Politics assignment

The Cold War and U.S. Diplomacy

M. A. Villarreal

Professor Tracy Herman

Contemporary International Problems (POL300)

31 July 2015

The Cold War and U.S. Diplomacy

From the early 19th Century up until 20th Century, most American Presidents articulated certain principles of American foreign policy because of the outward danger or looming opportunities they presented (Gareau, 2004). The Reagan Doctrine was one such example because it presupposed a world of right and wrong. The principal aim of Reagan’s doctrine was to sponsor anti-communist guerillas who had attempted to overthrow pro-Soviet regimes that were sprouting up in the Western Hemisphere. This principle was implemented in the mid-1980s, and he particularly made an indication of it during his 1985 State of the Union Address. Alas, this policy/doctrine only had to be imposed for a little less than a decade as a result of the Cold War ending in 1991(Gareau, 2004). This paper focuses on President Reagan’s doctrine and how he sponsored anticommunist guerrillas in trying to overthrow pro-soviet regimes.

One of the greatest difficulties that President Reagan confronted throughout his time in office was Communism and the Cold War. In spite of the fact that these issues had been a problem for the previous six administrations (Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter), the issues started to become more manifest in the early years of Reagan's administration. Reagan believed that President Carter to some extent provided negligible administrative roles to reverse communism. In 1985, President Reagan presented the standards of the principle that were held by his doctrine that supported anti-communist revolutions. When he gave his State of the Union Address in 1985 he looked at, “anticommunist strengths with American settlers who had battled the revolutionary war, portraying those latter-day patriots or loyalists as ‘freedom warriors’ for democracy.” This doctrine aimed at diminishing the Soviet impact in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a component of the Reagan administration’s Cold War methodology (Gareau, 2004). It has been contended that the Reagan doctrine added to the fall of socialism itself. One of the discretionary endeavors that happened when Reagan was in office was the backing of freedom fighters/or revolts in various nations around the globe. One particular country that was helped through these discretionary endeavors and the principle of his convention was giving guide to Afghan rebels, which later persuaded Moscow to end its control of Afghanistan (Gareau, 2004).

In 1985, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) indicated that the Soviet Union had arrangements to intensify the war in Afghanistan keeping in mind the end goal to diminish the impact and force of the Afghan rebels. Ronald Reagan, in his first term, had attempted to restore to the United States an apparent vital predominance. Open concern and the weights of re-election had guided him back toward a stance of guarded status for convenience with the Soviet Union in nuclear matters (Kagan, 1996). One can hypothesize that Reagan's unwinding of relations with Moscow in arms control had blended a repaying hunger for ideological involvement. This was evident in Nicaragua, where the vision was bleak because President Reagan stressed the importance of the Nicaragua’s support of guerrillas in El Salvador (Kagan, 1996). This move acted as a justification for the Reagan’s own support of a contra interdiction force.

The idea looked bleak, but it was geared towards bringing down the Sandinista regime. Nonetheless, a bit more convincing argument was required. In the fabulous custom of American anti-communist pronouncements, Reagan became morally principled. His comments in his State of the Union Address of 1985 remained fresh in the minds of the people as the essential content of what others then started depicting as the Reagan Doctrine. The effects of these diplomatic efforts by the United States is that they injected an explicitly moral component into America’s way of handling foreign affairs. The Reagan Doctrine further intensified the geopolitical foundation of earlier efforts by others such as Carter.

Finally, there were both advantages and disadvantages to President Reagan’s doctrine. It was the organization’s position that the Truman Doctrine’s adaptation of regulation, which was initially planned to foil Stalins points in Europe, was outdated. Since the 1950s, the Kremlin had accomplished significant impact in the Third World, showing that Moscow’s ambitions were more worldwide than initially envisioned. This new reality, as indicated by the administration, required a modification of those essential hypotheses first laid down by George Kennan in the early years of the Cold War (Kagan, 1996). Reagan had begun challenging many people globally, and thus, improving its base support. Specifically, the Nicaraguan harbor was being illegally mined by CIA contract personnel, and when this was revealed, Congress cut off aid to the Contra Guerillas. This was a move that many Americans had started to oppose, but Reagan opted to privatize it and seek covert means of continuing to aid contra guerillas (Kagan, 1996). Another disadvantage was that this policy created a number of scandals that led to policy crisis.

Congress later restored humanitarian assistance to the contras, as they could no longer acquire funding to challenge the Sandinistas. The result of the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua was entirely negative to United States’ interests. Extensive assets and endeavors were consumed on an approach that had obviously fizzled. The Contras never picked up a massive force inside Nicaragua and they barely debilitated Sandinista’s military force. Instead, it appeared to energize exorbitant militarization of the Sandinista administration and created closer binds to Cuba and the Soviet Union. Ultimately, Reagan’s Administration was viewed to have become weakened, and this made it increasingly difficult for them to handle foreign and domestic affairs efficiently.

References

Gareau, F. H. (2004). State terrorism and the United States: From countersurgency to the war on terrorism. London: Zed.

Kagan, R. (1996). A twilight struggle: American power and Nicaragua, 1977-1990. New York: Free Press.