Sociological Homework help
( Answer the text below in no more than 2 or 3 paragraphs ) two if possible
Please be detailed,
Due Thursday 4-23-15 No Plagiarism
"War and Peace" Please respond to the following:
· Based on the Webtext materials and article below, address the following:
Discuss the in which an armed conflict can affect a developing economy and analyze the reasons why developed nations do not experience the same kinds of social upheaval.
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The World’s Resources
Development, War and Peace
By Lloyd J. Dumas, STRW
August 2006
Introduction
Development and peace have been two of the major concerns of national and international
political economy for more than fifty years. Yet there is considerable disagreement as to the
nature of the relationship between these two economic and political phenomena.
Some (such as the “liberals/neoliberals”) argue that development encourages peace. People in
better economic condition are less likely to initiate violent conflict both because they are more
content and because they have more to lose from the physical danger and economic disruption
that war brings. Others say that development discourages peace, either because the continued
development of some depends on their forceful suppression or control of others (as the
“dependency” theorists argue) or because development increases the capacity to build and
mobilize military power (as the “neo-realists” argue). Still others (such as the old-line “realists”)
argue that development and peace have no significant connection to each other.
In order to better understand the power and limits of the relationship between development
and peace — and in particular to explore whether development and peace naturally do, or can
be made to, reinforce each other ― it is useful to begin by setting the terms of reference. What
do we mean by “development”? What do we mean by “peace”? What do we mean by
“militarization”? And what do we mean by “war”?
Development. For many economists, development has been synonymous with economic
growth, seen as the secular expansion in the level of aggregate economic income or output,
typically measured by GNP or GDP. But I think it is important to distinguish between this kind of growth, which says nothing in particular about whether the material wellbeing of the broad
mass of the population is increasing, and development, with its connotations of improvement in
the quality of life.
Peace. The narrowest definition of peace is that it is simply the absence of war. But real peace
is more than that. A person who is not able to go about the ordinary business of life without
the constant threat of murderous violence, whether from uniformed soldiers, ragged rebel
forces, terrorists, or ordinary criminals cannot be said to be living in a state of peace.
Johan Galtung referred to the absence of war as “negative peace.” But Galtung argued that
there was a richer, more complex meaning of peace, “positive peace.” For it is not bullets and
bombs alone that kill and maim people. There is also such a thing as “structural violence”,
violence that is built into the structure of political, social and economic systems. People who
die of malnutrition in a world with more than enough food; who are blinded, crippled or killed
by preventable diseases; who are subject to torture and abuse; who become the targets of
vicious crimes committed by desperate, marginalized people — these are not the victims of war.
They are the victims of structural violence. Yet they are just as damaged, just as dead as those
we count as war casualties. Positive peace is more than just the absence of war. It is the
presence of decency.
Militarization. Militarization is a process by which military values are exalted and military
institutions become dominant in a society. Military values emphasize obedience to authority,
loyalty, forceful and aggressive behavior, and the threat and use of violence as a means of
settling disputes and achieving objectives. Military institutions can become dominant by
directly seizing and wielding political power. Even the credible threat of taking such action is
sometimes enough to keep civilian authorities under de-facto military control.
Of course, there are many degrees of militarization. But it is important to emphasize that the
mere possession of a military, even a large and well-funded military, does not by itself establish
that a society is militarized. The degree of militarization of a society is positively related to the
degree to which military values are emphasized in the culture, and negatively related to the
extent to which civilian political authorities are not only formally, but also actively and
effectively in control of military commanders and forces.
War. Finally, war is not just a rhetorical term for a determined struggle against something, as in
Lyndon B. Johnson’s “war on poverty”, George W. Bush’s “war on terrorism”, or the infamous
and ongoing “war on drugs.” War is a brutal and deadly manifestation of mass organized
violence.
According to Michael Brzoska, “All major definitions of war . . . have three common core
elements: there needs to be fighting; such fighting is conducted by organized groups; and at
least one of the parties has to be the government.” By such a definition, there were more than
110 million people killed in more than 250 wars during the twentieth century alone. It is almost
a measure of the modernity of war how large a fraction of war-related deaths are made up of
civilians. In World War I, only about five percent of those killed were civilians; in World War II, it
was close to 50 percent. In wars fought in the 1960s, it is estimated that civilians accounted for
more than 60 percent of war dead; in those fought in the 1980s, the estimate is nearly 75
percent.
Militarization and War as Impediments to Development
Destruction and Disruption. Wars interfere directly with economic development by destroying
productive economic resources, both capital and labor, especially within the territory of the
nations where they are fought. Wars can also make it difficult to carry on ordinary economic
activity in areas that are part of the war zone. Part of the reason for famine in conflict-plagued
areas, such as the Horn of Africa, is the disruption of agricultural activities that results when
farmers are literally afraid to go out into the fields because of the possibility that they will be
injured or killed, intentionally or by accident, by one or another of the armed combatants.
Resource Diversion. In the midst of war, production or acquisition of the supplies needed to
sustain the war effort, whether they are specialized to military use (such as weapons and
ammunition) or more generally useful (such as food and fuel), is usually given higher priority
than provision of ordinary goods and services for the civilian population. In less developed
countries, where the quantity and quality of consumer goods and services and the capital
needed to produce them are less than abundant, this pre-emption of provisions is particularly
problematic. Often enough, it is not just the government that takes these provisions through
ordinary means, but also rebel forces and other armed gangs that forcefully expropriate what
they want or need. Under these conditions, development inevitably suffers.
In militarized societies, even in the absence of war, valuable productive resources and their
outputs are channeled with priority to what I have elsewhere called “economically noncontributive
activity” in the military sector. Taking the central purpose of the economy to be
providing material wellbeing, all activities that use resources to produce goods and services can
be divided into one of two categories ― those that contribute to that purpose and those that
do not. Since consumer goods and services raise the present material standard of living, while
producer goods and services raise the future standard of living by increasing the economy’s
capacity to produce, the activities involved in providing both are “economically contributive.”
On the other hand, whatever else may be said for battle tanks, fighter planes, missiles, artillery,
and the services soldiers provide, they do not add to present material wellbeing as consumer
goods do, or to the economy's capacity to produce standard-of-living goods and services in the
future, as producer goods do. Military goods and services are produced in the belief that they
enhance physical security. Though the purposes for which they are produced may be
important, and these goods and services may be very useful for the purposes they serve, they
do not directly contribute to increasing material wellbeing, the central purpose of the economy.
It is logical, then, to classify them as “economically non-contributive.” Military-oriented activity
is only one of many forms of non-contributive activity, but today, closing in on two decades after
the end of the Cold War, it is still one of the largest and most important in the world.
The tax base is generally much smaller and the difficulties of actually collecting taxes much
greater in developing countries than in the more developed world. Access to developmentoriented
foreign capital — whether in the form of grants, loans or foreign direct investment — is
also more limited, especially in countries that are conflict-ridden or politically unstable. The
diversion of public funds, including limited hard currency reserves, to military spending further
reduces the government’s ability to finance capital investments vital to development.
Virtually by definition, militarized societies are also likely to slight or completely overlook
nonmilitary options for dealing with what they perceive as threats to their internal or external
security. Domestic unrest, disaffection and dissidence tend to be seen as threats best dealt with
by force, rather than by negotiation or a serious attempt to try to understand and address the
underlying causes. More often than not this eventually exacerbates the underlying problems,
strengthens grievances and gives rise to political instability, terrorism or rebellion. Similarly,
disagreements between militarized states are also seen as calling for a hard, forceful, even
aggressive response that increases the probability of armed conflict. All of this creates
conditions that are antithetical to development.
Inhibition of Political and Economic Freedom. Militarization also constrains political and
economic development by interfering with political and economic freedom. For Amartya Sen,
the relationship between freedom and development is straightforward: “Freedoms are not only
the primary ends of development, they are also among its principal means.” Anything that
interferes with political and economic freedom therefore interferes with development.
Militarization interferes with political freedom in a number of ways. The formal institutions of
liberal democracy and informal traditions of democratic civil society have little room to operate
within the authoritarian structure of military and paramilitary organizations. Freestanding,
independent organizations of soldiers that might serve as alternative centers of power and
influence cannot be tolerated. Debate about policies, strategies and tactics is severely
circumscribed. While militaries encourage the positive values of courage, teamwork and
dedication, their culture of obedience and discipline, their formal hierarchical command
structure, and their tradition of rank and privilege are not conducive to either the open
discourse or the freedom of action that is essential to civil democracy.
The concentration of political power is inconsistent with political freedom. Militarization
provides both the physical means to promote the concentration of political power and the
values that justify the use of those means. As political power becomes more concentrated
within a nation, the number of channels available for the expression of alternative political
viewpoints shrinks. With fewer and fewer acceptable outlets, the pressure from those who
dissent builds, and those in power find it increasingly necessary to control them in order to
remain in power. Military force is often the most ready means of repression available. The
more militarized societies become, the more commonplace and routine is this reflexive reaction
to political opposition.
Militarization also aids and abets the concentration of economic power, which is inconsistent
with economic freedom. In societies with vastly unequal distributions of wealth and income, if
the rich do not actually run the government, they certainly exert disproportionate influence on
its policies and actions. They are ordinarily in a position to see to it that the instruments of
control and repression at the disposal of the government ― including military force ― are used
to protect and reinforce their own positions of economic privilege. This may be accomplished
through the unapologetic use of brute force, or through the simple enforcement of "rights" or
laws structured to their advantage.
In militarized, authoritarian societies, it is not difficult for those who wield concentrated supplyside
economic power to covertly encourage or directly arrange for the use of force to intimidate
their workers or their smaller, less influential suppliers or rivals. Special tax breaks and
government subsidies, all too easy to arrange even in liberal democracies, are that much easier
to come by in societies whose inequalities and concentrations of power make the granting of
further privilege to the rich and powerful almost a matter of course. All this greatly distorts
markets, interferes with economic freedom, and impedes economic development.
The inherently undemocratic and hierarchical structure and values of militarized societies also
make them unlikely to support any policy that works to counter the concentration of wealth and
economic power. Neither redistributive tax and income transfer policy nor aggressive antitrust
policy is likely to find a sympathetic hearing. There is little or no incentive for those few who sit
on top of the economic or political pyramid to encourage a wider distribution of either
economic or political largesse, beyond the minimal point that might prove necessary to forestall
riots in the streets.
If war and militarization create so many obstacles to development, it is logical that peace and
demilitarization can help to remove them. Even negative peace avoids the destruction and
disruption of war, making it possible for people to engage in the ordinary activities that support
production and consumption without constant fear of getting caught in the cross-fire or seeing
all that they worked long and hard to create reduced to rubble in a matter of minutes. Positive
peace implies a more equitable distribution of political power and economic power, both of
which are important in encouraging real political and economic development.
When there is peace and demilitarization, there is less compulsion to divert enormous amounts
of productive economic resources to support the buildup and use of military force as a means of
exerting power and influence in the world. Resources freed from this economically noncontributive
use become available for the kinds of contributive production and investment that
are crucial to economic development. The demilitarization of a society supports political
freedom by reducing the availability of repressive force to those who might be tempted to use it
to concentrate political power in their own hands, as well as by de-legitimizing the use of force
for such purposes.
The Limits of the Virtuous Circle
By removing the impediments to development that militarization and war produce,
demilitarization and peace help create the conditions that support and encourage economic
and political development. The first and perhaps most obvious is that demilitarization and peace may facilitate both economic and political development, but they do not guarantee them.
For economic development to be self-sustaining, or even viable, a sufficient quantity and quality of productive
resources must be channeled into a web of mutually reinforcing investments in human and
physical capital. Among these, the right mix of programs of education, health care,
infrastructure capital formation, and investment in production capital are the most important.
All of these programs are expensive. Militarization and war divert or destroy considerable
quantities of the required resources, making economic development exceedingly difficult to
achieve. But the fact that demilitarization and peace make the necessary resources more
available does not by itself assure that they will be effectively mobilized and properly used.
Corruption can also divert vast quantities of critical resources, undermining development. So
can utter incompetence, corruption’s first cousin.
Even the presence of sufficient foreign development aid to make up for any deficits in requisite
resources domestically available does not guarantee successful development. The effectiveness
of foreign development assistance can also be crippled by corruption and incompetence. More
than that, in the face of the best intentions of donor organizations and recipient governments,
poorly designed and implemented development assistance programs can undermine
development by actually encouraging corruption and failing to penalize incompetence. Ill-conceived
projects, backed by the authority of high status donor organizations and
governments, have also been known to direct the attention and resources of recipient
governments away from projects that might look less impressive but are actually far more
important to effective development.
Corruption has been a central issue in the international development community since the late
1990s, when the World Bank and other international organizations launched anti-corruption
missions worldwide. Most of the discussion to date has centered on how practices within
recipient governments of less developed (and transitional countries) have interfered with their
political and economic progress. But it is worth noting that problems with the ethics of
economic development advisers and/or development organizations, and corruption originating
in some of the practices of the developed world have also interfered with the progress of less
developed countries.
Conclusions
It is clear that in a number of very important ways, peace does facilitate development, and
development does facilitate peace. This mutually reinforcing relationship is a “virtuous” circle in
both senses of the word. But it is tentative, even fragile, and must be carefully nurtured. Care
must be taken to create the conditions that can help make the circle stronger and more robust.
This first of all requires a greater appreciation for the fact that the circle exists, that there
actually is a positive feedback loop between development and peace. If people can be
convinced that encouraging development is not just a good thing to do, but also a serious and
important part of national security strategy, it should be much easier to build political support
for policies that encourage real development, and thus mobilize the economic resources
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necessary. So much the better if they can also be convinced that by virtue of its effects in
promoting peace, improving the level of development in other parts of the world would also
raise their own economic status.
In the end, the fact that there is a virtuous circle between development and peace makes it
easier to achieve both. That is encouraging. But it does not relieve us of either the
responsibility or the hard work required to make this hopeful connection effective. The good
news is we do not need to cling so tightly to the threat or use of military force as a guarantor of
security, and continue to trade off our economic wellbeing and our civil liberties against our
deeply felt need to be safe. We can, at the same time, make this world more prosperous, freer
and more secure.
Lloyd J. Dumas is Professor of Economics, Political Economy and Public Policy at the University f Texas at Dallas.