financial analysis
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Ten timeless tests can help you kick the tires on your strategy and kick up the level of strategic dialogue throughout your company.
Have you tested your strategy lately?
‘What’s the next new thing in strategy?’ a senior executive
recently asked Phil Rosenzweig, a professor at IMD,1 in Switzerland. His
response was surprising for someone whose career is devoted to
advancing the state of the art of strategy: “With all respect, I think that’s
the wrong question. There’s always new stuff out there, and most of
it’s not very good. Rather than looking for the next musing, it’s probably
better to be thorough about what we know is true and make sure we
do that well.”
Let’s face it: the basic principles that make for good strategy often get
obscured. Sometimes the explanation is a quest for the next new thing—
natural in a field that emerged through the steady accumulation of
frameworks promising to unlock the secret of competitive advantage.2
In other cases, the culprit is torrents of data, reams of analysis, and
piles of documents that can be more distracting than enlightening.
Ultimately, strategy is a way of thinking, not a procedural exercise
or a set of frameworks. To stimulate that thinking and the dialogue that
goes along with it, we developed a set of tests aimed at helping exec-
utives assess the strength of their strategies. We focused on testing the
strategy itself (in other words, the output of the strategy-development
process), rather than the frameworks, tools, and approaches that generate
Chris Bradley, Martin Hirt, and Sven Smit
1 International Institute for Management Development. 2 For a rich account of strategy’s birth and growth as a field, see Walter Kiechel, The Lords of
Strategy, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2010.
J A N U A R Y 2 0 11
s t r a t e g y p r a c t i c e
2Have you tested your strategy lately?
strategies, for two reasons. First, companies develop strategy in many
different ways, often idiosyncratic to their organizations,
people, and markets. Second, many strategies emerge over time rather
than from a process of deliberate formulation.3
There are ten tests on our list, and not all are created equal. The first—
“will it beat the market?”—is comprehensive. The remaining nine dis-
aggregate the picture of a market-beating strategy, though it’s certainly
possible for a strategy to succeed without “passing” all nine of them.
This list may sound more complicated than the three Cs or the five forces
of strategy.4 But detailed pressure testing, in our experience, helps
pinpoint more precisely where the strategy needs work, while gener-
ating a deeper and more fruitful strategic dialogue.
Those conversations matter, but they often are loose and disjointed.
We heard that, loud and clear, over the past two years in workshops
where we explored our tests with more than 700 senior strategists
around the world. Furthermore, a recent McKinsey Quarterly survey
of 2,135 executives indicates that few strategies pass more than three
3 For a classic statement of the idea that strategies are more emergent than planned, see Henry Mintzberg, “Crafting strategy,” Harvard Business Review, 1987, July–August, Volume 65, Number 4, pp. 66–75.
4 The three Cs and the five forces are seminal strategy frameworks. The three Cs (competitors, customers, and company) were articulated by retired McKinsey partner Kenichi Ohmae in The Mind of the Strategist (McGraw-Hill, 1982). The five forces (barriers to entry, buyer power, supplier power, the threat of substitutes, and the degree of rivalry) were set forth by Harvard Business School professor Michael Porter in Competitive Strategy (Free Press, 1998).
Q1 2011 Ten timeless tests Exhibit 1 of 2
Number of tests rated as fully consistent with company strategy, % of respondents
3 or fewer
4–6
Source: 2010 McKinsey survey of 2,135 global executives on testing business strategy
Most companies’ strategies pass fewer than four of the ten tests.
7–10
25
10
65
3 January 2011
of the tests. In contrast, the reflections of a range of current and former
strategy practitioners (see “How we do it: Strategic tests from four
senior executives,” on mckinseyquarterly.com) suggest that the tests
described here help formalize something that the best strategists do
quite intuitively.
The tests of a good strategy are timeless in nature. But the ability to
pressure-test a strategy is especially timely now. The financial crisis of
2008 and the recession that followed made some strategies obsolete,
revealed weaknesses in others, and forced many companies to confront
choices and trade-offs they put off in boom years. At the same time,
a shift toward shorter planning cycles and decentralized strategic deci-
sion making are increasing the utility of a common set of tests.5 All
this makes today an ideal time to kick the tires on your strategy.
Will your strategy beat the market?
All companies operate in markets surrounded by customers, suppliers,
competitors, substitutes, and potential entrants, all seeking to advance
their own positions. That process, unimpeded, inexorably drives eco-
nomic surplus—the gap between the return a company earns and its
cost of capital—toward zero.
For a company to beat the market by capturing and retaining an eco-
nomic surplus, there must be an imperfection that stops or at least slows
the working of the market. An imperfection controlled by a company
is a competitive advantage. These are by definition scarce and fleeting
because markets drive reversion to mean performance. The best com-
panies are emulated by those in the middle of the pack, and the worst
exit or undergo significant reform. As each player responds to and
learns from the actions of others, best practice becomes commonplace
rather than a market-beating strategy. Good strategies emphasize
difference—versus your direct competitors, versus potential substitutes,
and versus potential entrants.
Market participants play out the drama of competition on a stage beset
by randomness. Because the evolution of markets is path dependent—
that is, its current state at any one time is the sum product of all pre-
Test 1:
5 For more on strategy setting in today’s environment, see Lowell Bryan, “Dynamic management: Better decisions in uncertain times,” mckinseyquarterly.com, December 2009; and “Navigating the new normal: A conversation with four chief strategy officers,” mckinseyquarterly.com, December 2009.
4Have you tested your strategy lately?
vious events, including a great many random ones—the winners of today
are often the accidents of history. Consider the development of the
US tire industry. At its peak in the mid-1920s, a frenzy of entry had
created almost 300 competitors. Yet by the 1940s, four producers con-
trolled more than 70 percent of the market. Those winners happened
to make retrospectively lucky choices about location and technology,
but at the time it was difficult to tell which companies were truly fit
for the evolving environment. The histories of many other industries,
from aerospace to information technology, show remarkably simi-
lar patterns.
To beat the market, therefore, advantages have to be robust and respon-
sive in the face of onrushing market forces. Few companies, in our
experience, ask themselves if they are beating the market—the pres-
sures of “just playing along” seem intense enough. But playing along
can feel safer than it is. Weaker contenders win surprisingly often in
war when they deploy a divergent strategy, and the same is true
in business.6
Q1 2011 10 Timeless tests Exhibit 2 of 2
Performance cohorts based on position in 2001 relative to mean, n = 7431
20
15
10
5
0
–5
–10
–15 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
–0.5
–1.0
–1.5
Return on invested capital (ROIC), %
Ratio of enterprise value to invested capital (EV/IC)
1 Sample of largest 1,200 nonfinancial US-listed companies in 2009 was narrowed to 743 that were also listed in 2001.
Source: Standard & Poor’s Compustat; McKinsey analysis
Markets drive a reversion to mean performance.
Top quintile
Middle quintile
Bottom quintile
6 See Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the weak win wars: A theory of asymmetric conflict, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
5 January 2011
Does your strategy tap a true source of advantage?
Know your competitive advantage, and you’ve answered the question
of why you make money (and vice versa). Competitive advantage
stems from two sources of scarcity: positional advantages and special
capabilities.
Positional advantages are rooted in structurally attractive markets. By
definition, such advantages favor incumbents: they create an asym-
metry between those inside and those outside high walls. For example,
in Australia, two beer makers control 95 percent of the market and
enjoy triple the margins of US brewers. This situation has sustained
itself for two decades, but it wasn’t always so. Beginning in the 1980s,
the Australian industry experienced consolidation. That change in struc-
ture was associated with a change in industry conduct (price growth
began outstripping general inflation) and a change in industry perfor-
mance (higher profitability). Understanding the relationship among
structure, conduct, and performance is a critical part of the quest for
positional advantage.
Special capabilities, the second source of competitive advantage, are
scarce resources whose possession confers unique benefits. The most
obvious resources, such as drug patents or leases on mineral deposits,
we call “privileged, tradable assets”: they can be bought and sold. A
second category of special capabilities, “distinctive competencies,” consists
of things a company does particularly well, such as innovating or
managing stakeholders. These capabilities can be just as powerful in
creating advantage but cannot be easily traded.
Too often, companies are cavalier about claiming special capabilities.
Such a capability must be critical to a company’s profits and exist in
abundance within it while being scarce outside. As such, special
capabilities tend to be specific in nature and few in number. Companies
often err here by mistaking size for scale advantage or overestimating
their ability to leverage capabilities across markets. They infer special
capabilities from observed performance, often without considering
other explanations (such as luck or positional advantage). Companies
should test any claimed capability advantage vigorously before pin-
ning their hopes on it.
When companies bundle together activities that collectively create
advantage, it becomes more difficult for competitors to identify and
Test 2:
6Have you tested your strategy lately?
replicate its exact source. Consider Aldi, the highly successful dis-
count grocery retailer. To deliver its value proposition of lower prices,
Aldi has completely redesigned the typical business system of a
supermarket: only 1,500 or so products rather than 30,000, the stock-
ing of one own-brand or private label rather than hundreds of
national brands, and superlean replenishment on pallets and trolleys,
thus avoiding the expensive task of hand stacking shelves. Given
the enormous changes necessary for any supermarket that wishes to
copy the total system, it is extremely difficult to mimic Aldi’s value
proposition.
Finally, don’t forget to take a dynamic view. What can erode positional
advantage? Which special capabilities are becoming vulnerable?
There is every reason to believe that competitors will exploit points of
vulnerability. Assume, like Lewis Carroll’s Red Queen, that you have
to run just to stay in the same place.
Is your strategy granular about where to compete?
The need to beat the market begs the question of which market.
Research shows that the unit of analysis used in determining strategy
(essentially, the degree to which a market is segmented) signifi-
cantly influences resource allocation and thus the likelihood of success:
dividing the same businesses in different ways leads to strikingly
different capital allocations.
What is the right level of granularity? Push within reason for the finest
possible objective segmentation of the market: think 30 to 50 seg-
ments rather than the more typical 5 or so. Too often, by contrast, the
business unit as defined by the organizational chart becomes the
default for defining markets, reducing from the start the potential scope
of strategic thinking.
Defining and understanding these segments correctly is one of the
most practical things a company can do to improve its strategy. Manage-
ment at one large bank attributed fast growth and share gains to
measurably superior customer perceptions and satisfaction. Examining
the bank’s markets at a more granular level suggested that 90 percent
of its outperformance could be attributed to a relatively high exposure
to one fast-growing city and to a presence in a fast-growing product
segment. This insight helped the bank avoid building its strategy on
Test 3:
7 January 2011
false assumptions about what was and wasn’t working for the operation
as a whole.
In fact, 80 percent of the variance in revenue growth is explained
by choices about where to compete, according to research summarized
in The Granularity of Growth, leaving only 20 percent explained by
choices about how to compete. Unfortunately, this is the exact opposite
of the allocation of time and effort in a typical strategy-development
process. Companies should be shifting their attention greatly toward
the “where” and should strive to outposition competitors by regularly
reallocating resources as opportunities shift within and between
segments.
Does your strategy put you ahead of trends?
The emergence of new trends is the norm. But many strategies place
too much weight on the continuation of the status quo because they
extrapolate from the past three to five years, a time frame too brief to
capture the true violence of market forces.
A major innovation or an external shock in regulation, demand,
or technology, for example, can drive a rapid, full-scale industry tran-
sition. But most trends emerge fairly slowly—so slowly that com-
panies generally fail to respond until a trend hits profits. At this point,
it is too late to mount a strategically effective response, let alone
shape the change to your advantage. Managers typically delay action,
held back by sunk costs, an unwillingness to cannibalize a legacy
business, or an attachment to yesterday’s formula for success. The
cost of delay is steep: consider the plight of major travel agency
chains slow to understand the power of online intermediaries. Con-
versely, for companies that get ahead of the curve, major market
transitions are an opportunity to rethink their commitments in areas
ranging from technology to distribution and to tailor their strategies
to the new environment.
To do so, strategists must take trend analysis seriously. Always look to
the edges. How are early adopters and that small cadre of consumers
who seem to be ahead of the curve acting? What are small, innovative
entrants doing? What technologies under development could change
the game? To see which trends really matter, assess their potential
Test 4:
8Have you tested your strategy lately?
impact on the financial position of your company and articulate the
decisions you would make differently if that outcome were certain. For
example, don’t just stop at an aging population as a trend—work it
through to its conclusion. Which consumer behaviors would change?
Which particular product lines would be affected? What would be
the precise effect on the P&L? And how does that picture line up with
today’s investment priorities?
Does your strategy rest on privileged insights?
Data today can be cheap, accessible, and easily assembled into detailed
analyses that leave executives with the comfortable feeling of pos-
sessing an informed strategy. But much of this is noise and most of it
is widely available to rivals. Furthermore, routinely analyzing readily
available data diverts attention from where insight-creating advantage
lies: in the weak signals buried in the noise.
In the 1990s, when the ability to burn music onto CDs emerged,
no one knew how digitization would play out; MP3s, peer-to-peer file
sharing, and streaming Web-based media were not on the horizon.
But one corporation with a large record label recognized more rapidly
than others that the practical advantage of copyright protection
could quickly become diluted if consumers began copying material.
Early recognition of that possibility allowed the CEO to sell the
business at a multiple based on everyone else’s assumption that the status
quo was unthreatened.
Developing proprietary insights isn’t easy. In fact, this is the element
of good strategy where most companies stumble (see sidebar, “The
insight deficit”). A search for problems can help you get started.
Create a short list of questions whose answers would have major
implications for the company’s strategy—for example, “What will we
regret doing if the development of India hiccups or stalls, and what
will we not regret?” In doing so, don’t forget to examine the assump-
tions, explicit and implicit, behind an established business model.
Do they still fit the current environment?
Another key is to collect new data through field observations or
research rather than to recycle the same industry reports everyone else
uses. Similarly, seeking novel ways to analyze the data can generate
Test 5:
9 January 2011
powerful new insights. For example, one supermarket chain we know
recently rethought its store network strategy on the basis of surprising
results from a new clustering algorithm.
Finally, many strategic breakthroughs have their root in a simple but
profound customer insight (usually solving an old problem for the
customer in a new way). In our experience, companies that go out of
their way to experience the world from the customer’s perspective
routinely develop better strategies.
Does your strategy embrace uncertainty?
A central challenge of strategy is that we have to make choices now,
but the payoffs occur in a future environment we cannot fully know or
control. A critical step in embracing uncertainty is to try to charac-
terize exactly what variety of it you face—a surprisingly rare activity at
many companies. Our work over the years has emphasized four levels
of uncertainty. Level one offers a reasonably clear view of the future:
a range of outcomes tight enough to support a firm decision. At level
two, there are a number of identifiable outcomes for which a company
should prepare. At level three, the possible outcomes are represented
not by a set of points but by a range that can be understood as a proba-
bility distribution. Level four features total ambiguity, where even
the distribution of outcomes is unknown.
In our experience, companies oscillate between assuming, simplis-
tically, that they are operating at level one (and making bold but unjusti-
fied point forecasts) and succumbing to an unnecessarily pessimistic
level-four paralysis. In each case, careful analysis of the situation usually
redistributes the variables into the middle ground of levels two
and three.
Rigorously understanding the uncertainty you face starts with listing
the variables that would influence a strategic decision and prioritizing
them according to their impact. Focus early analysis on removing
as much uncertainty as you can—by, for example, ruling out impossible
outcomes and using the underlying economics at work to highlight
outcomes that are either mutually reinforcing or unlikely because they
would undermine one another in the market. Then apply tools such
as scenario analysis to the remaining, irreducible uncertainty, which
should be at the heart of your strategy.
Test 6:
10Have you tested your strategy lately?
Does your strategy balance commitment and flexibility?
Commitment and flexibility exist in inverse proportion to each other:
the greater the commitment you make, the less flexibility remains.
This tension is one of the core challenges of strategy. Indeed, strategy
can be expressed as making the right trade-offs over time between
commitment and flexibility.
Making such trade-offs effectively requires an understanding of which
decisions involve commitment. Inside any large company, hundreds
of people make thousands of decisions each year. Only a few are strategic:
those that involve commitment through hard-to-reverse investments
in long-lasting, company-specific assets. Commitment is the only path
to sustainable competitive advantage.
In a world of uncertainty, strategy is about not just where and how to
compete but also when. Committing too early can be a leap in the
dark. Being too late is also dangerous, either because opportunities are
perishable or rivals can seize advantage while your company stands
on the sidelines. Flexibility is the essential ingredient that allows com-
panies to make commitments when the risk/return trade-off seems
most advantageous.
A market-beating strategy will focus on just a few crucial, high-
commitment choices to be made now, while leaving flexibility for other
such choices to be made over time. In practice, this approach means
building your strategy as a portfolio comprising three things: big bets,
or committed positions aimed at gaining significant competitive
advantage; no-regrets moves, which will pay off whatever happens; and
real options, or actions that involve relatively low costs now but can
be elevated to a higher level of commitment as changing conditions war-
rant. You can build underpriced options into a strategy by, for exam-
ple, modularizing major capital projects or maintaining the flexibility to
switch between different inputs.
Test 7:
11 January 2011
Is your strategy contaminated by bias?
It’s possible to believe honestly that you have a market-beating strat-
egy when, in fact, you don’t. Sometimes, that’s because forces beyond
your control change. But in other cases, the cause is unintentional
fuzzy thinking.
Behavioral economists have identified many characteristics of the
brain that are often strengths in our broader, personal environment
but that can work against us in the world of business decision making.
The worst offenders include overoptimism (our tendency to hope for
the best and believe too much in our own forecasts and abilities),
anchoring (tying our valuation of something to an arbitrary reference
point), loss aversion (putting too much emphasis on avoiding down-
sides and so eschewing risks worth taking), the confirmation bias (over-
weighting information that validates our opinions), herding (taking
comfort in following the crowd), and the champion bias (assigning to
an idea merit that’s based on the person proposing it).
Strategy is especially prone to faulty logic because it relies on extrap-
olating ways to win in the future from a complex set of factors
observed today. This is fertile ground for two big inference problems:
attribution error (succumbing to the “halo effect”) and survivorship
bias (ignoring the “graveyard of silent failures”). Attribution error is
the false attribution of success to observed factors; it is strategy by
hindsight and assumes that replicating the actions of another company
will lead to similar results. Survivorship bias refers to an analysis
based on a surviving population, without consideration of those who
did not live to tell their tale: this approach skews our view of what
caused success and presents no insights into what might cause failure—
were the survivors just luckier? Case studies have their place, but
hindsight is in reality not 20/20. There are too many unseen factors.
Developing multiple hypotheses and potential solutions to choose
among is one way to “de-bias” decision making. Too often, the typical
Test 8:
12Have you tested your strategy lately?
drill is to develop a promising hypothesis and put a lot of effort
into building a fact base to validate it. In contrast, it is critical to bring
fresh eyes to the issues and to maintain a culture of challenge, in
which the obligation to dissent is fostered.
The decision-making process can also be de-biased by, for example,
specifying objective decision criteria in advance and examining the
possibility of being wrong. Techniques such as the “premortem assess-
ment” (imagining yourself in a future where your decision turns out to
have been mistaken and identifying why that might have been so)
can also be useful.
Is there conviction to act on your strategy?
This test and the one that follows aren’t strictly about the strategy itself
but about the investment you’ve made in implementing it—a distinc-
tion that in our experience quickly becomes meaningless because the
two, inevitably, become intertwined. Many good strategies fall short
in implementation because of an absence of conviction in the organi-
zation, particularly among the top team, where just one or two non-
believers can strangle strategic change at birth.
Where a change of strategy is needed, that is usually because changes
in the external environment have rendered obsolete the assumptions
underlying a company’s earlier strategy. To move ahead with imple-
mentation, you need a process that openly questions the old assump-
tions and allows managers to develop a new set of beliefs in tune
with the new situation. This goal is not likely to be achieved just via
lengthy reports and presentations. Nor will the social processes
required to absorb new beliefs—group formation, building shared
meaning, exposing and reconciling differences, aligning and accept-
ing accountability—occur in formal meetings.
CEOs and boards should not be fooled by the warm glow they feel after
a nice presentation by management. They must make sure that the
whole team actually shares the new beliefs that support the strategy.
This requirement means taking decision makers on a journey of
discovery by creating experiences that will help them viscerally grasp
mismatches that may exist between what the new strategy requires
and the actions and behavior that have brought them success for many
Test 9:
13 January 2011
years. For example, visit plants and customers or tour a country your
company plans to enter, so that the leadership team can personally meet
crucial stakeholders. Mock-ups, video clips, and virtual experiences
also can help.
The result of such an effort should be a support base of influencers who
feel connected to the strategy and may even become evangelists for
it. Because strategy often emanates from the top, and CEOs are accus-
tomed to being heeded, this commonsense step often gets overlooked,
to the great detriment of the strategy.
Have you translated your strategy into an action plan?
In implementing any new strategy, it’s imperative to define clearly
what you are moving from and where you are moving to with respect
to your company’s business model, organization, and capabilities.
Develop a detailed view of the shifts required to make the move, and
ensure that processes and mechanisms, for which individual exec-
utives must be accountable, are in place to effect the changes. Quite
simply, this is an action plan. Everyone needs to know what to do.
Be sure that each major “from–to shift” is matched with the energy to
make it happen. And since the totality of the change often repre-
sents a major organizational transformation, make sure you and your
senior team are drawing on the large body of research and experi-
ence offering solid advice on change management—a topic beyond the
scope of this article!
Finally, don’t forget to make sure your ongoing resource allocation pro-
cesses are aligned with your strategy. If you want to know what it
actually is, look where the best people and the most generous budgets
are—and be prepared to change these things significantly. Effort
spent aligning the budget with the strategy will pay off many times over.
As we’ve discussed the tests with hundreds of senior executives at many
of the world’s largest companies, we’ve come away convinced that a
lot of these topics are part of the strategic dialogue in organizations. But
we’ve also heard time and again that discussion of such issues is often,
as one executive in Japan recently told us, “random, simultaneous, and
extremely confusing.” Our hope is that the tests will prove a simple
and effective antidote: a means of quickly identifying gaps in executives’
Test 10:
14Have you tested your strategy lately?
strategic thinking, opening their minds toward new ways of using
strategy to create value, and improving the quality of the strategy-
development process itself.
The authors wish to acknowledge the many contributions of McKinsey
alumnus Nick Percy, now the head of strategy for BBC Worldwide, to the
thinking behind this article.
Chris Bradley is a principal in McKinsey’s Sydney office, Martin
Hirt is a director in the Taipei office, and Sven Smit is a director in the
Amsterdam office.
The insight deficit
A fresh strategic insight—something
your company sees that no one
else does—is one of the foundations
of competitive advantage. It helps
companies focus their resources
on moves that separate them from
the pack. That makes the following
interesting: in a recent survey, only
35% of 2,135 global executives
believed their strategies rested on
unique and powerful insights. That
figure was dramatically lower than
the average—62 percent—for nine
other tests we asked executives to
measure their strategies against.
What’s more, only 14 percent
of surveyed executives placed
novel insights among the top
three strategic influencers of
financial performance. One likely
explanation: the widespread
availability of information and
adoption of sophisticated strategy
frameworks creates an impression
that “everyone knows what we know
and is probably analyzing the data
in the same ways that we are.” The
danger is obvious: if strategists
question their ability to generate
novel insights, they are less likely
to reach for the relative advantages
that are most likely to differentiate
them from competitors.
For the complete survey results,
see “Putting strategies to the test:
McKinsey Global Survey results,”
on mckinseyquarterly.com.
Copyright © 2011 McKinsey & Company. All rights reserved. We welcome your comments on this article. Please send them to [email protected].
related files/1349723555.pdf
McKinsey on Finance
Number 36, Summer 2010
Perspectives on Corporate Finance and Strategy
Why Asia’s banks underperform at M&A
21
Five ways CFOs can make cost cuts stick
25
The right way to hedge
32
A singular moment for merger value?
8
The five types of successful acquisitions
2
McKinsey conversations with global leaders: David Rubenstein of The Carlyle Group
10
2
There is no magic formula to make acquisitions
successful. Like any other business process, they
are not inherently good or bad, just as marketing
and R&D aren’t. Each deal must have its own
strategic logic. In our experience, acquirers in the
most successful deals have specific, well-
articulated value creation ideas going in. For less
successful deals, the strategic rationales—such as
pursuing international scale, filling portfolio gaps,
or building a third leg of the portfolio—tend to be
vague.
Empirical analysis of specific acquisition strategies
offers limited insight, largely because of the wide
variety of types and sizes of acquisitions and the
lack of an objective way to classify them by
strategy. What’s more, the stated strategy may not
Marc Goedhart,
Tim Koller,
and David Wessels
The five types of successful acquisitions
even be the real one: companies typically talk up
all kinds of strategic benefits from acquisitions that
are really entirely about cost cutting. In the
absence of empirical research, our suggestions for
strategies that create value reflect our acquisitions
work with companies.
In our experience, the strategic rationale for an
acquisition that creates value typically conforms to
at least one of the following five archetypes:
improving the performance of the target company,
removing excess capacity from an industry,
creating market access for products, acquiring
skills or technologies more quickly or at lower cost
than they could be built in-house, and picking
winners early and helping them develop their
businesses. If an acquisition does not fit one or
Companies advance myriad strategies for creating value with acquisitions—but only
a handful are likely to do so.
3
more of these archetypes, it’s unlikely to create
value. Executives, of course, often justify
acquisitions by choosing from a much broader
menu of strategies, including roll-ups,
consolidating to improve competitive behavior,
transformational mergers, and buying cheap.
While these strategies can create value, we find
that they seldom do. Value-minded executives
should view them with a gimlet eye.
Five archetypes
An acquisition’s strategic rationale should be a
specific articulation of one of these archetypes,
not a vague concept like growth or strategic
positioning, which may be important but must be
translated into something more tangible.
Furthermore, even if your acquisition is based on
one of the archetypes below, it won’t create value
if you overpay.
Improve the target company’s performance
Improving the performance of the target company
is one of the most common value-creating
acquisition strategies. Put simply, you buy a
company and radically reduce costs to improve
margins and cash flows. In some cases, the acquirer
may also take steps to accelerate revenue growth.
Pursuing this strategy is what the best private-
equity firms do. Among successful private-equity
acquisitions in which a target company was
bought, improved, and sold, with no additional
acquisitions along the way, operating-profit
margins increased by an average of about
2.5 percentage points more than those at peer
companies during the same period. This means
that many of the transactions increased
operating-profit margins even more.
Keep in mind that it is easier to improve the
performance of a company with low margins and
low returns on invested capital (ROIC) than that
of a high-margin, high-ROIC company. Consider a
target company with a 6 percent operating-profit
margin. Reducing costs by three percentage points,
to 91 percent of revenues, from 94 percent,
increases the margin to 9 percent and could lead to
a 50 percent increase in the company’s value. In
contrast, if the operating-profit margin of a
company is 30 percent, increasing its value by
50 percent requires increasing the margin to
45 percent. Costs would need to decline from
70 percent of revenues to 55 percent, a 21 percent
reduction in the cost base. That might not be
reasonable to expect.
Consolidate to remove excess capacity from
industry
As industries mature, they typically develop excess
capacity. In chemicals, for example, companies are
constantly looking for ways to get more production
out of their plants, while new competitors continue
to enter the industry. For example, Saudi Basic
Industries Corporation (SABIC), which began
production in the mid-1980s, grew from 6.3 million
metric tons of value-added commodities—such as
chemicals, polymers, and fertilizers—in 1985 to
56 million tons in 2008. Now one of the world’s
largest petrochemicals concerns, SABIC expects
continued growth, estimating its annual
production to reach 135 million tons by 2020.
The combination of higher production from
existing capacity and new capacity from recent
entrants often generates more supply than demand.
It is in no individual competitor’s interest to shut a
plant, however. Companies often find it easier to
shut plants across the larger combined entity
resulting from an acquisition than to shut their
least productive plants without one and end up
with a smaller company.
Reducing excess in an industry can also extend to
less tangible forms of capacity. Consolidation in
4 McKinsey on Finance Number 36, Summer 2010
the pharmaceutical industry, for example, has
significantly reduced the capacity of the sales force
as the product portfolios of merged companies
change and they rethink how to interact with
doctors. Pharmaceutical companies have also
significantly reduced their R&D capacity as they
found more productive ways to conduct research
and pruned their portfolios of development
projects.
While there is substantial value to be created from
removing excess capacity, as in most M&A activity
the bulk of the value often accrues to the seller’s
shareholders, not the buyer’s.
Accelerate market access for the target’s (or
buyer’s) products
Often, relatively small companies with innovative
products have difficulty reaching the entire
potential market for their products. Small
pharmaceutical companies, for example, typically
lack the large sales forces required to cultivate
relationships with the many doctors they need to
promote their products. Bigger pharmaceutical
companies sometimes purchase these smaller
companies and use their own large-scale sales
forces to accelerate the sales of the smaller
companies’ products.
IBM, for instance, has pursued this strategy in its
software business. From 2002 to 2009, it acquired
70 companies for about $14 billion. By pushing
their products through a global sales force, IBM
estimates it increased their revenues by almost
50 percent in the first two years after each
acquisition and an average of more than 10 percent
in the next three years.
In some cases, the target can also help accelerate
the acquirer’s revenue growth. In Procter &
Gamble’s acquisition of Gillette, the combined
company benefited because P&G had stronger
sales in some emerging markets, Gillette in others.
Working together, they introduced their products
into new markets much more quickly.
Get skills or technologies faster or at lower cost
than they can be built
Cisco Systems has used acquisitions to close gaps
in its technologies, allowing it to assemble a broad
line of networking products and to grow very
quickly from a company with a single product line
into the key player in Internet equipment. From
1993 to 2001, Cisco acquired 71 companies, at an
average price of approximately $350 million.
Cisco’s sales increased from $650 million in 1993
to $22 billion in 2001, with nearly 40 percent
of its 2001 revenue coming directly from these
acquisitions. By 2009, Cisco had more than
$36 billion in revenues and a market cap of
approximately $150 billion.
Pick winners early and help them develop their
businesses
The final winning strategy involves making
acquisitions early in the life cycle of a new industry
or product line, long before most others recognize
that it will grow significantly. Johnson & Johnson
pursued this strategy in its early acquisitions of
medical-device businesses. When J&J bought
device manufacturer Cordis, in 1996, Cordis had
$500 million in revenues. By 2007, its revenues
had increased to $3.8 billion, reflecting a 20 percent
annual growth rate. J&J purchased orthopedic-
device manufacturer DePuy in 1998, when DePuy
had $900 million in revenues. By 2007, they had
grown to $4.6 billion, also at an annual growth
rate of 20 percent.
This acquisition strategy requires a disciplined
approach by management in three dimensions.
First, you must be willing to make investments
early, long before your competitors and the market
see the industry’s or company’s potential. Second,
5The five types of successful acquisitions
you need to make multiple bets and to expect that
some will fail. Third, you need the skills and
patience to nurture the acquired businesses.
Harder strategies
Beyond the five main acquisition strategies we’ve
explored, a handful of others can create value,
though in our experience they do so relatively
rarely.
Roll-up strategy
Roll-up strategies consolidate highly fragmented
markets where the current competitors are too
small to achieve scale economies. Beginning in the
1960s, Service Corporation International, for
instance, grew from a single funeral home in
Houston to more than 1,400 funeral homes and
cemeteries in 2008. Similarly, Clear Channel
Communications rolled up the US market for radio
stations, eventually owning more than 900.
This strategy works when businesses as a group
can realize substantial cost savings or achieve
higher revenues than individual businesses can.
Service Corporation’s funeral homes in a given city
can share vehicles, purchasing, and back-office
operations, for example. They can also coordinate
advertising across a city to reduce costs and raise
revenues.
Size per se is not what creates a successful roll-up;
what matters is the right kind of size. For Service
Corporation, multiple locations in individual cities
have been more important than many branches
spread over many cities, because the cost savings
(such as sharing vehicles) can be realized only if
the branches are near one another. Roll-up
strategies are hard to disguise, so they invite
copycats. As others tried to imitate Service
Corporation’s strategy, prices for some funeral
homes were eventually bid up to levels that made
additional acquisitions uneconomic.
Consolidate to improve competitive behavior
Many executives in highly competitive industries
hope consolidation will lead competitors to focus
6 McKinsey on Finance Number 36, Summer 2010
less on price competition, thereby improving the
ROIC of the industry. The evidence shows, however,
that unless it consolidates to just three or four
companies and can keep out new entrants, pricing
behavior doesn’t change: smaller businesses or new
entrants often have an incentive to gain share
through lower prices. So in an industry with, say,
ten companies, lots of deals must be done before
the basis of competition changes.
Enter into a transformational merger
A commonly mentioned reason for an acquisition
or merger is the desire to transform one or both
companies. Transformational mergers are rare,
however, because the circumstances have to be just
right, and the management team needs to execute
the strategy well.
Transformational mergers can best be described by
example. One of the world’s leading
pharmaceutical companies, Switzerland’s Novartis,
was formed in 1996 by the $30 billion merger of
Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz. But this merger was much
more than a simple combination of businesses:
under the leadership of the new CEO, Daniel
Vasella, Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz were transformed
into an entirely new company. Using the merger as
a catalyst for change, Vasella and his management
team not only captured $1.4 billion in cost
synergies but also redefined the company’s
mission, strategy, portfolio, and organization, as
well as all key processes, from research to sales. In
every area, there was no automatic choice for either
the Ciba or the Sandoz way of doing things; instead,
the organization made a systematic effort to find
the best way.
Novartis shifted its strategic focus to innovation in
its life sciences business (pharmaceuticals,
nutrition, and products for agriculture) and spun
off the $7 billion Ciba Specialty Chemicals
business in 1997. Organizational changes included
structuring R&D worldwide by therapeutic rather
than geographic area, enabling Novartis to build a
world-leading oncology franchise.
Across all departments and management layers,
Novartis created a strong performance-oriented
culture supported by shifting from a seniority- to a
performance-based compensation system for
managers.
Buy cheap
The final way to create value from an acquisition is
to buy cheap—in other words, at a price below a
company’s intrinsic value. In our experience,
however, such opportunities are rare and relatively
small. Nonetheless, though market values revert to
intrinsic values over longer periods, there can be
brief moments when the two fall out of alignment.
Markets, for example, sometimes overreact to
negative news, such as a criminal investigation of
an executive or the failure of a single product in a
portfolio with many strong ones.
Such moments are less rare in cyclical industries,
where assets are often undervalued at the bottom
of a cycle. Comparing actual market valuations
with intrinsic values based on a “perfect foresight”
model, we found that companies in cyclical
industries could more than double their
shareholder returns (relative to actual returns) if
they acquired assets at the bottom of a cycle and
sold at the top.
While markets do throw up occasional
opportunities for companies to buy targets at levels
below their intrinsic value, we haven’t seen many
cases. To gain control of a target, acquirers must
pay its shareholders a premium over the current
market value. Although premiums can vary widely,
the average ones for corporate control have been
7The five types of successful acquisitions
fairly stable: almost 30 percent of the
preannouncement price of the target’s equity. For
targets pursued by multiple acquirers, the
premium rises dramatically, creating the so-called
winner’s curse. If several companies evaluate a
given target and all identify roughly the same
potential synergies, the pursuer that overestimates
them most will offer the highest price. Since it is
based on an overestimation of the value to be
created, the winner pays too much—and is
ultimately a loser.
Since market values can sometimes deviate from
intrinsic ones, management must also beware the
possibility that markets may be overvaluing a
potential acquisition. Consider the stock market
bubble during the late 1990s. Companies that
merged with or acquired technology, media, or
telecommunications businesses saw their share
prices plummet when the market reverted to
earlier levels. The possibility that a company might
pay too much when the market is inflated deserves
serious consideration, because M&A activity seems
to rise following periods of strong market
performance. If (and when) prices are artificially
high, large improvements are necessary to justify
an acquisition, even when the target can be
purchased at no premium to market value.
Premiums for private deals tend to be smaller,
although comprehensive evidence is difficult to
collect because publicly available data are scarce.
Private acquisitions often stem from the seller’s
desire to get out rather than the buyer’s desire
for a purchase.
By focusing on the types of acquisition strategies
that have created value for acquirers in the past,
managers can make it more likely that their
acquisitions will create value for their shareholders.
1 Viral V. Acharya, Moritz Hahn, and Conor Kehoe, “Corporate governance and value creation: Evidence from private equity,” Social Science Research Network Working Paper, February 19, 2010.
2 IBM investor briefing, May 12, 2010 (www.ibm.com/investor/ events/investor0510/presentation/pres3.pdf).
3 Marco de Heer and Timothy M. Koller, “Valuing cyclical companies,” mckinseyquarterly.com, May 2000.
4 Kevin Rock, “Why new issues are underpriced,” Journal of Financial Economics, 1986, Volume 15, Number 1–2, pp. 187–212.
Marc Goedhart ([email protected]) is a consultant in McKinsey’s Amsterdam office, Tim Koller
([email protected]) is a partner in the New York office, and David Wessels, an alumnus of the New York
office, is an adjunct professor of finance at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School. This article is excerpted
from Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart, and David Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies (fifth
edition, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, August 2010). Tim Koller is also coauthor, with Richard Dobbs and Bill
Huyett, of a forthcoming managers’ guide to value creation, titled Value: The Four Cornerstones of Corporate Finance
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, October 2010). Copyright © 2010 McKinsey & Company. All rights reserved.
related files/1472378321.pptx
Strategic Financial Analysis
MBA Module 5
1
Session 4
School of Business
1
2
Session 4
Readings and assignments
Have you tested your strategy lately?, McKinsey Quarterly, January 2011 (Bradley, et al)
Why bad multiples happen to good companies, McKinsey Quarterly, May 2012 (Foushee, et al)
Good Financial Analysts are Made, not Born and FP&A Peril: Too Much Data, Too Little Judgment, CFO.com, 6/20/2012 and 4/23/2012, respectively
Pink, “The Truth About What Motivates Us, Aspen Ideas Festival, July 29, 2010 (a podcast – over one hour)
PowerPoint deck in Bb (session 4)
Activities in class
Two merger paper presentations and “role teams” evaluate
Discuss readings
Goals
Bring closure to merger paper assignment
Answer any “open questions” on financial analysis and valuation
Emphasize the importance of leadership in implementing a financially well grounded new strategic direction
Answer any remaining questions about final paper and spreadsheet submission details
School of Business
2
3
Merger Paper Presentations
Creditors
Activist
Investors
Investors
Employees
COO
CFO
CEO
Presenters
Use your paper to present your merger paper (no new .ppt slides)
You have 15 minutes, including questions
Be sure to focus on the rationale of the acquisition, going forward targets to ensure success, and risks (if you acquired PSMT).
Role Teams
Evaluate the proposal from your perspective, specifically noting the strength of the rationale, supporting data, and risk identification.
What weaknesses do you see in the recommendation?
Of the two proposals, which is stronger and why? What would you change about it before going to the BoD?
School of Business
3
Final Readings – Discussion How Finance Dovetails with Strategy
4
School of Business
4
5
Bradley et al: Have you tested your strategy lately? *
Article Overview
What surprised you in this article?
Do you know your company’s strategy, and how many of the tests does it pass?
Which of the “test” are the most difficult to evaluate and why?
Why do you think so few companies only “pass” four or fewer tests?
Did any of the footnotes inspire you to read more on strategy? If so, which readings?
* McKinsey Quarterly, January 2011
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
School of Business
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6
Nolen et al: Why bad multiples happen to good companies *
Article Overview
What are your three key take-a-ways from this article?
Why do you think the article was written?
Any surprises for you in this material?
What is “enterprise value”?
Did you think about NewCo’s revenue growth after you read this article? What insight did you have?
* Mckinsey Quarterly, May 2012
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
School of Business
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7
McCann: Good Financial Analyst … & Too Much Data …*
Article Overview
What are your three key take-a-ways from these papers?
On a scale of one to 10, 10 being the best, rate yourself as a financial analyst? Why did you give yourself this rating?
Do these insights extend beyond financial analysis? Why or why not?
* CFO.com, June 20th and April 23rd, 2012
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
School of Business
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8
Daniel Pink: The Truth About What Motivates Us? *
Interesting points about the speech and speaking style
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
* Aspen Institute, July 29, 2010; Podcast from Aspen Public Radio – posted in Bb (it takes a while for the file to download before it starts)
Insights on the scientific evidence of what motivates us
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
What can motivation science say about financial management
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
School of Business
8
Final Reminders
9
* Proofread before submitting your paper and spreadsheet on Blackboard
Check for grammar – see “Examples of Poor Writing & How to Correct Them”
Reread the rubric on your syllabus
Follow the detailed instructions we have covered three times already
QUALITATIVE EVALUATION Paper (MS Word’s .doc or .docx format only!)
Cover sheet with Hamline ID #
Executive Summary Page
Maximum three additional pages using suggested headings
Have you gone “beyond the numbers” to describe precisely how
value can be created (or destroyed) by putting COST & PSMT together?
Reference page (minimum 5 references from this course)
QUANTITATIVE VALUATION Spreadsheet
Don’t forget to add your Hamline ID # to the Summary Tab
Don’t touch tabs 1 & 2 that we completed as a class
Change 4-5 variables on Combined New Company Inc. Stmt.
Do your changes from the weighted averages of COST
and PSMT continuing to operate separately reflect
the + or – synergies described in your paper?
On the Summary tab is your NPV reasonable?
Did you want to add a 5th tab? (DuPont analysis or WACC?)
School of Business
9
Final Reminders (continued)
10
Submit paper and spreadsheet by deadline = 10:00 PM this Saturday night!
Complete Course Evaluation on Hamline’s Piperline
I’ll try to return your evaluated papers to you via e-mail by evening, Tuesday July 28th; and I should have all course grades posted on Piperline late that night.
Best wishes to all of you as you come down the “home stretch” toward earning your MBA degree!
David Christopherson
School of Business
10
image1.jpeg
related files/1501597129.docx
Grading Rubric for Individual Paper (merger paper – 400 possible points)
|
Graded Elements & Relative Weighting (Share of 100%) |
Does not Meet Expectations Below 70% |
Approaches Expectations 70% - 79% |
Meets Expectations
80% - 89% |
Exceeds Expectations
90% - 100% |
|
Problem Formulation 20% Problems, issues, opportunities, or questions are identified and formulated comprehensively |
Fails to identify and formulate the problems, issues, opportunities, or questions
48 55 |
Recognizes one or more of the problems, but they are not stated correctly in all cases; may be confused as to some key information 56 63 |
Recognizes most of the problems and those seen are stated clearly and correctly, but formulation(s) are not comprehensive 64 71 |
Clearly identifies and formulates problems or issues and correctly summarizes implications and relationship among key factors 72 80 |
|
Information and Assumptions 10% Evidence, information quality and assumptions are evaluated |
Fails to assess the quality of data, and supporting evidence; does not identify key assumptions.
24 27 |
Available evidence is partially assessed but observations are limited and inadequate for the purpose used; key assumptions not explicitly stated
28 31 |
Available data and other evidence are reasonably assessed; and observations are made upon the adequacy of that data; key assumptions are stated, but their implications may not be noted 32 35 |
The evidence sources are validated and examined for relevancy and completeness, and the information referenced is determined to be suitable for use; key assumptions and the implications related to their use are noted 36 40 |
|
Analytical Skill 30% Quantitative and / or qualitative analysis undertaken for problem solving (30) |
Quantitative or qualitative analysis is inappropriate, inaccurate or incomplete
72 43 |
Analysis is somewhat appropriate but elements fall-short or are inaccurate, limiting its usefulness for decision-making 84 95 |
Analysis is mostly appropriate and is a reasonable beginning that is likely to lead to useful decision-making
96 107 |
Analysis is appropriate, accurate and complete, and enables good decision-making
108 120 |
|
Communication of Recommendations 25% Communicates effectively well-reasoned, creative, useful, and logical recommendations |
No actions proposed and communication is limited and narrow; and or with a high number of grammatical errors
60 69 |
Proposes solutions are expressed somewhat completely, but communication falls short of being fully effective and compelling and/or grammatically correct
70 79 |
Proposed solutions are expressed clearly and completely in the whole, though supporting rationale may not be compelling and/or some grammar mistakes present
80 89 |
Logical and reasoned recommendations or solutions are advanced and communication is effective, grammatically correct, and acknowledging both limitations and broader implications 90 100 |
|
Alternatives Addressed 15% Alternative perspectives incorporated in the analysis |
Fails to recognize the perspective of others or that other potential decisions that are possible
36 41 |
Begins to address the perspective of others and attempts to address other decisions, but not comprehensively
42 47 |
Addresses the perspective of others and begins to address other potential solutions, but is not compelling
48 53 |
Fully integrates alternative perspectives and decisions in the analysis and justifies the actions proposed in relations to other options
54 60 |
related files/1941091412.docx
Grading Rubric for Individual Paper (merger paper – 400 possible points)
|
Graded Elements & Relative Weighting (Share of 100%) |
Does not Meet Expectations Below 70% |
Approaches Expectations 70% - 79% |
Meets Expectations
80% - 89% |
Exceeds Expectations
90% - 100% |
|
Problem Formulation 20% Problems, issues, opportunities, or questions are identified and formulated comprehensively |
Fails to identify and formulate the problems, issues, opportunities, or questions
48 55 |
Recognizes one or more of the problems, but they are not stated correctly in all cases; may be confused as to some key information 56 63 |
Recognizes most of the problems and those seen are stated clearly and correctly, but formulation(s) are not comprehensive 64 71 |
Clearly identifies and formulates problems or issues and correctly summarizes implications and relationship among key factors 72 80 |
|
Information and Assumptions 10% Evidence, information quality and assumptions are evaluated |
Fails to assess the quality of data, and supporting evidence; does not identify key assumptions.
24 27 |
Available evidence is partially assessed but observations are limited and inadequate for the purpose used; key assumptions not explicitly stated
28 31 |
Available data and other evidence are reasonably assessed; and observations are made upon the adequacy of that data; key assumptions are stated, but their implications may not be noted 32 35 |
The evidence sources are validated and examined for relevancy and completeness, and the information referenced is determined to be suitable for use; key assumptions and the implications related to their use are noted 36 40 |
|
Analytical Skill 30% Quantitative and / or qualitative analysis undertaken for problem solving (30) |
Quantitative or qualitative analysis is inappropriate, inaccurate or incomplete
72 43 |
Analysis is somewhat appropriate but elements fall-short or are inaccurate, limiting its usefulness for decision-making 84 95 |
Analysis is mostly appropriate and is a reasonable beginning that is likely to lead to useful decision-making
96 107 |
Analysis is appropriate, accurate and complete, and enables good decision-making
108 120 |
|
Communication of Recommendations 25% Communicates effectively well-reasoned, creative, useful, and logical recommendations |
No actions proposed and communication is limited and narrow; and or with a high number of grammatical errors
60 69 |
Proposes solutions are expressed somewhat completely, but communication falls short of being fully effective and compelling and/or grammatically correct
70 79 |
Proposed solutions are expressed clearly and completely in the whole, though supporting rationale may not be compelling and/or some grammar mistakes present
80 89 |
Logical and reasoned recommendations or solutions are advanced and communication is effective, grammatically correct, and acknowledging both limitations and broader implications 90 100 |
|
Alternatives Addressed 15% Alternative perspectives incorporated in the analysis |
Fails to recognize the perspective of others or that other potential decisions that are possible
36 41 |
Begins to address the perspective of others and attempts to address other decisions, but not comprehensively
42 47 |
Addresses the perspective of others and begins to address other potential solutions, but is not compelling
48 53 |
Fully integrates alternative perspectives and decisions in the analysis and justifies the actions proposed in relations to other options
54 60 |
related files/202335146.xlsx
Costco IS
| Annual Income Statement * | To Be Finalized July 16 2015 | Divd. Growth Model | CAPM | Sales growth | 8.21% | STUDENT ID # | ||||||||||||||
| (Millions except for per share) | Divd. Yield | 1.11% | rf | 2.35% | Gross profit margin | 12.60% | ||||||||||||||
| gs | 5.99% | Beta | 0.76 | SG&A % of sales | 8.90% | |||||||||||||||
| COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP | SIC: 5399 (Misc. General Mdse Stores) | Mkt prem | 6.25% | Tax rate | 35.00% | |||||||||||||||
| 999 Lake Drive | GICS: 30101040 (Hypermarkets & Super Centers) | E(Ret) | 7.10% | RRR | 7.10% | Chg. NWC % of sales | 0.50% | |||||||||||||
| Issaquah, WA 98027 | S&P Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating: A+ | Equibrium CAPM=DGM Price | $ 144.33 | WACC | 6.95% | |||||||||||||||
| Ticker: COST | S&P Short-Term Issuer Credit Rating: Extremely Strong (A1) | Market Price 7/16/2015 | $ 144.33 | RADR (WACC + 10%) | 7.65% | |||||||||||||||
| Depr. % of Sales | 0.91% | |||||||||||||||||||
| Cap Exp. % of Sales | 1.92% | |||||||||||||||||||
| 2009 Aug | 2010 Aug | 2011 Aug | 2012 Aug | 2013 Aug | 2014 Aug | CAGR | Aug-15 | Aug-16 | Aug-17 | Aug-18 | Aug-19 | Aug-20 | Aug-21 | Aug-22 | Aug-23 | 2024 Aug | 2025 | |||
| Sales | 71,449 | 77,946 | 88,915 | 99,137 | 105,156 | 112,640 | 9.5% | 121,888 | 131,895 | 142,723 | 154,441 | 167,120 | 180,841 | 195,688 | 211,754 | 229,139 | 247,951 | |||
| Cost of Goods Sold | 61,607 | 67,995 | 77,739 | 86,823 | 91,948 | 98,458 | 9.8% | 106,530 | 115,276 | 124,740 | 134,981 | 146,063 | 158,055 | 171,031 | 185,073 | 200,268 | 216,710 | |||
| Gross Profit | 9,842 | 9,951 | 11,176 | 12,314 | 13,208 | 14,182 | 7.6% | 15,358 | 16,619 | 17,983 | 19,460 | 21,057 | 22,786 | 24,657 | 26,681 | 28,872 | 31,242 | |||
| Selling, General, & Administrative Exp. | 7,303 | 7,079 | 7,882 | 8,647 | 9,209 | 9,933 | 6.3% | 10,848 | 11,739 | 12,702 | 13,745 | 14,874 | 16,095 | 17,416 | 18,846 | 20,393 | 22,068 | |||
| Depreciation, Depletion, & Amortization | 728 | 795 | 855 | 908 | 946 | 1,029 | 7.2% | 1,109 | 1,200 | 1,299 | 1,405 | 1,521 | 1,646 | 1,781 | 1,927 | 2,085 | 2,256 | |||
| - 0 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Operating Profit (EBIT) | 1,811 | 2,077 | 2,439 | 2,759 | 3,053 | 3,220 | 12.2% | 3,401 | 3,680 | 3,982 | 4,309 | 4,663 | 5,045 | 5,460 | 5,908 | 6,393 | 6,918 | |||
| Interest Expense | 116 | 111 | 116 | 95 | 99 | 113 | -0.5% | |||||||||||||
| Non-Operating Income / Expense | 53 | 88 | 60 | 103 | 97 | 90 | 11.2% | |||||||||||||
| Special Items and other | 72 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 0 | 0 | ||||||||||||||
| Pretax Income | 1,714 | 2,054 | 2,383 | 2,750 | 3,051 | 3,197 | 13.3% | |||||||||||||
| Total Income Taxes | 628 | 731 | 841 | 1,000 | 990 | 1,109 | 12.0% | |||||||||||||
| Less | Non-Cont. Int. Adj. | 0 | 20 | 80 | 41 | 22 | 45 | |||||||||||||
| Adjusted Net Income | 1,086 | 1,303 | 1,462 | 1,709 | 2,039 | 2,043 | 13.5% | |||||||||||||
| EPS Basic from Operations | 2.55 | 2.97 | 3.35 | 3.94 | 4.68 | 4.69 | 13.0% | |||||||||||||
| EPS Diluted from Operations | 2.52 | 2.92 | 3.30 | 3.89 | 4.63 | 4.65 | 13.0% | |||||||||||||
| Dividends Per Share | 0.68 | 0.77 | 0.89 | 1.03 | 1.10 | 1.33 | 1.60 | |||||||||||||
| Com Shares for Basic EPS | 433.988 | 438.611 | 436.119 | 433.620 | 435.741 | 438.692 | ||||||||||||||
| Com Shares for Diluted EPS | 440.454 | 445.970 | 443.094 | 439.373 | 440.512 | 442.490 | ||||||||||||||
| NOPAT | 2,210 | 2,392 | 2,588 | 2,801 | 3,031 | 3,280 | 3,549 | 3,840 | 4,155 | 4,497 | ||||||||||
| Depreciation | 1,109 | 1,200 | 1,299 | 1,405 | 1,521 | 1,646 | 1,781 | 1,927 | 2,085 | 2,256 | ||||||||||
| Change in NWC | 46 | 50 | 54 | 59 | 63 | 69 | 74 | 80 | 87 | 94 | CAGR for FCF | |||||||||
| Cap Exp. | 2,340 | 2,532 | 2,740 | 2,965 | 3,209 | 3,472 | 3,757 | 4,066 | 4,399 | 4,761 | 8.21% | |||||||||
| Free cash flow | 933 | 1,010 | 1,093 | 1,182 | 1,279 | 1,384 | 1,498 | 1,621 | 1,754 | 1,898 | 2,054 | |||||||||
| 2025 Terminal Value >>>>>>> | 124,220 | |||||||||||||||||||
| Discount Factor | 0.935 | 0.874 | 0.817 | 0.764 | 0.715 | 0.668 | 0.625 | 0.584 | 0.546 | 0.511 | 0.478 | |||||||||
| Discounted CF | 872 | 883 | 893 | 904 | 914 | 925 | 936 | 947 | 958 | 969 | ||||||||||
| Sum of 1-10 DCF's | 9,202 | |||||||||||||||||||
| Disc. Terminal Value | 59,320 | Sensitivity analysis with WACC and growth rates | ||||||||||||||||||
| Total of all DCF's | 68,523 | |||||||||||||||||||
| Less Debt | 4,929 | |||||||||||||||||||
| Intrinsic Equity Val. | 63,594 | |||||||||||||||||||
| DCF/Share | 144.36 | |||||||||||||||||||
PSMT IS
| Annual Income Statement * | To Be Finalized July 16 2015 | Divd. Growth Model | CAPM | Sales growth | 13.00% | STUDENT ID # | |||||||||||||
| (Millions except for per share) | Divd. Yield | 0.70% | rf | 2.35% | Gross profit margin | 17.00% | |||||||||||||
| gs | 10.59% | Beta | 1.43 | SG&A % of sales | 8.450% | ||||||||||||||
| PRICESMART INC. | Mkt prem | 6.25% | Tax rate | 32.75% | |||||||||||||||
| 9740 Scranton Road | E(Ret) | 11.29% | RRR | 11.29% | NWC % of sales | 1.00% | |||||||||||||
| San Diego, CA 92121 | Equibrium CAPM=DGM Price | $ 100.61 | WACC | 10.76% | |||||||||||||||
| Ticker: PSMT | Market Price 7/16/2015 | $ 100.61 | RADR (WACC + 10%) | 11.84% | |||||||||||||||
| Fiscal Year: 8 | Depr. % Sales | 1.35% | |||||||||||||||||
| Cap. Ex. % Sales | 1.40% | ||||||||||||||||||
| 2009 Aug | 2010 Aug | 2011 Aug | 2012 Aug | 2013 Aug | 2014 Aug | CAGR | Aug-15 | Aug-16 | Aug-17 | Aug-18 | Aug-19 | Aug-20 | Aug-21 | Aug-22 | Aug-23 | 2024 Aug | 2025 | ||
| Sales | 1,252 | 1,396 | 1,714 | 2,051 | 2,300 | 2,518 | 10.4% | 2,845 | 3,215 | 3,633 | 4,106 | 4,639 | 5,242 | 5,924 | 6,694 | 7,564 | 8,548 | ||
| Cost of Goods Sold | 1,034 | 1,160 | 1,431 | 1,719 | 1,929 | 2,114 | 10.7% | 2,362 | 2,669 | 3,016 | 3,408 | 3,851 | 4,351 | 4,917 | 5,556 | 6,278 | 7,094 | ||
| Gross Profit | 217 | 236 | 283 | 332 | 371 | 404 | 8.8% | 484 | 547 | 618 | 698 | 789 | 891 | 1,007 | 1,138 | 1,286 | 1,453 | ||
| Selling, General, & Administrative Exp. | 132 | 146 | 174 | 200 | 218 | 238 | 8.7% | 240 | 272 | 307 | 347 | 392 | 443 | 501 | 566 | 639 | 722 | ||
| Depreciation, Depletion, & Amortization | 14 | 15 | 19 | 24 | 24 | 28 | 11.5% | 38 | 49 | 55 | 63 | 71 | 80 | 90 | 102 | 115 | |||
| Operating Profit (EBIT) | 72 | 75 | 90 | 108 | 129 | 138 | 8.5% | 205 | 275 | 262 | 296 | 334 | 377 | 427 | 482 | 545 | 615 | ||
| Interest Expense | 3 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 4 | |||||||||||||
| Non-Operating Income / Expense | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Special Items and other | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Pretax Income | 68 | 72 | 89 | 103 | 123 | 134 | |||||||||||||
| Total Income Taxes | 19 | 23 | 27 | 35 | 39 | 41 | |||||||||||||
| (Adjustments) | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Adjusted Net Income | 47 | 49 | 62 | 68 | 84 | 93 | |||||||||||||
| EPS Basic from Operations | 1.46 | 1.66 | 2.00 | 2.24 | 2.78 | 3.07 | |||||||||||||
| EPS Diluted from Operations | 1.45 | 1.65 | 2.00 | 2.24 | 2.78 | 3.07 | |||||||||||||
| Dividends Per Share | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.70 | ||||||||||||
| Com Shares for Basic EPS | 28.959 | 29.254 | 29.441 | 29.554 | 29.65 | 29.75 | |||||||||||||
| Com Shares for Diluted EPS | 29.181 | 29.279 | 29.450 | 29.566 | 29.68 | 29.76 | |||||||||||||
| NOPAT | 138 | 185 | 176 | 199 | 225 | 254 | 287 | 324 | 366 | 414 | |||||||||
| Depreciation | 38 | 0 | 49 | 55 | 63 | 71 | 80 | 90 | 102 | 115 | |||||||||
| Change in NWC | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | CAGR for FCF | ||||||||
| Cap Exp. | 40 | 45 | 51 | 57 | 65 | 73 | 83 | 94 | 106 | 120 | 13.00% | ||||||||
| Free cash flow | 133 | 136 | 170 | 192 | 217 | 245 | 277 | 313 | 354 | 400 | 452 | ||||||||
| 2025 Terminal Value >>>>>>> | 5,416 | ||||||||||||||||||
| Discount Factor | 0.903 | 0.815 | 0.736 | 0.664 | 0.600 | 0.542 | 0.489 | 0.442 | 0.399 | 0.360 | 0.325 | ||||||||
| Discounted CF | 120 | 111 | 125 | 128 | 130 | 133 | 135 | 138 | 141 | 144 | |||||||||
| Sum of 1-10 DCF's | 1,305 | ||||||||||||||||||
| Disc. Terminal Value | 1,760 | Sensitivity analysis with WACC and growth rates | |||||||||||||||||
| Total of all DCF's | 3,065 | ||||||||||||||||||
| Less Debt | 90 | ||||||||||||||||||
| Intrinsic Equity Val. | 2,975 | ||||||||||||||||||
| DCF/Share | 100.63 |
Combined IS
| Combined Pro Forma Income Statement - Projections Assuming Costco Acquires PriceSmart | ||||||||||||||
| Assumptions: | Sales growth | 8.42% | Gs | 6.0835% | Fill in your 10 assumptions about positive or negative | |||||||||
| Gross profit margin | 12.80% | synergy by changing any of the cells shaded in blue to the left. | ||||||||||||
| SG&A % of sales | 8.88% | Weights | <<<<==== | |||||||||||
| Tax rate | 34.90% | 0.95531 | COST | |||||||||||
| NWC % of sales | 0.52% | 0.04469 | PSMT | |||||||||||
| WACC | 7.12% | |||||||||||||
| RADR (WACC + 10%) | 7.83% | |||||||||||||
| Depr. % Sales | 0.93% | |||||||||||||
| Cap. Ex. % Sales | 1.90% | |||||||||||||
| Aug-15 | Aug-16 | Aug-17 | Aug-18 | Aug-19 | Aug-20 | Aug-21 | Aug-22 | Aug-23 | 2024 Aug | CAGR | 2025 | |||
| Sales | 124,733 | 135,241 | 146,633 | 158,986 | 172,379 | 186,900 | 202,645 | 219,716 | 238,225 | 258,293 | 8.42% | |||
| Cost of Goods Sold | 108,771 | 117,934 | 127,869 | 138,641 | 150,320 | 162,983 | 176,713 | 191,600 | 207,740 | 225,241 | 8.42% | |||
| Gross Profit | 15,962 | 17,306 | 18,764 | 20,345 | 22,059 | 23,917 | 25,932 | 28,116 | 30,485 | 33,053 | 8.42% | |||
| Selling, General, & Administrative Exp. | 11,076 | 12,009 | 13,021 | 14,118 | 15,307 | 16,597 | 17,995 | 19,511 | 21,154 | 22,936 | 8.42% | |||
| Depreciation, Depletion, & Amortization | 1,160 | 1,257 | 1,363 | 1,478 | 1,603 | 1,738 | 1,884 | 2,043 | 2,215 | 2,401 | 8.42% | |||
| Operating Profit (EBIT) | 3,726 | 4,040 | 4,380 | 4,749 | 5,149 | 5,583 | 6,053 | 6,563 | 7,116 | 7,715 | 8.42% | |||
| NOPAT | 2,426 | 2,630 | 2,851 | 3,092 | 3,352 | 3,634 | 3,941 | 4,273 | 4,633 | 5,023 | 8.42% | |||
| Depreciation | 1,160 | 1,257 | 1,363 | 1,478 | 1,603 | 1,738 | 1,884 | 2,043 | 2,215 | 2,401 | 8.42% | |||
| Change in NWC | 92 | 55 | 60 | 65 | 70 | 76 | 82 | 89 | 97 | 105 | 1.52% | |||
| CapEx | 2,366 | 2,565 | 2,781 | 3,016 | 3,270 | 3,545 | 3,844 | 4,167 | 4,519 | 4,899 | 8.42% | |||
| Free cash flow | 1,128 | 1,267 | 1,374 | 1,490 | 1,615 | 1,751 | 1,899 | 2,059 | 2,232 | 2,420 | 8.85% | 2,634 | ||
| 119,559 | ||||||||||||||
| Discount factor | 0.934 | 0.871 | 0.814 | 0.759 | 0.709 | 0.662 | 0.618 | 0.577 | 0.538 | 0.503 | ||||
| Discounted CF | 1,053 | 1,104 | 1,118 | 1,131 | 1,145 | 1,159 | 1,173 | 1,187 | 1,202 | 1,216 | ||||
| Sum of DCF yrs 1-10) | 11,489 | |||||||||||||
| DCF of terminal perp. | 60,099 | |||||||||||||
| Total of all DCFs | 71,588 | |||||||||||||
| Less Debt | 5,019 | |||||||||||||
| Intrinsic Equity Value | 66,569 | |||||||||||||
| DCF per share | 150.4414107145 | |||||||||||||
| Total Shares | 442.490 | |||||||||||||
| costco is 19 times bigger than coscto |
Summary
| Present value of Costco (PV-C) | 63,594 | July 16 2015 | STUDENT ID # | ||||||
| NOTE: All numbers in millions of USD. | |||||||||
| Present value of Pricesmart (PV-P) | 2,975 | ||||||||
| PV of C and P alone | 66,569 | Baseline value to exceed | separate | ||||||
| Present value of C & P Combined (PV-C&P) | 66,569 | Synergies included here (revenue, costs, efficiency, etc.) | together | ||||||
| Gain in value with synergies | -0 | ||||||||
| % gain | -0.0% | ||||||||
| Cash to be paid for PriceSmart | 3,868 | Premium = 30% (if PV = market value) (change if you like) | |||||||
| Premium Cost (cash paid - PV-PS) | 893 | ||||||||
| Overall NPV (+ gain or - loss) | (893) |
Sheet1
related files/243990533.xlsx
Costco IS
| Annual Income Statement * | To Be Finalized July 16 2015 | Divd. Growth Model | CAPM | Sales growth | 8.21% | STUDENT ID # | ||||||||||||||
| (Millions except for per share) | Divd. Yield | 1.11% | rf | 2.35% | Gross profit margin | 12.60% | ||||||||||||||
| gs | 5.99% | Beta | 0.76 | SG&A % of sales | 8.90% | |||||||||||||||
| COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP | SIC: 5399 (Misc. General Mdse Stores) | Mkt prem | 6.25% | Tax rate | 35.00% | |||||||||||||||
| 999 Lake Drive | GICS: 30101040 (Hypermarkets & Super Centers) | E(Ret) | 7.10% | RRR | 7.10% | Chg. NWC % of sales | 0.50% | |||||||||||||
| Issaquah, WA 98027 | S&P Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating: A+ | Equibrium CAPM=DGM Price | $ 144.33 | WACC | 6.95% | |||||||||||||||
| Ticker: COST | S&P Short-Term Issuer Credit Rating: Extremely Strong (A1) | Market Price 7/16/2015 | $ 144.33 | RADR (WACC + 10%) | 7.65% | |||||||||||||||
| Depr. % of Sales | 0.91% | |||||||||||||||||||
| Cap Exp. % of Sales | 1.92% | |||||||||||||||||||
| 2009 Aug | 2010 Aug | 2011 Aug | 2012 Aug | 2013 Aug | 2014 Aug | CAGR | Aug-15 | Aug-16 | Aug-17 | Aug-18 | Aug-19 | Aug-20 | Aug-21 | Aug-22 | Aug-23 | 2024 Aug | 2025 | |||
| Sales | 71,449 | 77,946 | 88,915 | 99,137 | 105,156 | 112,640 | 9.5% | 121,888 | 131,895 | 142,723 | 154,441 | 167,120 | 180,841 | 195,688 | 211,754 | 229,139 | 247,951 | |||
| Cost of Goods Sold | 61,607 | 67,995 | 77,739 | 86,823 | 91,948 | 98,458 | 9.8% | 106,530 | 115,276 | 124,740 | 134,981 | 146,063 | 158,055 | 171,031 | 185,073 | 200,268 | 216,710 | |||
| Gross Profit | 9,842 | 9,951 | 11,176 | 12,314 | 13,208 | 14,182 | 7.6% | 15,358 | 16,619 | 17,983 | 19,460 | 21,057 | 22,786 | 24,657 | 26,681 | 28,872 | 31,242 | |||
| Selling, General, & Administrative Exp. | 7,303 | 7,079 | 7,882 | 8,647 | 9,209 | 9,933 | 6.3% | 10,848 | 11,739 | 12,702 | 13,745 | 14,874 | 16,095 | 17,416 | 18,846 | 20,393 | 22,068 | |||
| Depreciation, Depletion, & Amortization | 728 | 795 | 855 | 908 | 946 | 1,029 | 7.2% | 1,109 | 1,200 | 1,299 | 1,405 | 1,521 | 1,646 | 1,781 | 1,927 | 2,085 | 2,256 | |||
| - 0 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Operating Profit (EBIT) | 1,811 | 2,077 | 2,439 | 2,759 | 3,053 | 3,220 | 12.2% | 3,401 | 3,680 | 3,982 | 4,309 | 4,663 | 5,045 | 5,460 | 5,908 | 6,393 | 6,918 | |||
| Interest Expense | 116 | 111 | 116 | 95 | 99 | 113 | -0.5% | |||||||||||||
| Non-Operating Income / Expense | 53 | 88 | 60 | 103 | 97 | 90 | 11.2% | |||||||||||||
| Special Items and other | 72 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 0 | 0 | ||||||||||||||
| Pretax Income | 1,714 | 2,054 | 2,383 | 2,750 | 3,051 | 3,197 | 13.3% | |||||||||||||
| Total Income Taxes | 628 | 731 | 841 | 1,000 | 990 | 1,109 | 12.0% | |||||||||||||
| Less | Non-Cont. Int. Adj. | 0 | 20 | 80 | 41 | 22 | 45 | |||||||||||||
| Adjusted Net Income | 1,086 | 1,303 | 1,462 | 1,709 | 2,039 | 2,043 | 13.5% | |||||||||||||
| EPS Basic from Operations | 2.55 | 2.97 | 3.35 | 3.94 | 4.68 | 4.69 | 13.0% | |||||||||||||
| EPS Diluted from Operations | 2.52 | 2.92 | 3.30 | 3.89 | 4.63 | 4.65 | 13.0% | |||||||||||||
| Dividends Per Share | 0.68 | 0.77 | 0.89 | 1.03 | 1.10 | 1.33 | 1.60 | |||||||||||||
| Com Shares for Basic EPS | 433.988 | 438.611 | 436.119 | 433.620 | 435.741 | 438.692 | ||||||||||||||
| Com Shares for Diluted EPS | 440.454 | 445.970 | 443.094 | 439.373 | 440.512 | 442.490 | ||||||||||||||
| NOPAT | 2,210 | 2,392 | 2,588 | 2,801 | 3,031 | 3,280 | 3,549 | 3,840 | 4,155 | 4,497 | ||||||||||
| Depreciation | 1,109 | 1,200 | 1,299 | 1,405 | 1,521 | 1,646 | 1,781 | 1,927 | 2,085 | 2,256 | ||||||||||
| Change in NWC | 46 | 50 | 54 | 59 | 63 | 69 | 74 | 80 | 87 | 94 | CAGR for FCF | |||||||||
| Cap Exp. | 2,340 | 2,532 | 2,740 | 2,965 | 3,209 | 3,472 | 3,757 | 4,066 | 4,399 | 4,761 | 8.21% | |||||||||
| Free cash flow | 933 | 1,010 | 1,093 | 1,182 | 1,279 | 1,384 | 1,498 | 1,621 | 1,754 | 1,898 | 2,054 | |||||||||
| 2025 Terminal Value >>>>>>> | 124,220 | |||||||||||||||||||
| Discount Factor | 0.935 | 0.874 | 0.817 | 0.764 | 0.715 | 0.668 | 0.625 | 0.584 | 0.546 | 0.511 | 0.478 | |||||||||
| Discounted CF | 872 | 883 | 893 | 904 | 914 | 925 | 936 | 947 | 958 | 969 | ||||||||||
| Sum of 1-10 DCF's | 9,202 | |||||||||||||||||||
| Disc. Terminal Value | 59,320 | Sensitivity analysis with WACC and growth rates | ||||||||||||||||||
| Total of all DCF's | 68,523 | |||||||||||||||||||
| Less Debt | 4,929 | |||||||||||||||||||
| Intrinsic Equity Val. | 63,594 | |||||||||||||||||||
| DCF/Share | 144.36 | |||||||||||||||||||
PSMT IS
| Annual Income Statement * | To Be Finalized July 16 2015 | Divd. Growth Model | CAPM | Sales growth | 13.00% | STUDENT ID # | |||||||||||||
| (Millions except for per share) | Divd. Yield | 0.70% | rf | 2.35% | Gross profit margin | 17.00% | |||||||||||||
| gs | 10.59% | Beta | 1.43 | SG&A % of sales | 8.450% | ||||||||||||||
| PRICESMART INC. | Mkt prem | 6.25% | Tax rate | 32.75% | |||||||||||||||
| 9740 Scranton Road | E(Ret) | 11.29% | RRR | 11.29% | NWC % of sales | 1.00% | |||||||||||||
| San Diego, CA 92121 | Equibrium CAPM=DGM Price | $ 100.61 | WACC | 10.76% | |||||||||||||||
| Ticker: PSMT | Market Price 7/16/2015 | $ 100.61 | RADR (WACC + 10%) | 11.84% | |||||||||||||||
| Fiscal Year: 8 | Depr. % Sales | 1.35% | |||||||||||||||||
| Cap. Ex. % Sales | 1.40% | ||||||||||||||||||
| 2009 Aug | 2010 Aug | 2011 Aug | 2012 Aug | 2013 Aug | 2014 Aug | CAGR | Aug-15 | Aug-16 | Aug-17 | Aug-18 | Aug-19 | Aug-20 | Aug-21 | Aug-22 | Aug-23 | 2024 Aug | 2025 | ||
| Sales | 1,252 | 1,396 | 1,714 | 2,051 | 2,300 | 2,518 | 10.4% | 2,845 | 3,215 | 3,633 | 4,106 | 4,639 | 5,242 | 5,924 | 6,694 | 7,564 | 8,548 | ||
| Cost of Goods Sold | 1,034 | 1,160 | 1,431 | 1,719 | 1,929 | 2,114 | 10.7% | 2,362 | 2,669 | 3,016 | 3,408 | 3,851 | 4,351 | 4,917 | 5,556 | 6,278 | 7,094 | ||
| Gross Profit | 217 | 236 | 283 | 332 | 371 | 404 | 8.8% | 484 | 547 | 618 | 698 | 789 | 891 | 1,007 | 1,138 | 1,286 | 1,453 | ||
| Selling, General, & Administrative Exp. | 132 | 146 | 174 | 200 | 218 | 238 | 8.7% | 240 | 272 | 307 | 347 | 392 | 443 | 501 | 566 | 639 | 722 | ||
| Depreciation, Depletion, & Amortization | 14 | 15 | 19 | 24 | 24 | 28 | 11.5% | 38 | 49 | 55 | 63 | 71 | 80 | 90 | 102 | 115 | |||
| Operating Profit (EBIT) | 72 | 75 | 90 | 108 | 129 | 138 | 8.5% | 205 | 275 | 262 | 296 | 334 | 377 | 427 | 482 | 545 | 615 | ||
| Interest Expense | 3 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 4 | |||||||||||||
| Non-Operating Income / Expense | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Special Items and other | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Pretax Income | 68 | 72 | 89 | 103 | 123 | 134 | |||||||||||||
| Total Income Taxes | 19 | 23 | 27 | 35 | 39 | 41 | |||||||||||||
| (Adjustments) | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Adjusted Net Income | 47 | 49 | 62 | 68 | 84 | 93 | |||||||||||||
| EPS Basic from Operations | 1.46 | 1.66 | 2.00 | 2.24 | 2.78 | 3.07 | |||||||||||||
| EPS Diluted from Operations | 1.45 | 1.65 | 2.00 | 2.24 | 2.78 | 3.07 | |||||||||||||
| Dividends Per Share | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.70 | ||||||||||||
| Com Shares for Basic EPS | 28.959 | 29.254 | 29.441 | 29.554 | 29.65 | 29.75 | |||||||||||||
| Com Shares for Diluted EPS | 29.181 | 29.279 | 29.450 | 29.566 | 29.68 | 29.76 | |||||||||||||
| NOPAT | 138 | 185 | 176 | 199 | 225 | 254 | 287 | 324 | 366 | 414 | |||||||||
| Depreciation | 38 | 0 | 49 | 55 | 63 | 71 | 80 | 90 | 102 | 115 | |||||||||
| Change in NWC | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | CAGR for FCF | ||||||||
| Cap Exp. | 40 | 45 | 51 | 57 | 65 | 73 | 83 | 94 | 106 | 120 | 13.00% | ||||||||
| Free cash flow | 133 | 136 | 170 | 192 | 217 | 245 | 277 | 313 | 354 | 400 | 452 | ||||||||
| 2025 Terminal Value >>>>>>> | 5,416 | ||||||||||||||||||
| Discount Factor | 0.903 | 0.815 | 0.736 | 0.664 | 0.600 | 0.542 | 0.489 | 0.442 | 0.399 | 0.360 | 0.325 | ||||||||
| Discounted CF | 120 | 111 | 125 | 128 | 130 | 133 | 135 | 138 | 141 | 144 | |||||||||
| Sum of 1-10 DCF's | 1,305 | ||||||||||||||||||
| Disc. Terminal Value | 1,760 | Sensitivity analysis with WACC and growth rates | |||||||||||||||||
| Total of all DCF's | 3,065 | ||||||||||||||||||
| Less Debt | 90 | ||||||||||||||||||
| Intrinsic Equity Val. | 2,975 | ||||||||||||||||||
| DCF/Share | 100.63 |
Combined IS
| Combined Pro Forma Income Statement - Projections Assuming Costco Acquires PriceSmart | ||||||||||||||
| Assumptions: | Sales growth | 8.42% | Gs | 6.0835% | Fill in your 10 assumptions about positive or negative | |||||||||
| Gross profit margin | 12.80% | synergy by changing any of the cells shaded in blue to the left. | ||||||||||||
| SG&A % of sales | 8.88% | Weights | <<<<==== | |||||||||||
| Tax rate | 34.90% | 0.95531 | COST | |||||||||||
| NWC % of sales | 0.52% | 0.04469 | PSMT | |||||||||||
| WACC | 7.12% | |||||||||||||
| RADR (WACC + 10%) | 7.83% | |||||||||||||
| Depr. % Sales | 0.93% | |||||||||||||
| Cap. Ex. % Sales | 1.90% | |||||||||||||
| Aug-15 | Aug-16 | Aug-17 | Aug-18 | Aug-19 | Aug-20 | Aug-21 | Aug-22 | Aug-23 | 2024 Aug | CAGR | 2025 | |||
| Sales | 124,733 | 135,241 | 146,633 | 158,986 | 172,379 | 186,900 | 202,645 | 219,716 | 238,225 | 258,293 | 8.42% | |||
| Cost of Goods Sold | 108,771 | 117,934 | 127,869 | 138,641 | 150,320 | 162,983 | 176,713 | 191,600 | 207,740 | 225,241 | 8.42% | |||
| Gross Profit | 15,962 | 17,306 | 18,764 | 20,345 | 22,059 | 23,917 | 25,932 | 28,116 | 30,485 | 33,053 | 8.42% | |||
| Selling, General, & Administrative Exp. | 11,076 | 12,009 | 13,021 | 14,118 | 15,307 | 16,597 | 17,995 | 19,511 | 21,154 | 22,936 | 8.42% | |||
| Depreciation, Depletion, & Amortization | 1,160 | 1,257 | 1,363 | 1,478 | 1,603 | 1,738 | 1,884 | 2,043 | 2,215 | 2,401 | 8.42% | |||
| Operating Profit (EBIT) | 3,726 | 4,040 | 4,380 | 4,749 | 5,149 | 5,583 | 6,053 | 6,563 | 7,116 | 7,715 | 8.42% | |||
| NOPAT | 2,426 | 2,630 | 2,851 | 3,092 | 3,352 | 3,634 | 3,941 | 4,273 | 4,633 | 5,023 | 8.42% | |||
| Depreciation | 1,160 | 1,257 | 1,363 | 1,478 | 1,603 | 1,738 | 1,884 | 2,043 | 2,215 | 2,401 | 8.42% | |||
| Change in NWC | 92 | 55 | 60 | 65 | 70 | 76 | 82 | 89 | 97 | 105 | 1.52% | |||
| CapEx | 2,366 | 2,565 | 2,781 | 3,016 | 3,270 | 3,545 | 3,844 | 4,167 | 4,519 | 4,899 | 8.42% | |||
| Free cash flow | 1,128 | 1,267 | 1,374 | 1,490 | 1,615 | 1,751 | 1,899 | 2,059 | 2,232 | 2,420 | 8.85% | 2,634 | ||
| 119,559 | ||||||||||||||
| Discount factor | 0.934 | 0.871 | 0.814 | 0.759 | 0.709 | 0.662 | 0.618 | 0.577 | 0.538 | 0.503 | ||||
| Discounted CF | 1,053 | 1,104 | 1,118 | 1,131 | 1,145 | 1,159 | 1,173 | 1,187 | 1,202 | 1,216 | ||||
| Sum of DCF yrs 1-10) | 11,489 | |||||||||||||
| DCF of terminal perp. | 60,099 | |||||||||||||
| Total of all DCFs | 71,588 | |||||||||||||
| Less Debt | 5,019 | |||||||||||||
| Intrinsic Equity Value | 66,569 | |||||||||||||
| DCF per share | 150.4414107145 | |||||||||||||
| Total Shares | 442.490 | |||||||||||||
| costco is 19 times bigger than coscto |
Summary
| Present value of Costco (PV-C) | 63,594 | July 16 2015 | STUDENT ID # | ||||||
| NOTE: All numbers in millions of USD. | |||||||||
| Present value of Pricesmart (PV-P) | 2,975 | ||||||||
| PV of C and P alone | 66,569 | Baseline value to exceed | separate | ||||||
| Present value of C & P Combined (PV-C&P) | 66,569 | Synergies included here (revenue, costs, efficiency, etc.) | together | ||||||
| Gain in value with synergies | -0 | ||||||||
| % gain | -0.0% | ||||||||
| Cash to be paid for PriceSmart | 3,868 | Premium = 30% (if PV = market value) (change if you like) | |||||||
| Premium Cost (cash paid - PV-PS) | 893 | ||||||||
| Overall NPV (+ gain or - loss) | (893) |
Sheet1
related files/469290633.pdf
McKinsey on Finance
Number 36, Summer 2010
Perspectives on Corporate Finance and Strategy
Why Asia’s banks underperform at M&A
21
Five ways CFOs can make cost cuts stick
25
The right way to hedge
32
A singular moment for merger value?
8
The five types of successful acquisitions
2
McKinsey conversations with global leaders: David Rubenstein of The Carlyle Group
10
2
There is no magic formula to make acquisitions
successful. Like any other business process, they
are not inherently good or bad, just as marketing
and R&D aren’t. Each deal must have its own
strategic logic. In our experience, acquirers in the
most successful deals have specific, well-
articulated value creation ideas going in. For less
successful deals, the strategic rationales—such as
pursuing international scale, filling portfolio gaps,
or building a third leg of the portfolio—tend to be
vague.
Empirical analysis of specific acquisition strategies
offers limited insight, largely because of the wide
variety of types and sizes of acquisitions and the
lack of an objective way to classify them by
strategy. What’s more, the stated strategy may not
Marc Goedhart,
Tim Koller,
and David Wessels
The five types of successful acquisitions
even be the real one: companies typically talk up
all kinds of strategic benefits from acquisitions that
are really entirely about cost cutting. In the
absence of empirical research, our suggestions for
strategies that create value reflect our acquisitions
work with companies.
In our experience, the strategic rationale for an
acquisition that creates value typically conforms to
at least one of the following five archetypes:
improving the performance of the target company,
removing excess capacity from an industry,
creating market access for products, acquiring
skills or technologies more quickly or at lower cost
than they could be built in-house, and picking
winners early and helping them develop their
businesses. If an acquisition does not fit one or
Companies advance myriad strategies for creating value with acquisitions—but only
a handful are likely to do so.
3
more of these archetypes, it’s unlikely to create
value. Executives, of course, often justify
acquisitions by choosing from a much broader
menu of strategies, including roll-ups,
consolidating to improve competitive behavior,
transformational mergers, and buying cheap.
While these strategies can create value, we find
that they seldom do. Value-minded executives
should view them with a gimlet eye.
Five archetypes
An acquisition’s strategic rationale should be a
specific articulation of one of these archetypes,
not a vague concept like growth or strategic
positioning, which may be important but must be
translated into something more tangible.
Furthermore, even if your acquisition is based on
one of the archetypes below, it won’t create value
if you overpay.
Improve the target company’s performance
Improving the performance of the target company
is one of the most common value-creating
acquisition strategies. Put simply, you buy a
company and radically reduce costs to improve
margins and cash flows. In some cases, the acquirer
may also take steps to accelerate revenue growth.
Pursuing this strategy is what the best private-
equity firms do. Among successful private-equity
acquisitions in which a target company was
bought, improved, and sold, with no additional
acquisitions along the way, operating-profit
margins increased by an average of about
2.5 percentage points more than those at peer
companies during the same period. This means
that many of the transactions increased
operating-profit margins even more.
Keep in mind that it is easier to improve the
performance of a company with low margins and
low returns on invested capital (ROIC) than that
of a high-margin, high-ROIC company. Consider a
target company with a 6 percent operating-profit
margin. Reducing costs by three percentage points,
to 91 percent of revenues, from 94 percent,
increases the margin to 9 percent and could lead to
a 50 percent increase in the company’s value. In
contrast, if the operating-profit margin of a
company is 30 percent, increasing its value by
50 percent requires increasing the margin to
45 percent. Costs would need to decline from
70 percent of revenues to 55 percent, a 21 percent
reduction in the cost base. That might not be
reasonable to expect.
Consolidate to remove excess capacity from
industry
As industries mature, they typically develop excess
capacity. In chemicals, for example, companies are
constantly looking for ways to get more production
out of their plants, while new competitors continue
to enter the industry. For example, Saudi Basic
Industries Corporation (SABIC), which began
production in the mid-1980s, grew from 6.3 million
metric tons of value-added commodities—such as
chemicals, polymers, and fertilizers—in 1985 to
56 million tons in 2008. Now one of the world’s
largest petrochemicals concerns, SABIC expects
continued growth, estimating its annual
production to reach 135 million tons by 2020.
The combination of higher production from
existing capacity and new capacity from recent
entrants often generates more supply than demand.
It is in no individual competitor’s interest to shut a
plant, however. Companies often find it easier to
shut plants across the larger combined entity
resulting from an acquisition than to shut their
least productive plants without one and end up
with a smaller company.
Reducing excess in an industry can also extend to
less tangible forms of capacity. Consolidation in
4 McKinsey on Finance Number 36, Summer 2010
the pharmaceutical industry, for example, has
significantly reduced the capacity of the sales force
as the product portfolios of merged companies
change and they rethink how to interact with
doctors. Pharmaceutical companies have also
significantly reduced their R&D capacity as they
found more productive ways to conduct research
and pruned their portfolios of development
projects.
While there is substantial value to be created from
removing excess capacity, as in most M&A activity
the bulk of the value often accrues to the seller’s
shareholders, not the buyer’s.
Accelerate market access for the target’s (or
buyer’s) products
Often, relatively small companies with innovative
products have difficulty reaching the entire
potential market for their products. Small
pharmaceutical companies, for example, typically
lack the large sales forces required to cultivate
relationships with the many doctors they need to
promote their products. Bigger pharmaceutical
companies sometimes purchase these smaller
companies and use their own large-scale sales
forces to accelerate the sales of the smaller
companies’ products.
IBM, for instance, has pursued this strategy in its
software business. From 2002 to 2009, it acquired
70 companies for about $14 billion. By pushing
their products through a global sales force, IBM
estimates it increased their revenues by almost
50 percent in the first two years after each
acquisition and an average of more than 10 percent
in the next three years.
In some cases, the target can also help accelerate
the acquirer’s revenue growth. In Procter &
Gamble’s acquisition of Gillette, the combined
company benefited because P&G had stronger
sales in some emerging markets, Gillette in others.
Working together, they introduced their products
into new markets much more quickly.
Get skills or technologies faster or at lower cost
than they can be built
Cisco Systems has used acquisitions to close gaps
in its technologies, allowing it to assemble a broad
line of networking products and to grow very
quickly from a company with a single product line
into the key player in Internet equipment. From
1993 to 2001, Cisco acquired 71 companies, at an
average price of approximately $350 million.
Cisco’s sales increased from $650 million in 1993
to $22 billion in 2001, with nearly 40 percent
of its 2001 revenue coming directly from these
acquisitions. By 2009, Cisco had more than
$36 billion in revenues and a market cap of
approximately $150 billion.
Pick winners early and help them develop their
businesses
The final winning strategy involves making
acquisitions early in the life cycle of a new industry
or product line, long before most others recognize
that it will grow significantly. Johnson & Johnson
pursued this strategy in its early acquisitions of
medical-device businesses. When J&J bought
device manufacturer Cordis, in 1996, Cordis had
$500 million in revenues. By 2007, its revenues
had increased to $3.8 billion, reflecting a 20 percent
annual growth rate. J&J purchased orthopedic-
device manufacturer DePuy in 1998, when DePuy
had $900 million in revenues. By 2007, they had
grown to $4.6 billion, also at an annual growth
rate of 20 percent.
This acquisition strategy requires a disciplined
approach by management in three dimensions.
First, you must be willing to make investments
early, long before your competitors and the market
see the industry’s or company’s potential. Second,
5The five types of successful acquisitions
you need to make multiple bets and to expect that
some will fail. Third, you need the skills and
patience to nurture the acquired businesses.
Harder strategies
Beyond the five main acquisition strategies we’ve
explored, a handful of others can create value,
though in our experience they do so relatively
rarely.
Roll-up strategy
Roll-up strategies consolidate highly fragmented
markets where the current competitors are too
small to achieve scale economies. Beginning in the
1960s, Service Corporation International, for
instance, grew from a single funeral home in
Houston to more than 1,400 funeral homes and
cemeteries in 2008. Similarly, Clear Channel
Communications rolled up the US market for radio
stations, eventually owning more than 900.
This strategy works when businesses as a group
can realize substantial cost savings or achieve
higher revenues than individual businesses can.
Service Corporation’s funeral homes in a given city
can share vehicles, purchasing, and back-office
operations, for example. They can also coordinate
advertising across a city to reduce costs and raise
revenues.
Size per se is not what creates a successful roll-up;
what matters is the right kind of size. For Service
Corporation, multiple locations in individual cities
have been more important than many branches
spread over many cities, because the cost savings
(such as sharing vehicles) can be realized only if
the branches are near one another. Roll-up
strategies are hard to disguise, so they invite
copycats. As others tried to imitate Service
Corporation’s strategy, prices for some funeral
homes were eventually bid up to levels that made
additional acquisitions uneconomic.
Consolidate to improve competitive behavior
Many executives in highly competitive industries
hope consolidation will lead competitors to focus
6 McKinsey on Finance Number 36, Summer 2010
less on price competition, thereby improving the
ROIC of the industry. The evidence shows, however,
that unless it consolidates to just three or four
companies and can keep out new entrants, pricing
behavior doesn’t change: smaller businesses or new
entrants often have an incentive to gain share
through lower prices. So in an industry with, say,
ten companies, lots of deals must be done before
the basis of competition changes.
Enter into a transformational merger
A commonly mentioned reason for an acquisition
or merger is the desire to transform one or both
companies. Transformational mergers are rare,
however, because the circumstances have to be just
right, and the management team needs to execute
the strategy well.
Transformational mergers can best be described by
example. One of the world’s leading
pharmaceutical companies, Switzerland’s Novartis,
was formed in 1996 by the $30 billion merger of
Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz. But this merger was much
more than a simple combination of businesses:
under the leadership of the new CEO, Daniel
Vasella, Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz were transformed
into an entirely new company. Using the merger as
a catalyst for change, Vasella and his management
team not only captured $1.4 billion in cost
synergies but also redefined the company’s
mission, strategy, portfolio, and organization, as
well as all key processes, from research to sales. In
every area, there was no automatic choice for either
the Ciba or the Sandoz way of doing things; instead,
the organization made a systematic effort to find
the best way.
Novartis shifted its strategic focus to innovation in
its life sciences business (pharmaceuticals,
nutrition, and products for agriculture) and spun
off the $7 billion Ciba Specialty Chemicals
business in 1997. Organizational changes included
structuring R&D worldwide by therapeutic rather
than geographic area, enabling Novartis to build a
world-leading oncology franchise.
Across all departments and management layers,
Novartis created a strong performance-oriented
culture supported by shifting from a seniority- to a
performance-based compensation system for
managers.
Buy cheap
The final way to create value from an acquisition is
to buy cheap—in other words, at a price below a
company’s intrinsic value. In our experience,
however, such opportunities are rare and relatively
small. Nonetheless, though market values revert to
intrinsic values over longer periods, there can be
brief moments when the two fall out of alignment.
Markets, for example, sometimes overreact to
negative news, such as a criminal investigation of
an executive or the failure of a single product in a
portfolio with many strong ones.
Such moments are less rare in cyclical industries,
where assets are often undervalued at the bottom
of a cycle. Comparing actual market valuations
with intrinsic values based on a “perfect foresight”
model, we found that companies in cyclical
industries could more than double their
shareholder returns (relative to actual returns) if
they acquired assets at the bottom of a cycle and
sold at the top.
While markets do throw up occasional
opportunities for companies to buy targets at levels
below their intrinsic value, we haven’t seen many
cases. To gain control of a target, acquirers must
pay its shareholders a premium over the current
market value. Although premiums can vary widely,
the average ones for corporate control have been
7The five types of successful acquisitions
fairly stable: almost 30 percent of the
preannouncement price of the target’s equity. For
targets pursued by multiple acquirers, the
premium rises dramatically, creating the so-called
winner’s curse. If several companies evaluate a
given target and all identify roughly the same
potential synergies, the pursuer that overestimates
them most will offer the highest price. Since it is
based on an overestimation of the value to be
created, the winner pays too much—and is
ultimately a loser.
Since market values can sometimes deviate from
intrinsic ones, management must also beware the
possibility that markets may be overvaluing a
potential acquisition. Consider the stock market
bubble during the late 1990s. Companies that
merged with or acquired technology, media, or
telecommunications businesses saw their share
prices plummet when the market reverted to
earlier levels. The possibility that a company might
pay too much when the market is inflated deserves
serious consideration, because M&A activity seems
to rise following periods of strong market
performance. If (and when) prices are artificially
high, large improvements are necessary to justify
an acquisition, even when the target can be
purchased at no premium to market value.
Premiums for private deals tend to be smaller,
although comprehensive evidence is difficult to
collect because publicly available data are scarce.
Private acquisitions often stem from the seller’s
desire to get out rather than the buyer’s desire
for a purchase.
By focusing on the types of acquisition strategies
that have created value for acquirers in the past,
managers can make it more likely that their
acquisitions will create value for their shareholders.
1 Viral V. Acharya, Moritz Hahn, and Conor Kehoe, “Corporate governance and value creation: Evidence from private equity,” Social Science Research Network Working Paper, February 19, 2010.
2 IBM investor briefing, May 12, 2010 (www.ibm.com/investor/ events/investor0510/presentation/pres3.pdf).
3 Marco de Heer and Timothy M. Koller, “Valuing cyclical companies,” mckinseyquarterly.com, May 2000.
4 Kevin Rock, “Why new issues are underpriced,” Journal of Financial Economics, 1986, Volume 15, Number 1–2, pp. 187–212.
Marc Goedhart ([email protected]) is a consultant in McKinsey’s Amsterdam office, Tim Koller
([email protected]) is a partner in the New York office, and David Wessels, an alumnus of the New York
office, is an adjunct professor of finance at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School. This article is excerpted
from Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart, and David Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies (fifth
edition, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, August 2010). Tim Koller is also coauthor, with Richard Dobbs and Bill
Huyett, of a forthcoming managers’ guide to value creation, titled Value: The Four Cornerstones of Corporate Finance
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, October 2010). Copyright © 2010 McKinsey & Company. All rights reserved.
related files/485230635.docx
Good Financial Analysts Are Made, Not Born
They probably won’t know what effective analysis looks like when they show up for work, so CFOs have to teach them. Here’s how.
CFOs who are looking to expand their roster of financial analysts, and not finding as many high-quality ones as they want, perhaps should assign some of the blame to themselves.
Rather than simply seek top talent, companies should also impose “rules of engagement” on those they hire that are likely to result in superior-quality analysis, according to the Corporate Executive Board (CEB), a membership-based research organization.
Many finance teams struggle to define the skills and behaviors that will deliver effective analytic support, CEB says. They often use generic descriptions of desired analyst skills, such as “thinks critically,” “influences business partners,” or “fosters innovation.” As a result, they may inadequately develop their financial-planning-and-analysis (FP&A) staffs.
The best companies, CEB says, describe more specific behaviors and techniques they want their analysts to demonstrate, such as “challenges conventional ideas in both group and one-on-one settings,” “proposes clear action steps,” and “focuses on cause-and-effect relationships between observable factors.”
“Financial analysts may come out of MBA or undergrad programs with good, finance-oriented analytical toolboxes, but they don’t necessarily have a good sense for how to produce analysis that’s easily consumable by senior executives and business partners,” says Tim Raiswell, a senior research director for the CEB Finance Leadership Council. “One thing that differentiates great organizations is having rules of engagement for what good analysis and a good analytic process look like.”
For example, CFOs could have a rule that they won’t even look at an analyst’s report unless it begins with the one thing they need to take away from the analysis or actions the company or business lines should take as a result of the analyst’s findings.
CEB came to its insights through qualitative research that consisted largely of extensive interviews with 70 corporate FP&A heads, as well as academics and consultants. Based on that research, it recommends a methodology for analysts to follow that it calls “insight as a process,” which consists of three key principles.
The first principle is that all analysis should include both inductive and deductive elements. Inductive analysis, also called pattern analysis, involves seeing patterns in data and inferring cause-and-effect relationships between different data points. Deductive analysis starts with an expectation based on previous experience, like “three months after housing sales start to increase, we see sales of our products increase,” and assesses whether that relationship might be changing and should be retested.
“If, say, you favor inductive analysis, so that you base every analysis on looking for new trends, you may miss something important by not using deductive tools that look at historical trends and rules that have helped in the past for the same type of analysis,” says Raiswell.
The second principle is that all analysis should start with a hypothesis. Without one, the analysis will lack focus, and it will take longer to arrive at a useful conclusion. A hypothesis would be, “The three-month sales lag relative to housing starts no longer applies because consumers have less access to credit now.” Whether the hypothesis is proven or not, something will be learned.
A good hypothesis, CEB says, has three characteristics. First, it is testable. If there is not strong-enough data to perform a test, the hypothesis is pointless. Second, it is fragile. If the hypothesis is a rock-solid theory of what you believe to be true already, you will never see beyond conventional wisdom, which is the point of most financial analysis. Third, a hypothesis should be clear. If it requires a PhD in finance to understand it, start over again, the council advises. “The clearer the hypothesis is, the clearer the final work will be,” says Raiswell.
Similarly, the third principle of the “insight as a process” scheme is to apply Occam’s razor, a philosophical tenet that holds that when there are competing theories, it is best to first examine the simplest one — the one that makes the fewest assumptions.
“If your hypothesis is testable, fragile, and clear, you’ll find out pretty quickly if the simplest theory is not the correct one,” Raiswell says. “Financial analysts tend to be enthralled by complex concepts. It’s easy to get caught up in an idea like ‘the reason customers aren’t buying isn’t because they can’t get credit but because of this crazy new reason I think I’ve uncovered.’ Analysts should be reminded to at least kick the tires on the simple explanation before going to higher levels of complexity. They should remember why they’re doing what they’re doing: someone will consume their analysis and potentially act on it.”
From CFO.com, June, 20, 2012 / US
FP&A Peril: Too Much Data, Too Little Judgment
Financial planning and analysis staff can’t begin to give CFOs what they want until they learn to apply more subjectivity in their analyses.
April 23, 2012 | CFO.com | US
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Financial planning and analysis (FP&A) teams that want as much data at their fingertips as possible yet insist on using only “perfect” data in their analyses are unlikely to provide the kind of actionable insight many CFOs seek from those teams, a new report suggests.
The desired level of insight can come only from financial planners who incorporate more judgment into their analyses and fewer raw numbers, according to the CEB Financial Planning & Analysis Leadership Council, a new program of the Corporate Executive Board, or CEB. (To understand common FP&A challenges, the council performed qualitative analyses based on extensive interviews with 70 corporate FP&A heads as well as academics and consultants. It also did some quantitative, survey-based research.)
Poor financial analyses may stem in part from overly detailed analyses that consume too much time. “When you give people too much information, they actually underperform,” says CEB executive director Michael Griffin. “There is more and more data coming in. But that doesn’t make it any easier for FP&A teams to deliver actionable insight to their business partners.”
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On the other hand, other potential slip-ups occur when qualitative or external inputs are used when hard, internal data is unavailable or imperfect.
Such failures disappoint CFOs. To their credit, the leaders of FP&A teams willingly point the finger at themselves. Only 29% of those surveyed say they consistently deliver insights about the business. The rest say they sometimes or never do that.
The difference between those two groups lies mainly in the degree of willingness to use subjective judgment to illuminate or discount what the raw numbers seem to say. In a separate survey of 444 finance employees of all types, the CEB found that 37% were “informed skeptics,” who apply judgment to their analyses and are comfortable with dissent and listening to other viewpoints.
Those are the preferred type of staffers, flanked by two extremes: “unquestioning empiricists” (44% of respondents), who trust data over judgment and value consensus, and “visceral decision makers” (19%), who seldom trust analysis and make decisions unilaterally.
That “unquestioning empiricists” comprise the largest of the three groups is hardly surprising, Griffin says: “Finance folks are very comfortable with data, but less so with the application of judgment into the data.”
The “informed skeptics,” on the other hand, possess the relevant skills for decoding large amounts of data, managing ambiguity, and using judgment to influence their analyses, the CEB writes.
“Unfortunately,” its report says, “there are a relatively small number of these analytic experts, constraining the scope and depth of analytic capabilities across finance. As such, FP&A teams’ greatest risk comes from too much data, not too little.”
The insight deficit not only limits finance’s influence on the business, it also has a measurable negative impact on financial performance. The FP&A teams under the 70 leaders surveyed in the latest research were divided into what the CEB assessed as analytically mature and low-performing ones, and the former enjoyed a 6% premium on total shareholder return.
With judgment playing such a critical role in analytics, the CEB defines what it sees as the five elements of judgment and in what ways they should be incorporated into FP&A:
■ Synthesizing diverse data. Integrate into the analysis both qualitative and quantitative data, as well as external viewpoints.
■ Inferring trends. Distinguish patterns that are relevant from those that are not; identify risks and opportunities based on data analysis.
■ Generating insight. Isolate actionable and noteworthy implications, and teach managers something new about their business.
■ Redirecting poor business assumptions. Surface key biases and assumptions that affect the results of data analysis; identify and size the impact of environmental factors that may not be reflected in the data.
■ Influencing business decisions. Deliver controversial messages comfortably and with authority; clarify decision trade-offs to internal customers.
The CEB identified three broad take-aways from its research. First, stop relying on boilerplate performance-review criteria that were created for finance generalists. Instead, tailor the FP&A competency model by clearly defining analytic skills and behaviors that are unique to that discipline and lead to insight generation.
Second, identify key decision points where FP&A can cut down on unnecessary, non-value-added work, and establish protocols for analysts to collaborate with business partners. Finally, don’t spend much time looking for the perfect data or analysis to answer business questions. Teach analysts to make smarter trade-offs between timeliness and accuracy by setting guidelines about what types of decisions or projects require perfection versus those that require only directional analysis.
3
related files/594412749.pdf
Earnings multiples, particularly the price-
to-earnings (P/E) ratio, are a common shorthand
for summarizing how the stock market values
a company. The media often use them for quick
comparisons between companies. Investors
and analysts use them when talking about how
they value companies.
That there are generally more detailed models
behind the shorthand seldom makes the headlines,
and this contributes to a problem: executives
who worry that their multiple should be higher
than the one the market currently awards
them. “We have great growth plans,” they say, or
“We’re the best company in the industry, so
we should have a substantially higher earnings
multiple.” Their logic isn’t necessarily wrong.
Finance theory does suggest that companies with
higher expected growth and returns on capital
should have higher multiples. And the theory held
true when we analyzed large samples of compa-
nies across the economy.
However, within mature industries, our analysis
showed that regardless of performance, multiples
vary little among true peers. Companies may
occasionally outperform their competitors, but
industry-wide trends show a convergence of
growth and returns that is so striking as to make it
difficult for investors, on average, to predict
which companies will do so. As a result, a com-
pany’s multiples are largely uncontrollable.
A premium multiple is hard to come by and harder to keep. Executives should worry
more about improving performance.
Why bad multiples happen to good companies
Susan Nolen Foushee,
Tim Koller,
and Anand Mehta
M AY 2 0 12
c o r p o r a t e f i n a n c e p r a c t i c e
2
Managers would be better off focusing instead
on growth and return on capital, which they can
influence. Doing so will improve the company’s
share price, even if it doesn’t result in a multiple
higher than those of its peers.
The trouble with multiples
Many executives who worry that their multiples
are too low are simply comparing their company
with the wrong set of peers. In one case, we
found that executives were comparing their com-
pany’s earnings multiple with those for a set
of companies in a faster-growing segment of the
market than their own. While the company
aspired to shift more activity to this segment, its
current level of activity was generating less
than 10 percent of its revenues at the time of the
analysis. Because investors evaluate companies
based on what they are, rather than what they
aspire to be, the multiples analysis was flawed. The
only relevant comparable companies, for
the purposes of multiples analysis, are those that
compete in the same markets, are subject to
the same set of macroeconomic forces, and have
similar growth and returns on capital.
Some multiples are also better than others for
comparing performance. Ubiquitous as the
P/E ratio is, it is distorted in its traditional form
by differences in capital structure and other
non-operating items. For example, as Exhibit 1
illustrates, when one company is financed
partially with debt and the other is financed only
with equity, the one with higher debt will have
a lower P/E ratio, all else being equal, even though
they have the same ratio of enterprise value to
Exhibit 1 Leverage distorts P/E multiples.
MoF 43 2012 Multiples Exhibit 1 of 3
Company with debt
Company with only equity
1 Price-to-earnings ratio. 2Earnings before interest, taxes, and amortization.
The operations of 2 companies are equivalent, except that 1 is financed partially with debt and the other is financed only with equity
In this example (which excludes taxes), the company with higher debt will have a lower P/E1 ratio
50 50Earnings (EBITA2)
–20 0Interest
30 50Net income
1,000 1,000Enterprise value (EV)
–500 0Debt
500 1,000Market capitalization
20.0x 20.0xEV/EBITA
25.0x N/ADebt/interest
16.7x 20.0xP/E ratio
3
earnings. As a result, most sophisticated investors
and bankers compare companies relative to peers
using an enterprise-value multiple1—usually either
EV/EBITA or EV/EBITDA.2 Such multiples are
preferable because they are not burdened with the
distortions that affect earnings ratios.
Yet comparisons based on enterprise-value
multiples typically reveal a very narrow range of
peer-company multiples. A closer look at the
US consumer-packaged-goods industry is illustra-
tive. From 1965 to 2010, the difference in
EV/EBITA multiples between top- and bottom-
quartile companies was, for the most part,3 less
than four points, even though the industry is
fairly diverse, including companies that manufac-
ture and sell everything from household
cleaners to soft drinks. When we examined more
closely matched peers at a given point in time,
we found even narrower ranges: for a sample of
branded-food companies, for example,
EV/EBITA multiples ranged from 10.6 to 11.4.
For medical-device companies, the range
was 8.4 to 9.7. In ranges this narrow, any differ-
Exhibit 2 Outperforming peers on revenue growth can be difficult to sustain.
MoF 43 2012 Multiples Exhibit 2 of 3
US nonfinancial companies1 grouped by comparable revenue growth at time of portfolio formation
Median portfolio growth, %
Growth rate at portfolio formation
Years since inception of portfolio
1 Companies with inflation-adjusted revenue ≥$200 million that were publicly listed from 1963–2000. We divided companies into 5 portfolios based on their growth rate at the midpoint of each decade (1965, 1975, 1985, and 1995). We then aligned the portfolios chronologically from Year 0 to Year 15 and compared their median growth rates.
Source: Compustat; McKinsey analysis
35
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 151
30
0
25
20
15
10
5
–5
0
>20%
15–20%
10–15%
5–10%
<5%
4
ences between true peers at a given point
in time are typically unremarkable. A company’s
position in the ranking is likely to be quite
variable simply as a result of normal share-
price fluctuations.
One explanation for the narrow range of multi-
ples is that investors, as a population, tend
to assume that all peers will grow at roughly the
same rate. Whether or not executives think
this is reasonable, the evidence is on the side of the
investors. Companies that are growing faster
than their peers today are not likely to continue
growing faster than their peers for the next
five years. Across the economy, we have found
substantial convergence of revenue growth
across companies (Exhibit 2). Even energetic
efforts to communicate to investors that a
company will grow faster probably won’t help,
since almost all companies predict they will
outgrow their market.4 And while equity analysts
sometimes forecast that companies will grow
at different rates, investors know that analysts are
consistently overly bullish as well.5
According to finance theory, companies with
higher returns on capital than their peers should
also have higher multiples—but in fact, these
companies’ multiples are not as high as one might
expect if investors believed their stronger
returns were sustainable. As with revenue growth,
the logic could be that investors assume that
incremental returns on capital across the industry
will converge or that competition will bring
them down toward the cost of capital. Once again,
the investors have some evidence on their side,
Exhibit 3 Investors may be skeptical of high ROICs that exclude goodwill.
MoF 43 2012 Multiples Exhibit 3 of 3
Example of US packaged-goods companies,1 n = 109
Without goodwill
With goodwill
Median return on invested capital (ROIC), %
+17 percentage points
1 Companies with real annual revenue >$1 billion for any year between 1962 and 2009; excludes companies with ROIC >10%, with or without goodwill.
34
32
1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2009
30
28
26
24
22
18
16
14
12
10
20
5
and the packaged-goods industry is illustrative
(Exhibit 3). To be sure, the power of their brands
has helped companies in the industry increase
their operating returns on capital over the past
15 years. But operating returns exclude an
important piece of the balance sheet—the premi-
ums over book value paid in acquisitions, or
goodwill. Some companies in the industry have
used the cash flow that comes from having
high return on invested capital to make acquisitions
with lower return on capital. As a result, the
industry median return on all capital including
goodwill has remained within a tight band,
between 15 and 19 percent. Investors as a whole
appear to assume that acquisitions will con-
tinue to eat away at returns on capital. And they
tar all companies in the sector with the same
brush. Companies might argue that they are more
disciplined than their peers, but investors aren’t
buying it.
There are exceptions, of course, among a few
companies with a truly durable competitive
advantage. For example, from the mid-1980s to the
middle of the last decade, Wal-Mart’s unique
business model earned it premium multiples as it
consistently posted double-digit top-line
growth, far higher than for most other retailers.
But today, Wal-Mart has become so large that
it is less likely to outgrow the economy, and its
multiple has fallen into line with those of
its peers. Starbucks, similarly, earned premium
multiples for over a decade beginning in the
mid-1990s, during a period of rapid expansion.
But as its rate of store openings and top-line growth
have slowed, its multiple has also fallen.
Keeping the focus on value
Of course, not all investors will be so skeptical
about a company’s ability to outperform its peers.
After examining the company’s track record,
its competitive position, strategy, management
strength, and credibility, sophisticated investors—
including those we have elsewhere called
intrinsic investors6—do place their bets that some
companies will outperform others. These
investors are looking to purchase the shares at an
attractive price and minimize their downside
risk. Sometimes they turn out to be right, though
they may not have enough buying power to
push the companies’ multiples to a sustainable
premium to peers. And in fact, they are likely
to stop purchasing if share prices rise to include
even a small premium.
Clearly, executives focused on having the highest
multiple are missing the point. Rather, as
companies with high total returns to shareholders
(TRS) know, executives should focus on the
amount of value they create—with regard to growth,
margins, and capital productivity. Doing so
won’t necessarily lead to a higher earnings multiple,
given the trends we have outlined. Take, for
example, the TRS of US household-products manu-
As companies with high total returns to shareholders know, executives should focus on the amount of value they create—with regard to growth, margins, and capital productivity
6
facturer Church & Dwight compared with the
broader consumer-goods sector. Over a 15-year
period, the company grew, both organically and
through acquisitions, as it effected a turn-
around and reshaped its portfolio of businesses.
The company’s EBITA margins increased
by 13.9 percentage points, compared with only
2.5 percentage points for the median company
in the sector, and its TRS beat the sector and the
S&P 500 handily—yet its earnings multiple
fell from 16 to 10. This is likely because its multiple
had been high at the outset, in spite of low
earnings, suggesting that investors had assumed
earnings would gravitate toward the median
for the sector.
Finally, executives should have realistic expec-
tations about how much they can raise their share
price above those of peers through investor
communications. Although such communications
seem like a natural first step if investors truly
fail to see the value in, for example, a company’s
product pipeline or geographic expansion,
jawboning has its limits. Eventually, investors as
a group are likely to revert once again to their
perceptions of convergence. That doesn’t mean
companies should abandon communications
entirely. Communicating with the right investors,
and making sure they understand the com-
pany’s performance and strategies, can at least
keep a company’s share price aligned
with peers’.
Susan Nolen Foushee ([email protected]) is a senior expert in McKinsey’s New York office,
where Tim Koller ([email protected]) is a partner and Anand Mehta ([email protected]) is
a consultant. Copyright © 2012 McKinsey & Company. All rights reserved.
1 For a discussion of enterprise-value multiples, see Richard Dobbs, Bill Huyett, and Tim Koller, Value: The Four Cornerstones of Corporate Finance, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010, pp. 241–4.
2 For more on how to choose the right multiple, see Marc Goedhart, Tim Koller, and David Wessels, “The right role for multiples in valuation,” McKinsey on Finance, Number 15, Spring 2005, pp. 7–11.
3 In the late 1990s, the multiples of the largest consumer- packaged-goods companies rose during the overall valuation boom for big companies.
4 See Peggy Hsieh, Tim Koller, and S. R. Rajan, “The misguided practice of earnings guidance,” McKinsey on Finance, Number 19, Spring 2006, pp. 1–5.
5 See Marc Goedhart, Rishi Raj, and Abhishek Saxena, “Equity analysts: Still too bullish,” McKinsey on Finance, Number 35, Spring 2010, pp. 14–7.
6 See Robert Palter, Werner Rehm, and Jonathan Shih, “Communicating with the right investors,” McKinsey on Finance, Number 27, Spring 2008, pp. 1–5.