Civil Liability and Private Police

Policing and Society, 2003, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 197–210

THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY OF PRIVATE POLICE: LESSONS FROM NEW YORK, JOHANNESBURG, AND MEXICO CITY

ROBERT C. DAVIS,* CHRISTOPHER W. ORTIZ, SARAH DADUSH, JENNY IRISH, ARTURO ALVARADO and DIANE DAVIS

Vera Institute of Justice, New York, NY, USA

(Received August 2001; In final form 11 December 2002)

The accountability of public police has been well documented. The role and function of internal affairs divisions, civilian review boards, the media, and criminal and civil courts has been explored in many works. The same cannot be said about their private counterparts. Since the beginning of the 1970s, the global community has witnessed a surge in the number of and the reliance upon private police forces. Yet, empirical knowledge about their functions is hard to find and the mechanisms through which they are held accountable are still relatively unknown. This article explores the multiple paths through which private police are accountable in three applications drawn from diverse parts of the world. We conclude effective accountability is possible for private police through a variety of mechanisms.

Keywords: Accountability; Private security; Private police

INTRODUCTION

The growing privatization of police services is a global phenomenon. It was first noted in the United States in a 1972 Rand Corporation study commissioned by the National Institute of Justice. Several years later, Stenning and Shearing (1980) observed that a “quiet revolution” toward private policing had occurred in Canada. South (1994) documented a similar trend in both Western and Eastern European countries. An update of the original Rand assessment in 1985 concluded that private security had outspent public law enforcement by 73 per cent and employed two-and-a-half times as many people (Kakalik and Wildhorn 1971; Stenning and Shearing 1980; Cunningham and Taylor 1985; South 1994).

The growth of private policing has been described as having several benefits. Scholars have noted that the number of private police far outranks that of public police, thereby substantially adding to the physical presence of law enforcement (Button 1999). Others have noted that private police free up the public police from more mundane patrol duties, allowing them to focus on the business of fighting crime (Irish 1999).

*Correspondence to: All correspondence and requests should be addressed to Robert C. Davis, Vera Institute of Justice, 233 Broadway, 12th Floor, New York, NY 10279, USA.

ISSN 1043-9463 print/ISSN 1477-2728 online/03/020197-14  2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/1043946032000071802

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Police experts have expressed reservations about privatization as well. Some object on social grounds, arguing that private policing will further divide the nation into two camps: the wealthy who can afford to insulate themselves from crime by hiring private police and the poor who must rely on the more limited services of the public police (Chaiken and Chaiken 1987; Wilson et al. 1994). South (1994) makes an extreme version of this argument, predicting that the crimes prevented by private police might actually be displaced onto the poorer sections of the population unable to afford similar protection. Smith (1994) adds another argument, stating that public safety is a concern of the government and therefore policing should solely be handled by public govern- mental agencies.

Lack of public accountability for private police is another area of concern (Fixler and Poole 1992; South 1994; Sarre 1998). As early as 1971, Scott and McPherson (1971) worried that private police might infringe upon civil liberties with impunity. Formal and familiar mechanisms exist around the world to hold public police accountable for their actions. Externally, the independent review of police actions is carried out by civilian oversight agencies, ombudsmen, governmental fact finding commissions and the media (Skolnick and McCoy 1985; Walker 2001). Internally, police management provides for accountability through the workings of internal affairs and professional standards offices (Reiner 1993). Walker (2001) points out that in addition to these forms of oversight, another level of indirect oversight is through the functioning of the political system and the courts.

Accountability mechanisms for private police are less well understood and often emanate from the private rather than the public sector. Smith (1994: 199) writes, “There is much concern in the arena of civil liberties about the accountability and performance of civil police and law enforcement agencies, [but] there is virtually no discussion about the private security sector.”

In many cases, the state seemingly has little power or incentive to hold private police accountable (Sarre 1994). The most visible form of accountability – regulation via the state or other formalized body – has been called deficient (Sarre 1998). Scholars have noted that regulation is often minimal and fragmented (Prenzler and Draper 1997). Hinds (1994) argues that private security guards do not have to abide by the same legislative and procedural constraints as the public police. Wilson (1994: 160) states “private security organizations are not publicly accountable and are not subject to the same kind of government and public scrutiny that [public] police forces are subject to”. All of this leads to a concern among some scholars and practitioners that the formal accountability mechanisms for private police are weak and inconsistent (Sarre 1998; South 1998; Stenning and Cornish 1975).

Others have questioned this belief, arguing that private police are accountable to other sources beyond that of state regulation (Stenning 1994; Sarre 1998). Prenzler et al. state: “The security industry is subject to a plethora of commercial laws and provisions of criminal law” and conclude that the belief that private police are not accountable is “simply wrong” (Prenzler et al. 1996: 21). Stenning (1994) believes that the accountability of private police has been understated: marketplace competition, consumer pressures, demands of organized labour and potential civil liability, he argues, compensate for lesser state regulation and oversight. Sarre (1998) echoes this in his argument that governmental regulation, market forces, self-regulation, civil and crimi- nal litigation, and the media all function together to bring accountability to private police.

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Governmental regulation of private policing is the most visible form of accountabil- ity. It can take the form of licensing, insurance requirements, training standards and registration requirements (Stenning 2000; Swanton 1993). However, several observers have noted that governmental regulation is often weak or ineffective (Stenning 2000; Prenzler 1995).

“Marketplace accountability” refers to the concepts of competition and supply and demand. In theory, only the best companies will thrive in a market where many choices are available, while companies that provide sub-standard services and harm the client or public will be forced out of business (Swanton 1993). Sarre (1998: 101) argues that: “If the operators do not perform satisfactorily and cannot continue to satisfy clients, then they will not remain in business.” Experts have debated the potential of the marketplace to promote adequate accountability, some siding for and some against (Sarre 1998; Hinds 1994; Swanton 1993).

“Self-regulation” refers to requirements and guidelines established by the security industry as a whole. Often mirroring governmental regulation, self-regulation can take the form of licensing requirements, training standards and registration requirements imposed by voluntary membership in trade associations (Sarre 1998). Self-regulation also includes internal company policies, supervision and disciplinary procedures. Swanton (1993) points out that internal regulation can often be much stronger than that provided for by industry associations.

Litigation has a long history in the accountability of public police, and has been explored as an accountability mechanism for private police as well (Walker 2001; Perez 1994). In general, accountability to the courts has proven to be an effective method of accountability for public police. Landmark decisions such as Mapp v. Ohio and Miranda v. Arizona, in addition to evidentiary rules such as the exclusionary rule, have served to check the powers of the public police in the United States (Walker 2001; Perez 1994). To date, there is no consensus about the effectiveness of litigation on the accountability of private police. Some scholars argue that litigation is an effective means for promoting accountability, while others make the opposing argument (Sten- ning 2000; Sarre 1998; Warren 1995; Bayley and Shearing 1996). Sarre (1998) has argued that companies’ efforts to settle suits in order to avoid litigation mitigates the potential effectiveness of litigation. He explores actual cases in order to evaluate the potential for accountability, concluding that the criminal law is a “crude tool” which poses “grave limitations … [for] general accountability” (Sarre 1998: 101). Sarre contrasts this with civil suits, citing their high potential and relevance on the account- ability of the private sector.

The media as a source of accountability has been rarely discussed. A rich history of the effects of the media on the public police has shown that the media can be an effective way to promote accountability (Niederhoffer 1969; Skolnick and McCoy 1985). By pointing out malpractice and the injustices of the private security industry, the media has the potential to encourage public sentiment for reform.

This article discusses the potential for each of these accountability mechanisms to affect the conduct of private policing. What is not known is how that potential is translated into practice. What is the relative significance of each of these mechanisms in specific private security applications? Does each play a role in particular applications, or are some mechanisms more salient than others?

The case studies presented in this work examine the ways in which private police are held accountable in diverse applications. The literature on private policing is

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remarkably lacking in empirical study, especially on the topic of accountability (Stenning 2000; Sarre 1998). The work presented here attempts to describe the ways in which governmental regulation and other forms of accountability operate within specific companies, noting the presence or absence of each and the specific ways in which the mechanisms help to form company policy.

METHOD

Three case studies were chosen for the present work. The case studies represent an aspect of private policing in three different countries: South Africa, Mexico and the United States. In addition, the case studies represent three different models of private policing: public spaces patrolled by private police, private spaces being patrolled by private police and public police employed as private security. The case studies were chosen to test the manner in which the currently accepted accountability mechanisms for private police operate on an international basis as well as across the differing modes of private policing.

Data for this work were gathered through interviews with managers of the private policing firms, private security officers within the firms, local public police administra- tors and clients. Interviews were conducted on-site in the majority of the cases, many times in the managerial offices. In all instances, top-level administrators and mid-level operations mangers were sought out for interviews. At least one administrator and manager participated at each case study site. Security officers were interviewed both individually and in focus groups. Focus groups consisted of available samples created from the ranks of officers at roll call for both day and night shifts. Two focus groups per site were conducted. Commercial clients were sought out and interviewed on a voluntary basis. In all cases, the interviews were conducted at the client’s place of business. Two researchers per site conducted the interviews and focus groups together. The interviewers were instructed to focus specifically on the five mechanisms of accountability, as they relate to each case study. In all cases, interviewers took notes during the interviews.

Official legislation authorizing and empowering private police firms and their officers was also examined. One researcher per case study accessed legislation via governmental agencies, regulatory bodies and legal references. This search was limited to legislation passed within the last twenty years.

Finally, a search of the local print media was conducted to explore the effect of media publicity on the private police. Records were gathered via an Internet search utilizing the case study name as the search criterion. Utilizing a modified content analysis for each site, records were coded into a dichotomous variable reflecting positive and negative stories. The lack of records made any significant analysis impossible.

THE CASE STUDIES

New York: Public Spaces Patrolled by Private Police

We examined the operations and accountability of the Metro Tech Business Improve- ment District, which is located in downtown Brooklyn. A Business Improvement District (BID) is a non-profit corporation that is established when property owners

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within a defined geographic area agree to levy an additional tax assessment on their property (Travers and Weimar 1996). In this way, BID members generate a supplemen- tal pool of money that is then used to promote business and economic development.

The Metro Tech BID’s primary concern is public safety and, as such, they have established their own private police agency. Metro Tech’s private police force currently consists of 28 officers. Four sergeants and three corporals supervise shifts and organize schedules determining the patrol patterns for each officer. Operations are administered by a director of public safety. Metro Tech’s private police operate 24 hours a day. They patrol on bike, foot or scooter. Their primary activity is surveillance, and they provide a visible presence that the public police cannot. In addition, they respond to emergency situations, such as fires or serious crimes, securing the scene until the police or fire department arrives.

As it is structured, Metro Tech represents public spaces being patrolled by private police. The Metro Tech officers do not have police power, but are granted expanded enforcement power through specialized training and certification as peace officers. Peace officer status gives Metro Tech officers more powers than regular security officers but they still cannot utilize firearms.

Johannesburg: Private Spaces patrolled by Private Police

Sentry Security Armed Response served as our subject in South Africa. Sentry Security is a private policing firm that serves both residential and commercial properties in South Africa. According to company records, Sentry Security serves 120,000 clients: 45,000 of whom are in Johannesburg alone.

Each Sentry client has an alarm system linked to a central control room. All 45,000 clients in Johannesburg are linked to a central operations room staffed by up to 16 people. If an alarm is triggered, a signal goes to the operations centre, which in turn dispatches an armed response team. The Johannesburg operations room receives approximately 400,000 signals each month, dispatching about 40,000 vehicles to respond. To make this possible, the company deploys at least 76 armed-response vans and 12 supervisory vehicles on for each shift. Their role is to respond quickly to a signal and, once at the scene, to secure clients and their property.

Sentry Security is an example of private spaces being patrolled by private police. Response officers are equipped with 9mm pistols and bulletproof vests, but they have no special powers of arrest: they can only make citizens arrests if they apprehend suspects.

Mexico City: Private Spaces Patrolled by Public Police

In Mexico City, the Banking and Industrial Police (Policia Bancaria e Industrial – PBI) served as the subject of our case study. The PBI provides security services to banks within Mexico City. Individual officers are contracted out to banks through the PBI. Its major work is comprised of surveillance of bank branches and administrative buildings, and protection of securities and cash in transit. The PBI is the largest public police corporation in charge of banking security in the Federal District. Police personnel are hired and trained directly by the PBI.

The PBI divides Mexico City into regions, each with its own cadre and zone headquarters. There are currently 16,748 PBI employees. The PBI is self-financed but

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not completely autonomous. The PBI is an example of public police patrolling private spaces. PBI officers are armed and do have strong enforcement powers due to the fact that they are sworn police officers.

FINDINGS

All three of our case studies had multiple and substantial accountability measures in place. Two of the companies we studied proved to be leaders in terms of professional- ism and overlapping accountability mechanisms. We now discuss each accountability mechanism in the context of how it operates within the case study. Wherever possible, potential flaws and criticisms are pointed out.

Governmental Regulation

South Africa

In South Africa, the major piece of legislation regulating private policing is the Security Officers Act. This Act established the Security Officers Board, charged with oversight of the regulatory processes within the security industry. Under the Act, all companies, owners and security guards must be registered with the Board. This process includes screening all applicants to ensure that people guilty of criminal offenses are not offered work in the industry. The board is also responsible for creating minimum training standards and ensuring that they are followed. The Act established an inspectorate under the auspices of the board to enforce the regulations, and a code of conduct to ensure ethical and legal practices by security companies.

As the statutory body responsible for regulating the industry, the Security Officers Board is responsible for dealing with complaints regarding abuses within the industry. Although the board investigates and acts on such complaints, several factors limit its ability to handle them effectively. First, the board is dominated by the security industry, only two members are not industry representatives. Second, the board has just 28 inspectors nationwide who follow up on all complaints of abuse. Finally, most of the general public does not even know that the board exists and they are unaware that it is possible to lodge complaints with it. Despite these shortcomings, the board has brought a number of cases against the more unscrupulous operators. Between July 1998 and August 1999, it charged 1,349 security guards or operators with violations. Summonses were subsequently executed in 713 of these cases and 528 of these were prosecuted.

As a licensed operator, Sentry Security is governed by the Security Officers Act, and adheres stringently to its requirements. Before officers can be hired, Sentry Security screens all candidates using background checks, psychological examinations and, in some cases, lie detector tests. In addition, once they are hired, all guards are trained to a level two grades above the minimum qualifications set by the Security Officers Act.

Mexico

The Mexican government has passed several laws that deal with the regulation of banking police. The Preventive Police Act outlines regulations for the PBI and defines the contractual requirements between it and the individual banks. In addition, it delegates the responsibility for oversight of the administration of the PBI to the

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Ministry of Public Security and the Congressional Comptroller. The Public Security Law created the Honor and Justice Council, a group of officers whose sole responsi- bility is to monitor police behaviour and sanction conduct that is not clearly regulated by any existing law or code. It is PBI’s policy to refer all cases of misconduct and malfeasance to the Honor and Justice Council for discipline. Punishments issued by the Council can range from verbal reprimands to dismissal. In fact, however, a very small number of officers are dismissed. Opponents of self-regulation by the public police have questioned whether the councils with compositions such as this can effectively police their own (Walker 2001; Perez 1994; Reiner 1993). Moreover, the accountability scheme leaves out the banks, which have a strong interest in ensuring that bank police officers are honest, effective and respectful in dealing with members of the public.

New York

In contrast to the other two sites, local rather than national government is responsible for regulating the security industry in New York. The municipal government regulates security in business improvement districts only indirectly through control over creation and maintenance of the BID itself. Centralized governmental investigation of miscon- duct like that which occurs in Mexico or South Africa is rare. Instead, most issues of misconduct are left in the hands of the BID.

The greatest influence of government regulation derives from the specialized status of the security officers, who are trained and licensed as peace officers. Training standards for peace officers far exceeds minimum standards set by the New York State Security Guard Act. In fact, because Metro Tech participates in this arrangement, its officers are the only BID security officers to receive training at the New York Police Department’s training academy. This special status gives them extra enforcement powers, but also serves to hold them more accountable for their actions. If criminal conduct is alleged, the New York City Police Department is mandated to investigate. The accused officer’s license is immediately revoked until the investigation is com- pleted. If the allegations are substantiated, formal charges are filed and the license is revoked indefinitely. Metro Tech administrators estimate that they have had about six allegations of abuse by officers in the nine-year history of the BID.

Accountability through the Marketplace

South Africa

In South Africa, a close examination into the number of companies registered with the Security Officers Board illustrates the work of market forces. According to the Board’s figures, in 1990, 6,453 companies were registered with the Board. By 1997, 2,464 had shut down operations, leaving a little under 4,000 companies in operation. According to the Board, these figures do not represent a contraction in demand, but rather a funneling of demand into specific reputable companies. Those companies that provided professional services found their business increase while those that provided substan- dard services closed due to lack of business. Sentry Security illustrates this trend. In 1992, Sentry Security had approximately 2,500 clients in Johannesburg. By 2000, that number grew to 45,000 clients in Johannesburg and 250,000 throughout South Africa.

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The marketplace also has an effect on individual guards. Board figures also reveal that there are approximately 350,000 registered guards in South Africa, but only 160,000 of them are employed. These figures underscore the fact that not all companies or persons that set out to provide security service will remain in business.

Sentry’s managers are keenly aware of the importance of satisfying the client and the market and minimizing potential risk. According to one company official: “We exist because of our clients and therefore the client must always be the top priority.” This understanding governs Sentry’s policy mandating stringent candidate screening and training.

Mexico

Mexico City further illustrates the significance of marketplace accountability. Prior to the 1990’s, bank security was the sole task of the PBI, who were subcontracted by individual banks. By the mid-1990’s, the number and severity of bank robberies had dramatically increased (“Crime going up in the Capital”, The News, 19 March 2002: 1). Confidence in the ability of the public police in bank security was shaken, especially when it was revealed that some police officers themselves were implicated in the robberies. In response to the rise in crime against banks, the banking industry formed the Bankers’ Association of Mexico, an association of owners of private, public, national and foreign banks, largely shifting responsibility for decisions on bank security away from the government. Many banks decided to stop contracting with the PBI for public police officers and hire private security firms to guard their branches instead. The PBI is learning that marketplace accountability can be powerful, as their representation in banking security lessens each year.

New York

In New York, marketplace accountability for the Metro Tech private police came in the form of a board made up of business owners. All operational decisions and actions are approved by this board, allowing the clientele to have direct input into the daily operations of the BID. This is a significant departure from what is experienced in South Africa or Mexico. The clientele there can only influence the policies and actions of private security companies to the degree that discontinuing service contracts will allow. In New York, the board, which is the clientele, can make direct changes to the operations of the BID. The corporate entities that founded Metro Tech have proven to be adept overseers, making a concerted effort to staff the BID security offices with top-notch management, establish hiring guidelines that allow only well-qualified indi- viduals to become officers, and ensure that the officers abide by the organization’s code of conduct.

Criminal and Civil Litigation

Mexico

According to the General Director of the PBI, the PBI has never been the subject of a civil suit even though the systems necessary for lawsuits are in place in Mexico City. This is because banks often opt to settle potential lawsuits before they are ever brought to court. The effect has been to insulate the PBI from litigation.

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South Africa

The processes by which many legal remedies function in other countries are under- developed in South Africa (Irish 1999). In addition, many members of the public fear the police and are reluctant to initiate actions against them. This can be seen in the tragic events of the Thembisa Railway Station tragedy, in which 16 commuters were shot and stampeded to death by security guards (not employees of Sentry Security) who had used cattle prods to clear a congested railway station. An official investigation revealed that the guards used firearms improperly when confronted with a large crowd, but no civil or criminal charges were ever laid.

In the company’s 12-year history, only one civil claim and one criminal claim has ever been lodged against Sentry Security. The criminal case resulted in a finding of “not guilty” for both the company and the guard involved. The civil case involved a response officer who fired shots at a suspected carjacker. In its decision, the regional court ruled that his actions were improper and awarded damages to the complainant.

New York

New York proved to have the most accountability through both criminal and civil litigation. A total of three lawsuits have been filed in the nine-year history of the Metro Tech BID: one criminal and two civil. The criminal case involved the excessive use of force against a disorderly juvenile. The parents of the juvenile filed formal charges with the New York Police Department, and the guard was arrested and prosecuted. The two civil cases arose from separate incidents. In one incident, a guard was alleged to have run over a pedestrian’s foot with a scooter and, in the other, a guard was accused of starting a fight while on his way to work. The actions in these cases are still pending.

Self-Regulation

South Africa

Sentry Security is part of a security organization known as the South African Intruder Detection Services Association (SAIDSA). In order to join SAIDSA, companies must meet certain standards and obey several by-laws. SAIDSA attempts to monitor and enforce these standards by investigating complaints and conducting random checks, but it only has authority over its members. It cannot penalize companies who choose not to join, nor is there legislation to enforce the standards it sets.

SAIDSA’s standards are far higher than those set by the South African Security Officers Board, and many armed-response companies feel it is more effective in regulating members. In fact, SAIDSA’s high standards have helped promote improved practices in the industry (Irish 1999). Recognizing SAIDSA’s importance, many insurance companies now look for evidence that SAIDSA-approved companies are providing security to clients.

Sentry has effective internal controls embodied in national standards for all of its branches. Managing directors of each branch attend monthly national meetings, and are required to ensure that these standards are met. Interviews with Sentry clients in Johannesburg and Durban suggest, however, that there are provincial variations, and that the standards in the Johannesburg area are substantially higher than those in the

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Durban area. This is possibly because the company has its origins and head office in Johannesburg.

At the start of each shift, supervisors check response officers to ensure that they are sober and presentable. Officers are issued guns and ammunition, which are registered in a company firearm registry. The guns are checked before they are issued. Vehicles are then checked and the instructions for the shift given. At the end of each shift, the same checks take place and the guns and ammunition are locked in a gun safe. If guards fire their guns at any time, then they must immediately report it to their supervisors. Management then investigates the matter. In fact, since management personnel are on duty 24 hours a day, they are available to immediately investigate any kind of questionable incident.

The company states that it is quick to take action against guards involved in misconduct. Officers lose monthly bonus pay for such minor transgressions as oc- casional absenteeism or bad driving. Serious transgressions, such as failure to adhere to company policy or malicious damage to people or property, lead to internal disciplinary procedures that could result in dismissal.

New York

We identified four separate internal accountability mechanisms that control the behav- iour of BID officers in New York. First, officers must pass written examinations each year as part of their annual review. These examinations test their knowledge of the code of conduct and duties set forth in the manual on patrol procedures. Guidelines prescribe appropriate conduct in responding to fires, crimes and other situations. For example, the manual explains when officers may search people accused of shoplifting and how these searches must be conducted.

Second, officers are granted or denied merit increases based on their performance. BID administrators do not evaluate Metro Tech officers on the basis of the number of criminals they apprehend or contacts with the public, but they do scrutinize behaviour closely. A log of minor violations tracks tardiness, misuse of sick time and other petty infractions.

Third, officers on patrol are constantly subject to surveillance from a closed-circuit television system. Officers are well aware that most of their activity is observable and that infractions can be preserved and viewed at a later date. According to a Metro Tech administrator, when a merchant once complained that an officer had been absent from his post, the tapes from the cameras were used to verify that the officer had been within his assigned sector.

Fourth, Metro Tech’s assistant director of public safety investigates complaints against officers. Serious complaints are brought to the attention of Metro Tech’s executive director, and then to the board.

Mexico

The PBI assigns a large proportion of its officers to supervisory duties. Each region and each headquarters has a central administration officer. In addition, there are officers responsible for administration services at each bank. These officers report both to the contractor (the bank) and to the next level of authority within the PBI. They address nearly all of the requests of the banks and negotiate strategies and policies for

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preventing assaults and robberies directly. PBI also sets minimum hiring standards for its officers. To be eligible to work for the PBI, an individual must have completed secondary studies, complete a three-month training course and pass a written examin- ation. On completion, they are ranked as basic police. After a period of about three years, they are eligible for promotion to mid-level positions.

Media

New York

In New York, where there are no less than four major newspapers, we found little recent media coverage – either positive or negative – about the actions of BID security officers. Feature pieces did appear in several of the papers years earlier when the first BID’s were created. These pieces tended to emphasize the greater surveillance and sense of safety among merchants and citizens in BID territory. One more recent story received significant media attention. It detailed the efforts of security officers in one BID to remove homeless people from BID territory as part of a campaign to improve quality of life in the area. We did not encounter any negative news articles about the Metro Tech BID.

Mexico

Newspapers in Mexico City were found to run numerous stories about the banking police. Reporters often criticized the public police for their involvement in bank security. One reporter wrote, “The PBI has been used as a business and the companies hiring its officers are operating on the margins of the law, because when PBI provides private security services it becomes a business and this is not its function” (Ramirez 1998: A1). Articles like this that question the role of public police contracting security services to banks are plentiful, as are articles focusing on accountability issues, but the latter stories sometimes suffer from inaccurate and sensationalized reporting. For example, newspapers still report frequently about the incidence and circumstances surrounding bank robberies. However, according to a manager of Seproban, a mixed private/public banking security company, its own investigation into media stories found that some robberies that were reported had never actually occurred, while factual information was incorrect in others.

South Africa

In South Africa, newspaper accounts about private security were found to be sparse, rarely getting into the issues surrounding the accountability of private police. In general, the print media were not playing an effective role in promoting accountability of private security.

CONCLUSION

Our work suggests that private security services can be highly accountable through a diverse array of sources. Between the three case studies, we saw instances of effective governmental regulation, market regulation, self-regulation and regulation through

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litigation and the media. The salience of each of these accountability mechanisms varied from site to site and none was sufficient in and of itself. In two of the three sites, the various mechanisms, in concert, resulted in well-run, professional operations.

The security industry is regulated by state government in New York. Yet the strongest governmental regulation influencing Metro Tech occurred through the training programme required for individual officers to acquire peace officer status. Through this mechanism, Metro Tech officers received a portion of the same training required of public police officers. Even more powerful in creating a climate of accountability for Metro Tech officers was the oversight board made up of Metro Tech business owners. These companies had a significant stake in seeing that citizens felt safe on their way to work or shop. To promote a sense of comfort, it was important to the board that security officers were both an effective visible presence to deter would-be criminals and respectful in their dealings with citizens. It was also important to avoid costly and embarrassing lawsuits against the security force. The strong pressures toward account- ability led Metro Tech to develop stringent internal accountability procedures that included annual written examinations, merit pay increases and closed circuit TV surveillance.

In South Africa, governmental regulation also played a significant role in establishing hiring and training standards for the private security industry. Oversight and investiga- tion of misconduct by the Security Officers Board seems to work well, judging by the large numbers of officers charged and prosecuted by the board. We also noted that heavy competition in the security industry in South Africa has encouraged companies to maintain high standards in order to attract and hold a client base. As in New York, the existence of these strong external accountability mechanisms has produced scrupu- lous internal regulation at Sentry Security. This manifested itself in the insistence on high standards of conduct for employees and disciplinary action taken against guards involved in misconduct.

Mexico City’s banking police represent the least successful case in our study in terms of accountability. The board that was established by statute to investigate instances of misconduct by the PBI was questionable in its effectiveness at best. In part, this may be because the board was composed of police officers who seem to have a hard time finding fault with the behaviour of fellow officers. (Yet South Africa has a board with similar composition that seems to work well.) Another structural problem that reduced accountability was that the client banks – the organizations that had a clear interest in performance of PBI officers – were not involved in the chain of command. Similarly, client banks de-emphasized litigation, making it an ineffective tool for keeping police behaviour in check. The hopeful thing is that, in Mexico City, banks have begun turning away from the PBI toward private security companies to protect their assets and clients. Thus, after the failure of other accountability systems, market forces may yet produce a system that is highly accountable.

A common theme that emerged from our work was that internal controls are essential to promote a high degree of accountability. A climate that encourages accountability can be created through government-mandated policies, training and administrative oversight. However, while external accountability mechanisms may have symbolic importance in their own right, their functional importance appears to lie in their ability to provoke effective management and internal controls. Its is only when private police management take officer conduct and misconduct seriously and disseminate that message through meaningful actions that effective accountability can occur.

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It was abundantly clear from the case studies that one accountability mechanism alone is unlikely to effectively control misconduct. The potential for robust accountabil- ity can only be realized when many mechanisms are used in unison. When multiple accountability mechanisms are developed and elaborated for private policing, then there is a strong possibility that officers will approach their jobs in a manner that is both respectful and effective.

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