easy paper
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Ch. # 6 Voting systems Different between Majority and plurality: Majority (any percent greater than 50 % is called a majority) Plurality The candidate that receives the most votes is declared the winner.
In case of a tie, a special runoff election might be held. Ex. With 50 Voters, 3 – candidates
Candidate # Votes Percent
A 13 26%
B 27 54%
C 10 20%
B : is a winner by majority
Candidate # Votes Percent
D 15 30%
E 23 46%
F 12 24%
E : is a winner by Plurality
The plurality method of voting may produce a “winner” even though a majority of voters did not vote for the “winner.” This dilemma can be avoided in several ways
To avoid this:
One common way is to eliminate the candidate with the fewest votes and then hold another election.
The voters who vote for the eliminated candidate now vote for their second choice.
If the majority is still not attained, the process is repeated until a candidate obtains a majority of votes.
The Plurality-with-Elimination Method The idea is to eliminate the candidates with the fewest first-place votes one at a time until one of them gets a majority; Each person vote for his or her favorite candidate.
If a candidate receives a majority of votes, that candidate is declared the winner.
If no, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and a new election is held.
The process is repeated until a candidate receives a majority of the votes.
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Ex.
Choice A B C
# of votes 15 23 12
Using plurality method: A: 23 Most, not majority. We eliminate C, we go to next vote.
Choice A B
# of votes 21 29
B: 29, B – received a majority. B – Winner.
Rather than holding a new election after eliminating the candidate with the fewest votes, each voter rank each candidate during the first election.
Instant Runoff Method (Ranked-Choice)
Each voter rank all the candidates; 1st. 2nd. 3rd. Choice, if a candidate receives a majority of the first choice votes, that candidate is declared the winner.
If no candidate receives a majority, then the candidate with the fewest first choice votes is eliminated, and these votes are given to the next preferred candidate.
If a candidate now has a majority of first choice votes, that candidate is declared the
winner.
If no majority repeat until a candidate receive a majority.
Because the choices are being put in an order (that is, a person must make a first choice, a second choice, and a third choice), we conclude that permutations can be used to determine the number of different rankings.
Voter preference tables: Is a tables that list different rankings of the candidates along with the number of voters who chose each specific ranking.
Ex: Consider 60 voters, 3-candidates as shown in the preference table. Majority (at least: 30+1)
# of voters 9 14 15 4 2 16
1st. Choice A A C C B B
2nd. Choice C B B A A C
3rd. Choice B C A B C A
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Round 1.
Candidate A B C
# of 1st. place 9+14=23 2+16=18 15+4=19
No Majority, we eliminate: B and these votes are given to the next preferred candidate.
# of voters 9 14 15 4 2 16
1st. Choice A A C C A C
2nd. Choice C C A A C A
Round 2.
Candidate A C
# of 1st. place 9+14+2=25 15+4+16=35
C: Is the winner. – Majority
To win an election using the instant runoff method, a candidate must capture a majority of first-choice votes.
Rather than tallying the first-choice votes only, we might want to tally the first-choice votes, the second-choice votes, the third-choice votes, and so on. This is the basis of the Borda count method.
Borda Count Method of Voting If we have an election with K candidates we will give 1 point for last place, 2 points for second to last, . . . and K points for first place. The candidate with the highest total number of points is the winner. We will call such a candidate the Borda winner.
Ex: Consider 60 voters, 3-candidates as shown in the preference table.
9 14 15 4 2 16
1st. Choice A A C C B B
2nd. Choice C B B A A C
3rd. Choice B C A B C A
K = 3 number of candidates.
Each 1st. choice vote is worth 3 – points
Each 2nd. Choice vote is worth 2 – points
Each 3rd. choice vote is worth 1 – point
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Candidate A B C
1st. Choice 9 + 14 = 23 2 + 16 = 18 15 + 4 = 19
2nd. Choice 4 + 2 = 6 14 + 15 = 29 9 + 16 = 25
3rd. Choice 15 + 16 = 31 9 + 4 = 13 14 + 2 = 16
A = (23) (3) + (6) (2) + (31) (1) = 112 points B = (18) (3) + (29) (2) + (13) (1) = 125 points C = (19) (3) + (25) (2) + (16) (1) = 123 points B: Is the winner.
C: was the winner in runoff. !! It is very important to inform voters before the election as to which system will be used.
The Pairwise comparison Method of Voting
Each voter ranks all of the candidates; that is, each select his or her 1st. 2nd. 3rd. Choice, and so on. Each possible pairing of candidates, the candidate with the most votes receives 1 – point; if there is a tie, each candidate receives ½ point. The candidate who receives the most points is declared the winner.
• That is, if there are three candidates, X, Y, and Z, we may consider the mini-elections
or pairwise comparisons of X versus Y, X versus Z, and Y versus Z.
• We then determine the winner of each of these pairwise comparisons, and the candidate who wins the most of these is declared the winner of the overall election.
Ex.
9 14 15 4 2 16
1st. Choice A A C C B B
2nd. Choice C B B A A C
3rd. Choice B C A B C A
Because there are 3 – candidates (A, B, C) we have:
n r
! 3! 3
! ! 2!(3 2)!
n C
r n r
(Pairwise)
(A – B) A = 9 + 14 + 4 = 27 B = 15 + 2 + 16 = 33 Voters preferred B over A, B – receives 1 – point.
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(A – C) A = 9 + 14 + 2 = 25 C = 15 + 4 + 16 = 35 Voters preferred C, over A, C – receives 1 – point.
(B – C) B = 14 + 2 + 16 = 32 C = 9 + 15 + 4 = 28 Voters preferred B over C, B – receives 1 – point.
So, B – receives 2 – points, C – 1 point, A – 0 point. B – Is declared the winner.
Flaws of Voting Systems The outcome of an election may depend on the voting system that is used. Political scientists and mathematician have created a list of criteria that any fair voting system should meet.
But what exactly is meant by the word fair? Political scientists and mathematicians have created a list of criteria that any “fair” voting system should meet.
Four fairness criteria are: 1. The Majority criterion
The candidate X receives a majority of votes, should be declared the winner.
2. The Head-to-Head criterion If a candidate X is favored when compare head-to-head (individually) with each other candidates, then Candidate X should be declared the winner. Some cases plurality method can violate the head-to-head criterion
3. Monotonicity criterion If candidate X wins an election and, in subsequent election, the only changes are in favor of candidate X, then candidate X should be declared the winner. The instant runoff method can in fact violate the monotonicity criterion
4. The irrelevant Alternatives criterion If candidate X wins an election and, in a recount, the only changes are that one or more losing candidates are removed from the ballot, then candidate X should be declared the winner. The pairwise comparison method can violate the irrelevant alternatives criterion.
Each of the common systems of voting can be shown to violate at least one of the four fairness criterion.
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem It is mathematically impossible to create any system of voting (involving three or more candidates) that satisfies all four fairness criteria.
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Methods of Apportionment
Congress
Senate: composed of 2 – senators from each state.
House of Representatives: to determine the number of representative for a particular state by the size of population.
The process of making this decision is called apportionment. (To divide according to a plan) Consequently, several methods of apportionment have been proposed, and several different
methods have actually been used since the first apportionment in 1790.
1. Hamilton’s Method. Was proposed by Alexander Hamilton (1757–1804) and was the first plan to be approved by Congress in 1790.
2. Jefferson’s Method. Was proposed by Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826)
3. Adam’s Method. Was proposed by John Quincy Adams (1767–1848) and has never been used.
4. Webster’s Method. Was proposed by Daniel Webster (1782–1852).
5. Hill-Huntington Method. Was proposed by Joseph Hill (1860–1938) and Edward Huntington (1874–1952), and it has been used following every census from 1940 to the present.
Standard Divisor (d)
The standard divisor – d – is define as: total population
d total number of seats
(round to two decimal place)
Standard Quota (q)
The standard quota is define as: state population
q d
(round to two decimal place)
Quota Rule
The number assigned to each represented unit must be either integer or the standard quota
rounded down to the nearest integer or the standard quota round up to the nearest integer.
Lower quota:
The lower quota (of special state) is the standard quota rounded down to a whole number.
Upper quota:
The upper quota (of special state) is the standard quota rounded up to a whole number.
A modified divisor
Is a number that is close to the standard divisor, and it is denoted by dm
A modified divisor may be less than or greater than the standard divisor
Modified Quota
The modified quota, m
q is the ratio of a state’s population to the modified divisor;
stat's population stat's population
modified quota round to two decimal place modified divisor
m
m
q d
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1. Hamilton’s Method
Hamilton’s Method
Procedure:
1. Calculate the Standard Divisor.
2. Calculate each state’s Standard Quota.
3. Initially assign each state its Lower Quota.
4. If there are surplus seats, give them, one at a time, to states in descending order of the fractional parts of their Standard Quota.
Problems:
The Alabama Paradox
An increase in the total number of seats to be apportioned causes a state to lose a seat.
The Population Paradox
An increase in a state’s population can cause it to lose a seat.
The New States Paradox
adding a new state with its fair share of seats can affect the number of seats due other
states.
Ex:
Use Hamilton’s method to apportioned 10 – seats among the three states. (Population in thousands)
201, 000
20100 20.1 ( ) 10
d Thousans , 94700
4.71 20100
q
State A B C Total
Population 94.7 72.6 33.7 201
Standard quota
using d = 20.1 94.7
4.71 20.1
q 72.6
3.61 20.1
q 33.7
1.68 20.1
q
10
Lower quota 4 3 1 8
Additional seats 1 0 1 2
Number of seats 5 3 2 10
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2. Jefferson’s Method
Procedure:
1. Calculate the Standard Divisor.
2. Calculate each state’s Standard Quota.
3. Initially assign each state its Lower Quota.
4. Check to see if the sum of the Lower Quotas is equal to the correct number of seats to be apportioned.
o If the sum of the Lower Quotas is equal to the correct number of seats to be
apportioned, then apportion to each state the number of seats equal to its Lower
Quota.
o If the sum of the Lower Quotas is NOT equal to the correct number of seats to
be apportioned, then, by trial and error, find a number, dm called the Modified
Divisor to use in place of the Standard Divisor so that when the Modified
Quota, m q
, for each state (computed by dividing each State's Population by dm
instead of d ) is rounded DOWN, the sum of all the rounded (down) Modified
Quotas is the exact number of seats to be apportioned. (Note: The dm will always
be smaller than the Standard Divisor.) These rounded (down) Modified Quotas
are sometimes called Modified Lower Quotas. Apportion each state its Modified
Lower Quota.
Problem:
Violates the Quota Rule. (However, it can only violate Upper Quota—never Lower
Quota.)
Different methods of apportionment can lead to different allocations of legislative seats.
Jefferson’s method favors larger states while Hamilton’s method favors smaller states.
Ex:
Use Jefferson’s method to apportioned 10 – seats among the three states. (Population in thousands)
State A B C Total
Population 94.7 72.6 33.7 201
Standard quota, d = 20.1 94.7 4.71
20.1 q
72.6 3.61
20.1 q
33.7 1.68
20.1 q
10
Modified quota (dm = 19) 4.98 3.82 1.77
Lower modified quota 4 3 1 8
Modified quota (dm = 18) 5.26 4.03 1.87
Lower modified quota 5 4 1 10
The modified divisor dm = 19 still creates two surplus seats.
The modified divisor dm = 18 works.
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3. Adams’s Method
Adams's Method
Also known as the Method of Smallest Divisors.
Procedure:
1. Calculate the Standard Divisor.
2. Calculate each state’s Standard Quota.
3. Initially assign each state its Upper Quota.
4. Check to see if the sum of the Upper Quotas is equal to the correct number of seats to be apportioned.
o If the sum of the Upper Quotas is equal to the correct number of seats to be
apportioned, then apportion to each state the number of seats equal to its Upper
Quota.
o If the sum of the Upper Quotas is NOT equal to the correct number of seats to be
apportioned, then, by trial and error, find a number, dm, called the Modified
Divisor to use in place of the Standard Divisor so that when the Modified Quota,
for each state (computed by dividing each State's Population by dm instead
of d) is rounded UP, the sum of all the rounded (up) Modified Quotas is the exact
number of seats to be apportioned. (Note: The dm will always be larger than the
Standard Divisor.) These rounded (up) Modified Quotas are sometimes called
Modified Upper Quotas. Apportion each state its Modified Upper Quota.
Problem:
Violates the Quota Rule. (However, it can only violate Lower Quota—never Upper
Quota.)
Ex:
Use Adam’s method to apportioned 10 – seats among the three states. (Population in thousands)
Using dm = 23.8 ( dm > d)
State A B C Total
Population 94.7 72.6 33.7 201
Standard quota, d = 20.1 94.7 4.71
20.1 q
72.6 3.61
20.1 q
33.7 1.68
20.1 q
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Modified quota (dm = 23) 4.12 3.16 1.47
upper modified quota 5 4 2 11
Modified quota (dm =
23.8)
3.98 3.05 1.42
upper modified quota 4 4 2 10
The modified divisor dm = 23 still creates two surplus seats. The modified divisor dm = 23.8 works.
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4. Webster’s Method
Webster’s Method
Also known as the Webster-Willcox Method as well as the Method of Major Fractions.
Procedure:
1. Calculate the Standard Divisor.
2. Calculate each state’s Standard Quota.
3. Initially assign a state its Lower Quota if the fractional part of its Standard Quota is less than 0.5.
Initially assign a state its Upper Quota if the fractional part of its Standard Quota is
greater than or equal to 0.5. [In other words, round down or up based on the
arithmetic mean (average).]
4. Check to see if the sum of the Quotas (Lower and/or Upper from Step 3) is equal to the correct number of seats to be apportioned.
o If the sum of the Quotas (Lower and/or Upper from Step 3) is equal to the
correct number of seats to be apportioned, then apportion to each state the
number of seats equal to its Quota (Lower or Upper from Step 3).
o If the sum of the Quotas (Lower and/or Upper from Step 3) is NOT equal to the
correct number of seats to be apportioned, then, by trial and error, find a
number, dm, called the Modified Divisor to use in place of the Standard Divisor
so that when the Modified Quota, for each state (computed by dividing each
State's Population by dm instead of d) is rounded based on the arithmetic mean
(average) , the sum of all the rounded Modified Quotas is the exact number of
seats to be apportioned. Apportion each state its Modified Rounded Quota.
Problem:
Violates the Quota Rule. (However, violations are rare and are usually associated
with contrived situations.)
Ex:
Use Webster’s method to apportioned 10 – seats among the three states. (Population in thousands)
Using dm = 21
State A B C Total
Population 94.7 72.6 33.7 201
Standard quota, d = 20.1 94.7 4.71
20.1 q
72.6 3.61
20.1 q
33.7 1.68
20.1 q
10
Rounded quota 5 4 2 11
Modified quota (dm = 21) 4.51 3.46 1.60
Rounded quota 5 3 2 10
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5. Hill-Huntington Method Geometric Mean
Given two numbers x and y, the geometric mean of x and y, denoted by:
gm xy
Huntington-Hill Method
Also known as the Method of Equal Proportions.
Current method used to apportion U.S. House
Developed around 1911 by Joseph A. Hill, Chief Statistician of the Bureau of the
Census and Edward V. Huntington, Professor of Mechanics & Mathematics,
Harvard
Preliminary terminology: The Geometric Mean
Procedure:
1. Calculate the Standard Divisor.
2. Calculate each state’s Standard Quota.
3. Initially assign a state its Lower Quota if the fractional part of its Standard Quota is less than the Geometric Mean of the two whole numbers that the Standard
Quota is immediately between.
Initially assign a state its Upper Quota if the fractional part of its Standard Quota
is greater than or equal to the Geometric Mean of the two whole numbers that the
Standard Quota is immediately between.
[In other words, round down or up based on the geometric mean.]
4. Check to see if the sum of the Quotas (Lower and/or Upper from Step 3) is equal to the correct number of seats to be apportioned.
o If the sum of the Quotas (Lower and/or Upper from Step 3) is equal to the
correct number of seats to be apportioned, then apportion to each state the
number of seats equal to its Quota (Lower or Upper from Step 3).
o If the sum of the Quotas (Lower and/or Upper from Step 3) is NOT equal
to the correct number of seats to be apportioned, then, by trial and error,
find a number, dm, called the Modified Divisor to use in place of the
Standard Divisor so that when the Modified Quota, for each state
(computed by dividing each State's Population by dm instead of d) is
rounded based on the geometric mean, the sum of all the rounded Modified
Quotas is the exact number of seats to be apportioned. Apportion each state
its Modified Rounded Quota.
Problem:
Violates the Quota Rule.
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Ex.
Use Hill-Huntington method to apportioned 10 – seats among the three states. (Population in thousands)
4 5 20 4.47213 4.47 A
gm
3 4 12 3.46 B
gm 1 2 2 1.4 C
gm
State A B C Total
Population 94.7 72.6 33.7 201
Standard quota, d = 20.1 94.7 4.71
20.1 q
72.6 3.61
20.1 q
33.7 1.68
20.1 q
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Lower quota 4 3 1 8
Upper quota 5 4 2 11
Geometric mean 4.47 3.46 1.41
Round quota 5 4 2 11
Modified quota (dm = 21.2) 4.47 3.42 1.59
Rounded quota 5 3 2 10
State A B C Total
Webster’s Apportionment 4 3 2 10
Adams’s Apportionment 5 4 2 10
Jefferson’s Apportionment 5 4 1
Hamilton’s Apportionment 5 3 2 10 Hill-Huntington’s Apportionment 5 3 2 10
Additional Seats
Once the seats of a legislature have been allocated, it might be decided that the size of the
legislature should be increased; that is, new seats might be added to an existing
apportionment. Who gets the new seats? The answer lies in the calculation of Hill-Huntington
numbers.
Hill-Huntington Number
The Hill-Huntington Number for a state, Denoted by HHN ,
2 '
1
state s population HHN
n n
Where: n = state’s current number of seats.
Ex:
The populations of A, B, and C and the apportionment of the ten seats via the Hill-Huntington
Method are given in the Figure
State A B C Total
Population 94.7 72.6 33.7 201
# of seats 5 3 2 10
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Suppose the high council decides to add an additional seat; (the council should now consist of
eleven seats). Use Hill-Huntington numbers to determine which realm should receive the new seat.
Beginning with A, we calculate the Hill-Huntington number for each realm:
2 2
94.7 94.7 298.936333... 298.93633
5(5 1) 30 A
HHN
Similarly with B, we calculate the Hill-Huntington number for each realm:
2 2
72.6 72.6 439.23
3(3 1) 12 B
HHN
Similarly with C, we calculate the Hill-Huntington number for each realm:
2 2
33.7 33.7 189.28
2(2 1) 6 C
HHN
Because B, has the highest HHN (439.23 is greater than 298.23 or 189.28)
B, should receive the new seat.
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Doing an Apportionment Problem
1. Standard Divisor: (round to two decimal place) total population
d total number of seats
2. Standard Quota: (round to two decimal place) state population
q d
3. Round Quotas: Use the appropriate Rounding Rule to get the Rounded Quotas from the Standard Quotas:
For HM, the Rounding Rule is to always round DOWN to Lower Quotas.
For JM, the Rounding Rule is to always round DOWN to Lower Quotas.
For AM, the Rounding Rule is to always round UP to Upper Quotas.
For WM, the Rounding Rule is to round UP if the computed Quota is greater than or equal to the
arithmetic mean, and round DOWN if not.
For HHM, the rounding rule is to round UP if the computed Quota is greater than or equal to the
geometric mean, and round DOWN if not.
4. Apportionment (for each state) For HM: If Lower Quotas do not apportion enough seats, add the proper number of seats by giving
an additional seat to those states whose Divisors have the largest fractional parts.
All other methods: If Rounded Quotas do not apportion enough seats, modify the divisor and use this
Modified Divisor to compute Modified Quotas and then go back to STEP 3 using these Modified
Quotas instead of the Standard Quotas.
Some Problems with Apportionments Methods • Violating Quota • Paradoxes
The Alabama Paradox An increase in the total number of seats to be apportioned causes a state to lose a seat.
The Alabama Paradox first surfaced after the 1870 census. With 270 members in the House of Representatives, Rhode Island got 2 representatives but when the House size was increased to 280, Rhode Island lost a seat. After the 1880 census. W. Seaton (chief clerk of U. S. Census Office) computed apportionments for all House sizes between 275 and 350 members. He then wrote a letter to Congress pointing out that if the House of Representatives had 299 seats, Alabama would get 8 seats but if the House of Representatives had 300 seats, Alabama would only get 7 seats.
The Population Paradox An increase in a state’s population can cause it to lose a seat.
The Population Paradox was discovered around 1900, when it was shown that a state could lose seats in the House of Representatives as a result of an increase in its population. (Virginia was growing much faster than Maine--about 60% faster--but Virginia lost a seat in the House while Maine gained a seat.)The New States Paradox: Adding a new state with its fair share of seats affects the number of seats apportioned to other states.
The New States Paradox Adding a new state with its fair share of seats can affect the number of seats due other states.
The New States Paradox was discovered in 1907 when Oklahoma became a state. Before Oklahoma became a state, the House of Representatives had 386 seats. Comparing Oklahoma's population to other states, it was clear that Oklahoma should have 5 seats so the House size was increased by five to 391 seats. The intent was to leave the number of seats unchanged for the other states. However, when the apportionment was mathematically recalculated, Maine gained a seat (4 instead of 3) and New York lost a seat (from 38 to 37).