English Course
untitled folder/1984 Thoughtcrime.pdf
1984 Thoughtcrime? Does it matter that George Orwell pinched the plot?
George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four is a classic – but it owes its plot, characters and conclusion to Yevgeny Zamyatin's 1920s novel We
A superior writer … George Orwell in the 1940s. Photograph: CSU Archives/Everett/
Rex Features
It is a book in which one man, living in a totalitarian society a number of years in the future, gradually finds himself rebelling against the dehumanizing forces of an omnipotent, omniscient dictator. Encouraged by a woman who seems to represent the political and sexual freedom of the pre-revolutionary era (and with whom he sleeps in an ancient house that is one of the few manifestations of a former world), he writes down his thoughts of rebellion – perhaps rather imprudently – as a 24-hour clock ticks in his grim, lonely flat. In the end, the system discovers both the man and the woman, and after a period of physical and mental trauma the protagonist discovers he loves the state that has oppressed him throughout, and betrays his fellow rebels. The story is intended as a warning against and a prediction of the natural conclusions of totalitarianism.
This is a description of George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, which was first published 60 years ago on Monday. But it is also the plot of Yevgeny Zamyatin's We, a Russian novel originally published in English in 1924.
Orwell's novel is consistently acclaimed as one of the finest of the last 100 years – two years ago Guardian readers voted it the 20th century's "definitive" book – and it remains a consistent bestseller. Should it alter our respect for it that Orwell borrowed much of his
plot, the outlines of three of his central figures, and the progress of the book's dramatic arc from an earlier work?
Orwell reviewed We for Tribune in 1946, three years before he published Nineteen Eighty-Four. In his review, he called Zamyatin's book an influence on Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, though Huxley always denied anything of the sort. "It is in effect a study of the Machine," Orwell wrote of We, "the genie that man has thoughtlessly let out of its bottle and cannot put back again. This is a book to look out for when an English version appears." He seems to have taken his own advice.
We was not published in Russia until the glasnost era of 1988; among its most controversial passages for the Soviets was an apparent call for a new revolution to sweep away theirs: "How can there be a final revolution? There is no final one. The number of revolutions is infinite. The last one – that's for children. Infinity frightens children, and it's essential that children get a good night's sleep." Foreign editions released in Zamyatin's lifetime led to his being banned from publishing, and eventually he wrote to Stalin to ask permission to live abroad. It was granted, and he left Russia for ever in 1931. He died six years later.
The characters in We are numbered rather than named: its Winston Smith is D-503, and its Julia I-330. Its Big Brother is known as the Benefactor, a more human figure than Orwell's almost mythical dictator, who at one point phones D-503 ("D-503? Ah … You're speaking to the Benefactor. Report to me immediately!"). Where Orwell's apartments come complete with an all-seeing "telescreen", Zamyatin's buildings are simply made of glass, allowing each of the residents – and the "Guardians" who police them – to see in whenever they want. We's Airstrip One, or Oceania, is called OneState. Instead of puzzling over 2+2=5, its lead character is disturbed by the square root of –1.
There are many aspects of We that mark it out as an interesting work in its own right. Zamyatin has a distinctive way with description: when a doctor laughs, "the blades of [his] scissor-lips flashed", while a woman walks along moving her buttocks "from side to side as if she had eyes in them". He anthropomorphizes the letters that begin his characters' names; it is thought he may have had synaesthesia, and identified letters with certain colors.
On the down side, Zamyatin's structure – a series of diary entries – becomes progressively less believable the more trouble D-503 gets himself into, while his plot is marred by confusing jumps in time and place. A scene in which the characters fly into space unfortunately cannot help but seem laughable now.
So does it matter that Orwell borrowed plot and characters from the earlier book? After all, it seems clear that he made a superior work of literature out of them. Nineteen Eighty-Four's importance comes not so much from its plot as from its immense cultural impact, which was recognized almost immediately when it won the £357 Partisan Review prize for that year's most significant contribution to literature, and which has continued to this day. Most of the aspects and ideas of the novel that still resonate so
strongly in political life are his own: Newspeak, doublethink, thoughtcrime, the Thought Police, Room 101; the extreme use of propaganda, censorship and surveillance; the rewriting of history; labels and slogans that mean the opposite of what they say; the role for Britain implied in the name Airstrip One. References to these things pervade all levels of our culture. Apart from the obvious, I remember an amusing NME review of an album by the laddish band Cast that read: "Imagine a trainer stamping on a human face ... for ever."
In addition, unlike We, Nineteen Eighty-Four is written with expert control in an accessible style about a world recognizably our own, and its twists of plot – including the existence (or not) of the Brotherhood resistance movement – are gripping, sophisticated and convincing. The dark, pessimistic tone of Nineteen Eighty-Four is also all Orwell's.
If any aspect of We takes the shine off Nineteen Eighty-Four, it's that Orwell lifted that powerful ending – Winston's complete, willing capitulation to the forces and ideals of the state – from Zamyatin. It's a wonderful, wrenching twist, in both books, and a perfect conclusion, though We and Nineteen Eighty-Four differ slightly in the fate of the female dissident: I-330 is killed without giving up her beliefs, whereas Julia is broken in the same way as Winston.
Perhaps We deserves more recognition than it has had, but if Nineteen Eighty-Four had never existed, it is extremely doubtful Zamyatin's book would have come to fill the unique place Orwell's work now occupies. Nineteen Eighty-Four is an almanac of all the political ideas no "right-thinking" person would ever want their government to countenance, and the word Orwellian has come to signify a badge of shame intended to shut down any movement in that direction – with an imperfect record of success.
URL: http://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2009/jun/08/george-orwell-1984-zamyatin-
we
__MACOSX/untitled folder/._1984 Thoughtcrime.pdf
untitled folder/Dangers_of_Surveillance_HarvardLawReview.pdf
THE DANGERS OF SURVEILLANCE
Neil M. Richards*
From the Fourth Amendment to George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty- Four, and from the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to films like Minority Report and The Lives of Others, our law and culture are full of warnings about state scrutiny of our hves. These warnings are commonplace, but they are rarely very specific. Other than the vague threat of an Orwellian dystopia, as a society we don't really know why surveillance is bad and why we should be wary of it. To the extent that the answer has something to do with "privacy," we lack an under- standing of what "privacy" means in this context and why it matters. We've been able to live with this state of affairs largely because the threat of constant surveillance has been relegated to the realms of science fiction and failed totalitarian states.
But these warnings are no longer science fiction. The digital tech- nologies that have revolutionized our daily lives have also created mi- nutely detailed records of those Uves, In an age of terror, our govern- ment has shown a keen wilhngness to acquire this data and use it for unknown purposes. We know that governments have been buying and borrowing private-sector databases,' and we recently learned that the National Security Agency (NSA) has been building a massive data and supercomputing center in Utah, apparently with the goal of intercept- ing and storing much of the world's Internet communications for de- cryption and analysis,^
Although we have laws that protect us against government surveil- lance, secret government programs cannot be challenged until they are discovered. And even when they are, our law of surveillance provides only minimal protections. Courts frequently dismiss challenges to such programs for lack of standing, under the theory that mere surveillance creates no harms. The Supreme Court recently reversed the only ma- jor case to hold to the contrary, in Clapper v. Amnesty International
Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. For helpful comments on prior drafts, I thank Jim Bohman, John Inazu, Jonathan King, Wendy Niece Richards, and participants in the Washington University Political Theory Workshop. Special thanks are also due to my co- participants at the Harvard Law Review Symposium on Privacy and Technology — Professors Julie Cohen, Paul Schwartz, Dan Solove, and Lior Strahilevitz — and my generous commenta- tors, Danielle Citron, David Gray, and Orin Kerr. Thanks also to my research assistants, Matthew Cin and Ananth Iyengar, and my faculty assistant, Rachel Manee.
1 See, e.g., ROBERT O'HARROW, JR., N O PLACE TO HIDE 1-4 (2005). 2 James Bamford, The Black Box, WIRED, Apr. 2012, at 78, 80.
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USA,^ finding that the respondents' claim that their communications were likely being monitored was "too speculative."'*
But the important point is that our society lacks an understanding of why (and when) government surveillance is harmful. Existing at- tempts to identify the dangers of surveillance are often unconvincing, and they generally fail to speak in terms that are likely to influence the law. In this Article, I try to explain the harms of government surveil- lance. Drawing on law, history, literature, and the work of scholars in the emerging interdisciplinary field of "surveillance studies," I offer an account of what those harms are and why they matter. I will move beyond the vagueness of current theories of surveillance to articulate a more coherent understanding and a more workable approach.
At the level of theory, I will explain why and when surveillance is particularly dangerous and when it is not. First, surveillance is harm- ful because it can chill the exercise of our civil liberties. With respect to civil liberties, consider surveillance of people when they are think- ing, reading, and communicating with others in order to make up their minds about political and social issues. Such intellectual surveillance is especially dangerous because it can cause people not to experiment with new, controversial, or deviant ideas. To protect our intellectual freedom to think without state oversight or interference, we need what I have elsewhere called "intellectual privacy."^ A second special harm that surveillance poses is its effect on the power dynamic between the watcher and the watched. This disparity creates the risk of a variety of harms, such as discrimination, coercion, and the threat of selec- tive enforcement, where critics of the government can be prose- cuted or blackmailed for wrongdoing unrelated to the purpose of the surveillance.
At a practical level, I propose a set of four principles that should guide the future development of surveillance law, allowing for a more appropriate balance between the costs and benefits of government surveillance. First, we must recognize that surveillance transcends the public/private divide. Public and private surveillance are simply related parts of the same problem, rather than wholly discrete. Even if we are ultimately more concerned with government surveillance, any solution must grapple with the complex relationships between gov- ernment and corporate watchers. Second, we must recognize that secret surveillance is illegitimate and prohibit the creation of any domestic-surveillance programs whose existence is secret. Third, we should recognize that total surveillance is illegitimate and reject the
3 133 S. Ct. 1138(2013). 4 Id. at 1147. 5 See generally Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter Richards, Intellectual Privacy].
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idea that it is acceptable for the government to record all Internet ac- tivity without authorization. Government surveillance of the Internet is a power with the potential for massive abuse. Like its precursor of telephone wiretapping, it must be subjected to meaningful judicial process be-fore it is authorized. We should carefully scrutinize any surveillance that threatens our intellectual privacy. Fourth, we must recognize that surveillance is harmful. Surveillance menaces intellec- tual privacy and increases the risk of blackmail, coercion, and discrim- ination; accord-ingly, we must recognize surveillance as a harm in con- stitutional standing doctrine. Explaining the harms of surveillance in a doctrinally sensitive way is essential if we want to avoid sacrificing our vital civil liberties.
I develop this argument in four steps. In Part I, I show the scope of the problem of modern "surveillance societies," in which individuals are increasingly monitored by an overlapping and entangled assem- blage of government and corporate watchers. I then develop an ac- count of why this kind of watching is problematic. Part II shows how surveillance menaces our intellectual privacy and threatens the devel- opment of individual beliefs in ways that are inconsistent with the ba- sic commitments of democratic societies. Part III explores how sur- veillance distorts the power relationships between the watcher and the watched, enhancing the watcher's ability to blackmail, coerce, and dis- criminate against the people under its scrutiny. Part IV explores the four principles that I argue should guide the development of surveil- lance law, to protect us from the substantial harms of surveillance.
L T H E AGE OF S U R V E I L L A N C E
We are living in an age of surveillance. The same digital technolo- gies that have revolutionized bur daily lives over the past three de- cades have also created ever more detailed records about those lives. In addition, new technologies, from surveillance cameras and web bugs to thermal scanners and GPS transponders, have increased the ability to track, observe, and monitor. The scope and variety of the types of surveillance that are possible today are unprecedented in hu- man history. This fact alone should give us pause.
But not only have the technologies of surveillance multiplied; so too have the entities that wish to surveil. Autocratic regimes have long been the Villains in the stories we tell about surveillance, but they are no longer the only governments that have stepped up their surveillance activities. Democratically elected governments in the West have deep- ened their commitment to surveillance of the public as well. Since 2001 this monitoring has often been done in the name of counter- terrorism, but it has also been justified as protecting cybersecurity, in- tellectual property, children from predators, and a seemingly ever- growing list of other concerns. Some of the most well-known and
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valuable publicly traded corporations have also got in on the act, often with the consent (in varying degrees) of their customers. Surveillance, it seems, is not just good politics, but also good business.
What, then, is surveillance? Scholars working throughout the Enghsh-speaking academy have produced a thick descriptive literature examining the nature, causes, and implications of the age of surveil- lance.^ Working under the umbrella term of "surveillance studies," these scholars represent both the social sciences and humanities, with sociologists making many of the most significant contributions.'
Reviewing the vast surveillance studies literature. Professor David Lyon concludes that surveillance is primarily about power, but it is al- so about personhood.^ Lyon offers a definition of surveillance as "the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for pur- poses of influence, management, protection or direction."' Four as- pects of this definition are noteworthy, as they expand our understand- ing of what surveillance is and what its purposes are. First, it is focused on learning information about individuals. Second, surveil- lance is systematic] it is intentional rather than random or arbitrary. Third, surveillance is routine — a part of the ordinary administrative apparatus that characterizes modern societies.'° Fourth, surveillance can have a wide variety of purposes — rarely totalitarian domination, but more typically subtler forms of influence or control.^'
A. The Scope of Surveillance
Even a cursory overview of the kinds of surveillance that are being performed today reveals the scope of the surveillance problem. At the level of state surveillance, it should be no surprise that autocratic re- gimes have been among the worst offenders. For example, China has used Internet activity to detect and censor dissidents,^^ and states re- sisting the Arab Spring uprisings have also keenly sought social media data in order to stem the tide of the revolts." Some activists also sus- pect that the Vietnamese government may have used computer viruses
* For three recent introductions to this vast literature, see, for example, DAVID LYON, SUR- VEILLANCE STUDIES (2007); SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY (Kevin D. Haggerty & Minas Samatas eds., 2010); and T H E SURVEILLANCE STUDIES READER (Sean P. Hier & Joshua Greenberg eds., 2007).
' See LYON, supra note 6, at 18-22. 8 See id. at 23. 9 Id. at 14.
•0 Id. •• See id. at 15-16. •2 REBECCA MACKINNON, C O N S E N T OF T H E N E T W O R K E D 36-40 (2012). •3 ld.\ Anupam Chander, Essay, Jasmine Revolutions, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1505, 1516-17,
1525-28(2012).
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to monitor the Internet activity and private data of dissidents protest- ing government mining poUcies."*
Surveillance is not just for communists and dictators. Democratic states have also invested heavily in surveillance technologies in the af- termath of the September 11 attacks in America, the London subway bombings of 2005, and other atrocities. Britain is one of the most heavily surveilled countries in the world, with a network of public and private surveillance cameras, traffic enforcement cameras, and broad government powers to examine Internet traffic.'^ In the United States, the NSA has engaged in a program of warrantless wiretapping of tele- phone conversations. Although many of the details of the wiretapping and other surveillance programs remain shrouded in secrecy, it is clear that the investment in surveillance infrastructure remains significant. And as noted above, a 2012 investigative report by Wired magazine revealed that the NSA is building a massive supercomputing facility in the Utah desert, possibly with the goal of capturing and archiving much of the world's Internet traffic, with a view to decrypting and searching it as decryption technologies inevitably advance."^
Surveillance is not just for governments either. Private companies big and small generate vast fortunes from the collection, use, and sale of personal data. At the broadest level, we are building an Internet that is on its face free to use, but is in reality funded by billions of transactions where advertisements are individually targeted at Internet users based upon detailed profiles of their reading and consumer hab- its. ^̂ Such "behavioral advertising" is a multibillion-dollar business, and is the foundation on which the successes of companies hke Google and Facebook have been built.'^ One recent study concludes that this form of surveillance is so ingrained into the fabric of the Internet "that a small number of companies have a window into most of our move- ments online."'' Other technologies engage in similar forms of private surveillance. "Social reading" applications embedded into Facebook and other platforms enable the disclosure of one's reading habits.
I"* EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION 143-45 (2011). 15 Brendan M. Palfreyman, Note, Lessons from the British and American Approaches to Com-
pelled Decryption, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 345, 362 (2009). See generally KiRSTIE BALL ET AL., A R E P O R T O N T H E S U R V E I L L A N C E S O C I E T Y : F O R T H E I N F O R M A T I O N C O M M I S S I O N E R B Y
THE S U R V E I L L A N C E S T U D I E S N E T W O R K (David Murakami Wood ed., 2006), avail- able at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/o2_i i_o6_surveillance.pdf; How We Are Being Watched, BBC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2006, 2:21 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uky2/hi/uk_news/6iio866.stm.
16 See generally Bamford, supra note 2. 17 See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, T H E G O O G L I Z A T I O N O F E V E R Y T H I N G 26-30 (2011).
18 See DAVID KIRKPATRICK, T H E FACEBOOK E F F E C T 260-66 (2010); S T E V E N LEVY, I N
THE P L E X 262-63, 336-37 (2011). 19 Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al.. Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 6 HARV.
L. & POL'Y R E V . 273, 279 (2012).
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while electronic readers like the Kindle and the Nook track reader be- havior down to the specific page of the specific book on which a user's attention is currently Ungering,̂ ^
In recent years, industry, media, and scholars have increasingly fo- cused their attention on the concept of "Big Data," an unwieldy term often used to describe the creation and analysis of massive data sets,^' Big Data is notable not just because of the amount of personal infor- mation that can be processed, but because of the ways data in one area can be linked to other areas and analyzed to produce new inferences and findings. As social scientists danah boyd and Kate Crawford put it, "Big Data is fundamentally networked. Its value comes from the patterns that can be derived by making connections between pieces of data, about an individual, about individuals in relation to others, about groups of people, or simply about the structure of information itself,"" Big Data holds much potential for good in areas as diverse as medical research, the "smart" electrical grid, and traffic management,^^
But Big Data also raises many potential problems in areas such as privacy and consumer power. For example, the retail superstore Tar- get uses Big Data analytics to infer which of its customers are preg- nant based upon their purchases of other products and upon personal- ly identifying data from other sources.2"* As the New York Times Magazine reports, new parents are highly desirable customers not just because they buy many new products, but because their normally sta- ble purchasing habits are "up for grabs" in the chaotic exhaustion that accompanies the birth of a child.̂ ^ Target uses Big Data to snare new parents because, as one of its data analysts concedes, "[w]e knew that if we could identify them in their second trimester, there's a good chance we could capture them for years , , , , As soon as we get them buying diapers from us, they're going to start buying everything else too,"2ö Big Data analytics enabled Target to discover that expectant parents display a change in buying habits (for example, buying un- scented lotion and magnesium supplements) that mark them as expec- tant, allowing this kind of (appropriately enough) "targeted" market-
20 N e i l M . R i c h a r d s , The Perils of Social Reading, i o i G E O . L . J . 6 8 9 , 6 9 8 - 9 9 (2013) [hereinaf- t e r R i c h a r d s , The Perils of Social Reading].
21 d a n a h b o y d & K a t e C r a w f o r d , Six P r o v o c a t i o n s for B i g D a t a 6 (Sept. 2 1 , 2011) ( u n p u b - l i s h e d m a n u s c r i p t ) (on file w i t h t h e H a r v a r d L a w S c h o o l L i b r a r y ) .
22 Id. 23 S e e generally O m e r T e n e & J u l e s P o l o n e t s k y , Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in
the Age of Analytics, 11 N w . J . T E C H . & I N T E L L . PROP, ( f o r t h c o m i n g 2013). 21 C h a r l e s D u h i g g , Psst, You in Aisle 5, N . Y . T I M E S , F e b . 16, 2012 ( m a g a z i n e ) , § 6, a t 30,
available at h t t p : / / w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 2 / 0 2 / 1 9 / m a g a z i n e / s h 0 p p i n g - h a b i t s . h t m l . 25 Id. 26 Id.\ see also Tom Simonite, What Facebook Knows, M I T TECH. REV. (June 13, 2012),
http://www.technologyreview.com/featured-story/428i5p/what-facebook-knows/?mod=related.
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ing. Big Data surveillance and analysis thus affect the commercial power of consumers, identifying their times of relative weakness and allowing more effective marketing to nudge them in the directions that watchful companies desire.
The incentives for the collection and distribution of private data are on the rise. The past fifteen years have seen the rise of an Internet in which personal computers and smartphones have been the domi- nant personal technologies. But the next fifteen will likely herald the "Internet of Things," in which networked controls, sensors, and data collectors will be increasingly built into our appliances, cars, elec- tric power grid, and homes, enabling new conveniences but subjecting more and more previously unobservable activity to electronic measurement, observation, and control.^' Many of us already carry GPS tracking devices in our pockets, not by government command, but in the form of powerful multifunction smartphones. Sociologists Zygmunt Bauman and David Lyon have identified the spread of sur- veillance beyond nonconsensual state watching to a sometimes-private surveillance in which the subjects increasingly consent and partici- pate — a phenomenon that they call "liquid surveillance."^* Professor Scott Peppet foresees the "unraveling" of privacy,̂ ^ as economic incen- tives lead consumers to agree to surveillance devices like Progressive Insurance's "MyRate" program, which offers reduced insurance rates in exchange for the installation of a device that monitors driving speed, time, and habits.^° Peppet argues that this unraveling of priva- cy creates a novel challenge to privacy law, which has long focused on unconsented surveillance rather than on surveillance as part of an eco- nomic transaction.^!
It might seem curious to think of information gathering by private entities as "surveillance." Notions of surveillance have traditionally been concerned with the watchful gaze of government actors like po- lice and prison officials rather than companies and individuals. But in a postmodern age of "liquid surveillance," the two phenomena are deeply intertwined. Government and nongovernment surveillance support each other in a complex manner that is often impossible to disentangle. At the outset, the technologies of surveillance — soft- ware, RFID chips, GPS trackers, cameras, and other cheap sensors —
27 Clive T h o m p s o n , Sensors Everywhere, W I R E D , D e c . 2012, a t 72, available at h t t p : / / w w w . w i r e d . c o m / o p i n i o n / 2 0 i 2 / i 2 / 2 0 - i 2 - s t _ t h o m p s o n / . F o r a c r i t i q u e of t h e " I n t e r n e t of T h i n g s , " see R O B VAN KRANENBURG, T H E I N T E R N E T O F T H I N G S (2008), available at http://www .networkcultures.org/_uploads/notebook2_theinternetofthings.pdf.
28 ZYGMUNT BAUMAN & DAVID LYON, L I Q U I D SURVEILLANCE 2-3 (2013). '
2' Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full- Disclosure Future, 105 N w . U. L. REV. 1153, 1156 (2011).
30 /d. a t 1153-56. 31 Id.
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are being used almost interchangeably by government and nongov- ernment watchers.32 Private industry is also marketing new surveil- lance technologies to the state. Though it sounds perhaps like a plot from a paranoid science fiction novel, the Gwardia« reports that the Disney Corporation has been developing facial recognition technolo- gies for its theme parks and selling the technology to the U.S. mih- tary.33 Nor do the fruits of surveillance respect the public/private di- vide. Since the September 11 attacks, governments have been eager to acquire the massive consumer and Internet-activity databases that private businesses have compiled for security and other purposes, ei- ther by subpoena^" or outright purchase.^^ Information can also flow in the other direction; the U.S. government recently admitted that it was giving information to insurance companies that it had collected from automated license-plate readers at border crossings.̂ ^
Similarly, while government regulation might be one way to limit or shape the growth of the data industry in socially beneficial ways, governments also have an interest in making privately collected data amenable to public-sector surveillance. In the United States, for ex- ample, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 19943' requires telecommunications providers to build their networks in ways that make government surveillance and interception of elec- tronic communications possible.̂ ^ A European analogue, the EC Data Retention Directive Regulations of 2009, requires Internet service pro- viders to retain details of all Internet access, email, and Internet tele- phony by users for twelve months, so that they can be made available to government investigators for cases of antiterrorism, intellectual property, child protection, or for other purposes.̂ « This surveillant symbiosis between companies and governments means that no analysis of surveillance can be strictly limited to just the government or the market in isolation. Surveillance must instead be understood in its ag- gregated and complex social context.
32 See L Y O N , supra note 6, a t 1 1 1 - 1 2 .
33 N a o m i Wolf, The New Totalitarianism of Surveillance Technology, GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2012, 4:12 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/15/new-totalitarianism-surveillance -technology. 1
34 S e e G o n z a l e s v. Google, I n c . , 234 F . R . D . 674, 688 ( N . D . C a l . 2006). 35 See O ' H A R R O W , supra n o t e i , a t 64, 9 8 - 1 0 3 . 36 Cyrus Farivar, License Plates Scanned at Border, Data Shared with Car Insurance Group,
ARS T E C H N I C A (Aug. 22, 2012, 4:36 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/08/license-plates -scanned-at-border-data-shared-with-car-insurance-group/.
37 47 U . S . C §§ 1 0 0 1 - 1 0 1 0 ( 2 0 0 6 ) . 38 Id. § 1002.
39 T h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m version of this regulation is T h e D a t a R e t e n t i o n ( E C Directive) Regula- tions, 2009, S.I. 2009/859 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.ukyukdsi/2OO9/978oii 1473894 / c o n t e n t s .
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B. Surveillance Law's Limited Protections
American law governing surveillance is piecemeal, spanning consti- tutional protections such as the Fourth Amendment, statutes like the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986"° (ECPA), and private law rules such as the intrusion-into-seclusion tort."i But the general principle under which American law operates is that surveillance is le- gal unless forbidden. Perhaps out of a fear that surveillance might be used to suppress dissent, American law contains some limited protec- tions against government surveillance of purely political activity. For example, government investigators in antiterrorism cases possess a powerful tool known as the National Security Letter (NSL). NSLs are statutory authorizations by which the FBI can obtain information about people from their telephone companies, Internet service provid- ers, banks, credit agencies, and other institutions with which those people have a relationship. NSLs are covert and come with a gag or- der that prohibits the recipient of the letter from disclosing its exis- tence, even to the person whose secrets have been told to the govern- ment. NSLs can currently be obtained under four federal statutes: the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978"̂ (RFPA), the ECPA,"^ the Fair Credit Reporting Act"" (FCRA), and the National Security Act of 1947."̂ Taken together, these provisions allow the FBI to access a wide variety of information about people, including historical and transactional information relating to telephone calls and emails, finan- cial information, and consumer credit information."^ This information can be obtained by crossing a Very low threshold — the FBI must merely certify in writing that the request is "relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
"•o Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C). '' • See generally Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser's Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy,
98 CALIF. L . REV. 1887 (2010). "•2 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (allowing access to personal financial records
held by a wide variety of entities, including casinos, insurance companies, automobile dealerships, credit unions, real estate companies, and travel agencies).
"•3 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (allowing access to telephone and email information including billing and call history, email, subscriber information, and screen names).
'*'' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681X (2006 & Supp. V 2011); iee also id. § 1681U (allowing access to credit history information and the header information on credit reports, including name, address, and employment history); id. § i68iv (allowing access to a consumer's full credit report and "all other information in a consumer's file").
"'S 50 U.S.C. §§ 4Oi-442b (2006 & Supp. V 2011); iee also id. § 436 (allowing the issuance of NSLs in connection with investigations of improper disclosure of classified information by gov- ernment employees).
46 See O F F I C E O F T H E I N S P E C T O R G E N . , U.S. D E P ' T O F J U S T I C E , A R E V I E W O F T H E
F E D E R A L B U R E A U O F I N V E S T I G A T I O N ' S U S E O F N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y L E T T E R S 10 (2007).
2OI3] THE DANGERS OF SURVEILLANCE 1943
intelligence activities."'*' Communications and bank records sought under the ECPA and the RFPA are protected by the additional re- quirement that the FBI certify that "such an investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities pro- tected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States."-*«
Despite these protections, courts lack the tools to enforce them. This problem predates the current NSL framework. For example, in 1967, the President ordered the U.S. Army to engage in surveillance of domestic dissident groups, fearing civil disorder in the aftermath of the assassination of IMartin Luther King, Jr."' The program expanded over time to become a large-scale military surveillance program of the domestic political activities of American citizens.^° In Laird v. Tatum,^^ the Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims that the surveillance violated the First Amendment rights of the subjects of the program, because the subjects claimed only that they felt deterred from exercising their First Amendment rights or that the government could misuse the information it collected in the future.̂ ^ The Court could thus declare that "[a]llegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm."^^
]V[ore recent surveillance cases have followed the lead of the Laird Court. Challenges to the NSA's wiretapping program have foundered because plaintiffs have failed to convince federal courts that secret surveillance has caused them any legally cognizable injury. In ACLU V. NSA,^'^ the Sixth Circuit dismissed any suggestion that First Amendment values were threatened when the government listened to private conversations. As that court put it: "The First Amendment protects public speech and the free exchange of ideas, while the Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unwanted intrusion into their per- sonal lives and effects."^^ The court concluded that the plaintiffs had
••7 This precise language is quoted from the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 27O9(b)(i)-(2), but the other N S L provisions are substantially similar. See 12 U . S . C § 34i4(a)(5)(A) (RFPA); 15 U . S . C §§ i68iu(b), i 6 8 i v ( a ) (FCRA); 50 U.S.C. § 436(a)(3) (National Security Act).
18 18 U . S . C § 2 7O9(b)(i)-(2) (ECPA); 12 U.S.C. § 34i4(a)(5)(A) (RFPA). T h e original F C R A N S L provision allowing access to the headers of credit reports only, 15 U.S.C. § i68iu(b), contains such a First A m e n d m e n t limitation, but since the Patriot Act added § i 6 8 i v , which allows for the full credit report to be obtained without meeting the First Amendment requirement, it is unclear w h a t practical effect the limitation in § i68iu(b) will have.
t ' See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. i, 4-5 (1972). 50 See id. at 6-7. 51 408 U.S. I. 52 Id. a t 13. 53 Id. a t 1 3 - 1 4 . 5'' 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007). 55 Id. a t 657 n.15 (citations o m i t t e d ) .
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no standing to assert First or Fourth Amendment violations, as they could not prove that the secret government surveillance program had targeted them,̂ ^ Similarly, in Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. V. Bush,^'' the government successfully invoked the state-secrets doc- trine to stop the plaintiffs from finding out whether they were the sub- jects of secret surveillance under the program,^^ This ruling created a brutal paradox for the plaintiffs: they could not prove whether their telephone calls had been listened to, and thus they could not establish standing to sue for the violation of their civil liberties,^^ Despite the fact that the judges in the case knew whether surveillance had taken place, they believed that the state-secrets doctrine barred them from ruling on that fact,̂ ° And the Court's most recent decision in Clapper affirmed this approach to standing to challenge surveillance. Plaintiffs can only challenge secret government surveillance they can prove, but the government isn't telling. Plaintiffs (and perhaps civil liberties) are out of luck.
So far so bad. Or maybe not. Putting the oppression of totalitarian states to one side, public and private surveillance can have beneficial effects. All other things being equal, greater security from crime and terrorism is a good thing,^! So too are the conveniences of modern communications, email, and the power of a search engine in our pock- ets valuable advances that improve our quality of life. And a sensible system of automated traffic regulation can save money and direct scarce police resources to serious criminals rather than ordinary motorists.
As a society, we are thus of two minds about surveillance. On the one hand, it is creepy, Orwellian, and corrosive of civil liberties. On the other hand, it keeps us and our children safe. It makes our lives more convenient and gives us the benefit of a putatively free Internet. Moreover, some influential thinkers argue that data surveillance does not affect privacy at all. As Judge Posner puts it:
The collection, mainly through electronic means, of vast amounts of per- sonal data is said to invade privacy. But machine collection and processing of data cannot, as such, invade privacy. Because of their vol- ume, the data are first sifted by computers, which search for names, ad- dresses, phone numbers, etc, that may have intelligence value. This ini-
56 Id. a t 6 7 3 - 7 4 . 5 ' 507 F.3d i i 9 o ( 9 t h Cir. 2007). 58 Id. a t 1204. 59 See id. a t 1205. 60 See id. a t 1 2 0 4 - 0 5 . 61 See RICHARD A. POSNER, N O T A SUICIDE PACT 130 (2006) (arguing that adherence to
civil liberties like the right to privacy must be flexible where it confiicts with government antiter- rorism efforts).
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tial sifting, far from invading privacy (a computer is not a sentient being), keeps most private data from being read by any intelligence officer^^
Surveillance is thus confusing. We like its benefits, though we are fearful (and sometimes dismissive) of its costs. This confusion points to a larger problem: civil liberties advocates lack a compelling account of when and why (if at all) surveillance is harmful. As a society, we have an intuitive understanding that public- and private-sector sur- veillance is potentially bad, but we do not have an articulate explana- tion of why it is bad. Some of our intuitions stem from literature, such as George Orwell's chilling portrait of Big Brother in Nineteen Eighty- Four.^^ But few critics of government surveillance such as the NSA wiretapping program and the British data-retention regulations would suggest that these programs are directly analogous to the evil regime depicted in Orwell's dystopia. Moreover, the Orwell metaphor seems wholly inapplicable to databases used to personalize targeted advertis- ing on the web, the efforts of insurance companies to promote safe driving, and the practices of online booksellers to sell more books by monitoring consumers' shopping habits in ways that used to be impossible.̂ "̂
We need an account of when and why surveillance is problematic to help us see when we should regulate and when we should not. The following Parts seek to provide an account of some of the dangers of surveillance and the ways in which laws could mitigate them. ..I want to advance two lines of critique to the notion that surveillance does not create a legally cognizable injury: first, that surveillance by govern- ment and private actors threatens intellectual privacy and chills the exercise of vital civil liberties; and second, that surveillance affects the power balance between individuals and those who are watching, in- creasing the risk of persuasion, blackmail, and other harmful uses of sensitive information by others.
II. S U R V E I L L A N C E A N D I N T E L L E C T U A L PRIVACY
The most salient harm of surveillance is that it threatens a value I have elsewhere called "intellectual privacy. "̂ ^ Intellectual-privacy
62 Richard A. Posner, Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at A31, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/20/AR2005122001053.html.
63 G E O R G E O R W E L L , N I N E T E E N E I G H T Y - F O U R (Irving Howe ed., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 1982) (1949).
64 5ee D A N I E L J. S O L O V E , T H E D I G I T A L P E R S O N 29-36 (2004) (critiquing the usefulness of Orwell's metaphor as a tool in understanding the private database industry). But see Neil M. Richards, Essay, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 G E O . L.J. 1087, 1133 (2006) (suggesting that the Orwell metaphor retains some validity as a tool to understand electronic surveillance).
65 R i c h a r d s , Intellectual Privacy, supra note 5, a t 389; R i c h a r d s , The Perils of Social Reading, supra note 20, a t 6 9 1 .
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theory suggests that new ideas often develop best away from the in- tense scrutiny of public exposure; that people should be able to make up their minds at times and places of their own choosing; and that a meaningful guarantee of privacy — protection from surveillance or in- terference — is necessary to promote this kind of intellectual freedom. It rests on the idea that free minds are the foundation of a free society, and that surveillance of the activities of belief formation and idea gen- eration can affect those activities profoundly and for the worse.̂ ^ I want to be clear at the outset that intellectual-privacy theory protects "intellectual" activities, broadly defined — the processes of thinking and making sense of the world with our minds. Intellectual privacy has its limits — it is a subset of all things that we might call "privacy," albeit a very important subset. But importantly, intellectual privacy is not just for intellectuals; it is an essential kind of privacy for us all.
At the core of the theory of intellectual privacy are two claims, one normative and one empirical. The normative claim is that the founda- tion of Anglo-American civil hberties is our commitment to free and unfettered thought and belief — that free citizens should be able to make up their own minds about ideas big and small, political and triv- ial. This claim requires at a minimum protecting individuals' rights to think and read, as well as the social practice of private consultation with confidantes. It may also require some protection of broader so- cial rights, whether we call them rights of association or assembly.^' Protection of these individual rights and social practices allows indi- viduals to develop both intellectual diversity and eccentric individuali- ty. They reflect the conviction that big ideas like truth, value, and culture should be generated from the bottom up rather than from the top down.̂ *
These commitments to the freedoms of thought, belief, and private speech lie at the foundation of traditional First Amendment theory, though they have been underappreciated elements of that tradition. But as I have argued elsewhere, a careful examination reveals that a commitment to freedom of thought is present in virtually every major text in First Amendment theory.^' In particular, freedom of thought lies at the core of the modern American tradition of First Amendment libertarianism, which began with the opinions of Justices Holmes and
66 Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 5, at 403-04. 6' See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 998 (2011) ("An as-
sociation is a coming together of individuals for a common cause or based on common values or goals."). See generally JOHN D . INAZU, LIBERTY'S REFUGE (2012) (arguing for the protection of political- and religious-group autonomy under the alternative rubric of the right of assembly).
68 See generally JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF (2012). 69 See Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 5, at 408-12 (exploring this point in greater
detail). For a similar argument, see generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Ap- proach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 283 (2011).
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Brandéis in the decade following the end of the First World War. Dis- senting from the majority position of the Supreme Court, the two friends developed theories that justified special protection for speech and ideas under the First Amendment. The two men advanced slightly different reasons why speech should be protected — Justice Holmes justified protection in terms of the search for truth, while Jus- tice Brandeis privileged democratic self-government — but each theory enshrined protection for free thought at its core. For example. Justice Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United States'"^ is a forceful statement of the idea that democratic institutions depend on minds' being able to freely and fearlessly engage in the search for political truth. As he put it poetically:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.'^ Justice Brandeis also placed the freedom of thought at the foun-
dation of his justification for special protection for free speech. In Whitney v. California,''^ he wrote:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its gov- ernment the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They be- lieved that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth . . . .'^ Thus, in each of the traditional American justifications for freedom
of speech,'" a commitment to freedom of thought — to intellectual freedom — rests at the core of the tradition.
70 250 U.S. 616(1919). ' • Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). '2 274 U.S. 357 (1927). '3 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added). '* Although most courts justify free speech in terms of truth-seeking or democratic self-
governance, some scholars have argued that free speech is better justified in terms of the autono- my or self-development of the individual. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amend- ment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 990-92 (1978); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593-94 (1982); David A. J. Richards, free Speech and Ob- scenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L . R E V . 45, 62 (1974); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 210-19 (1972). Free thought is a logically necessary precondition for autonomous speech, though this point is un- derdeveloped in the relevant literature. For an analysis of the relationship between free thought and autonomous speech, see Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 5, at 406 & n.113, and see generally Shiffrin, supra note 69.
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The second claim at the core of the theory of intellectual privacy is an empirical one — that surveillance inclines us to the mainstream and the boring. It is a claim that when we are watched while engag- ing in intellectual activities, broadly defined — thinking, reading, web- surfing, or private communication — we are deterred from engaging in thoughts or deeds that others might find deviant. Surveillance thus menaces our society's foundational commitments to intellectual diver- sity and eccentric individuality.
Three different kinds of arguments highlight the ways in which surveillance can restrain intellectual activities. The first set of argu- ments relies on cultural and literary works exploring the idea that sur- veillance deters eccentric or deviant behavior. IVIany such works owe a debt to Jeremy Bentham's idea of the Panopticon, a prison designed around a central surveillance tower from which a warden could see in- to all of the cells. In the Panopticon, prisoners had to conform their activities to those desired by the prison staff because they had no idea when they were being watched. As Bentham describes this system, "[t]o be incessantly under the eyes of an Inspector is to lose in fact the power of doing ill, and almost the very wish."" Of course, the most famous cultural exploration of the conforming effects of surveillance is Orwell's harrowing depiction in Nineteen Eighty-Four of the totalitar- ian state personified by Big Brother." Orwell's fictional state sought to prohibit not just verbal dissent from the state but even the think- ing of such ideas, an act punished as "thoughtcrime" and de- terred by constant state surveillance." Some scholars have docu- mented how the modern surveillance environment differs from both the classic Panopticon and a fully realized Big Brother in important ways.'^ Nevertheless, Orwell's insight about the effects of surveillance on thought and behavior remains valid — the fear of being watched causes people to act and think differently from the way they might otherwise.
Our cultural intuitions about the effects of surveillance are sup- ported by a second set of arguments that comes from the empirical work of scholars in the interdisciplinary field of surveillance studies. Moving beyond the classic metaphors of the Panopticon and Big Brother, these scholars have tried to understand modern forms of sur- veillance by governments, companies, and individuals in all of their
75 J e r e m y B e n t h a m , Panopticon, in 3 O P I N I O N S O F D I F F E R E N T A U T H O R S U P O N T H E P U N I S H M E N T O F D E A T H 3 2 1 , 3 2 8 ( B a s i l M o n t a g u ed., 1816).
76 O R W E L L , SM^ra n o t e 6 3 , a t 4. " Id. at 14. '8 See, e.g., Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRIT. J.
SOC. 605, 606-08 (2000); S O L O V E , supra note 64, at 33-35.
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complexities." The scope of this burgeoning literature has been wide- ranging and provides many examples of the normalizing effects of sur- veillance in a wide variety of contexts. In his pioneering work in the 1980s, for example. Professor Anthony Giddens argues that surveil- lance continually seeks the supervision of social actors and carries with it a permanent risk that supervision could lead to domination.8° More recent scholars have explored the risks that surveillance poses to dem- ocratic self-governance.81 One such risk is that of self-censorship, in terms of speech, action, or even belief. Studies of communist states give social-scientific accounts of many of the cultural intuitions about these self-censoring effects of surveillance,^^ but so too do studies of modern forms of surveillance in democratic societies. For example, one study of the EU Data Retention Directive notes that "[u]nder per- vasive surveillance, individuals are inclined to make choices that con- form to mainstream expectations."*^ As I explore below, the scope of surveillance studies is much broader than merely the study of panoptic state surveillance; scholars working in this field have examined the full scope of modern forms of watching, including data surveillance by private actors. But above all, surveillance scholars continually reaf- firm that, while surveillance by government and others can have many purposes, a recurrent purpose of surveillance is to control behavior,*"*
A third and final set of arguments for intellectual privacy comes from First Amendment doctrine, A basic principle of free speech law as it has developed over the past century is that free speech is so im- portant that its protection should err on the side of caution. Given the uncertainty of Utigation, the Supreme Court has created a series of procedural devices to attempt to ensure that errors in the adjudication of free speech cases tend to allow unlawful speech rather than engage in mistaken censorship. These doctrines form what Professor Lee Bollinger calls the "First Pillar" of First Amendment law — the "[e]xtraordinary [p]rotection against [cjensorship.''̂ ^ Such doctrines take various forms, such as those of prior restraint, overbreadth, and vagueness, but they are often characterized under the idea of the "chilling effect." This idea maintains that rules that might deter poten- tially valuable expression should be treated with a high level of suspi-
7 ' See generally LYON, supra n o t e 6. 80 See generally A N T H O N Y G I D D E N S , T H E N A T I O N - S T A T E AND V I O L E N C E (1985). 81 See generally, e.g., SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY, supra n o t e 6, 82 See, e,g,, Maria Los, A Trans-Systemic Surveillance: The Legacy of Communist Surveillance
in the Digital Age, in SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY, supra n o t e 6, a t 173, 1 7 4 - 7 5 . 83 Lilian Mitrou, The Impact of Communications Data Retention on Fundamental Rights and
Democracy — The Case of the EU Data Retention Directive, in SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOC- RACY, supra note 6, at 127, 138.
8'' See, e.g., LYON, supra note 6, at 15; BALL ET AL., supra note 15, at 4. »̂ LEE C, B O L L I N G E R , U N I N H I B I T E D , ROBUST, A N D W I D E - O P E N 12 (2010),
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cion by courts. As the Supreme Court put it in perhaps its most im- portant free speech decision of the twentieth century. New York Times Co. V. Sullivan,^^ the importance of uninhibited public debate.means that, although "erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to survive.'"^' As Professor Frederick Schauer explains, "the chilling effect doctrine recognizes the fact that the legal system is imperfect and mandates the formulation of legal rules that reflect our preference for errors made in favor of free speech."8* Although the chilling-effect doctrine has been criticized on grounds that it overprotects free speech and makes empirically unsup- ported judgments,*^ such criticisms miss the point. The doctrines en- capsulated by the chilling effect reflect the substantive value judgment that First Amendment valúes are too important to require scrupulous proof to vindicate them, and that it is (constitutionally speaking) a bet- ter bargain to allow more speech, even if society must endure some of that speech's undesirable consequences.
Intellectual-privacy theory explains why we should extend chilling- effect protections to intellectual surveillance, especially traditional-style surveillance by the state. If we care about the development of eccen- tric individuality and freedom of thought as First Amendment values, then we should be especially wary of surveillance of activities through which those aspects of the self are constructed.^° Professor Timothy Macklem argues that "[t]he isolating shield of privacy enables people to develop and exchange ideas, or to foster and share activities, that the presence or even awareness of other people might stifle. For better and for worse, then, privacy is sponsor and guardian to the creative and the subversive."" A meaningful measure of intellectual privacy should be erected to shield these activities from the normalizing gaze of surveillance. This shield should be justified on the basis of our cul- tural intuitions and empirical insights about the normalizing effects of surveillance. But it must also be tempered by the chilling-effect doc- trine's normative commitment to err on the side of First Amendment values even if proof is imperfect.
86 376 U.S. 254(1964). 8' Id. at 271-72 (second omission in original) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
433 (1963))- 88 Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect,"
58 B.U. L. REV 685, 688 (1978). 85 See generally, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent and the Chilling Effect, 54 W M . & MARY
L. R E V . (forthcoming 2013). '0 See C O H E N , supra note 68, at 223-25; Julie Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L.
R E V . 1904, 1912, 1918 (2013). '1 TIMOTHY MACKLEM, INDEPENDENCE OF MIND 36 (2006).
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Intellectual-privacy theory therefore suggests a solution to the con- fusion that has plagued courts and others in dealing with whether sur- veillance programs create legally cognizable injuries. Despite often displaying an intuitive understanding that surveillance might be pot- entially harmful, courts have struggled to understand why. This ab- sence of clarity has led to courts misunderstanding and diminishing privacy interests that conflict with other values. . When faced with ba- lancing a vague and poorly articulated privacy right against state in- terests such as the prevention of terrorist attacks, surveillance tends to win. Courts also make the mistake that the ACLU v. NSA court made and cast surveillance as solely a Fourth Amendment issue of crime prevention, rather than as one that also threatens intellectual freedom and First Amendment values of the highest order. «̂ other decisions mirror the mistake of the Al-Haramain court in concluding that pre- venting secret surveillance is less important than inconveniencing the executive branch.'^ Additionally, some courts can make the mistake that the Clapper Court made, refusing to recognize as justiciable harms the costly measures that people must adopt to shield their communica- tions from government surveillance.'"
Shadowy regimes of surveillance corrode the constitutional com- mitment to intellectual freedom that lies at the heart of most theories of political freedom in a democracy. Secret programs of wide-ranging intellectual surveillance that are devoid of pubhc process and that cannot be justified in court are inconsistent with this commitment and illegitimate in a free society. My argument is not that intellectual sur- veillance should never be possible, but that when the state seeks to learn what people are reading, thinking, and saying privately, such scrutiny is a serious threat to civil liberties. Accordingly, meaningful legal process (that is, at least a warrant supported by probable cause) must be followed before the government can perform the digital equivalent of reading our diaries.
But we must also remember that in modern societies, surveillance fails to respect the line between public and private actors. Intellectual privacy should be preserved against private actors as well as against the state. Federal prosecutions based on purely intellectual surveil- lance are thankfully rare, but the coercive effects of monitoring by our friends and acquaintances are much more common. We are con- strained in our actions by peer pressure at least as much as by the state. Moreover, records collected by private parties can be sold to or subpoenaed by the government, which (as noted above) has shown a
92 See A C L U v. N S A , 493 F.3d 644, 657 (6th Cir. 2007). 93 See A l - H a r a m a i n I s l a m i c F o u n d . , I n c . v. B u s h , 507 F.3d 1190, 1201-05 (9th Cir. 2007).
94 See C l a p p e r v. A m n e s t y I n t ' l USA, 133 S. C t . 1138, 1150-53 (2013).
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voracious interest in all kinds of personal information, particularly records related to the operation of the mind and political beliefs.̂ ^ Put simply, the problem of intellectual privacy transcends the pub- lic/private divide, and justifies additional legal protections on intellec- tual privacy and the right to read freely.'̂ Constitutional law and standing doctrine alone will not solve the threat of surveillance to in- tellectual freedom and privacy, but they are a good place to start.
III. S U R V E I L L A N C E A N D P O W E R
The mechanics of intellectual privacy discussed so far depend upon knowing, or at least fearing, that someone might be watching us. If we have a sense of privacy, even one that turns out to be an illusion, we are less likely to change our behavior under the panoptic gaze. Truly secret and unexpected surveillance, from this perspective, might appear not to violate our intellectual privacy at all. If we have no in- kling that we are being watched, if we really do not care that we are being watched, or if we fear no consequences of being watched, it could be argued that our intellectual freedom is unaffected. It can thus be argued that if the NSA Wiretapping Program had never leaked, it would have posed no threat to intellectual privacy.
There are two problems with this account. First, no program of widespread surveillance is likely to remain secret forever. At some point, such a program will inevitably come to light, either by being leaked (as happened with the NSA program and the Army surveillance in Laird), or by actions taken pursuant to the program (such as prose- cutions or disclosures). The injury suffered by those thus punished would serve as an example to the rest of us, and the mechanisms of in- tellectual privacy would come into effect at that point.
Second, surveillance (even secret surveillance) can create additional harms that are separate from the ones suggested by intellectual- privacy theory. Scholars working in surveillance studies have explored the phenomenon of surveillance in all of its contemporary complexity, going beyond the Panopticon to consider private surveillance, the rela- tionships between watchers and watched, and the wide variety of dan- gers that modern surveillance societies raise. ̂ ' Recall in this regard that Lyon's definition of surveillance notes that surveillance has a purpose,'^ but in the modern era this purpose is rarely totalitarian domination. All the same, most forms of surveillance seek some form
' 5 See R i c h a r d s , Intellectual Privacy, supra note 5, a t 4 2 7 - 2 8 (providing examples). 9* See generally R i c h a r d s , The Perils of Social Reading, supra note 20. 97 See, e.g., Kevin D . H a g g e r t y & M i n a s S a m a t a s , Introduction, in S U R V E I L L A N C E AND
D E M O C R A C Y , supra note 6, a t i , 3-4. 98 See L Y O N , supra note 6, a t 14.
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of subtler influence or control over others. Even when' surveillance is not Orwellian, it is usually about influencing or being able to respond to someone else's behavior. And while surveillance can sometimes have benign goals (like traffic safety, or parents using baby monitors or GPS trackers to keep tabs on their children), it is invariably tied to a particular purpose. Critically, the gathering of information affects the power dynamic between the watcher and the watched, giving the watcher greater power to influence or direct the subject of surveil- lance.'' It might sound trite to say that "information is power," but the power of personal information lies at the heart of surveillance. The power effects of surveillance illustrate three additional dangers of surveillance: blackmail, discrimination, and persuasion.
A. Blackmail
Information collected surreptitiously can be used to blackmail or discredit opponents by revealing embarrassing secrets. American po- litical history over the past hundred years furnishes numerous exam- ples of this phenomenon, but perhaps the most compelling is the treatment of Martin Luther King, Jr., by the FBI. Concerned that Dr. King was a threat to public order, the FBI listened to his private tele- phone conversations in order to seek information with which to blackmail him. As the official government investigation into the Dr. King wiretaps concluded in 1976:
The FBI collected information about Dr. King's plans and activities through an extensive surveillance program, employing nearly every intelli- gence-gathering technique at the Bureau's disposal. Wiretaps, which were initially approved by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, were main- tained on Dr. IQng's home telephone from October 1963 until mid-iços; the SCLC headquarter's [sic] telephones were covered by wiretaps for an even longer period. Phones in the homes and offices of some of Dr. King's close advisers were also wiretapped. The FBI has acknowledged 16 occa- sions on which microphones were hidden in Dr. King's hotel and motel rooms in an "attempt" to obtain information about the "private activities of King and his advisers" for use to "completely discredit" them.i°°
Imagine a dissident like Dr. King living in today's information age. A government (or political opponent) that wanted him silenced might be able to obtain not just access to his telephone conversations, but al- so to his reading habits and emails. This critic could be blackmailed outright, or he could be discredited by disclosure of the information as an example to others. Perhaps he has not been having an affair, but has some other secret. Maybe he is gay, or has a medical condition, or
99 See id. 100 S. R E P . N O . 94-755, at 8i (1976) (quoting Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to
William Sullivan (Jan. 28, 1964)).
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visits embarrassing web sites, or has cheated on his expenses or his taxes. All of us have secrets we would prefer not be made public. Surveillance allows those secrets greater opportunities to come out, and it gives the watchers power that can be used nefariously.
The risk of the improper use of surveillance records persists over time. Most of the former communist states in Eastern Europe have passed laws strictly regulating access to the surveillance files of the communist secret police. The primary purpose of such laws is to pre- vent the blackmail of political candidates who may have been sur- veilled under the former regime,i°i The experience of these laws re- veals, moreover, that the risk of such blackmail is one that the law cannot completely prevent after the fact. Professor Maria Los explains that "[s]ecret surveillance files are routinely turned into a weapon in political struggles, seriously underrnining democratic processes and
More recently, the world observed some of the potential of electron- ic blackmail during the revolutions in the Arab world. Many observ- ers have argued that the turmoil in Ilinisia, Libya, and Syria shows the liberating potential of digital technologies,'°^ But the crisis also il- lustrates the potential of modern surveillance technologies, which have been deployed by authoritarian governments across the Middle East, The Libyan government of Colonel Moammar Gadhafi, for example, attempted to capture Internet and phone communications with the as- sistance of Western technology companies for later review. As one journalist remarked about the availalbility of such "'massive intercept' technology" to governments around the world, "[t]oday you can run an approximation of IÇ84 out of a couple of rooms filled with server racks, "1°"* Using these technologies, the Libyan government obtained information about dissidents that it was able to use to blackmail them into silence. And while the Gadhafi regime did not hesitate to use vi- olence against its critics, it found blackmail and harassment to be even easier tools to use,i°5 The fact that the Gadhafi regime ultimately col- lapsed does not diminish surveillance's blackmail threat.
Even in democratic societies, the blackmail threat of surveillance is a real one. Surveillance (especially secret surveillance) often detects crimes or embarrassing activity beyond or unrelated to its original purposes. The surveillance of Dr, King, for instance, produced evi- dence of his marital infidelity. In another infamous case, FISA- authorized surveillance of a terrorist suspect produced chilling evi-
101 L o s , supra n o t e 82, at 176.-77. 102 Id at 180. 103 See, e.g., C h a n d e r , supra n o t e 13, a t 1508. lot M a t t h i e u A i k i n s , Jamming Tripoli, W I R E D , J u n e 2012, a t 146, 176. 105 Id.
2OI3] THE DANGERS OF SURVEILLANCE 1 9 5 5
dence of the suspect's murder of his own daughter for dating the wrong boy.i°^ Whether these discoveries are important, incidental, or irrelevant, all of them give greater power to the watcher. Unscrupu- lous government officials could engage in blackmail, whether moti- vated by political or pecuniary considerations. But even faithful gov- ernment agents who discover illegal activity would now possess the weapon of selective prosecution, which could be used to influence the subject, and would be able to wield the threat of mere disclosure of le- gal but embarrassing activity. Putting the seriousness of the crime to one side, it is important to realize that wide-ranging secret surveillance gives coercive power to the watcher.
B. Persuasion
Surveillance also gives the watcher increased power to persuade. Persuasion is a more subtle exercise of the power differential that can be used to blackmail, but it can be even more effective. Consider again Target's use of Big Data to lure pregnant customers into its stores. Even if the customers have told no one that they are expecting. Big Data analj^ics can look for correlations between pregnancy and other changes in consumer behavior, for instance, purchasing more vi- tamins or scent-free lotions. Once an inference of pregnancy is estab- lished. Target's marketers can offer coupons to the pregnant woman in order to capture her business, knowing that she is at a point in her life when her buying habits are temporarily in flux before they will lock in for a period of some years. It is entirely possible that such actions by a retailer like Target could occur without the knowledge of the pregnant consumer. Indeed, the science of targeted online or "behavioral" ad- vertising seeks to do exactly that: to market products to consumers based upon detailed profiles collected about their behavior. The effec- tive sales technique of behavioral "retargeting" allows marketers to go one step further and literally follow targeted consumers around the web, delivering the same targeted advertisement to them with enough frequency that they are likely eventually to succumb and make a pur- chase in a moment of weakness.'°'
Governments also use the power of surveillance to control behavior. For example, one of the justifications for massive closed-circuit televi- sion (CCTV) networks in modern urban areas is that they allow police greater ability to watch and influence what happens on city streets. 1°̂ Certainly, the presence of cameras or police can persuade citizens to obey the law, but it can have other effects as well. The surveillance-
1̂ 6 United States v. Isa, 923 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir. 1991). 10' EI.TPARTSF.R, T H E FTT.TER RURRLE44 (20TT). 108 See L Y O N , supra note 6, at 107-08.
I9S6 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 126:1934
studies literature has documented the use of government CCTV as- semblages to direct public behavior toward commerce and away from other activities ranging from crime to protest."°' In Britain, where the science of surveillance-based control is at its most advanced, CCTV operates in connection with court-ordered injunctions, known as Anti- Social Behavior Orders, to move groups of teens out of the commercial cores of cities using surveillance and the power of the state to ensure that commerce continues efficiently. ""° Government use of persuasive surveillance is still in its relative infancy, but since the technologies of surveillance and Big Data analjdics are available to the state as well as to private companies, we can imagine the government becoming in- creasingly able to engage in Target-style persuasion in the future.
The bottom line about surveillance and persuasion is that surveil- lance gives the watcher information about the watched. That infor- mation gives the watcher increased power over the watched that can be used to persuade, influence, or otherwise control them, even if they do not know they are being watched or persuaded. Sometimes this power is arguably a good thing, for example when police are engaged in riot control. But we should not forget that surveillance represents a persuasive power shift whether the watcher is a government agent or a corporate marketer, and whether the target is a rioter or law-abiding citizen. The legal system has rules dealing with power imbalances be- tween consumers and businesses, such as the doctrine of unconsciona- bility and much of consumer protection law. There are also rules pro- tecting citizens from state coercion, such as the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and the First Amendment's protections of freedom of thought and conscience. In our age of surveillance, where technolo- gical change has given the watcher enhanced powers of persuasion, it may well be time to think about updating those doctrines to restore the balance.
C. Sorting/Discrimination
Many kinds of surveillance are routinely used to sort people into categories. Some of these forms of sorting are insidious. Consider, for example, the use of census records by the American, Canadian, and German governments during the Second World War to identify citizens to relocate to the Japanese internment camps in North America and the concentration camps in Europe.""" Others seem innocuous or even benign. The vast preference engines that power the "free" Internet are
109 See, e.g., ROY C O L E M A N , RECLAIMING T H E S T R E E T S 2 2 6 - 2 8 (2004); LYON, supra n o t e 6, at 107-08; Roy Coleman, Surveillance in the City: Primary Definition and Urban Spatial Or- der, in T H E S U R V E I L L A N C E S T U D I E S R E A D E R , supra note 6, at 231,234-35.
110 See COLEMAN,5M/>ra note 109, at I I I . 111 L Y O N , s«/)»-o note 6, at 30, 32.
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used to profile Internet users for marketing purposes. Companies like Google amass vast detailed profiles of our web-surfing habits, our in- terests, and our buying habits."^ Data brokers hke Acxiom and LexisNexis create even more detailed consumer profiles by combining various kinds of data and sell the data to a wide variety of sources, in- cluding direct marketers, background-check companies, and compa- nies consumers may already have a relationship with, such as car deal- er's or Target."^ Commercial data of this kind can be used to offer discounts or selective promotions to more or less desirable customers.
The sorting power of surveillance is a major theme among surveil- lance scholars. In the 1990s, sociologist Oscar Gandy described the "panoptic sort": the use of consumer databases to profile consumers, sort them into categories, and then discriminate among the categories, allocating opportunities on the basis of the classification."" More re- cently, Lyon and other scholars have built on Gandy's work to show the ways in which software is increasingly used to sort citizens and consumers by governments seeking profiles of criminal risk and by companies seeking profiles of commercial opportunity."^
From one perspective, the use of the fruits of data surveillance in this way might look like ordinary marketing. But consider the power that data-driven marketing gives companies in relation to their cus- tomers. The power of sorting can bleed imperceptibly into the power of discrimination. A coupon for a frequent shopper might seem inno- cuous, but consider the power to offer shorter airport security lines (and less onerous procedures) to rich frequent fliers, or to discriminate against customers or citizens on the basis of wealth, geography, gender, race, or ethnicity. The power to treat people differently is a dangerous one, as our many legal rules in the areas of fair credit, civil rights, and constitutional law recognize. Surveillance, especially when fuelled by Big Data, puts pressure on those laws and threatens to upend the basic power balance on which our consumer protection and constitutional laws operate. As Professor Danielle Citron argues, algorithmic deci- sionmaking based on data raises issues of "technological due process.""^ The sorting power of surveillance only raises the stakes of these issues. After all, what sociologists call "sorting" has many other
••2 L E V Y , supra note 18, at 336-37, 341. ••3 See Jon D. Michaels, All the President's Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in
the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901, 917-18 (2008). •••I O S C A R H . G A N D Y , J R . , T H E P A N O P T I C S O R T 15 (1993).
•'5 See generally JOHN GiLLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR (2006); DAVID LYON, SUR- VEILLANCE AFTER S E P T E M B E R I I (2003); T H E N E W P O L I T I C S O F S U R V E I L L A N C E A N D V I S I B I L I T Y (Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson eds., 2006); SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL S O R T I N G ( n a v i d Lyon erl., 2003).
••6 Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1258 (2008).
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names in the law, with "profiling" and "discrimination" being just two of them.
IV. L I M I T I N G S U R V E I L L A N C E
These insights into the ways in which surveillance is harmful point toward identifying remedies that can be built into law, technologies, and social norms to deter the most dangerous forms of surveillance. In this section, I outline four principles that we should use to guide the treatment of surveillance. ]VIy purpose is not to propose neat doctrinal fixes to existing law; as I have shown already, the age of surveillance raises massive challenges that will require us to think creatively about how to capture its benefits without sacrificing important civil liberties. Instead, my purpose is to identify some of the values that the law of surveillance ought to protect and the principles that should guide its evolution.
A. Surveillance Transcends the Public/Private Divide
One of the most significant changes that the age of surveillance has brought about is the increasing difficulty of separating surveillance by governments from that by commercial entities. Public- and private- sector surveillance are intertwined — they use the same technologies and techniques, they operate through a variety of public/private part- nerships, and their digital fruits can easily cross the public/private divide. It is probably in this respect that our existing models for un- derstanding surveillance — such as Big Brother and the Panopticon — are the most out of date. Even if we are primarily worried about state surveillance, perhaps because we fear the state's powers of criminal enforcement, our solutions to the problem of surveillance can no longer be confined to regulation of government actors. Any solutions to the problem of surveillance must thus take into account private surveil- lance as well as public.
In this respect. Professor Orin Kerr is correct when he argues that federal statutory law has advantages over the Fourth Amendment in guarding against surveillance in the digital age.*'' Not only is statuto- ry law easier to change, but it also can be applied to bind both gov- ernment and nongovernment actors. A good model in this context is the federal ECPA and its state-law equivalents. These laws prohibit wiretapping by private actors and require the government to obtain a warrant under a standard higher than probable cause before it can en- gage in wiretapping."8 ECPA has many defects, both in terms of the
117 Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 806-08 (2004).
118 18 U.S.C. §2516(2006).
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level of protection it offers and in its often-bewildering complexity, but in transcending the public/private divide, it represents a good model for dealing with surveillance.
Additional legal protections will be needed to cope with develop- ments in surveillance practices. Because the government can sidestep many legal restrictions on the collection of data by buying it from pri- vate databases, we should place additional restrictions on this growing form of state surveillance. Such regulations could operate in both di- rections. In relation to government, we could place restrictions both on the government's abihty to buy private databases and on its ability to share personal information with the private sector. Privacy law al- ready has numerous models for this latter category, ranging from the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994,"' which limits the govern- ment's ability to sell drivers' license records to industry, to the Privacy Act of 1974,1̂ ° which prevents the government from disclosing many kinds of records about individuals that it has in its possession. In rela- tion to private actors, we can place special obligations of confidentiali- ty upon the holders of personal information related to intellectual pri- vacy, treating them as information fiduciaries. Our law has long had a tradition of confidentiality rules, placing nondisclosure obligations on lawyers, doctors, trustees, librarians, and other information custo- dians,'^^ On the Internet, many companies already promise not to share personal information with governments unless compelled. It would be but a small step to make such promises the default, or even the mandatory practice, for certain kinds of particularly sensitive information,'^^
B. Secret Surveillance Is Illegitimate
Democratic societies should prohibit the creation of any domestic- surveillance programs whose existence is secret. In a democratic socie- ty, the people, and not the state apparatus, are sovereign. In American law, this tradition goes back to James Madison, and it lies at the very heart of both First Amendment theory and American constitutionalism itself, 1̂ ^ These principles are refiected at the core of modern informa- tion law. For example, the Supreme Court has made clear that the
119 18 U . S . C . § § 2 7 2 1 - 2 7 2 5 (2006). 120 5 U . S . C . § 5 5 2 a (2006). •21 See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of Con-
fidentiality, 96 G E O . L.J. 123, 134-40 (2007). 122 R i c h a r d s , The Perils of Social Reading, supra n o t e 20, a t 6 9 2 , 123 Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions (178Ç-1800), in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON T H E ADOPTION OF T H E FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 553-76 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1891).
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federal Freedom of Information Act̂ "̂* protects at its core the "citizens' right to be informed about 'what their government is up to.'"i^^ As Professor Henry Steele Commager put it aptly, "[t]he generation that made the nation thought secrecy in government [to be] one of the in- struments of Old World tyranny and committed itself to the principle that a democracy cannot function unless the people are permitted to know what their government is up to."'^^
The illegitimacy of secret surveillance also lies at the heart of in- formation-privacy law, which remains guided by the "Fair Information Practices" drafted by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1973.̂ ^̂ The Code of Fair Information Practices recom- mended by the Department has continued to influence information- privacy law throughout the world,i^^ and the first of its five principles is the commitment that "there must be no personal-data record- keeping systems whose very existence is secret."'̂ ^
Requiring the existence of domestic-surveillance programs to be disclosed solves a practical problem that has bedeviled courts trying to assess legal challenges to secret surveillance programs. How can plaintiffs prove injury if the government is not required to admit whether surveillance exists in the first place? A prohibition on secret surveillance programs solves this problem. When government pro- grams are public — when we have no secret surveillance — courts will be able to assess their legality in the open. The NSA wiretapping pro- gram was hard to challenge because its details were shrouded in secre- cy, denials, and unassessable invocations of national security inter- ests. 1̂ ° At the same time, its shadowy nature created an even greater threat to intellectual privacy in particular because no one knew if her telephone calls were being listened to or not. Requiring disclosure of the existence and capabilities of domestic-surveillance programs to the general public makes them amenable to judicial and public scrutiny to ensure their compatibility with the rule of law. At the same time, the prohibition on secret surveillance systems does not require the gov- ernment to notify individual targets of surveillance that they are being
124 5 U . S . C . § 552 (2006 & S u p p . V 2011). 125 U . S . D e p ' t of J u s t i c e v. R e p o r t e r s C o m m . for F r e e d o m of t h e P r e s s , 489 U . S . 749, 773 (1989)
( q u o t i n g E P A v. M i n k , 4 1 0 U . S . 73, 105 (1973)). 126 H e n r y Steele C o m m a g e r , The Defeat of America, N . Y . REV. B O O K S , O c t . 5, 1972, a t 7, 7
( r e v i e w i n g R I C H A R D J . B A R N E T , R O O T S O F WAR (1972)). 12' U.S. D E P ' T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTO- MATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS (1973).
128 L A W R E N C E L E S S I G , C O D E : V E R S I O N 2.0, a t 227 (2006); D A N I E L J. S O L O V E , U N D E R - S T A N D I N G P R I V A C Y 130 (2008).
129 U.S. D E P ' T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, i « ^ a note i27,at4i;jeeo/soid. 29-30,41-42. •30 See In re NSA Telecomm. Record Litig., 671 F.3d 881, 893 (9th Cir. 2011).
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watched. But fundamentally, surveillance requires legal process and the involvement of the judiciary to ensure that surveillance is targeted, justified, and no more extensive than is necessary.
Thus, while covert domestic surveillance can be justified in discrete (and temporary) instances when there is advance judicial process, Ijlanket surveillance of all Internet activity menaces our intellectual privacy and gives the government too much power to blackmail or discriminate against the subjects of surveillance. In a free society, all forms of surveillance must be ultimately accountable to a self- governing public, and for this reason, secret domestic-surveillance pro- grams of any kind are illegitimate.
C. Total Surveillance Is Illegitimate
Democratic societies should also reject the idea that it is reasonable for the government to record all Internet and telephone activity with or without authorization. Government surveillance of the Internet is a power with the potential for massive abuse, as the (thankfully) failed attempts by the Gadhafi regime illustrated."3" Like its precursor, tele- phone wiretapping, Internet surveillance must be subjected to mean- ingful judicial process before it is authorized. And such authorization must allow only discrete and limited forms of surveillance. Otherwise, there would be no constraint on the government's ability to record and archive all electronic communications and read them at its leisure. The magnitude of technological change should not blind us to the im- portant values that our law has protected for decades: the importance of private communications, intellectual privacy, and unfettered intel- lectual exploration. Moreover, a world of total surveillance would be one in which the power dangers of surveillance are even more menac- ing. In such a world, watchers would have increased power to black- mail, selectively prosecute, coerce, persuade, and sort individuals. A world of total surveillance is not just science fiction. It is the world toward which we are slowly creeping, as software is coded, databases are combined, and each CCTV camera is successively added to the network.
Rather than jettisoning longstanding civil liberties in our brave new digital world, we should instead follow the example of federal wiretapping law, which for decades has rested on the premise that pri- vate communications should be exactly that, shielded from the. gov- ernment (and other private actors) except in cases of proven law- enforcement need for limited access to those communications. Such a regime is a far cry from the security-driven argument for total surveil- lance, even in an age of terror.
131 See generally Aikins, supra note 104.
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D. Surveillance Is Harmful
As Parts II and III of this Article demonstrate, many forms of sur- veillance — covert and overt, public and private — menace our intel- lectual privacy and the processes of belief formation on which a free society depends. They also create a power imbalance between the watcher and the watched that creates risks of blackmail, undue per- suasion, and discrimination. Courts and legislatures should therefore scrutinize any surveillance that threatens these values. But because of its relationship to First Amendment values and political freedom, sur- veillance of intellectual records — Internet search histories, email, web traffic, and telephone communications — is particularly harmful. In practice, this means that surveillance by government that seeks access to intellectual records should be subjected to a high threshold before a warrant can issue. A good model for this rule is Title I of the ECPA, which provides for a more stringent procedure under federal wiretap- ping law before a warrant may issue to intercept the contents of a tele- phone or electronic communication. 1̂2 -phe ECPA requires more than just the standard probable cause requirement that is the constitutional floor under Fourth Amendment law. In addition to probable cause, government agents seeking to tap a phone or electronic communication must also show three other elements: (i) that the warrant is sought for a limited time, (2) that the interception of the communication is neces- sary to obtain the information sought, and (3) that the wiretapping will be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of infor- mation not relevant to the warrant.'^^ These "super-warrant" protec- tions for communications should be expanded to cover the full range of intellectual records.
For private-sector surveillance, additional statutory procedures are necessary to ensure that intellectual records are handled with greater care by the entities that hold them. We already have piecemeal protec- tions for intellectual privacy against private-sector surveillance, which could serve as useful models for the extension of intellectual-privacy protection more broadly.̂ ^" For example, the ECPA prohibition against warrantless wiretapping applies to private actors as well.'̂ ^ The Act makes private acts of wiretapping illegal, providing severe criminal and civil liability — up to five years in prisoni36 and fines or
•32 18 U.S.C. § 2518(2006). •33 See ¿d. ; see also Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing Importance of Justi-
fication Standards, 94 MiNN. L. REV. 1514, 1554 (2010). •3'' For an expanded treatment of this argument in the context of reading records, see generally
Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, supra note 20. •35 18 U.S.C. § 2511 ("any person"). •36 Id. § 25ii(4)(a).
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tort liability of $10,000 for each violation of the Act.'^' Other good models for intellectual-privacy protection in the private sector include the confidentiality obligations placed on video-rental companies by the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988,'̂ * on librarians by the vast number of library-records confidentiality laws, and on print and elec- tronic booksellers in Cahfornia under its Reader Privacy Act."'
Because surveillance of intellectual activities menaces self- government, our law must also recognize it as a harm in standing doc- trine. One of the difficulties that courts have faced in dealing with surveillance in the past is an inability to articulate exactly why surveil- lance is harmful. This inability was the problem in Laird and also in the NSA wiretapping cases. Contrary to the trend of the law. Amnesty International USA v. Clapper^'*^ held that amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that authorized the NSA wiretapping program actually could cause a legally cognizable injury to journalists, lawyers, and aid workers whose communications with overseas clients might be subjected to surveillance by the United States government.''*' But even that outlier case, which the Supreme Court reversed on ap- peal, failed to recognize that a reasonable fear of government surveil- lance threatens the privacy of the surveilled, causing them to act dif- ferently. The Second Circuit found standing but rested its conclusions instead upon injury to the professional duties of the doctors and law- yers who feared that the government was listening. The professional duties of the plaintiffs in Clapper are important, and the Second Cir- cuit was correct to recognize injuries to those duties as harms under standing doctrine. But on its own terms, even the Second Circuit seemed to suggest that only professional elites have standing to chal- lenge surveillance. Such a conclusion is underprotective of the rights of all people to be free from unlawful surveillance and to be able to challenge unlawful surveillance in court. As I have argued, intellectual privacy is not just for intellectuals. If the government is engaged in unwarranted surveillance of a person's intellectual activities, that per- son should have standing to challenge the legality,of the surveillance. The surveillance may or may not turn out to be warranted in each particular case, but our society's fundamental commitments to due process, freedom of the mind, and the rule of law suggest that such dangerous surveillance should be subject to legal challenge.
Intellectual-privacy theory thus corrects the errors of Clapper, Laird, and the NSA cases. It would extend protection from surveil-
137 Id. § 252O(2)(B). 138 18 U.S.C. §2710(2006). '39 C A L . CIV. C O D E § 1798.90.05 (West 2012). '"0 638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2011), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
' ' " Id. at 121-22.
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lance to all people, and not just to professional elites. It explains why surveillance of reading, thinking, and private communication harms the development of ideas and beliefs unfettered by the skewing effects of observation. Accordingly, a reasonable fear of government surveil- lance that affects the subject's intellectual activities (reading, thinking, and communicating) should be recognized as a harm sufficient to prove an injury in fact under standing doctrine. Such a change to our law would not be a radical one; in fact, it is precisely the way courts currently assess challenges to individual free speech rights under the First Amendment's chilling-effects doctrine. Since intellectual privacy protects, at heart. First Amendment values, it is appropriate to extend these existing and workable doctrinal tools to this related area of the law.
This is not to say that individual determinations of the chilling of intellectual activities will always be easy. Determining whether a chill to intellectual privacy is substantial would certainly present difficult cases at the margins. In our law, the devil is frequently in the details. But as the chilling-effects doctrine has demonstrated, courts have man- aged to balance threats to free speech against competing government interests. Moreover, because the general details of government surveil- lance programs should be pubhc, courts and litigants will have more information with which to assess the effects of surveillance. And even when publication of the details of surveillance might threaten ongoing investigations, such details could be released either under seal to the litigants or shared with the court. Courts have a wide variety of tools to manage the flow of confidential information that litigation inevita- bly produces, and they would be well suited to such a task. Such tasks may be difficult and require judgment, but that is the job of courts. The alternative to grappling with the civil-hberties threats that sur- veillance poses is to ignore those threats altogether, to face the prospect of rendering widespread government surveillance unreviewable and uncheckable. Democratic societies can do better than that.
V. C O N C L U S I O N
The challenge to our law posed by the Age of Surveillance is im- mense. The justifications for surveillance by pubhc and private actors are significant, but so too are the costs that the rising tide of unfettered surveillance is creating. Surveillance can sometimes be necessary, even helpful. But unconstrained surveillance, especially of our intellectual activities, threatens a cognitive revolution that cuts at the core of the freedom of the mind that our political institutions presuppose. There- fore, surveillance must be constrained by legal and social rules. The technological, economic, and geopolitical changes of the past twenty years have whittled away at those rules, both formally on their sub- stance (for example, the Patriot Act and the expansion of National Se-
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curity Letter jurisdiction) and in practice (for example, the pressure that the technological social practices of. the Internet have exerted on privacy). By thus recognizing the harms of surveillance and crafting our laws accordingly, we can obtain many of its benefits without sacri- ficing our vital civil liberties or upending the power balance between individuals on the one hand and companies and governments on the other.
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untitled folder/Freedom and Happiness by George Orwell.pdf
Freedom and Happiness
(by George Orwell: Review of We by Yevgeny Zamyatin)
George Orwell: Nineteen Eighty-Four Paul Owen: 1984 thoughtcrime? Does it matter that George Orwell pinched
the plot? Buy We by Yevgeny Zamyatin (Blackwell’s)
This material remains under copyright and is reproduced by kind permission of the Orwell Estate and Penguin Books.
Several years after hearing of its existence, I have at last got my hands on a copy of Zamyatin’s We, which is one of the literary curiosities of this book-burning age. Looking it up in Gleb Struve’s 25 Years of Soviet Russian Literature, I find its history to have been this:
Zamyatin, who died in Paris in 1937, was a Russian novelist and critic who published a number of books both before and after the Revolution. We was written about 1923, and though it is not about Russia and has no direct connection with contemporary politics—it is a fantasy dealing with the twenty- sixth century A.D.—it was refused publication on the ground that it was ideologically undesirable. A copy of the manuscript found its way out of the country, and the book has appeared in English, French and Czech translations, but never in Russian. The English translation was published in the United States, and I have never been able to procure a copy: but copies of the French translation (the title is Nous Autres) do exist, and I have at last succeeded in borrowing one. So far as I can judge it is not a book of the first order, but it is certainly an unusual one, and it is astonishing that no English publisher has been enterprising enough to re- issue it.
The first thing anyone would notice about We is the fact—never pointed out, I believe—that Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World must be partly derived from it. Both books deal with the rebellion of the primitive human spirit against a rationalised, mechanised, painless world, and both stories are supposed to take place about six hundred years hence. The atmosphere of the two books is similar, and it is roughly speaking the same kind of society that is being described, though
Huxley’s book shows less political awareness and is more influenced by recent biological and psychological theories.
In the twenty-sixth century, in Zamyatin’s vision of it, the inhabitants of Utopia have so completely lost their individuality as to be known only by numbers. They live in glass houses (this was written before television was invented), which enables the political police, known as the ‘Guardians,’ to supervise them more easily. They all wear identical uniforms, and a human being is commonly referred to either as ‘a number’ or ‘a unif’ (uniform). They live on synthetic food, and their usual recreation is to march in fours while the anthem of the Single State is played through loudspeakers. At stated intervals they are allowed for one hour (known as ‘the sex hour’) to lower the curtains round their glass apartments. There is, of course, no marriage, though sex life does not appear to be completely promiscuous. For purposes of love-making everyone has a sort of ration book of pink tickets, and the partner with whom he spends one of his allotted sex hours signs the counterfoil. The Single State is ruled over by a personage known as The Benefactor, who is annually re-elected by the entire population, the vote being always unanimous. The guiding principle of the State is that happiness and freedom are incompatible. In the Garden of Eden man was happy, but in his folly he demanded freedom and was driven out into the wilderness. Now the Single State has restored his happiness by removing his freedom.
So far the resemblance with Brave New World is striking. But though Zamyatin’s book is less well put together—it has a rather weak and episodic plot which is too complex to summarise—it has a political point which the other lacks. In Huxley’s book the problem of ‘human nature’ is in a sense solved, because it assumes that by pre-natal treatment, drugs and hypnotic suggestion the human organism can be specialised in any way that is desired. A first-rate scientific worker is as easily produced as an Epsilon semi-moron, and in either case the vestiges of primitive instincts, such as maternal feeling or the desire for liberty, are easily dealt with. At the same time no clear reason is given why society should be stratified in the elaborate way that is described. The aim is not economic exploitation, but the desire to bully and dominate does not seem to be a motive either. There is no power-hunger, no sadism, no hardness of any kind. Those at the top have no strong motive for staying at the top, and though everyone is happy in a vacuous way, life has become so pointless that it is difficult to believe that such a society could endure.
Zamyatin’s book is on the whole more relevant to our own situation. In spite of education and the vigilance of the Guardians, many of the ancient human instincts are still there. The teller of the story, D-503, who, though a gifted engineer, is a poor conventional creature, a sort of Utopian Billy Brown of London Town, is constantly horrified by the atavistic impulses which seize upon him. He falls in love (this is a crime, of course) with a certain I-330 who is a member of an underground resistance movement and succeeds for a while in leading him into rebellion. When the rebellion breaks out it appears that the enemies of The Benefactor are in fact fairly numerous, and these people, apart from plotting the overthrow of the State, even indulge, at the moment when their curtains are down, in such vices as smoking cigarettes and drinking alcohol. D-503 is ultimately saved from the consequences of his own folly. The authorities announce that they have discovered the cause of the recent disorders: it is that some human beings suffer from a disease called imagination. The nerve-centre responsible for imagination has now been located, and the disease can be cured by X-ray treatment. D-503 undergoes the operation, after which it is easy for him to do what he has known all along that he ought to do—that is, betray his confederates to the police. With complete equanimity he watches I-330 tortured by means of compressed air under a glass bell:
She looked at me, her hands clasping the arms of the chair, until her eyes were completely shut. They took her out, brought her to herself by means of an electric shock, and put her under the bell again. This operation was repeated three times, and not a word issued from her lips.
The others who had been brought along with her showed themselves more honest. Many of them confessed after one application. Tomorrow they will all be sent to the Machine of the Benefactor.
The Machine of the Benefactor is the guillotine. There are many executions in Zamyatin’s Utopia. They take place publicly, in the presence of the Benefactor, and are accompanied by triumphal odes recited by the official poets. The guillotine, of course, is not the old crude instrument but a much improved model which literally liquidates its victim, reducing him in an instant to a puff of smoke and a pool of clear water. The execution is, in fact, a human sacrifice, and the scene describing it is given deliberately the colour of the sinister slave civilisations of the ancient world. It is this intuitive grasp of the irrational side of totalitarianism—human sacrifice, cruelty as an end in itself, the worship of a
Leader who is credited with divine attributes—that makes Zamyatin’s book superior to Huxley’s.
It is easy to see why the book was refused publication. The following conversation (I abridge it slightly) between D-503 and I-330 would have been quite enough to set the blue pencils working:
“Do you realise that what you are suggesting is revolution?” “Of course, it’s revolution. Why not?”
“Because there can’t be a revolution. Our revolution was the last and there can never be another. Everybody knows that.”
“My dear, you’re a mathematician: tell me, which is the last number?”
“What do you mean, the last number?”
“Well, then, the biggest number!”
“But that’s absurd. Numbers are infinite. There can’t be a last one.”
“Then why do you talk about the last revolution?”
There are other similar passages. It may well be, however, that Zamyatin did not intend the Soviet regime to be the special target of his satire. Writing at about the time of Lenin’s death, he cannot have had the Stalin dictatorship in mind, and conditions in Russia in 1923 were not such that anyone would revolt against them on the ground that life was becoming too safe and comfortable. What Zamyatin seems to be aiming at is not any particular country but the implied aims of industrial civilisation. I have not read any of his other books, but I learn from Gleb Struve that he had spent several years in England and had written some blistering satires on English life. It is evident from We that he had a strong leaning towards primitivism. Imprisoned by the Czarist Government in 1906, and then imprisoned by the Bolsheviks in 1922 in the same corridor of the same prison, he had cause to dislike the political regime he had lived under, but his book is not simply the expression of a grievance. It is in effect a study of the Machine, the genie that man has thoughtlessly let out of its bottle and cannot put back again. This is a book to look out for when an English version appears.
George Orwell Published in Tribune, 4th January 1946.
Gleb Struve on We and Zamyatin
In Tribune, 25 January 1946, Gleb Struve amplified Orwell’s remarks on We and Zamyatin.
May I add a few observations and facts to George Orwell’s article about Zamyatin’s We (Tribune, January 4) which, though, I agree, not a great book, is certainly both an important and an interesting work deserving to be known in this country?
There is no doubt that Zamyatin had in mind, in his Utopian satire, the Soviet Union which, even in 1922, was a single-party dictatorship, and it was because it was understood to be aimed at the Soviet State that the book was refused publication. Although never published in the original (and I do not know whether the Russian manuscript of it has been preserved) the book was at one time freely commented upon by Soviet critics. It is, of course, possible that some features of Zamyatin’s State of the future were suggested by Mussolini’s incipient Fascist order. Conditions of life in Zamyatin’s ‘Single State’ may differ in important particulars from those actually prevailing in the U.S.S.R. at the time the book was written, but the aspects on which Zamyatin dwelt were those which seemed to him to be the inevitable logical outcome of modern totalitarianism. Had the book been written after Hitler’s advent to power it might have been allowed to see the light of day and even hailed as a powerful invective of the Nazi State. It is important just because it is even more prophetic than topical.
On the other hand Orwell is right in saying that the book was also meant as a protest against the dominant spirit of our machine age. Zamyatin saw modern civilisation heading for an impasse and at times even looked forward to the emergence of a new Attila as the only salvation for humanity. It is curious that Zamyatin himself was by profession a shipbuilding engineer, and it was as an expert in the construction of ice-breakers that he came to this country towards the end of the 1914-18 war on a mission from the Russian Government. His mathematical training is strongly reflected in all his work. The satire on England which Orwell refers to is a longish short story called The Islanders, a bitingly
satirical picture of English smugness and philistinism. So far as I know it was translated into English but was turned down by publishers because of its ‘anti- English’ bias.
Zamyatin’s other works include a satirical play, The Fires of St. Dominic, generally believed to have been aimed at the Soviet Cheka. The action, however, is set in Spain in the times of the Inquisition, and, unlike We, the play was allowed to appear in print. As a result of writing We, and of his general unorthodox attitude, Zamyatin fell under a cloud, was proclaimed an ‘inside émigré’ and eventually forced (or allowed) to emigrate (in 1930, I think). His last book, written in Paris, had Attila for its subject. At one time Zamyatin, as a master of his craft, had a great influence on younger Soviet writers and held the post of Chairman of the Association of Soviet Writers
http://theorwellprize.co.uk/george-orwell/by-orwell/essays-and-other-
works/freedom-and-happiness-review-of-we-by-yevgeny-zamyatin/
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Nineteen Eighty-Four
‘Sometimes,’ she said, ‘they threaten you with something – something you can’t stand up to, can’t even think about. And then you say, “Don’t do it to me, do it to somebody else, do it to So-and-so.” And perhaps you might pretend, afterwards, that it was only a trick and that you just said it to make them stop and didn’t really mean it. But that isn’t true. At the time when it happens you do mean it. You think there’s no other way of saving yourself, and you’re quite ready to save yourself that way. You want it to happen to the other person. You don’t give a damn what they suffer. All you care about is yourself.’
Read the first chapter of Nineteen Eighty-Four (courtesy of Penguin Books) Buy Nineteen Eighty-Four (Penguin Books)
Published in 1949, and written while Orwell was seriously ill with tuberculosis, 1984 is perhaps Orwell’s most famous work. The story of Winston Smith, who rewrites Times editorials at the Ministry of Truth to suit the Party’s version of events, 1984 introduced ‘Big Brother’, ‘thought police’, ‘Room 101′, ‘doublethink’ and ‘newspeak’ to the English language. A satire on totalitarianism, 1984 is a testament to the potential power of modern political systems, and the dark side of human nature: as O’Brien tells Winston, ‘the object of power is power’.
More by Orwell related to Nineteen Eighty-Four
Arthur Koestler (written 1944) Freedom and Happiness – Review of We by Yevgeny Zamyatin (Tribune,
1946) In Front of Your Nose (Tribune, 1946) Just Junk – But Who Could Resist It? (Evening Standard, 1946) Pleasure Spots (Tribune, 1946) Politics and the English Language (Horizon, 1946) Second Thoughts on James Burnham (Polemic, 1946) The Prevention of Literature (Polemic, 1946) You and the Atom Bomb (Tribune, 1945)
More about Nineteen Eighty-Four
BBC: 1984 (1954 TV version on YouTube) – more about the adaptation on Wikipedia
Colin Brush: ‘It was a bright cold day in April…’ Richard Cavendish: Publication of 1984 (History Today) Bernard Crick: Orwell as a comic writer Robert Harris: Interview with Sebastian Faulks on Winston Smith (BBC on
YouTube) Robert Harris: Introduction to 1984 – Frail, cowardly Winston saved us (The
Times) John Hurt: On 1984 (National Media Museum) Steve King: Orwell’s warning (Barnes and Noble Review) Aleks Krotoski: 1984 in pictures, one word at a time (Flickr)
Sébastian Lefait: « The Big Screen is watching you » (video) (French) Scott Lucas: Nineteen Eighty-Four - timeline (eNotes) Robert McCrum: 1984 – The masterpiece that killed George Orwell (The
Observer) Paul Owen: 1984 thoughtcrime? Does it matter that George Orwell pinched
the plot? (The Guardian) Ben Pimlott: Introduction to 1984 V. S Pritchett: The most honest writer alive – review of 1984 (New
Statesman) Mike Radford: 1984 (1984 film) Q&A D. J. Taylor: Orwell and the rats D. J. Taylor: The Road to 1984 (video)
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__MACOSX/untitled folder/._George Orwell.docx
untitled folder/NotJustAnotherApocalyptician.pdf
Not Just Another Apocalyptician Author(s): Samuel Hynes
Source: The New York Times Book Review. (Nov. 3, 1991): Arts and Entertainment: From Academic OneFile.
Document Type: Article Full Text:
GEORGE ORWELL The Authorized Biography. By Michael Shelden. Illustrated. 497 pp. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. $25.
One evidence of George Orwell's place in our lives now, more than 40 years
after his death, is an entry in the Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary: "Orwellian . . . Characteristic or suggestive of the writings of
'George Orwell,' esp. in his satirical novel 1984 ." The examples that follow are from Mary McCarthy and Norman Mailer, and from a variety of
publications, including The New York Times. Some of them refer to Orwell's vision of a future totalitarian state; others use the term to name a corruption
of language, in which meaning is inverted or annihilated.
It was Orwell's great achievement that he made the connection between
those two meanings a clear and urgent issue for his time. His writing years were the 1930's and 40's -- the decades of the great dictators -- and he
wrote in opposition to them and what they stood for: " against totalitarianism," he said, "and for democratic Socialism, as I understand it."
But he might just as well have said that he wrote against debased language and for plain, honest statements. His two best-known books, "Animal Farm"
and "Nineteen Eighty-Four," are as much about what absolute power does to language as they are about what it does to lives. He saw those evils as
inextricably intertwined: bad politics debases language, debased language empowers bad politics. If we aim to oppose the evils of states, we must start
by speaking plain truths.
Not all of Orwell's plain truths were socialist truths; he was humane before
he was political, and he had developed a sense of injustice long before he began to express it in political terms. You might say that he was born into
injustice. His father, Arthur Blair, was a minor British official in Bengal whose job was to keep the opium trade running profitably, and Eric Blair (who was
to become Orwell) was born there in 1903. Young Eric's early years, as Michael Shelden recounts them in "Orwell: The Authorized Biography," were
a string of tyrannies endured -- at home, back in England, in prep school, at Eton and in his first job, as an officer in the Indian Imperial Police in Burma.
Having seen power in action, he hated it, and he shifted his loyalties from
his own class, the wielders of power, to the world's oppressed and
powerless.
In practice that meant quitting the Indian Police and returning to Europe to live among the poor -- with paupers in Paris, with tramps in London, with
the unemployed in the town of Wigan, near Manchester, then with common soldiers of the Loyalist army in Spain. And then to write about their lives, in
"Down and Out in Paris and London," "The Road to Wigan Pier" and "Homage to Catalonia." These books are not autobiographies exactly; Orwell adjusted
events to suit his polemical and literary ends. A better term would be "fables of injustice." Perhaps it was because he wasn't quite writing autobiographies
that he chose not to sign his books with his real name, but adopted instead
a pseudonym composed of an ordinary English first name and the name of an English river. Still, the sufferings he wrote about were sufferings he had
felt; in that sense his accounts were true. Other books of those early years were novels: "Burmese Days," "A Clergyman's Daughter," "Keep the
Aspidistra Flying." These too were written close to Orwell's experience of poverty and injustice -- too close, perhaps, for them to succeed altogether
as novels.
Orwell returned from Burma hating the British Empire; he returned from Spain hating Communism. That was the point, he said, at which he became
a political writer and a socialist. A very Orwellian kind of socialist, though.
His experiences among the poor had convinced him of a few simple truths: that injustice was the great social crime; that the right moral position was
always on the side of the weak; that failure was honorable and success corrupting; that decency was a primary moral value; that common sense
was more trust worthy than systems; that decency and common sense were most likely to be found in ordinary people. You couldn't call that set of
propositions an ideology, but then Orwell wouldn't want you to: he hated ideology. But that too is a possible political position.
Orwell's anti-ideological socialism was eccentric in another way: it went
against the internationalist tradition of the movement by being explicitly and
unashamedly English. "The Lion and the Unicorn," his wartime book about England, is subtitled "Socialism and the English Genius," and that subtitle
would do for virtually all of his political writings. "Every political theory has a certain regional tinge to it," he wrote, and his was as English as bitter beer
and toad-in-the-hole. He had much to say about the English that was unflattering: they were unesthetic, unphilosophical and anti-intellectual, a
nation of tea-drinking, dog-loving, class-conscious, xenophobic hypocrites. But they were also decent, sensible, peaceable people who believed in
justice, liberty, objective truth and the right to privacy. If you wanted an
English socialism, you'd have to start from those qualities, the faults as well
as the virtues.
What Orwell created in his books was not a systematic socialism; you couldn't govern England, or even a village, on the basis of what he wrote.
But system wasn't what he was after. He offered instead a double vision: of what society does to the poor and helpless, and of a good life that ordinary
people might live, if they were allowed to -- a life as simple and unpolitical as a working-class kitchen on a Sunday afternoon. He wanted to believe that
in the future such a life would be possible for everyone; but he was realistic enough to see the human forces of cruelty and greed that work against that
dream, and the future he foresaw, toward the end of his life, was bleak --
bleakest in that terrible image in "Nineteen Eighty-Four": a boot stamping on a human face, forever.
In the years since Orwell's death in 1950, the date he made into a symbol,
1984, has passed into history, and so has the Soviet state that best exemplified what he had made that date mean. Big Brother has been pulled
from his pedestal, K.G.B. is no longer an acronym for terror, and Orwell's books can be bought and read in Moscow. One mustn't be too millennial
about the change; the future will no doubt contain new police states and new gulags, but it seems unlikely that they will be world-class. The global
totalitarianism that Orwell feared and warned against is not going to happen,
at least not for a while.
What, then, will be the future importance of Orwell and his work? Has history made him merely historical, one more apocalyptician whose
predictions were wrong? I think not. He will survive as a voice, telling us that small-scale, decent social democracy is possible, that the world does not
belong to the managers but to ordinary people. His is not the only voice saying that now. Orwell would have felt a kinship with Eastern Europeans
like Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia; he'd have admired Mr. Havel's anti- ideological views, his pragmatism and the "regional tinge" of his politics. I'd
be surprised if Mr. Havel didn't also admire Orwell.
Orwell cared about politics, but he also cared about good writing. He was a
master of the plain style; nobody in our time has written it better. But his writing also has another quality that is crucial to the life of language now: its
fierce intemperateness. He believed that humankind benefited from the unrestrained use of strong, vivid language, and he would have regarded the
lexical pussyfooting of current American academic discourse as political cowardice. His resources of invective and abuse were extraordinary, and he
found targets on the left as well as on the right. His contempt for English socialist intellectuals must have offended entire drawing rooms full in
Hampstead and Oxford: "vegetarians with wilting beards, Bolshevik
commissars (half gangster, half gramophone), earnest ladies in sandals, shock-headed Marxists chewing polysyllables, escaped Quakers, birth-control
fanatics and Labour Party backstairs-crawlers," he called them. Bearded and sandal-wearing readers may find this offensive; but no one can deny that it
expresses the feelings of an individual man. Somebody is there, speaking his own language, plainly and pungently. Orwell knew that he would offend
people; he also knew that offensiveness is a necessary consequence of opinions strongly held and openly expressed, and that free societies should
treasure and protect it. An idea that offends no one is not worth entertaining.
Orwell is a rare case of a modern writer of unquestioned importance and influence who never wrote a great work of art, had no effect on the forms of
literature and has no place in the history of literary modernism. His example is greater than his formal accomplishments; he affected the world by
thinking and feeling about great issues, and by speaking with an angry insistence, in his own voice.
The danger in such a case is that the man will be canonized for his virtue
rather than admired for his achievements. When V. S. Pritchett called Orwell "a kind of saint," he did him a disservice, one that Orwell would have
resented. "Sainthood is a thing that human beings must avoid," he wrote in
an essay on Gandhi, and he proposed his own counterfaith: "The essence of being human is that one does not seek perfection, that one is sometimes
willing to commit sins for the sake of loyalty, that one does not push asceticism to the point where it makes friendly intercourse impossible, and
that one is prepared in the end to be defeated and broken up by life, which is the inevitable price of fastening one's love upon other human individuals."
That is what one gets from Orwell -- the essence of being human.
While Orwell's widow, his second wife, Sonia, was alive, no biographer could count on help from the executors -- quite the opposite, in fact. Peter
Stansky and William Abrahams wrote two intelligent volumes of an intended
life of Orwell, but broke off at 1938, defeated by Mrs. Orwell's obstructionism. Bernard Crick persevered and reached the end of the life,
but only after many tribulations. Neither biography mentions Sonia Orwell among the acknowledgments.
Michael Shelden has been more fortunate; his book is an "authorized
biography," and he has had the cooperation of the Orwell estate. He has been industrious in his research, and has found material that the other
biographers missed. His Orwell is neither a saint nor an ideologue; he is imperfect in his work and contradictory in his thought -- a man, not a model.
Mr. Shelden, a professor of English at Indiana State University, is an
unobtrusive presence, willing to let the life take its shape from events, preferring Orwell's ideas to his own. He sets out his principles of biography
writing in his introduction: the story of a life "deserves to be told with as much accuracy and fairness as possible"; it "must have a strong narrative,
and it must provide some sense of the human character behind the public face." Those are unexceptionable rules, and Mr. Shelden has followed them
faithfully. His accurate, fair book will send readers back to its subject -- to opinionated, unfair, vivid Orwell. That surely is the function of a literary
biography.
CAPTION(S):
Drawing of George Orwell (David Johnson)
By Samuel Hynes;
Source Citation Hynes, Samuel. "Not Just Another Apocalyptician." The New York Times
Book Review 3 Nov. 1991. Academic OneFile. Web. 9 Oct. 2011.
Document URL
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his essay about "education as an instrument of torture
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untitled folder/Orwell Notes on Nationalism 1945_1.pdf
mean by nationalism becomes a good deal clearer. A nationalist is one who thinks solely, or mainly, in
terms of competitive prestige. He may be a positive or a negative nationalist — that is, he may use his
mental energy either in boosting or in denigrating — but at any rate his thoughts always turn on
victories, defeats, triumphs and humiliations. He sees history, especially contemporary history, as the
endless rise and decline of great power units, and every event that happens seems to him a
demonstration that his own side is on the upgrade and some hated rival is on the downgrade. But
finally, it is important not to confuse nationalism with mere worship of success. The nationalist does
not go on the principle of simply ganging up with the strongest side. On the contrary, having picked his
side, he persuades himself that it is the strongest, and is able to stick to his belief even when the facts
are overwhelmingly against him. Nationalism is power-hunger tempered by self-deception. Every
nationalist is capable of the most flagrant dishonesty, but he is also — since he is conscious of serving
something bigger than himself — unshakeably certain of being in the right.
Now that I have given this lengthy definition, I think it will be admitted that the habit of mind I am
talking about is widespread among the English intelligentsia, and more widespread there than among
the mass of the people. For those who feel deeply about contemporary politics, certain topics have
become so infected by considerations of prestige that a genuinely rational approach to them is almost
impossible. Out of the hundreds of examples that one might choose, take this question: Which of the
three great allies, the U.S.S.R., Britain and the USA, has contributed most to the defeat of Germany? In
theory, it should be possible to give a reasoned and perhaps even a conclusive answer to this question.
In practice, however, the necessary calculations cannot be made, because anyone likely to bother his
head about such a question would inevitably see it in terms of competitive prestige. He would therefore
start by deciding in favour of Russia, Britain or America as the case might be, and only after this
would begin searching for arguments that seemed to support his case. And there are whole strings of
kindred questions to which you can only get an honest answer from someone who is indifferent to the
whole subject involved, and whose opinion on it is probably worthless in any case. Hence, partly, the
remarkable failure in our time of political and military prediction. It is curious to reflect that out of all
the ‘experts’ of all the schools, there was not a single one who was able to foresee so likely an event as
the Russo-German Pact of 1939(2). And when news of the Pact broke, the most wildly divergent
explanations were of it were given, and predictions were made which were falsified almost
immediately, being based in nearly every case not on a study of probabilities but on a desire to make
the U.S.S.R. seem good or bad, strong or weak. Political or military commentators, like astrologers,
can survive almost any mistake, because their more devoted followers do not look to them for an
appraisal of the facts but for the stimulation of nationalistic loyalties (3). And aesthetic judgements,
especially literary judgements, are often corrupted in the same way as political ones. It would be
difficult for an Indian Nationalist to enjoy reading Kipling or for a Conservative to see merit in
Mayakovsky, and there is always a temptation to claim that any book whose tendency one disagrees
with must be a bad book from a literary point of view. People of strongly nationalistic outlook often
perform this sleight of hand without being conscious of dishonesty.
In England, if one simply considers the number of people involved, it is probable that the dominant
form of nationalism is old-fashioned British jingoism. It is certain that this is still widespread, and
much more so than most observers would have believed a dozen years ago. However, in this essay I
am concerned chiefly with the reactions of the intelligentsia, among whom jingoism and even
patriotism of the old kind are almost dead, though they now seem to be reviving among a minority.
Among the intelligentsia, it hardly needs saying that the dominant form of nationalism is Communism
— using this word in a very loose sense, to include not merely Communist Party members, but ‘fellow
travelers’ and russophiles generally. A Communist, for my purpose here, is one who looks upon the
U.S.S.R. as his Fatherland and feels it his duty to justify Russian policy and advance Russian interests
at all costs. Obviously such people abound in England today, and their direct and indirect influence is
very great. But many other forms of nationalism also flourish, and it is by noticing the points of
resemblance between different and even seemingly opposed currents of thought that one can best get
the matter into perspective.
Ten or twenty years ago, the form of nationalism most closely corresponding to Communism today
was political Catholicism. Its most outstanding exponent — though he was perhaps an extreme case
rather than a typical one — was G. K. Chesterton. Chesterton was a writer of considerable talent who
chose to suppress both his sensibilities and his intellectual honesty in the cause of Roman Catholic
propaganda. During the last twenty years or so of his life, his entire output was in reality an endless
repetition of the same thing, under its laboured cleverness as simple and boring as ‘Great is Diana of
the Ephesians.’ Every book that he wrote, every scrap of dialogue, had to demonstrate beyond the
possibility of mistake the superiority of the Catholic over the Protestant or the pagan. But Chesterton
was not content to think of this superiority as merely intellectual or spiritual: it had to be translated into
terms of national prestige and military power, which entailed an ignorant idealisation of the Latin
countries, especially France. Chesterton had not lived long in France, and his picture of it — as a land
of Catholic peasants incessantly singing the Marseillaise over glasses of red wine — had about as
much relation to reality as Chu Chin Chow has to everyday life in Baghdad. And with this went not
only an enormous overestimation of French military power (both before and after 1914-18 he
maintained that France, by itself, was stronger than Germany), but a silly and vulgar glorification of
the actual process of war. Chesterton's battle poems, such as Lepanto or The Ballad of Saint Barbara,
make The Charge of the Light Brigade read like a pacifist tract: they are perhaps the most tawdry bits
of bombast to be found in our language. The interesting thing is that had the romantic rubbish which he
habitually wrote about France and the French army been written by somebody else about Britain and
the British army, he would have been the first to jeer. In home politics he was a Little Englander, a true
hater of jingoism and imperialism, and according to his lights a true friend of democracy. Yet when he
looked outwards into the international field, he could forsake his principles without even noticing he
was doing so. Thus, his almost mystical belief in the virtues of democracy did not prevent him from
admiring Mussolini. Mussolini had destroyed the representative government and the freedom of the
press for which Chesterton had struggled so hard at home, but Mussolini was an Italian and had made
Italy strong, and that settled the matter. Nor did Chesterton ever find a word to say about imperialism
and the conquest of coloured races when they were practised by Italians or Frenchmen. His hold on
reality, his literary taste, and even to some extent his moral sense, were dislocated as soon as his
nationalistic loyalties were involved.
Obviously there are considerable resemblances between political Catholicism, as exemplified by
Chesterton, and Communism. So there are between either of these and for instance Scottish
nationalism, Zionism, Antisemitism or Trotskyism. It would be an oversimplification to say that all
forms of nationalism are the same, even in their mental atmosphere, but there are certain rules that hold
good in all cases. The following are the principal characteristics of nationalist thought:
Obsession. As nearly as possible, no nationalist ever thinks, talks, or writes about anything except the
superiority of his own power unit. It is difficult if not impossible for any nationalist to conceal his
allegiance. The smallest slur upon his own unit, or any implied praise of a rival organization, fills him
with uneasiness which he can relieve only by making some sharp retort. If the chosen unit is an actual
country, such as Ireland or India, he will generally claim superiority for it not only in military power
and political virtue, but in art, literature, sport, structure of the language, the physical beauty of the
inhabitants, and perhaps even in climate, scenery and cooking. He will show great sensitiveness about
such things as the correct display of flags, relative size of headlines and the order in which different
countries are named(4). Nomenclature plays a very important part in nationalist thought. Countries
which have won their independence or gone through a nationalist revolution usually change their
names, and any country or other unit round which strong feelings revolve is likely to have several
names, each of them carrying a different implication. The two sides of the Spanish Civil War had
between them nine or ten names expressing different degrees of love and hatred. Some of these names
(e. g. ‘Patriots’ for Franco-supporters, or ‘Loyalists’ for Government-supporters) were frankly
question-begging, and there was no single one of which the two rival factions could have agreed to
use. All nationalists consider it a duty to spread their own language to the detriment of rival languages,
and among English-speakers this struggle reappears in subtler forms as a struggle between dialects.
Anglophobe-Americans will refuse to use a slang phrase if they know it to be of British origin, and the
conflict between Latinizers and Germanizers often has nationalist motives behind it. Scottish
nationalists insist on the superiority of Lowland Scots, and socialists whose nationalism takes the form
of class hatred tirade against the B.B.C. accent and even the often gives the impression of being tinged
by belief in sympathetic magic — a belief which probably comes out in the widespread custom of
burning political enemies in effigy, or using pictures of them as targets in shooting galleries.
Instability. The intensity with which they are held does not prevent nationalist loyalties from being
transferable. To begin with, as I have pointed out already, they can be and often are fastened up on
some foreign country. One quite commonly finds that great national leaders, or the founders of
nationalist movements, do not even belong to the country they have glorified. Sometimes they are
outright foreigners, or more often they come from peripheral areas where nationality is doubtful.
Examples are Stalin, Hitler, Napoleon, de Valera, Disraeli, Poincare, and Beaverbrook. The Pan-
German movement was in part the creation of an Englishman, Houston Chamberlain. For the past fifty
or a hundred years, transferred nationalism has been a common phenomenon among literary
intellectuals. With Lafcadio Hearne the transference was to Japan, with Carlyle and many others of his
time to Germany, and in our own age it is usually to Russia. But the peculiarly interesting fact is that
re-transference is also possible. A country or other unit which has been worshipped for years may
suddenly become detestable, and some other object of affection may take its place with almost no
interval. In the first version of H. G. Wells' Outline of History, and others of his writings about that
time, one finds the United States praised almost as extravagantly as Russia is praised by Communists
today: yet within a few years this uncritical admiration had turned into hostility. The bigoted
Communist who changes in a space of weeks, or even days, into an equally bigoted Trotskyist is a
common spectacle. In continental Europe Fascist movements were largely recruited from among
Communists, and the opposite process may well happen within the next few years. What remains
constant in the nationalist is his state of mind: the object of his feelings is changeable, and may be
imaginary.
But for an intellectual, transference has an important function which I have already mentioned shortly
in connection with Chesterton. It makes it possible for him to be much more nationalistic — more
vulgar, more silly, more malignant, more dishonest — that he could ever be on behalf of his native
country, or any unit of which he had real knowledge. When one sees the slavish or boastful rubbish
that is written about Stalin, the Red Army, etc. by fairly intelligent and sensitive people, one realises
that this is only possible because some kind of dislocation has taken place. In societies such as ours, it
is unusual for anyone describable as an intellectual to feel a very deep attachment to his own country.
Public opinion — that is, the section of public opinion of which he as an intellectual is aware — will
not allow him to do so. Most of the people surrounding him are skeptical and disaffected, and he may
adopt the same attitude from imitativeness or sheer cowardice: in that case he will have abandoned the
form of nationalism that lies nearest to hand without getting any closer to a genuinely internationalist
outlook. He still feels the need for a Fatherland, and it is natural to look for one somewhere abroad.
Having found it, he can wallow unrestrainedly in exactly those emotions from which he believes that
he has emancipated himself. God, the King, the Empire, the Union Jack — all the overthrown idols can
reappear under different names, and because they are not recognised for what they are they can be
worshipped with a good conscience. Transferred nationalism, like the use of scapegoats, is a way of
attaining salvation without altering one's conduct.
Indifference to Reality. All nationalists have the power of not seeing resemblances between similar sets
of facts. A British Tory will defend self-determination in Europe and oppose it in India with no feeling
of inconsistency. Actions are held to be good or bad, not on their own merits, but according to who
does them, and there is almost no kind of outrage — torture, the use of hostages, forced labour, mass
deportations, imprisonment without trial, forgery, assassination, the bombing of civilians — which
does not change its moral colour when it is committed by ‘our’ side. The Liberal News Chronicle
published, as an example of shocking barbarity, photographs of Russians hanged by the Germans, and
then a year or two later published with warm approval almost exactly similar photographs of Germans
hanged by the Russians(5). It is the same with historical events. History is thought of largely in
nationalist terms, and such things as the Inquisition, the tortures of the Star Chamber, the exploits of
the English buccaneers (Sir Francis Drake, for instance, who was given to sinking Spanish prisoners
alive), the Reign of Terror, the heroes of the Mutiny blowing hundreds of Indians from the guns, or
Cromwell's soldiers slashing Irishwomen's faces with razors, become morally neutral or even
meritorious when it is felt that they were done in the ‘right’ cause. If one looks back over the past
quarter of a century, one finds that there was hardly a single year when atrocity stories were not being
reported from some part of the world; and yet in not one single case were these atrocities — in Spain,
Russia, China, Hungary, Mexico, Amritsar, Smyrna — believed in and disapproved of by the English
intelligentsia as a whole. Whether such deeds were reprehensible, or even whether they happened, was
always decided according to political predilection.
The nationalist not only does not disapprove of atrocities committed by his own side, but he has a
remarkable capacity for not even hearing about them. For quite six years the English admirers of Hitler
contrived not to learn of the existence of Dachau and Buchenwald. And those who are loudest in
denouncing the German concentration camps are often quite unaware, or only very dimly aware, that
there are also concentration camps in Russia. Huge events like the Ukraine famine of 1933, involving
the deaths of millions of people, have actually escaped the attention of the majority of English
russophiles. Many English people have heard almost nothing about the extermination of German and
Polish Jews during the present war. Their own antisemitism has caused this vast crime to bounce off
their consciousness. In nationalist thought there are facts which are both true and untrue, known and
unknown. A known fact may be so unbearable that it is habitually pushed aside and not allowed to
enter into logical processes, or on the other hand it may enter into every calculation and yet never be
admitted as a fact, even in one's own mind.
Every nationalist is haunted by the belief that the past can be altered. He spends part of his time in a
fantasy world in which things happen as they should — in which, for example, the Spanish Armada
was a success or the Russian Revolution was crushed in 1918 — and he will transfer fragments of this
world to the history books whenever possible. Much of the propagandist writing of our time amounts
to plain forgery. Material facts are suppressed, dates altered, quotations removed from their context
and doctored so as to change their meaning. Events which it is felt ought not to have happened are left
unmentioned and ultimately denied (6). In 1927 Chiang Kai Shek boiled hundreds of Communists
alive, and yet within ten years he had become one of the heroes of the Left. The re-alignment of world
politics had brought him into the anti-Fascist camp, and so it was felt that the boiling of the
Communists ‘didn't count’, or perhaps had not happened. The primary aim of propaganda is, of course,
to influence contemporary opinion, but those who rewrite history do probably believe with part of their
minds that they are actually thrusting facts into the past. When one considers the elaborate forgeries
that have been committed in order to show that Trotsky did not play a valuable part in the Russian civil
war, it is difficult to feel that the people responsible are merely lying. More probably they feel that
their own version was what happened in the sight of God, and that one is justified in rearranging the
records accordingly.
Indifference to objective truth is encouraged by the sealing-off of one part of the world from another,
which makes it harder and harder to discover what is actually happening. There can often be a genuine
doubt about the most enormous events. For example, it is impossible to calculate within millions,
perhaps even tens of millions, the number of deaths caused by the present war. The calamities that are
constantly being reported — battles, massacres, famines, revolutions — tend to inspire in the average
person a feeling of unreality. One has no way of verifying the facts, one is not even fully certain that
they have happened, and one is always presented with totally different interpretations from different
sources. What were the rights and wrongs of the Warsaw rising of August 1944? Is it true about the
German gas ovens in Poland? Who was really to blame for the Bengal famine? Probably the truth is
discoverable, but the facts will be so dishonestly set forth in almost any newspaper that the ordinary
reader can be forgiven either for swallowing lies or failing to form an opinion. The general uncertainty
as to what is really happening makes it easier to cling to lunatic beliefs. Since nothing is ever quite
proved or disproved, the most unmistakable fact can be impudently denied. Moreover, although
endlessly brooding on power, victory, defeat, revenge, the nationalist is often somewhat uninterested in
what happens in the real world. What he wants is to feel that his own unit is getting the better of some
other unit, and he can more easily do this by scoring off an adversary than by examining the facts to
see whether they support him. All nationalist controversy is at the debating-society level. It is always
entirely inconclusive, since each contestant invariably believes himself to have won the victory. Some
nationalists are not far from schizophrenia, living quite happily amid dreams of power and conquest
which have no connection with the physical world.
I have examined as best as I can the mental habits which are common to all forms of nationalism. The
next thing is to classify those forms, but obviously this cannot be done comprehensively. Nationalism
is an enormous subject. The world is tormented by innumerable delusions and hatreds which cut across
one another in an extremely complex way, and some of the most sinister of them have not yet
impinged on the European consciousness. In this essay I am concerned with nationalism as it occurs
among the English intelligentsia. In them, much more than in ordinary English people, it is unmixed
with patriotism and therefore can be studied pure. Below are listed the varieties of nationalism now
flourishing among English intellectuals, with such comments as seem to be needed. It is convenient to
use three headings, Positive, Transferred, and Negative, though some varieties will fit into more than
one category:
Positive Nationalism
(i) Neo-toryism. Exemplified by such people as Lord Elton, A. P. Herbert, G. M. Young, Professor
Pickthorn, by the literature of the Tory Reform Committee, and by such magazines as the New English
Review and the Nineteenth Century and After. The real motive force of neo-Toryism, giving it its
nationalistic character and differentiating it from ordinary Conservatism, is the desire not to recognise
that British power and influence have declined. Even those who are realistic enough to see that
Britain's military position is not what it was, tend to claim that ‘English ideas’ (usually left undefined)
must dominate the world. All neo-Tories are anti-Russian, but sometimes the main emphasis is anti-
American. The significant thing is that this school of thought seems to be gaining ground among
youngish intellectuals, sometimes ex-Communists, who have passed through the usual process of
disillusionment and become disillusioned with that. The anglophobe who suddenly becomes violently
pro-British is a fairly common figure. Writers who illustrate this tendency are F. A. Voigt, Malcolm
Muggeridge, Evelyn Waugh, Hugh Kingsmill, and a psychologically similar development can be
observed in T. S. Eliot, Wyndham Lewis, and various of their followers.
(ii) Celtic Nationalism. Welsh, Irish and Scottish nationalism have points of difference but are alike in
their anti-English orientation. Members of all three movements have opposed the war while continuing
to describe themselves as pro-Russian, and the lunatic fringe has even contrived to be simultaneously
pro-Russian and pro-Nazi. But Celtic nationalism is not the same thing as anglophobia. Its motive
force is a belief in the past and future greatness of the Celtic peoples, and it has a strong tinge of
racialism. The Celt is supposed to be spiritually superior to the Saxon — simpler, more creative, less
vulgar, less snobbish, etc. — but the usual power hunger is there under the surface. One symptom of it
is the delusion that Eire, Scotland or even Wales could preserve its independence unaided and owes
nothing to British protection. Among writers, good examples of this school of thought are Hugh
McDiarmid and Sean O'Casey. No modern Irish writer, even of the stature of Yeats or Joyce, is
completely free from traces of nationalism.
(iii) Zionism. This the unusual characteristics of a nationalist movement, but the American variant of it
seems to be more violent and malignant than the British. I classify it under Direct and not Transferred
nationalism because it flourishes almost exclusively among the Jews themselves. In England, for
several rather incongruous reasons, the intelligentsia are mostly pro-Jew on the Palestine issue, but
they do not feel strongly about it. All English people of goodwill are also pro-Jew in the sense of
disapproving of Nazi persecution. But any actual nationalistic loyalty, or belief in the innate superiority
of Jews, is hardly to be found among Gentiles.
Transferred Nationalism
(i) Communism.
(ii) Political Catholicism.
(iii) Colour Feeling. The old-style contemptuous attitude towards ‘natives’ has been much weakened
in England, and various pseudo-scientific theories emphasising the superiority of the white race have
been abandoned (7). Among the intelligentsia, colour feeling only occurs in the transposed form, that
is, as a belief in the innate superiority of the coloured races. This is now increasingly common among
English intellectuals, probably resulting more often from masochism and sexual frustration than from
contact with the Oriental and Negro nationalist movements. Even among those who do not feel
strongly on the colour question, snobbery and imitation have a powerful influence. Almost any English
intellectual would be scandalised by the claim that the white races are superior to the coloured,
whereas the opposite claim would seem to him unexceptionable even if he disagreed with it.
Nationalistic attachment to the coloured races is usually mixed up with the belief that their sex lives
are superior, and there is a large underground mythology about the sexual prowess of Negroes.
(iv) Class Feeling. Among upper-class and middle-class intellectuals, only in the transposed form (i.e.,
as a belief in the superiority of the proletariat). Here again, inside the intelligentsia, the pressure of
public opinion is overwhelming. Nationalistic loyalty towards the proletariat, and most vicious
theoretical hatred of the bourgeoisie, can and often do co-exist with ordinary snobbishness in everyday
life.
(v) Pacifism. The majority of pacifists either belong to obscure religious sects or are simply
humanitarians who object to the taking of life and prefer not to follow their thoughts beyond that point.
But there is a minority of intellectual pacifists whose real though unadmitted motive appears to be
hatred of western democracy and admiration of totalitarianism. Pacifist propaganda usually boils down
to saying that one side is as bad as the other, but if one looks closely at the writings of younger
intellectual pacifists, one finds that they do not by any means express impartial disapproval but are
directed almost entirely against Britain and the United States. Moreover they do not as a rule condemn
violence as such, but only violence used in defence of western countries. The Russians, unlike the
British, are not blamed for defending themselves by warlike means, and indeed all pacifist propaganda
of this type avoids mention of Russia or China. It is not claimed, again, that the Indians should abjure
violence in their struggle against the British. Pacifist literature abounds with equivocal remarks which,
if they mean anything, appear to mean that statesmen of the type of Hitler are preferable to those of the
type of Churchill, and that violence is perhaps excusable if it is violent enough. After the fall of
France, the French pacifists, faced by a real choice which their English colleagues have not had to
make, mostly went over to the Nazis, and in England there appears to have been some small overlap of
membership between the Peace Pledge Union and the Blackshirts. Pacifist writers have written in
praise of Carlyle, one of the intellectual fathers of Fascism. All in all it is difficult not to feel that
pacifism, as it appears among a section of the intelligentsia, is secretly inspired by an admiration for
power and successful cruelty. The mistake was made of pinning this emotion to Hitler, but it could
easily be retransferred.
Negative Nationalism
(i) Anglophobia. Within the intelligentsia, a derisive and mildly hostile attitude towards Britain is more
or less compulsory, but it is an unfaked emotion in many cases. During the war it was manifested in
the defeatism of the intelligentsia, which persisted long after it had become clear that the Axis powers
could not win. Many people were undisguisedly pleased when Singapore fell ore when the British were
driven out of Greece, and there was a remarkable unwillingness to believe in good news (e.g., El
Alamein, or the number of German planes shot down in the Battle of Britain). English left-wing
intellectuals did not, of course, actually want the Germans or Japanese to win the war, but many of
them could not help getting a certain kick out of seeing their own country humiliated, and wanted to
feel that the final victory would be due to Russia, or perhaps America, and not to Britain. In foreign
politics many intellectuals follow the principle that any faction backed by Britain must be in the
wrong. As a result, ‘enlightened’ opinion is quite largely a mirror-image of Conservative policy.
Anglophobia is always liable to reversal, hence that fairly common spectacle, the pacifist of one war
who is a bellicist in the next.
(ii) Anti-Semitism. There is little evidence about this at present, because the Nazi persecutions have
made it necessary for any thinking person to side with the Jews against their oppressors. Anyone
educated enough to have heard the word ‘antisemitism’ claims as a matter of course to be free of it,
and anti-Jewish remarks are carefully eliminated from all classes of literature. Actually antisemitism
appears to be widespread, even among intellectuals, and the general conspiracy of silence probably
helps exacerbate it. People of Left opinions are not immune to it, and their attitude is sometimes
affected by the fact that Trotskyists and Anarchists tend to be Jews. But antisemitism comes more
naturally to people of Conservative tendency, who suspect Jews of weakening national morale and
diluting the national culture. Neo-Tories and political Catholics are always liable to succumb to
antisemitism, at least intermittently.
(iii) Trotskyism. This word is used so loosely as to include Anarchists, democratic Socialists and even
Liberals. I use it here to mean a doctrinaire Marxist whose main motive is hostility to the Stalin
regime. Trotskyism can be better studied in obscure pamphlets or in papers like the Socialist Appeal
than in the works of Trotsky himself, who was by no means a man of one idea. Although in some
places, for instance in the United States, Trotskyism is able to attract a fairly large number of adherents
and develop into an organised movement with a petty Führer of its own, its inspiration is essentially
negative. The Trotskyist is against Stalin just as the Communist is for him, and, like the majority of
Communists, he wants not so much to alter the external world as to feel that the battle for prestige is
going in his own favour. In each case there is the same obsessive fixation on a single subject, the same
inability to form a genuinely rational opinion based on probabilities. The fact that Trotskyists are
everywhere a persecuted minority, and that the accusation usually made against them, i. e. of
collaborating with the Fascists, is obviously false, creates an impression that Trotskyism is
intellectually and morally superior to Communism; but it is doubtful whether there is much difference.
The most typical Trotskyists, in any case, are ex-Communists, and no one arrives at Trotskyism except
via one of the left-wing movements. No Communist, unless tethered to his party by years of habit, is
secure against a sudden lapse into Trotskyism. The opposite process does not seem to happen equally
often, though there is no clear reason why it should not.
In the classification I have attempted above, it will seem that I have often exaggerated, oversimplified,
made unwarranted assumptions and have left out of account the existence of ordinarily decent motives.
This was inevitable, because in this essay I am trying to isolate and identify tendencies which exist in
all our minds and pervert our thinking, without necessarily occurring in a pure state or operating
continuously. It is important at this point to correct the over-simplified picture which I have been
obliged to make. To begin with, one has no right to assume that everyone, or even every intellectual, is
infected by nationalism. Secondly, nationalism can be intermittent and limited. An intelligent man may
half-succumb to a belief which he knows to be absurd, and he may keep it out of his mind for long
periods, only reverting to it in moments of anger or sentimentality, or when he is certain that no
important issues are involved. Thirdly, a nationalistic creed may be adopted in good faith from non-
nationalistic motives. Fourthly, several kinds of nationalism, even kinds that cancel out, can co-exist in
the same person.
All the way through I have said, ‘the nationalist does this’ or ‘the nationalist does that’, using for
purposes of illustration the extreme, barely sane type of nationalist who has no neutral areas in his
mind and no interest in anything except the struggle for power. Actually such people are fairly
common, but they are not worth the powder and shot. In real life Lord Elton, D. N. Pritt, Lady
Houston, Ezra Pound, Lord Vanisttart, Father Coughlin and all the rest of their dreary tribe have to be
fought against, but their intellectual deficiencies hardly need pointing out. Monomania is not
interesting, and the fact that no nationalist of the more bigoted kind can write a book which still seems
worth reading after a lapse of years has a certain deodorising effect. But when one has admitted that
nationalism has not triumphed everywhere, that there are still peoples whose judgements are not at the
mercy of their desires, the fact does remain that the pressing problems — India, Poland, Palestine, the
Spanish civil war, the Moscow trials, the American Negroes, the Russo-German Pact or what have you
— cannot be, or at least never are, discussed upon a reasonable level. The Eltons and Pritts and
Coughlins, each of them simply an enormous mouth bellowing the same lie over and over again, are
obviously extreme cases, but we deceive ourselves if we do not realise that we can all resemble them
in unguarded moments. Let a certain note be struck, let this or that corn be trodden on — and it may be
corn whose very existence has been unsuspected hitherto — and the most fair-minded and sweet-
tempered person may suddenly be transformed into a vicious partisan, anxious only to ‘score’ over his
adversary and indifferent as to how many lies he tells or how many logical errors he commits in doing
so. When Lloyd George, who was an opponent of the Boer War, announced in the House of Commons
that the British communiques, if one added them together, claimed the killing of more Boers than the
whole Boer nation contained, it is recorded that Arthur Balfour rose to his feet and shouted ‘Cad!’
Very few people are proof against lapses of this type. The Negro snubbed by a white woman, the
Englishman who hears England ignorantly criticised by an American, the Catholic apologist reminded
of the Spanish Armada, will all react in much the same way. One prod to the nerve of nationalism, and
the intellectual decencies can vanish, the past can be altered, and the plainest facts can be denied.
If one harbours anywhere in one's mind a nationalistic loyalty or hatred, certain facts, although in a
sense known to be true, are inadmissible. Here are just a few examples. I list below five types of
nationalist, and against each I append a fact which it is impossible for that type of nationalist to accept,
even in his secret thoughts:
BRITISH TORY: Britain will come out of this war with reduced power and prestige.
COMMUNIST: If she had not been aided by Britain and America, Russia would have been defeated
by Germany.
IRISH NATIONALIST: Eire can only remain independent because of British protection.
TROTSKYIST: The Stalin regime is accepted by the Russian masses.
PACIFIST: Those who ‘abjure’ violence can only do so because others are committing violence on
their behalf.
All of these facts are grossly obvious if one's emotions do not happen to be involved: but to the kind of
person named in each case they are also intolerable, and so they have to be denied, and false theories
constructed upon their denial. I come back to the astonishing failure of military prediction in the
present war. It is, I think, true to say that the intelligentsia have been more wrong about the progress of
the war than the common people, and that they were more swayed by partisan feelings. The average
intellectual of the Left believed, for instance, that the war was lost in 1940, that the Germans were
bound to overrun Egypt in 1942, that the Japanese would never be driven out of the lands they had
conquered, and that the Anglo-American bombing offensive was making no impression on Germany.
He could believe these things because his hatred for the British ruling class forbade him to admit that
British plans could succeed. There is no limit to the follies that can be swallowed if one is under the
influence of feelings of this kind. I have heard it confidently stated, for instance, that the American
troops had been brought to Europe not to fight the Germans but to crush an English revolution. One
has to belong to the intelligentsia to believe things like that: no ordinary man could be such a fool.
When Hitler invaded Russia, the officials of the MOI issued ‘as background’ a warning that Russia
might be expected to collapse in six weeks. On the other hand the Communists regarded every phase of
the war as a Russian victory, even when the Russians were driven back almost to the Caspian Sea and
had lost several million prisoners. There is no need to multiply instances. The point is that as soon as
fear, hatred, jealousy and power worship are involved, the sense of reality becomes unhinged. And, as
I have pointed out already, the sense of right and wrong becomes unhinged also. There is no crime,
absolutely none, that cannot be condoned when ‘our’ side commits it. Even if one does not deny that
the crime has happened, even if one knows that it is exactly the same crime as one has condemned in
some other case, even if one admits in an intellectual sense that it is unjustified — still one cannot feel
that it is wrong. Loyalty is involved, and so pity ceases to function.
The reason for the rise and spread of nationalism is far too big a question to be raised here. It is enough
to say that, in the forms in which it appears among English intellectuals, it is a distorted reflection of
the frightful battles actually happening in the external world, and that its worst follies have been made
possible by the breakdown of patriotism and religious belief. If one follows up this train of thought,
one is in danger of being led into a species of Conservatism, or into political quietism. It can be
plausibly argued, for instance — it is even possibly true — that patriotism is an inoculation against
nationalism, that monarchy is a guard against dictatorship, and that organised religion is a guard
against superstition. Or again, it can be argued that no unbiased outlook is possible, that all creeds and
causes involve the same lies, follies, and barbarities; and this is often advanced as a reason for keeping
out of politics altogether. I do not accept this argument, if only because in the modern world no one
describable as an intellectual can keep out of politics in the sense of not caring about them. I think one
must engage in politics — using the word in a wide sense — and that one must have preferences: that
is, one must recognise that some causes are objectively better than others, even if they are advanced by
equally bad means. As for the nationalistic loves and hatreds that I have spoken of, they are part of the
make-up of most of us, whether we like it or not. Whether it is possible to get rid of them I do not
know, but I do believe that it is possible to struggle against them, and that this is essentially a moral
effort. It is a question first of all of discovering what one really is, what one's own feelings really are,
and then of making allowance for the inevitable bias. If you hate and fear Russia, if you are jealous of
the wealth and power of America, if you despise Jews, if you have a sentiment of inferiority towards
the British ruling class, you cannot get rid of those feelings simply by taking thought. But you can at
least recognise that you have them, and prevent them from contaminating your mental processes. The
emotional urges which are inescapable, and are perhaps even necessary to political action, should be
able to exist side by side with an acceptance of reality. But this, I repeat, needs a moral effort, and
contemporary English literature, so far as it is alive at all to the major issues of our time, shows how
few of us are prepared to make it.
1945
_____ Author’s Notes
1) Nations, and even vaguer entities such as Catholic Church or the proletariat, are commonly thought of as
individuals and often referred to as ‘she’. Patently absurd remarks such as ‘Germany is naturally treacherous’
are to be found in any newspaper one opens and reckless generalization about national character (‘The Spaniard
is a natural aristocrat’ or ‘Every Englishman is a hypocrite’) are uttered by almost everyone. Intermittently these
generalizations are seen to be unfounded, but the habit of making them persists, and people of professedly
international outlook, e.g., Tolstoy or Bernard Shaw, are often guilty of them. [back]
2) A few writers of conservative tendency, such as Peter Drucker, foretold an agreement between Germany and
Russia, but they expected an actual alliance or amalgamation which would be permanent. No Marxist or other
left-wing writer, of whatever colour, came anywhere near foretelling the Pact. [back]
3) The military commentators of the popular press can mostly be classified as pro-Russian or anti-Russian pro-
blimp or anti-blimp. Such errors as believing the Maginot Line impregnable, or predicting that Russia would
conquer Germany in three months, have failed to shake their reputation, because they were always saying what
their own particular audience wanted to hear. The two military critics most favoured by the intelligentsia are
Captain Liddell Hart and Major-General Fuller, the first of whom teaches that the defence is stronger that the
attack, and the second that the attack is stronger that the defence. This contradiction has not prevented both of
them from being accepted as authorities by the same public. The secret reason for their vogue in left-wing
circles is that both of them are at odds with the War Office. [back]
4) Certain Americans have expressed dissatisfaction because ‘Anglo-American’ is the form of combination for
these two words. It has been proposed to submit ‘Americo-British’. [back]
5) The News Chronicle advised its readers to visit the news film at which the entire execution could be
witnessed, with close-ups. The Star published with seeming approval photographs of nearly naked female
collaborationists being baited by the Paris mob. These photographs had a marked resemblance to the Nazi
photographs of Jews being baited by the Berlin mob. [back]
6) An example is the Russo-German Pact, which is being effaced as quickly as possible from public memory. A
Russian correspondent informs me that mention of the Pact is already being omitted from Russian year-books
which table recent political events. [back]
7) A good example is the sunstroke superstition. Until recently it was believed that the white races were much
more liable to sunstroke that the coloured, and that a white man could not safely walk about in tropical sunshine
without a pith helmet. There was no evidence whatever for this theory, but it served the purpose of accentuating
the difference between ‘natives’ and Europeans. During the war the theory was quietly dropped and whole
armies maneuvered in the tropics without pith helmets. So long as the sunstroke superstition survived, English
doctors in India appear to have believed in it as firmly as laymen. [back]
THE END
____BD____
George Orwell: ‘Notes on Nationalism’
First published: Polemic. — GB, London. — May 1945.
Reprinted:
— ‘England Your England and Other Essays’. — 1953.
URL: http://orwell.ru/library/essays/nationalism/english/e_nat
Machine-readable version: O. Dag
Last modified on: 2004-07-24
George Orwell
‘England, Your England and Other Essays’
© 1953 Secker and Warburg
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PAGE
1
SHORT TITLE OF YOUR ESSAY ALL CAPS FLUSH LEFT
The Title of Your Essay in Title Case and Centered
Firstname Lastname
Rogue Community College
WR 121 English Composition I
Instructor: Dr. V. E. Lasnik
DD Month 2015
Words: ????
The Title of Your Essay in Title Case and Centered
Your introduction begins immediately. Begin with an engaging “hook” to interest your reader; within the first paragraph, fully address the reader’s rationale “Why should I care?” With the exception of any block quotes and the end references, all text should be flush left and ragged right, in the same font throughout the document (with the exception of italics when needed), and double-spaced. Indent each paragraph’s first line at a standard depth using the Tab key set to one-half inch or five to seven spaces as shown in this paragraph. Tabs ensure consistency.
Your second of many paragraphs to come logically follows the first. You are permitted to use a simple/open narrative style such as the one show here, or you may choose to use a more formally-structured format in which you identify major sections and subsections of the essay manuscript. However, in such a relatively brief paper as required by the minimum (1000+) word count requirements for this course, section and subsection headings are not required. The exception is the end bibliographic section: in APA style, this final section is simply titled “References,” and the word is centered, begins on a separate page (following your conclusion) and does not contain quotations. Please consult additional APA materials if using headings/subheadings is something you plan on doing, but again—these secondary demarcations are not necessary.
By this point, but certainly no later than this third paragraph, you should have thoroughly engaged your reader as to the interesting, fascinating, intriguing, and salient, compelling nature of the particular problem or issue you will explore in this essay. You should have clearly, unambiguously, and explicitly stated the gist (and arguable through logic and evidence) of the essay or concise set of questions that you will investigate/explore in your paper. If you haven’t completed your in-depth introduction by the end of the first page—do so now!
You should beginning the body of your essay here. You will now understand why we suggest the thoughtful construction of an outline with which to proceed writing your analysis of an argument. You high-level outline can provide the basic organizational strategy of your essay and should begin with the most critical element(s) of the question you are investigating. You should routinely use your most powerful, convincing, and authentic evidence and persuasive logic early in your argument. There is not an absolute rule on this approach, and some writers reverse the pattern of the strongest logic/data first and the weakest—last. However, this is not an easy task to pull off successfully, and although many dramatic courtroom stories have the hero/heroine lawyer do precisely that (saving the best for last in a slam-dunk, final scene evisceration of his/her opponent)—such a theatrically-appealing approach is not recommended for this assignment.
It is a good idea to have multiple sources to support your most important point(s). Two heads may be better than one—and two references are often better than one in convincing the astute, discernable (i.e., critical) reader that an argument corroborated by multiple sources (from different researchers and sources) has more strength, validity, and generalizability. Musing back to the courtroom metaphor, a fair assessment is that your readers are on the jury as you prosecute (or defend) the positions at issue: your research analyses. It is the jury or readers that will render the final verdict after all the evidence (on both sides of the equation) has been presented.
If there are flaws in your thinking or weaknesses in your evidence—your readers will find them! Any fuzziness, uncertainty, vagueness, obscurity or lack of clarity between the evidence you present and the arguments you weave should become apparent by this point in your essay. To summarize your task: you are to (attempt to) write so that you cannot possibly be misunderstood and the “verdict” falls clearly in your favor.
After you have completed the body of your essay and convincingly argued (and richly supported with sound, solid, scholarly empirical (i.e., observable, verifiable, demonstrated) evidence—you should briefly summarize the major findings of your essay. This penultimate essay section is thus known as the summary , and you only need to restate the principal points you already made in your essay. One way of doing this summarizing efficiently is to take the “thesis sentence” (or data) from each of your critical paragraphs, rephrase them to flow together in a convincing and logical narrative form within one or two short paragraphs.
Finally {Note: You may only use this word once and only once in your entire essay), you have an open opportunity to expand and elaborate on your own perspectives in the paper’s conclusion (which follows the summary). Still using only third-person, impersonal, objective voice [i.e., Do not use I, my, me, mine, etc.]—The conclusion is where you can present you own ideas, models, approaches, and potential solutions to your research problem and ask: “Where do we go from here? What future research needs to be conducted to fill in the gaps to our critical knowledge and understanding of the problem/question? How do we get a consensus about how to move forward while reconciling all of the participants, stakeholders, policy-makers, corporate, government, community, and individual interests?” Try to end your essay on a positive, fair-minded (if not optimistic) note—but maintain and emphasize that something needs to be done or some definite action taken if the problems/phenomena you analyzed are to be resolved and remedied. Address the jury’s hearts and minds (this is your last chance to persuade them that their cause is your cause, and that your view(s) should prevail) and then “rest your case.” The judge (your instructor) will act as “jury” in this case—and grade the outcome of your writing performance all things (and stated scoring rubrics) considered! Do not forget the references section that follows.
References
Each of your end references must follow the APA style correctly and fully. Study all of the APA style (format) content/materials included within this course. There is ample information in the course to learn the APA style for in-text and end references, but feel free to explore other outside APA sources as appropriate and helpful, as well as giving/receiving peer reviews. This is flush left, ragged right text but with a hanging indent of one-half inch.
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untitled folder/We_Are_Living_1984_Today.pdf
We Are Living 1984 Today
By Lewis Beale, Special to CNN updated 9:22 AM EDT, Sat August 3, 2013
Police monitor license plates STORY HIGHLIGHTS
Lewis Beale: We live in age where authorities, companies collect information about us
He says after Snowden spying revelations, sales of George Orwell's "1984" spiked
He says elements like "doublethink" and "endless war" have parallels today Beale: In a modern surveillance state, we're all suspects
Editor's note: Lewis Beale writes about culture and film for the Los Angeles Times, Newsday and other publications.
(CNN) -- It appears that the police now have a device that can read license plates and check if a car is unregistered, uninsured or stolen. We already know that the National Security Agency can dip into your Facebook page and Google searches. And it seems that almost every store we go into these days wants your home phone number and ZIP code as part of any transaction.
So when Edward Snowden -- now cooling his heels in Russia -- revealed the extent to which the NSA is spying on Americans, collecting data on phone calls we make, it's not
as if we should have been surprised. We live in a world that George Orwell predicted in "1984." And that realization has caused sales of the 1949, dystopian novel to spike dramatically upward recently -- a 9,000% increase at one point on Amazon.com.
Comparisons between Orwell's novel about a tightly controlled totalitarian future ruled by the ubiquitous Big Brother and today are, in fact, quite apt. Here are a few of the most obvious ones.
Lewis Beale
Telescreens -- in the novel, nearly all public and private places have large TV screens that broadcast government propaganda, news and approved entertainment. But they are also two-way monitors that spy on citizens' private lives. Today websites like Facebook track our likes and dislikes, and governments and private individuals hack into our computers and find out what they want to know. Then there are the ever- present surveillance cameras that spy on the average person as they go about their daily routine.
The endless war -- In Orwell's book, there's a global war that has been going on seemingly forever, and as the book's hero, Winston Smith, realizes, the enemy keeps changing. One week we're at war with Eastasia and buddies with Eurasia. The next week, it's just the opposite. There seems little to distinguish the two adversaries, and they are used primarily to keep the populace of Oceania, where Smith lives, in a constant state of fear, thereby making dissent unthinkable -- or punishable. Today we have the so-called war on terror, with no end in sight, a generalized societal fear, suspension of certain civil liberties, and an ill-defined enemy who could be anywhere, and anything.
Doublethink -- Orwell's novel defines this as the act of accepting two mutually contradictory beliefs as correct. It was exemplified by some of the key slogans used by the repressive government in the book: War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery, Ignorance is Strength. It has also been particularly useful to the activists who have been hard at work introducing legislation regulating abortion clinics. The claim is that these laws are only to protect women's health, but by forcing clinics to close because of stringent regulations, they are effectively shutting women off not only from abortion, but other health services.
Snowden documents: U.S. spied on EU
Bush vs. Obama on surveillance
Police are tracking where you drive
Brok: NSA's spying on EU 'out of control'
Newspeak -- the fictional, stripped down English language, used to limit free thought. OMG, RU serious? That's so FUBAR. LMAO.
Memory hole -- this is the machine used in the book to alter or disappear incriminating or embarrassing documents. Paper shredders had been invented, but were hardly used when Orwell wrote his book, and the concept of wiping out a hard drive was years in the future. But the memory hole foretold both technologies.
Anti-Sex League -- this was an organization set up to take the pleasure out of sex, and to make sure that it was a mechanical function used for procreation only. Organizations that promote abstinence-only sex education, or want to ban artificial birth control, are the modern versions of this.
So what's it all mean? In 1984, Winston Smith, after an intense round of "behavior modification" -- read: torture -- learns to love Big Brother, and the harsh world he was born into. Jump forward to today, and it seems we've willingly given up all sorts of freedoms, and much of our right to privacy. Fears of terrorism have a lot to do with this, but dizzying advances in technology, and the ubiquity of social media, play a big part.
There are those who say that if you don't have anything to hide, you have nothing to be afraid of. But the fact is, when a government agency can monitor everyone's phone calls, we have all become suspects. This is one of the most frightening aspects of our modern society. And even more frightening is the fact that we have gone so far down the road, there is probably no turning back. Unless you spend your life in a wilderness cabin, totally off the grid, there is simply no way the government won't have information about you stored away somewhere.
What this means, unfortunately, is that we are all Winston Smith. And Big Brother is the modern surveillance state.
URL: http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/03/opinion/beale-1984-
now/index.html?iid=article_sidebar