Summarize Psychology Article

Research Report

Counteractive Self-Control When Making Temptation Available Makes Temptation Less Tempting Kristian Ove R. Myrseth,1 Ayelet Fishbach,1 and Yaacov Trope2

1 University of Chicago and

2 New York University

ABSTRACT—We propose a self-control analysis of the role

of availability in valuation. We explored the hypothesis

that, when temptation becomes available, counteractive

self-control processes render it less valuable. We found evi-

dence for devaluation of available temptation among gym

users before they choose to forgo an unhealthy snack

rather than after they make their choice (Study 1), and

among students evaluating leisure activities when their

decision to enroll in an uninteresting class is reversible

rather than irreversible (Study 2).

Suppose you are on a diet, yet you have found yourself in a res-

taurant contemplating the dessert menu. You observe a dessert

cart in the distance. Would the napoleon appear more pleasur-

able if it were in front of you, or would it seem better if it re-

mained in the distance?

Current theories of valuation do not provide an unequivocal

answer. Making tempting stimuli available might increase valua-

tion. Zajonc (1968) provided evidence for a positive association

between availability and value: ‘‘The mere repeated exposure of

the individual to a stimulus is a sufficient condition for the en-

hancement of his attitude toward it’’ (p. 1; see also Bornstein, 1989;

Harrison, 1977). Subsequently, research on goal pursuit (Shah &

Kruglanski, 2002) showed that presentation of a means for goal

pursuit implicitly activates the goal toward which the means is

instrumental. Making a stimulus available would then activate any

goals toward which the stimulus is instrumental. With the goals

activated, the stimulus holds more utility, and so it becomes more

valuable (Ferguson, 2007; Ferguson & Bargh, 2004).

However, making temptations less available might also render

the temptations more desirable. Reactance theory (J.W. Brehm,

1966; S.S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981) and commodity theory (Brock,

1968) posit that decreasing availability of a stimulus increases its

perceived value. According to reactance theory, this forbidden-

fruit effect would operate as a function of the individual’s

negative reaction to constraints on the individual’s freedom.

According to commodity theory, the effect is driven by the

scarcity principle for appraising value (Cialdini, 1984); the

scarcer an object is, the more value it has.

COUNTERACTIVE VALUATION AS A FUNCTION OF TEMPTATION AVAILABILITY

We propose a self-control analysis of the role of availability as a

determinant of value. Self-control dilemmas are situations

wherein individuals’ higher-order goals, offering delayed ben-

efits, conflict with lower-order goals, offering immediate benefits

(Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Loewenstein, 1996;

Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Critically for a self-control dilemma,

pursuit of the lower-order goal is mutually exclusive with that of

the higher-order goal, and vice versa. For example, procrasti-

nating implies work not done, and an affair may be at the ex-

pense of a happy marriage. Although short-term interests may

tempt individuals to stray from otherwise dominant long-term

goals (Rachlin, 1997; Thaler, 1991), people do not always act

as slaves to instant gratification. On the contrary, often mindful of

temptation, individuals proactively employ self-control strategies

to guide behavior toward long-term interests (Gollwitzer &

Moskowitz, 1996; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).

Counteractive self-control theory describes these proactive self-

control strategies (Fishbach & Trope, 2005; Trope & Fishbach,

2000). The theory postulates that self-control involves asymmetric

shifts in subjective valuation of stimuli; individuals in self-control

dilemmas dampen their valuation of temptations while boosting

their valuation of goals. The net counteractive effect is that the

value of the goal relative to the temptation is higher, increasing the

likelihood of resolving the self-control dilemma in favor of goal

pursuit. Furthermore, asymmetric shifts increase as a function of

Address correspondence to Kristian Ove R. Myrseth or Ayelet Fish- bach, University of Chicago, Booth School of Business, 5807 South Woodlawn Ave., Chicago, IL 60637, e-mail: kmyrseth@chicagogsb. edu or [email protected].

P S Y C H O L O G I C A L S C I E N C E

Volume 20—Number 2 159Copyright r 2009 Association for Psychological Science

the strength of temptation; the stronger the temptation, the more

likely individuals are to devalue it relative to the goal.

The effect of availability of temptation on valuation may then

depend on counteractive self-control processes. Specifically,

increasing availability of temptation in the face of opposing

higher order goals will cause counteractive devaluation of temp-

tation and bolstering of goals. Available temptations threaten

goals more than unavailable temptations, and are thus more

likely to activate counteractive processes to promote goal

pursuit. Consequently, available temptations will seem less

valuable and less tempting.

We tested this prediction across two studies, examining

evaluation of temptations in domains of dieting (fatty foods) and

academics (leisure activities). One way to operationalize avail-

ability is by the presence versus absence of temptation. How-

ever, this procedure leaves the possibility that people choose to

forgo temptation before evaluating the options, and so their de-

valuation could reflect postchoice dissonance reduction (Aronson,

1997; Festinger, 1957) rather than prechoice self-control pro-

cesses. Accordingly, we operationalized availability as having op-

portunity to choose between temptation and goal pursuit versus just

having had the opportunity to choose. For example, if the diner is

about to choose between fruit salad and a napoleon, then the

tempting dessert is readily available, merely depending on choice.

However, if the dieter has just chosen to have fruit salad, then the

self-control dilemma is no longer present, and so self-control pro-

cesses would cease. Whereas dissonance reduction takes place

after choice, self-control occurs before choice, ceasing when choice

renders temptation unavailable.

We also operationalized availability as choice reversibility.

Naturally, many choices are reversible. If the diner chooses to

have fruit salad, but the opportunity to switch to the napoleon is

still present, then self-control conflict persists and with it self-

control processes. Across these two operationalizations of

availability, we predicted devaluation of available but not un-

available temptation.

STUDY 1: HEALTHY EATING AND TEMPTING CHOCOLATE

We predicted that individuals would motivate choice before

choosing by counteractively devaluing temptation and bolster-

ing goals, but that self-control processes would disengage when

a choice that could not be undone was made. In Study 1, health-

conscious participants chose health bars over unhealthy choc-

olate bars. We expected that those who rated these choice op-

tions before choosing would boost their valuation of health bars

while dampening their valuation of chocolates. This pattern

should attenuate after choice. In dissonance terms, we predicted

a reverse spreading of alternatives (Aronson, 1997; J.W. Brehm,

1956), namely, that the gap between the ratings of the two op-

tions is greater before rather than after choosing.

Method

Participants

Participants were 34 females (mean age 5 21.6 years) at a gym

facility. Another 9 participants did not select the health bars.

They were omitted from further analysis because counteractive

valuation by those who did not choose goal pursuit cannot be

distinguished from postchoice justification.

Procedure

Study 1 employed a 2 (food: health vs. chocolate bars)�2 (choice: before vs. after choice) mixed factorial design. Choice order varied

between subjects, whereas food type varied within subjects.

As participants were exiting a gym facility, they were shown

one plate with three health bars and one plate with three

chocolate bars. The two food types were selected for the experi-

ment because choosing between them represents a self-control

dilemma for gym users, who tend to make healthy choices. The

experimenter informed participants that they would be given a

choice between either three health bars or three chocolates.

Participants rated each type of food just before or after choosing

(and before tasting). Specifically, they rated on a 160-mm scale

the perceived appeal of the bars, and how much they would

enjoy eating the bars. We counterbalanced the order of the

ratings of health bars and chocolates.

Results and Discussion

We averaged the value ratings for the two items to compute an index

for positive valuation of the food, rhealth bar 5 .70, rchocolate 5 .77. A

Food Type � Choice analysis of variance of the composite food ratings yielded a main effect for target food, F(1, 32) 5 4.79, prep 5

.93, d 5 0.77, and no effect for choice. As predicted, this analysis

yielded a two-way interaction, F(1, 32) 5 4.09, prep 5 .92 (see

Fig. 1). Among those who completed the ratings before choosing,

health bars (M 5 102.19, SD 5 19.58) were valued higher than

were chocolates (M 5 74.06, SD 5 32.44), t(15) 5 2.82, prep 5 .96,

d 5 1.05. However, there was no difference between ratings of

F o o d E

v a lu

a ti o n

110

100

90

80

70

60

50 Prechoice Postchoice

Health Bars

Chocolates

Fig. 1. Evaluation of healthy and tempting food options before versus after choosing between them. Participants’ ratings of the perceived ap- peal of each food and how much they would enjoy eating it were averaged together to compute an index for positive valuation of the food.

160 Volume 20—Number 2

Making Temptation Available

health bars (M 5 94.22, SD 5 26.11) and chocolates (M 5 93.11,

SD 5 39.80) among those who completed the ratings after

choosing, t(18) 5 .124, prep 5 .53, d 5 0.03.

Study 1 yielded support for our theorized relationship between

availability and value. Self-control, which is activated before

choosing between the foods, boosted the value of the health bars

relative to the unhealthy chocolates, but this pattern diminished

after having chosen between the foods.

This study examined settings where choice was perceived as

final or irreversible. However, not all choice settings share this

feature. Some choices may be reversed at any time. We predicted

that counteractive valuation would occur for reversible choices

to motivate goal pursuit, but not for irreversible choices, be-

cause the nonchosen alternatives are rendered unavailable.

STUDY 2: TAKING COURSES AND TEMPTING LEISURE

We employed a paradigm of reversible versus irreversible choice

to test whether students, who wish to motivate themselves to not

drop an uninteresting course, devalue tempting leisure activities

(such as partying and socializing), the pursuits of which are

generally inconsistent with academic goals. Devaluation of

tempting activities should then increase as a function of the

strength of the temptation to stray from the goal. Assuming that

the temptation to stray from boring classes is stronger than that

for interesting classes, devaluation of leisure activities should

increase with the degree to which the class is uninteresting.

Method

Participants

Participants were 105 M.B.A. students (35 women, 70 men;

mean age 5 28.2 years) at the University of Chicago.

Procedure

Study 2 employed a between-subjects design with the single factor

of choice (reversible vs. irreversible). Participants completed the

study some days before or after the school deadline to change

course registration (Week 3). Presumably, students experience

course registration as a reversible choice before the deadline, but

as an irreversible choice after the deadline.

Participants completed a questionnaire on their academic and

extracurricular activities. Depending on experimental condi-

tion, the questionnaire reminded participants of the deadline

ahead or the deadline that had passed. They first described and

rated the most recent class they had attended. Participants had

attended a heterogeneous sample of classes. They rated on a

150-mm continuous scale how interesting they found their class.

Because they were not yet reminded of leisure temptations,

participants were not experiencing a self-control dilemma, and

so we obtained their assessment of course interest in the absence

of counteractive self-control processes.

The next part of the questionnaire assessed the value of leisure

activities. Participants rated on 150-mm continuous scales how

much they enjoyed a series of 11 leisure activities, such as par-

tying, socializing with friends, watching movies, drinking, and on-

line chatting.

Results and Discussion

We computed an index for the value of leisure temptations by

averaging ratings of all leisure items for each participant (a 5 .69). We tested the joint hypotheses that tempting leisure activities

would be valued less just before the deadline to drop courses than

after the deadline, and that this effect would be stronger for par-

ticipants who had just attended a less interesting course.

To achieve this, we regressed value of leisure activities on the

time of evaluation (a dummy variable taking 0 if the question-

naire was administered before the deadline to drop courses or 1

if administered after), the degree to which their most recently

attended course was interesting, and the two-way interaction

between these two variables. The regression was significant,

F(3, 97) 5 3.37, prep 5 .95, R 2

5 .09.

We found that the time of evaluation predicted the value of

leisure, b 5 1.11, t(97) 5 2.51, prep 5 .96, indicating that temptations were devalued before, relative to after, the deadline

to drop the course. There was no main effect for the interest level

of the course, b 5 0.19, t(97) 5 1.12, prep 5 .78. Critically, the Choice � Interest interaction predicted the value of leisure, b 5 �0.96, t(97) 5 �2.10, prep 5 .93. As Figure 2 illustrates, participants’ tendency to devalue leisure before (vs. after) the

deadline was more pronounced after attending less interesting

courses than after attending more interesting courses.

E v a lu

a ti o n o

f L e is

u re

110

105

100

95

90

85

80

Before Deadline to Drop a Course

After Deadline to Drop a Course

Low Interest

High Interest

Fig. 2. Evaluation of leisure activities before versus after the deadline to drop university courses, as a function of participants’ interest in their most recently attended course. The graph presents predicted evaluation of leisure activities at 1 standard deviation above and below the mean level of interest in the most recently attended course (see Aiken & West, 1991).

Volume 20—Number 2 161

Kristian Ove R. Myrseth, Ayelet Fishbach, and Yaacov Trope

Study 2 complements the previous study in two important

ways. First, it provides evidence for devaluation of available

temptations when choice is reversible compared to when it is

not. This effect is congruent with that found in Study 1, which

explored the relative value of goal versus temptation stimuli.

Whereas dissonance theory predicts greater devaluation of

forgone alternatives when the choice is irreversible than when

the choice is reversible, we found more devaluation of tempta-

tions before a final choice was made than after. Second, this

study shows that counteractive devaluation varies as a function

of motivation necessary to ensure goal pursuit. The more inter-

esting a course is, the less effort is required to motivate pursuit of

the course. Thus, individuals motivating pursuit of more inter-

esting courses are expected to employ less counteractive self-

control than those motivating pursuit of less interesting courses.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

We argue that the relationship between the availability of a

stimulus and its value depends on counteractive self-control

processes. When making a tempting stimulus available, coun-

teractive processes make the temptation less attractive while

rendering goal-related stimuli more attractive. We conclude that

the relationship between availability of a stimulus and its value

depends on two factors: the status of the stimulus as either a goal

or a temptation, and the operation of counteractive self-control

processes. When a stimulus is goal-related, making it available

will render it more valuable. In contrast, when a stimulus rep-

resents a temptation, making it available will render it less

valuable, given the presence of a conflicting goal.

Specifically, in Study 1, we found that counteractive valuation

occurred before but not after choosing. Participants devalued

chocolates relative to health bars before but not after choosing

health bars. Then, in Study 2, we found that people devalued

temptation for reversible but not irreversible choices. Partic-

ipants devalued leisure activities before relative to after

the deadline to drop courses for which they were registered.

Because devaluation increases as a function of the motivation

necessary for goal pursuit, devaluation of leisure activities was

stronger for uninteresting courses, the pursuit of which required

more motivation than that of interesting courses.

The inevitable questions arise as we consider the intuitively

puzzling discovery that making temptations available makes

temptations less tempting: Would dieters paradoxically benefit

from waiters rolling the cart forward to their table rather than

tucking it out of sight? Would the smokers actually benefit from

making their cigarette packages more easily within reach? Our

evidence for counteractive valuation of temptation suggests that

the answer may not be the clear-cut ‘‘no!’’ compelled by intuition;

counteractive valuation may offset the influence of temptation on

behavior.

That is, counteractive devaluation of available temptation,

and the likely corresponding bolstering of goal value, may prove

sufficient to offset the psychological ease with which one may

consume available temptation. On the one hand, the dessert next

to you is within easy reach and so requires minimal effort (costs)

for consumption, which increases likelihood of indulgence. On

the other hand, the dessert on the cart next to your table is valued

less than that on the cart in the next room due to self-control

processes, which might undermine indulgence. Furthermore,

there might be situations where counteractive valuation is rel-

atively strong, but the cost of obtaining the psychologically

unavailable temptation is relatively low. Then, there might

emerge a crossover point, beyond which counteractive valuation

more than offsets the psychological ease with which one may

indulge. In such situations, making temptation available would

also make one less likely to indulge.

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(RECEIVED 5/2/08; REVISION ACCEPTED 7/31/08)

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