250 Word Response to another Student

In the realm of intelligence collection, access and placement are paramount to success. This is particularly true for collection activities focused on denied areas and non-permissive operating environments. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union, and in particular, its strategic weapons systems were a hard target that presented significant operational challenges to traditional collection platforms and capabilities.[1] As the skies over the Soviet Union became increasing inhospitable to the U-2 spy plan (ultimately culminating in the 1960 shoot down of Gary Powers), U.S. intelligence organizations were looking for ways to close critical intelligence gaps. With this in mind, President Eisenhower green lit the CORONA project in February of 1998 to provide timely and relevant photoreconnaissance of the USSR and PRC through space-based collection platforms.[2] CORONA was principally a CIA project, but key partnerships from the U.S. Air Force and private industry (namely Lockheed Martin) were critical to its success.[3] The U.S. Air Force provided the proper cover for the program under its “Discoverer” program. CORONA satellites, numbered via one-up serial, were designated KH-1 through 4B and capitalized off many of the same technologies used to launch medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM).[4] KH stood for “Key Hole” and was analogous to peering through someone’s door keyhole.[5] Additionally, the CORONA program was governed by the classification TALENT KEYHOLE, which stood for satellite-based imagery collection.[6] The CORONA program was based on the premise of placing a satellite in orbit, placing the photographic film into recovery vehicles, and then de-orbiting the recovery vehicles and subsequently retrieving them mid-air via Air Force C-119 aircraft.[7] The first successful CORONA operation took place in March of 1960 with its contents being delivered to President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles (Director of Central Intelligence) six days later.[8] The imagery, taken on 70-millimeter film from a 24” Kodak-manufactured camera, provided outstanding results at nearly three times the resolution of World War II aerial photography.[9] This initial mission managed to collect over 1.5 million square miles of the Earth’s surface and led to the identification of 64 Soviet airfields and 26 surface-to-air missile (SAM) previously unidentified through U-2 photoreconnaissance.[10] Success was not without failure, and the CORONA program experienced significant difficulties (e.g., 18 of its first 30 missions were unproductive) before succeeding. However, there is no doubt that the program was successful. Continuous improvements were made to the satellites, camera systems, and payloads that ultimately led to CORONA imaging all of the Soviet ballistic missile launch facilities and R&D centers, the construction of ballistic-missile-equipped submarines, and many other strategic and operational-level aspects of Soviet and PRC defense capabilities.[11] Of all the successes of the CORONA program, the most tangible benefit came from the realization that the Soviet Union had vastly overstated its hand and in fact did not possess many of the military capabilities it claimed and thus, explicitly detailed a missile gap in favor of the U.S.[12] This aspect helped to dial back the doomsday clock and allowed the U.S. to back off from the nuclear threshold while affording it a strategic advantage over the USSR during military and diplomatic engagements.