomorrow. Our financial institutions remain strong, and the American economy will be open for business, as well.

The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I’ve directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice.We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.

I appreciate so very much the members of Congress who have joined me in strongly condemning these attacks. And on behalf of the American people, I thank the many world leaders who have called to offer their condolences and assistance.

America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism.Tonight, I ask for your prayers for all those who grieve, for the children whose worlds have been shattered, for all whose sense of safety and security has been threatened. And I pray they will be comforted by a power greater than any of us, spoken through the ages in Psalm 23:“Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me.”

This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time. None of us will ever forget this day.Yet, we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world.

Thank you. Good night, and God bless America.

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UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT 41

smaller scale. These attacks have included the Jemaah Islamiya (Indonesian affiliate) attack on a Bali nightclub, killing 180 (October 2002); the bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel and the related firing (and near miss) of shoulder-fired missiles at an Israeli passenger aircraft, both in Mombasa, Kenya (November 2002); suicide car bomb attacks against three housing compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing 20 people, including eight Amer- icans (May 2003); a suicide bomb attack against five sites in Casablanca killing about 40 people (May 2003); and the bombing of a commuter train in Madrid, Spain, killing about 300 (March 2004).26 Numerous smaller attacks have also been conducted against U.S. interests and personnel in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, East Asia, and other areas where Al Qaeda affiliates operate.

It has, however, been noted that no attacks have occurred on American soil since September 11th, which the Bush administration, as well as Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, have attributed to the work of the F.B.I., the C.I.A., and the De- partment of Homeland Security and for the fact that the fight has been brought to the Middle East in terms of both wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.27 This, however, should not negate the emphasis of state and local police on homeland security, for Al Qaeda’s his- tory of attacks against U.S. interests has consistently retained a time lag between at- tacks. Al Qaeda has also been quite adept at adapting to the changing environment in which it finds itself, thus although our attention may be on airport security, this focus may very well leave other sectors vulnerable to attack. Therefore, it should be stated that although Al Qaeda has not carried out a direct attack on the United States since September 11th, it is true that their ability to survive and adapt continues to leave fu- ture attacks a reality.

Although Al Qaeda is assuredly the terrorist group of concern, it is important that police come to understand that they are not the only threat to homeland security. Other international terrorist organizations and extremist groups exist that perceive the United States as a target of interest.28 In addition, other international crime prob- lems cross countries, and thus transnational crimes such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, and the black market sales of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction have become a threat to homeland security. Taken further, the United States also has its own domestic terrorism threats that are of concern, and past threats, such as organized crime and gangs, continue to pose a threat to homeland se- curity. Just like these latter threats, good information and intelligence are the primary means by which police can make arrests; therefore, the key to dealing effectively with the threat of terrorism, both international and domestic, is having good information and intelligence and the ability to act on it. This is why understanding the threat America faces, not only from Al Qaeda, but other terrorist organizations, is critical to today’s modern police.

Police, however, are better able to comprehend the threat of crime, rather than the threat of terrorism. Police operate in an environment of law-based violations and the enforcement of these laws. The fact that there are conceptual similarities between crime and terrorism provides for a better understanding of terrorism from a police per- spective. First and foremost, it should be noted that terrorism is criminal in nature. Ac- cording to McVey, “virtually all terrorist acts violate some criminal statutes of the host jurisdiction,” making it “the easiest element for local law enforcement to appreciate.”29

In addition, it has been noted that both crime and terrorism are almost always the work

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of young males, similar to the majority of crimes, especially violent crimes.30 And, at a more conceptual level, it has also been noted that both the terms crime and terrorism are often hard to define, are social constructs, and when committed, serve to under- mine social trust.31 From these viewpoints, terrorism is an issue with which police can play a role.

Crime and terrorism are different, however, in that the targets of terrorism are of- ten symbolic, the terrorist’s actions are almost always violent, terrorists are primarily seeking publicity, and their goals are largely political.32 Unlike crime, there are few laws regulating terrorism, and the response to terrorism is not limited to the local level, but almost always rises to the highest levels of government.33 In addition, unlike criminals who tend to commit crimes in a very similar manner (modus operandi), terrorists tend to adapt and innovate, thus making it more difficult to utilize traditional investigatory methods. Finally, although only some crime tends to operate within an organizational structure, terrorist groups almost always operate by some operational structure, even if the structural organization is not fully clear.

BOX 1-7

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT TO POLICE, FIREMEN AND RESCUE WORKERS MURRAY AND WEST STREETS, NEW YORK, NEW YORK SEPTEMBER 14, 2001

CROWD: U.S.A.! U.S.A.!

THE PRESIDENT:Thank you all. I want you all to know—

Q: Can’t hear you.

THE PRESIDENT: I can’t talk any louder. (Laughter.)

I want you all to know that America today—that America today is on bended knee in prayer for the people whose lives were lost here, for the workers who work here, for the families who mourn.This nation stands with the good people of New York City, and New Jer- sey and Connecticut, as we mourn the loss of thousands of our citizens.

Q: I can’t hear you.

THE PRESIDENT: I can hear you. (Applause.) I can hear you.The rest of the world hears you. (Applause.) And the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon. (Applause.)

CROWD: U.S.A.! U.S.A.!

THE PRESIDENT:The nation sends its love and compassion to everybody who is here. Thank you for your hard work. Thank you for making the nation proud. And may God bless America. (Applause.)

CROWD: U.S.A.! U.S.A.!

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UNDERSTANDING THE ATTACK 43

Understanding the threat first entails understanding the ideological motivations be- hind terrorism. It then necessitates an understanding of the various groups and the threat they pose to America. Specifically, it entails not only a generic understanding of terror- ism and terrorist groups, but also a continual update of potential threats and the poten- tial targets, especially those in each police department’s jurisdiction. But perhaps before any of this can occur, the police must first understand the impact that September 11th has had on policing and that because of that attack, the police now play a crucial role in the era of homeland security.

UNDERSTANDING THE ATTACK34

On September 11, 2001, when Al Qaeda terrorists hijacked four planes and attacked the World Trade Center buildings in New York City and the Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia, little did anyone know that they would set in motion a new era of policing, namely the era of homeland security.35 In the wake of 9-11 it has become evident that many state and local police agencies across the country have found themselves adapting to this new role in policing. Whether they have adopted the concepts of Homeland Se- curity by force (e.g., New York City, Arlington County (VA), Washington, D.C.), by local circumstances (e.g., San Francisco, Chicago, Houston), by lure of grant dollars (e.g., City of Pine Bluff Police Department, Arkansas; Town of Kittery Police Department, Maine; Casper Police Department, WY), by state directive, or simply by local government and citizen demand, police agencies are beginning to wrestle with what homeland security means to their particular agencies. As one author has stated, the overriding question to- day for police management is, “What is the role of state and local law enforcement in a post–September 11 environment?”36

The new role in American policing in the post–September 11 environment is not only a response to the specific events on that fateful day, but they are also an amalgam of change brought about by various political, economic, and social factors in the United States. The political implications have been derived by the president winning a second term and his agenda focus on the “war on terrorism” and Homeland Security. In ad- dition, Congress has played a major role in the passage of legislation that created the Department of Homeland Security and enacted the myriad laws encapsulated in the USA PATRIOT Act.

The economic factors that followed in kind are found in the spending by the national government, and to some degree by state governments, in the area of homeland security. Many government agencies have seen their budgets slashed while budgets for homeland security have risen. In fact, even police-related grant programs such as the Edward Bryne and COPS grants have seen their budgets drastically cut by the Bush administration, while funding for homeland security has continued to rise substantially.

No less important than the political and economic factors shaping the concepts of homeland security are the social factors. The social implications for the movement to- ward homeland security are derived from public concern regarding terrorism, which has moved from little to no concern in the pre–9-11 years to ranking as one of the three most important problems facing our country ever since.37 Americans now agree that government should address the problems of terrorism and homeland/domestic

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security. This may be from a high level of concern that there will be another terrorist attack in the United States and that they or someone in their family could become a victim of terrorism. According to a recent Pew Research poll, since 9-11, 23 percent of respondents stated they were very worried, whereas an additional 44 percent have stated they are somewhat worried about another terrorist attack.38 And, in a Gallup poll during the same time period, 9 percent of respondents have stated they were very worried, and an additional 29 percent have stated they are somewhat worried that they or a member of their family would fall victim to a terrorist act.39 In fact, concern among Americans has risen so high that approximately half of Americans surveyed by the Pew Research Center stated that to “curb terrorism” they believe it will be nec- essary to “give up some of their civil liberties,” and they favor the requirement that all citizens carry a national identification card.40 It is perhaps not all too surprising, then, to find that over 81 percent of citizens favor government expanding under-cover ac- tivities to penetrate groups under suspicion, over 67 percent of citizens favor closer monitoring of banking and credit card transactions to trace funding sources, and over 54 percent favor law enforcement monitoring Internet discussions in chat rooms and other forums.41 The movement toward the era of homeland security by police is not emerging in some police management vacuum, but rather it is coming about as part of a larger environmental change.

The movement to an era of homeland security in policing should also not be all too surprising. The previous paradigm42 or epicycle43 in policing that has lasted for well over 25 years has been the philosophy of community policing. It will later be noted that community policing moved through three generations of policy development, namely innovation (early 1980s), diffusion (late 1980s and early 1990s), and institutionalization, achieving this by the mid to late 1990s.44 What typically follows the institutionalization of a policy is the process of disappearance, which generally takes the form of new in- novations being integrated into the institutionalized model as a means of dealing with change. This eventually gives way to the new innovations and ideas beginning to stand more firmly on their own, thus giving rise to the new policy and diminishing the old.45

We witnessed the adoption of “Homeland Security through Community Policing” in the wake of 9-11, but as the idea of a policing role in homeland security took shape, homeland security has been more recently thought of as its own distinct policy. As a result, Pelfrey’s assertion in 1998 that “the current paradigm, community policing, will be refined . . . and may eventually be replaced by a different paradigm”46 is possibly coming to fruition.

To understand the implications of the September 11th attack for state and local policing, it is necessary to explore this new era of policing by drawing on past conceptual frameworks of policing. To do so, we must look to the organizational strategies of polic- ing used by Kelling and Moore to explain the three previous eras of policing, specifically the political, reform, and community eras.47 As they once stated, “This concept can be used not only to describe the different styles of policing in the past and the present, but also to sharpen the understanding of police policy makers of the future.”48 Still further, we must draw on the previous work of Greene49 and his comparison of various models of policing to compare and contrast the various social interactions and social components of American policing, by highlighting these same concepts under the homeland security form of policing.

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BOX 1-8

THE FOUR ERAS OF POLICING BASED ON ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY

Community Homeland Elements Political Era Reform Era Era Security Era

Authorization Politics and Law and Community National/international law professionalism support threats (politics), law

(political), law, (intergovernmental), professionalism professionalism

Function Broad social Crime control Broad, provision Crime control, services of service antiterrorism/

counterterrorism, intelligence gathering

Organizational Decentralized Centralized, Decentralized, Centralized decision design classical task forces, making, decentralized

matrices execution

Relationship to Intimate Professionally Intimate Professional environment remote

Demand Decentralized, Centralized Decentralized Centralized to patrol and politicians

Tactics and Foot patrol Preventive Foot patrol, Risk assessment, technology patrol and problem police operations

rapid response solving, etc. centers, information to calls for systems service

Outcome Citizen Crime control Quality of life Citizen safety, political and citizen crime control, satisfaction satisfaction antiterrorism

Adapted by author from Kelling, G. L. & Moore, M. H. (1988).“The Evolving Strategy of Policing.” Perspectives on Policing, No. 4. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice.

The Four Eras of Policing According to researchers Kelling and Moore, American policing has moved through three distinct eras: the political, the reform, and the community eras.50 In explaining these three distinct eras, the authors used the conceptual framework of “corporate strategy,” which was defined as “the pattern of major objectives, purposes, or goals and essential policies and plans for achieving these goals.”51 Based on this framework, Kelling and Moore looked at police organizational strategies in seven topical areas: authorization, function, organization, demand, environment, tactics, and outcomes to distinguish how

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policing has evolved throughout American history. Authorization, the first of these seven dimensions, referred to the underlying source of authority given to the police. This was essentially the mandate for police operations. Function detailed the values, mission, and goals of the organization, which focused on the police role in society. Organization con- sisted of the structure, human resources, and management processes of an agency. De- mand entailed the source of the demand for police services, whereas environment dealt with the varied relationship of the organization with those elements external to the agency. Tactics described the methods and technologies the organization used to obtain their goals, and outcomes are the results of these activities. By detailing the changes in policing across these seven dimensions throughout the history of American policing, Kelling and Moore were able to describe these three distinct eras in policing (see Box 1-8).

The first era of policing, the political era, began around the 1840s with the creation of the first bona fide police agencies in America. Although people recognized the need for a police force at the time, they were not sure of its role in society. As the political ma- chines of the day had full control over the machinations of government, policing became part and parcel to the politics of the day. The authorization for the police during the po- litical era was largely derived from these same political machines. Because no one was certain as to their specific function and for the fact few social agencies existed at the time, police delivered a broad array of services from dealing with criminals, to keeping immi- grant workers in line and running soup kitchens. Although the organization of these early police had military overtones, they were largely decentralized in their deployment with poor supervision and little in the way of management. As a result of this and the strong political ties, the police were very intimate and close to the people they policed. The demands on these early police came first and foremost from the ward politicians, who made their de- mands for political gain, while the local citizens made their demands directly to the local beat cop. There was little in the way of tactics or technology at the time, although call boxes would later be a factor, so local beat officers and foot patrol was the overriding method of police delivery. The outcome of policing during the political era was largely aimed at implementing the political machine’s will and keeping the citizens satisfied by officers maintaining some semblance of order. The political era, however, was not suc- cessful in any right as it was ill-suited for controlling crime, delivering social services, or maintaining control, for it was largely corrupt and often very brutal.

The time period of the 1920s through the 1970s is marked as the “reform era” by Kelling and Moore.52 The political corruption and rampant brutality among the police, exacerbated by their ties to the local political machines, reached a zenith at the turn of the century, as cit- izens began calling for the reform of the police. Progressive police chiefs such as August Vollmer and professional-minded leaders like J. Edgar Hoover helped create a model of policing that would take decades to implement, but the changes would help reign in control of the police. The authorization of the police became more entrenched in the law, especially the criminal law, and rooted in the concept of police professionalism. Its function, stripped of all the social services, became centered on crime control. In addition, to rein in corrup- tion it adopted a very paramilitary template formed around the classical hierarchical organi- zational method. The demand for police services was more centralized by directing calls toward the police station itself, and police became more professionally detached from the citizens they policed. The overriding methods of police deployment came about as a result of technology, police vehicles, and radios and emphasized preventive patrol and rapid

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UNDERSTANDING THE ATTACK 47

response to the centralized calls for service. The outcome of policing was solely focused on crime control. The reform era was somewhat successful in removing corruption and bru- tality from policing through its centralized control and its move toward professionalism. However, the distancing of the police from the citizens generated new problems and con- flicts, especially during the array of social changes that occurred during the 1960s.

This realization, that for police to effectively perform their job they need the assis- tance of the citizenry, led to the third era of policing, the “community era.”53 The au- thorization for the police, although still rooted in the law and professionalism, focused more heavily on local community support. To deal more effectively with crime, fear of crime, and disorder, police began focusing on those factors that contribute to crime by providing a broad array of services beyond the crime control methods of the previous era. The police organized themselves through a more decentralized geographical neighbor- hood identity method of policing and responded to the demands of these citizens by working more closely with them on a routine basis. The tactics employed included a re- turn to foot patrols (and bicycle, horse, etc.) to enhance contact with citizens, and it used various problem-solving and geographical information systems to identify trends and solve underlying problems rather than symptoms. As a result, the focus of the commu- nity era was on the outcome of citizen satisfaction with the police and the quality of life of the local communities and neighborhoods. Although the community era has been mar- ginally successful in reducing the fear of crime and increasing the quality of life, there is little evidence that its ability to control crime has had equal success, if any at all.

In terms of the era of homeland security, by applying the framework used by Kelling and Moore to describe the political, reform, and community eras, it helps clarify the di- rection of this new era in policing. The authorization for this era has largely come from the national and international threat that is terrorism, driven by the events of September 11, 2001. In addition, citizen awareness of the issue of terrorism reached a critical juncture on that day, and as a result, citizens have given authorization to the government to target ter- rorism and protect the home front.54 Thus the authorization for policing is derived from the national and international threats, but it has played out through government and citizens giving this new role in policing legitimacy. In addition, the era is still marked by an adherence to the law, but more so in that intergovernmental law (and relations) are be- coming an overriding concern. Professionalism of the police also continues to play a role in authorizing the police to take on this role in that police were and, in the event of future at- tacks, will continue to be the first responders and an integral part of the recovery process.

The function of police under homeland security is marked by a more focused con- centration of its resources into crime control, for it is through crime control, enforcement of the criminal law, and traffic law that many potential threats can be exposed and intel- ligence gathered. In addition, police have begun to take on the role of antiterrorism by focusing on various passive measures that can reduce the vulnerabilities of their com- munities to future terrorist attacks. Much of this is being done through local threat as- sessments, intelligence gathering, and intergovernmental information sharing. Another added function of the police is counterterrorism, which are those offensive measures taken to respond to terrorist acts through the process of preparedness training, creation of emergency (and routine) operations centers, large-scale crisis intervention, and special reaction team training. Moreover, the collection, processing, and analysis of intelligence are also becoming a necessary and crucial function of the police in this current era.

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The organizational design of the police agency would seem to entail another pendu- lum swing bringing it back to the centralized design. This is only partially the case. Al- though the era of homeland security would entail a more centralized organizational control, especially in dealing with information coming from the enhanced intergovern- mental relations and information sharing, it primarily entails a centralized decision-mak- ing process. The actual execution of the organization will, like the community era, entail a decentralized and flexible approach. It is internal information sharing that will feed the centralized decision making, but it is the officer on the street that will execute these de- cisions with the flexibility of street-level decision making.

Because the demand on the organization will be somewhat more centralized, the de- mand for the agency’s services will be more centralized as well. Hence, under the role of the police in homeland security the relationship to their environment will be profes- sional. Unlike the professionally remote relationship that marked the reform era, policing under homeland security will not isolate themselves from the community, which is a cru- cial source of information and intelligence, but will by the nature of demand, function, and organizational design be professionally oriented.

Tactics and technology are perhaps one of the most critical areas due to the nature of homeland security concepts and one in which police are most deficient and for which they will remain on a learning curve for some time to come. The concepts of conducting risk assessments, intelligence gathering and processing, and developing large-scale crisis response, although not completely foreign to policing, will necessitate more training and education. The employment of tactics related to antiterrorism and counterterrorism is partially a continuation of past police practices, but with a wider array of information to process. It is the adoption of new technologies that police will need and the protection of these technologies that police will be engaged in for some time to come.

The outcome of homeland security continues to bear elements of previous eras—crime control, citizen satisfaction, and quality of life. However, the primary emphasis of this new era will be citizen safety and antiterrorism methods aimed at the mitigation of future at- tacks. Although crime prevention will also still be a desired outcome, preventing future terrorist acts is the new challenge to law enforcement in America.

The Five Models of Policing A more recent analysis of policing styles comes from a leading researcher in the policing field, Jack R. Greene.55 Greene articulated that there were currently (at the time of his writing) four models of policing in America. These four models included traditional policing, community policing, problem-oriented policing, and zero-tolerance policing. To clarify the differences among these four models, Greene compared them across 12 di- mensions related to the “police role and function, interaction with the community, for- mal and social organization, and service delivery.”56 These dimensions consisted of the following: (1) focus of policing, (2) forms of intervention, (3) range of police activity, (4) level of discretion at line level, (5) focus of police culture, (6) locus of decision making, (7) communication flow, (8) range of community involvement, (9) linkage with other agencies, (10) types of organization and command focus, (11) implications for organizational change and development, and (12) measurement of success (see Box 1-9).57 Although Greene acknowledges this typology was largely a heuristic device it does provide “a use- ful way to contrast and compare potentially differing paradigms of policing.”58 ISB

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BOX 1-9

COMPARISONS OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONS AND STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS OF VARIOUS FORMS OF POLICING INCLUDING HOMELAND SECURITY

Social Interaction Problem- Zero- Homeland or Structural Traditional Community Oriented Tolerance Security Dimension Policing Policing Policing Policing Policing

Focus of Law Community Law, order, Order Security, policing enforcement building and fear problems antiterrorism,

through problems counter crime terrorism, prevention law and order

Forms of Reactive, Proactive, on Mixed, on Proactive, Proactive, on intervention based on criminal, and criminal, and uses criminal, criminal law

criminal law administrative administra- civil, and and for law tive law administra- mitigation and

tive law preparedness

Range Narrow, Broad crime, Narrow to Narrow, Broad, of police crime order, fear, broad— location and security, activity focused and quality- problem behavior terrorism,

of-life focused focused crime, fear focused

Levels of High and High and High and Low, but High and discretion at unaccountable accountable primarily primarily primarily line level to the accountable accountable accountable

community to the police to the police to the police and local administra- administra- administration commanders tion tion

Focus of Inward, Outward, Mixed Inward Mixed police rejecting building depending focused on depending culture community partnerships on problem, attacking on threat,

but analysis the target threat-analysis focused problem focused

Locus of Police Community– Varied, Police Police decision directed, police police identify directed, directed making minimizes coproduction problems, but some with linkage

the —joint with linkage to other involvement responsibility community to other agencies of others and involvement agencies

assessment and where interaction necessary

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BOX 1-9

Social Interaction Problem- Zero- Homeland or Structural Traditional Community Oriented Tolerance Security Dimension Policing Policing Policing Policing Policing

Communi- Downward Horizontal Horizontal Downward Downward cation flow from police between between from police from police

to community police and police and to to community community community community

Range of Low and High and Mixed Low and Mixed community passive active depending on passive depending involvement problem set on threat

Linkage Poor and Participative Participative Moderate Participative with other intermittent and and and and agencies integrative in integrative intermittent integrative in

the depending the overarching on the overarching process problem set process

Type of Centralized Decentralized Decentrali- Centralized Centralized organization command with zed with or decision and and control community local decentralized making, command linkage command but internal decentralized focus accountabil- focus exectuion

ity to central adminis- tration

Implications Few, static Many, dynamic Varied, Few, limited Varied, for organiza organization organization focused interventions focused on tional fending focused on problem focused on security and change/ off the on the resolution target threat, but development environment environmental but with problems, with import

interactions import for using many for organization traditional intelligence intelligence methods and stucture and structure

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BOX 1-9

Social interaction Problem- Zero- Homeland or Structural Traditional Community Oriented Tolerance Security Dimension Policing Policing Policing Policing Policing

Measurement Arrest and Varied, crime, Varied, Arrests, Arrests, of success crime rates, calls for problems field stops, field stops,

particularly service, fear solved, activity, intelligence serious reduction, minimized, location- gathering, Part 1 crimes use of public displaced specific mitigation,

places, reductions and community in targeted preparedness linkages and activity contacts, safer neighborhoods

Adapted by author from Greene, J. R. (2000).“Community Policing in America: Changing the Nature, Structure, and Function of the Police.” In Criminal Justice 2000: Policies, Processes, and Decisions of the Criminal Justice System. Vol. 3.Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs.

The traditional policing model is largely an early twentieth-century development, and like Kelling and Moore explained, it was primarily focused on crime control through law enforcement. By enforcing the criminal law after crimes occurred, it made the police largely a reactive organization with a very narrow focus. Gone were the social services pro- vided in the nineteenth century, as other social service agencies came into creation and took over those various tasks. In addition, to overcome the past corruption and brutality, police were organized more along military lines with a strict chain of command, which did make them more accountable for their behaviors, but also distanced them from the citi- zens they policed. Police officers became a responsive agent of the police centralized bu- reaucracy, and they began taking their orders solely from the police hierarchy, thus making their interaction with community members and other social agencies extremely limited. Ultimately the measurement of success under traditional policing became focused on the number of arrests made and the ability to control the crime rate as exemplified by the Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports. The traditional policing model still exists today and for many agencies remains the primary model of policing.

The community policing model, largely derived from innovations in the 1980s, is pri- marily focused on building community partnerships and crime prevention. Although community policing still uses criminal law, it encompasses a wider scope of alternatives, including administrative and civil law, mediation and arbitration, as well as redirecting problems by working with other social service agencies. Police officers under community policing are more proactive, and they address not only problems of crime, but also of dis- order, quality of life, and fear of crime. As police officers build these partnerships, they

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become coproducers of the solutions to various problems that plague specific neighbor- hoods and thus are more accountable to the citizens they serve. As a result, police are actively involved with the community, they communicate on a routine basis, and they work with other agencies in addressing crime and disorder. Organizationally, to achieve these ends, the police must be more decentralized. Finally, the outcomes of community policing are based on the needs of the specific neighborhoods policed.

Problem-oriented policing also came became a key model of policing in the 1980s through the work of Herman Goldstein. Problem-oriented policing is also focused on crime, disorder, and fear of crime and utilizes a variety of means to address these prob- lems. What sets problem-oriented policing apart is that police may engage in problem solving without the support or assistance of the community. Police identify specific problems in the neighborhoods they police, they research these problems, then develop solutions. After a period of implementation they assess the solution’s effectiveness on the problem. Therefore, problem-oriented policing is problem centered, thus depending on the type of problem and the possible solutions selected, police may or may not have much discretion, contact with citizens, or engagement with other social agencies. The organi- zation implementing problem-oriented policing in many ways has to allow decentralized local commands, but demands accountability to the central administration. The meas- urement of success under problem-oriented policing, then, is really based on the police officer’s ability to solve problems, reduce the impact of the problem, or potentially to displace and disperse the problem from a concentrated area.

The final model of policing articulated by Greene is zero-tolerance policing. Largely a 1990s derived model of policing, its focus is on both crime and disorder problems through proactive means and calling on criminal, civil, and administrative law. It does this by targeting a specific crime (e.g., prostitution, open-air drug markets) or disorder (e.g., panhandlers, graffiti) that occurs in a specific time and place and then concentrating po- lice resources on this specific problem. Police engaging in zero-tolerance policing tend to have a narrow range of focus, based on the behavior(s) they are trying to address. There tends to be a highly centralized control over this type of policing, which means communi- cation is driven by the hierarchy with limited community or other social service agency in- volvement. The measurement of success for zero-tolerance policing, like traditional policing, emphasizes such things as the number of arrests, tickets, or field stops, with the desired outcome being a reduction in the undesirable behavior in a specific location.

Turning to the new model of policing, by applying Greene’s 12 dimensions of polic- ing to homeland security assists in clarifying the current and future direction of home- land security. The focus of policing under homeland security has incorporated the concepts of security and both antiterrorism and counterterrorism into its primary focus. Recognizing and assessing the level of threat, incorporating security measures to prevent future terrorist acts, and developing methods of mitigating threats and responding to both threats and actual incidents have become part of policing under homeland security. Despite these additions, more traditional methods of law enforcement and the focus on law and order still remain an important focus of homeland security policing, as this type of activity can serve the function of security through both arrests or simply intelligence gathering. This is why the forms of intervention under this model of policing will remain very proactive and will draw on the criminal law for enforcement. Although new laws ori- ented toward dealing with the problem of terrorism will be applied, especially in the area

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UNDERSTANDING THE ATTACK 53

of investigations (e.g., USA PATRIOT Act), for the average line officer the basic means of intervention will remain criminal and traffic violations, as well as routine field stops.

Based on the focus and both new and old forms of intervention, the range of police activity is clearly going to be very broad under homeland security. New security meas- ures will include threat assessments and risk analysis, antiterrorism practices for both mitigation and preparedness, as well as counterterrorism and recovery practices in the event of an actual attack. This will be combined with a concentration on crime, disorder, and fear of crime, especially when associated with terrorism. Because of the concentra- tion of many of these activities at the line officer level, discretion for these officers will have to remain high, but due to the nature of intelligence gathering and information dis- semination, these officers will be held accountable by the police administration.

The focus of the police culture, due to the nature of the threat, will be mixed. Al- though certain threats or information dissemination by such agencies as the U.S. Depart- ment of Homeland Security, or the state equivalent, may create a “police only” information dissemination, police will have to continue an outward focus in regard to their own low-level intelligence gathering. Police will need to rely on citizen support in provid- ing information either through traditional means or through partnerships previously formed under the community policing model. This also means that the police will have a mixed range of community involvement as some aspects of the threat analysis may pre- clude citizen involvement, whereas others may rely heavily on their input and expertise.

Police and citizen participation may be mixed based on the threat, but police will have to link with other agencies, both governmental and nongovernmental to implement nearly any type of security measure. This will include other public safety agencies such as fire and code enforcement, it will include those in the medical and mental health com- munity, and it will draw heavily on such agencies as public works, water treatment, and transportation. Police agencies will need to have far greater linkage with these types of agencies then ever before for security reasons, and this type of lateral linkage will be just as important as the vertical linkage with state and federal agencies.

Organizationally, police departments under homeland security will incorporate a strong centralized command structure, but it will need to maintain a largely decentralized method of execution. Because intelligence gathering and information sharing will be critical not only for the processing of information beyond the police agencies themselves, but also for quickly disseminating intelligence down to line officers, centralized control through active command operations centers that can link with these other agencies, both vertically and horizontally, will be critical. Because information has to be processed and disseminated in real time, the centralized operations command center with a decision-making staff element will become the means of organizational control. However, line officers will still need the flexibility of dis- cretion for the implementation of centralized information and orders, as well as for the means of gathering and disseminating information through routine police procedures.

Ultimately, the measurement of success under the Homeland Security model will en- tail the traditional methods of arrest, field stops, and traffic enforcement, but it will include the ability to gather, process, and disseminate intelligence information. In addition, it will entail the agency’s ability to mitigate security threats and be prepared for the possibility of an attack. Simply stated, preventing terrorism, mitigating the impact that a terrorist attack would have, and responding effectively to a terrorist attack are the key outcomes of polic- ing for homeland security.

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UNDERSTANDING THE RESPONSE Understanding the threat that America faced prior to September 11, 2001, the attack itself, and the local police response on that day provides us the context in which to understand that policing has moved into a new era, an era of homeland security. Rec- ognizing that the threat from Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, as well as from other transnational crimes, remains provides the basis for which homeland se- curity is now important to state and local police agencies. In addition, learning from the police response to the 9-11 attacks gives us some understanding of the issues that police face, not only in preparing to respond to future attacks, but to prevent future attacks as well.

As Melchor Guzman has so succinctly explained, The roles and strategies of the police are shaped by the need of the times. In this time of terror, police are required to be more vigilant and perhaps more suspicious. They are required to be more proactive both in detecting and investigating acts of terrorism. The community policing roles that they have embraced for the last decade should be examined in the light of its opposing tenets to the demands of providing police service in a time of terror. The police should lean toward a more legalistic style and begin to apply their innate talent for sensing danger. This is the philosophical shift that circum- stances demand. This is probably the role that the American people demand from their law enforcement officers.59

Recovery effort from the attack on the Pentagon, Arlington County, Virginia. (Source: Photo Courtesy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA].)

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BOX 1-10

TERRORISM TIME LINE (ABBREVIATED) POST–SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

Train Bombing, Madrid, Spain, March 11, 2004: Bombs were exploded simultaneously on commuter trains as they arrived at various train stations in Madrid. The bombings killed at least 192 people and wounded more than 1,400.

Restaurant Bombing in Baghdad, December 31, 2003: A car bomb explosion outside Baghdad’s Nabil Restaurant killed 8 persons and wounded 35.The wounded included 3 Los Angeles Times reporters and 3 local employees.

Grenade Attacks in Bogota, November 15, 2003: Grenade attacks on two bars frequented by Americans in Bogota killed one person and wounded 72, including 4 Americans. Colombian authorities suspected FARC (the Rev- olutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). The U.S. Embassy suspected that the attacks had targeted Americans and warned against visiting commercial centers and places of entertainment.

Rocket Attack on the al-Rashid Hotel in Baghdad, October 26, 2003: Iraqis using an improvised rocket launcher bombarded the al-Rashid Hotel in Baghdad, killing one U.S.Army officer and wounding 17 persons.The wounded included 4 U.S. mil- itary personnel and 7 American civilians. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D.Wolfowitz, who was staying at the hotel, was not injured. After visiting the wounded, he said, “They’re not going to scare us away; we’re not giving up on this job.”

Bomb Attack on U.S. Diplomats in the Gaza Strip, October 15, 2003: A remote-controlled bomb exploded under a car in a U.S. diplomatic convoy passing through the northern Gaza Strip.Three security guards, all employees of DynCorp, were killed. A fourth was wounded.The diplomats were on their way to interview Palestinian candidates for Fulbright scholarships to study in the United States. Palestinian President Arafat and Prime Minister Qurei condemned the attack, while the major Palestinian mil- itant groups denied responsibility.The next day, Palestinian security forces arrested sev- eral suspects, some of whom belonged to the Popular Resistance Committees.

Car Bombings in Baghdad, October 12, 2003: Two suicide car bombs exploded outside the Baghdad Hotel, which housed U.S. officials. Six persons were killed and 32 wounded. Iraqi and U.S. security personnel apparently kept the cars from actually reaching the hotel.

Hotel Bombing in Indonesia, August 5, 2003: A car bomb exploded outside the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing 10 persons and wounding 150. One of the dead was a Dutch citizen.The wounded included an American, a Canadian, an Australian, and two Chinese. Indonesian authorities suspected the Jemaah Is- lamiah, which had carried out the October 12, 2002, bombing in Bali.

Truck Bomb Attacks in Saudi Arabia, May 12, 2003: Suicide bombers attacked three residential compounds for foreign workers in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The 34 dead included 9 attackers, 7 other Saudis, 9 U.S. citizens, and one

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citizen each from the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Philippines. Another American died on June 1. It was the first major attack on U.S. targets in Saudi Arabia since the end of the war in Iraq. Saudi authorities arrested 11 al-Qaida suspects on May 28.

Suicide Bombing in Haifa, March 5, 2003: A suicide bombing aboard a bus in Haifa, Israel, killed 15 persons and wounded at least 40. One of the dead claimed U.S. as well as Israeli citizenship.The bomber’s affiliation was not immediately known.

Assassination of an AID Official, October 28, 2002: Gunmen in Amman assassinated Laurence Foley, Executive Officer of the U.S. Agency for International Development Mission in Jordan.The Honest People of Jordan claimed responsibility.

Ambush on the West Bank, September 18, 2002: Gunmen ambushed a vehicle on a road near Yahad, killing an Israeli and wounding a Ro- manian worker.The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility.

Attack on a School in Pakistan, August 5, 2002: Gunmen attacked a Christian school attended by children of missionaries from around the world. Six persons (two security guards, a cook, a carpenter, a receptionist, and a pri- vate citizen) were killed, and a Philippine citizen was wounded. A group called al-Intigami al-Pakistani claimed responsibility.

Bombing at the Hebrew University, July 31, 2002: A bomb hidden in a bag in the Frank Sinatra International Student Center of Jerusalem’s Hebrew University killed 9 persons and wounded 87. The dead included 5 U.S. citizens and 4 Israelis.The wounded included 4 U.S. citizens, 2 Japanese, and 3 South Koreans.The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) claimed responsibility.

Suicide Bombing in Jerusalem, June 19, 2002: A suicide bombing at a bus stop in Jerusalem killed 6 persons and wounded 43, including 2 U.S. citizens.The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility.

Car Bombing in Pakistan, June 14, 2002: A car bomb exploded near the U.S. Consulate and the Marriott Hotel in Karachi, Pak- istan. Eleven persons were killed and 51 were wounded, including one U.S. and one Japan- ese citizen. Al Qaida and al-Qanin were suspected.

Hostage Rescue Attempt in the Philippines, June 7, 2002: Philippine Army troops attacked Abu Sayyaf terrorists on Mindanao Island in an attempt to rescue U.S. citizen Martin Burnham and his wife Gracia, who had been kidnapped more than a year earlier. Burnham was killed but his wife, though wounded, was freed. A Filipino hostage was killed, as were four of the guerrillas. Seven soldiers were wounded.

Suicide Bombing in the West Bank, March 31, 2002: A suicide bombing near an ambulance station in Efrat wounded four persons, including a U.S. citizen.The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility.

Suicide Bombing in Israel, March 27, 2002: A suicide bombing in a noted restaurant in Netanya, Israel, killed 22 persons and wounded 140. One of the dead was a U.S. citizen. The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) claimed responsibility.

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UNDERSTANDING THE RESPONSE 57

Suicide Bombing in Jerusalem, March 21, 2002: A suicide bombing in Jerusalem killed 3 persons and wounded 86 more, including 2 U.S. citizens.The Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

Car Bomb Explosion in Peru, March 20, 2002: A car bomb exploded at a shopping center near the U.S. Embassy in Lima, Peru. Nine persons were killed and 32 wounded. The dead included two police officers and a teenager. Peruvian authorities suspected either the Shining Path rebels or the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement.The attack occurred 3 days before President George W. Bush visited Peru.

Grenade Attack on a Church in Pakistan, March 17, 2002: Militants threw grenades into the Protestant International Church in Islamabad, Pakistan, during a service attended by diplomatic and local personnel. Five persons, two of them U.S. citizens, were killed, and 46 were wounded.The dead Americans were State Depart- ment employee Barbara Green and her daughter, Kristen Wormsley.Thirteen U.S. citizens were among the wounded.The Lashkar-e-Tayyiba group was suspected.

Drive-by Shooting in Colombia, March 14, 2002: Gunmen on motorcycles shot and killed two U.S. citizens who had come to Cali, Colombia, to negotiate the release of their father, who was a captive of the FARC. No group claimed responsibility.

Suicide Bombing in Jerusalem, March 9, 2002: A suicide bombing in a Jerusalem restaurant killed 11 persons and wounded 52, one of whom was a U.S. citizen.The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility.

Suicide Bombing in the West Bank, March 7, 2002: A suicide bombing in a supermarket in the settlement of Ariel wounded 10 persons, 1 of whom was a U.S. citizen.

Suicide Bombing in Jerusalem, January 27, 2002: A suicide bomb attack in Jerusalem killed 1 person and wounded 100.The incident was the first suicide bombing made by a Palestinian woman.

Kidnapping of Daniel Pearl, January 23, 2002: Armed militants kidnapped Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in Karachi, Pakistan. Pakistani authorities received a videotape on February 20 depicting Pearl’s murder. His grave was found near Karachi on May 16. Pakistani authorities arrested four suspects. Ring- leader Ahmad Omar Saeed Sheikh claimed to have organized Pearl’s kidnapping to protest Pakistan’s subservience to the United States and had belonged to Jaish-e-Muhammad, an Islamic separatist group in Kashmir. All four suspects were convicted on July 15. Saeed Sheikh was sentenced to death, the others to life imprisonment.

Drive-by Shooting at a U.S. Consulate, January 22, 2002: Armed militants on motorcycles fired on the U.S. Consulate in Calcutta, India, killing 5 In- dian security personnel and wounding 13 others.The Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami and the Asif Raza Commandoes claimed responsibility. Indian police later killed two suspects, one of whom confessed to belonging to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba as he died.

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58 CHAPTER 1 The Era of Homeland Security

Ambush on the West Bank, January 15, 2002: Palestinian militants fired on a vehicle in Beit Sahur, killing one passenger and wounding the other. The dead passenger claimed U.S. and Israeli citizenship. The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Battalion claimed responsibility.

Attack on the Indian Parliament, December 13, 2001: Five gunmen attacked the Indian Parliament in New Delhi shortly after it had adjourned. Before security forces killed them, the attackers killed 6 security personnel and a gar- dener. Indian officials blamed Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and demanded that Pakistan crack down on it and on other Muslim separatist groups in Kashmir.

Suicide Bombing in Haifa, December 2, 2001: A suicide bomb attack aboard a bus in Haifa, Israel, killed 15 persons and wounded 40. HAMAS claimed responsibility for both this attack and those on December 1 to avenge the death of a HAMAS member at the hands of Israeli forces a week earlier.

Anthrax Attacks, October–November 2001: On October 7 the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that investigators had detected evidence that the deadly anthrax bacterium was present in the building where a Florida man who died of anthrax on October 5 had worked. Discovery of a second anthrax case triggered a major investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation (FBI). The two anthrax cases were the first to appear in the United States in 25 years. Anthrax subsequently appeared in mail received by television networks in New York and by the offices in Washington of Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle and other mem- bers of Congress. Attorney General John Ashcroft said in a briefing on October 16,“When people send anthrax through the mail to hurt people and invoke terror, it’s a terrorist act.”

Source: U.S.Army—Timeline of Terrorism, Available online at http://www.army.mil/terrorism

September 11th spawned a number of changes related to law enforcement as the con- cepts of homeland security were put into place. These events include everything from the creation of the USA PATRIOT Act, a sweeping piece of legislation that was drafted and signed into law within six weeks, and the creation of the Department of Homeland Secu- rity, the largest reorganization of the federal bureaucracy since World War II. Although many of the changes have occurred at the national level, they place the role of state and lo- cal police in homeland security in context and is therefore the subject of the next chapter.

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