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Friends, when you click either the pictures or the graph, you will be linked to a Youtube video. It is called the “Plan Colombia. Now, before you watch that material, you might want to read the following.

One of the most controversial U.S. policies in Latin America today is Washington’s financing of operations against cocaine production in Colombia. This policy, known as “Plan Colombia,” aims to curb the flow of cocaine into America. Billions of dollars have been sent to the Columbian government to finance such operations as spraying of herbicide, military campaign against drug producers and transporters, and providing economic incentives to peasants who give up coca production. It seems, however, these measures are not working that well. To begin with, the flow of cocaine into the U.S., the world’s largest market for illegal drugs, has not been reduced significantly as shown in the graph to the left. Second, peasants are arguing that what the U.S. government provides to them in exchange of their giving up coca growing is not enough for them to survive on. Also, they are insisting that they cannot make a living by growing other agricultural crops because they cannot compete with America’s agro- capitalism. Third, the anti-government leftist guerilla forces, which provide military protection to the coca and drug producers, highlight Plan Columbia as an example of U.S. imperialistic design in Latin America, and seek to incite popular support of their cause. And it seems, these guerilla forces are succeeding to a certain extent. Fourth, the government forces are committing serious violation of human rights in the name of preventing coca production and the leftist guerillas cashing in on this enterprise. Lastly, there are environmental concerns over the use of herbicide. Yet, Plan Colombia goes on. Is this right? What do you think? Before you answer this question, let us get more information on this scheme: “Plan Colombia: Cashing-in on the Drug-War Failure” available in YouTube. This is a fairly long documentary so if you prefer to read about the Plan Colombia, take a look at the following: ‘Yet Another Drug War Failure’ by Ted Galen Carpenter John Walters, the head of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, recently startled the media by admitting that the

$3.3 billion Plan Colombia, now in its fourth year, has failed to make a significant dent in the amount of cocaine flowing out of that country. Walters added hastily, however, that he expected to see substantial progress in the next year or so.

His comments are the latest in a familiar and dreary pattern. Each new initiative in Washington's international campaign to stem the supply of illegal drugs is launched with great fanfare. During the early phases, isolated examples of success are touted as evidence that the overall strategy is working. Ultimately, though, reality intrudes and it becomes clear that the drug supply is as plentiful as ever. Thrown on the defensive, drug warriors admit that the task has proven more difficult than anticipated but argue that if we stay the course, success is just around the corner. When such predictions prove faulty often enough, the existing initiative is quietly buried and a new one is launched with the appropriate fanfare.

That is what has occurred with Plan Colombia. The Clinton administration initiated the program in 2000, and within months U.S. officials boasted about the amount of coca plants (the raw ingredient for cocaine shown left) that the aerial spraying program was eradicating. Similar claims of success continued until recently. The State Department's most recent annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report contended that the amount of coca cultivation in Colombia fell from 420,000 acres in 2001 to 280,000 acres in 2003.

That statistic was superficially impressive, but it ignored two important factors. First, although the acreage devoted to coca cultivation may have

declined in Colombia, the acreage in Peru and Bolivia (the other two major players) had risen sharply. That reversed the trend of the mid- and late 1990s when U.S.-funded anti-drug measures led to a crackdown that reduced cultivation in Peru and Bolivia-only to see it explode in Colombia and spread to new locales such as Ecuador and Brazil.

Second, even if the acreage devoted to coca in the entire Andean region has declined slightly in recent years, drug traffickers have become more efficient. In other words, they are able to produce the same amount of cocaine from

a smaller number of cultivated plants. The bottom line is that the supply of cocaine flowing into the United States (and other markets) remains plentiful, as even the nation's drug czar now admits.

Indeed, the situation in Colombia may be even worse than Walters' remarks suggest. Washington has placed great confidence in the willingness of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe to wage a vigorous war on drugs. But a 1991 assessment by the Defense Intelligence Agency concluded that Uribe was in league with drug trafficking organizations. Indeed, the DIA concluded that Uribe himself was one of the top 100 drug traffickers.

Uribe has denied those allegations, and the U.S. State Department criticized the DIA's assessment and expressed continued confidence in him. Nevertheless, given how thoroughly drug trafficking cartels have penetrated Colombia's political establishment over the years, the episode creates more than a little doubt.

Drug-related corruption within the Colombian police and military is certainly notorious. Just last month, the police commander of one of the major drug-producing provinces and his deputy were sacked after an 80 lb. cocaine seizure mysteriously disappeared. That was the latest in a series of scandals that included the resignation of the head of the National Police when it became apparent that members of his force took more than $1 million in bribes to return some two tons of cocaine they had seized from traffickers.

Plan Colombia has not succeeded any better than earlier anti-drug initiatives. And contrary to the drug czar's tenacious optimism, that pattern is not likely to improve in the next year-or the next 10 years. One wonders how many times U.S. officials have to travel down the road of a prohibitionist strategy before they realize that it always leads to a dead end. Given the huge profit margin that exists because drugs are illegal, supply side campaigns are doomed to fail. It is time that Walters and other policymakers recognize that reality.

Plan Colombia: Big Gains, But Cocaine Still Flows’ By Danna Harman (The Christian Science Monitor) Sitting in his Washington office a block from the White House, John P. Walters, President Bush's 'drug czar,' [said] "There is absolutely no question we are winning," he states flatly. The "winning," in this case, is against narcotraffickers. And the "we" is the US and Colombian governments, inexorably bound together in a multibillion dollar war against the drug trade. In 1989, when the US drug czar's post (officially, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, or ONDCP) was created, Pablo Escobar, the notorious head of the Medellín cartel, was the kingpin. "Escobar and other drug lords were the most powerful and violent people in the world. They could buy or kill anyone. They could go anywhere. They could do anything," says ONDCP director Walters. Those days, he stresses, are patently over. "Through years of systematic efforts, and not always without obstacles and setbacks, the Colombians have reconstructed their police, military, judicial, and political institutions," he says, giving much credit, as many in the administration do, to Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, Washington's conservative ally in Bogotá. Mr. Uribe's success in bringing stability to the country, says Mr. Walters, is nothing short of "astounding." But Walters doesn't downplay the U' role. "You can't build capacities without metal detectors and armored cars and radios and people who are going to teach personnel to use all those things effectively," says Walters. "It could not have been done without our assistance." The US Embassy in Bogotá, since the launch of the $4.7 billion Plan Colombia in 2000, has grown into the second largest US diplomatic mission in the world, after Baghdad. It employs over 2,000 people, including some 350 US military personnel and 750 contractors. The cornerstone of Plan Colombia is the massive effort to eradicate Colombia's coca plants before they are processed into cocaine. Some 20 aircraft, piloted by contractors with DynCorp International, headquartered in Falls Church, Va., take turns carrying out daily spray missions. Army and police units assist these efforts by clearing the ground of coca farmers, guerrillas, or traffickers below, and by protecting the spray mission from above - with a fleet of 71 US provided helicopters. The majority of the State Department's counternarcotics and law enforcement budget in Colombia is dedicated - directly or indirectly - to these endeavors. In 2005, a record-breaking 170,000 hectares (419,000 acres) of coca were destroyed: 138,000 sprayed and 32,000 pulled out by hand or plowed under. In total, since the program began in 1994 (and particularly since it was ramped up in 2000), 986,925 hectares of coca plant and opium poppy have been eradicated - an area almost equivalent to the size of the states of Rhode Island and Delaware combined. Drug seizures are another pillar of the plan, and here too, there are results. Two hundred and twenty-five tons of cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base were seized in 2005, up from 125 tons in 2002, and the number of clandestine drug labs destroyed soared to nearly 2,000 last year from 317 in 2000, according to a July study by Colombia's National Narcotics Directorate (DNE). Meanwhile, the number of traffickers extradited to the US in the last four years is climbing toward 400. "We are squeezing them. We are forcing them to change their drug trafficking routes and their methods," says Walters.

A better-trained and -equipped military and police, meanwhile, has meant that overall security in Colombia has vastly improved, especially in the urban areas. From 2002 to 2005, the murder rate fell 35 percent - from 28,837 murders to 18,111 - and kidnappings have dropped from nearly 3,000 in 2002 to 800 last year, according to Uribe's office. As a consequence, nearly 1

million foreigners visited last year, a 21 percent jump compared with 2004, and foreign investment hit $10 billion last year, a fivefold increase since 2002. Microsoft's Bill Gates is scheduled to visit in March, to take a look, he said last week, into business opportunities. "Plan Colombia," says Michael Shifter of the Inter-American Dialogue, a think tank in Washington, "....has manifestly helped the government restore some measure of authority in a country that was on the verge of being a failed state six years ago." [Well equipped though they are, these soldiers who are on their way to eradicating coca filed are not take so seriously or menacing by drug lords who sometime bribe the commanders of these food soldiers.] But even Plan Colombia advocates admit the impressive statistics do not a complete victory make. "We're making first downs," US Ambassador to Colombia William Wood is fond of saying, "...but we're not sure how long the football field is." President Uribe is often even more circumspect. "It is clear we cannot abandon Plan Colombia," he said while in New York last week." But it is also clear that, in comparison to our efforts, we should be seeing better results." Sometimes, it seems the harder Colombians and Americans fight, the more the drug lords push back and the coca fields reproduce. When Escobar was shot to death on a Medellín rooftop in 1993, some expected the industry in which he had played such a key role would contract. But, the Medellín cartel was soon replaced by their Cali rivals. And when key Cali cartel leaders were jailed a few years later - the trade was divided up by competing factions of the Norte del Valle cartel and a host of smaller "cartelitos." Mexican cartels meanwhile, moved quickly to fill remaining voids. Uribe's government, meanwhile, is being criticized for allowing some top drug traffickers to avoid extradition by surrendering themselves as part of the government's peace deal with the paramilitaries [left.] And the rebel Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), in turn, may have been pushed into more remote zones - but they are estimated to still be earning hundreds of millions of dollars a year from their involvement in the drug trade. There is no lack, after all, of coca. Despite the unprecedented eradication efforts, coca cultivation actually increased last year by 8 percent, according to a study released in June by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). More

significantly, the amount of cocaine being produced from coca leaves is also increasing. According to DNE, Colombia produced 776 metric tons of cocaine last year, 231 more than previous US estimates, and enough to supply almost 80 percent of the world market. Why? Growing techniques have improved over the years and farmers in some regions are now able to harvest coca leaf six times a year, instead of the usual four harvests, according to UNODC. Also, aerial spraying has pushed farmers to smaller, more isolated plots deeper in the countryside, making spray operations more complicated and less effective. While coca was concentrated in three provinces at the start of Plan

Colombia, today, it has spread to at least 23 of the country's 32 provinces. This geographical expansion also feeds a different problem, explains Pablo Casas, a security expert at the Security and Democracy Foundation in Bogotá. In the past, counternarcotics work was concentrated in a few areas, he says, but "everyone touches drugs now. Which means there are more police, military, and local authorities for the narcos to try to corrupt." Even worse - as far as Washington is concerned - is that the most expensive US foreign aid program outside the

Middle East has apparently failed to significantly change the availability, price, or quality of cocaine on American streets. The question of cost and purity of street cocaine in the US remains contentious, due both to methods of gathering statistics, and ways in which those statistics are interpreted. When the White House drug czar's office announced last November that the price of a gram of cocaine was slightly higher (a sign of less availability), it was quickly attacked with statistics showing the opposite. "We need a new a new approach to drug policy," says John Walsh, a drug policy expert at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), an advocacy group. "A reevaluation is long overdue." [Picture above shows that money from drug trafficking does very little to improving the way people live.]