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Globalization, Culture, and Identities in Crisis Author(s): Robert J. Lieber and Ruth E. Weisberg Reviewed work(s): Source: International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Winter, 2002), pp. 273-296 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20020163 . Accessed: 23/09/2012 14:40

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International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 16, No. 2, Winter 2002 (? 2002)

Globalization, Culture, and Identities in Crisis

Robert J. Lieber* * and Ruth E. Weisbergf

Culture in its various forms now serves as a primary carrier of globalization and modern values, and constitutes an important arena of contestation for

national, religious, and ethnic identity. Although reactions in Europe, Japan, and other societies where modern values prevail, tend to be symbolic, in areas

of the developing world, especially in Muslim countries where traditional values and radically different notions of identity and society predominate, reactions tend to be very intense and redirected at external targets through forms of transference and scapegoating. Ultimately, this is not so much a clash between civilizations as a clash within civilizations.

KEY WORDS: culture; globalization; identity; transference; backlash.

GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE

Globalization and its discontents has taken on huge significance in the aftermath of September 11th. Driven by the end of the Cold War, a dramatic

surge in international trade, investment and finance, and the onset of the information revolution, the subject had attracted growing attention for more

than a decade. However, the traumatic events of 9/11, the nihilistic rage evident in the destruction of the World Trade Center, and the issues that have arisen in its aftermath provide an enormous new impetus.

Until very recently, analyses of globalization have emphasized eco

nomics and politics rather than culture. Definitions of globalization abound,

* Professor of Government & Foreign Service, Department of Government, Georgetown Uni

versity, Washington, DC.

^Dean, School of Fine Arts, University of Southern California, Watt Hall 103, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0292.

* Correspondence should be directed to Robert J. Lieber, Professor of Government & Foreign Service, Department of Government, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057-1034; e-mail: [email protected].

273

0891-4486/02/1200-0273/0 ? 2002 Human Sciences Press, Inc.

274 Lieber and Weisberg

but for our purposes it can be described as the increasing global integra tion of economies, information technology, the spread of global popular culture, and other forms of human interaction.1 In the polarized discus

sion of the subject, one side has tended to be relentlessly optimistic and, at least until the September attacks, enthusiasm about globalization as a

whole was sometimes accompanied by an almost blissful naivete about the

information revolution as an unalloyed blessing. In the words of Bill Clinton

shortly before leaving the presidency, "In the new century, liberty will be

spread by cell phone and cable modem."2 On the other side, globaliza tion inspires dire warnings about its disruptions or dangers as well as or

ganized protests, editorials and marches against its perceived inequities and

abuses.

As an artist and a political scientist, our contribution to this discussion

is to probe the intersection of culture and politics. The effect is synergis tic, in that by doing so we gain insights that neither a focus on culture nor

politics alone can provide. An apt analogy exists with the study of political

economy, which explores the interplay of politics and economics in shaping international affairs. Often, examining events through a combination of two

disciplines provides texture and understanding in ways that an exclusive dis

ciplinary view does not allow.3 As a result, the combination of perspectives from culture and politics can offer comparably rich insights. While others

have made reference to culture, they have tended to privilege politics and

economics. One author who has emphasized culture is Samuel Huntington. In his writing on the "Clash of Civilizations,"4 he has argued that with the end

of the Cold War and its contest of ideologies, and as a result of disruptions

brought by modernization, urbanization and mass communications, the fun

damental source of international conflict will not be primarily ideological or

economic but cultural. However, our own view of culture is broader than

that of Huntington and encompasses folk and high culture as well as pop ular culture. Moreover in our judgment, the ultimate clash is less between

civilizations than within them.

The impact of globalization on culture has been viewed primarily as

a side effect. Nonetheless, for those absorbed with the subject, reactions

tend to be deeply divided. For example, one observer has asserted that, "... globalization promotes integration and the removal not only of cultural

barriers but many of the negative dimensions of culture. Globalization is a

vital step toward both a more stable world and better lives for the people within it."5 Others, however, have treated globalization of culture as an evil

because of their fears of the pervasive power and duplicity of multinational

corporations or international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In recent years, this reaction has been manifest in sometimes

violent demonstrations when the leaders of the world's richest countries

Globalization, Culture, and Identities in Crisis 275

(e.g., the G-8, the European Union) have held their meetings?as evident

in the streets of Seattle, Washington, Genoa and Barcelona.

And who among us would not be disturbed by, for example, the echo

of rap music in an old Barcelona neighborhood, the demise of local food

products and neighborhood shops, or the proliferation of the same brands

and chain stores from San Francisco to Santiago to Shanghai? Yet beyond unwarranted optimism or equally exaggerated negativity there is an under

lying dynamic. We seek to explicate the deeper reasons for these strong but

often oppositional reactions that people have to the effects of globalization on what they identify as their culture. By integrating perspectives from both

culture and politics, we find that in an increasingly globalized world, culture

has become a central arena of contestation. Culture takes on this pivotal

position not only because of its intrinsic significance, but precisely because

it has become so bound up with the most fundamental questions of human

identity in its many dimensions: personal, ethnic, religious, social and na

tional. As a result, controversies about culture often have less to do with

surface level phenomena: McDonalds, American tastes in music, language, art and lifestyle, than with deeper forms of alienation that owe more to

the changes and disruptions brought by modernization and globalization. In some cultures, especially in parts of the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, there is an important added dimension of existential rage against corrupt and

authoritarian regimes that, with the breakdown of older traditional social,

political and economic relationships, have failed to meet the needs of their own societies. In these regions, resentments expressed about modernity, the

West or America are often a sublimation of rage against more deep rooted

problems of identity. In the western world and in more prosperous regions of East Asia and

Latin America, where domestic problems of acculturation are much less

acute, cultural alienation tends to be based primarily on an uneasiness about the ubiquity of American culture and influence as well as on U.S. primacy

more generally. These resentments often are less the preoccupation of the

general public than of intellectual elites, who react against cultural intrusions into their own established realms and prerogatives. At times, such reactions can approach self-parody, as in the assertion that "resistance to the hege

monic pretenses of hamburgers is, above all, a cultural imperative."6 Specific criticisms thus can have more to do with what the U.S., seems to symbol ize than with any specific characteristic of American culture or policy in itself.

We begin this essay by analyzing the impact of a virtually unprece dented degree of American cultural primacy. We next consider culture as an

arena of contestation, noting the contradictory impulses of both attraction and repulsion as well as the phenomena of differentiation and assimilation.

276 Lieber and Weisberg

These reactions can be observed across the range of mass culture, folk cul ture and high culture. We then examine culture as a problem of identity in an era of globalization. We find that although both globalization and

American primacy evoke cultural backlash, the reaction takes very dif

ferent forms in modern societies than elsewhere. We explore two distinct

causes of cultural anxiety and turmoil. One of these, the material effects

of globalization and modernity, including the consumer economy, the in

formation revolution and the mass media, provides both a window to the

wider world and a challenge to traditional ways of doing things. The other, Western values, is often more profound in its impact, even though more

intangible. Cultural reactions to globalization in Europe, Japan and elsewhere

where modern values prevail, tend to be more symbolic and less extreme

and often have more to do with status resentments than with disagreements about fundamental values. But in large areas of the developing world and

especially in many Muslim countries, reactions to globalization and to the

U.S. as the embodiment of capitalism, modernity and mass culture tend to

be much more intense. We posit that in these societies, radically different

notions of values and identity are played out in the cultural realm, with much

of the impetus stemming from rage at corrupt regimes and failed societies, which is then redirected at external targets through forms of transference. By transference we are referring to the process by which group fears or resent

ments are shifted onto other entities or groups. Intense cultural resentments

thus come to be focused upon actors, especially the U.S., the West and Israel, that bear little relationship to the problems at hand yet provide convenient

scapegoats.

CULTURE AND AMERICAN PRIMACY

In the 21st century, the United States enjoys a degree of international

preponderance that has rarely been seen in any era. Historians, strate

gists, journalists and cultural observers have called attention to the phe nomenon in increasingly hyperbolic terms. In the words of one recent ob

server, "We dominate every field of human endeavor from fashion to film

to finance. We rule the world culturally, economically, diplomatically and

militarily as no one has since the Roman Empire."7 The United States, with less than 5% of the world's population, accounts for at least one

fourth of its economic activity. It leads in the information revolution. It

accounts for some 75% of the Nobel prizewinners in science, medicine and

economics.8 It predominates in business and banking and in the number and

quality of its research universities. Its defense budget is larger than those

Globalization, Culture, and Identities in Crisis 277

of the next fifteen countries combined. And there are few signs that any other international actor will soon become a true competitor of the United

States.

This American primacy is the product of the country's own attributes

(population, economic strength, technology, military preponderance, social

dynamism), as well as of the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. With the

collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, the U.S. no longer faces

any country possessing even remotely comparable power. For much of the

period since at least the mid-17th century, international politics had been

characterized by balance of power rivalry involving competition among a

number of great powers (typically France, Britain, Russia, Spain, Austria, Prussia and later Germany.) After World War II, world politics became

bipolar with the onset of the Cold War and the superpower confrontation

between the US and USSR. Since the early 1990s, however, the United

States has occupied a unique position, and its degree of primacy has grown rather than diminished with time. Moreover, the very scale of America's

relative power compared to other countries tends to discourage challenges from other would-be world powers.9

Influence in the cultural arena is more difficult to gauge than in the

economic or military realms. Although many of the criteria are less specific and more subjective, here too American preponderance is evident. An astute

German diplomat, Karsten Voight, long acquainted with the United States, has aptly characterized the pervasiveness of this influence in the cultural

realm:

The USA has long been setting standards on a worldwide basis, not just for the

general populace, but has been leading the field in the classic cultural spheres, for

example in research and teaching, or film and modern art. Its global role is rooted in a hitherto unknown blend of economic power, the ability to set the global cultural

agenda and military superiority.10

Moreover, this influence is evident not only in what Voight refers to as the classic cultural spheres, but is even more pronounced in mass culture, where

American popular music, casual clothing, movies, advertising media, fast food and sports (notably basketball) have become pervasive.

A particularly ubiquitous feature that confers enormous influence is the spread of American English as an international lingua franca. A century ago, French was the language of diplomacy and German was the leading sci entific language as well as extensively used in Central and Eastern Europe. By the mid 20th century, Russian was the predominant second language throughout the Soviet sphere in Central Asia and in Eastern Europe. Now, however, it is English that prevails. For example, at the United Nations, 120 countries specify English as the language in which correspondence to their missions should be addressed. By contrast some forty countries (mostly

278 Lieber and Weisberg

former French colonies) choose French, while twenty designate Spanish.11 In much of the world, English has become widely used and is by far the

leading choice for those who aspire to communicate outside their own local

ity. English is the language shared by the different communities of India

(or at least by their educated, commercial or political elites), it is over

whelmingly the second language in China and is often taught as a required

subject in primary or secondary schools throughout Europe and Asia. Sto

ries abound of bilateral meetings of foreign leaders who are not fluent in

each other's languages, conversing in English which they share as a second

tongue.

The inroads made by American English have been growing with glob alization and as a consequence of America's power and influence.

Approximately 380 million people use English as their first language and

another 250 million as their second language. A billion people are learning

English, and approximately one-third of the world's population have some

exposure to it. English is the predominant language of the European Union,

and more than 85% of international organizations employ it as one of their

official languages.12 To the intense irritation of French cultural and political elites and despite annual expenditures of

some $1 billion per year to promote that country's language and culture, French is now ranked only ninth among the world's most widely spoken languages. And four of France's most im

portant and dynamic international businesses, Alcatel, Total-FinaElf, Airbus

and Vivendi, have made English their official language.13 Entertainment is another cultural realm in which American influence

is pervasive. This takes various forms. Hollywood films capture more than

70% of the Western European audience and have a huge market share

elsewhere, in some cases as much as 90%.14 Here too, France has sought to stem the tide through regulations and subsidies. Paris has ardently

as

serted a "cultural exception" in trade negotiations, and under prevailing international agreements the countries of the European Union

can impose

quotas on imported American music and television programs as well as

movies. France requires that at least 40% of TV and radio programs be

made domestically and maintains an elaborate system for subsidizing its

movie industry.15 The results, however, are modest. In 2001, only four of the top ten films

at the French box office were French, led by the light comedy "Am?lie."16 Yet

this was an improvement on the previous year, when only one out of twenty

French-made films was a hit and Hollywood swept 91% of the country's film

revenues among summer audiences.17 The heyday of French cinema in the

1930s and again in the late 1950s and the 1960s, when its directors, actors

and films were a significant presence in world cinema, is a fading memory.

When French films have been at all competitive, this is mostly a result of

Globalization, Culture, and Identities in Crisis 279

Table 1. Western European Film Statistics (1999)

Host country American market share

Germany 76.0%

Spain 64.2

France 54.1

Italy 53.6

U.K. 86.0*

Denmark 58.7

*Data for UK for 1998.

SOURCE: Media Sales, Milan Italy, www.mediasalles.it, adapted from tabular data in Tyler Cowen, "Why Hollywood Rules the

World (and Should We Care?)" in Correspondence, Summer/Fall

2001, p. 7.

embracing those features for which Hollywood has been criticized. In the

words of one French critic:

French cinema is allowing itself everything American cinema used to be blamed

for: sex, violence, epic-scale historical reconstruction. All that distinguishes France's

biggest hits of 2000 from some American B-movie is that the car chase is happening in

Marseille, not Los Angeles, among Peugeots, not Chryslers. And the repetitiveness we once condemned in such hit film series as Rocky, Rambo, and Halloween, is

becoming a more French practice too.. ,18

Elsewhere in Europe, the pervasiveness of American films is even more

evident. For example in Berlin, following the opening of a huge business and

entertainment complex at the Potsdammer Platz, a multiplex cinema there

featured Hollywood films on eight of its nine screens. The sole exception was a German action film with an English title, "Crazy," clearly comparable in content to the French movies cited above in their embrace of Hollywood clich?s.19 Overall, in five leading countries of the EU, the U.S. market share of the cinema audience has ranged from just under 54% in Italy to 76% in

Germany and 86% in the United Kingdom. (See Table 1.)

CULTURE AS AN ARENA OF CONTESTATION

As we have previously suggested, culture understood as popular, folk or high art has become a major arena of contestation as conflicts of national ism and ethnicity are played out in the cultural realm. Certain concepts are

especially illuminating in the analysis of cultural conflict and change. First, attraction and toleration as contrasted to repulsion and suppression of cul tural expression; and second, the sometimes simultaneous impulses toward

differentiation and assimilation. In regard to the first dynamic, in the spring of 2001, the world learned of

the deliberate demolition of two 5th to 7th century giant cliff side carvings

280 Lieber and Weisberg

of the Buddha. Although these artifacts had been designated a World His

toric Monument by the UN, Afghanistan's Taliban rulers and other Is

lamic militants used artillery and explosives to demolish them. They also

destroyed with sledgehammers much of the Buddhist patrimony stored or

displayed in Afghan museums. This was especially shocking for contempo

rary Westerners, who tend to value cultural artifacts very highly and who

generally neutralize the ideology or beliefs inherent in sculpture or painting

by redefining it as belonging to the category of art, where it tends to acquire great secular and monetary value. However, 20th century Western history also includes haunting episodes of the symbolic destruction of culture, most

notably in the Nazi book burnings. The destruction of the ancient Buddhas is a dramatic and appalling

episode of cultural suppression. Indeed it has been referred to as "a cultural

and historical Hiroshima" in a Washington Post article. The same story quotes notes from a meeting between Taliban officials and Islamic militants: "The

Taliban authorities agreed the destruction of [the statues] is an Islamic act

that would make the Islamic world happy."20 The spectrum of responses to cultural phenomena is very broad. It

ranges, at one end, from the extreme just cited, through hostility to toleration

and attraction at the other end. Most interestingly, attraction and repression can happen simultaneously. Human beings seem to respond to a number of

siren songs in this area: enforced rarity, the exotic, the transgressive and the forbidden among others. Dick Hebdige's book about the way subcultures

affect the dominant culture, especially in regard to the cycling of styles and

artifacts of subcultures into the mainstream, is pertinent here.21 There are

many historical examples. For instance, in 18th century Spain, the colorful

world of the Maja, with its brigands and courtesans, influenced the high cul

ture of the court in the time of Goya. In the late 19th century, the demimonde

in Paris made a huge imprint on popular culture and the Impressionist and

Post-Impressionist art movements as well, particularly in the works of Degas and Toulouse-Lautrec. A dynamic of attraction/repulsion between high cul

ture and associated elites and transgressive outsiders is a phenomenon that

periodically emerges. The popularity of movies about gangsters and outlaws

is no accident.

What is the mechanism at work here? Reason may argue for one set

of choices, and emotion or a deep-seated sense of attraction or identity

may press for another. Samuel Huntington has written that "cultural char

acteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compro mised and resolved than political and economic ones."22 This may help ex

plain why nations, and ethnic and religious groups as well as individuals

sometimes make choices that appear so irrational and against their best

interests.

Globalization, Culture, and Identities in Crisis 281

The other pair of often simultaneous tendencies that characterize the

reception of culture involves impulses toward differentiation and assimila

tion. Both tendencies are dynamic. We are constantly borrowing, imitating and incorporating just as we are distinguishing and differentiating ourselves

by innovative, exclusive or

singular expressions.

When culture is discussed in relation to globalization, it is most of

ten American popular or mass culture that is the referent, and the rhetoric

about it is highly charged. For example, Louis Hebron and John F Stack

describe the negative view of the globalization of mass culture in this way: "This foreign invasion and assimilation of cosmopolitan consumerism with

its materialistic orientation, indulgent values, moral bankruptcy and frater

nizing of nationalities is a prescription of cultural genocide because of the

process' potential to vulgarize and/or destroy the rich diversity of human

civilizations."23

This is similar to the argument of antiglobalization advocates alleging the destruction of biodiversity by American corporate interests. In the view

of these critics, part of the richness of human culture is its variety, its trueness

to its own cultural roots, but global popular culture dominated by American

products and ideas destroys this diversity of cultural production. So there

is fear and backlash against what is viewed as a leveling force, a sweep

ing homogeneity or Disneyfication of culture. The rhetoric surrounding the

globalization of culture, sometimes compares it to colonialism, as evident

for example, in the criticism by President Mohammed Khatami of Iran:

[Globalization is] a destructive force threatening dialogue between cultures. The new

world order and globalization that certain powers are trying to make us accept, in which the culture of the entire world is ignored, looks like a kind of neocolonialism. This imperialism threatens mutual understanding between nations and communica tion and dialogue between cultures.24

Rather than mounting a critique of the globalization of culture, we pro pose to analyze historical and political causes which make culture a major arena of contestation for nationalism and ethnicity. Three partially overlap ping cultural arenas are encompassed in this analysis, first and most obvi

ously, popular culture; second, folk or indigenous culture; and lastly, an arena

that is not often discussed in this context, high culture.

Popular culture is the most obvious realm because there is a pervasive influence of American music, fashion, food, movies, TV, all tied to open

markets and global consumerism. This influence is in part a reflection of what is often called "soft power."25 The U.S. does not force anyone to use

these American products, but they have, nevertheless, enormous popularity and consumer attraction. Although U.S. products have the advantage of well

capitalized production and distribution, as Richard Pells indicates, American

capitalism is not the only or even the most important explanation for the "soft

282 Lieber and Weisberg

power" of the United States. In Pell's words, "What Americans have done more brilliantly than their competitors overseas is repackage the cultural

products we receive from abroad and then transmit them to the rest of the

planet."26 Our history as a nation of immigrants has taught us to synthesize and incorporate the cultural and popular expressions of a wide range of

nationalities and ethnicities. We are the consumers of foreign intellectual

and artistic influences par excellence.

"American" is as much a style as a point of origin. Many "American"

products are made elsewhere, and there is also the influence of French,

British, Japanese, and German products or imitations of them. Japan is per

haps the most distinctive global alternative to American culture. An exam

ple, is the "Hello Kitty" phenomenon. There are shops in malls across the

United States that have "Hello Kitty" products, which were originally de

signed for little Japanese girls. They are by design sentimental, plastic and

pink and quite popular with little girls in the United States, many of whose

backpacks and pencil cases are part of the "Hello Kitty" line. And fascinat

ingly, there is a subculture on the West Coast with its own flagship magazine called Giant Robot, which comments on this and similar phenomena of re

verse cultural influence.

Although, as noted above, American movies have a huge influence

abroad, the action films that dominate international markets represent the reverse phenomenon. They are manifestations of a global market affecting the production of American film making. Half or more of the gross rev

enues for some Hollywood films come from foreign audiences. As a result, and because younger moviegoers make up a disproportionate share of the

audience, American action movies, especially those aimed at Asian markets, are characterized more by their violence or explosiveness (which requires little translation) than by their dialogue. The de-emphasis on language and

the tendency toward highly demarcated good and evil is appealing across

many cultures.

Folk or indigenous culture is another arena where observers lament the

effects of globalization as damaging to indigenous cultural production. Yet

the concerned parties are often not from the cultures in question. There is

a great deal of idealization of the cultures involved, as folkways tend to be

viewed as pure, authentic and unchanging. Folk art, rather than demonstrat

ing purity, provides an excellent case study of the dynamics of assimilation

and differentiation as it is usually a mixture of local production and aes

thetics with outside influences. Two instances from Navajo culture illustrate

this point. The rugs we view as so characteristic of the Navajos were greatly influenced by the late 19th century discovery on the part of the Navajos of German aniline dyes. If we examined the rugs made before the Navajos

adopted the use of these dyes, they would not seem to us to be Navajo rugs

Globalization, Culture, and Identities in Crisis 283

because of their subdued appearance, a consequence of the more limited

color range obtained by dying the wool with vegetable matter. Another ex

ample is the great bifurcation of design in Navajo jewelry which was heavily influenced by native aesthetics on one hand and tourist preferences on the

other. What they did for themselves tended to be very heavy and bold be

cause they were designing jewelry emblematic of power. The more delicate,

graceful, somewhat subdued jewelry was geared to tourist preferences. The

Navajos were quite willing to create two modes of production geared to two

different audiences, which is a sophisticated marketing technique. These

are clear examples of cultural output influenced by foreign technology and

tourist preferences. Among other things, we thus ought to view folk culture as more complex and more calculated than it is generally conceived.

While popular culture dominates the public discourse about global ization, high culture also acts as an arena of contestation. An additional reason for focusing on high culture is its connection to the governing elites

in any country. A smaller number of influential people involved in interna

tional or global dynamics can weigh more than a larger number involved in

popular culture. There are numerous focal points for international cultural

presentation, exchange and collaboration. They include biennials, festivals, architectural competitions and the internet. One of the most visible sites for

global high culture is the museum, which has traditionally been seen as an

aid to civic, national, or ethnic identity. Typically, museums came into being

through the secularization of royal, court or church collections, which were

made public in national or municipal forums.

The history of the Museum Bilbao in the Basque region of northern

Spain illustrates a number of the issues we are addressing, such as identity formation and assimilation versus differentiation. In the late 19th century, the elites of Bilbao were in intellectual ferment, characteristic of that era,

concerning what they viewed as a choice between their local folkloric legacy and the cosmopolitan culture of the late 19th century. Very similar tensions

developed in different locales around the world. Nations were becoming much more aware of their folkloric heritage and the field of ethnography was expanding. In Germany, where the subject had already become well

established as an aspect of the Romantic movement of the 1830s, people increasingly collected and valued folk material as a source of local or ethnic

pride. At the same time, because of a number of different phenomena in

cluding world fairs, there was a growing sense of positive identification with national cultural production. And beyond the nation-state, a cosmopoli tan art world was coming into being. One result of this more international awareness and diffusion of information was the rapid spread, for instance, of French Impressionism as it came to influence American, Spanish and Italian art by the last decade of the 19th century.

284 Lieber and Weisberg

Note that there are at least three related terms pertinent to this dis

cussion that seem to overlap in meaning but have different valences and

connotations. These are the words cosmopolitan, international, and global.

They can all be applied to culture and they all carry different baggage. The

term cosmopolitan, arising in the second half of the 19th century, had a

worldly, urbane, sophisticated sense to it. It was associated with high culture

and particularly with things French. Cosmopolitanism in Iran, Russia and

the United States in the 19th century embodied French cultural dominance.

In the 20th century, that mutated into a negative connotation, especially within the Communist world, as in "rootless cosmopolitan," while lately it

seems back in favor as a term of approbation. Internationalism, while iden

tified with Western culture, is not dominated by one particular country. It is

also a word more applicable to the 20th century. In the art world, it referred

to the elite style of a period, although it also had an idealistic connota

tion. In architecture, the "international style" was a manifestation of 20th

century modernism, and in the realm of painting, abstract expressionism

exemplified internationalism in the immediate post-World War Two period. Globalization, in turn, has recently acquired more negative connotations

and is less strictly tied to high culture, as it has come to be identified with

consumerism and Disneyfication. The Basques, with their distinctive culture and language, were, and still

are, a particular blend of ethnicity, cosmopolitanism, anti-Spanish, and anti Madrid sentiments. In the late 19th century, their choice was between a strong ethnic identity and a more cosmopolitan one, and oscillation between those

two poles has characterized their situation throughout the 20th and into

the 21st century. In the 1990s, a group of industrial and civic leaders from

the region decided that internationalism was the best choice for Bilbao, and became very interested in having their city become the site for a new

European Guggenheim Museum. To quote Selma Holo's Beyond the Prado:

It would enable the civic leaders, with the assistance of a small group of advocates to

convince enough of the elite population of the city that rejection of the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, would be tantamount to scuttling any chance for Bilbao to assume a

modern identity or protect the regional identity. These new institutions were meant

to prove that the intent of the politicians to support internationalism would not

preclude their aggressive support for Basque cultural identity reinforcement.27

So Basque identity and a modern identity became linked: the Museum

would solve both problems. As in the 19th Century, much of this attitude was

fueled by a rejection of Central Spain and Spanish identity. Ironically, Basque elites traded off centralist Spain for centralist New York. In the end the

Guggenheim Bilbao adopted an internationalist program for the museum,

and regional artists of some quality were not shown there. The idea that

Basque cultural identity would be promoted and supported was forgotten

Globalization, Culture, and Identities in Crisis 285

once the spectacular building designed by Frank Gehry became a

reality. However, the payoff for Bilbao has been an extraordinary surge in cul

tural tourism. Bilbao provides a perfect illustration of the late 20th-early 21st century importance of museums as branding a city through a cultural

attraction and, in the case of the Guggenheim in Bilbao, giving it a global presence. The Guggenheim with its various branches worldwide had approx

imately three million visitors in 2001, which compares favorably with giants like the Louvre with some six million visitors.

Biennials, music festivals, international architectural competitions, and

cultural tourism are among the many ways nations or cities project them

selves into the international art world. In contrast to the jockeying for po sition among cultural elites of many nations, there are more radical forms

of contestation. As noted above, the Taliban banned culture altogether and

severely punished transgressors, destroying an estimated 80 % of Afghan cul

tural artifacts in the process. They burned more than 1000 reels of Afghan films, and a prominent musician who was caught playing his instrument was warned that if he were caught again, they would cut off his hands.28

Afghanistan is an extreme case, but it shows how virulent cultural contesta

tion can become.

CULTURE AS A PROBLEM OF IDENTITY IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

Both globalization and American primacy evoke cultural backlash. But the character and magnitude of this reaction differ greatly depending on

the societies in which they occur. Moreover, this reaction takes very differ ent forms in the West and in other modern societies than in the developing

world and especially in Muslim countries. The reason is that cultural anxiety and turmoil are a consequence of two related but distinct phenomena. First, there are the material and economic effects of globalization and moder

nity. Among these are urbanization, the appearance of modern consumer

goods, and the impact of the mass media, including satellite television, movie cassettes and the internet. These provide a window to?and sometimes dis torted impressions of?the outside world. A second element, western values, is more intangible but often more profound in its impact. These values in

clude, among others, scientific reasoning, secularism, religious toleration, in

dividualism, freedom of expression, political pluralism, the rule of law, equal rights for women and minorities, and openness to change. As one widely re

spected observer has commented, the result for much of the Islamic world is an "intractable confrontation between a theistic, land-based and traditional

286 Lieber and Weisberg

culture, in places little different from the Europe of the Middle Ages, and the secular material values of the Enlightenment."29

In Europe, Canada, Japan and other societies, where modern values

prevail, cultural reactions to globalization and to American predominance tend to be more nuanced. Intellectual, literary, artistic and political elites

often seek ways to define or reassert their own identities and importance and their national cultures by confronting the policies and the material and cultural influences of the United States. In part, these reactions have less to

do with Washington's policies than with the inbalance of power and influence between their own countries and the United States. However, there are

indications that the European public as a whole may not share these views to

the same degree, and public opinion polls in France, whose intellectuals and officials are among Europe's most strident critics, indicate possibly as little as 10% of the public is anti-American.30 The critiques can become heated, but they remain largely symbolic and are often ephemeral. Indeed, in their use of hyperbole, they can approach caricature, at least in the case of the

French, where they can take on the appearance of an elaborate verbal and

aesthetic game, for example, in denunciations of Eurodisney as a "cultural

Chernobyl."31

Among the different forms of cultural reaction, scapegoating and trans

ference are especially evident, whereby cultural and economic resentments

are deflected from the original systemic causes such as globalization, mod

ernization, urbanization, and economic rationalization, onto convenient

symbolic targets. In France these phenomena have been evident in the highly

publicized exploits of Jose Bove, an antiglobalization activist who learned his

tactics while a foreign student at the University of California at Berkeley, and

who in 1999 drove a tractor into a McDonald's restaurant in the provincial town of Millau. However, the presence of more than 700 of these fast food

restaurants in the country suggests that French consumers in large numbers

find their own reasons to patronize the franchise.

While Europe and the United States share many cultural values and

have a rich history of cross-fertilization, a contrasting component of Euro

pean cultural reaction is evident in distrust of other facets of modernity. In

Britain and France, as a result of deadly medical fiascos in the 1980s and

1990s, a degree of cynicism and suspicion has developed toward experts in modern science and technology. In the French case, the reaction stems

from the government's deliberate delay in licensing an American test for

the HIV/AIDS virus in donated blood in order to await a French-made

product. As a consequence, hundreds of people who received transfusions

during this period became infected with the deadly virus. In Britain, public distrust reflects the "Mad Cow" disease experience in 1996, when public health officials mistakenly assured the public that there was no danger in

Globalization, Culture, and Identities in Crisis 287

eating beef from diseased animals. The backlash has recently been apparent in the refusal of many British parents to have their infants inoculated for

measles, mumps and rubella, not because of scientific evidence, but due to

the speculation of a single doctor that the vaccine might cause autism.32 Re

actions of this kind are also manifest, for example, in a European consumer

backlash against genetically modified (GM) crops. Evidence of harm from

products available to the public has never been documented. Nonetheless, without any scientific confirmation, the European Union has halted approval of new GM crops for use or import into the EU.33

In the United States, globalization has had notable effects on basic

values and beliefs. Paul Cantor, in his book Gilligan Unbound: Pop Culture

in the Age of Globalization,3A explores four television series over the course

of four decades (Gilligan's Island, Star Trek, The Simpsons, and The X

Files) to demonstrate how globalization has undermined traditional attitudes

concerning power, authority and the role of the state.35 Cantor argues that

the traditional importance of the state and of other national institutions has

given way in the consciousness of most people (as represented, e.g., in The

Simpsons) to focus on the family, neighbors and the marketplace. Indeed, Cantor maintains that as a result of the economic and cultural effects of

globalization, together with the impact of mass media such as cable TV, the

centrality of the nation-state in American life may be giving way to the family and other basic social units.

Whether this trend will persist is another matter. In part, it reflects the

effects of a post-Cold War decade in which the absence of an external threat on the scale of World War Two or the Cold War, coupled with the impact of the information revolution and an extraordinary period of economic growth and lavish consumer spending caused Americans and the media to focus on ephemeral domestic stories about celebrities, life style, crime, and the sexual peccadillos of prominent personalities. The focus, magnified by cable television (all-Monica-all-the-time) on the sordid Clinton scandals, the O.J.

Simpson trial, the lifestyles of dot.com billionaires, and celebrity gossip were

among the most prominent cultural symbols of the 1990s. However, this

absorption, together with waning public confidence in government, was the

product of an era in which the role of the state at home and abroad seemed less essential.

In the aftermath of the September 11th terror attacks, the persistence of these trends is much less certain. The unprecedented nature and scope of the assault on the US. homeland, the mass murder of 3000 Americans, the very real threat from terror and weapons of mass destruction, and the effect on the US. economy have impacted the lives of ordinary Americans and may have transformative effects. The cultural impact of 9/11 can be

gauged in many ways, big and small. One is the outpouring of unabashed

288 Lieber and Weisberg

patriotic sentiment in response to the destruction of the World Trade Cen

ter and the bravery of passengers who fought with their hijackers on the

doomed American Airlines flight #93. Other measures can be found in

increased volunteerism, the broad-based and unselfconscious display of the

flag, and in dramatic changes in public opinion. For example, trust in govern ment and confidence in national institutions, including the presidency and

Congress, has surged?at least temporarily?to the highest levels since the

mid-1960s.36 There has also been a perceptible shift in media tastes and in

magazines and books. One straw in the wind is the collapse of Talk mag

azine, the brain child of celebrity editor Tina Brown.37 Another was evi

dent in the list of nonfiction best sellers. Illustratively, six months after the

September 11th attacks, six of the top ten books were traditional or culturally conservative works. The list included, at #1 Tom Clancy's Shadow Warriors

(US. special-operations forces); #2 Bernard Goldberg's Bias (liberal bias in

news media); David Vise's, The Bureau and the Mole (Soviet spy Robert

Hanssen); #6 David McCullough's John Adams (biography of the second

president); #7 Bernard Lewis's What Went Wrong (failures of the Islamic

world); #8 One Nation (photos and essays on September 11th by the editors

of Life)', and #10 Pat Buchanan's Death of the West (a warning about threats

to western civilization by a right-wing columnist.)38 The impact of globalization on American culture and the United States

more broadly has had a number of contradictory effects. Until recently, glob alization, along with the end of the Cold War, the information revolution

and an economic boom fostered the kind of shifts described by Cantor. But

especially since September 11, 2001, Americans have discovered that key

components of globalization (technology, openness, cell phones, the Inter

net, financial flows, modern air travel) could be used to murderous effect

against modern society, and public attitudes have shown signs of shifting in

the direction of more traditional cultural values.

Reaction to globalization and America's role as the symbol of capital ism, modernity and mass culture takes a very different and more intense

form in large areas of the developing world and especially in Muslim coun

tries. Here, the intrusion of modern western values combined with the crisis

of traditional societies in coping with economic and social change fosters a

sometimes bitter backlash and periodically virulent forms of transference

and scapegoating. Often, the forces of both attraction and repulsion are ev

ident at the same time. This outlook, a kind of "cultural schizophrenia," is

vividly evident in the television viewing habits of Middle Eastern youths, as

described by a close observer:

Young people in particular... are simultaneously seduced and repelled by Ameri

can culture. The most popular show on MBC [the most popular Arab satellite TV

channel] is Who Wants to be a Millionaire! The same youths who shout 'death to

Globalization, Culture, and Identities in Crisis 289

America' go home to read contraband copies of Hollywood magazines. What the

Iranian philosopher Daryush Shayegan refers to as Islam's 'cultural schizophrenia'? the struggle between tradition and Western secular modernity, between fundamen

talism and globalization?haunts the soul of many Muslims.. ,"39

As another example, on September 11th, patrons at a trendy Beirut coffee

house applauded the televised pictures of the World Trade Center's destruc

tion, while dressed in American style clothing and gathering in an establish

ment that would have fit within any upscale American neighborhood.40

Major conflicts that ultimately concern radically different visions of so

ciety and identity are thus played out in the cultural realm. Though a great deal of comment has been devoted to these reactions as stemming from

problems of poverty, environmental degradation, or in response to Ameri

can policies, the root causes lie elsewhere. The most intense resentment of

the United States is expressed by proponents of militant Islam. The words

of Osama bin Laden are chilling in their unabashed hatred, as expressed, for example, in his February 1998 fatwa proclaiming, "The killing of Amer

icans and their civilian and military allies is a religious duty for each and

every Muslim to be carried out in whichever country they are found."41

But, as Fouad Ajami has observed, what really motivates bin Laden and his

followers is rage over their inability to overthrow the existing Arab ruling

order, which they redirect at America. Ajami captures both the paradoxical attraction and repulsion toward the United States and the bitter resent

ment of Arabs at their own broken societies and corrupt and authoritarian

regimes:

Nothing grows in the middle between an authoritarian political order and populations

given to perennial flings with dictators, abandoned to their most malignant hatreds.

Something is amiss in an Arab world that besieges American embassies for visas and

at the same time celebrates America's calamities.42

This rage embodies both an historical and a modern component. There

is frustration at the loss of grandeur for a civilization that once far outpaced

Europe in its achievements but has in recent centuries fallen into anger and

despair. There is a flavor of this in a bin Laden video aired in October 2001, which revels in the destruction of the World Trade Center and calls upon Muslims to wage war against America. The AI Qaeda leader invokes the

memory of past Arab indignities:

W^hat America is tasting now is something insignificant compared to what we have

tasted for scores of years. Our nation [the Islamic world] has been tasting this humil

iation and this degradation for more than 80 years.43

The reference to "80 years" would be obscure for most western audiences

but readily understood in the Arab world. The year, 1921, marked the col

lapse of the Ottoman Empire, and thus the ultimate demise of the

290 Lieber and Weisberg

Caliphate?Muslim civil and religious rule by the successors of Muhammad, which had lasted, at least symbolically, for nearly 1300 years. Documents

found at sites in Afghanistan abandoned by AI Qaeda fighters contained even more explicit reference to the Caliphate, as in the words of one of the recovered texts:

[The Caliphate] is the only and best solution to the predicaments and problems from

which Muslims suffer today and indubitable cure to the turbulence and internal

struggles that plague them. It will remedy the economic underdevelopment which

bequeathed upon us a political dependence on an atheist East and infidel West.44

What is revealing about reference to the Caliphate is not only its irrele vance to the "predicaments and problems from which Muslims suffer today," but also the notion that reestablishment of the Caliphate could somehow

solve contemporary problems of economic development. Moreover, while

bin Laden's October video laments the carving up of the Middle East into a

series of separate states that have largely failed to cope with the challenges of modernity, it ignores the fact that the United States had little to do with the Ottoman breakup and the drawing of borders. That legacy is shared by

France and Britain, as the prevailing colonial powers of the day. Moreover, the events took place a quarter-century before the United States became a

superpower in the aftermath of World War Two, and long before the cre

ation of the state of Israel in 1948. But bin Laden's focus upon America is evidence of how this rage has been redirected at the United States as the

most powerful symbol of western values and modern economic, military and cultural influence.45

Ultimately, the resentment and hostility is driven far less by poverty than by issues of identity, and its proponents are mostly from the university educated professional and middle classes who comprise an embittered counter-elite within their own societies. Martin Kramer observes how this resentment is embodied by militant Islam:

[It is] the vehicle of counter-elites, people who, by virtue of education and/or in

come, are potential members of the elite, but who for some reason or another get excluded. Their education may lack some crucial prestige-conferring element; the sources of their wealth may be a bit tainted. Or they may just come from the wrong

background. So while they are educated and wealthy, they have a grievance: their ambition is blocked, they cannot translate their socio-economic assets into political clout. Islamism is particularly useful to these people, in part because by its careful

manipulation, it is possible to recruit a following among the poor, who make valuable

foot-soldiers.46

This is not an entirely new development. Some two decades ago, an Egyptian study found that jailed Islamists in that country were mostly of middle class

origins, highly motivated, and often educated in engineering or science. In

deed, fifteen of the nineteen September 11th hijackers came from Saudi

Globalization, Culture, and Identities in Crisis 291

Arabia, one of the Muslim world's wealthiest countries. Moreover, the two

top leaders of AI Qaeda are bin Laden, the son of a Saudi billionaire, and

Ayman al-Zawahiri, a wealthy Egyptian doctor. Indeed, militant Islam's

ability to attract such competent, well motivated and ambitious people re

sembles that of fascism and Marxism-Leninism in their day.47 Not only are these traits of Islamic extremists evident in their own coun

tries, but they are also apparent among some Islamic and Arab emigres in

Europe. For example, Mohamed Atta, the Saudi who piloted the hijacked airliner that slammed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center and

is believed to be the ringleader of the hijackers, had lived with several of the terrorists in Germany and appears to have become increasingly alienated

by his inability to find a place and purpose in that society despite his gradu ate education in urban planning. As Fouad Ajami has eloquently observed, "The modern world unsettled Atta... The magnetic power of the American

imperium had fallen across his country. He arrived here with a presumption and a claim. We had intruded into his world; he would shatter the peace of ours. The glamorized world couldn't be fully had; it might as well be humbled

and taken down."48

In essence, an indigenous rage stemming from social disruption, oppres sion and alienation becomes transferred or redirected onto targets that have

little to do with the sources of discontent. In its most nihilistic expressions, it takes the form of delusional conspiracy theories directed at the United

States, the West, or Israel. As evidence, a Gallup survey of public opinion in

nine Muslim countries found only 18% of respondents believe that Arabs

carried out the September 11th attacks.49 More blatantly, Arab and Muslim

media disseminated conspiracy theories claiming a Jewish or Israeli hand

behind the attack on the World Trade Center, and leading Saudi, Egyp tian and Syrian papers have carried crude anti-Semitic stories?essentially a

form of political pornography?including the old Czarist forgery, "The Pro

tocols of the Elders of Zion" and the ancient libel that Jews use the blood

of non-Jewish children in food prepared for Purim or Passover.50

CONCLUSION

In an increasingly globalized world, culture has emerged as a central arena of contestation. Other issues on the globalization agenda, especially economic problems of trade, aid, investment and poverty, are more read

ily subject to negotiation and compromise. But precisely because culture

has become a signifier for other more deep-seated and intractable issues, the

problems it poses are harder to resolve. Culture in its various forms serves as

a primary carrier of globalization and modern values, and cultural issues are

292 Lieber and Weisberg

so fraught precisely because of their impact on both individual and national

identity. The idea that modernization often proves disruptive to traditional soci

eties and that this can cause revolutionary turmoil is not new. In the mid-19th

century, Alexis de Tocqueville concluded that rage and political upheaval stemmed not from poverty and deprivation or from the exercise of power

itself, but from more symbolic causes including rising expectations, feelings of humiliation, and reactions against a ruler considered "illegitimate... and

oppressive."51 A century later, a leading social scientist, Seymour Martin

Lipset, identified relative deprivation as a source of upheaval and found

that disruptions caused by economic and social modernization could radi

calize sections of the middle and professional classes and cause them to be

attracted to extremist movements.52 But what is increasingly evident today is the key role played by culture, for it serves as the transmission belt by

which so much of the impact of globalization and modern values is con

veyed to foreign audiences, and through which identities are so profoundly

challenged. The animus directed against the United States is by no means uniform.

And, as we have observed, expressions of it in Europe are much more mod

est and symbolic because globalization there (and in other regions where

modern values prevail) does not dictate a profound cultural clash with pre modern values. Moreover, in the post 9/11 world, basic European solidarity with the United States has been reinforced, along with a sense that Europe continues to require close links with America as insurance in a dangerous

world.

Elsewhere, although American policies and practices can be a source of

resentment, and primacy can readily translate into bruised feelings about the

exercise of American power, the predominant sources of anti-Americanism are deep-seated and structural and only secondarily due to specific policies.

This was especially evident in the aftermath of September 11th. A statement

by sixty leading American scholars makes a telling point when it observes

the way bin Laden and the attackers directed their hatred against the United States itself rather than make any specific policy demands:

... the killing was done for its own sake. The leader of AI Qaeda described the

"blessed strikes" of September 11 as blows against America, "the head of world

infidelity." Clearly, then, our attackers despise not just our government, but our

overall society, our entire way of living. Fundamentally, their grievance concerns not

only what our leaders do, but also who we are.53

The transference of deep-seated rage about turmoil and humiliation within their own societies into bitter attacks upon the United States can be

understood in many ways, but above all it represents a sublimation of anger

Globalization, Culture, and Identities in Crisis 293

and its redirection toward a source that has little to do with the problem in the first place. Deliberate scapegoating is increasingly evident too. The

author Salman Rushdie, himself a target of a fatwa calling for his death as punishment for supposed blasphemy, captures this phenomenon when

he writes that even if a Middle East peace settlement were achieved, anti

Americanism would be likely to continue unabated:

It has become too useful a smokescreen for Muslim nations' many defects?their cor

ruption, their incompetence, their oppression of their citizens, their economic, scien

tific and cultural stagnation. America-hating has become a badge of identify, making

possible a chest-beating, flag-burning rhetoric of word and deed that makes men

feel good. It contains a strong streak of hypocrisy, hating most what it desires most, and elements of self-loathing. ('We hate America because it has made of itself what

we cannot make of ourselves.') What America is accused of?closed-mindedness,

stereotyping, ignorance?is also what its accusers would see if they looked into a

mirror.54

This transference is driven by several mechanisms: the desire of au

thoritarian regimes to deflect criticism away from their own corrupt rule, the agendas of virulently antimodernist movements which can now, para

doxically, utilize television and the Internet to disseminate their views, and

widespread frustration and alienation. Yet Islamic radicalism is by no means

dominant, and it remains contested within these societies, not least (as

Afghanistan under Taliban rule demonstrated) because its antirational, theo cratic and misogynist values do not provide a viable option for successfully confronting the tasks of modernization. Moreover, hostility to the U.S. is not

universal and successful exercise of power can actually discourage opposi tion. For example, demonstrations against the initial American intervention in Afghanistan quickly subsided as U.S. and anti-Taliban forces gained the

upper hand and it became evident that much of the Afghan population was

celebrating its liberation from an oppressive regime. In important parts of the Muslim world in the aftermath of

September 11th and the defeat of the Taliban, moderate views have surfaced to contest the radical Islamist vision. In at least some cases, journalists, intel lectuals and government leaders have condemned the 9/11 attacks, spoken out against extremism and the search for scapegoats, and have challenged the notion that returning to practices of the distant past can solve practical problems of society and economy. Thus, as a former Libyan Prime Minister has observed, "Perhaps most of the things we complain of... stem from our own flaws."55

Ultimately, the causes of fanaticism and cultural backlash lie not within the United States and the West, but inside the troubled societies themselves. In these situations, culture is a mode of self and group expression and a source

of upheaval and contestation. There is less a "clash of civilizations" than a

294 Lieber and Weisberg

clash within civilizations. Outsiders can take steps to encourage moderate

elements within these societies, but much more depends on developments inside the countries concerned. The outcome of this competition may ulti

mately determine whether globalization itself continues or instead is vio

lently overturned?much as the guns of August 1914 touched off a World

War and reversed a century of increasing openness, integration and

interdependence.

ENDNOTES

1. Among other definitions of globalization, Thomas Friedman describes it as, "... the inte

gration of everything with everything else" He adds that, "Globalization enables each of

us, wherever we live, to reach around the world farther, faster and cheaper than ever before

and at the same time allows the world to reach into each of us farther, faster, deeper, and

cheaper than ever before." See Friedman, "Techno Logic," Foreign Policy, March/April 2002, p. 64. Also see Friedman's The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization

(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999). 2. Quoted by Fouad Aj ami, "The New Faith," Saisphere, Alumni Magazine of Johns Hopkins

University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC 2000, p. 13.

3. Robert Gilpin makes this point well in observing that political scientists tend to overlook

the role of markets, while economists often neglect the political context of events and the

important role of power. See U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political

Economy of Direct Foreign Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975), pp. 4-5.

4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996.)

5. David Rothkopf, "In Praise of Cultural Imperialism?" Foreign Policy, No. 107 (Summer

1997): 38-53, at 39. A more ambivalent treatment is that of Benjamin Barber, Jihad Versus

McWorld (New York: Times Books, 1995), who emphasizes the tensions between global and parochial values as increasingly central to world affairs.

6. Quotation from Le Monde, cited in Sophie Meunier, "The French Exception," Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4 (July/August 2000):104-116 at 107.

7. Charles Krauthammer, "Who Needs Gold Medals?" Washington Post, February 20,2002. 8. Paul Kennedy, "The Eagle Has Landed," Financial Times (London), February 1, 2002.

9. See especially William Wohlforth "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Se

curity, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999): 5-41. Also see Lieber, Eagle Rules?, Chapter One,

"Foreign Policy and American Primacy," pp. 1-15.

10. Karsten Voight, a German foreign ministry official and influential figure in the Social

Democratic Party, speaking in Washington on March 8, 2000, quoted in Peter Rodman,

Uneasy Giant: The Challenges to American Predominance (Washington, DC: The Nixon

Center, June 2000), p. 1.

11. Barbara Crosssette, "At the UN French Slips and English Stands Tall," New York Times, March 25, 2001.

12. Data from "A World Empire By Other Means," The Economist (London), December 22,

2001, pp. 65-67.

13. David Ignatius, "France's Constructive Critic," Washington Post, February 22, 2002.

14. "Globalization and Cinema," in Correspondence: An International Review of Culture and

Society (New York: The Committee on Intellectual Correspondence, published by the

Council on Foreign Relations), No. 8, Summer/Fall, 2001, p. 1.

15. Keith Richburg, "Vive le Cinema! France Looks to Protect Its Film Industry's 'Cultural

Exception,'" Washington Post, January 28, 2002.

16. Richburg, Washington Post, January 28, 2002.

Globalization, Culture, and Identities in Crisis 295

17. New York Times, September 1,2000. 18. Guy Konopnicki, "French Cinema's American Obsession," abridged from Marianne,

March 5-11,2001, reprinted in Correspondence, Summer/Fall 2001, p. 9.

19. Film titles on display at the Sony multiplex at Potsdammer Platz, June 17, 2000.

20. Marc Kaufman, "Afghanistan's Monument of Rubble," Washington Post, March 6, 2002.

21. Subculture: the meaning of style (London & NY: Routledge, 1979). 22. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3

(Summer 1973): 22-49, at 27.

23. Louis Hebron and John F. Stack, Jr., "The Globalization Process: Debunking the Myths."

Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago,

IL., 20-24 February, 2001.

24. Hebron & Stack, Loc cit.

25. The term is that of Joseph Nye, in Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature of American

Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990.) Also see Nye, The Paradox of American Power:

Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (NY: Oxford UP, 2002.) 26. Richard Pells, "American Culture Goes Global, or Does It?" The Chronicle of Higher

Education, April 12,2002. 27. Selma Reuben Holo, Beyond the Prado: Museums and Identity in Democratic Spain

(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1999), p. 149.

28. Andrew Solomon, An Awakening After the Taliban," New York Times, March 10, 2002.

After the ouster of the Taliban, the new minister of information and culture, Said

Makhtoum Rahim, estimated that the Taliban had destroyed "about 80% of our cultural

identity." 29. Michael Howard, "What's in a Name? How to Fight Terrorism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81,

No. 1 (January/February 2002): 8-13, at 13.

30. The 10% figure was used by French foreign minister Hubert V?drine, cited in David

Ignatius, "France's Constructive Critic," Washington Post, February 22, 2002. However, different polling questions provide a range of numbers. One poll taken during the spring 2002 Presidential election found 31% of respondents identifying the U.S. in response to the question, "Who are the principal adversaries of France?" See Le Figaro, "Suivi

Pr?sidentielle 2002: Place de la France dans le monde. Sondage IFOP," Le Figaro (Paris),

April 2, 2002.

31. The term is quoted in William Drodziak, "L'Etat C'est Mouse," Washington Post, March

2,1992. 32. T.R. Reid, "After Shaky Start, London Bridge Reopens," Washington Post, February 23,

2002.

33. Robert Paarlberg, "The Global Food Fight," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 3 (May/June

2000): 24-38. Paarlberg's analysis of this issue is compelling, and he also notes that the

de facto ban has blocked corn imports from the United States worth roughly $200 million

annually to U.S. farmers.

34. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.

35. David Brooks summarizes these ideas in his thoughtful review of Cantor's book. See

"Farewell to Greatness: America from Gilligan's Island to the X-Files," The Weekly Stan

dard, September 17, 2001, pp. 31-35.

36. Data in Jeffrey M. Jones, "Ratings of Government and Bush Remain High," Gallup News

Service, October 31,2001, www.gallup.com/poll/Releases/pr011031f.asp. 37. See Larry Kudlow, "Closing the Book on Tina," townhall.com, February 1, 2002. Kudlow

makes a strong case for the post 9/11 cultural shift described above.

38. Source: hardcover nonfiction bestseller list, New York Times Book Review, March 3,2002,

p. 18.

39. David Hoffman, "Beyond Public Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 2 (March/April 2002), p. 89

40. Elisabetta Burba "How Lebanon Reacted to the News," Wall Street Journal Europe,

September 19, 2001. As yet another example, Osama bin Laden in his video denunci ations of the United States seems to be wearing a Timex Ironman Triathlon watch. See

296 Lieber and Weisberg

Edward Rothstein. "Damning (Yet Desiring) Mickey and the Big Mac: It Isn't Imperialism but Freedom That Makes Pop Culture So Appealing Even Among America's Enemies,"

New York Times, March 2, 2002. 41. Quoted in "British Detail bin Laden Tie to U.S. Attacks," New York Times, October 5,

2001. Also see text of report issued by British government, "Responsibility for the Terrorist

Atrocities in the United States, 11 September, 2001," reprinted in the same issue. 42. Fouad Ajami, "Arabs Have Nobody to Blame but Themselves," Wall Street Journal,

October 16,2001. Also see Ajami, The Dream Palace oftheArabs:A Generation's Odyssey

(New York: Pantheon, 1998.) 43. Text of bin Laden Remarks. "Hypocrisy Rears Its Ugly Head," as broadcast by al-Jazeera

television on October 7,2001. Washington Post, October 8,2001. 44. David Rhode and C. J. Chivers, "Qaeda's Grocery Lists and Manuals of Killing," New York

Times, March 17, 2002, p. 18.

45. On this point, see Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Approaches to the Modern History

of the Middle East (NY: Oxford University Press, 2002.) 46. Quoted in Daniel Pipes, "God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?" The

National Interest, No. 66 (Winter 2001/02), pp. 14-21 at p. 17.

47. The Egyptian study was conducted in 1980 by a respected Egyptian scholar, Said Eddin

Ibrahim, and is cited in Pipes, p. 16. It should be noted that in the late 1990s, Ibrahim himself was jailed as a result of his vigorous efforts to promote democratic freedoms within Egypt. Daniel Pipes makes a compelling argument that militant Islam is not a response to poverty and has often surged in countries experiencing rapid economic growth. He concludes that

militant Islam has far more to do with issues of identity than with economics. P. 14.

48. Fouad Ajami, "Nowhere Man," New York Times Magazine, October 7,2001. 49. These data, in a survey done by Gallup for USA Today and CNN, should be regarded

with some caution. Although Gallup polled nearly 10,000 respondents in nine countries

(Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, Lebanon, Morocco, Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia), the percentages reported may not be reliable. Summary data for the entire group were

not weighted by size of population, non-citizens were included, and the political cultures in most of the countries would make respondents wary of expressing their views candidly. See, Richard Morin and Claudia Dean, "The Poll That Didn't Add Up: Spin on Data Blurs Findings From Gallup's Muslim Survey, Washington Post, March 23, 2002. Also see

CNN.com, "Poll: Muslims Call U.S. 'Ruthless, Arrogant'," February 26, 2001.

50. An appalling example appeared in a Saudi newspaper, the government daily, Al-Riyadh. In a two part series, a columnist, Dr. Umayma Ahmad Al-Jalahma of King Faysal University in Al-Damman, wrote on the "Jewish Holiday of Purim," stating that, "For this holiday, the Jewish people must obtain human blood so that their clerics can prepare the holiday

pastries." The article is translated in MEMRI, Middle East research Institute, Special

Dispatch?Saudi Arabia/Anti-Semitism, 3.13.02, No. 354, www.memri.org. The blood libel

has also appeared in the Egyptian government dailies, Al-Ahram (October 28, 2000) and

Al-Akhbar (October 20,2000 and March 25,2001), see MEMRI's Special Dispatches #150

and 201.

51. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (NY: Harper & Row, 1967), Author's In

troduction, p. 14. Also see The Old Regime and the Revolution; ed. Francois Furet and

Fran?oise Melonio (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). Originally published,

(NY: Harper & Brothers, 1856). 52. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 131ff.

53. "What We're Fighting For: A Letter From America," Text of statement from a group of American scholars, Chronicle of Higher Education, posted February 12, 2002: http://

chronicle.com/weekly/documents/v48/i24/4824sep_llJetter.htm 54. Salman Rushdie, "America and the Anti-Americans," New York Times, February 4,2002. 55. Abd Al-Hamid Al-Bakkoush, "The U.S. and the Complexities of the Arab Mind," Al

Hayat (London), February 12, 2002. Quoted in MEMRI, 2/22/02, No. 348, February 22, 2002. www.memri.org.