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1984 Thoughtcrime? Does it matter that George Orwell pinched the plot?

George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four is a classic – but it owes its plot, characters and conclusion to Yevgeny Zamyatin's 1920s novel We

A superior writer … George Orwell in the 1940s. Photograph: CSU Archives/Everett/

Rex Features

It is a book in which one man, living in a totalitarian society a number of years in the future, gradually finds himself rebelling against the dehumanizing forces of an omnipotent, omniscient dictator. Encouraged by a woman who seems to represent the political and sexual freedom of the pre-revolutionary era (and with whom he sleeps in an ancient house that is one of the few manifestations of a former world), he writes down his thoughts of rebellion – perhaps rather imprudently – as a 24-hour clock ticks in his grim, lonely flat. In the end, the system discovers both the man and the woman, and after a period of physical and mental trauma the protagonist discovers he loves the state that has oppressed him throughout, and betrays his fellow rebels. The story is intended as a warning against and a prediction of the natural conclusions of totalitarianism.

This is a description of George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, which was first published 60 years ago on Monday. But it is also the plot of Yevgeny Zamyatin's We, a Russian novel originally published in English in 1924.

Orwell's novel is consistently acclaimed as one of the finest of the last 100 years – two years ago Guardian readers voted it the 20th century's "definitive" book – and it remains a consistent bestseller. Should it alter our respect for it that Orwell borrowed much of his

plot, the outlines of three of his central figures, and the progress of the book's dramatic arc from an earlier work?

Orwell reviewed We for Tribune in 1946, three years before he published Nineteen Eighty-Four. In his review, he called Zamyatin's book an influence on Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, though Huxley always denied anything of the sort. "It is in effect a study of the Machine," Orwell wrote of We, "the genie that man has thoughtlessly let out of its bottle and cannot put back again. This is a book to look out for when an English version appears." He seems to have taken his own advice.

We was not published in Russia until the glasnost era of 1988; among its most controversial passages for the Soviets was an apparent call for a new revolution to sweep away theirs: "How can there be a final revolution? There is no final one. The number of revolutions is infinite. The last one – that's for children. Infinity frightens children, and it's essential that children get a good night's sleep." Foreign editions released in Zamyatin's lifetime led to his being banned from publishing, and eventually he wrote to Stalin to ask permission to live abroad. It was granted, and he left Russia for ever in 1931. He died six years later.

The characters in We are numbered rather than named: its Winston Smith is D-503, and its Julia I-330. Its Big Brother is known as the Benefactor, a more human figure than Orwell's almost mythical dictator, who at one point phones D-503 ("D-503? Ah … You're speaking to the Benefactor. Report to me immediately!"). Where Orwell's apartments come complete with an all-seeing "telescreen", Zamyatin's buildings are simply made of glass, allowing each of the residents – and the "Guardians" who police them – to see in whenever they want. We's Airstrip One, or Oceania, is called OneState. Instead of puzzling over 2+2=5, its lead character is disturbed by the square root of –1.

There are many aspects of We that mark it out as an interesting work in its own right. Zamyatin has a distinctive way with description: when a doctor laughs, "the blades of [his] scissor-lips flashed", while a woman walks along moving her buttocks "from side to side as if she had eyes in them". He anthropomorphizes the letters that begin his characters' names; it is thought he may have had synaesthesia, and identified letters with certain colors.

On the down side, Zamyatin's structure – a series of diary entries – becomes progressively less believable the more trouble D-503 gets himself into, while his plot is marred by confusing jumps in time and place. A scene in which the characters fly into space unfortunately cannot help but seem laughable now.

So does it matter that Orwell borrowed plot and characters from the earlier book? After all, it seems clear that he made a superior work of literature out of them. Nineteen Eighty-Four's importance comes not so much from its plot as from its immense cultural impact, which was recognized almost immediately when it won the £357 Partisan Review prize for that year's most significant contribution to literature, and which has continued to this day. Most of the aspects and ideas of the novel that still resonate so

strongly in political life are his own: Newspeak, doublethink, thoughtcrime, the Thought Police, Room 101; the extreme use of propaganda, censorship and surveillance; the rewriting of history; labels and slogans that mean the opposite of what they say; the role for Britain implied in the name Airstrip One. References to these things pervade all levels of our culture. Apart from the obvious, I remember an amusing NME review of an album by the laddish band Cast that read: "Imagine a trainer stamping on a human face ... for ever."

In addition, unlike We, Nineteen Eighty-Four is written with expert control in an accessible style about a world recognizably our own, and its twists of plot – including the existence (or not) of the Brotherhood resistance movement – are gripping, sophisticated and convincing. The dark, pessimistic tone of Nineteen Eighty-Four is also all Orwell's.

If any aspect of We takes the shine off Nineteen Eighty-Four, it's that Orwell lifted that powerful ending – Winston's complete, willing capitulation to the forces and ideals of the state – from Zamyatin. It's a wonderful, wrenching twist, in both books, and a perfect conclusion, though We and Nineteen Eighty-Four differ slightly in the fate of the female dissident: I-330 is killed without giving up her beliefs, whereas Julia is broken in the same way as Winston.

Perhaps We deserves more recognition than it has had, but if Nineteen Eighty-Four had never existed, it is extremely doubtful Zamyatin's book would have come to fill the unique place Orwell's work now occupies. Nineteen Eighty-Four is an almanac of all the political ideas no "right-thinking" person would ever want their government to countenance, and the word Orwellian has come to signify a badge of shame intended to shut down any movement in that direction – with an imperfect record of success.

URL: http://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2009/jun/08/george-orwell-1984-zamyatin-

we

__MACOSX/untitled folder/._1984 Thoughtcrime.pdf

untitled folder/Dangers_of_Surveillance_HarvardLawReview.pdf

THE DANGERS OF SURVEILLANCE

Neil M. Richards*

From the Fourth Amendment to George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty- Four, and from the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to films like Minority Report and The Lives of Others, our law and culture are full of warnings about state scrutiny of our hves. These warnings are commonplace, but they are rarely very specific. Other than the vague threat of an Orwellian dystopia, as a society we don't really know why surveillance is bad and why we should be wary of it. To the extent that the answer has something to do with "privacy," we lack an under- standing of what "privacy" means in this context and why it matters. We've been able to live with this state of affairs largely because the threat of constant surveillance has been relegated to the realms of science fiction and failed totalitarian states.

But these warnings are no longer science fiction. The digital tech- nologies that have revolutionized our daily lives have also created mi- nutely detailed records of those Uves, In an age of terror, our govern- ment has shown a keen wilhngness to acquire this data and use it for unknown purposes. We know that governments have been buying and borrowing private-sector databases,' and we recently learned that the National Security Agency (NSA) has been building a massive data and supercomputing center in Utah, apparently with the goal of intercept- ing and storing much of the world's Internet communications for de- cryption and analysis,^

Although we have laws that protect us against government surveil- lance, secret government programs cannot be challenged until they are discovered. And even when they are, our law of surveillance provides only minimal protections. Courts frequently dismiss challenges to such programs for lack of standing, under the theory that mere surveillance creates no harms. The Supreme Court recently reversed the only ma- jor case to hold to the contrary, in Clapper v. Amnesty International

Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. For helpful comments on prior drafts, I thank Jim Bohman, John Inazu, Jonathan King, Wendy Niece Richards, and participants in the Washington University Political Theory Workshop. Special thanks are also due to my co- participants at the Harvard Law Review Symposium on Privacy and Technology — Professors Julie Cohen, Paul Schwartz, Dan Solove, and Lior Strahilevitz — and my generous commenta- tors, Danielle Citron, David Gray, and Orin Kerr. Thanks also to my research assistants, Matthew Cin and Ananth Iyengar, and my faculty assistant, Rachel Manee.

1 See, e.g., ROBERT O'HARROW, JR., N O PLACE TO HIDE 1-4 (2005). 2 James Bamford, The Black Box, WIRED, Apr. 2012, at 78, 80.

1934

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USA,^ finding that the respondents' claim that their communications were likely being monitored was "too speculative."'*

But the important point is that our society lacks an understanding of why (and when) government surveillance is harmful. Existing at- tempts to identify the dangers of surveillance are often unconvincing, and they generally fail to speak in terms that are likely to influence the law. In this Article, I try to explain the harms of government surveil- lance. Drawing on law, history, literature, and the work of scholars in the emerging interdisciplinary field of "surveillance studies," I offer an account of what those harms are and why they matter. I will move beyond the vagueness of current theories of surveillance to articulate a more coherent understanding and a more workable approach.

At the level of theory, I will explain why and when surveillance is particularly dangerous and when it is not. First, surveillance is harm- ful because it can chill the exercise of our civil liberties. With respect to civil liberties, consider surveillance of people when they are think- ing, reading, and communicating with others in order to make up their minds about political and social issues. Such intellectual surveillance is especially dangerous because it can cause people not to experiment with new, controversial, or deviant ideas. To protect our intellectual freedom to think without state oversight or interference, we need what I have elsewhere called "intellectual privacy."^ A second special harm that surveillance poses is its effect on the power dynamic between the watcher and the watched. This disparity creates the risk of a variety of harms, such as discrimination, coercion, and the threat of selec- tive enforcement, where critics of the government can be prose- cuted or blackmailed for wrongdoing unrelated to the purpose of the surveillance.

At a practical level, I propose a set of four principles that should guide the future development of surveillance law, allowing for a more appropriate balance between the costs and benefits of government surveillance. First, we must recognize that surveillance transcends the public/private divide. Public and private surveillance are simply related parts of the same problem, rather than wholly discrete. Even if we are ultimately more concerned with government surveillance, any solution must grapple with the complex relationships between gov- ernment and corporate watchers. Second, we must recognize that secret surveillance is illegitimate and prohibit the creation of any domestic-surveillance programs whose existence is secret. Third, we should recognize that total surveillance is illegitimate and reject the

3 133 S. Ct. 1138(2013). 4 Id. at 1147. 5 See generally Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008) [hereinaf-

ter Richards, Intellectual Privacy].

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idea that it is acceptable for the government to record all Internet ac- tivity without authorization. Government surveillance of the Internet is a power with the potential for massive abuse. Like its precursor of telephone wiretapping, it must be subjected to meaningful judicial process be-fore it is authorized. We should carefully scrutinize any surveillance that threatens our intellectual privacy. Fourth, we must recognize that surveillance is harmful. Surveillance menaces intellec- tual privacy and increases the risk of blackmail, coercion, and discrim- ination; accord-ingly, we must recognize surveillance as a harm in con- stitutional standing doctrine. Explaining the harms of surveillance in a doctrinally sensitive way is essential if we want to avoid sacrificing our vital civil liberties.

I develop this argument in four steps. In Part I, I show the scope of the problem of modern "surveillance societies," in which individuals are increasingly monitored by an overlapping and entangled assem- blage of government and corporate watchers. I then develop an ac- count of why this kind of watching is problematic. Part II shows how surveillance menaces our intellectual privacy and threatens the devel- opment of individual beliefs in ways that are inconsistent with the ba- sic commitments of democratic societies. Part III explores how sur- veillance distorts the power relationships between the watcher and the watched, enhancing the watcher's ability to blackmail, coerce, and dis- criminate against the people under its scrutiny. Part IV explores the four principles that I argue should guide the development of surveil- lance law, to protect us from the substantial harms of surveillance.

L T H E AGE OF S U R V E I L L A N C E

We are living in an age of surveillance. The same digital technolo- gies that have revolutionized bur daily lives over the past three de- cades have also created ever more detailed records about those lives. In addition, new technologies, from surveillance cameras and web bugs to thermal scanners and GPS transponders, have increased the ability to track, observe, and monitor. The scope and variety of the types of surveillance that are possible today are unprecedented in hu- man history. This fact alone should give us pause.

But not only have the technologies of surveillance multiplied; so too have the entities that wish to surveil. Autocratic regimes have long been the Villains in the stories we tell about surveillance, but they are no longer the only governments that have stepped up their surveillance activities. Democratically elected governments in the West have deep- ened their commitment to surveillance of the public as well. Since 2001 this monitoring has often been done in the name of counter- terrorism, but it has also been justified as protecting cybersecurity, in- tellectual property, children from predators, and a seemingly ever- growing list of other concerns. Some of the most well-known and

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valuable publicly traded corporations have also got in on the act, often with the consent (in varying degrees) of their customers. Surveillance, it seems, is not just good politics, but also good business.

What, then, is surveillance? Scholars working throughout the Enghsh-speaking academy have produced a thick descriptive literature examining the nature, causes, and implications of the age of surveil- lance.^ Working under the umbrella term of "surveillance studies," these scholars represent both the social sciences and humanities, with sociologists making many of the most significant contributions.'

Reviewing the vast surveillance studies literature. Professor David Lyon concludes that surveillance is primarily about power, but it is al- so about personhood.^ Lyon offers a definition of surveillance as "the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for pur- poses of influence, management, protection or direction."' Four as- pects of this definition are noteworthy, as they expand our understand- ing of what surveillance is and what its purposes are. First, it is focused on learning information about individuals. Second, surveil- lance is systematic] it is intentional rather than random or arbitrary. Third, surveillance is routine — a part of the ordinary administrative apparatus that characterizes modern societies.'° Fourth, surveillance can have a wide variety of purposes — rarely totalitarian domination, but more typically subtler forms of influence or control.^'

A. The Scope of Surveillance

Even a cursory overview of the kinds of surveillance that are being performed today reveals the scope of the surveillance problem. At the level of state surveillance, it should be no surprise that autocratic re- gimes have been among the worst offenders. For example, China has used Internet activity to detect and censor dissidents,^^ and states re- sisting the Arab Spring uprisings have also keenly sought social media data in order to stem the tide of the revolts." Some activists also sus- pect that the Vietnamese government may have used computer viruses

* For three recent introductions to this vast literature, see, for example, DAVID LYON, SUR- VEILLANCE STUDIES (2007); SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY (Kevin D. Haggerty & Minas Samatas eds., 2010); and T H E SURVEILLANCE STUDIES READER (Sean P. Hier & Joshua Greenberg eds., 2007).

' See LYON, supra note 6, at 18-22. 8 See id. at 23. 9 Id. at 14.

•0 Id. •• See id. at 15-16. •2 REBECCA MACKINNON, C O N S E N T OF T H E N E T W O R K E D 36-40 (2012). •3 ld.\ Anupam Chander, Essay, Jasmine Revolutions, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1505, 1516-17,

1525-28(2012).

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to monitor the Internet activity and private data of dissidents protest- ing government mining poUcies."*

Surveillance is not just for communists and dictators. Democratic states have also invested heavily in surveillance technologies in the af- termath of the September 11 attacks in America, the London subway bombings of 2005, and other atrocities. Britain is one of the most heavily surveilled countries in the world, with a network of public and private surveillance cameras, traffic enforcement cameras, and broad government powers to examine Internet traffic.'^ In the United States, the NSA has engaged in a program of warrantless wiretapping of tele- phone conversations. Although many of the details of the wiretapping and other surveillance programs remain shrouded in secrecy, it is clear that the investment in surveillance infrastructure remains significant. And as noted above, a 2012 investigative report by Wired magazine revealed that the NSA is building a massive supercomputing facility in the Utah desert, possibly with the goal of capturing and archiving much of the world's Internet traffic, with a view to decrypting and searching it as decryption technologies inevitably advance."^

Surveillance is not just for governments either. Private companies big and small generate vast fortunes from the collection, use, and sale of personal data. At the broadest level, we are building an Internet that is on its face free to use, but is in reality funded by billions of transactions where advertisements are individually targeted at Internet users based upon detailed profiles of their reading and consumer hab- its. ^̂ Such "behavioral advertising" is a multibillion-dollar business, and is the foundation on which the successes of companies hke Google and Facebook have been built.'^ One recent study concludes that this form of surveillance is so ingrained into the fabric of the Internet "that a small number of companies have a window into most of our move- ments online."'' Other technologies engage in similar forms of private surveillance. "Social reading" applications embedded into Facebook and other platforms enable the disclosure of one's reading habits.

I"* EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION 143-45 (2011). 15 Brendan M. Palfreyman, Note, Lessons from the British and American Approaches to Com-

pelled Decryption, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 345, 362 (2009). See generally KiRSTIE BALL ET AL., A R E P O R T O N T H E S U R V E I L L A N C E S O C I E T Y : F O R T H E I N F O R M A T I O N C O M M I S S I O N E R B Y

THE S U R V E I L L A N C E S T U D I E S N E T W O R K (David Murakami Wood ed., 2006), avail- able at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/o2_i i_o6_surveillance.pdf; How We Are Being Watched, BBC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2006, 2:21 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uky2/hi/uk_news/6iio866.stm.

16 See generally Bamford, supra note 2. 17 See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, T H E G O O G L I Z A T I O N O F E V E R Y T H I N G 26-30 (2011).

18 See DAVID KIRKPATRICK, T H E FACEBOOK E F F E C T 260-66 (2010); S T E V E N LEVY, I N

THE P L E X 262-63, 336-37 (2011). 19 Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al.. Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 6 HARV.

L. & POL'Y R E V . 273, 279 (2012).

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while electronic readers like the Kindle and the Nook track reader be- havior down to the specific page of the specific book on which a user's attention is currently Ungering,̂ ^

In recent years, industry, media, and scholars have increasingly fo- cused their attention on the concept of "Big Data," an unwieldy term often used to describe the creation and analysis of massive data sets,^' Big Data is notable not just because of the amount of personal infor- mation that can be processed, but because of the ways data in one area can be linked to other areas and analyzed to produce new inferences and findings. As social scientists danah boyd and Kate Crawford put it, "Big Data is fundamentally networked. Its value comes from the patterns that can be derived by making connections between pieces of data, about an individual, about individuals in relation to others, about groups of people, or simply about the structure of information itself,"" Big Data holds much potential for good in areas as diverse as medical research, the "smart" electrical grid, and traffic management,^^

But Big Data also raises many potential problems in areas such as privacy and consumer power. For example, the retail superstore Tar- get uses Big Data analytics to infer which of its customers are preg- nant based upon their purchases of other products and upon personal- ly identifying data from other sources.2"* As the New York Times Magazine reports, new parents are highly desirable customers not just because they buy many new products, but because their normally sta- ble purchasing habits are "up for grabs" in the chaotic exhaustion that accompanies the birth of a child.̂ ^ Target uses Big Data to snare new parents because, as one of its data analysts concedes, "[w]e knew that if we could identify them in their second trimester, there's a good chance we could capture them for years , , , , As soon as we get them buying diapers from us, they're going to start buying everything else too,"2ö Big Data analytics enabled Target to discover that expectant parents display a change in buying habits (for example, buying un- scented lotion and magnesium supplements) that mark them as expec- tant, allowing this kind of (appropriately enough) "targeted" market-

20 N e i l M . R i c h a r d s , The Perils of Social Reading, i o i G E O . L . J . 6 8 9 , 6 9 8 - 9 9 (2013) [hereinaf- t e r R i c h a r d s , The Perils of Social Reading].

21 d a n a h b o y d & K a t e C r a w f o r d , Six P r o v o c a t i o n s for B i g D a t a 6 (Sept. 2 1 , 2011) ( u n p u b - l i s h e d m a n u s c r i p t ) (on file w i t h t h e H a r v a r d L a w S c h o o l L i b r a r y ) .

22 Id. 23 S e e generally O m e r T e n e & J u l e s P o l o n e t s k y , Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in

the Age of Analytics, 11 N w . J . T E C H . & I N T E L L . PROP, ( f o r t h c o m i n g 2013). 21 C h a r l e s D u h i g g , Psst, You in Aisle 5, N . Y . T I M E S , F e b . 16, 2012 ( m a g a z i n e ) , § 6, a t 30,

available at h t t p : / / w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 2 / 0 2 / 1 9 / m a g a z i n e / s h 0 p p i n g - h a b i t s . h t m l . 25 Id. 26 Id.\ see also Tom Simonite, What Facebook Knows, M I T TECH. REV. (June 13, 2012),

http://www.technologyreview.com/featured-story/428i5p/what-facebook-knows/?mod=related.

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ing. Big Data surveillance and analysis thus affect the commercial power of consumers, identifying their times of relative weakness and allowing more effective marketing to nudge them in the directions that watchful companies desire.

The incentives for the collection and distribution of private data are on the rise. The past fifteen years have seen the rise of an Internet in which personal computers and smartphones have been the domi- nant personal technologies. But the next fifteen will likely herald the "Internet of Things," in which networked controls, sensors, and data collectors will be increasingly built into our appliances, cars, elec- tric power grid, and homes, enabling new conveniences but subjecting more and more previously unobservable activity to electronic measurement, observation, and control.^' Many of us already carry GPS tracking devices in our pockets, not by government command, but in the form of powerful multifunction smartphones. Sociologists Zygmunt Bauman and David Lyon have identified the spread of sur- veillance beyond nonconsensual state watching to a sometimes-private surveillance in which the subjects increasingly consent and partici- pate — a phenomenon that they call "liquid surveillance."^* Professor Scott Peppet foresees the "unraveling" of privacy,̂ ^ as economic incen- tives lead consumers to agree to surveillance devices like Progressive Insurance's "MyRate" program, which offers reduced insurance rates in exchange for the installation of a device that monitors driving speed, time, and habits.^° Peppet argues that this unraveling of priva- cy creates a novel challenge to privacy law, which has long focused on unconsented surveillance rather than on surveillance as part of an eco- nomic transaction.^!

It might seem curious to think of information gathering by private entities as "surveillance." Notions of surveillance have traditionally been concerned with the watchful gaze of government actors like po- lice and prison officials rather than companies and individuals. But in a postmodern age of "liquid surveillance," the two phenomena are deeply intertwined. Government and nongovernment surveillance support each other in a complex manner that is often impossible to disentangle. At the outset, the technologies of surveillance — soft- ware, RFID chips, GPS trackers, cameras, and other cheap sensors —

27 Clive T h o m p s o n , Sensors Everywhere, W I R E D , D e c . 2012, a t 72, available at h t t p : / / w w w . w i r e d . c o m / o p i n i o n / 2 0 i 2 / i 2 / 2 0 - i 2 - s t _ t h o m p s o n / . F o r a c r i t i q u e of t h e " I n t e r n e t of T h i n g s , " see R O B VAN KRANENBURG, T H E I N T E R N E T O F T H I N G S (2008), available at http://www .networkcultures.org/_uploads/notebook2_theinternetofthings.pdf.

28 ZYGMUNT BAUMAN & DAVID LYON, L I Q U I D SURVEILLANCE 2-3 (2013). '

2' Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full- Disclosure Future, 105 N w . U. L. REV. 1153, 1156 (2011).

30 /d. a t 1153-56. 31 Id.

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are being used almost interchangeably by government and nongov- ernment watchers.32 Private industry is also marketing new surveil- lance technologies to the state. Though it sounds perhaps like a plot from a paranoid science fiction novel, the Gwardia« reports that the Disney Corporation has been developing facial recognition technolo- gies for its theme parks and selling the technology to the U.S. mih- tary.33 Nor do the fruits of surveillance respect the public/private di- vide. Since the September 11 attacks, governments have been eager to acquire the massive consumer and Internet-activity databases that private businesses have compiled for security and other purposes, ei- ther by subpoena^" or outright purchase.^^ Information can also flow in the other direction; the U.S. government recently admitted that it was giving information to insurance companies that it had collected from automated license-plate readers at border crossings.̂ ^

Similarly, while government regulation might be one way to limit or shape the growth of the data industry in socially beneficial ways, governments also have an interest in making privately collected data amenable to public-sector surveillance. In the United States, for ex- ample, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 19943' requires telecommunications providers to build their networks in ways that make government surveillance and interception of elec- tronic communications possible.̂ ^ A European analogue, the EC Data Retention Directive Regulations of 2009, requires Internet service pro- viders to retain details of all Internet access, email, and Internet tele- phony by users for twelve months, so that they can be made available to government investigators for cases of antiterrorism, intellectual property, child protection, or for other purposes.̂ « This surveillant symbiosis between companies and governments means that no analysis of surveillance can be strictly limited to just the government or the market in isolation. Surveillance must instead be understood in its ag- gregated and complex social context.

32 See L Y O N , supra note 6, a t 1 1 1 - 1 2 .

33 N a o m i Wolf, The New Totalitarianism of Surveillance Technology, GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2012, 4:12 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/15/new-totalitarianism-surveillance -technology. 1

34 S e e G o n z a l e s v. Google, I n c . , 234 F . R . D . 674, 688 ( N . D . C a l . 2006). 35 See O ' H A R R O W , supra n o t e i , a t 64, 9 8 - 1 0 3 . 36 Cyrus Farivar, License Plates Scanned at Border, Data Shared with Car Insurance Group,

ARS T E C H N I C A (Aug. 22, 2012, 4:36 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/08/license-plates -scanned-at-border-data-shared-with-car-insurance-group/.

37 47 U . S . C §§ 1 0 0 1 - 1 0 1 0 ( 2 0 0 6 ) . 38 Id. § 1002.

39 T h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m version of this regulation is T h e D a t a R e t e n t i o n ( E C Directive) Regula- tions, 2009, S.I. 2009/859 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.ukyukdsi/2OO9/978oii 1473894 / c o n t e n t s .

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B. Surveillance Law's Limited Protections

American law governing surveillance is piecemeal, spanning consti- tutional protections such as the Fourth Amendment, statutes like the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986"° (ECPA), and private law rules such as the intrusion-into-seclusion tort."i But the general principle under which American law operates is that surveillance is le- gal unless forbidden. Perhaps out of a fear that surveillance might be used to suppress dissent, American law contains some limited protec- tions against government surveillance of purely political activity. For example, government investigators in antiterrorism cases possess a powerful tool known as the National Security Letter (NSL). NSLs are statutory authorizations by which the FBI can obtain information about people from their telephone companies, Internet service provid- ers, banks, credit agencies, and other institutions with which those people have a relationship. NSLs are covert and come with a gag or- der that prohibits the recipient of the letter from disclosing its exis- tence, even to the person whose secrets have been told to the govern- ment. NSLs can currently be obtained under four federal statutes: the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978"̂ (RFPA), the ECPA,"^ the Fair Credit Reporting Act"" (FCRA), and the National Security Act of 1947."̂ Taken together, these provisions allow the FBI to access a wide variety of information about people, including historical and transactional information relating to telephone calls and emails, finan- cial information, and consumer credit information."^ This information can be obtained by crossing a Very low threshold — the FBI must merely certify in writing that the request is "relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine

"•o Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C). '' • See generally Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser's Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy,

98 CALIF. L . REV. 1887 (2010). "•2 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (allowing access to personal financial records

held by a wide variety of entities, including casinos, insurance companies, automobile dealerships, credit unions, real estate companies, and travel agencies).

"•3 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (allowing access to telephone and email information including billing and call history, email, subscriber information, and screen names).

'*'' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681X (2006 & Supp. V 2011); iee also id. § 1681U (allowing access to credit history information and the header information on credit reports, including name, address, and employment history); id. § i68iv (allowing access to a consumer's full credit report and "all other information in a consumer's file").

"'S 50 U.S.C. §§ 4Oi-442b (2006 & Supp. V 2011); iee also id. § 436 (allowing the issuance of NSLs in connection with investigations of improper disclosure of classified information by gov- ernment employees).

46 See O F F I C E O F T H E I N S P E C T O R G E N . , U.S. D E P ' T O F J U S T I C E , A R E V I E W O F T H E

F E D E R A L B U R E A U O F I N V E S T I G A T I O N ' S U S E O F N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y L E T T E R S 10 (2007).

2OI3] THE DANGERS OF SURVEILLANCE 1943

intelligence activities."'*' Communications and bank records sought under the ECPA and the RFPA are protected by the additional re- quirement that the FBI certify that "such an investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities pro- tected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States."-*«

Despite these protections, courts lack the tools to enforce them. This problem predates the current NSL framework. For example, in 1967, the President ordered the U.S. Army to engage in surveillance of domestic dissident groups, fearing civil disorder in the aftermath of the assassination of IMartin Luther King, Jr."' The program expanded over time to become a large-scale military surveillance program of the domestic political activities of American citizens.^° In Laird v. Tatum,^^ the Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims that the surveillance violated the First Amendment rights of the subjects of the program, because the subjects claimed only that they felt deterred from exercising their First Amendment rights or that the government could misuse the information it collected in the future.̂ ^ The Court could thus declare that "[a]llegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm."^^

]V[ore recent surveillance cases have followed the lead of the Laird Court. Challenges to the NSA's wiretapping program have foundered because plaintiffs have failed to convince federal courts that secret surveillance has caused them any legally cognizable injury. In ACLU V. NSA,^'^ the Sixth Circuit dismissed any suggestion that First Amendment values were threatened when the government listened to private conversations. As that court put it: "The First Amendment protects public speech and the free exchange of ideas, while the Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unwanted intrusion into their per- sonal lives and effects."^^ The court concluded that the plaintiffs had

••7 This precise language is quoted from the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 27O9(b)(i)-(2), but the other N S L provisions are substantially similar. See 12 U . S . C § 34i4(a)(5)(A) (RFPA); 15 U . S . C §§ i68iu(b), i 6 8 i v ( a ) (FCRA); 50 U.S.C. § 436(a)(3) (National Security Act).

18 18 U . S . C § 2 7O9(b)(i)-(2) (ECPA); 12 U.S.C. § 34i4(a)(5)(A) (RFPA). T h e original F C R A N S L provision allowing access to the headers of credit reports only, 15 U.S.C. § i68iu(b), contains such a First A m e n d m e n t limitation, but since the Patriot Act added § i 6 8 i v , which allows for the full credit report to be obtained without meeting the First Amendment requirement, it is unclear w h a t practical effect the limitation in § i68iu(b) will have.

t ' See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. i, 4-5 (1972). 50 See id. at 6-7. 51 408 U.S. I. 52 Id. a t 13. 53 Id. a t 1 3 - 1 4 . 5'' 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007). 55 Id. a t 657 n.15 (citations o m i t t e d ) .

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no standing to assert First or Fourth Amendment violations, as they could not prove that the secret government surveillance program had targeted them,̂ ^ Similarly, in Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. V. Bush,^'' the government successfully invoked the state-secrets doc- trine to stop the plaintiffs from finding out whether they were the sub- jects of secret surveillance under the program,^^ This ruling created a brutal paradox for the plaintiffs: they could not prove whether their telephone calls had been listened to, and thus they could not establish standing to sue for the violation of their civil liberties,^^ Despite the fact that the judges in the case knew whether surveillance had taken place, they believed that the state-secrets doctrine barred them from ruling on that fact,̂ ° And the Court's most recent decision in Clapper affirmed this approach to standing to challenge surveillance. Plaintiffs can only challenge secret government surveillance they can prove, but the government isn't telling. Plaintiffs (and perhaps civil liberties) are out of luck.

So far so bad. Or maybe not. Putting the oppression of totalitarian states to one side, public and private surveillance can have beneficial effects. All other things being equal, greater security from crime and terrorism is a good thing,^! So too are the conveniences of modern communications, email, and the power of a search engine in our pock- ets valuable advances that improve our quality of life. And a sensible system of automated traffic regulation can save money and direct scarce police resources to serious criminals rather than ordinary motorists.

As a society, we are thus of two minds about surveillance. On the one hand, it is creepy, Orwellian, and corrosive of civil liberties. On the other hand, it keeps us and our children safe. It makes our lives more convenient and gives us the benefit of a putatively free Internet. Moreover, some influential thinkers argue that data surveillance does not affect privacy at all. As Judge Posner puts it:

The collection, mainly through electronic means, of vast amounts of per- sonal data is said to invade privacy. But machine collection and processing of data cannot, as such, invade privacy. Because of their vol- ume, the data are first sifted by computers, which search for names, ad- dresses, phone numbers, etc, that may have intelligence value. This ini-

56 Id. a t 6 7 3 - 7 4 . 5 ' 507 F.3d i i 9 o ( 9 t h Cir. 2007). 58 Id. a t 1204. 59 See id. a t 1205. 60 See id. a t 1 2 0 4 - 0 5 . 61 See RICHARD A. POSNER, N O T A SUICIDE PACT 130 (2006) (arguing that adherence to

civil liberties like the right to privacy must be flexible where it confiicts with government antiter- rorism efforts).

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tial sifting, far from invading privacy (a computer is not a sentient being), keeps most private data from being read by any intelligence officer^^

Surveillance is thus confusing. We like its benefits, though we are fearful (and sometimes dismissive) of its costs. This confusion points to a larger problem: civil liberties advocates lack a compelling account of when and why (if at all) surveillance is harmful. As a society, we have an intuitive understanding that public- and private-sector sur- veillance is potentially bad, but we do not have an articulate explana- tion of why it is bad. Some of our intuitions stem from literature, such as George Orwell's chilling portrait of Big Brother in Nineteen Eighty- Four.^^ But few critics of government surveillance such as the NSA wiretapping program and the British data-retention regulations would suggest that these programs are directly analogous to the evil regime depicted in Orwell's dystopia. Moreover, the Orwell metaphor seems wholly inapplicable to databases used to personalize targeted advertis- ing on the web, the efforts of insurance companies to promote safe driving, and the practices of online booksellers to sell more books by monitoring consumers' shopping habits in ways that used to be impossible.̂ "̂

We need an account of when and why surveillance is problematic to help us see when we should regulate and when we should not. The following Parts seek to provide an account of some of the dangers of surveillance and the ways in which laws could mitigate them. ..I want to advance two lines of critique to the notion that surveillance does not create a legally cognizable injury: first, that surveillance by govern- ment and private actors threatens intellectual privacy and chills the exercise of vital civil liberties; and second, that surveillance affects the power balance between individuals and those who are watching, in- creasing the risk of persuasion, blackmail, and other harmful uses of sensitive information by others.

II. S U R V E I L L A N C E A N D I N T E L L E C T U A L PRIVACY

The most salient harm of surveillance is that it threatens a value I have elsewhere called "intellectual privacy. "̂ ^ Intellectual-privacy

62 Richard A. Posner, Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at A31, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/20/AR2005122001053.html.

63 G E O R G E O R W E L L , N I N E T E E N E I G H T Y - F O U R (Irving Howe ed., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 1982) (1949).

64 5ee D A N I E L J. S O L O V E , T H E D I G I T A L P E R S O N 29-36 (2004) (critiquing the usefulness of Orwell's metaphor as a tool in understanding the private database industry). But see Neil M. Richards, Essay, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 G E O . L.J. 1087, 1133 (2006) (suggesting that the Orwell metaphor retains some validity as a tool to understand electronic surveillance).

65 R i c h a r d s , Intellectual Privacy, supra note 5, a t 389; R i c h a r d s , The Perils of Social Reading, supra note 20, a t 6 9 1 .

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theory suggests that new ideas often develop best away from the in- tense scrutiny of public exposure; that people should be able to make up their minds at times and places of their own choosing; and that a meaningful guarantee of privacy — protection from surveillance or in- terference — is necessary to promote this kind of intellectual freedom. It rests on the idea that free minds are the foundation of a free society, and that surveillance of the activities of belief formation and idea gen- eration can affect those activities profoundly and for the worse.̂ ^ I want to be clear at the outset that intellectual-privacy theory protects "intellectual" activities, broadly defined — the processes of thinking and making sense of the world with our minds. Intellectual privacy has its limits — it is a subset of all things that we might call "privacy," albeit a very important subset. But importantly, intellectual privacy is not just for intellectuals; it is an essential kind of privacy for us all.

At the core of the theory of intellectual privacy are two claims, one normative and one empirical. The normative claim is that the founda- tion of Anglo-American civil hberties is our commitment to free and unfettered thought and belief — that free citizens should be able to make up their own minds about ideas big and small, political and triv- ial. This claim requires at a minimum protecting individuals' rights to think and read, as well as the social practice of private consultation with confidantes. It may also require some protection of broader so- cial rights, whether we call them rights of association or assembly.^' Protection of these individual rights and social practices allows indi- viduals to develop both intellectual diversity and eccentric individuali- ty. They reflect the conviction that big ideas like truth, value, and culture should be generated from the bottom up rather than from the top down.̂ *

These commitments to the freedoms of thought, belief, and private speech lie at the foundation of traditional First Amendment theory, though they have been underappreciated elements of that tradition. But as I have argued elsewhere, a careful examination reveals that a commitment to freedom of thought is present in virtually every major text in First Amendment theory.^' In particular, freedom of thought lies at the core of the modern American tradition of First Amendment libertarianism, which began with the opinions of Justices Holmes and

66 Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 5, at 403-04. 6' See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 998 (2011) ("An as-

sociation is a coming together of individuals for a common cause or based on common values or goals."). See generally JOHN D . INAZU, LIBERTY'S REFUGE (2012) (arguing for the protection of political- and religious-group autonomy under the alternative rubric of the right of assembly).

68 See generally JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF (2012). 69 See Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 5, at 408-12 (exploring this point in greater

detail). For a similar argument, see generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Ap- proach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 283 (2011).

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Brandéis in the decade following the end of the First World War. Dis- senting from the majority position of the Supreme Court, the two friends developed theories that justified special protection for speech and ideas under the First Amendment. The two men advanced slightly different reasons why speech should be protected — Justice Holmes justified protection in terms of the search for truth, while Jus- tice Brandeis privileged democratic self-government — but each theory enshrined protection for free thought at its core. For example. Justice Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United States'"^ is a forceful statement of the idea that democratic institutions depend on minds' being able to freely and fearlessly engage in the search for political truth. As he put it poetically:

[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.'^ Justice Brandeis also placed the freedom of thought at the foun-

dation of his justification for special protection for free speech. In Whitney v. California,''^ he wrote:

Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its gov- ernment the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They be- lieved that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth . . . .'^ Thus, in each of the traditional American justifications for freedom

of speech,'" a commitment to freedom of thought — to intellectual freedom — rests at the core of the tradition.

70 250 U.S. 616(1919). ' • Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). '2 274 U.S. 357 (1927). '3 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added). '* Although most courts justify free speech in terms of truth-seeking or democratic self-

governance, some scholars have argued that free speech is better justified in terms of the autono- my or self-development of the individual. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amend- ment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 990-92 (1978); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593-94 (1982); David A. J. Richards, free Speech and Ob- scenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L . R E V . 45, 62 (1974); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 210-19 (1972). Free thought is a logically necessary precondition for autonomous speech, though this point is un- derdeveloped in the relevant literature. For an analysis of the relationship between free thought and autonomous speech, see Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 5, at 406 & n.113, and see generally Shiffrin, supra note 69.

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The second claim at the core of the theory of intellectual privacy is an empirical one — that surveillance inclines us to the mainstream and the boring. It is a claim that when we are watched while engag- ing in intellectual activities, broadly defined — thinking, reading, web- surfing, or private communication — we are deterred from engaging in thoughts or deeds that others might find deviant. Surveillance thus menaces our society's foundational commitments to intellectual diver- sity and eccentric individuality.

Three different kinds of arguments highlight the ways in which surveillance can restrain intellectual activities. The first set of argu- ments relies on cultural and literary works exploring the idea that sur- veillance deters eccentric or deviant behavior. IVIany such works owe a debt to Jeremy Bentham's idea of the Panopticon, a prison designed around a central surveillance tower from which a warden could see in- to all of the cells. In the Panopticon, prisoners had to conform their activities to those desired by the prison staff because they had no idea when they were being watched. As Bentham describes this system, "[t]o be incessantly under the eyes of an Inspector is to lose in fact the power of doing ill, and almost the very wish."" Of course, the most famous cultural exploration of the conforming effects of surveillance is Orwell's harrowing depiction in Nineteen Eighty-Four of the totalitar- ian state personified by Big Brother." Orwell's fictional state sought to prohibit not just verbal dissent from the state but even the think- ing of such ideas, an act punished as "thoughtcrime" and de- terred by constant state surveillance." Some scholars have docu- mented how the modern surveillance environment differs from both the classic Panopticon and a fully realized Big Brother in important ways.'^ Nevertheless, Orwell's insight about the effects of surveillance on thought and behavior remains valid — the fear of being watched causes people to act and think differently from the way they might otherwise.

Our cultural intuitions about the effects of surveillance are sup- ported by a second set of arguments that comes from the empirical work of scholars in the interdisciplinary field of surveillance studies. Moving beyond the classic metaphors of the Panopticon and Big Brother, these scholars have tried to understand modern forms of sur- veillance by governments, companies, and individuals in all of their

75 J e r e m y B e n t h a m , Panopticon, in 3 O P I N I O N S O F D I F F E R E N T A U T H O R S U P O N T H E P U N I S H M E N T O F D E A T H 3 2 1 , 3 2 8 ( B a s i l M o n t a g u ed., 1816).

76 O R W E L L , SM^ra n o t e 6 3 , a t 4. " Id. at 14. '8 See, e.g., Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRIT. J.

SOC. 605, 606-08 (2000); S O L O V E , supra note 64, at 33-35.

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complexities." The scope of this burgeoning literature has been wide- ranging and provides many examples of the normalizing effects of sur- veillance in a wide variety of contexts. In his pioneering work in the 1980s, for example. Professor Anthony Giddens argues that surveil- lance continually seeks the supervision of social actors and carries with it a permanent risk that supervision could lead to domination.8° More recent scholars have explored the risks that surveillance poses to dem- ocratic self-governance.81 One such risk is that of self-censorship, in terms of speech, action, or even belief. Studies of communist states give social-scientific accounts of many of the cultural intuitions about these self-censoring effects of surveillance,^^ but so too do studies of modern forms of surveillance in democratic societies. For example, one study of the EU Data Retention Directive notes that "[u]nder per- vasive surveillance, individuals are inclined to make choices that con- form to mainstream expectations."*^ As I explore below, the scope of surveillance studies is much broader than merely the study of panoptic state surveillance; scholars working in this field have examined the full scope of modern forms of watching, including data surveillance by private actors. But above all, surveillance scholars continually reaf- firm that, while surveillance by government and others can have many purposes, a recurrent purpose of surveillance is to control behavior,*"*

A third and final set of arguments for intellectual privacy comes from First Amendment doctrine, A basic principle of free speech law as it has developed over the past century is that free speech is so im- portant that its protection should err on the side of caution. Given the uncertainty of Utigation, the Supreme Court has created a series of procedural devices to attempt to ensure that errors in the adjudication of free speech cases tend to allow unlawful speech rather than engage in mistaken censorship. These doctrines form what Professor Lee Bollinger calls the "First Pillar" of First Amendment law — the "[e]xtraordinary [p]rotection against [cjensorship.''̂ ^ Such doctrines take various forms, such as those of prior restraint, overbreadth, and vagueness, but they are often characterized under the idea of the "chilling effect." This idea maintains that rules that might deter poten- tially valuable expression should be treated with a high level of suspi-

7 ' See generally LYON, supra n o t e 6. 80 See generally A N T H O N Y G I D D E N S , T H E N A T I O N - S T A T E AND V I O L E N C E (1985). 81 See generally, e.g., SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY, supra n o t e 6, 82 See, e,g,, Maria Los, A Trans-Systemic Surveillance: The Legacy of Communist Surveillance

in the Digital Age, in SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY, supra n o t e 6, a t 173, 1 7 4 - 7 5 . 83 Lilian Mitrou, The Impact of Communications Data Retention on Fundamental Rights and

Democracy — The Case of the EU Data Retention Directive, in SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOC- RACY, supra note 6, at 127, 138.

8'' See, e.g., LYON, supra note 6, at 15; BALL ET AL., supra note 15, at 4. »̂ LEE C, B O L L I N G E R , U N I N H I B I T E D , ROBUST, A N D W I D E - O P E N 12 (2010),

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cion by courts. As the Supreme Court put it in perhaps its most im- portant free speech decision of the twentieth century. New York Times Co. V. Sullivan,^^ the importance of uninhibited public debate.means that, although "erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to survive.'"^' As Professor Frederick Schauer explains, "the chilling effect doctrine recognizes the fact that the legal system is imperfect and mandates the formulation of legal rules that reflect our preference for errors made in favor of free speech."8* Although the chilling-effect doctrine has been criticized on grounds that it overprotects free speech and makes empirically unsup- ported judgments,*^ such criticisms miss the point. The doctrines en- capsulated by the chilling effect reflect the substantive value judgment that First Amendment valúes are too important to require scrupulous proof to vindicate them, and that it is (constitutionally speaking) a bet- ter bargain to allow more speech, even if society must endure some of that speech's undesirable consequences.

Intellectual-privacy theory explains why we should extend chilling- effect protections to intellectual surveillance, especially traditional-style surveillance by the state. If we care about the development of eccen- tric individuality and freedom of thought as First Amendment values, then we should be especially wary of surveillance of activities through which those aspects of the self are constructed.^° Professor Timothy Macklem argues that "[t]he isolating shield of privacy enables people to develop and exchange ideas, or to foster and share activities, that the presence or even awareness of other people might stifle. For better and for worse, then, privacy is sponsor and guardian to the creative and the subversive."" A meaningful measure of intellectual privacy should be erected to shield these activities from the normalizing gaze of surveillance. This shield should be justified on the basis of our cul- tural intuitions and empirical insights about the normalizing effects of surveillance. But it must also be tempered by the chilling-effect doc- trine's normative commitment to err on the side of First Amendment values even if proof is imperfect.

86 376 U.S. 254(1964). 8' Id. at 271-72 (second omission in original) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,

433 (1963))- 88 Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect,"

58 B.U. L. REV 685, 688 (1978). 85 See generally, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent and the Chilling Effect, 54 W M . & MARY

L. R E V . (forthcoming 2013). '0 See C O H E N , supra note 68, at 223-25; Julie Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L.

R E V . 1904, 1912, 1918 (2013). '1 TIMOTHY MACKLEM, INDEPENDENCE OF MIND 36 (2006).

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Intellectual-privacy theory therefore suggests a solution to the con- fusion that has plagued courts and others in dealing with whether sur- veillance programs create legally cognizable injuries. Despite often displaying an intuitive understanding that surveillance might be pot- entially harmful, courts have struggled to understand why. This ab- sence of clarity has led to courts misunderstanding and diminishing privacy interests that conflict with other values. . When faced with ba- lancing a vague and poorly articulated privacy right against state in- terests such as the prevention of terrorist attacks, surveillance tends to win. Courts also make the mistake that the ACLU v. NSA court made and cast surveillance as solely a Fourth Amendment issue of crime prevention, rather than as one that also threatens intellectual freedom and First Amendment values of the highest order. «̂ other decisions mirror the mistake of the Al-Haramain court in concluding that pre- venting secret surveillance is less important than inconveniencing the executive branch.'^ Additionally, some courts can make the mistake that the Clapper Court made, refusing to recognize as justiciable harms the costly measures that people must adopt to shield their communica- tions from government surveillance.'"

Shadowy regimes of surveillance corrode the constitutional com- mitment to intellectual freedom that lies at the heart of most theories of political freedom in a democracy. Secret programs of wide-ranging intellectual surveillance that are devoid of pubhc process and that cannot be justified in court are inconsistent with this commitment and illegitimate in a free society. My argument is not that intellectual sur- veillance should never be possible, but that when the state seeks to learn what people are reading, thinking, and saying privately, such scrutiny is a serious threat to civil liberties. Accordingly, meaningful legal process (that is, at least a warrant supported by probable cause) must be followed before the government can perform the digital equivalent of reading our diaries.

But we must also remember that in modern societies, surveillance fails to respect the line between public and private actors. Intellectual privacy should be preserved against private actors as well as against the state. Federal prosecutions based on purely intellectual surveil- lance are thankfully rare, but the coercive effects of monitoring by our friends and acquaintances are much more common. We are con- strained in our actions by peer pressure at least as much as by the state. Moreover, records collected by private parties can be sold to or subpoenaed by the government, which (as noted above) has shown a

92 See A C L U v. N S A , 493 F.3d 644, 657 (6th Cir. 2007). 93 See A l - H a r a m a i n I s l a m i c F o u n d . , I n c . v. B u s h , 507 F.3d 1190, 1201-05 (9th Cir. 2007).

94 See C l a p p e r v. A m n e s t y I n t ' l USA, 133 S. C t . 1138, 1150-53 (2013).

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voracious interest in all kinds of personal information, particularly records related to the operation of the mind and political beliefs.̂ ^ Put simply, the problem of intellectual privacy transcends the pub- lic/private divide, and justifies additional legal protections on intellec- tual privacy and the right to read freely.'̂ Constitutional law and standing doctrine alone will not solve the threat of surveillance to in- tellectual freedom and privacy, but they are a good place to start.

III. S U R V E I L L A N C E A N D P O W E R

The mechanics of intellectual privacy discussed so far depend upon knowing, or at least fearing, that someone might be watching us. If we have a sense of privacy, even one that turns out to be an illusion, we are less likely to change our behavior under the panoptic gaze. Truly secret and unexpected surveillance, from this perspective, might appear not to violate our intellectual privacy at all. If we have no in- kling that we are being watched, if we really do not care that we are being watched, or if we fear no consequences of being watched, it could be argued that our intellectual freedom is unaffected. It can thus be argued that if the NSA Wiretapping Program had never leaked, it would have posed no threat to intellectual privacy.

There are two problems with this account. First, no program of widespread surveillance is likely to remain secret forever. At some point, such a program will inevitably come to light, either by being leaked (as happened with the NSA program and the Army surveillance in Laird), or by actions taken pursuant to the program (such as prose- cutions or disclosures). The injury suffered by those thus punished would serve as an example to the rest of us, and the mechanisms of in- tellectual privacy would come into effect at that point.

Second, surveillance (even secret surveillance) can create additional harms that are separate from the ones suggested by intellectual- privacy theory. Scholars working in surveillance studies have explored the phenomenon of surveillance in all of its contemporary complexity, going beyond the Panopticon to consider private surveillance, the rela- tionships between watchers and watched, and the wide variety of dan- gers that modern surveillance societies raise. ̂ ' Recall in this regard that Lyon's definition of surveillance notes that surveillance has a purpose,'^ but in the modern era this purpose is rarely totalitarian domination. All the same, most forms of surveillance seek some form

' 5 See R i c h a r d s , Intellectual Privacy, supra note 5, a t 4 2 7 - 2 8 (providing examples). 9* See generally R i c h a r d s , The Perils of Social Reading, supra note 20. 97 See, e.g., Kevin D . H a g g e r t y & M i n a s S a m a t a s , Introduction, in S U R V E I L L A N C E AND

D E M O C R A C Y , supra note 6, a t i , 3-4. 98 See L Y O N , supra note 6, a t 14.

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of subtler influence or control over others. Even when' surveillance is not Orwellian, it is usually about influencing or being able to respond to someone else's behavior. And while surveillance can sometimes have benign goals (like traffic safety, or parents using baby monitors or GPS trackers to keep tabs on their children), it is invariably tied to a particular purpose. Critically, the gathering of information affects the power dynamic between the watcher and the watched, giving the watcher greater power to influence or direct the subject of surveil- lance.'' It might sound trite to say that "information is power," but the power of personal information lies at the heart of surveillance. The power effects of surveillance illustrate three additional dangers of surveillance: blackmail, discrimination, and persuasion.

A. Blackmail

Information collected surreptitiously can be used to blackmail or discredit opponents by revealing embarrassing secrets. American po- litical history over the past hundred years furnishes numerous exam- ples of this phenomenon, but perhaps the most compelling is the treatment of Martin Luther King, Jr., by the FBI. Concerned that Dr. King was a threat to public order, the FBI listened to his private tele- phone conversations in order to seek information with which to blackmail him. As the official government investigation into the Dr. King wiretaps concluded in 1976:

The FBI collected information about Dr. King's plans and activities through an extensive surveillance program, employing nearly every intelli- gence-gathering technique at the Bureau's disposal. Wiretaps, which were initially approved by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, were main- tained on Dr. IQng's home telephone from October 1963 until mid-iços; the SCLC headquarter's [sic] telephones were covered by wiretaps for an even longer period. Phones in the homes and offices of some of Dr. King's close advisers were also wiretapped. The FBI has acknowledged 16 occa- sions on which microphones were hidden in Dr. King's hotel and motel rooms in an "attempt" to obtain information about the "private activities of King and his advisers" for use to "completely discredit" them.i°°

Imagine a dissident like Dr. King living in today's information age. A government (or political opponent) that wanted him silenced might be able to obtain not just access to his telephone conversations, but al- so to his reading habits and emails. This critic could be blackmailed outright, or he could be discredited by disclosure of the information as an example to others. Perhaps he has not been having an affair, but has some other secret. Maybe he is gay, or has a medical condition, or

99 See id. 100 S. R E P . N O . 94-755, at 8i (1976) (quoting Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to

William Sullivan (Jan. 28, 1964)).

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visits embarrassing web sites, or has cheated on his expenses or his taxes. All of us have secrets we would prefer not be made public. Surveillance allows those secrets greater opportunities to come out, and it gives the watchers power that can be used nefariously.

The risk of the improper use of surveillance records persists over time. Most of the former communist states in Eastern Europe have passed laws strictly regulating access to the surveillance files of the communist secret police. The primary purpose of such laws is to pre- vent the blackmail of political candidates who may have been sur- veilled under the former regime,i°i The experience of these laws re- veals, moreover, that the risk of such blackmail is one that the law cannot completely prevent after the fact. Professor Maria Los explains that "[s]ecret surveillance files are routinely turned into a weapon in political struggles, seriously underrnining democratic processes and

More recently, the world observed some of the potential of electron- ic blackmail during the revolutions in the Arab world. Many observ- ers have argued that the turmoil in Ilinisia, Libya, and Syria shows the liberating potential of digital technologies,'°^ But the crisis also il- lustrates the potential of modern surveillance technologies, which have been deployed by authoritarian governments across the Middle East, The Libyan government of Colonel Moammar Gadhafi, for example, attempted to capture Internet and phone communications with the as- sistance of Western technology companies for later review. As one journalist remarked about the availalbility of such "'massive intercept' technology" to governments around the world, "[t]oday you can run an approximation of IÇ84 out of a couple of rooms filled with server racks, "1°"* Using these technologies, the Libyan government obtained information about dissidents that it was able to use to blackmail them into silence. And while the Gadhafi regime did not hesitate to use vi- olence against its critics, it found blackmail and harassment to be even easier tools to use,i°5 The fact that the Gadhafi regime ultimately col- lapsed does not diminish surveillance's blackmail threat.

Even in democratic societies, the blackmail threat of surveillance is a real one. Surveillance (especially secret surveillance) often detects crimes or embarrassing activity beyond or unrelated to its original purposes. The surveillance of Dr, King, for instance, produced evi- dence of his marital infidelity. In another infamous case, FISA- authorized surveillance of a terrorist suspect produced chilling evi-

101 L o s , supra n o t e 82, at 176.-77. 102 Id at 180. 103 See, e.g., C h a n d e r , supra n o t e 13, a t 1508. lot M a t t h i e u A i k i n s , Jamming Tripoli, W I R E D , J u n e 2012, a t 146, 176. 105 Id.

2OI3] THE DANGERS OF SURVEILLANCE 1 9 5 5

dence of the suspect's murder of his own daughter for dating the wrong boy.i°^ Whether these discoveries are important, incidental, or irrelevant, all of them give greater power to the watcher. Unscrupu- lous government officials could engage in blackmail, whether moti- vated by political or pecuniary considerations. But even faithful gov- ernment agents who discover illegal activity would now possess the weapon of selective prosecution, which could be used to influence the subject, and would be able to wield the threat of mere disclosure of le- gal but embarrassing activity. Putting the seriousness of the crime to one side, it is important to realize that wide-ranging secret surveillance gives coercive power to the watcher.

B. Persuasion

Surveillance also gives the watcher increased power to persuade. Persuasion is a more subtle exercise of the power differential that can be used to blackmail, but it can be even more effective. Consider again Target's use of Big Data to lure pregnant customers into its stores. Even if the customers have told no one that they are expecting. Big Data analj^ics can look for correlations between pregnancy and other changes in consumer behavior, for instance, purchasing more vi- tamins or scent-free lotions. Once an inference of pregnancy is estab- lished. Target's marketers can offer coupons to the pregnant woman in order to capture her business, knowing that she is at a point in her life when her buying habits are temporarily in flux before they will lock in for a period of some years. It is entirely possible that such actions by a retailer like Target could occur without the knowledge of the pregnant consumer. Indeed, the science of targeted online or "behavioral" ad- vertising seeks to do exactly that: to market products to consumers based upon detailed profiles collected about their behavior. The effec- tive sales technique of behavioral "retargeting" allows marketers to go one step further and literally follow targeted consumers around the web, delivering the same targeted advertisement to them with enough frequency that they are likely eventually to succumb and make a pur- chase in a moment of weakness.'°'

Governments also use the power of surveillance to control behavior. For example, one of the justifications for massive closed-circuit televi- sion (CCTV) networks in modern urban areas is that they allow police greater ability to watch and influence what happens on city streets. 1°̂ Certainly, the presence of cameras or police can persuade citizens to obey the law, but it can have other effects as well. The surveillance-

1̂ 6 United States v. Isa, 923 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir. 1991). 10' EI.TPARTSF.R, T H E FTT.TER RURRLE44 (20TT). 108 See L Y O N , supra note 6, at 107-08.

I9S6 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 126:1934

studies literature has documented the use of government CCTV as- semblages to direct public behavior toward commerce and away from other activities ranging from crime to protest."°' In Britain, where the science of surveillance-based control is at its most advanced, CCTV operates in connection with court-ordered injunctions, known as Anti- Social Behavior Orders, to move groups of teens out of the commercial cores of cities using surveillance and the power of the state to ensure that commerce continues efficiently. ""° Government use of persuasive surveillance is still in its relative infancy, but since the technologies of surveillance and Big Data analjdics are available to the state as well as to private companies, we can imagine the government becoming in- creasingly able to engage in Target-style persuasion in the future.

The bottom line about surveillance and persuasion is that surveil- lance gives the watcher information about the watched. That infor- mation gives the watcher increased power over the watched that can be used to persuade, influence, or otherwise control them, even if they do not know they are being watched or persuaded. Sometimes this power is arguably a good thing, for example when police are engaged in riot control. But we should not forget that surveillance represents a persuasive power shift whether the watcher is a government agent or a corporate marketer, and whether the target is a rioter or law-abiding citizen. The legal system has rules dealing with power imbalances be- tween consumers and businesses, such as the doctrine of unconsciona- bility and much of consumer protection law. There are also rules pro- tecting citizens from state coercion, such as the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and the First Amendment's protections of freedom of thought and conscience. In our age of surveillance, where technolo- gical change has given the watcher enhanced powers of persuasion, it may well be time to think about updating those doctrines to restore the balance.

C. Sorting/Discrimination

Many kinds of surveillance are routinely used to sort people into categories. Some of these forms of sorting are insidious. Consider, for example, the use of census records by the American, Canadian, and German governments during the Second World War to identify citizens to relocate to the Japanese internment camps in North America and the concentration camps in Europe.""" Others seem innocuous or even benign. The vast preference engines that power the "free" Internet are

109 See, e.g., ROY C O L E M A N , RECLAIMING T H E S T R E E T S 2 2 6 - 2 8 (2004); LYON, supra n o t e 6, at 107-08; Roy Coleman, Surveillance in the City: Primary Definition and Urban Spatial Or- der, in T H E S U R V E I L L A N C E S T U D I E S R E A D E R , supra note 6, at 231,234-35.

110 See COLEMAN,5M/>ra note 109, at I I I . 111 L Y O N , s«/)»-o note 6, at 30, 32.

2013] THE DANGERS OF SURVEILLANCE 1 9 5 7

used to profile Internet users for marketing purposes. Companies like Google amass vast detailed profiles of our web-surfing habits, our in- terests, and our buying habits."^ Data brokers hke Acxiom and LexisNexis create even more detailed consumer profiles by combining various kinds of data and sell the data to a wide variety of sources, in- cluding direct marketers, background-check companies, and compa- nies consumers may already have a relationship with, such as car deal- er's or Target."^ Commercial data of this kind can be used to offer discounts or selective promotions to more or less desirable customers.

The sorting power of surveillance is a major theme among surveil- lance scholars. In the 1990s, sociologist Oscar Gandy described the "panoptic sort": the use of consumer databases to profile consumers, sort them into categories, and then discriminate among the categories, allocating opportunities on the basis of the classification."" More re- cently, Lyon and other scholars have built on Gandy's work to show the ways in which software is increasingly used to sort citizens and consumers by governments seeking profiles of criminal risk and by companies seeking profiles of commercial opportunity."^

From one perspective, the use of the fruits of data surveillance in this way might look like ordinary marketing. But consider the power that data-driven marketing gives companies in relation to their cus- tomers. The power of sorting can bleed imperceptibly into the power of discrimination. A coupon for a frequent shopper might seem inno- cuous, but consider the power to offer shorter airport security lines (and less onerous procedures) to rich frequent fliers, or to discriminate against customers or citizens on the basis of wealth, geography, gender, race, or ethnicity. The power to treat people differently is a dangerous one, as our many legal rules in the areas of fair credit, civil rights, and constitutional law recognize. Surveillance, especially when fuelled by Big Data, puts pressure on those laws and threatens to upend the basic power balance on which our consumer protection and constitutional laws operate. As Professor Danielle Citron argues, algorithmic deci- sionmaking based on data raises issues of "technological due process.""^ The sorting power of surveillance only raises the stakes of these issues. After all, what sociologists call "sorting" has many other

••2 L E V Y , supra note 18, at 336-37, 341. ••3 See Jon D. Michaels, All the President's Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in

the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901, 917-18 (2008). •••I O S C A R H . G A N D Y , J R . , T H E P A N O P T I C S O R T 15 (1993).

•'5 See generally JOHN GiLLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR (2006); DAVID LYON, SUR- VEILLANCE AFTER S E P T E M B E R I I (2003); T H E N E W P O L I T I C S O F S U R V E I L L A N C E A N D V I S I B I L I T Y (Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson eds., 2006); SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL S O R T I N G ( n a v i d Lyon erl., 2003).

••6 Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1258 (2008).

1958 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 126:1934

names in the law, with "profiling" and "discrimination" being just two of them.

IV. L I M I T I N G S U R V E I L L A N C E

These insights into the ways in which surveillance is harmful point toward identifying remedies that can be built into law, technologies, and social norms to deter the most dangerous forms of surveillance. In this section, I outline four principles that we should use to guide the treatment of surveillance. ]VIy purpose is not to propose neat doctrinal fixes to existing law; as I have shown already, the age of surveillance raises massive challenges that will require us to think creatively about how to capture its benefits without sacrificing important civil liberties. Instead, my purpose is to identify some of the values that the law of surveillance ought to protect and the principles that should guide its evolution.

A. Surveillance Transcends the Public/Private Divide

One of the most significant changes that the age of surveillance has brought about is the increasing difficulty of separating surveillance by governments from that by commercial entities. Public- and private- sector surveillance are intertwined — they use the same technologies and techniques, they operate through a variety of public/private part- nerships, and their digital fruits can easily cross the public/private divide. It is probably in this respect that our existing models for un- derstanding surveillance — such as Big Brother and the Panopticon — are the most out of date. Even if we are primarily worried about state surveillance, perhaps because we fear the state's powers of criminal enforcement, our solutions to the problem of surveillance can no longer be confined to regulation of government actors. Any solutions to the problem of surveillance must thus take into account private surveil- lance as well as public.

In this respect. Professor Orin Kerr is correct when he argues that federal statutory law has advantages over the Fourth Amendment in guarding against surveillance in the digital age.*'' Not only is statuto- ry law easier to change, but it also can be applied to bind both gov- ernment and nongovernment actors. A good model in this context is the federal ECPA and its state-law equivalents. These laws prohibit wiretapping by private actors and require the government to obtain a warrant under a standard higher than probable cause before it can en- gage in wiretapping."8 ECPA has many defects, both in terms of the

117 Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 806-08 (2004).

118 18 U.S.C. §2516(2006).

2013] THE DANGERS OF SURVEILLANCE 1 9 5 9

level of protection it offers and in its often-bewildering complexity, but in transcending the public/private divide, it represents a good model for dealing with surveillance.

Additional legal protections will be needed to cope with develop- ments in surveillance practices. Because the government can sidestep many legal restrictions on the collection of data by buying it from pri- vate databases, we should place additional restrictions on this growing form of state surveillance. Such regulations could operate in both di- rections. In relation to government, we could place restrictions both on the government's abihty to buy private databases and on its ability to share personal information with the private sector. Privacy law al- ready has numerous models for this latter category, ranging from the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994,"' which limits the govern- ment's ability to sell drivers' license records to industry, to the Privacy Act of 1974,1̂ ° which prevents the government from disclosing many kinds of records about individuals that it has in its possession. In rela- tion to private actors, we can place special obligations of confidentiali- ty upon the holders of personal information related to intellectual pri- vacy, treating them as information fiduciaries. Our law has long had a tradition of confidentiality rules, placing nondisclosure obligations on lawyers, doctors, trustees, librarians, and other information custo- dians,'^^ On the Internet, many companies already promise not to share personal information with governments unless compelled. It would be but a small step to make such promises the default, or even the mandatory practice, for certain kinds of particularly sensitive information,'^^

B. Secret Surveillance Is Illegitimate

Democratic societies should prohibit the creation of any domestic- surveillance programs whose existence is secret. In a democratic socie- ty, the people, and not the state apparatus, are sovereign. In American law, this tradition goes back to James Madison, and it lies at the very heart of both First Amendment theory and American constitutionalism itself, 1̂ ^ These principles are refiected at the core of modern informa- tion law. For example, the Supreme Court has made clear that the

119 18 U . S . C . § § 2 7 2 1 - 2 7 2 5 (2006). 120 5 U . S . C . § 5 5 2 a (2006). •21 See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of Con-

fidentiality, 96 G E O . L.J. 123, 134-40 (2007). 122 R i c h a r d s , The Perils of Social Reading, supra n o t e 20, a t 6 9 2 , 123 Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions (178Ç-1800), in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE

SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON T H E ADOPTION OF T H E FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 553-76 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1891).

i960 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 126:1934

federal Freedom of Information Act̂ "̂* protects at its core the "citizens' right to be informed about 'what their government is up to.'"i^^ As Professor Henry Steele Commager put it aptly, "[t]he generation that made the nation thought secrecy in government [to be] one of the in- struments of Old World tyranny and committed itself to the principle that a democracy cannot function unless the people are permitted to know what their government is up to."'^^

The illegitimacy of secret surveillance also lies at the heart of in- formation-privacy law, which remains guided by the "Fair Information Practices" drafted by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1973.̂ ^̂ The Code of Fair Information Practices recom- mended by the Department has continued to influence information- privacy law throughout the world,i^^ and the first of its five principles is the commitment that "there must be no personal-data record- keeping systems whose very existence is secret."'̂ ^

Requiring the existence of domestic-surveillance programs to be disclosed solves a practical problem that has bedeviled courts trying to assess legal challenges to secret surveillance programs. How can plaintiffs prove injury if the government is not required to admit whether surveillance exists in the first place? A prohibition on secret surveillance programs solves this problem. When government pro- grams are public — when we have no secret surveillance — courts will be able to assess their legality in the open. The NSA wiretapping pro- gram was hard to challenge because its details were shrouded in secre- cy, denials, and unassessable invocations of national security inter- ests. 1̂ ° At the same time, its shadowy nature created an even greater threat to intellectual privacy in particular because no one knew if her telephone calls were being listened to or not. Requiring disclosure of the existence and capabilities of domestic-surveillance programs to the general public makes them amenable to judicial and public scrutiny to ensure their compatibility with the rule of law. At the same time, the prohibition on secret surveillance systems does not require the gov- ernment to notify individual targets of surveillance that they are being

124 5 U . S . C . § 552 (2006 & S u p p . V 2011). 125 U . S . D e p ' t of J u s t i c e v. R e p o r t e r s C o m m . for F r e e d o m of t h e P r e s s , 489 U . S . 749, 773 (1989)

( q u o t i n g E P A v. M i n k , 4 1 0 U . S . 73, 105 (1973)). 126 H e n r y Steele C o m m a g e r , The Defeat of America, N . Y . REV. B O O K S , O c t . 5, 1972, a t 7, 7

( r e v i e w i n g R I C H A R D J . B A R N E T , R O O T S O F WAR (1972)). 12' U.S. D E P ' T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE

RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTO- MATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS (1973).

128 L A W R E N C E L E S S I G , C O D E : V E R S I O N 2.0, a t 227 (2006); D A N I E L J. S O L O V E , U N D E R - S T A N D I N G P R I V A C Y 130 (2008).

129 U.S. D E P ' T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, i « ^ a note i27,at4i;jeeo/soid. 29-30,41-42. •30 See In re NSA Telecomm. Record Litig., 671 F.3d 881, 893 (9th Cir. 2011).

2013] THE DANGERS OF SURVEILLANCE 1961

watched. But fundamentally, surveillance requires legal process and the involvement of the judiciary to ensure that surveillance is targeted, justified, and no more extensive than is necessary.

Thus, while covert domestic surveillance can be justified in discrete (and temporary) instances when there is advance judicial process, Ijlanket surveillance of all Internet activity menaces our intellectual privacy and gives the government too much power to blackmail or discriminate against the subjects of surveillance. In a free society, all forms of surveillance must be ultimately accountable to a self- governing public, and for this reason, secret domestic-surveillance pro- grams of any kind are illegitimate.

C. Total Surveillance Is Illegitimate

Democratic societies should also reject the idea that it is reasonable for the government to record all Internet and telephone activity with or without authorization. Government surveillance of the Internet is a power with the potential for massive abuse, as the (thankfully) failed attempts by the Gadhafi regime illustrated."3" Like its precursor, tele- phone wiretapping, Internet surveillance must be subjected to mean- ingful judicial process before it is authorized. And such authorization must allow only discrete and limited forms of surveillance. Otherwise, there would be no constraint on the government's ability to record and archive all electronic communications and read them at its leisure. The magnitude of technological change should not blind us to the im- portant values that our law has protected for decades: the importance of private communications, intellectual privacy, and unfettered intel- lectual exploration. Moreover, a world of total surveillance would be one in which the power dangers of surveillance are even more menac- ing. In such a world, watchers would have increased power to black- mail, selectively prosecute, coerce, persuade, and sort individuals. A world of total surveillance is not just science fiction. It is the world toward which we are slowly creeping, as software is coded, databases are combined, and each CCTV camera is successively added to the network.

Rather than jettisoning longstanding civil liberties in our brave new digital world, we should instead follow the example of federal wiretapping law, which for decades has rested on the premise that pri- vate communications should be exactly that, shielded from the. gov- ernment (and other private actors) except in cases of proven law- enforcement need for limited access to those communications. Such a regime is a far cry from the security-driven argument for total surveil- lance, even in an age of terror.

131 See generally Aikins, supra note 104.

1962 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 126:1934

D. Surveillance Is Harmful

As Parts II and III of this Article demonstrate, many forms of sur- veillance — covert and overt, public and private — menace our intel- lectual privacy and the processes of belief formation on which a free society depends. They also create a power imbalance between the watcher and the watched that creates risks of blackmail, undue per- suasion, and discrimination. Courts and legislatures should therefore scrutinize any surveillance that threatens these values. But because of its relationship to First Amendment values and political freedom, sur- veillance of intellectual records — Internet search histories, email, web traffic, and telephone communications — is particularly harmful. In practice, this means that surveillance by government that seeks access to intellectual records should be subjected to a high threshold before a warrant can issue. A good model for this rule is Title I of the ECPA, which provides for a more stringent procedure under federal wiretap- ping law before a warrant may issue to intercept the contents of a tele- phone or electronic communication. 1̂2 -phe ECPA requires more than just the standard probable cause requirement that is the constitutional floor under Fourth Amendment law. In addition to probable cause, government agents seeking to tap a phone or electronic communication must also show three other elements: (i) that the warrant is sought for a limited time, (2) that the interception of the communication is neces- sary to obtain the information sought, and (3) that the wiretapping will be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of infor- mation not relevant to the warrant.'^^ These "super-warrant" protec- tions for communications should be expanded to cover the full range of intellectual records.

For private-sector surveillance, additional statutory procedures are necessary to ensure that intellectual records are handled with greater care by the entities that hold them. We already have piecemeal protec- tions for intellectual privacy against private-sector surveillance, which could serve as useful models for the extension of intellectual-privacy protection more broadly.̂ ^" For example, the ECPA prohibition against warrantless wiretapping applies to private actors as well.'̂ ^ The Act makes private acts of wiretapping illegal, providing severe criminal and civil liability — up to five years in prisoni36 and fines or

•32 18 U.S.C. § 2518(2006). •33 See ¿d. ; see also Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing Importance of Justi-

fication Standards, 94 MiNN. L. REV. 1514, 1554 (2010). •3'' For an expanded treatment of this argument in the context of reading records, see generally

Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, supra note 20. •35 18 U.S.C. § 2511 ("any person"). •36 Id. § 25ii(4)(a).

2013] THE DANGERS OF SURVEILLANCE 1963

tort liability of $10,000 for each violation of the Act.'^' Other good models for intellectual-privacy protection in the private sector include the confidentiality obligations placed on video-rental companies by the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988,'̂ * on librarians by the vast number of library-records confidentiality laws, and on print and elec- tronic booksellers in Cahfornia under its Reader Privacy Act."'

Because surveillance of intellectual activities menaces self- government, our law must also recognize it as a harm in standing doc- trine. One of the difficulties that courts have faced in dealing with surveillance in the past is an inability to articulate exactly why surveil- lance is harmful. This inability was the problem in Laird and also in the NSA wiretapping cases. Contrary to the trend of the law. Amnesty International USA v. Clapper^'*^ held that amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that authorized the NSA wiretapping program actually could cause a legally cognizable injury to journalists, lawyers, and aid workers whose communications with overseas clients might be subjected to surveillance by the United States government.''*' But even that outlier case, which the Supreme Court reversed on ap- peal, failed to recognize that a reasonable fear of government surveil- lance threatens the privacy of the surveilled, causing them to act dif- ferently. The Second Circuit found standing but rested its conclusions instead upon injury to the professional duties of the doctors and law- yers who feared that the government was listening. The professional duties of the plaintiffs in Clapper are important, and the Second Cir- cuit was correct to recognize injuries to those duties as harms under standing doctrine. But on its own terms, even the Second Circuit seemed to suggest that only professional elites have standing to chal- lenge surveillance. Such a conclusion is underprotective of the rights of all people to be free from unlawful surveillance and to be able to challenge unlawful surveillance in court. As I have argued, intellectual privacy is not just for intellectuals. If the government is engaged in unwarranted surveillance of a person's intellectual activities, that per- son should have standing to challenge the legality,of the surveillance. The surveillance may or may not turn out to be warranted in each particular case, but our society's fundamental commitments to due process, freedom of the mind, and the rule of law suggest that such dangerous surveillance should be subject to legal challenge.

Intellectual-privacy theory thus corrects the errors of Clapper, Laird, and the NSA cases. It would extend protection from surveil-

137 Id. § 252O(2)(B). 138 18 U.S.C. §2710(2006). '39 C A L . CIV. C O D E § 1798.90.05 (West 2012). '"0 638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2011), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).

' ' " Id. at 121-22.

1964 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 126:1934

lance to all people, and not just to professional elites. It explains why surveillance of reading, thinking, and private communication harms the development of ideas and beliefs unfettered by the skewing effects of observation. Accordingly, a reasonable fear of government surveil- lance that affects the subject's intellectual activities (reading, thinking, and communicating) should be recognized as a harm sufficient to prove an injury in fact under standing doctrine. Such a change to our law would not be a radical one; in fact, it is precisely the way courts currently assess challenges to individual free speech rights under the First Amendment's chilling-effects doctrine. Since intellectual privacy protects, at heart. First Amendment values, it is appropriate to extend these existing and workable doctrinal tools to this related area of the law.

This is not to say that individual determinations of the chilling of intellectual activities will always be easy. Determining whether a chill to intellectual privacy is substantial would certainly present difficult cases at the margins. In our law, the devil is frequently in the details. But as the chilling-effects doctrine has demonstrated, courts have man- aged to balance threats to free speech against competing government interests. Moreover, because the general details of government surveil- lance programs should be pubhc, courts and litigants will have more information with which to assess the effects of surveillance. And even when publication of the details of surveillance might threaten ongoing investigations, such details could be released either under seal to the litigants or shared with the court. Courts have a wide variety of tools to manage the flow of confidential information that litigation inevita- bly produces, and they would be well suited to such a task. Such tasks may be difficult and require judgment, but that is the job of courts. The alternative to grappling with the civil-hberties threats that sur- veillance poses is to ignore those threats altogether, to face the prospect of rendering widespread government surveillance unreviewable and uncheckable. Democratic societies can do better than that.

V. C O N C L U S I O N

The challenge to our law posed by the Age of Surveillance is im- mense. The justifications for surveillance by pubhc and private actors are significant, but so too are the costs that the rising tide of unfettered surveillance is creating. Surveillance can sometimes be necessary, even helpful. But unconstrained surveillance, especially of our intellectual activities, threatens a cognitive revolution that cuts at the core of the freedom of the mind that our political institutions presuppose. There- fore, surveillance must be constrained by legal and social rules. The technological, economic, and geopolitical changes of the past twenty years have whittled away at those rules, both formally on their sub- stance (for example, the Patriot Act and the expansion of National Se-

2013] THE DANGERS OF SURVEILLANCE 1965

curity Letter jurisdiction) and in practice (for example, the pressure that the technological social practices of. the Internet have exerted on privacy). By thus recognizing the harms of surveillance and crafting our laws accordingly, we can obtain many of its benefits without sacri- ficing our vital civil liberties or upending the power balance between individuals on the one hand and companies and governments on the other.

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untitled folder/Freedom and Happiness by George Orwell.pdf

Freedom and Happiness

(by George Orwell: Review of We by Yevgeny Zamyatin)

 George Orwell: Nineteen Eighty-Four  Paul Owen: 1984 thoughtcrime? Does it matter that George Orwell pinched

the plot?  Buy We by Yevgeny Zamyatin (Blackwell’s)

This material remains under copyright and is reproduced by kind permission of the Orwell Estate and Penguin Books.

Several years after hearing of its existence, I have at last got my hands on a copy of Zamyatin’s We, which is one of the literary curiosities of this book-burning age. Looking it up in Gleb Struve’s 25 Years of Soviet Russian Literature, I find its history to have been this:

Zamyatin, who died in Paris in 1937, was a Russian novelist and critic who published a number of books both before and after the Revolution. We was written about 1923, and though it is not about Russia and has no direct connection with contemporary politics—it is a fantasy dealing with the twenty- sixth century A.D.—it was refused publication on the ground that it was ideologically undesirable. A copy of the manuscript found its way out of the country, and the book has appeared in English, French and Czech translations, but never in Russian. The English translation was published in the United States, and I have never been able to procure a copy: but copies of the French translation (the title is Nous Autres) do exist, and I have at last succeeded in borrowing one. So far as I can judge it is not a book of the first order, but it is certainly an unusual one, and it is astonishing that no English publisher has been enterprising enough to re- issue it.

The first thing anyone would notice about We is the fact—never pointed out, I believe—that Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World must be partly derived from it. Both books deal with the rebellion of the primitive human spirit against a rationalised, mechanised, painless world, and both stories are supposed to take place about six hundred years hence. The atmosphere of the two books is similar, and it is roughly speaking the same kind of society that is being described, though

Huxley’s book shows less political awareness and is more influenced by recent biological and psychological theories.

In the twenty-sixth century, in Zamyatin’s vision of it, the inhabitants of Utopia have so completely lost their individuality as to be known only by numbers. They live in glass houses (this was written before television was invented), which enables the political police, known as the ‘Guardians,’ to supervise them more easily. They all wear identical uniforms, and a human being is commonly referred to either as ‘a number’ or ‘a unif’ (uniform). They live on synthetic food, and their usual recreation is to march in fours while the anthem of the Single State is played through loudspeakers. At stated intervals they are allowed for one hour (known as ‘the sex hour’) to lower the curtains round their glass apartments. There is, of course, no marriage, though sex life does not appear to be completely promiscuous. For purposes of love-making everyone has a sort of ration book of pink tickets, and the partner with whom he spends one of his allotted sex hours signs the counterfoil. The Single State is ruled over by a personage known as The Benefactor, who is annually re-elected by the entire population, the vote being always unanimous. The guiding principle of the State is that happiness and freedom are incompatible. In the Garden of Eden man was happy, but in his folly he demanded freedom and was driven out into the wilderness. Now the Single State has restored his happiness by removing his freedom.

So far the resemblance with Brave New World is striking. But though Zamyatin’s book is less well put together—it has a rather weak and episodic plot which is too complex to summarise—it has a political point which the other lacks. In Huxley’s book the problem of ‘human nature’ is in a sense solved, because it assumes that by pre-natal treatment, drugs and hypnotic suggestion the human organism can be specialised in any way that is desired. A first-rate scientific worker is as easily produced as an Epsilon semi-moron, and in either case the vestiges of primitive instincts, such as maternal feeling or the desire for liberty, are easily dealt with. At the same time no clear reason is given why society should be stratified in the elaborate way that is described. The aim is not economic exploitation, but the desire to bully and dominate does not seem to be a motive either. There is no power-hunger, no sadism, no hardness of any kind. Those at the top have no strong motive for staying at the top, and though everyone is happy in a vacuous way, life has become so pointless that it is difficult to believe that such a society could endure.

Zamyatin’s book is on the whole more relevant to our own situation. In spite of education and the vigilance of the Guardians, many of the ancient human instincts are still there. The teller of the story, D-503, who, though a gifted engineer, is a poor conventional creature, a sort of Utopian Billy Brown of London Town, is constantly horrified by the atavistic impulses which seize upon him. He falls in love (this is a crime, of course) with a certain I-330 who is a member of an underground resistance movement and succeeds for a while in leading him into rebellion. When the rebellion breaks out it appears that the enemies of The Benefactor are in fact fairly numerous, and these people, apart from plotting the overthrow of the State, even indulge, at the moment when their curtains are down, in such vices as smoking cigarettes and drinking alcohol. D-503 is ultimately saved from the consequences of his own folly. The authorities announce that they have discovered the cause of the recent disorders: it is that some human beings suffer from a disease called imagination. The nerve-centre responsible for imagination has now been located, and the disease can be cured by X-ray treatment. D-503 undergoes the operation, after which it is easy for him to do what he has known all along that he ought to do—that is, betray his confederates to the police. With complete equanimity he watches I-330 tortured by means of compressed air under a glass bell:

She looked at me, her hands clasping the arms of the chair, until her eyes were completely shut. They took her out, brought her to herself by means of an electric shock, and put her under the bell again. This operation was repeated three times, and not a word issued from her lips.

The others who had been brought along with her showed themselves more honest. Many of them confessed after one application. Tomorrow they will all be sent to the Machine of the Benefactor.

The Machine of the Benefactor is the guillotine. There are many executions in Zamyatin’s Utopia. They take place publicly, in the presence of the Benefactor, and are accompanied by triumphal odes recited by the official poets. The guillotine, of course, is not the old crude instrument but a much improved model which literally liquidates its victim, reducing him in an instant to a puff of smoke and a pool of clear water. The execution is, in fact, a human sacrifice, and the scene describing it is given deliberately the colour of the sinister slave civilisations of the ancient world. It is this intuitive grasp of the irrational side of totalitarianism—human sacrifice, cruelty as an end in itself, the worship of a

Leader who is credited with divine attributes—that makes Zamyatin’s book superior to Huxley’s.

It is easy to see why the book was refused publication. The following conversation (I abridge it slightly) between D-503 and I-330 would have been quite enough to set the blue pencils working:

“Do you realise that what you are suggesting is revolution?” “Of course, it’s revolution. Why not?”

“Because there can’t be a revolution. Our revolution was the last and there can never be another. Everybody knows that.”

“My dear, you’re a mathematician: tell me, which is the last number?”

“What do you mean, the last number?”

“Well, then, the biggest number!”

“But that’s absurd. Numbers are infinite. There can’t be a last one.”

“Then why do you talk about the last revolution?”

There are other similar passages. It may well be, however, that Zamyatin did not intend the Soviet regime to be the special target of his satire. Writing at about the time of Lenin’s death, he cannot have had the Stalin dictatorship in mind, and conditions in Russia in 1923 were not such that anyone would revolt against them on the ground that life was becoming too safe and comfortable. What Zamyatin seems to be aiming at is not any particular country but the implied aims of industrial civilisation. I have not read any of his other books, but I learn from Gleb Struve that he had spent several years in England and had written some blistering satires on English life. It is evident from We that he had a strong leaning towards primitivism. Imprisoned by the Czarist Government in 1906, and then imprisoned by the Bolsheviks in 1922 in the same corridor of the same prison, he had cause to dislike the political regime he had lived under, but his book is not simply the expression of a grievance. It is in effect a study of the Machine, the genie that man has thoughtlessly let out of its bottle and cannot put back again. This is a book to look out for when an English version appears.

George Orwell Published in Tribune, 4th January 1946.

Gleb Struve on We and Zamyatin

In Tribune, 25 January 1946, Gleb Struve amplified Orwell’s remarks on We and Zamyatin.

May I add a few observations and facts to George Orwell’s article about Zamyatin’s We (Tribune, January 4) which, though, I agree, not a great book, is certainly both an important and an interesting work deserving to be known in this country?

There is no doubt that Zamyatin had in mind, in his Utopian satire, the Soviet Union which, even in 1922, was a single-party dictatorship, and it was because it was understood to be aimed at the Soviet State that the book was refused publication. Although never published in the original (and I do not know whether the Russian manuscript of it has been preserved) the book was at one time freely commented upon by Soviet critics. It is, of course, possible that some features of Zamyatin’s State of the future were suggested by Mussolini’s incipient Fascist order. Conditions of life in Zamyatin’s ‘Single State’ may differ in important particulars from those actually prevailing in the U.S.S.R. at the time the book was written, but the aspects on which Zamyatin dwelt were those which seemed to him to be the inevitable logical outcome of modern totalitarianism. Had the book been written after Hitler’s advent to power it might have been allowed to see the light of day and even hailed as a powerful invective of the Nazi State. It is important just because it is even more prophetic than topical.

On the other hand Orwell is right in saying that the book was also meant as a protest against the dominant spirit of our machine age. Zamyatin saw modern civilisation heading for an impasse and at times even looked forward to the emergence of a new Attila as the only salvation for humanity. It is curious that Zamyatin himself was by profession a shipbuilding engineer, and it was as an expert in the construction of ice-breakers that he came to this country towards the end of the 1914-18 war on a mission from the Russian Government. His mathematical training is strongly reflected in all his work. The satire on England which Orwell refers to is a longish short story called The Islanders, a bitingly

satirical picture of English smugness and philistinism. So far as I know it was translated into English but was turned down by publishers because of its ‘anti- English’ bias.

Zamyatin’s other works include a satirical play, The Fires of St. Dominic, generally believed to have been aimed at the Soviet Cheka. The action, however, is set in Spain in the times of the Inquisition, and, unlike We, the play was allowed to appear in print. As a result of writing We, and of his general unorthodox attitude, Zamyatin fell under a cloud, was proclaimed an ‘inside émigré’ and eventually forced (or allowed) to emigrate (in 1930, I think). His last book, written in Paris, had Attila for its subject. At one time Zamyatin, as a master of his craft, had a great influence on younger Soviet writers and held the post of Chairman of the Association of Soviet Writers

http://theorwellprize.co.uk/george-orwell/by-orwell/essays-and-other-

works/freedom-and-happiness-review-of-we-by-yevgeny-zamyatin/

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Nineteen Eighty-Four

‘Sometimes,’ she said, ‘they threaten you with something – something you can’t stand up to, can’t even think about. And then you say, “Don’t do it to me, do it to somebody else, do it to So-and-so.” And perhaps you might pretend, afterwards, that it was only a trick and that you just said it to make them stop and didn’t really mean it. But that isn’t true. At the time when it happens you do mean it. You think there’s no other way of saving yourself, and you’re quite ready to save yourself that way. You want it to happen to the other person. You don’t give a damn what they suffer. All you care about is yourself.’

 Read the first chapter of Nineteen Eighty-Four (courtesy of Penguin Books)  Buy Nineteen Eighty-Four (Penguin Books)

Published in 1949, and written while Orwell was seriously ill with tuberculosis, 1984 is perhaps Orwell’s most famous work. The story of Winston Smith, who rewrites Times editorials at the Ministry of Truth to suit the Party’s version of events, 1984 introduced ‘Big Brother’, ‘thought police’, ‘Room 101′, ‘doublethink’ and ‘newspeak’ to the English language. A satire on totalitarianism, 1984 is a testament to the potential power of modern political systems, and the dark side of human nature: as O’Brien tells Winston, ‘the object of power is power’.

More by Orwell related to Nineteen Eighty-Four

 Arthur Koestler (written 1944)  Freedom and Happiness – Review of We by Yevgeny Zamyatin (Tribune,

1946)  In Front of Your Nose (Tribune, 1946)  Just Junk – But Who Could Resist It? (Evening Standard, 1946)  Pleasure Spots (Tribune, 1946)  Politics and the English Language (Horizon, 1946)  Second Thoughts on James Burnham (Polemic, 1946)  The Prevention of Literature (Polemic, 1946)  You and the Atom Bomb (Tribune, 1945)

More about Nineteen Eighty-Four

 BBC: 1984 (1954 TV version on YouTube) – more about the adaptation on Wikipedia

 Colin Brush: ‘It was a bright cold day in April…’  Richard Cavendish: Publication of 1984 (History Today)  Bernard Crick: Orwell as a comic writer  Robert Harris: Interview with Sebastian Faulks on Winston Smith (BBC on

YouTube)  Robert Harris: Introduction to 1984 – Frail, cowardly Winston saved us (The

Times)  John Hurt: On 1984 (National Media Museum)  Steve King: Orwell’s warning (Barnes and Noble Review)  Aleks Krotoski: 1984 in pictures, one word at a time (Flickr)

 Sébastian Lefait: « The Big Screen is watching you » (video) (French)  Scott Lucas: Nineteen Eighty-Four - timeline (eNotes)  Robert McCrum: 1984 – The masterpiece that killed George Orwell (The

Observer)  Paul Owen: 1984 thoughtcrime? Does it matter that George Orwell pinched

the plot? (The Guardian)  Ben Pimlott: Introduction to 1984  V. S Pritchett: The most honest writer alive – review of 1984 (New

Statesman)  Mike Radford: 1984 (1984 film) Q&A  D. J. Taylor: Orwell and the rats  D. J. Taylor: The Road to 1984 (video)

__MACOSX/untitled folder/._Freedom and Happiness by George Orwell.pdf

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Why I Write (1946)

From a very early age, perhaps the age of five or six, I knew that when I grew up I should be a writer. Between the ages of about seventeen and twenty-four I tried to abandon this idea, but I did so with the consciousness that I was outraging my true nature and that sooner or later I should have to settle down and write books. I was the middle child of three, but there was a gap of five years on either side, and I barely saw my father before I was eight. For this and other reasons I was somewhat lonely, and I soon developed disagreeable mannerisms which made me unpopular throughout my schooldays. I had the lonely child’s habit of making up stories and holding conversations with imaginary persons, and I think from the very start my literary ambitions were mixed up with the feeling of being isolated and undervalued. I knew that I had a facility with words and a power of facing unpleasant facts, and I felt that this created a sort of private world in which I could get my own back for my failure in everyday life. Nevertheless the volume of serious — i.e. seriously intended — writing which I produced all through my childhood and boyhood would not amount to half a dozen pages. I wrote my first poem at the age of four or five, my mother taking it down to dictation. I cannot remember anything about it except that it was about a tiger and the tiger had ‘chair-like teeth’— a good enough phrase, but I fancy the poem was a plagiarism of Blake’s ‘Tiger, Tiger’. At eleven, when the war or 1914-18 broke out, I wrote a patriotic poem which was printed in the local newspaper, as was another, two years later, on the death of Kitchener. From time to time, when I was a bit older, I wrote bad and usually unfinished ‘nature poems’ in the Georgian style. I also attempted a short story which was a ghastly failure. That was the total of the would-be serious work that I actually set down on paper during all those years. However, throughout this time I did in a sense engage in literary activities. To begin with there was the made-to-order stuff which I produced quickly, easily and without much pleasure to myself. Apart from school work, I wrote VERS D’OCCASION, semicomic poems which I could turn out at what now seems to me astonishing speed — at fourteen I wrote a whole rhyming play, in imitation of Aristophanes, in about a week — and helped to edit a school magazines, both printed and in manuscript. These magazines were the most pitiful burlesque stuff that you could imagine, and I took far less trouble with them than I now would with the cheapest journalism. But side by side with all this, for fifteen years or more, I was carrying out a literary exercise of a quite different kind: this was the making up of a continuous ‘story’ about myself, a sort of diary existing only in the mind. I believe this is a common habit of children and adolescents. As a very small child I used to imagine that I was, say, Robin Hood, and picture myself as the hero of thrilling adventures, but quite soon my ‘story’ ceased to be narcissistic in a crude way and became more and more a mere description of what I was doing and the things I saw. For minutes at a time this kind of thing would be running through my head: ‘He pushed the door open and entered the room. A yellow beam of sunlight, filtering through the muslin curtains, slanted on to the table, where a match-box, half-open, lay beside the inkpot. With his right hand in his pocket he moved across to the window. Down in the street a tortoiseshell cat was chasing a dead leaf’, etc. etc. This habit continued until I was about twenty-five, right through my nonliterary years. Although I had to search, and did search, for the right words, I seemed to be making this descriptive effort almost against my will, under a kind of compulsion from outside. The ‘story’ must, I suppose, have reflected the styles of the various writers I admired at different ages, but so far as I remember it always had the same meticulous descriptive quality. When I was about sixteen I suddenly discovered the joy of mere words, i.e. the sounds and associations of words. The lines from PARADISE LOST, So hee with difficulty and labour hard Moved on: with difficulty and labour hee. which do not now seem to me so very wonderful, sent shivers down my backbone; and the spelling ‘hee’ for ‘he’ was an added pleasure. As for the need to describe things, I knew all about it already. So it is clear what kind of books I wanted to write, in so far as I could be said to want to write books at that time. I wanted to write enormous naturalistic novels with unhappy endings, full of detailed descriptions and arresting similes, and also full of purple passages in which words were used partly for the sake of their own sound. And in fact my first completed novel, BURMESE DAYS, which I wrote when I was thirty but projected much earlier, is rather that kind of book. I give all this background information because I do not think one can assess a writer’s motives without knowing something of his early development. His subject matter will be determined by the age he lives in — at least this is true in tumultuous, revolutionary ages like our own — but before he ever begins to write he will have acquired an emotional attitude from which he will never completely escape. It is his job, no doubt, to discipline his temperament and avoid getting stuck at some immature stage, in some perverse mood; but if he escapes from his early influences altogether, he will have killed his impulse to write. Putting aside the need to earn a living, I think there are four great motives for writing, at any rate for writing prose. They exist in different degrees in every writer, and in any one writer the proportions will vary from time to time, according to the atmosphere in which he is living. They are: (i) Sheer egoism. Desire to seem clever, to be talked about, to be remembered after death, to get your own back on the grown-ups who snubbed you in childhood, etc., etc. It is humbug to pretend this is not a motive, and a strong one. Writers share this characteristic with scientists, artists, politicians, lawyers, soldiers, successful businessmen — in short, with the whole top crust of humanity. The great mass of human beings are not acutely selfish. After the age of about thirty they almost abandon the sense of being individuals at all — and live chiefly for others, or are simply smothered under drudgery. But there is also the minority of gifted, willful people who are determined to live their own lives to the end, and writers belong in this class. Serious writers, I should say, are on the whole more vain and self-centered than journalists, though less interested in money. (ii) Aesthetic enthusiasm. Perception of beauty in the external world, or, on the other hand, in words and their right arrangement. Pleasure in the impact of one sound on another, in the firmness of good prose or the rhythm of a good story. Desire to share an experience which one feels is valuable and ought not to be missed. The aesthetic motive is very feeble in a lot of writers, but even a pamphleteer or writer of textbooks will have pet words and phrases which appeal to him for non-utilitarian reasons; or he may feel strongly about typography, width of margins, etc. Above the level of a railway guide, no book is quite free from aesthetic considerations. (iii) Historical impulse. Desire to see things as they are, to find out true facts and store them up for the use of posterity. (iv) Political purpose.— Using the word ‘political’ in the widest possible sense. Desire to push the world in a certain direction, to alter other peoples’ idea of the kind of society that they should strive after. Once again, no book is genuinely free from political bias. The opinion that art should have nothing to do with politics is itself a political attitude. It can be seen how these various impulses must war against one another, and how they must fluctuate from person to person and from time to time. By nature — taking your ‘nature’ to be the state you have attained when you are first adult — I am a person in whom the first three motives would outweigh the fourth. In a peaceful age I might have written ornate or merely descriptive books, and might have remained almost unaware of my political loyalties. As it is I have been forced into becoming a sort of pamphleteer. First I spent five years in an unsuitable profession (the Indian Imperial Police, in Burma), and then I underwent poverty and the sense of failure. This increased my natural hatred of authority and made me for the first time fully aware of the existence of the working classes, and the job in Burma had given me some understanding of the nature of imperialism: but these experiences were not enough to give me an accurate political orientation. Then came Hitler, the Spanish Civil War, etc. By the end of 1935 I had still failed to reach a firm decision. I remember a little poem that I wrote at that date, expressing my dilemma: A happy vicar I might have been Two hundred years ago To preach upon eternal doom And watch my walnuts grow; But born, alas, in an evil time, I missed that pleasant haven, For the hair has grown on my upper lip And the clergy are all clean-shaven. And later still the times were good, We were so easy to please, We rocked our troubled thoughts to sleep On the bosoms of the trees. All ignorant we dared to own The joys we now dissemble; The greenfinch on the apple bough Could make my enemies tremble. But girl’s bellies and apricots, Roach in a shaded stream, Horses, ducks in flight at dawn, All these are a dream. It is forbidden to dream again; We maim our joys or hide them: Horses are made of chromium steel And little fat men shall ride them. I am the worm who never turned, The eunuch without a harem; Between the priest and the commissar I walk like Eugene Aram; And the commissar is telling my fortune While the radio plays, But the priest has promised an Austin Seven, For Duggie always pays. I dreamt I dwelt in marble halls, And woke to find it true; I wasn’t born for an age like this; Was Smith? Was Jones? Were you? The Spanish war and other events in 1936-37 turned the scale and thereafter I knew where I stood. Every line of serious work that I have written since 1936 has been written, directly or indirectly, AGAINST totalitarianism and FOR democratic socialism, as I understand it. It seems to me nonsense, in a period like our own, to think that one can avoid writing of such subjects. Everyone writes of them in one guise or another. It is simply a question of which side one takes and what approach one follows. And the more one is conscious of one’s political bias, the more chance one has of acting politically without sacrificing one’s aesthetic and intellectual integrity. What I have most wanted to do throughout the past ten years is to make political writing into an art. My starting point is always a feeling of partisanship, a sense of injustice. When I sit down to write a book, I do not say to myself, ‘I am going to produce a work of art’. I write it because there is some lie that I want to expose, some fact to which I want to draw attention, and my initial concern is to get a hearing. But I could not do the work of writing a book, or even a long magazine article, if it were not also an aesthetic experience. Anyone who cares to examine my work will see that even when it is downright propaganda it contains much that a full-time politician would consider irrelevant. I am not able, and do not want, completely to abandon the world view that I acquired in childhood. So long as I remain alive and well I shall continue to feel strongly about prose style, to love the surface of the earth, and to take a pleasure in solid objects and scraps of useless information. It is no use trying to suppress that side of myself. The job is to reconcile my ingrained likes and dislikes with the essentially public, non-individual activities that this age forces on all of us. It is not easy. It raises problems of construction and of language, and it raises in a new way the problem of truthfulness. Let me give just one example of the cruder kind of difficulty that arises. My book about the Spanish civil war, HOMAGE TO CATALONIA, is of course a frankly political book, but in the main it is written with a certain detachment and regard for form. I did try very hard in it to tell the whole truth without violating my literary instincts. But among other things it contains a long chapter, full of newspaper quotations and the like, defending the Trotskyists who were accused of plotting with Franco. Clearly such a chapter, which after a year or two would lose its interest for any ordinary reader, must ruin the book. A critic whom I respect read me a lecture about it. ‘Why did you put in all that stuff?’ he said. ‘You’ve turned what might have been a good book into journalism.’ What he said was true, but I could not have done otherwise. I happened to know, what very few people in England had been allowed to know, that innocent men were being falsely accused. If I had not been angry about that I should never have written the book. In one form or another this problem comes up again. The problem of language is subtler and would take too long to discuss. I will only say that of late years I have tried to write less picturesquely and more exactly. In any case I find that by the time you have perfected any style of writing, you have always outgrown it. ANIMAL FARM was the first book in which I tried, with full consciousness of what I was doing, to fuse political purpose and artistic purpose into one whole. I have not written a novel for seven years, but I hope to write another fairly soon. It is bound to be a failure, every book is a failure, but I do know with some clarity what kind of book I want to write. Looking back through the last page or two, I see that I have made it appear as though my motives in writing were wholly public-spirited. I don’t want to leave that as the final impression. All writers are vain, selfish, and lazy, and at the very bottom of their motives there lies a mystery. Writing a book is a horrible, exhausting struggle, like a long bout of some painful illness. One would never undertake such a thing if one were not driven on by some demon whom one can neither resist nor understand. For all one knows that demon is simply the same instinct that makes a baby squall for attention. And yet it is also true that one can write nothing readable unless one constantly struggles to efface one’s own personality. Good prose is like a windowpane. I cannot say with certainty which of my motives are the strongest, but I know which of them deserve to be followed. And looking back through my work, I see that it is invariably where I lacked a POLITICAL purpose that I wrote lifeless books and was betrayed into purple passages, sentences without meaning, decorative adjectives and humbug generally.

Politics and the English Language by George Orwell Horizon, April 1946.

Recorded as completed in Orwell‘s Payments Book on 11 December 1945. Most people who bother with the matter at all would admit that the English language is in a bad way, but it is generally assumed that we cannot by conscious action do anything about it. Our civilization is decadent, and our language — so the argument runs — must inevitably share in the general collapse. It follows that any struggle against the abuse of language is a sentimental archaism, like preferring candles to electric light or hansom cabs to aeroplanes. Underneath this lies the half-conscious belief that language is a natural growth and not an instrument which we shape for our own purposes. Now, it is clear that the decline of a language must ultimately have political and economic causes: it is not due simply to the bad influence of this or that individual writer. But an effect can become a cause, reinforcing the original cause and producing the same effect in an intensified form, and so on indefinitely. A man may take to drink because he feels himself to be a failure, and then fail all the more completely because he drinks. It is rather the same thing that is happening to the English language. It becomes ugly and inaccurate because our thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our language makes it easier for us to have foolish thoughts. The point is that the process is reversible. Modern English, especially written English, is full of bad habits which spread by imitation and which can be avoided if one is willing to take the necessary trouble. If one gets rid of these habits one can think more clearly, and to think clearly is a necessary first step towards political regeneration: so that the fight against bad English is not frivolous and is not the exclusive concern of professional writers. I will come back to this presently, and I hope that by that time the meaning of what I have said here will have become clearer. Meanwhile, here are five specimens of the English language as it is now habitually written. These five passages have not been picked out because they are especially bad — I could have quoted far worse if I had chosen — but because they illustrate various of the mental vices from which we now suffer. They are a little below the average, but are fairly representative samples. I number them so that I can refer back to them when necessary: (1) I am not, indeed, sure whether it is not true to say that the Milton who once seemed not unlike a seventeenth-century Shelley had not become, out of an experience ever more bitter in each year, more alien (sic) to the founder of that Jesuit sect which nothing could induce him to tolerate. Professor Harold Laski (Essay in Freedom of Expression) (2) Above all, we cannot play ducks and drakes with a native battery of idioms which prescribes such egregious collocations of vocables as the Basic PUT UP WITH for TOLERATE or PUT AT A LOSS for BEWILDER. Professor Lancelot Hogben (Interglossa) (3) On the one side we have the free personality; by definition it is not neurotic, for it has neither conflict nor dream. Its desires, such as they are, are transparent, for they are just what institutional approval keeps in the forefront of consciousness; another institutional pattern would alter their number and intensity; there is little in them that is natural, irreducible, or culturally dangerous. But ON THE OTHER SIDE, the social bond itself is nothing but the mutual reflection of these self-secure integrities. Recall the definition of love. Is not this the very picture of a small academic? Where is there a place in this hall of mirrors for either personality or fraternity? Essay on psychology in Politics (New York) (4) All the "best people" from the gentlemen's clubs, and all the frantic fascist captains, united in common hatred of Socialism and bestial horror of the rising tide of the mass revolutionary movement, have turned to acts of provocation, to foul incendiarism, to medieval legends of poisoned wells, to legalize their own destruction of proletarian organizations, and rouse the agitated petty-bourgeoisie to chauvinistic fervor on behalf of the fight against the revolutionary way out of the crisis. Communist pamphlet (5) If a new spirit is to be infused into this old country, there is one thorny and contentious reform which must be tackled, and that is the humanization and galvanization of the B.B.C. Timidity here will bespeak canker and atrophy of the soul. The heart of Britain may lee sound and of strong beat, for instance, but the British lion's roar at present is like that of Bottom in Shakespeare's MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM— as gentle as any sucking dove. A virile new Britain cannot continue indefinitely to be traduced in the eyes, or rather ears, of the world by the effete languors of Langham Place, brazenly masquerading as "standard English." When the Voice of Britain is heard at nine o'clock, better far and infinitely less ludicrous to hear aitches honestly dropped than the present priggish, inflated, inhibited, school-ma'amish arch braying of blameless bashful mewing maidens. Letter in Tribune Each of these passages has faults of its own, but quite apart from avoidable ugliness, two qualities are common to all of them. The first is staleness of imagery; the other is lack of precision. The writer either has a meaning and cannot express it, or he inadvertently says something else, or he is almost indifferent as to whether his words mean anything or not. This mixture of vagueness and sheer incompetence is the most marked characteristic of modern English prose, and especially of any kind of political writing. As soon as certain topics are raised, the concrete melts into the abstract and no one seems able to think of turns of speech that are not hackneyed: prose consists less and less of WORDS chosen for the sake of their meaning, and more and more of PHRASES tacked together like the sections of a prefabricated hen-house. I list below, with notes and examples, various of the tricks by means of which the work of proseconstruction is habitually dodged: DYING METAPHORS. A newly-invented metaphor assists thought by evoking a visual image, while on the other hand a metaphor which is technically "dead" (e.g., IRON RESOLUTION) has in effect reverted to being an ordinary word and can generally be used without loss of vividness. But in between these two classes there is a huge dump of worn-out metaphors which have lost all evocative power and are merely used because they save people the trouble of inventing phrases for themselves. Examples are: RING THE CHANGES ON, TAKE UP THE CUDGELS FOR, TOE THE LINE, RIDE ROUGHSHOD OVER, STAND SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH, PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF, AN AXE TO GRIND, GRIST TO THE MILL, FISHING IN TROUBLED WATERS, ON THE ORDER OF THE DAY, ACHILLES' HEEL, SWAN SONG, HOTBED. Many of these are used without knowledge of their meaning (what is a "rift," for instance?), and incompatible metaphors are frequently mixed, a sure sign that the writer is not interested in what he is saying. Some metaphors now current have been twisted out of their original meaning without those who use them even being aware of the fact. For example, TOE THE LINE is sometimes written TOW THE LINE. Another example is THE HAMMER AND THE ANVIL, now always used with the implication that the anvil gets the worst of it. In real life it is always the anvil that breaks the hammer, never the other way about: a writer who stopped to think what he was saying would be aware of this, and would avoid perverting the original phrase. OPERATORS, or VERBAL FALSE LIMBS. These save the trouble of picking out appropriate verbs and nouns, and at the same time pad each sentence with extra syllables which give it an appearance of symmetry. Characteristic phrases are: RENDER INOPERATIVE, MILITATE AGAINST, PROVE UNACCEPTABLE, MAKE CONTACT WITH, BE SUBJECTED TO, GIVE RISE TO, GIVE GROUNDS FOR, HAVING THE EFFECT OF, PLAY A LEADING PART (role) IN, MAKE ITSELF FELT, TAKE EFFECT, EXHIBIT A TENDENCY TO, SERVE THE PURPOSE OF, etc., etc. The keynote is the elimination of simple verbs. Instead of being a single word, such as BREAK, STOP, SPOIL, MEND, KILL, a verb becomes a PHRASE, made up of a noun or adjective tacked on to some general-purposes verb as PROVE, SERVE, FORM, PLAY, RENDER. In addition, the passive voice is wherever possible used in preference to the active, and noun constructions are used instead of gerunds (BY EXAMINATION OF instead of BY EXAMINING). The range of verbs is further cut down by means of the '-IZE' AND 'DE-' formations, and banal statements are given an appearance of profundity by means of the NOT 'UN-' formation. Simple conjunctions and prepositions are replaced by such phrases as WITH RESPECT TO, HAVING REGARD TO, THE FACT THAT, BY DINT OF, IN VIEW OF, IN THE INTERESTS OF, ON THE HYPOTHESIS THAT; and the ends of sentences are saved from anti-climax by such resounding commonplaces as GREATLY TO BE DESIRED, CANNOT BE LEFT OUT OF ACCOUNT, A DEVELOPMENT TO BE EXPECTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, DESERVING OF SERIOUS CONSIDERATION, BROUGHT TO A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION, and so on and so forth. PRETENTIOUS DICTION. Words like PHENOMENON, ELEMENT, INDIVIDUAL (as noun), OBJECTIVE, CATEGORICAL, EFFECTIVE, VIRTUAL, BASIS, PRIMARY, PROMOTE, CONSTITUTE, EXHIBIT, EXPLOIT, UTILIZE, ELIMINATE, LIQUIDATE, are used to dress up simple statements and give an air of scientific impartiality to biased judgments. Adjectives like EPOCH-MAKING, EPIC, HISTORIC, UNFORGETTABLE, TRIUMPHANT, AGE-OLD, INEVITABLE, INEXORABLE, VERITABLE, are used to dignify the sordid processes of international politics, while writing that aims at glorifying war usually takes on an archaic color, its characteristic words being: REALM, THRONE, CHARIOT, MAILED FIST, TRIDENT, SWORD, SHIELD, BUCKLER, BANNER, JACKBOOT, CLARION. Foreign words and expressions such as CUL DE SAC, ANCIEN RÉGIME, DEUS EX MACHINA, MUTATIS MUTANDIS, STATUS QUO, GLEICHSCHALTUNG, WELTANSCHAUUNG, are used to give an air of culture and elegance. Except for the useful abbreviations i.e., e.g., and etc., there is no real need for any of the hundreds of foreign phrases now current in English. Bad writers, and especially scientific, political and sociological writers, are nearly always haunted by the notion that Latin or Greek words are grander than Saxon ones, and unnecessary words like EXPEDITE, AMELIORATE, PREDICT, EXTRANEOUS, DERACINATED, CLANDESTINE, SUB-AQUEOUS and hundreds of others constantly gain ground from their Anglo-Saxon opposite numbers. * The jargon peculiar to Marxist writing (HYENA, HANGMAN, CANNIBAL, PETTY BOURGEOIS, THESE GENTRY, LACKEY, FLUNKEY, MAD DOG, WHITE GUARD, etc.) consists largely of words and phrases translated from Russian, German or French; but the normal way of coining a new word is to use a Latin or Greek root with the appropriate affix and, where necessary, the '-ize' formation. It is often easier to make up words of this kind (DE-REGIONALIZE, IMPERMISSIBLE, EXTRAMARITAL, NON-FRAGMENTARY and so forth) than to think up the English words that will cover one's meaning. The result, in general, is an increase in slovenliness and vagueness. * An interesting illustration of this is the way in which the English flower names which were in use till very recently are being ousted by Greek ones, SNAPDRAGON becoming ANTIRRHINUM, FORGET-ME-NOT becoming myosotis, etc. It is hard to see any practical reason for this change of fashion: it is probably due to an instinctive turning-away from the more homely word and a vague feeling that the Greek word is scientific. (Orwell's footnote.) MEANINGLESS WORDS. In certain kinds of writing, particularly in art criticism and literary criticism, it is normal to come across long passages which are almost completely lacking in meaning. * Words like ROMANTIC, PLASTIC, VALUES, HUMAN, DEAD, SENTIMENTAL, NATURAL, VITALITY, as used in art criticism, are strictly meaningless, in the sense that they not only do not point to any discoverable object, but are hardly even expected to do so by the reader. When one critic writes, "The outstanding feature of Mr. X's work is its living quality," while another writes, "The immediately striking thing about Mr. X's work is its peculiar deadness," the reader accepts this as a simple difference of opinion If words like BLACK and WHITE were involved, instead of the jargon words DEAD and LIVING, he would see at once that language was being used in an improper way. Many political words are similarly abused. The word FASCISM has now no meaning except in so far as it signifies "something not desirable." The words DEMOCRACY, SOCIALISM, FREEDOM, PATRIOTIC, REALISTIC, JUSTICE, have each of them several different meanings which cannot be reconciled with one another. In the case of a word like DEMOCRACY, not only is there no agreed definition, but the attempt to make one is resisted from all sides. It is almost universally felt that when we call a country democratic we are praising it: consequently the defenders of every kind of régime claim that it is a democracy, and fear that they might have to stop using the word if it were tied down to any one meaning. Words of this kind are often used in a consciously dishonest way. That is, the person who uses them has his own private definition, but allows his hearer to think he means something quite different. Statements like MARSHAL PÉTAIN WAS A TRUE PATRIOT, THE SOVIET PRESS IS THE FREEST IN THE WORLD, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IS OPPOSED TO PERSECUTION, are almost always made with intent to deceive. Other words used in variable meanings, in most cases more or less dishonestly, are: CLASS, TOTALITARIAN, SCIENCE, PROGRESSIVE, REACTIONARY BOURGEOIS, EQUALITY. * Example: "Comfort's catholicity of perception and image, strangely Whitmanesque in range, almost the exact opposite in aesthetic compulsion, continues to evoke that trembling atmospheric accumulative hinting at a cruel, an inexorably serene timelessness . . . Wrey Gardiner scores by aiming at simple bullseyes with precision. Only they are not so simple, and through this contented sadness runs more than the surface bittersweet of resignation." (Poetry Quarterly.) (Orwell's footnote.) Now that I have made this catalogue of swindles and perversions, let me give another example of the kind of writing that they lead to. This time it must of its nature be an imaginary one. I am going to translate a passage of good English into modern English of the worst sort. Here is a well-known verse from ECCLESIASTES: I returned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favor to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all. Here it is in modern English: Objective consideration of contemporary phenomena compels the conclusion that success or failure in competitive activities exhibits no tendency to be commensurate with innate capacity, but that a considerable element of the unpredictable must invariably be taken into account. This is a parody, but not a very gross one. Exhibit (3), above, for instance, contains several patches of the same kind of English. It will be seen that I have not made a full translation. The beginning and ending of the sentence follow the original meaning fairly closely, but in the middle the concrete illustrations — race, battle, bread — dissolve into the vague phrase "success or failure in competitive activities." This had to be so, because no modern writer of the kind I am discussing — no one capable of using phrases like "objective consideration of contemporary phenomena"— would ever tabulate his thoughts in that precise and detailed way. The whole tendency of modern prose is away from concreteness. Now analyze these two sentences a little more closely. The first contains 49 words but only 60 syllables, and all its words are those of everyday life. The second contains 38 words of 90 syllables: 18 of its words are from Latin roots, and one from Greek. The first sentence contains six vivid images, and only one phrase ("time and chance") that could be called vague. The second contains not a single fresh, arresting phrase, and in spite of its 90 syllables it gives only a shortened version of the meaning contained in the first. Yet without a doubt it is the second kind of sentence that is gaining ground in modern English. I do not want to exaggerate. This kind of writing is not yet universal, and outcrops of simplicity will occur here and there in the worst-written page. Still, if you or I were told to write a few lines on the uncertainty of human fortunes, we should probably come much nearer to my imaginary sentence than to the one from ECCLESIASTES. As I have tried to show, modern writing at its worst does not consist in picking out words for the sake of their meaning and inventing images in order to make the meaning clearer. It consists in gumming together long strips of words which have already been set in order by someone else, and making the results presentable by sheer humbug. The attraction of this way of writing, is that it is easy. It is easier — even quicker, once you have the habit — to say IN MY OPINION IT IS A NOT UNJUSTIFIABLE ASSUMPTION THAT than to say I THINK. If you use ready-made phrases, you not only don't have to hunt about for words; you also don't have to bother with the rhythms of your sentences, since these phrases are generally so arranged as to be more or less euphonious. When you are composing in a hurry — when you are dictating to a stenographer, for instance, or making a public speech — it is natural to fall into a pretentious, Latinized style. Tags like A CONSIDERATION WHICH WE SHOULD DO WELL TO BEAR IN MIND OR A CONCLUSION TO WHICH ALL OF US WOULD READILY ASSENT will save many a sentence from coming down with a bump. By using stale metaphors, similes and idioms, you save much mental effort at the cost of leaving your meaning vague, not only for your reader but for yourself. This is the significance of mixed metaphors. The sole aim of a metaphor is to call up a visual image. When these images clash — as in THE FASCIST OCTOPUS HAS SUNG ITS SWAN SONG, THE JACKBOOT IS THROWN INTO THE MELTING POT— it can be taken as certain that the writer is not seeing a mental image of the objects he is naming; in other words he is not really thinking. Look again at the examples I gave at the beginning of this essay. Professor Laski (1) uses five negatives in 53 words. One of these is superfluous, making nonsense of the whole passage, and in addition there is the slip ALIEN for akin, making further nonsense, and several avoidable pieces of clumsiness which increase the general vagueness. Professor Hogben (2) plays ducks and drakes with a battery which is able to write prescriptions, and, while disapproving of the everyday phrase PUT UP WITH, is unwilling to look EGREGIOUS up in the dictionary and see what it means. (3), if one takes an uncharitable attitude towards it, is simply meaningless: probably one could work out its intended meaning by reading the whole of the article in which it occurs. In (4), the writer knows more or less what he wants to say, but an accumulation of stale phrases chokes him like tea leaves blocking a sink. In (5), words and meaning have almost parted company. People who write in this manner usually have a general emotional meaning — they dislike one thing and want to express solidarity with another — but they are not interested in the detail of what they are saying. A scrupulous writer, in every sentence that he writes, will ask himself at least four questions, thus: What am I trying to say? What words will express it? What image or idiom will make it clearer? Is this image fresh enough to have an effect? And he will probably ask himself two more: Could I put it more shortly? Have I said anything that is avoidably ugly? But you are not obliged to go to all this trouble. You can shirk it by simply throwing your mind open and letting the ready-made phrases come crowding in. They will construct your sentences for you — even think your thoughts for you, to a certain extent-and at need they will perform the important service of partially concealing your meaning even from yourself. It is at this point that the special connection between politics and the debasement of language becomes clear. In our time it is broadly true that political writing is bad writing. Where it is not true, it will generally be found that the writer is some kind of rebel, expressing his private opinions and not a "party line." Orthodoxy, of whatever color, seems to demand a lifeless, imitative style. The political dialects to be found in pamphlets, leading articles, manifestos, White Papers and the speeches of undersecretaries do, of course, vary from party to party, but they are all alike in that one almost never finds in them a fresh, vivid, home-made turn of speech. When one watches some tired hack on the platform mechanically repeating the familiar phrases — BESTIAL ATROCITIES, IRON HEEL, BLOODSTAINED TYRANNY, FREE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD, STAND SHOULDER TO SHOULDER— one often has a curious feeling that one is not watching a live human being but some kind of dummy: a feeling which suddenly becomes stronger at moments when the light catches the speaker's spectacles and turns them into blank discs which seem to have no eyes behind them. And this is not altogether fanciful. A speaker who uses that kind of phraseology has gone some distance towards turning himself into a machine. The appropriate noises are coming out of his larynx, but his brain is not involved as it would be if he were choosing his words for himself. If the speech he is making is one that he is accustomed to make over and over again, he may be almost unconscious of what he is saying, as one is when one utters the responses in church. And this reduced state of consciousness, if not indispensable, is at any rate favorable to political conformity. In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defense of the indefensible. Things like the continuance of British rule in India, the Russian purges and deportations, the dropping of the atom bombs on Japan, can indeed be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face, and which do not square with the professed aims of political parties. Thus political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenseless villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called PACIFICATION. Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry: this is called TRANSFER OF POPULATION or RECTIFICATION OF FRONTIERS. People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber camps: this is called ELIMINATION OF UNRELIABLE ELEMENTS. Such phraseology is needed if one wants to name things without calling up mental pictures of them. Consider for instance some comfortable English professor defending Russian totalitarianism. He cannot say outright, "I believe in killing off your opponents when you can get good results by doing so." Probably, therefore, he will say something like this: While freely conceding that the Soviet régime exhibits certain features which the humanitarian may be inclined to deplore, we must, I think, agree that a certain curtailment of the right to political opposition is an unavoidable concomitant of transitional periods, and that the rigors which the Russian people have been called upon to undergo have been amply justified in the sphere of concrete achievement. The inflated style is itself a kind of euphemism. A mass of Latin words falls upon the facts like soft snow, blurring the outlines and covering up all the details. The great enemy of clear language is insincerity. When there is a gap between one's real and one's declared aims, one turns, as it were instinctively, to long words and exhausted idioms, like a cuttlefish squirting out ink. In our age there is no such thing as "keeping out of politics." All issues are political issues, and politics itself is a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred and schizophrenia. When the general atmosphere is bad, language must suffer. I should expect to find — this is a guess which I have not sufficient knowledge to verify — that the German, Russian and Italian languages have all deteriorated in the last ten or fifteen years as a result of dictatorship. But if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought. A bad usage can spread by tradition and imitation, even among people who should and do know better. The debased language that I have been discussing is in some ways very convenient. Phrases like A NOT UNJUSTIFIABLE ASSUMPTION, LEAVES MUCH TO BE DESIRED, WOULD SERVE NO GOOD PURPOSE, A CONSIDERATION WHICH WE SHOULD DO WELL TO BEAR IN MIND, are a continuous temptation, a packet of aspirins always at one's elbow. Look back through this essay, and for certain you will find that I have again and again committed the very faults I am protesting against. By this morning's post I have received a pamphlet dealing with conditions in Germany. The author tells me that he "felt impelled" to write it. I open it at random, and here is almost the first sentence that I see: "[The Allies] have an opportunity not only of achieving a radical transformation of Germany's social and political structure in such a way as to avoid a nationalistic reaction in Germany itself, but at the same time of laying the foundations of a cooperative and unified Europe." You see, he "feels impelled" to write — feels, presumably, that he has something new to say — and yet his words, like cavalry horses answering the bugle, group themselves automatically into the familiar dreary pattern. This invasion of one's mind by ready-made phrases (LAY THE FOUNDATIONS, ACHIEVE A RADICAL TRANSFORMATION) can only be prevented if one is constantly on guard against them, and every such phrase anesthetizes a portion of one's brain. I said earlier that the decadence of our language is probably curable. Those who deny this would argue, if they produced an argument at all, that language merely reflects existing social conditions, and that we cannot influence its development by any direct tinkering with words and constructions. So far as the general tone or spirit of a language goes, this may be true, but it is not true in detail. Silly words and expressions have often disappeared, not through any evolutionary process but owing to the conscious action of a minority. Two recent examples were EXPLORE EVERY AVENUE and LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED, which were killed by the jeers of a few journalists. There is a long list of fly-blown metaphors which could similarly be got rid of if enough people would interest themselves in the job; and it should also be possible to laugh the NOT 'UN-' formation out of existence, * to reduce the amount of Latin and Greek in the average sentence, to drive out foreign phrases and strayed scientific words, and, in general, to make pretentiousness unfashionable. But all these are minor points. The defense of the English language implies more than this, and perhaps it is best to start by saying what it does NOT imply. * One can cure oneself of the NOT 'UN-' formation by memorizing this sentence: A NOT UNBLACK DOG WAS CHASING A NOT UNSMALL RABBIT ACROSS A NOT UNGREEN FIELD. (Orwell's footnote.) To begin with, it has nothing to do with archaism, with the salvaging of obsolete words and turns of speech, or with the setting-up of a "standard-English" which must never be departed from. On the contrary, it is especially concerned with the scrapping of every word or idiom which has outworn its usefulness. It has nothing to do with correct grammar and syntax, which are of no importance so long as one makes one's meaning clear, or with the avoidance of Americanisms, or with having what is called a "good prose style." On the other hand it is not concerned with fake simplicity and the attempt to make written English colloquial. Nor does it even imply in every case preferring the Saxon word to the Latin one, though it does imply using the fewest and shortest words that will cover one's meaning. What is above all needed is to let the meaning choose the word, and not the other way about. In prose, the worst thing one can do with words is to surrender them. When you think of a concrete object, you think wordlessly, and then, if you want to describe the thing you have been visualizing, you probably hunt about till you find the exact words that seem to fit it. When you think of something abstract you are more inclined to use words from the start, and unless you make a conscious effort to prevent it, the existing dialect will come rushing in and do the job for you, at the expense of blurring or even changing your meaning. Probably it is better to put off using words as long as possible and get one's meaning as clear as one can through pictures or sensations. Afterwards one can choose — not simply ACCEPT— the phrases that will best cover the meaning, and then switch round and decide what impressions one's words are likely to make on another person. This last effort of the mind cuts out all stale or mixed images, all prefabricated phrases, needless repetitions, and humbug and vagueness generally. But one can often be in doubt about the effect of a word or a phrase, and one needs rules that one can rely on when instinct fails. I think the following rules will cover most cases: (i) Never use a metaphor, simile or other figure of speech which you are used to seeing in print. (ii) Never use a long word where a short one will do. (iii) If it is possible to cut a word out, always cut it out. (iv) Never use the passive where you can use the active. (v) Never use a foreign phrase, a scientific word or a jargon word if you can think of an everyday English equivalent. (vi) Break any of these rules sooner than say anything outright barbarous. These rules sound elementary, and so they are, but they demand a deep change of attitude in anyone who has grown used to writing in the style now fashionable. One could keep all of them and still write bad English, but one could not write the kind of stuff that I quoted in these five specimens at the beginning of this article. I have not here been considering the literary use of language, but merely language as an instrument for expressing and not for concealing or preventing thought. Stuart Chase and others have come near to claiming that all abstract words are meaningless, and have used this as a pretext for advocating a kind of political quietism. Since you don't know what Fascism is, how can you struggle against Fascism? One need not swallow such absurdities as this, but one ought to recognize that the present political chaos is connected with the decay of language, and that one can probably bring about some improvement by starting at the verbal end. If you simplify your English, you are freed from the worst follies of orthodoxy. You cannot speak any of the necessary dialects, and when you make a stupid remark its stupidity will be obvious, even to yourself. Political language — and with variations this is true of all political parties, from Conservatives to Anarchists — is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind. One cannot change this all in a moment, but one can at least change one's own habits, and from time to time one can even, if one jeers loudly enough, send some worn-out and useless phrase — some jackboot, Achilles’ heel, hotbed, melting pot, acid test, veritable inferno or other lump of verbal refuse — into the dustbin where it belongs. Orwell‘s Notes: Propaganda tricks. 1. ―I do not claim that everything (in the USSR etc.) is perfect, but —‖ Technique. The intention to eulogise is disclaimed in advance, but in no specific instance is it ever admitted that anything is wrong. Thus the writer in effect does what he has declared he will not do—(i.e., claims that everything is perfect). 2. The balancing technique. When it is intended to eulogise A & denigrate B, anything detrimental which has to be admitted about A is balanced by a dragged-in reference to some scandal about B, while on the other hand unfavourable references to B are not so balanced. Especially common in pacifist literature, in which unavoidable references to Belsen, Buchenwald etc, are always carefully balanced by a mention of the Isle of Man, etc., whereas hostile references to Britain/USA are left unbalanced. 3. ―I should be the last to deny that there are faults on both sides‖ Technique. Where the aim is to whitewash A. & discredit B., admissions are made about both, but the admission made about A. is a damaging one, while the one made about B. is trivial & may even redound to B.‘s credit. Example: the writer will start by saying that the conduct of all of the Big Three leaves much to be desired, & proceed to accuse Britain of imperialist greed, the USA of being dominated by Big Business, & the USSR of ―suspicion.‖He will then probably add that Russian suspicions are justified. But in any case, after a preliminary declaration of impartiality, one of the three is accused of a pecadillo, the other two of serious misdeeds. 4. ―Playing into the hands of.‖ Technique. If A is opposed to B, & B. is held in general opprobrium, then all who oppose A. are declared to be on the side of B. This is applied only to the actions of one‘s opponents, never to one‘s own actions. 5. Verbal colorations. (Innumerable—write down instances as they occur.) 6. The unwilling witness. (Cf. the Daily Worker‘s statement that the New Statesman is an ―antiSoviet organ.‖ In practice the N.S. ‗s reference0 to the USSR are almost always favourable, hence the N.S. can be quoted as an unwilling & therefore trustworthy witness.) 7. Tu quoque, or two blacks make a white. 8. Swear words. (Fascist, antisemitic, reactionary, imperialist, etc.) 9. Transition from the moral to the practical phase, & back again.

Newspeak and George Orwell's 1984 Newspeak is a fictional language in George Orwell's famous novel Nineteen Eighty-Four. Orwell included an essay about it in the form of an Appendix after the end of the novel, in which the basic principles of the language are explained. Newspeak is closely based on English but has a greatly reduced and simplified vocabulary and grammar. This suited the totalitarian regime of the Party, whose aim was to make subversive thought ("thoughtcrime") and speech impossible. The Newspeak term for the existing English language was Oldspeak. Oldspeak was supposed to have been completely eclipsed by Newspeak by 2050. The genesis of Orwell's Newspeak can be seen in his earlier essay, Politics and the English Language, where he laments the quality of the English of his day, citing examples of dying metaphors, pretentious diction or rhetoric, and meaningless words – all of which contribute to fuzzy ideas and a lack of logical thinking. Towards the end of this essay, having argued his case, Orwell muses: I said earlier that the decadence of our language is probably curable. Those who deny this would argue, if they produced an argument at all, that language merely reflects existing social conditions, and that we cannot influence its development by any direct tinkering with words or constructions. Thus Newspeak is possibly an attempt by Orwell to describe a deliberate intent to exploit this decadence with the aim of oppressing its speakers. Basic Principles of Newspeak The basic idea behind Newspeak was to remove all shades of meaning from language, leaving simple dichotomies (pleasure and pain, happiness and sadness, good thoughts and thoughtcrimes) which reinforce the total dominance of the State. A staccato rhythm of short syllables was also a goal, further reducing the need for deep thinking about language. In addition, words with opposite meanings were removed as redundant, so "bad" became "ungood." Words with similar meanings were also removed, so "best" became "doubleplusgood." In this manner, as many words as possible were removed from the language. The ultimate aim of Newspeak was to reduce even the dichotomies to a single word that was a "yes" of some sort: an obedient word with which everyone answered affirmatively to what was asked of them. Orwell reveals a certain ethnocentrism in his ideas, in that the characteristics of Newspeak that he derides as controlling changes in English are common in perfectly functional agglutinative languages. His distaste for the replacement of "bad" with "ungood" seems to be largely due to the fact that the practice is foreign to his native language of English. It serves speakers of agglutinative languages quite well for everyday communication, poetry, etc. It is clear that Orwell was an English speaker addressing other English speakers. The underlying theory of Newspeak is that if something can't be said, then it can't be thought. One question raised by this is whether we are defined by our language, or whether we actively define it. For instance, can we communicate the need for freedom, or organize an uprising, if we don't have the words for either? This is related to the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, and Ludwig Wittgenstein's proposition, "The limits of my language mean the limits to my world." Examples of Newspeak, from the novel, include: "crimethink"; "doubleplusungood"; and "Ingsoc." They mean, respectively: "thought-crime"; "extremely bad"; and "English Socialism," the political philosophy of the Party. The word "Newspeak" itself also comes from the language. Generically, newspeak has come to mean any attempt to restrict disapproved language by a government or other powerful entity. Real-life examples of Newspeak A comparison to Newspeak may arguably be seen in political rhetoric, where two opposing sides string together phrases so empty of meaning that they may be compared to the taunts young children toss back and forth. The arguments of either side ultimately reduce to "I'm good; he's bad." Charges of Newspeak are sometimes advanced when a group tries to replace a word/phrase that is politically unsuitable (e.g. "civilian casualties") or offensive (e.g. "murder") with a politically correct or inoffensive one (e.g. "collateral damage"). Some maintain that to make certain words or phrases 'unspeakable' (thoughtcrime), restricts what ideas may be held (Newspeak) and is therefore tantamount to censorship. Others believe that expunging terms that have fallen out of favour or become insulting will make people less likely to hold outdated or offensive views. The intent to alter the minds of the public through changes made to language illustrates Newspeak perfectly. Either way, there is a resemblance between political correctness and Newspeak, although some may feel that they differ in their intentions: in Nineteen EightyFour, Newspeak is instituted to enhance the power of the state over the individual; politically correct language, on the other hand, is said by supporters to free individuals from stereotypical preconceptions caused by the use of prejudicial terminology. It is this attempt to change thought through changing (or eliminating) words that earns political correctness the connection to Newspeak. The main distinction is that politically correct language is often inspired only by politeness, while Newspeak has a more explicit limiting political motivation. However, there exist striking instances where Orwell's speculation have matched with reality. Orwell suggested that all philosophies prior to Ingsoc (English Socialism) would be covered under the term 'oldthink,' bearing with it none of the nuances of these ideologies, but simply a connotation of badness. Since the Cold War, a similar effect has been wrought on the word 'communism,' where it no longer bears with it, to most people, the doctrines of Marx, Engels, or Lenin, but rather a general bad connotation. (Much the same could be said about 'fascism,' perhaps with even more accuracy.) Two examples unrelated to political correctness are Basic English, a language which prides itself on reducing the number of English words, and E-Prime another simplifed version of English. Political groups often avail themselves of the principles behind Newspeak to frame their views in a positive way. Thus the term "estate tax" was replaced by the "death tax." A similar effect may be observed in the abortion debates where those advocating restrictions on abortion label themselves "pro-life," leaving their opponents presumably "anti-life." Conversely, those advocating greater availability of abortion call themselves "pro-choice," and the opposition "antichoice," to engender similarly positive emotions. Abbreviations and Acronyms Another common use of Newspeak today is the overuse of abbreviations. To quote from the 1984 Appendix "It was perceived that in thus abbreviating a name one narrowed and subtly altered its meaning, by cutting out most of the associations that would otherwise cling to it." Attention is also drawn to the use of such abbreviations by totalitarian regimes prior to World War II. Even more powerful are acronyms like "Ofcom," "AIDS," "OPEC" and "NAFTA," which can be pronounced as if they were proper words. This is most vividly seen in an acronym like "laser," which today is nearly always written in lowercase. Acronyms contain less information than the full term and tend not to trigger spontaneous associations; this also makes them ambiguous and therefore vulnerable to misuse. Newspeak words * Crimestop * Doublethink * Doubleplusgood * Doubleplusungood * Duckspeak * Blackwhite * Ingsoc * Oldspeak * Thoughtcrime (The actual Newspeak word is Crimethink). * Miniluv, Minipax: "Ministry of Love" (secret police) and "Ministry of Peace" (Ministry of War). Compare to abbreviations in real life such as "Nazi" and "Gestapo." * Bellyfeel * Oldthink * Goodthink * Goodsex (chastity) In Oceania the only purpose of sex is the creation of new party members. * Sexcrime (sex that does not lead to the creation of new party members) * Free (only in statements like "This dog is free from lice.") The concepts of "political freedom" and "intellectual freedom" do not exist in Newspeak. * Equal (a statement such as "All men are equal." would only mean "All men are of equal size.") "Political Equality" doesn't even exist as a concept in Newspeak. * Unperson A person who had been vaporized, and all records of him/her had been wiped out. All other party members must forget that the unperson ever existed, and mentioning his/her name is thoughtcrime. (The concept that the person may have existed at one time, and has disappeared, cannot be expressed in Newspeak.) Compare to the Stalinist use of erasing people from photographs after their death. * Facecrime (an indication that a person is guilty of thoughtcrime based on their facial expression) * Vaporize (the same as liquidate) When people disappear, they are vaporized. The word doublespeak was coined in the early 1950s and it is often incorrectly attributed to George Orwell and his novel. However the word never actually appears in that novel. INSTRUCTOR’S NOTE: All modern politicians are masters of both doublethink (i.e., maintaining two mutually exclusive, equivocal, antithetic (diametrically opposed) thoughts at the same time, and being able to selectively forget that one ever held either thought in the first place) and doublespeak. NOTES:

October 30, 2001 hoover digest » 2001 no. 4 » archives URL: http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/6275 Why Orwell Matters by Timothy Garton Ash Why should we still read George Orwell on politics? Until 1989, the answer was plain.

He was the writer who captured the essence of totalitarianism. All over communist-ruled Europe, people would show me their dog-eared, samizdat copies of Animal Farm or Nineteen Eighty-Four and ask, "How did he know?" The world of Nineteen Eighty-Four may have ended in 1989, the year the Berlin Wall came down, but George Orwell’s writing remains as relevant today as ever. Hoover Fellow Timothy Garton Ash explains why. Yet the world of Nineteen Eighty-Four ended in 1989. Orwellian regimes persisted in a few remote countries, such as North Korea, and communism survived in an attenuated form in China. But the three dragons against which Orwell fought his good fight—European and especially British imperialism; fascism, whether Italian, German, or Spanish; and communism, not to be confused with the democratic socialism in which Orwell himself believed—were all either dead or mortally weakened. Forty years after his own painful and early death, Orwell had won. What need, then, of Orwell? One answer is that we should read him because of his historical impact. For Orwell was the most influential political writer of the twentieth century. This is a bold claim, but who else would compete? Among novelists, perhaps Alexander Solzhenitsyn or Albert Camus; among playwrights, Bertolt Brecht. Or would it be a philosopher, such as Karl Popper, Friedrich von Hayek, or Hannah Arendt? Or the novelist, playwright, and philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, whom Orwell privately called "a bag of wind"? Take them one by one, and you will find that each made an impact more limited in duration or geographic scope than did this short-lived, old-fashioned English man of letters. "All over communist-ruled Europe, people would show me their dog-eared, samizdat copies of Animal Farm or Nineteen Eighty-Four and ask, ‘How did he know?’" Worldwide familiarity with the word Orwellian is proof of that influence. Orwellian is used as a pejorative adjective, to evoke totalitarian terror, the falsification of history by state-organized lying, and, more loosely, any unpleasant example of repression or manipulation. It is used as a noun to describe an admirer and conscious follower of his work. Occasionally, it is deployed as a complimentary adjective, to mean something like "displaying outspoken intellectual honesty, like Orwell." Very few other writers have garnered this double tribute of becoming both adjective and noun. Everywhere that people lived under totalitarian dictatorships, they felt he was one of them. The Russian poet Natalya Gorbanyevskaya once told me that Orwell was an East European. In fact, he was a very English writer who never went anywhere near Eastern Europe. His knowledge of the communist world was largely derived from reading. Three personal experiences had transformed his understanding. First, as a British imperial policeman for five years in Burma he was himself the servant of an oppressive, though not a totalitarian, regime. By the time he resigned, he had acquired a lifelong hatred of imperialism and also a deep insight into the psychology of the oppressor. Then he went to live among the down-and-outs in England and in Paris. So he knew at firsthand the humiliating unfreedom that comes from poverty. Finally, there was the Spanish Civil War. Spain, for Orwell, meant fighting fascism and getting a bullet through his throat. But still more important was the revelation of Russian-led communist terror and duplicity, as he and his comrades in the heterodox Marxist POUM militia were hunted through the streets of Barcelona by the Communists who were supposed to be their allies. Of the Russian agent in Barcelona charged with defaming the POUM as Trotskyist Francoist traitors, he writes, in Homage to Catalonia, "It was the first time that I had seen a person whose profession was telling lies—unless one counts journalists." The barb’s black humor also reflects his disgust at the way the whole left-wing press in Britain was falsifying events that he had seen with his own eyes. (For more on Orwell’s experience in Spain, see "The Man Who Saved Orwell" on page 180.) "After his experiences in the Spanish Civil War, Orwell knew where he stood. From that point on, every line of Orwell’s writing had a political purpose." As he says in his 1946 essay "Why I Write," after Spain he knew where he stood. He had earlier adopted the pen name George Orwell in preference to his own, Eric Blair, but it was after Spain that he really became Orwell. Every line of his writing now had a political purpose. Imperialism and fascism would remain major targets of his generous anger. But the first enemy would be the blindness or intellectual dishonesty of those in the West who supported or condoned Stalinist communism—even more so after the Soviet Union became the West’s ally in the war against Hitler. And so he sat down to write a Swiftian satire on Stalinist Russia, with the Communists as the pigs in a farm run by the animals. "Willingness to criticize Russia and Stalin," he wrote in August 1944, "is the test of intellectual honesty." The rejection of Animal Farm by several British publishers, because they did not want to criticize Britain’s heroic wartime ally, showed what he was up against. When it was finally published in Britain in 1945 (and the United States in 1946), the book was a political event, which helped to open the eyes of the Englishspeaking West to the true nature of the Soviet regime. (One might call this the Orwell effect.) Nineteen Eighty-Four, with its more generalized dystopia, became another defining Cold War text. Not accidentally, the first use of the phrase Cold War recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary comes from an article by Orwell. "Imperialism and fascism were the major targets of Orwell’s generous anger. But his first enemy would be the blindness or intellectual dishonesty of those in the West who supported or condoned Stalinist communism." In short, he was more memorably and influentially right, and sooner than anyone, about the single greatest political menace of the second half of the twentieth century, as well as seeing off the two largest horrors of the first half. But those monsters are dead or on their last legs. To say "read him because he mattered a lot in the past" will hardly attract new readers to Orwell. Fortunately, there is a more compelling reason we should read Orwell in the twenty-first century: he remains an exemplar of political writing. Both meanings of exemplar are required. He is a model of how to do it well, but he is also an example—a deliberate, self-conscious, and self-critical instance—of how difficult it is. In "Why I Write," he says that his purpose, after Spain, was to "make political writing into an art." Animal Farm is the work in which he most completely succeeded. In his "little fairy story," artistic form and political content are perfectly matched—partly because they are so grotesquely mismatched. What could be further apart than Stalinist Moscow and an English country farmyard? He cared passionately for the English countryside and lived there in the late 1930s, keeping a village shop, a goat, and a notebook. Animal Farm overflows with lovingly observed physical detail of country life. But then, from the mouth of the pig Major, there erupts a perfect parody of a communist speech: the fruit of many hours Orwell had spent poring over the political pamphlets he collected. Only he would have this peculiar combination of expertise. Only Orwell would know both how to milk a goat and how to skewer a revisionist. "In short, Orwell was more memorably and influentially right (and sooner than anyone) about the single greatest political menace of the second half of the twentieth century." The twists and turns of his animal regime closely follow the decay of the Russian revolution into tyranny. There is no ambiguity here: the pig Napoleon is Stalin, the pig Snowball is Trotsky. And there is his humor, an underrated part of Orwell’s sandpapery charm. (Soon after he was shot through the neck in Spain, his commanding officer perceptively reported: "Breathing absolutely regular. Sense of humor untouched.") Unforgettable is that perfect one-liner, at once comic and deeply serious: "All Animals Are Equal, but Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others." Animal Farm is a timeless satire on the central tragi-comedy of all politics—that is, the tragi-comedy of corruption by power. This ability to move from the particular to the universal also characterizes his essays: the other genre in which he wrote best about politics. What he abhors, perhaps even more than violence or tyranny, is dishonesty. Marching up and down the frontier between literature and politics, like a sentry for morality, he can spot a double standard at 500 yards in bad light. Does a Tory MP demand freedom for Poland while remaining silent about India? Sentry Orwell fires off a quick round. Orwell the moralist is fascinated by the pursuit not merely of truth but of the most complicated and difficult truths. It starts already with the early essay "Shooting an Elephant," where he confidently asserts that the British empire is dying but immediately adds that it is "a great deal better than the younger empires that are going to supplant it." At times, he seems to take an almost masochistic delight in confronting uncomfortable truths. Not that his own political judgment was always good. His vivacious and perceptive wife, Eileen, wrote that he retained "an extraordinary political simplicity." There are striking misjudgments in his work. It’s startling to find him, early on, repeating the communist line that "fascism and capitalism are at bottom the same thing." He opposed fighting Hitler until well into 1939, only to reverse his position. In his wartime tract The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius, he proposes the nationalization of "land, mines, railways, banks and major industries." Orwell was a very English writer, and we think of understatement as a very English quality. But his specialty is outrageous overstatement: "No real revolutionary has ever been an internationalist," "All leftwing parties in the highly industrialized countries are at bottom a sham," "A humanitarian is always a hypocrite." "Unforgettable is that perfect one-liner, at once comic and deeply serious: ‘All Animals Are Equal, but Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others.’" As V. S. Pritchett observed, in reviewing The Lion and the Unicorn, he "is capable of exaggerating with the simplicity and innocence of a savage." But that is what satirists do. Evelyn Waugh, from the other end of the political spectrum, did the same. So this weakness of his nonfiction is one of the great strengths of his fiction. Both his life and his work are case studies in the demands of political engagement. In Writers and Leviathan he describes the political writer’s dilemma: "seeing the need of engaging in politics while also seeing what a dirty, degrading business it is." After briefly being a member of the Independent Labour Party, he concludes that "a writer can only remain honest if he keeps free of party labels." (That key word honest again.) But he plans and becomes vicechairman of a nonparty organization called the Freedom Defense Committee, defending freedom against imperialism and fascism, of course, but now, above all, against communism. A word is due about the already notorious list of crypto-Communists and fellow travelers, which he is popularly thought to have handed over to the British secret service. ("Socialist Icon Who Became an Informer," trumpeted the Daily Telegraph when "breaking" the story in 1998.) The facts are these. Orwell kept a pale blue notebook in which he noted names and details of suspected communist agents or sympathizers. The content of this notebook is disquieting, with its sharp judgments—"almost certainly agent of some kind," "decayed liberal," "appeaser only"—and especially its national/racial annotations: "Jewish?" (Charlie Chaplin) or "English Jew" (Tom Driberg) as well as "Polish," "Jugo-Slav," "AngloAmerican," and so on. There is something unsettling—a touch of the old imperial policeman—about a writer who could have lunch with a friend like the poet Stephen Spender and then go home to note "Sentimental sympathizer and very unreliable. Easily influenced. Tendency to homosexuality." "Orwell taught us that the corruption of language is an essential part of oppressive or exploitative politics." However, two very important things need to be said in explanation. First, there was a Cold War on. There were Soviet agents and sympathizers about, and they were influential. The most telling example is the man Orwell had down as "almost certainly agent of some kind." His name was Peter Smollett. During World War II he was the head of the Russian section in the Ministry of Information, and it was on his advice that T. S. Eliot, no less, rejected Animal Farm for Jonathan Cape. We now know that Smollett was indeed a Soviet spy. Second, Orwell did not give this notebook to the British secret service. He gave a list of 35 names drawn from it to the Information Research Department, a semisecret branch of the Foreign Office that specialized in getting writers on the democratic left to counter the then highly organized Soviet communist propaganda offensive. Absurdly, the British government has not declassified this list or any letter that accompanied it. So we still don’t know exactly what Orwell did. But from the available evidence it is quite clear that Orwell was not putting some British thought police onto these people’s tails. All he was doing, in effect, was to say: "Don’t use these people for anticommunist propaganda because they are probably communists or communist sympathizers!" A dying man, but still in complete command of his faculties, Orwell judged this to be a morally defensible act for a writer in a period of intense political struggle, just as he had earlier judged that it was proper for a politically engaged writer to take up arms against Franco. I think he was right. You may think he was wrong. Either way, he exemplifies for us—he is that exemplar—of the dilemmas of the political writer. "The extreme, totalitarian version of political doublespeak that Orwell satirized as Newspeak is less often encountered these days, except in countries such as Burma and North Korea. But the obsession of democratically elected governments, especially in Britain and America, with media management and ‘spin’ is today one of the main obstacles to understanding what is being done in our name." Finally, of course, Orwell’s list and Orwell’s life are much less important than the work. It matters, to be sure, that there is no flagrant contradiction between the work and the life—as there often is with political intellectuals. The Orwellian voice, placing honesty and single standards above everything, would be diminished. But what endures is the work. If I had to name a single quality that makes Orwell still essential reading in the twenty-first century, it would be his insight into the use and abuse of language. If you have time to read only one essay, read "Politics and the English Language," which brilliantly sums up the central Orwellian argument that the corruption of language is an essential part of oppressive or exploitative politics. "The defense of the indefensible" is sustained by a battery of euphemisms, verbal false limbs, prefabricated phrases, and all the other paraphernalia of deceit that he pinpoints and parodies. The extreme, totalitarian version that he satirized as Newspeak is less often encountered these days, except in countries such as Burma and North Korea. But the obsession of democratically elected governments, especially in Britain and America, with media management and "spin" is today one of the main obstacles to understanding what is being done in our name. There are also distortions that come from within the press, radio, and television themselves, partly because of hidden ideological bias but increasingly because of fierce commercial competition and the relentless need to "entertain." Read Orwell, and you will know that something nasty must be hidden behind the euphemistic, Latinate phrase used by NATO spokespeople during the Kosovo war: "collateral damage." (It means innocent civilians killed.) Read Orwell, and you will smell a rat whenever you find a British newspaper or politician once again churning out a prefabricated phrase such as "Brussels’ inexorable march to a European superstate." He does not just equip us to detect this semantic abuse. He also suggests how writers can fight back. For the abusers of power are, after all, using our weapons: words. In "Politics and the English Language" he even gives some simple stylistic rules for honest and effective political writing. He compares good English prose to a clean windowpane. Through these windows, citizens can see what their rulers are really up to. So political writers should be the window cleaners of freedom. Orwell both tells and shows us how to do it. That is why we need him still, because Orwell’s work is never done. Timothy Garton Ash, an internationally acclaimed contemporary historian whose work has focused on Europe since 1945, is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. Garton Ash is in residence at Hoover on a part-year basis; at the same time he continues to hold his appointments as professor of European studies and Isaiah Berlin Professorial Fellow at St. Antony's College, Oxford University. Among the topics his work has covered are the emancipation and eventual liberation of Central Europe from communism, the eastern policy of Germany and its reunification, how countries deal with a difficult past, the role of intellectuals in politics, and the European Union in its relationships with partners such as the United States and rising non-Western powers such as China. His most recent book is Facts are Subversive: Political Writing From a Decade Without a Name (2009). This essay appears in longer form as the introduction to Orwell & Politics, edited by Peter Davison, published by Penguin Books (UK). This excerpt originally appeared in the (London) Guardian, May 5, 2001. Available from the Hoover Press is The Collapse of Communism, edited by Lee Edwards. Also available is The Fall of the Berlin Wall: Reassessing the Causes and Consequences of the End of the Cold War, edited by Peter Schweizer.

Jeffrey Meyers GEORGE ORWELL AND THE ART OE WRITING While our country is bitterly divided by radically opposing views on domestic and foreign policy and we are engaged in an increasingly costly and risky far-off war, we had to vote in a presidential election in which neither candidate inspired hope or confidence. In London during the Second World War, when the propaganda war at home raged in concert with the war against Hitler, Orwell felt as many of us feel now. In his "War Diary" of April 27, 1942, he recorded: "We are all drowning in filth. When I talk to anyone or read the writings of anyone who has any axe to grind, I feel that intellectual honesty and balanced judgement have simply disappeared from the face of the earth. . . . Is there no one who has both firm opinions and a balanced outlook? Actually there are plenty, but they are powerless. All power is in the hands of paranoiacs." Repeatedly struck by the viciousness and dishonesty of political controversy, Orwell used his journalism to attack politicians' lies and blatant fear-mongering tactics, the supine press and passive public. Orwell perfected his rhetorical arsenal and lucid but flexible prose style during the political battles of the 1930s and 1940s, when the threat to western civilization came from totalitarian and fascist regimes in Europe. Today we wage a "war on terror," for which the "Patriot Act" 92 Jeffrey Meyers has been passed (both classic Orwellian locutions) against a shadowy and multinational army of radical Islamists. In Orwell's time people suffered large-scale bombing and destruction, and after 1945 learned to live with the Cold War and the threat of nuclear war. In our time we feel nostalgic for the good old days, when the major powers, at least, had enriched plutonium under lock and key. Terrorist attacks signify an additional loss of security that affects every aspect of our Uves, and we are now led ever deeper into confrontation and danger. Though he died in 1950, Orwell's ideas about the language and style of politics, expressed in vwtty how-to-do-it essays as well as in his weekly political commentary and literary journalism, are not merely relevant to this moment, but more desperately needed than ever. As Wyndham Levsis vwote in One-Way Song (1933): "These times require a tongue that naked goes, / Without more fuss than Dryden's or Defoe's." "A happy vicar I might have been," wrote Orwell in a reflective poem about that pre-1914 world he had briefly glimpsed in his childhood. His ambition was to create long "social" novels, and he also tried almost every other kind of writing. But history and politics claimed him, and his genius was to write more acutely about politics than anyone had done before. Orwell, whose books have sold a phenomenal forty million copies in more than sixty languages, was the most influential prose stylist of the twentieth century. Homage to Catahma (1938), which showed that good reporting not only describes the urgent political and military issues but also captures the spirit of the place, influenced both the concepts and methods of participatory journalism from Mary McCarthy, Norman Mailer, and Truman Capote to Joan Didion, George Plimpton, and Tom Wolfe. Kingsley Amis observed that "no modem writer has his air of passionately believing what he has to say and of being passionately determined to say it as forcefully and simply as possible." Norman Mailer, agreeing with Amis, maintained: "I don't think there's a man vwiting English today who can't leam how to write a litde better by reading his essays. Even his maxims and instructions on how to write well are superb." Like Hobbes and Swift, Orwell saw political writing not only as a powerful tool for conveying ideas, but also as a demanding and enthralling art with a moral imperative to search for truth. Orwell was obsessed by writing, felt compelled to write and composed with great fluency in an age that gready admired authors 93 The Kenyon Review like Gustave Flaubert, James Joyce, and Franz Kafka, who'd tortured themselves with creative agony. Flaubert, the antithesis of Orwell in his complete lack of political commitment, thought the artist "should have neither religion, country, nor even any social conviction. . . . No cause is worth dying for, any govemment can be lived with, nothing but art may be believed in, and literature is the only confession." The smoldering indignation of Orwell was also the opposite of the cool objectivity of Joyce, who said he wrote Dubliners in a style of scrupulous meanness. And his personal reticence is quite different from Kafka's self-exposure and belief that a book must "be the axe for the frozen sea inside us." Who, then, was Orwell's model? In an autobiographical note of April 1940, he said "the modem writer who has infiuenced me most is Somerset Maugham, whom I admire immensely for his power of telling a story straightforwardly and without frills." Both vmters advocated direct language and unambiguous expression, distrusting attempts to "dress up" facts and ideas to make them more palatable. They believed that the writer ought to communicate in the clearest possible way and employed a plain style that appealed to their readers' common sense. Maugham wrote that "good prose should be like the clothes of a well-dressed man, appropriate but unobtmsive"; Orwell echoed him in his famous simile: "Good prose is like a window pane." Despite their preference for simplicity, both were also deeply moved when young by the rich sounds and exotic associations of John Milton's high style. Maugham noted: "The exultation, the sense of freedom which came to me when first I read in my youth the first few books oi Paradise Lost." Orwell also recalled that "when I was about sixteen I suddenly discovered the joy of mere words. . . . The lines from Paradise Lost. . . sent shivers dovm my backbone." Like Maugham, Orwell trusted his audience to share his values and understanding of the world, but had a far more didactic bent, a crusading spirit that sought to cut through cant and intensify political consciousness. He developed a clear, racy, supple style, fluent and readable, forceful and direct, with a colloquial ease of expression. The critic Edmund Wilson, defining his essential qualities, praised his "readiness to think for himself, courage to speak his mind, the tendency to deal with concrete realities rather than theoretical positions, and a prose style that is both downright and disciplined." The English historian Veronica Wedgwood elegantly 94 Jeffrey Meyers described Orwell's combination of passion and restraint: "The strength of his feelings and his detennination that they should not intrude make his style spare and economical, while his acute observation and sensibility make its very bleakness the more powerful." Orwell's style is spare but never drab. His vigorous prose, engaging honesty, and sly wit immediately engage his readers. And his literary personality—^his integrity, idealism, and commitment—shine through his writing like pebbles in a clear stream. The striking openings of his major essays are uncannily effective and immediately hook the reader: —In Moulmein, in Lower Burma, I was hated by large numbers of people. —As I write, highly civilized human beings are flying overhead, trying to kiU me. —Autobiography is only to be trusted when it reveals something disgraceful. —Saints should always be judged guilty until they are proved innocent. The first two sentences portray Orwell as a victim of hate and war; the last two are paradoxical statements about the complexity of human nature. All four are as vivid and concentrated as a line of poetry. Fascinated by every aspect of an author's life, in the course of his all-too-brief career Orwell discussed the teaching of creative writing, revising one's work, being edited, editing others, author's notes, and the limitations of reviewers. In his "As I Please" newspaper column in the London Tribune, he satirized ads for writing courses (which were just beginning in England and have since become entrenched college courses, even majors, in America). He effectively punctured their pretensions with a eommonsensical question: "If these [anonymous] people really knew how to make money out of writing, why aren't they just doing it instead of peddling their seeret at 5/- a time? .. . If Bernard Shaw or J. B. Priestley offered to teach you how to make money out of writing, you might feel that there was something in it. But who would buy a bottle of hair restorer from a bald man?" In these days when everybody wants to be a writer (but nobody wants to read, preferring to get information and interpretation from 95 The Kenyon Review television "news" and radio talk shows), it is worth emphasizing that writing even competendy demands diligent effort that few students are prepared to give. In June 1940, chronically poor and still under pressure to earn money after more than a decade as a vmter, Orwell reflected that his apparent ease of composition had been achieved by years of practice and repetition: "Nowadays, when I write a review, I sit down at the typewriter and type it straight out. Till recently, indeed till six months ago, I never did this and would have said that I could not do it. Virtually all that I wrote was written at least twice, and my books as a whole three times—individual passages as many as five or ten times." Reviews and articles kept Orwell's body and soul together as he labored to complete his novels, and he wrote interestingly on the practical problems of writing for newspapers. As a highly contentious and polemical writer, hostile to any form of censorship, he loathed cuts that weakened his argument and changed his meaning, yet had to accept the reality of being edited. "The question of 'editing' might be more difficult," he told his agent. "In my experience one can never be sure that one's stuff will get to press unaltered in any daily or weekly periodical. The Observer, for instance, habitually cuts my articles without consulting me if there is a last-minute shortage of space. In writing for papers like the Evening Standard, I have had things not merely cut but actually altered, and of course even a cut always modifies the sense of an article to some extent. What really matters here is whether or not one is dealing with a civilized and intelligent paper." When Orwell took over as literary editor of the socialist Tribune in November 1943, he found his desk drawer "stuffed with letters and manuscripts which ought to have been dealt with weeks earlier, and hurriedly shut it up again." As an editor himself, he had a fatal tendency to accept manuscripts which he knew very well could never be printed, but didn't have the heart to send back. When he considered manuscripts submitted to the newspaper, he must have remembered Gordon Comstock's bitter rage (in Orwell's novel Keep the Aspidistra Flying, 1936) when his verse was politely rejected: "Why be so bloody mealy-mouthed about it? Why not say outright, 'We don't want your bloody poems. We only take poems from chaps we were at Cambridge with.'" In June 1947 Orwell, an ex-policeman, recalled his generous weakness as editor and concluded 96 Jeffrey Meyers the discussion with a characteristically witty simile: "It is questionable whether anyone who has had long experience as a freelance journalist ought to become an editor. It is too like taking a convict out of his cell and making him governor of the prison." Reserved about his private life and wary of improper publicity, Orwell was reluctant to provide biographical details for his dust jackets and, with a prematurely lined face and idiosyncratic mustache, didn't think his photograph would be a good advertisement for his books. He jusdy complained about the low standards of book critics and told a fellow novelist Anthony Powell: "The reviewers are awful, so much so that in a general way I prefer the ones who lose their temper & call one names to the silly asses who mean so well & never bother to discover what you are writing about." Though Animal Farm was enthusiastically received in 1945, Orwell felt reviewers had missed an essential aspect, compared them to the villains of his book and called them "gmdging swine . . . not one of them said it's a beautiful book." Orwell's primary ambition was to be a writer of fiction, and he carefully studied writers he admired—like Edgar Poe, D. H. Lawrence, and James Joyce—to leam how they'd achieved their artistic effects. His account of Poe's realistic fantasy suggests how he created his own convincing futuristic world in Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949): "Poe's outlook is at best a wild romanticism and at worst is not far from being insane in the literal clinical sense. Why is it, then, that [his] stories . . . which might very nearly have been written by a lunatic, do not convey a feeling of falsity? Because they are tme within a certain framework, they keep the rules of their own peculiar world, like a Japanese picture. But it appears that to write successfully about such a world you have got to believe in it." Writing in July 1933 to one of his girlfriends about Lawrence (who'd died, neglected and reviled, in 1930), Orwell tried to account for his powerful, heroically primitive vision: "There is a quality about L. that I can't define, but everywhere in his work one comes on passages of an extraordinary freshness, vividness, so that tho' I would never, even given the power, have done it quite like that myself, I feel that he has seized on an aspect of things that no one else would have noticed. .. . He reminds me of someone from the Bronze Age." 97 The Kenyon Review Orwell was passionate about Joyce's Ulysses, which he'd bought when working in Paris and smuggled into England. In a letter to another girlfriend a year later, he confessed that "Joyce interests me so much that I can't stop talking about him once I start." He was writing his weakest novel, A Clergyman's Daughter (1935), very much under the influence of Joyce. But he went on to make fun of his work in comparison to the Master's: "My novel, instead of going forwards, goes backwards with the most alarming speed. There are whole wads of it that are so awful that I really don't know what to do with them. . . . When I read [Ulysses] and then come back to my ovwi work, I feel like a eunuch who has taken a course in voice production and can pass himself off fairly well as a bass or baritone, but if you listen closely you can hear the good old squeak just the same as ever." He knew that he could not be a Joyce or a D. H. Lawrence, but realized that he had to keep trying to find his own narrative style. Lawrence was a great travel writer and—^like Joyce in Ulysses— had broken through traditional restraints with his vivid sexual descriptions in Lady Chatterl^'s Lover. (Both novels, suppressed on grounds of obscenity, were only published in England after contentious trials.) But Orwell disliked both travel books and detailed descriptions of sexual acts. Henry Miller's narcissistic account of his life in Greece in The Colossus ofMaroussi, for example, "has all the normal stigmata of the travel book, the fake intensities, the tendency to discover the 'soul' of a town after spending two hours in it, the boring descriptions of conversations v^ith taxi-drivers." And Orwell felt that in a novel by his friend Humphrey Slater, "the sex stuff was out of place and in poor taste," disapproved of "this modem habit of describing lovemaking in detail," and thought it would one day seem as meaningless as the sentimental gush of Victorian novels. He was surely right about this modem obsession. Depictions of sex in contemporary novels and films have become ever more graphic, ugly, and depressing. Orwell's illuminating comments on his own work show how desperately he wanted to be a writer and how long he had to struggle to become one. He destroyed his early stories and first novel, and after retuming from police duties in Burma, worked as a dishwasher, hoppicker, tutor, teacher, and tramp before publishing his first book, the autobiographical Down and Out in Paris and London (1933), at the age 98 Jeffrey Meyers of twenty-nine. In his introduction to the French translation the following year, he defended the truthfulness and explained the artistic rearrangement of the incidents in that book: "As for the truth of my story, I think I can say that I have exaggerated nothing except in so far as all writers exaggerate by selecting. I did not feel I had to describe events in the exact order in which they happened, but everything I have described did take place at one time or another." Orwell found it difficult to invent fictional incidents and wanted to use the events of his early life in Coming Up for Air (1939), but also saw the technical weakness in telling the story from the hero's point of view. "You are perfectly right," he told a friend, "about my own character constantly intruding on that of the narrator. I am not a real novelist anyway, and that particular vice is inherent in writing a novel in the first person, which one [i.e., Orwell] should never do. One difficulty I have never solved is that one has masses of experience which one passionately wants to write about, e.g. the part about fishing in that book, and no way of using them up except by disguising them as a novel." Orwell felt that he should use every scrap of his experience in his work. If it couldn't be placed in an essay or review, it ought to be "used up" in his fiction. Most writers, after struggling for seventeen years to achieve literary success, would have remained in London to be lionized and enjoy their celebrity. But Orwell, immune to the effects of wealth and fame, couldn't endure the success of Animal Farm in 1945. It didn't match his guilt-ridden idea of himself. Success also led to the conflict between accepting endless lucrative offers to write for periodicals and dedicating himself to his more serious books. Nineteen Eighty-Four was beginning to take shape in his mind, and he wanted to rest for two months and allow the idea to gemiinate. "I am anxious to get out of London," he wrote a friend, "because I am constandy smothered under journalism—at present I am doing 4 articles every week—and I want to write another book which is impossible unless I can get 6 months quiet." Quite unexpectedly, the man who'd always hated Scotland took off for the remote island of Jura in the Inner Hebrides. When he finished Mrieteen Eighty-Four, under harsh living conditions and with a terminal illness, Orwell, with his usual honesty, saw the flaws in his work and conceded: "the vulgarity of the [torture in] 'Room 99 The Kenyon Review 101' business. I was aware of this while writing it, but I didn't know another way of getting somewhere near the effect I wanted. .. . I am not pleased with the book but I am not absolutely dissatisfied. I first thought of it in 1943.1 think it is a good idea but the execution would have been better if I had not written it under the influence of TB." Orwell's description of his ghasdy treatment in the tuberculosis sanatorium is very close to his portrayal of Winston Smith after his torture in the novel and reveals Orwell's horrific condition when completing the book: "The truly frightening thing was the emaciation of his body. The barrel of the ribs was as narrow as that of a skeleton. . . . The curvature of the spine was astonishing. The thin shoulders were hunched forward so as to make a cavity of the chest, the scraggy neck seemed to be bending double under the weight of the skull. .. . He was aware of his ugliness." When Orwell was in the sanatorium, the doctors had to take extreme measures to prevent him from writing. The medical staff, insisting on complete physical and mental rest, confiscated his typewriter. When he kept on writing with a ballpoint pen, they put his right arm in plaster. OrweU, usually able to write four serious articles a week (or about 200 articles a year!), was a desperately driven and manically compulsive writer. In one of his most revealing passages (in a notebook of 1949), he confessed, despite his extraordinary output, that he always felt guilty about his work and fearful that his creative energy would dry up: [Since I started publishing in 1928] there has literally been not one day in which I did not feel that I was idling, that I was behind with the eurrent job, & that my total output was miserably small. Even at the periods when I was working 10 hours a day on a book, or tuming out 4 or 5 articles a week, I have never been able to get away from this neurotic feeling that I was wasting time. I can never get any sense of achievement out of the work that is actually in progress, because it always goes slower than I intend, & in any case I feel that a book or even an article does not exist until it is finished. But as soon as a book is finished, I begin, actually from the next day, worrying because the next one is not begun, & am haunted with the fear that there never will be a next one—that my impulse is exhausted for good & all. Though guilt made Orwell miserable, it also energized him and drove him to produce his impressive body of work. Orwell completed the final draft of Nineteen Eighty-Four in 100 Jeffrey Meyers November 1948, but found it too indecipherable to send to a typist. His friends desperately tried to find a London secretary to go to Jura. Despite intensive efforts, no one was willing to help the distinguished author type his extraordinary manuscript—even at two or three times the going rate of pay. He had to sit up in bed typing the final copy of the 150,000-word novel, finally collapsed and went into hospital. Mortally ill when Nineteen Eighty-Four was published in June 1949, he died seven months later, before he could enjoy his newfound wealth. The creation of the novel virtually killed Orwell, and its vision of the future (by a man who himself had no future) is correspondingly grim. It's not surprising that in "Why I Write" he exclaimed that "writing a book is a horrible, exhausting struggle, like a long bout of some painful illness." Orwell had limited success in creating a credible first-person narrator in his fiction, but the lively persona he created in his nonfiction made essays his most suecessful genre. His essays on writing fall into three main categories: the writer's life, popular literature, and the search for truth. These essays—and three passages from his novels—cover many aspects of writing and reading, or how to deconstruct the meaning and purpose of pieces of writing: the deceptions of advertising, techniques of book reviewing, writers' income, and authors' motives; the brutality of crime novels, definition of humor, mediocre but enduringly popular books, and children's literature; the creation of new words, effects of propaganda, genesis of satire, suppression of literature, purity of language, relation between content and pleasure, political pamphlets, keeping a diary, and rewriting history. With a keen nose for the bogus, Orwell saw early on the falsity and fraudulence of the newly spawned advertising agencies that serve the corporate economy and would eventually contaminate the media. Orwell, who'd been to school with the advertising innovator David Ogilvy, had amused himself in childhood by answering a fake ad for a weightreducing course and, by pretending to be an obese lady, had deliberately 101 The Kenyon Review prolonged the cheeky correspondence. "Do come before ordering your summer frocks," the weight-reducer insisted, "as after taking my course your figure will have altered out of recognition." This went on for some time, he recalled, "during which the fee gradually sank from two guineas to half a crown, and then I brought the matter to an end by writing to say that I had been cured of my obesity by a rival agency." In Keep the Aspidistra Flying Orwell's embittered hero and wouldbe poet Gordon Gomstock is forced by poverty to take a humiliating job as a hack writer in a cynical, hard-boiled, Americanized advertising agency. He calls it the dirtiest swindle of capitalism, and (in a homely farm metaphor) "the rattling of a stick inside a swill-bucket." When the boss discovers that Gomstock has published poetry, he promotes him to copy editor and launches him on a successful career. Fearful that he'll be trapped by "blind worship of the money-god," Gordon manages to escape. But when his girlfriend Rosemary becomes pregnant during their plein air frolics, he feels obliged to marry her and is trapped once again in his old job. Orwell's family in Southwold and Leeds, and visitors to his London flat and house on the Scottish island of Jura, emphasized how hard he worked and how he constantly pounded away at the typewriter. The endless clacking sound became part of his legend. But no one ever mentioned his sitting quietly (if not comfortably, for he thrived on hardship) in a chair and actually reading the books he was reviewing. The chief bore (he felt) was having to read at least fifty pages of each book to avoid making a howler, but he eventually learned to skip expertly through these useless volumes. He begins the autobiographical "Gonfcssions of a Book Reviewer" like a short story—^with himself as the satiric victim. Looking (like OnvcU) much older than his age and plagued by unpaid bills, predatory creditors, and tax demands, the literary hack tries in vain to write his way out of poverty as a book reviewer. Since most books arc worthless, yet somehow have to be praised, Orwell calls book reviewing "a quite exceptionally thankless, irritating and exhausting job." To alleviate this tedium, he advocates fewer but longer reviews; and claims that the book reviewer is, at least, better off than the film critic (who has to praise a greater proportion of trash). Since there's an endless supply of amateurs 102 Jeffrey Meyers eager to break into print, there will always be desperate men willing to have a shot at the disparate books that, the editor falsely claims, "ought to go well together." Most of Orwell's fictional heroes are impoverished and (like Gharles Dickens and George Gissing) he puts a great deal of emphasis on money, or the lack of it. In August 1941, when he took a job at the BBG and earned a salary of £640 a year, he made, for the first time since 1925, more money than he had as a policeman in Burma. A writer hke Gordon Gomstock usually has to have another job. In "The Gost of Letters" Orwell, always the Socialist, states that a writer should ideally have £1,000 a year, which would enable him to live in reasonable comfort without joining the privileged class. He concedes that it's almost impossible to earn this income solely by writing books; and that a second occupation, useful for putting the author in touch with the real world, should be nonliterary. He'd been strongly discouraged by his conventional family, who were horrified by his resignation from his secure job in the Burmese police, and recalls that "I had to struggle desperately at the beginning, and if I had listened to what people said to me I would never have been a writer." Orwell's instinctive approach to literary topics was moral. He analyzed crime novels in "Raffies and Miss Blandish" to reveal the social and political dimensions of popular art. In a classic contrast he argues that there was an "immense difference in moral atmosphere" between the two novels (Raffles, by E.W. Hornung, published in 1900, and No Orehidsfor Miss Blandish by James Hadley Ghase, in 1939) and discusses the "change in the popular attitude that this probably implies." The first had an almost schoolboy atmosphere; the second, full of cruelty and corruption, was "a header into the cesspool." There are, however, perverse elements in Orwell's condemnation. He loathed Ghase's fictional character, "whose sole pleasure in life consists in driving knives into other people's bellies" but, as he himself sadistically wrote in "Shooting an Elephant," as a young policeman in Burma he thought the "greatest joy in the world would be to drive a bayonet into a Buddhist priest's guts." He blames the horrors of James Hadley Ghase on the American obsession with violence—though the author was in fact English. Gonnecting his thesis to wartime politics, Orwell argues that Ghase's obsession with the struggle for power and the 103 The Kenyon Review triumph of the strong over the weak reveals "the interconnection between sadism, masochism, success worship, power worship, nationalism and totalitarianism." Just as "Raffles and Miss Blandish" explains the moral and stylistic decline of crime novels, "Fxmny, But Not Vulgar" defines comedy and describes the decline of English humorous writing from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. Humor, Orwell observes with many lively examples, must "show a willingness to attack the beliefs and the virtues on which society necessarily rests" and dare to upset the established order. AU comedy attacks social evils, and in order to be funny you have to be serious and include an element of vulgarity. "Good Bad Books" reveals Orwell's nostalgia for the idyllic prewar era of his youth as well as his keen interest in popular "escape" literature. Like his previous essays, it also attempts to explain the decline of the contemporary novel. Good bad books (a term he borrowed from G. K. Ghesterton) show that "one can be amused or excited or even moved by a book that one's intellect simply refuses to take seriously," and that "art is not the same thing as cerebration." Despite Orwell's valiant attempt to revive interest in out-of-date popular fiction, only Gonan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes, Bram Stoker's Dracula, Rider Haggard's She and perhaps Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin—all of which have been made into films—are stiU in print and read today. "Riding Down from Bangor," closely related to "Good Bad Books," describes Orwell's strong attraction to works like Helen's Babies and Little Women that formed his childhood vision of America. The characters in these books, though slightly ridiculous, have "integrity, or good morale, founded partly on an unthinking piety .. . a native gaiety, a buoyant, carefree feeling, which was the product, presumably, of the unheard-of freedom and security" of nineteenth-century America. He's nostalgic about the lost world of these books that have no hint "of the twin nightmares that beset nearly every modem man": unemployment and state interference. When Orwell, a new boy at his preparatory school, had to stand on a table in the dormitory and sing a song, he sang "Riding Down from Bangor," the American folksong he quotes in the essay. In 1942 Orwell wrote that "Kipling is the only English writer of our time who has added phrases to the language." But in Nineteen Eighty-Four 104 Jeffrey Meyers Orwell also invented many vivid phrases: "Big Brother Is Watching You," "two minutes hate," "thought police," "thoughterime," "facecrime," "doublethink," "memory hole," "vaporized," and "unperson." These words, which uncannily expressed the ideas and emotions of people living under totalitarian oppression, read like advertising catchwords. They became political shorthand during the Gold War, and remain so today. In "New Words" Orwell ventures into the realm of dreams and psychology, argues for the expansion of language and boldly but impractically suggests that "it would be quite feasible to invent a vocabulary, perhaps amounting to several thousands of words, which would deal with parts of our experience now practically unamenable to language." Just as the French Academy was created in the seventeenth century to preserve the purity of language, so, OrweU argues, "several thousands of people with the necessary time, talents and money" could, by dedicating themselves to this noble task, create new words "for the now unnamed things [intuitions, fantasies, dreams] that exist in the mind." Through this unrealistic project OrweU hoped to increase understanding through language and reduce "the star-like isolation in which human beings live." "The Frontiers of Art and Propaganda" considers the infiuenee of history on Uterature and explains why English writers have shifted from an interest in form over content in the 1920s to the reverse in the 1930s. Minimizing the military, political, and social effects of the Great War, which shattered a century of relative peace in Europe and kiUed ten milhon men, OrweU argues that it was the Depression and the Second World War that forced writers into "a world in which not only one's life but one's whole scheme of values is constandy menaced." Detachment is no longer possible and "literature had to become political because anything else would have entailed mental dishonesty." Propaganda has crept into art and aesthetic judgments are now infiuenced by the author's prejudices and beliefs. OrweU's preface to the Ukrainian edition of Animal Farm describes the genesis of his most humorous and wickedly satiric book. As in "Why I Write," he describes his background—including his five years with the poUce in Burma, association with the criminal class in Paris, and warfare in Spain—to explain his poUtical beliefs. His experience in Spain taught him about the great dangers to clear style and free thought: "how 105 The Kenyon Review easily totalitarian propaganda can control the opinion of enlightened people in democratic countries" and "the negative influence of the Soviet myth upon the western Socialist movement." His duty, he felt, was to expose the iUusions created by such propaganda, make people "see the Soviet regime for what it really was," and destroy the Soviet myth in order to revive the real Socialist movement. Inspired by seeing a little boy whip a huge farm horse, OrweU imagined a revolution of oppressed beasts and analyzed "Marx's theory from the animals' point of view." OrweU's lucid, witty, and ironic style is perfectly suited to his political allegory of the Russian Revolution. In Animal Farm the actual writing of political slogans takes place after the revolution. The pigs. Napoleon (Stalin) and SnowbaU (Trotsky), become Uterate, reduce the principles of Animalism to seven commandments, and use writing to manipulate the animals and consolidate their political power. As the revolution is gradually betrayed and the pigs replace the oppressive farmer they have overthrown, each of these sacred rules is broken. Finally, the horse Glover realizes that the last and most important commandment—"All animals are equal"—has also been changed to "ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS." The most famous phrase in his fable, rewritten by the shrewd, self-serving pigs, combines Thomas Jefferson's fundamental concept in the Declaration of Independence, "aU men are created equal," with Eve's command to the serpent in Milton's Paradise Lost: "Render me more equal, and perhaps, / A thing not undesirable, sometime / Superior." The defeat of the Loyalists in the Spanish War taught him that "history is written by the winners." His own minimal achievement, while working as a talks producer at the wartime BBG, was to keep "our propaganda slighdy less disgusting than it might otherwise have been." Several of OrweU's essays explore the conditions that aUow or prevent the freedom of expression (and freedom from self-censorship) that's essential for good writing to exist. The polemical "Prevention of Literature" considers the more insidious factors, apart from totalitarianism, that mitigate against the creation of great, or even honest literature. It also anticipates OrweU's portrayal of Winston Smith's job in Nineteen Eighty-Four: rewriting and perverting history in order to adhere to the ever-changing party line. In England, he argues, "the immediate enemies 106 Jeffrey Meyers of truthfulness, and hence freedom of thought, are the Press lords, the film magnates, and the bureaucrats, but on a long view the weakening of the desire for liberty among the inteUectuals themselves is the most serious symptom of all." AU Uterature is political in an age like his own, when fears, hatreds, and loyalties affect everyone's beliefs. In one of his most striking sentences, he insists that a writer must have freedom of thought and oppose the prevaiUng doctrines in order to create serious work: "To write in plain, vigorous language one has to think fearlessly, and if one thinks fearlessly one cannot be politicaUy orthodox. . . . Literature is doomed if liberty of thought perishes." The assumption that the act of writing is in itself a political act runs through aU OrweU's work. In a 1946 review of a book by the noveUst Georges Bemanos, OrweU, always ready to expose poor style, noted: "A tendency towards rhetoric—that is, a tendency to say everything at enormous length and at once forcibly and vaguely—seems to be a common faiUng with presentday French writers." His classic essay "PoUtics and the English Language" opposes this trend and forcefuUy advocates clear language. OrweU's ideas were foreshadowed by Leviathan (1651), the major work of the English poUtical phUosopher Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes, who had also attacked the abuse of words, argued that a sane, stable society must have a clear, stable language and believed that pure style was not only good in itself but also a civU duty. Writing during the English civil war, in an elegant and balanced style, Hobbes insisted that clear words benefited society while confused and confusing style could lead to seditious disruption: The light of human minds is perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; reason is the pace; increase of science, the way; and the benefit of mankind, the end. And, on the contrary, metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words, are like ignesfatui [delusions]; and reasoning upon them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their ends, contention and sedition, or contempt. Hobbes also observed that the misuse of words and creation of meaningless speech—also the subject of OrweU's essay—^were intended to deceive rather than enlighten readers: There is yet another fault in the discourses of some men; which may also be numbered amongst the sorts of madness; namely, that abuse 107 The Kenyon Review of words, whereof I have spoken before .. . by the name of absurdity. And that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have in them no signification at all; but are fallen upon by some, through misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by rote; by others from intention to deceive by obscurity. E. M. Forster, himself a notable styUst and, in y\ Passage to India, a major infiuenee on Burmese Days (1934), wrote that in "PoUtics and the EngUsh Language" OrweU "was passionate over the purity of prose, and . . . tears to bits some passages of contemporary vmting. It is a dangerous game . . . but it ought to be played, for if prose decays, thought decays and aU the finer roads of communication are broken. Liberty, he argues, is connected with prose." OrweU begins his practical advice to writers by giving five examples of bad contemporary prose, characterized by stale imagery and lack of precise meaning. He then Usts (with convincing examples) four common faults, "a catalogue of swindles and perversions" that conceal and prevent rather than express clear thought: dying metaphors, verbal false limbs (including the use of passive rather than active voice and awkward noun constructions rather than gerunds), pretentious diction and meaningless words. He insists that a careful, thoughtful writer wiU always ask six essential questions about everything he writes: "What am I trying to say? What words will express it? What image or idiom will make it clearer? Is this image fresh enough to have an effect? Could I put it more shortly? Have I said anything that is unavoidably ugly?" It's worth noting, as OrweU would say, that he enlivens his essay on the evils of bad writing with a number of striking satirical simUes. He compares dead language to tea-leaves blocking a sink, to soft snow blurring sharp outlines, to cuttlefish spurting out ink, and to cavalry horses mechanicaUy answering the caU of a bugle. OrweU's six stylistic rules (he seems fond of the number six) are worth repeating and should be carved in stone above every writer's desk: i. Never use a metaphor, simUe or other figure of speech which you are used to seeing in print. ii. Never use a long word where a short one will do. iii. If it is possible to cut a word out, always cut it out. iv. Never use the passive where you can use the active. 108 Jeffrey Meyers V. Never use a foreign phrase, a scientific word or a jargon word if you can think of an everyday English equivalent. vi. Break any of these rules sooner than say anything outright barbarous. As we aU know from the speeches we hear every day, it is possible to obey aU these rules and write persuasively, with aU the appearance of clarity and strength, yet stiU be an outrageous liar. In his rules for writing, OrweU assumes that the author wants to teU the truth. He believed that the consistent and courageous attempt to find the simplest and most direct way of communicating an idea would keep a person honest. In an observation that also describes govemment propaganda today, he concludes that in his time "poUtical speech and writing are largely the defence of the indefensible." Perhaps the most appealing quality of this essay is OrweU's daring to suggest that politics doesn't have to be dirty, and that the language we use can be a powerful force for order and understanding, for choosing the right thing to do. In his "Imaginary Interview" with Jonathan Sv^aft, pubUshed in the Listener November 1942, OrweU said that "Gulliver's Travels has meant more to me than any other book ever written. I can't remember when I first read it, I must have been eight years old at the most, and it's lived with me ever since so that I suppose a year has never passed without my re-reading at least part of it." Swift, a major infiuenee on OrweU's ideas about writing, also wrote three important essays about the need to preserve clear style and eliminate corrupt language. In "On Corruptions of Style" (1710)—essential reading for anyone who wants to write good prose—Swift, like Hobbes, foUowed the tradition of English plain style. He attacked senseless, convoluted "wit" and condemned "aU Words and Phrases that are offensive to good Sense." Swift's "Proposal for Correcting the English Tongue" (1712) unrealisticaUy hoped to arrest the decline of language and preserve (his editor wrote) "a sanctioned standard language, in order to give permanent life to aU vmtten records." Anticipating OrweU's plan in "New Words" to create an informal academy to study language. Swift proposed a strict English Academy (modeled on the weU estabUshed Academy in France) dedicated to eliminating useless words. They "will observe many gross 109 The Kenyon Review Improprieties, which however authorized by Practice, and grown famUiar, ought to be discarded. They wiU find many Words that deserve to be utterly throviTi out of our Language; many more to be corrected." In his "Letter to a Young Gendeman, lately entered into Holy Orders" (1721), Swift, an old gentleman, long in holy orders, expressed his clearest ideas about style, which he classicaUy defined as "Proper Words in proper Places." (In "New Words" OrweU, echoing Swift, defines good style as "taking the right words and putting them in place.") Swift emphasized clarity, particularly disliked the "Use of obscure Terms" and urged the young clergyman to address his congregation "in a manner to be understood by the meanest among them." OrweU's "Politics vs. Literature: An Examination of Gulliver's Travels" considers "the inter-connection between Swift's political loyalties and his ultimate despair" and "the relationship between agreement vwth a vmter's opinions, and enjoyment of his work." He discusses the changes in GuUiver's character in the four parts of this rancorous, reactionary, and pessimistic book, as weU as Swift's hatred of the human body, his paradoxical denunciation of oppression but dislike of democracy, his reverence for the past, lack of beUef in religion or progress, and his scorn for humanity. For OrwcU the most significant aspect of Gulliver's Travels and "Swift's greatest contribution to poUtical thought" is his attack on totalitarianism: "He has an extraordinarily clear prevision of the spyhaunted 'police State,' with its endless heresy-hunts and treason trials." Swift had a profound impact on OrweU's poHtical fiction. Taking a hint from Swift's rational horses, he idealized the horses in Animal Farm, and transformed Swift's Floating Island of Laputa into the Floating Fortress in Nineteen Eighty-Four. He mentions that books were written by machinery in Gulliver's Travels and in "The Prevention of Literature" says it would "not be beyond human ingenuity to write books by machinery." OrweU, Uke Swift, was a "Tory anarchist," a revolutionary in love with the past, but he was not a complete pessimist. In "Why I Write" OrweU states: "So long as I remain alive and weU I shaU continue to feel strongly about prose style, to love the surface of the earth, and to take pleasure in solid objects." In "PoUtics vs. Literature," by contrast, he emphasizes Swift's inability "to believe that life—ordinary life on the solid earth . . .—could be made worth living." 110 Jeffrey Meyers OrweU owned hundreds of poUtical pamphlets, and in his essay on pamphlet literature, published in 1943, he exelaimed: "The pamphlet ought to be the Uterary form of an age like our own. We live in a time when poUtical passions run high, channels of free expression are dwindling, and organised lying exists on a scale never before known. For plugging the holes in history the pamphlet is the ideal form." His introduction to a co-authored anthology British Pamphleteers (1948) advocates (Uke "Good Bad Books") another minor but valuable kind of writing. Closely connected—in comparative method and argument—to "PoUtics and the English Language," it forcefuUy laments the current decay of English and the corresponding decline of the pamphlet. After defining the topical and polemical pamphlet, rarely concerned with evidence or truth and essentially a protest expressed through exuberant argument and scurrilous attacks, he sums up the horrors of capitaUsm in a single, rhetoricaUy effective sentence. "Wherever one looks," he exclaims, "one sees fiercer struggles than the Crusades, worse tyrannies than the Inquisition, and bigger lies than the Popish Plot." His age (like ours) cries out for poUtical pamphlets but the form, to OrweU's deep regret, has virtuaUy died out. OrweU's political point of view informed aU his criticism and fiction. "Why I Write," his retrospective artistic credo, begins with a brief account of his early life, including a description of his first novel, Burmese Days, in order to explain his four great motives for writing: sheer egoism, aesthetic enthusiasm, historical impulse, and political purpose. In a letter of 1938 he added, in amusingly cynical American diction, "puUing in the dough." He might also have mentioned, as he did in a review of John Galsworthy, "some inner trouble, sharpening his sensitiveness," that gave him the urge to write. He caUed the Spanish CivU War, in which he fought on the Loyalist side and was shot through the throat, the great tuming point in his life. After that, he said, every line of his serious work—and in his view no work could be serious without a poUtical purpose—^was written "against totalitarianism and/or democratic Socialism." His conscious aim was to transform "political writing into an art." Most of OrweU's essays on writing—^particularly "New Words," "The Frontiers of Art and Propaganda," and "Politics and the English Language"—^prefigure the ideas that he dramatized in Nineteen EightyFour. Fond of making poUtical prophecies and honesdy wiUing to admit 111 The Kenyon Review his mistakes, OrweU urged readers to keep a diary—as Winston Smith does in the novel—^not only to recover and preserve the past, but also to maintain an accurate perspective on the truth: "To see what is in front of one's nose needs a constant struggle. One thing that helps towards it is to keep a diary, or, at any rate, to keep some kind of record of one's opinions about important events. Otherwise, when some particularly absurd belief is exploded by events, one may simply forget that one ever held it." Like Gordon Comstock in Keep the Aspidistra Flying, Winston Smith is absorbed into the hateful system he'd once opposed, and expresses his anxiety in two kinds of composition. He professionally destroys the work of others while secretly writing his own work. In his job Winston alters the records of the past to fit Party policy. In private, he writes on the creamy paper of an old diary with an old-fashioned pen and ink. The first kind of writing (like OrweU's at the BBC) is mechanical and exhausting, the second (Hke OrweU's own creative writing) is psychologically liberating, but also sets off disturbing memories and dreams. The first is systematic lying in Newspeak, the second a passionate search for truth in Oldspeak. OrweU contrasts the mindless, bureaucratic attitude Winston needs to do this work with his panic at the blank sheet of paper, his poor handwriting, his mental and emotional confusion when he starts writing for himself. Winston's work forces him to practice "doublethink," the ability to hold simultaneously two contradictory opinions which cancel each other out. Winston has to beUeve that he's rectifying errors, yet also knows that he's falsifying information. Each kind of vmting forces him to find a plausible formula to disguise the truth. Winston is manipulated by the system and, in his role of Outer Party inteUectual, is also part of the system that manipulates others. The word "OrweUian" constantly appeared in 2003, OrweU's centenary year, and has become essential to our political discourse. But the term is ambiguous. In the negative sense, it stands for the kind of oppressive totalitarian regime that he created in Nineteen Eighty-Four, especiaUy political manipulation of the media to deceive the public. In the positive sense, it suggests the personal honesty, bravery, and idealism in both his life and his writing. For OrweU, writing has two essential aspects. The first concerns an individual writer (Uke Winston Smith) who sits down alone to communicate his most secret thoughts, even to an 112 Jeffrey Meyers unknown future reader. He must have courage and dedication, and an optimistic belief in his ov^n ideas. The second concerns the writer's desire and power to ameliorate society. For OrweU clear language and independent thought were an aesthetic as weU as a moral responsibUity. IronicaUy, OrweU's subde and moraUy acute lessons on how to read and write have been misunderstood and misappUed after his death. Neoconservatives have singled out his warnings about the totalitarian aspects of the Socialist state and claimed him as one of their own. Recent accounts of the Cold War described Nineteen Eighty-Four as "the canonical text" of conservative anticommunism, as "the key imaginative manifesto of the Cold War" and gave OrweU credit for having "invented . . . a complete poetics of poUtical invective." WiUfuUy obscuring the complexity of its vision, they reduce the novel to a clever piece of propaganda. More grotesquely, the John Birch Society used to seU his novel in its Washington office and even used 1984 as the last digits of its telephone number. Since OrweU himself was so scrupulous about his ovra limitations as a poUtical observer and criticized the Left as sharply as the Right, it is easy to cite his ideas out of context and simply ignore his professed belief in democratic Socialism. Like devout Mormons baptizing their helpless ancestors, the Neocons, by trying to co-opt him, have missed the whole point of his life and work. In an anxious, atheistic age Uke our own, he resisted the temptation to submit to religious or poUtical dogma, and believed that ordinary people had to participate in the conduct of poUtical life. Despite his vast infiuenee, OrweU was never part of a movement, and remained a solitary, individualistic writer with a stubborn message: think for yourself and write the truth. In a famous statement the eighteenth-century French naturaUst Count Buffon said: "The style is the man himself." Like his hero Jonathan Swift and other writers of the Enlightenment, OrweU derived his clear style from moral integrity. There was in OrweU an unusual consistency between the gritty, combative persona that emanates from his lucid writing and his courageous, civiUzed, and inteUectuaUy truthful character. His description of Charles Dickens, another of his Uterary heroes, appUes equaUy to himself: "In every page of his work one can see a consciousness that society is wrong somewhere at the root. . . . The strongest single 113 The Kenyon Review impression one carries away from his books is that of a hatred of tyranny. . . . As a matter of course he is on the side of the underdog, always and everywhere." Dickens, OrweU observes, has "the face of a man who is always fighting against something, but who fights in the open and is not frightened, the face of a man who is generously angry—. . . a free intelligence, a type hated with equal hatred by aU the smeUy little orthodoxies which are now contending for our souls." Irving Howe summed up OrweU as "craggy, fiercely polemical, sometimes mistaken, but an utterly free man. In his readiness to stand alone and take on aU comers, he was a model for every writer of our age." OrweU belongs with Johnson, Blake, and Lawrence in the great English tradition of prophetic moralists. Works Cited Amis, Kingsley. Socialism and the Intellectuals. London: Fabian Society, 1957. Flaubert, Gustave. Selected Letters. Ed. and trans. Franeus SteegmuUer. New York: Vintage, 1953. Gleason, Abbot. Thtcditarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War. New York: Oxford UP, 1955. Gross, Miriam, ed. The World of George Orwell. London: Weidenfeld & Nieolson, 1971. Henderson, Peter, "W. Somerset Maugham," Cantuarian (King's School, Canterbury), August 1989. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Ed. Michael Oakshott. 1651; New York: Collier, 1962. Inglis, Fred. The Cruel Peace. New York: Basic Books, 1991. Katka, Franz. Letters to Friends, Family and Editors. Trans. Richard and Clara Winston. New York: Schocken, 1977. Lewis, Wyndham. One-Way Song. London: Faber and Faber, 1933. Mailer, Norman, "Orwell in 1984." Arena Television. Typescript in Orwell Archive, University College London, n.d. Maugham, W. Somerset. The Summing Up. 1938; London: Pan, 1977. Meyers, Jeffrey, ed. George Orwell: The Critical Heritage. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975. Milton, John. Paradise Lost. Orwell, George. Complete Works. Ed. Peter Davison. 20 volumes. London: Seeker & Warburg, 1998. Swift, Jonathan. A Proposal for Correcting the English Tbngue, Polite Conversation, Etc. Ed. Herbert Davis and Louis Landa. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957. Swift, Jonathan. Satires and Personal Writings. Ed. William Alfred Eddy. London: Oxford UP, 1958. 114 Copyright of Kenyon Review is the property of Kenyon Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

Orwell Revisited: Privacy in the Age of Surveillance By John W. Whitehead June 17, 2013

“You had to live—did live, from habit that became instinct—in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized.”—George Orwell, 1984 There’s a reason George Orwell’s 1984 is a predominant theme in my new book A Government of Wolves: The Emerging American Police State (available now on Amazon.com and in stores on June 25). It’s the same reason Orwell’s dystopian thriller about a futuristic surveillance society has skyrocketed to the top of book charts in the wake of recent revelations by former CIA employee and National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden that the nefarious spy agency is collecting the telephone records of millions of Verizon customers, with the complete blessing of the Obama administration. “To the future or to the past, to a time when thought is free, when men are different from one another and do not live alone— to a time when truth exists and what is done cannot be undone: From the age of uniformity, from the age of solitude, from the age of Big Brother, from the age of doublethink — greetings! ” ― George Orwell Orwell understood what many Americans, caught up in their partisan flagwaving, are still struggling to come to terms with: that there is no such thing as a government organized for the good of the people—even the best intentions among those in government inevitably give way to the desire to maintain power and control at all costs. As Orwell explains: The Party seeks power entirely for its own sake. We are not interested in the good of others; we are interested solely in power, pure power. What pure power means you will understand presently. We are different from the oligarchies of the past in that we know what we are doing. All the others, even those who resembled ourselves, were cowards and hypocrites. The German Nazis and the Russian Communists came very close to us in their methods, but they never had the courage to recognize their own motives. They pretended, perhaps they even believed, that they had seized power unwillingly and for a limited time, and that just around the corner there lay a paradise where human beings would be free and equal. We are not like that. We know that no one ever seizes power with the intention of relinquishing it. Power is not a means; it is an end. One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes the revolution in order to establish the dictatorship. The object of persecution is persecution. The object of torture is torture. The object of power is power. Now you begin to understand me. The fact that the U.S. government now has at its disposal a technological arsenal so sophisticated and invasive as to render any constitutional protections null and void, and these technologies are being used by the government to invade the privacy of the American people should not come as a surprise to anyone who has been paying attention over the past decade. Spearheaded by the NSA, which has shown itself to care little for constitutional limits or privacy, the “security/industrial complex”—a marriage of government, military and corporate interests aimed at keeping Americans under constant surveillance—has come to dominate our government and our lives. At three times the size of the CIA, constituting one third of the intelligence budget and with its own global spy network to boot, the NSA has a long history of spying on Americans, whether or not it has always had the authorization to do so. “The creatures outside looked from pig to man, and from man to pig, and from pig to man again; but already it was impossible to say which was which.”―George Orwell, Animal Farm What many fail to realize, however, is that the government is not operating alone. It cannot. It requires an accomplice. Thus, the increasingly complex security needs of our massive federal government, especially in the areas of defense, surveillance and data management, have been met within the corporate sector, which has shown itself to be a powerful ally that both depends on and feeds the growth of governmental bureaucracy. For example, USA Today reports that five years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the homeland security business was booming to such an extent that it eclipsed mature enterprises like movie-making and the music industry in annual revenue. This security spending by the government to private corporations is forecast to exceed $1 trillion in the near future. Money, power, control. There is no shortage of motives fueling the convergence of mega-corporations and government. But who is paying the price? The American people, of course, and you can be sure that it will take a toll on more than our pocketbooks. “You have government on a holy mission to ramp up information gathering and you have an information technology industry desperate for new markets,” says Peter Swire, the nation’s first privacy counselor in the Clinton Administration. “Once this is done, you will have unprecedented snooping abilities. What will happen to our private lives if we're under constant surveillance?” We’re at that point now. “Until they became conscious they will never rebel, and until after they have rebelled they cannot become conscious.”—George Orwell Americans have been conditioned to accept routine incursions on their privacy rights. However, at one time, the idea of a total surveillance state tracking one’s every move would have been abhorrent to most Americans. That all changed with the 9/11 attacks. As professor Jeffrey Rosen observes, “Before Sept. 11, the idea that Americans would voluntarily agree to live their lives under the gaze of a network of biometric surveillance cameras, peering at them in government buildings, shopping malls, subways and stadiums, would have seemed unthinkable, a dystopian fantasy of a society that had surrendered privacy and anonymity.” We have, so to speak, gone from being a nation where privacy is king to one where nothing is safe from the prying eyes of government. In search of terrorists hiding amongst us--the proverbial “needle in a haystack,” as one official termed it--the government has taken to monitoring all aspects of our lives, from cell phone calls and emails to Internet activity and credit card transactions. Much of this data is being fed through fusion centers across the country. These are state and regional intelligence centers that collect data on you. “If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear.”―George Orwell Wherever you go and whatever you do, you are now being watched-- especially if you leave behind an electronic footprint. When you use your cell phone, you leave a record of when the call was placed, who you called, how long it lasted and even where you were at the time. When you use your ATM card, you leave a record of where and when you used the card. There is even a video camera at most locations. When you drive a car enabled with GPS, you can be tracked by satellite. And all of this once-private information about your consumer habits, your whereabouts and your activities is now being fed to the U.S. government. As I document in A Government of Wolves: The Emerging American Police State, the government has nearly inexhaustible resources when it comes to tracking our movements, from electronic wiretapping devices, traffic cameras and biometrics to radio-frequency identification cards, satellites and Internet surveillance. “Big Brother is Watching You.”―George Orwell Speech recognition technology now makes it possible for the government to carry out massive eavesdropping by way of sophisticated computer systems. Phone calls can be monitored, the audio converted to text files and stored in computer databases indefinitely. And if any “threatening” words are detected--no matter how inane or silly--the record can be flagged and assigned to a government agent for further investigation. And in recent years, federal and state governments, as well as private corporations, have been amassing tools aimed at allowing them to monitor Internet content. Users are profiled and tracked in order to identify, target and even prosecute them. In such a climate, everyone is a suspect. And you’re guilty until you can prove yourself innocent. To underscore this shift in how the government now views its citizens, just before leaving office, President Bush granted the FBI wide-ranging authority to investigate individuals or groups, regardless of whether they are suspected of criminal activity. “Nothing was your own except the few cubic centimetres inside your skull. ” ― George Orwell Here’s what a lot of people fail to understand, however: it’s not just what you say or do that is being monitored, but how you think that is being tracked and targeted. We've already seen this play out on the state and federal level with hate crime legislation that cracks down on so-called “hateful” thoughts and expression, encourages self-censoring and reduces free debate on various subject matter. Total Internet surveillance is merely the next logical step in the government’s attempts to predict and, more importantly, control the populace--and it’s not as far-fetched as you might think. For example, the NSA is now designing an artificial intelligence system that is designed to anticipate your every move. In a nutshell, the NSA will feed vast amounts of the information it collects to a computer system known as Aquaint (the acronym stands for Advanced QUestion Answering for INTelligence), which the computer can then use to detect patterns and predict behavior. No information is sacred or spared. Everything from cell phone recordings and logs, to emails, to text messages, to personal information posted on social networking sites, to credit card statements, to library circulation records, to credit card histories, etc., is collected by the NSA. One NSA researcher actually quit the Aquaint program, “citing concerns over the dangers in placing such a powerful weapon in the hands of a top-secret agency with little accountability.” Thus, what we are witnessing, in the so-called name of security and efficiency, is the creation of a new class system comprised of the watched (average Americans such as you and me) and the watchers (government bureaucrats, technicians and private corporations). Clearly, the age of privacy in America is coming to a close. If Orwell’s predictions prove true, what follows will be even worse. “If you want a picture of the future,” he forewarned, “imagine a boot stamping on a human face—for ever.” URL: https://www.rutherford.org/publications_resources/john_whiteheads_commentary/ orwell_revisited_privacy_in_the_age_of_surveillance

Scholarly Orwell Article 2003 HONEST, DECENT, WRONG Author(s): Louis Menand Source: The New Yorker. 78.44 (Jan. 27, 2003): p084. From Academic OneFile. Document Type: Article Full Text: All rights reserved. Reproduced by permission of The Conde Nast Publications Inc. Full Text: Louis Menand discusses George Orwell and his legacy "Animal Farm," George Orwell's satire, which became the Cold War "Candide," was finished in 1944, the high point of the Soviet-Western alliance against fascism. It was a warning against dealing with Stalin and, in the circumstances, a prescient book. Orwell had trouble finding a publisher, though, and by the time the book finally appeared, in August, 1945, the month of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, the Cold War was already on the horizon. "Animal Farm" was an instant success in England and the United States. It was a Book-of-the-Month Club selection; it was quickly translated into many languages and distributed, in some countries, by the United States government; and it made Orwell, who had spent most of his life scraping by, famous and rich. "1984," published four years later, had even greater success. Orwell was fatally ill with pulmonary tuberculosis when he wrote it, and he died in January, 1950. He was forty-six. The revision began almost immediately. Frances Stonor Saunders, in her fascinating study "The Cultural Cold War," reports that right after Orwell's death the C.I.A. (Howard Hunt was the agent on the case) secretly bought the film rights to "Animal Farm" from his widow, Sonia, and had an animated-film version produced in England, which it distributed throughout the world. The book's final scene, in which the pigs (the Bolsheviks, in Orwell's allegory) can no longer be distinguished from the animals' previous exploiters, the humans (the capitalists), was omitted. A new ending was provided, in which the animals storm the farmhouse where the pigs have moved and liberate themselves all over again. The great enemy of propaganda was subjected, after his death, to the deceptions and evasions of propaganda--and by the very people, American Cold Warriors, who would canonize him as the great enemy of propaganda. Howard Hunt at least kept the story pegged to the history of the Soviet Union, which is what Orwell intended. Virtually every detail in "Animal Farm" allegorizes some incident in that history: the Kronstadt rebellion, the five-year plan, the Moscow trials, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Tehran conference. But although Orwell didn't want Communism, he didn't want capitalism, either. This part of his thought was carefully elided, and "Animal Farm" became a warning against political change per se. It remains so today. The cover of the current Harcourt paperback glosses the contents as follows: As ferociously fresh as it was more than half a century ago, "Animal Farm" is a parable about would-be liberators everywhere. As we witness the rise and bloody fall of the revolutionary animals through the lens of our own history, we see the seeds of totalitarianism in the most idealistic organizations; and in our most charismatic leaders, the souls of our cruelest oppressors. This is the opposite of what Orwell intended. But almost everything in the popular understanding of Orwell is a distortion of what he really thought and the kind of writer he was. Writers are not entirely responsible for their admirers. It is unlikely that Jane Austen, if she were here today, would wish to become a member of the Jane Austen Society. In his lifetime, George Orwell was regarded, even by his friends, as a contrary man. It was said that the closer you got to him the colder and more critical he became. As a writer, he was often hardest on his allies. He was a middle-class intellectual who despised the middle class and was contemptuous of intellectuals, a Socialist whose abuse of Socialists--"all that dreary tribe of highminded women and sandal-wearers and bearded fruit-juice drinkers who come flocking toward the smell of 'progress' like bluebottles to a dead cat"--was as vicious as any Tory's. He preached solidarity, but he had the habits of a dropout, and the works for which he is most celebrated, "Animal Farm," "1984," and the essay "Politics and the English Language," were attacks on people who purported to share his political views. He was not looking to make friends. But after his death he suddenly acquired an army of fans--all middle-class intellectuals eager to suggest that a writer who approved of little would have approved of them. Orwell's army is one of the most ideologically mixed up ever to assemble. John Rodden, whose "George Orwell: The Politics of Literary Reputation" was published in 1989 and recently reprinted, with a new introduction (Transaction; $30), has catalogued it exhaustively. It has included, over the years, ex-Communists, Socialists, left-wing anarchists, right-wing libertarians, liberals, conservatives, doves, hawks, the Partisan Review editorial board, and the John Birch Society: every group in a different uniform, but with the same button pinned to the lapel-- Orwell Was Right. Irving Howe claimed Orwell, and so did Norman Podhoretz. Almost the only thing Orwell's posthumous admirers have in common, besides the button, is anti-Communism. But they all somehow found support for their particular bouquet of moral and political values in Orwell's writings, which have been universally praised as "honest," "decent," and "clear." In what sense, though, can writings that have been taken to mean so many incompatible things be called "clear"? And what, exactly, was Orwell right about? Indifferent to his own person as Orwell genuinely was, his writing is essentially personal. He put himself at the center of all his nonfiction books and many of his essays, and he often used personal anecdotes in his political journalism to make, or reinforce, his points. He never figured himself as the hero of these stories, in part because his tendency to self-abnegation was fairly remorseless. But selfabnegation was perhaps the most seductive aspect of the persona he devised. Orwell had the rare talent for making readers feel that they were dealing not with a reporter or a columnist or a literary man--not with a writer--but with an ordinary person. His method for making people believe what he wrote was to make them believe, first of all, in him. He was a writer, of course--he was a graphomaniac, in fact: writing was what he lived for--and there was not much that was ordinary about him. He was born, a hundred years ago, in Bengal, where his father was a sub-agent in the Opium Department of the Indian Civil Service, and he came to England when he was one, and was brought up there by his mother. (The family name was Blair, and Orwell's given name was Eric.) Orwell's father visited the family for three months in 1907, engaging in domestic life with sufficient industry to leave his wife pregnant, and did not come back until 1912. By then, Orwell was boarding as a scholarship student at St. Cyprian's, the school he wrote about, many years later, in the essay "Such, Such Were the Joys." He studied hard and won a scholarship to Eton, and it was there that he began his career in self-denial. He deliberately slacked off, finishing a hundred and thirty-eighth in a class of a hundred and sixty-seven, and then, instead of taking the exams for university, joined the Imperial Police and went to Burma, the scene of the essays "A Hanging" and "Shooting an Elephant." In 1927, after five years in Burma, while on leave in England and with no employment prospects, he resigned. He spent the next four years as a tramp and an itinerant worker, experiences that became the basis for "Down and Out in Paris and London," the first work to appear under the pen name George Orwell, in 1933. He taught school briefly, worked in a bookstore (the subject of the essay "Bookshop Memories"), and spent two months travelling around the industrial districts in the North of England gathering material for "The Road to Wigan Pier," which came out in 1937. Orwell spent the first half of 1937 fighting with the Loyalists in Spain, where he was shot in the throat by a fascist sniper, and where he witnessed the brutal Communist suppression of the revolutionary parties in the Republican alliance. His account of these events, "Homage to Catalonia," which appeared in 1938, was, indeed, brave and iconoclastic (though not the only work of its kind), and it established Orwell in the position that he would maintain for the rest of his life, as the leading anti-Stalinist writer of the British left. During the war, Orwell took a job with the Indian section of the BBC's Eastern Service, where he produced and, with T. S. Eliot, William Empson, Louis MacNeice, and other distinguished writers, delivered radio talks, mostly on literary subjects, intended to rally the support of Indians for the British war effort. For the first time since 1927, he received the salary he had once enjoyed as a policeman in Burma, but he regarded the work as propaganda--he felt, he said, like "an orange that's been trodden on by a very dirty boot"--and, in 1943, he quit. He worked for a while as literary editor and as a columnist at the Tribune, a Socialist paper edited by Aneurin Bevan, the leader of the left wing of the Labour Party in Britain and a man Orwell admired. In 1946, after the success of "Animal Farm," and knowing that he was desperately ill with lung disease, he removed himself to one of the dankest places in the British Isles: the island of Jura, off the coast of Scotland. When he was not too sick to type, he sat in a room all day smoking black shag tobacco, and writing "1984." His biographers have noted that the life of Winston Smith at the Ministry of Truth in that novel is based in part on Orwell's own career (as he experienced it) at the BBC. Room 101, the torture chamber in the climactic scene, was the name of the room where the Eastern Service held compulsory committee meetings. Orwell (is it necessary to say?) hated committees. His first wife, Eileen, with whom he adopted a son, died in 1945. He proposed to several women thereafter, sometimes suggesting, as an inducement, that he would probably die soon and leave his widow with a valuable estate; but he struck out. Then, in 1949, when he really was on his deathbed, he married Sonia Brownell, a woman whose sex appeal was widely appreciated. Brownell had slept with Orwell once, in 1945, apparently from the mixed motives of pity and the desire to sleep with famous writers, one of her hobbies. The marriage was performed in a hospital room; Orwell died three months later. He ended up selling more books than any other serious writer of the twentieth century-- "Animal Farm" and "1984" were together translated into more than sixty languages; in 1973, English-language editions of "1984" were still selling at a rate of 1,340 copies a day--and he left all his royalties to Sonia. She squandered them and died more or less in poverty, in 1980. Today, Orwell's gravesite, in a churchyard in Sutton Courtenay, Oxfordshire, is tended by volunteers. Orwell has been posthumously psychoanalyzed, but there is no great mystery behind the choices he made in his life. He explained his motive plainly and repeatedly in his writing: he wanted to de-class himself. From his days at St. Cyprian's, and possibly even earlier, he saw the class system as a system of oppression--and nothing but a system of oppression. The guilt (his term) that he felt about his position as a member of the white imperialist bourgeoisie preceded his interest in politics as such. He spent much of his time criticizing professional Socialists, particularly the leaders of the British Labour Party, because, apart from the commitment to equality, there was not much about Socialism that was important to him. His economics were rudimentary, and he had little patience for the temporizing that ordinary politics requires. In 1945, after Germany surrendered, Churchill and the Conservatives were voted out and a Labour government came in (with Bevan as Minister of Health). In less than a year, Orwell was complaining that no steps had been taken to abolish the House of Lords. He didn't merely go on adventures in class-crossing. He turned his life into an experiment in classlessness, and the intensity of his commitment to that experiment was the main reason that his friends and colleagues found him a perverse and sometimes exasperating man. His insistence on living in uncomfortable conditions, his refusal (despite his bad lungs) to wear a hat or coat in winter, his habit of pouring his tea into the saucer and slurping it noisily (in the working-class manner) struck his friends not as colorful eccentricities but as reproaches directed at their own bourgeois addiction to comfort and decorum. Which they were. Orwell was a brilliant and cultured man, with an Eton accent and an anomalous, vaguely French mustache, who wore the same beat-up tweed jacket nearly every day, made (very badly) his own furniture, and lived, most of the time, one step up from squalor. He read Joyce and kept a goat in the back yard. He was completely authentic and completely inauthentic at the same time-- a man who believed that to write honestly he needed to publish under a false name. Orwell's writing is effortlessly compelling. He was in the tradition of writers who-- as Leslie Stephen said of Defoe--understand that there is a literary fascination in a clear recitation of the facts. There is much more to Orwell than this, though. As Christopher Hitchens points out in "Why Orwell Matters" (Basic; $24), a book more critical of Orwell than the title might suggest, "Homage to Catalonia" survives as a model of political journalism, and "Animal Farm" and "1984" belong permanently to the literature of resistance. Whatever uses they were made to serve in the West, they gave courage to people in the East. The territory that Orwell covered in "Down and Out in Paris and London" and "The Road to Wigan Pier"--the lower-class extremes--was by no means new to nonfiction prose. Engels wrote about it feelingly in "The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844"; Jacob Riis studied it in "How the Other Half Lives." But Orwell discovered a tone--"generous anger" is the phrase he once used to describe Dickens, and it has been applied to him, but "cool indignation" seems a little more accurate--that has retained its freshness after seventy years. Orwell's essays have recently been collected, with exceptional thoroughness, by John Carey (Everyman; $35). The essay on Dickens, published in 1940, is weaker criticism than Edmund Wilson's "Dickens: The Two Scrooges," which came out the same year. But Orwell's essay on Henry Miller, "Inside the Whale," which also appeared in 1940, was original and unexpected. His personal essays, especially "Shooting an Elephant" and "Such, Such Were the Joys," are models of the form. Still, his qualities as a writer are obscured by the need of his admirers to claim for his work impossible virtues. Honesty was important to Orwell. He was certainly quick enough to accuse people he disagreed with of dishonesty. But there is sometimes a confusion, when people talk about Orwell's writing, between honesty and objectivity. "He said what he believed" and "He told it like it was" refer to different virtues. One of the effects of the tone Orwell achieved--the tone of a reasonable, modest, supremely undogmatic man, hoping for the best but resigned to the worst--was the impression of transparency, something that Orwell himself, in an essay called "Why I Write," identified as the ideal of good prose. It was therefore a shock when Bernard Crick, in the first major biography of Orwell, authorized by Sonia Orwell and published the year of her death, confessed that he had found it difficult to corroborate some of the incidents in Orwell's autobiographical writings. Jeffrey Meyers, whose biography "Orwell: Wintry Conscience of a Generation" came out in 2000, concluded that Orwell sometimes "heightened reality to achieve dramatic effects." Crick has doubts that the event Orwell recounted in remarkably fine detail in "A Hanging"--he describes the condemned man stepping aside to avoid a puddle of water on his way to the scaffold--ever happened, and Meyers notes that, during his years as a tramp, Orwell would take time off to rest and write in the homes of family and friends, something he does not mention in "Down and Out in Paris and London," where the narrator is sometimes on the verge of death by starvation. Both Crick and Meyers suspect that "Shooting an Elephant" has fabricated elements. And everything that Orwell wrote was inflected by his predilection for the worm's-eye view. When biographers asked Orwell's contemporaries what it was really like at St. Cyprian's, or in Burma, or working at the bookshop, the usual answer was "It was bad, but it wasn't that bad." The point is not that Orwell made things up. The point is that he used writing in a literary, not a documentary, way: he wrote in order to make you see what he wanted you to see, to persuade. During the war, Orwell began contributing a "London Letter" to Partisan Review. In one letter, he wrote that park railings in London were being torn down for scrap metal, but that only working-class neighborhoods were being plundered; parks and squares in upper-class neighborhoods, he reported, were untouched. The story, Crick says, was widely circulated. When a friend pointed out that it was untrue, Orwell is supposed to have replied that it didn't matter, "it was essentially true." You need to grasp Orwell's premises, in other words, before you can start talking about the "truth" of what he writes. He is not saying, This is the way it objectively was from any possible point of view. He is saying, This is the way it looked to someone with my beliefs. Otherwise, his work can be puzzling. "Down and Out in Paris and London" is a powerful book, but you are always wondering what this obviously decent, well-read, talented person is doing washing dishes in the kitchen of a Paris hotel. In "The Road to Wigan Pier," Orwell gave the reader some help with this problem by explaining, at length, where he came from, what his views were, and why he went to live with the miners. Orwell was not a reporter or a sociologist. He was an advocate. He had very definite political opinions, and promoting them was his reason for writing. "No book is genuinely free of political bias," he asserted in "Why I Write." "Every line of serious work that I have written since 1936 has been written, directly or indirectly, against totalitarianism and for democratic Socialism, as I understand it." Here we arrive at the challenge presented by the "Orwell Was Right" button. Hitchens says that there were three great issues in the twentieth century, and that Orwell was right on all three: imperialism, fascism, and Stalinism. What does this mean, though? Orwell was against imperialism, fascism, and Stalinism. Excellent. Many people were against them in Orwell's time, and a great many more people have been against them since. The important question, after condemning those things, was what to do about them, and how to understand the implications for the future. On this level, Orwell was almost always wrong. Orwell thought that any Englishman who boasted of liberty and prosperity while India was still a colony was a hypocrite. "In order that England may live in comparative comfort, a hundred million Indians must live on the verge of starvation--an evil state of affairs, but you acquiesce in it every time you step into a taxi or eat a plate of strawberries and cream," he wrote in "The Road to Wigan Pier." Still, he did not believe that India was capable of complete independence, and was still saying so as late as 1943. At first, he had the idea that the British Empire should be turned into "a federation of Socialist states, like a looser and freer version of the Union of Soviet Republics," but eventually he arrived at another solution. In 1943, entering a controversy in the pages of the Tribune over the future of Burma, which had been invaded by Japan, he laid out his position. The notion of an independent Burma, he explained, was as ludicrous as the notion of an independent Lithuania or Luxembourg. To grant those countries independence would be to create a bunch of "comic opera states," he wrote. "The plain fact is that small nationalities cannot be independent, because they cannot defend themselves." The answer was to place "the whole main-land of south-east Asia, together with Formosa, under the guidance of China, while leaving the islands under an Anglo-American-Dutch condominium." Orwell was against colonial exploitation, in other words, but not in favor of national selfdetermination. If this is anti-imperialism, make the most of it. Orwell took a particular dislike to Gandhi. He referred to him, in private correspondence, as a "bit of a charlatan"; in 1943, he wrote that "there is indeed a sort of apocalyptic truth in the statement of the German radio that the teachings of Hitler and Gandhi are the same." One of his last essays was on Gandhi, written two years after India, and one year after Burma, became independent, and a year after Gandhi's assassination. It is a grudging piece of writing. The method of Satyagraha, Orwell said, might have been effective against the British, but he was doubtful about its future as a tactic for political struggle. (A few years later, Martin Luther King, Jr., would find a use for it.) He confessed to "a sort of aesthetic distaste" for Gandhi himself--Gandhi was, after all, just the sort of sandal-wearing, vegetarian mystic Orwell had always abhorred--and he attributed the success of the Indian independence movement as much to the election of a Labour government in Britain as to Gandhi's efforts. "I have never been able to feel much liking for Gandhi, but I do not feel sure that as a political thinker he was wrong in the main, nor do I believe that his life was a failure" was the most that he could bring himself to say. Hitler, on the other hand, Orwell did find personally appealing. "I have never been able to dislike Hitler," he admitted, in 1940. Hitler, it seems, "grasped the falsity of the hedonistic attitude to life," which Orwell called the attitude of "nearly all Western thought since the last war, certainly all 'progressive' thought." This response--the idea that fascism, whatever might be wrong with it, is at least about the necessity of struggle and self-sacrifice--is not that far from the response of the relatively few people in England (there were more in France) who actively endorsed fascism. Orwell was opposed to Nazi Germany. But he thought that Britain, as an imperial power, had no moral right to go to war against Hitler, and he was sure that a war would make Britain fascist. This is a theme in his novel "Coming Up for Air," which was published in 1939, and that winter he was urging friends to begin planning "illegal anti-war activities." He thought that it would be a good idea to set up an underground antiwar organization, in anticipation of what he called the "pre-war fascising processes," and predicted that he would end up in a British concentration camp because of his views. He kept up his antiwar agitation until August, 1939. Then, with the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, he flipped completely. In "The Lion and the Unicorn," in 1941, he accused British antiwar intellectuals of "sabotage." They had become "Europeanized"; they sneered at patriotism. (This from a man who, two years earlier, had been proposing an illegal campaign against government policy.) They had weakened the morale of the English people, "so that the Fascist nations judged that they were 'decadent' and that it was safe to plunge into war. . . . Ten years of systematic Blimpbaiting affected even the Blimps themselves and made it harder than it had been before to get intelligent young men to enter the armed forces." The prediction of a fascist Britain had evidently been forgotten. What were Orwell's political opinions? Orwell was a revolutionary Socialist. That is, he hoped that there would be a Socialist revolution in England, and, as he said more than once, if violence was necessary, violence there should be. "I dare say the London gutters will have to run with blood," he wrote in "My Country Right or Left," in 1940. And a year later, in "The Lion and the Unicorn," "It is only by revolution that the native genius of the English people can be set free. . . . Whether it happens with or without bloodshed is largely an accident of time and place." Orwell had concluded long before that capitalism had failed unambiguously, and he never changed his opinion. He thought that Hitler's military success on the Continent proved once and for all the superiority of a planned economy. "It is not certain that Socialism is in all ways superior to capitalism, but it is certain that, unlike capitalism, it can solve the problems of production and consumption," he wrote. "The State simply calculates what goods will be needed and does its best to produce them." A Socialist England, as Orwell described it, would be a classless society with virtually no private property. The State would own everything, and would require "that nobody shall live without working." Orwell thought that perhaps fifteen acres of land, "at the very most," might be permitted, presumably to allow subsistence farming, but that there would be no ownership of land in town areas. Incomes would be equalized, so that the highest income would never be greater than ten times the lowest. Above that, the tax rate should be a hundred per cent. The House of Lords would be abolished, though Orwell thought that the monarchy might be preserved. (Everybody would drink at the same pub, presumably, but one of the blokes would get to wear a crown.) As for its foreign policy: a Socialist state "will not have the smallest scruple about attacking hostile neutrals or stirring up native rebellions in enemy colonies." Orwell was not a cultural radical. Democracy and moral decency (once the blood was cleaned off the pavement, anyway) were central to his vision of Socialism. His admirers remembered the democracy and the decency, and managed to forget most of the rest. When "Homage to Catalonia" was finally published in the United States, in 1952, Lionel Trilling wrote an introduction, which Jeffrey Meyers has called "probably the most influential essay on Orwell." It is a work of short fiction. "Orwell clung with a kind of wry, grim pride to the old ways of the last class that had ruled the old order," Trilling wrote; he exemplified the meaning of the phrase "my station and its duties," and respected "the old bourgeois virtues." He even "came to love things, material possessions." A fully housebroken antiCommunist. It is amusing to imagine Orwell slurping his tea at the Columbia Faculty House. Understanding Orwell's politics helps to explain that largely inaccurate prediction about postwar life "1984." There was, Hitchens points out, an enormous blind spot in Orwell's view of the world: the United States. Orwell never visited the United States and, as Hitchens says, showed little curiosity about what went on there. To the extent that he gave it any attention, he tended to regard the United States as vulgar, materialistic, and a threat to the English language. ("Many Americans pronounce . . . water as though it had not in it, or even as though it had no consonant in it at all, except the w," he claimed. "On the whole we are justified in regarding the American language with suspicion.") He thought that, all things considered, Britain was better off as a client-state of Washington than as a client-state of Moscow, but he did not look on an increased American role in the world with hope. Since Orwell was certain that capitalism was doomed, the only future he could imagine for the United States was as some sort of totalitarian regime. He laid out his view in 1947, in the pages of Partisan Review. There were, he explained, three possible futures in a nuclear world: a preemptive nuclear strike by the United States against the Soviet Union; a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, wiping out most of the race and returning life to the Bronze Age; and a stalemate created by the fear of actually using atomic bombs and other weapons of mass destruction--what would be known as the policy of mutually assured destruction. This third possibility, Orwell argued, was the worst of all: It would mean the division of the world among two or three vast superstates, unable to conquer one another and unable to be overthrown by any internal rebellion. In all probability their structure would be hierarchic, with a semi-divine caste at the top and outright slavery at the bottom, and the crushing out of liberty would exceed anything that the world has yet seen. Within each state the necessary psychological atmosphere would be kept up by complete severance from the outer world, and by a continuous phony war against rival states. Civilizations of this type might remain static for thousands of years. Orwell's third possibility was, of course, the path that history took. Mutually assured destruction was the guiding policy of the arms race and the Cold War. Orwell himself coined the term "Cold War," and after his death he became a hero to Cold Warriors, liberal and conservative alike. But he hated the idea of a Cold War--he preferred being bombed back to the Bronze Age--because it seems never to have entered his mind that the United States would be a force for liberty and democracy. "1984" is, precisely, Orwell's vision of what the Cold War might be like: a mindless and interminable struggle among totalitarian monsters. Was he right? Some people in 1949 received "1984" as an attack on the Labour Party (in the book, the regime of Big Brother is said to have derived from the principles of "Ingsoc"; that is, English Socialism), and Orwell was compelled to issue, through his publisher, a statement clarifying his intentions. He was a supporter of the Labour Party, he said. "I do not believe that the kind of society I describe necessarily will arrive," he continued, "but I believe (allowing of course for the fact that the book is satire) that something resembling it could arrive. I believe also that totalitarian ideas have taken root in the minds of intellectuals everywhere, and I have tried to draw these ideas out to their logical consequences." The attitude behind this last sentence seems to me the regrettable part of Orwell's legacy. If ideas were to stand or fall on the basis of their logically possible consequences, we would have no ideas, because the ultimate conceivable consequence of every idea is an absurdity--is, in some way, "against life." We don't live just by ideas. Ideas are part of the mixture of customs and practices, intuitions and instincts that make human life a conscious activity susceptible to improvement or debasement. A radical idea may be healthy as a provocation; a temperate idea may be stultifying. It depends on the circumstances. One of the most tiresome arguments against ideas is that their "tendency" is to some dire condition--to totalitarianism, or to moral relativism, or to a war of all against all. Orwell did not invent this kind of argument, but he provided, in "1984," a vocabulary for its deployment. "Big Brother" and "doublethink" and "thought police" are frequently cited as contributions to the language. They are, but they belong to the same category as "liar" and "pervert" and "madman." They are conversation-stoppers. When a court allows videotape from a hidden camera to be used in a trial, people shout "Big Brother." When a politician refers to his proposal to permit logging on national land as "environmentally friendly," he is charged with "doublethink." When a critic finds sexism in a poem, she is accused of being a member of the "thought police." The terms can be used to discredit virtually any position, which is one of the reasons that Orwell became everyone's favorite political thinker. People learned to make any deviation from their own platform seem the first step on the slippery slope to "1984." There are Big Brothers and thought police in the world, just as there are liars and madmen. "1984" may have been intended to expose the true character of Soviet Communism, but, because it describes a world in which there are no moral distinctions among the three fictional regimes that dominate the globe, it ended up encouraging people to see totalitarian "tendencies" everywhere. There was visible totalitarianism, in Russia and in Eastern Europe; but there was also the invisible totalitarianism of the so-called "free world." When people talk about Big Brother, they generally mean a system of covert surveillance and manipulation, oppression in democratic disguise (unlike the system in Orwell's book, which is so overt that it is advertised). "1984" taught people to imagine government as a conspiracy against liberty. This is why the John Birch Society used 1984 as the last four digits in the phone number of its Washington office. Orwell himself was a sniffer of tendencies. He, too, could blur moral distinctions among the things he disliked, between the BBC and the Ministry of Love, for instance; he apparently thought of the Ministry of Love as the logical consequence of the mass media's "tendency" to thought control. His most celebrated conflation of dislikes is the essay, for many years a staple of the freshman-composition syllabus, "Politics and the English Language." Orwell wrote many strong essays, but "Politics and the English Language," published in 1946, is not one of them. Half of the essay is an attack on bad prose. Orwell is against abstractions, mixed metaphors, Latinate roots, polysyllabic words, cliches, and most of the other stylistic vices identified in Fowler's "Modern English Usage" (in its fourth printing in 1946). The other half is an attack on political dishonesty. Certain political terms, Orwell argues, are often used in a consciously dishonest way. That is, the person who uses them has his own private definition, but allows his hearer to think he means something quite different. Statements like Marshal Petain was a true patriot, The Soviet Press is the freest in the world, The Catholic Church is opposed to persecution, are almost always made with intent to deceive. Fowler would have found nothing to complain about, though, in the sentences Orwell objects to. They are as clear as can be. Somehow, Orwell has run together his distaste for flowery, stale prose with his distaste for fascism, Stalinism, and Roman Catholicism. He makes it seem that the problem with fascism (and the rest) is, at bottom, a problem of style. They're bad, we are encouraged to feel, because their language is bad, because they're ugly. This is not an isolated instance of this way of thinking in Orwell. From his earliest work, he was obsessed with body odor, and olfactory metaphors are probably the most consistent figure in his prose, right to the end of his life, when he congratulated Gandhi for leaving a clean smell when he died. But Orwell didn't think of the relation between smell and virtue as only metaphorical. He took quite seriously the question of whether it was ever possible to feel true solidarity with a man who smelled. Many pages in "The Road to Wigan Pier" are devoted to the problem. In his fiction, a bad character is, often, an ugly, sweaty, smelly character. Smell has no relation to virtue, however. Ugliness has no relation to insincerity or evil, and short words with Anglo-Saxon roots have no relation to truth or goodness. Political speech, like etiquette, has its codes and its euphemisms, and Orwell is right to insist that it is important to be able to decipher them. He says that if what he calls political speech--by which he appears to mean political cliches--were translated into plain, everyday speech, confusion and insincerity would begin to evaporate. It is a worthy, if unrealistic, hope. But he does not stop there. All politics, he writes, "is a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred and schizophrenia." And by the end of the essay he has damned the whole discourse: "Political language--and with variations this is true of all political parties, from Conservatives to Anarchists--is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable." All political parties? Orwell had sniffed out a tendency. Orwell's prose was so effective that it seduced many readers into imagining, mistakenly, that he was saying what they wanted him to say, and what they themselves thought. Orwell was not clairvoyant; he was not infallible; he was not even consistent. He changed his mind about things, as most writers do. He dramatized out of a desire to make the world more the way he wished it to be, as most writers do. He also said what he thought without hedging or trimming, as few writers do all the time. It is strange how selectively he was heard. It is no tribute to him to turn his books into anthems to a status quo he hated. Orwell is admired for being a paragon when he was, self-consciously, a naysayer and a misfit. If he is going to be welcomed into the pantheon of right-thinking liberals, he should at least be allowed to bring along his goat.

Roney 13 13 ARTICLES Postmodernist Prose and George Orwell Stephen K. Roney

T he essential notion of English style since the 1920s has been that clarity and simplicity are the essence of good writing. Orwell in England, Strunk & White in America,1 have been the main proponents. We might call this, for the sake of argument, the modern style. There is a new challenge to this in contemporary academics. Judith Butler is the spokesperson. She has been charged with bad writing, along with such scholars as Gayatri Spivak.2 Indeed, she won the annual “Bad Writing Award” from the journal Philosophy and Literature. Butler responded, in a letter to the London Review of Books and in an op-ed piece in the New York Times, that clarity and simplicity are impossible if one is discussing a topic deeply. She claims for her side such writers as Adorno and Marcuse. This might be called, for the sake of argument, the postmodern claim. Are Butler and the postmodernists right? Have editors been holding back academic and social progress? Have we been dumbing the culture down? First, let’s note Orwell’s argument for simplicity and clarity, presented in his essay “Politics and the English Language.” 3 a) Pretentious diction and technical sounding words “give an air of scientific impartiality to biased judgements.” Hence, it is a rhetorical trick; a way for bad ideas to hide. As such, it retards the discourse, on whatever subject. b) “Orthodoxy, of whatever colour, seems to demand a lifeless, imitative style. . . . This reduced state of consciousness, if not indispensable, is at any rate favourable to political conformity. . . . Every such phrase anaesthetizes a portion of one’s brain.” I.e., clear thinking is only made possible by clear writing and the avoidance of stock phrases. c) “The great enemy of clear language is insincerity. . . . Political language is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.” That is, it promotes plays for power over the search for truth and the effort to express truth. Now, let’s summarize Butler’s implied counter-argument for the style fa- vored by postmodernists such as herself, Gayatri Spivak, and Homi Bhabha,4 as given in the London Review of Books and New York Times: Stephen K. Roney is past president of the Editors’ Association of Canada. He is coauthor of Meeting Editorial Standards (Toronto: Captus Press, 1995). 14 Academic Questions / Spring 2002 a) Difficult ideas, she implies, must necessarily be expressed in difficult language. “Surely. . . theorists should [not] confine themselves to writing introductory primers.” 5 “Language plays an important role in shaping and attuning our common or ‘natural’ understanding of social and political realities.” 6 “[T]he difficulty of. . . [Spivak’s] work is fresh air when read against the truisms which, now fully commodified as ‘radi- cal theory,’ pass as critical thinking.” 7 This first claim seems directly to contradict Orwell’s second: he argues, or asserts, that difficult ideas require the plainest language possible, while simple or foolish ideas are more likely to be expressed in complex terms. b) Language conditions thought. Therefore, fitting discourse into any one prescribed style proscribes what can be thought or said. “Only what they [the critics of postmodern style] do not need first to understand, they consider understandable; only the word coined by commerce,” she argues, suggesting that the current style has something to do with capitalism and the rule of the bourgeoisie, “and really alienated, touches them as familiar.”8 Butler quotes Marcuse’s Marxist analysis approvingly on this point: “If what [the intellectual] says could be said in terms of ordinary language he would probably have done so in the first place. [Understanding] presupposes the collapse and invalidation of precisely that universe of discourse and behaviour into which you want to translate it.”9 And she speaks disparagingly of “truisms which, now fully commodified as ‘radical theory,’ pass as critical thinking” 10—the use of the term “commodified” suggests again a claim that modern style is capitalist style. Her second point, therefore, seems to be in opposition to Orwell’s third point: he saw the plain style as the one way to ensure that ideology did not dictate style. This political manipulation of language was, of course, something he feared above all else; it is the “Newspeak” of his novel 1984. Yet, to Butler, apparently, if you want to express an opinion that does not fit the opinions of those who formed the language, you must be obscure. You cannot follow the rules of style. c) Obscurity is the proper medium to represent the obscure. “Luckily for us, Spivak’s new book gives us the political landscape of culture in all its obscurity and proximity.”11 This seems to be a separate, third point: if you are describing something obscure, your language should be obscure (“nuanced,” in the current postmodern jargon) to reflect this accurately. Roney 15 d) Finally, Butler appeals to authority. She has not invented this trend in language, she notes; the Frankfurt School did. She might also have mentioned Kant; other postmodernists have. She quotes not only Marcuse, but Adorno: “Man is the ideology of dehumanization.” 12 Adorno, she argues, here objects to the use of the word “man” as itself ideological. For the most part, then, Butler and Orwell seem to be making opposite assumptions about the nature of language. Is there any objective stance from which we can judge whether the one or the other has got it right? Let’s look more closely at Butler’s points, one by one. Difficult ideas require difficult language We find this in the hard sciences. A newly-discovered thing requires a coined word, and these can be impenetrable to a newcomer: “charm” (on the sub- atomic level), “quark,” “quantum leap,” or, for that matter, “ROM,” or “DOS.” Scientific or academic precision may require a special term even for familiar things. If you ask a Korean, for example, whether ducks can fly, he will tell you they cannot; but the average Canadian is equally certain that they can. The problem is that the Korean language classifies “duck” and “wild duck” as quite different things, while English sees them as essentially the same. Latin names for animal species avoid such problems. Similar semantic issues are common in philosophy. Specialized terminology may, accordingly, be needed to ensure we are talking about the same thing. However, to ensure that we are talking about the same thing, note that this need for specialized terms is not quite the same issue as that of clarity of style generally. The use of unfamiliar words is only one element; scientists can write well or badly by Orwell’s rules, apart from using jargon terms. Einstein, for example, wrote with great clarity. It is worth noting that Butler’s academic writing, and that of other postmodernists like Spivak and Bhabha, do not conform to Orwell’s rules on other points; yet this argument apparently addresses only this one aspect of style. For his part, Orwell stressed he was talking of political language; this is apparent in the very title of his essay, “Politics and the English Language.” From his point of view, the issue would presumably be whether Butler, and the other postmodernists, were using obscure or uncommon terminology for the sake of scientific precision, or for political aims. In fact, Butler is explicit in asserting that her goals are political, not scientific. Butler does not, indeed, believe in science or in the possibility of scientific precision. When a participant at a seminar protested to Butler that it is necessary to believe there is right and wrong, truth and error, Butler’s response was: “for political reasons, it’s extremely important to use those terms, and not to know what their future and final form will take.” 13 Indeed, the word 16 Academic Questions / Spring 2002 she chooses to illustrate her point about technical terms is clearly an example of political terminology: “hegemony.” Butler defines “hegemony,” illustrating the need for such technical terms, as “a dominance so entrenched that we take it for granted, and even appear to consent to it.” 14 This is, of course, not the dictionary definition of “hegemony.” The OED gives the common English meaning of the word as “Leadership, predomi- nance, preponderance; esp. the leadership or predominant authority of one state of a confederacy or union over the others.” There is nothing here about it being unconscious or hidden. Butler’s use, on the other hand, implies and requires acceptance of a postmodern concept, essentially the Marxist one of “ideology,” perhaps here combined with Freud’s idea of unconscious motivation. Neither of these theo- ries, Marx’s or Freud’s, has ever been established scientifically or philosophi- cally to the general satisfaction of thinkers; they are very much open to debate, and, in the case of Marxism, specifically political debate. Butler’s use is ac- cordingly, at the least, rhetorical, and open to the Orwellian charge that she is giving to airy nothing a name and a habitation, “giving an appearance of solidity to pure wind.” 15 Is there any reason, without accepting Marxist/Freudian/postmodernist theory, to suppose there is such a thing as “hegemony” in this sense? Does not Butler’s usage—is it not indeed designed to—disguise that fact? Does it not do so for essentially political reasons? More generally, against Butler’s claim that difficult subjects require diffi- cult or specialized language, there is the obvious truth that many—indeed, most—generally recognized “great thinkers” have been clear and lucid in their writing. This is especially true in Butler’s field, the humanities. Freud won the Goethe Prize for Literature. Bertrand Russell, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Henri Bergson won the Nobel Prize for Literature. Hume, Descartes, Plato, Darwin, Berkeley, Pascal, Rousseau, Augustine, and Marx are all models of literary style of the Orwellian sort, plain, elegant, clear of expression. Is Butler claiming to be deeper than all of them? Can she be rejecting the greatness of all as a social construct? How can she, when her own admitted starting points are Marx and Freud? Nor is it enough, for the present point, to show that it is possible to express difficult ideas in difficult language. For Butler’s thesis to hold, it must be necessary to do so. For Butler, no syntactically simply sentence can express other than a “truism,” a thing too obviously true to be worth saying. Let’s look at a few counter-examples: “Let the dead bury their own dead.” (New Testament) “What is the sound of one hand clapping?” (Zen koan) “I think, therefore I am.” (Descartes) “Know thyself.” (Oracle at Delphi; quoted approvingly by Plato, attributed to Socrates) Roney 17 “He who knows, does not speak; he who speaks, does not know.” (Tao Te Ching) “Whoever eats me will draw life from me.” (New Testament) “The word was made flesh; he lived among us.” (New Testament) All of these are expressed in the simplest language. Yet they are taken by various cultures to be expressions of some of the profoundest thoughts those cultures have produced. For most of them, although expressed simply, the true and complete meaning is not immediately apparent. All are quite prob- ably true; none could, I submit, fairly be characterized as a “truism.” Conversely, it does not seem to follow that a phrase that is difficult to parse grammatically, or language that is unfamiliar to the average person, is diffi- cult to conceive. There seems no necessary relationship between a complex sentence and a complex thought. As if to illustrate the point, a wag at Monash University has set up a web page called “The Post-Modernism Generator.” Its software generates mechanically an example of Butlerish prose, with the ca- veat at the end of the page that “The essay you have probably just seen is completely meaningless and was randomly generated. . . . More detailed tech- nical information may be found in Monash University Department of Com- puter Science Technical Report 96/264: ‘On the Simulation of Postmodernism and Mental Debility Using Recursive Transition Networks.’” 16 A second counter-example of sorts is the celebrated Alan Sokal essay in Social Text.17 Sokal, a physicist at NYU, submitted and successfully published a paper in this postmodernist journal arguing that the physical world of science was a social construct. He later declared the piece a deliberate hoax, a “com- pilation of pomo [postmodern] gibberish” and “an annotated bibliography of charlatanism and nonsense.” 18 Language radically conditions thought; our present language enforces capitalist hegemony. There are, properly, two points here. That language conditions thought is, in fact, an unpopular claim among modern linguists, generally dismissed as the “Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis.” Nevertheless, in the present debate, it is Orwell’s premise, too. Orwell proposed the rules of modern English usage, just after the Second World War, in the belief that language and style have political causes and consequences. The same claim, as noted, figures in 1984. It is also clear, at least to the present author, that there is a relationship between language and politics in various cultures: hierarchical societies tend to have elaborate honorifics, while honorific forms have generally disappeared from languages like English and French. We no longer use the intimate “thee,” for example; everybody now is “monsieur.” However, there is a limit to how far this point will push. If language fully conditioned thought, it would follow that we would not be able to express or grasp the claim that language conditions thought. Our own thought would be 18 Academic Questions / Spring 2002 conditioned by the words in which we stated the proposition, to the extent that we could have no clear view of any linguistic order but our own. We could say nothing objective about another language, and nothing about language generally. The claim disproves the claim; it is on a par with the paradox, “Ev- erything I say is a lie.” The example given, differences in honorifics, can be equally explained by changing circumstances’ altering language, making some grammar and vo- cabulary practically obsolete, rather than by language altering thought. The buggy whip, in turn, probably did not disappear because people stopped saying “buggy whip.” The test case is gender. French, Italian, and Spanish have a universal gen- der distinction; Chinese and Korean have none, even for people. English is in the middle, with gender for people but not for objects. It should follow, from the Butlerian thesis, that sexual discrimination would be greatest in France and least in China and Korea. Most observers do not find this so. Nevertheless, this is not germane to the choice between Butler and Orwell; both accept the premise that language conditions thought, at least to some extent. However, if the possibility of conditioning is not great, as the above examples suggest, Orwell’s position seems the more plausible one: the solution is to keep things simple and general. For no one system could then plausibly be so overwhelmingly powerful as to condition our thought so completely that we “take it for granted, and even appear to consent to it.” Yet this is what Butler assumes. We can be more definite, on historical grounds, in examining the second part of Butler’s claim here, that the English tongue and style we know is “coined by commerce.” Does it indeed enforce capitalist assumptions? For the modern style per se, Butler is certainly wrong. If it was meant to impose any particular ideology, it is that of socialism, not capitalism. Orwell, its main proponent, was a socialist, a leftist, a Marxist,19 who sought to encour- age social progress and equality. He advised sticking to short, Anglo-Saxon words largely as it was the language of the common man—of the oppressed proletariat, if you prefer. Nor does Orwellian style seem in any way to inform the actual practice of commerce, of large corporations, today. Is corporate writing generally a model of plain speech and clarity? Just the reverse, if the test case is the internal memo: corporations and MBAs love jargon and indeterminate speech. Contracts, too, are rarely models of simplicity or of clarity; but contracts are the essence of all trade or exchange. Advertising may be; but that is only one form of “corporate speech.” And its plainness may better be explained by the need to communicate effectively to as broad a group as possible as by any ideologi- cal content. Nor is advertising that uses novel terms or ambiguous phrasing most to be trusted; which tends to illustrate Orwell’s point. Roney 19 In terms of the history of the language, the question can be quickly settled by etymological research. Choose a handful of Anglo-Saxon terms, the sort Orwell advocates; look them up in the Oxford English Dictionary. Find the date they were first observed in print. If this was before the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century, they are not the creations of capitalism, in- vented to impose capitalist power structures. The power structures, on the Marxist model, changed from feudal to capitalist only at that time. None of them were. These, rather, are the oldest words in English. The same is probably equally true of simple, daily terms in French, Korean, or any other language you might name. These are precisely, as Orwell argues, the terms least likely to be influenced by any particular historical regime. Does Butler, then, really choose to go far beyond (and away from) Marx and argue that all of past history has been radically conditioned by capitalist oppression? Besides its apparent logical impossibility, such a general premise that any culture is so radically conditioned, by language, by economics, or by its structure of power, leads us down paths we may not want to go. If culture circumscribes thought, it of course follows that different cultures and languages will produce different thoughts, different ideologies. This would imply a correspondingly radical difference among the different cultures and nations—the different “races,” if you will—of mankind. Moreover, if it is possible significantly to improve any one language for purposes of either political advancement or profundity of thought, as Butler implicitly claims, it follows that one existing language may and quite probably will be superior to another for purposes of political liberty, or indeed for thinking per se. The plausible assertion of radical cultural superiority and inferiority is enshrined in this thesis. It may be so, but it is not a pleasant or a politically progressive thought. The obscure is best described by the obscure. This, Butler’s apparent third point, sounds satisfyingly McLuhanesque: if you are describing something obscure, your language should be obscure to reflect this accurately. This makes some seeming sense. Overly-precise language can, postmodernists argue, enforce distinctions that do not really exist. Giving two distinct names to two types of bird can be scientifically misleading if the two actually interbreed, and there is a continuum of individuals with distinct features between the two supposed species. This charge of unnecessary over-classification has recently been argued in the case of the human “races,” for example; albeit perhaps for political, more than scientific, reasons. It is per- haps a real issue, as well, in the case of classifying human individuals by sup- posed disability. 20 Academic Questions / Spring 2002 There is a difference, however, between demonstrating that terminology is too precise in any given case—that there has been, in effect, an error in classification—and demonstrating that terminological accuracy is wrong for an entire area of human endeavor, such as the humanities or culture studies; or, indeed, to postmodernism, for all discourse. As a possibly illustrative parallel, the fact that many first graders make errors in arithmetic does not make two and two any more probably five. That oversimplification is a legitimate con- cern does not mean all simplification is oversimplification. For Butler’s thesis to hold, then, oversimplification must first be shown to be a pervasive problem. And she must also establish that it is not, by comparison, in whatever other language or style she proposes. Orwell would agree, as would any modernist, that there is a time for obscu- rity in language. To express the muddle of emotion in his Wasteland, for example, T.S. Eliot ends his verse lines with the weak gerund form, a violation of Strunk & White’s rules for “vigorous” speech—to show precisely this lack of vigor. Politeness also commonly requires a certain indirection. But this, surely, is exceptional, and gains its force from its exceptionality. Orwell simply believes that the opposite, in practice, is more often true. More often, the greater the initial obscurity, the greater the need for clarity in ex- pression, even to understand that the object is obscure—leaving aside any intent to dispel that obscurity. Otherwise, by the same postmodern logic, if you are visiting a dangerous place, your approach to it should be made or kept dangerous. If you write a technical manual on a difficult operation, say safety measures for a nuclear reactor, you should ensure that the writing is as difficult as possible to understand, to represent the task fairly. If you teach a difficult subject, you should choose your teaching style to ensure it stays difficult. This becomes Wonderland logic; this becomes a caucus race, where everyone ends precisely where they began, and all must have prizes. Explaining the obscure by the obscure, in other words, seems an only occasionally valuable technique, and only to the ultimate goal of making the obscure, finally, less obscure. If your general goal is to keep the obscure obscure, one wonders, why is one speaking, or writing, or teaching, in the first place? The appeal to authority. The Frankfurt School. If we disagree with Butler, Butler points out, we may also have to throw out other thinkers. While we have cited philosophers who were great literary stylists, there are counter-examples: Adorno, Marcuse. Kant’s writing is impen- etrable and full of specialized terminology; a random fog index produces a reading level, in translation, of grade 26.20 Is Kant also to be dismissed? It should be noted, first, that an appeal to authority is not a rational argu- ment. The authority must itself be tested. We have no obligation to assume the correctness of either Kant or the Frankfurt School. Roney 21 Moreover, Butler’s argument once again not only requires that it be possible to be a good thinker and still a “bad” stylist; it must be necessary to use bad style to be a good thinker. I, for one, while I would not choose to dismiss Kant, am certainly prepared to dismiss his writing style. It was, indeed, in his own day, profitably parodied by Fichte. Nor am I ready to dismiss Adorno. The quote Butler chooses from Adorno to illustrate her point is “Man is the ideology of dehumanization.” It is certainly obscure enough, on the face of it. It has a fog index of grade 20. Butler helpfully explains what Adorno had in mind. He refers, apparently, to a special circumstance at the time in which “man” was used by some thinkers to refer to humanity divorced from social context. Adorno, Butler explains, found this dehumanizing. If this were true, Adorno would be guilty only of not making his referent clear—of bad writing. There would be no justification for making the claimed assertion in such a gnomic way. That Butler can explain it actually to mean something so mundane would demonstrate in itself that the obscurity was unnecessary and an error. Point to Orwell. But, for my part, I cannot see this interpretation of Adorno as plausible. It seems plain enough to me from much else that he wrote that Adorno’s true position is the reverse of what Butler claims here for him. Elsewhere, Adorno finds social context itself, not its absence, dehumanizing. “Society,” he writes, “is integral even before it undergoes totalitarian rule. Its organization also embraces those at war with it by co-ordinating their consciousness to its own.” 21 In other words, for him, social context is totalitarian per se. More probably, therefore, as I read it, Adorno means in the quoted adage to say that one must never speak of “man” as of a thing detached from you; that to do so, to suppose one can be a detached observer of “mankind,” is necessarily dehumanizing. This, true or false, is a very different point. And, whether I am ultimately right in my reading or not, the presumed fact that Butler and I can reasonably interpret Adorno’s position to be so different, in this passage, rather reinforces Orwell’s point that an obscure style is always a hindrance. It is more so if your thinking happens to be good. For now, and for my part, I believe I have established that Butler’s challenge to Orwell cannot be justified on the grounds she has stated. Obscurity of style is still, it seems, and necessarily, a bad thing in itself. As for the true significance of the obscurity characteristic of postmodernism, I would only suggest that it is a symptom, not of a progressive or enlightened position, but of a vested interest seeking to secure its privileges.22 But perhaps Butler’s own chosen authority, Adorno, makes this point for me: “The conversion of all questions of truth into questions of power. . . not only suppresses truth . . . but has attacked the very heart of the distinction 22 Academic Questions / Spring 2002 between true and false, which the hirelings of logic were in any case diligently working to abolish.” 23 Butler, and postmodernist colleagues like Spivak and Bhabha, are in a lit- eral sense “hirelings of logic”: they are professional philosophers, paid to philosophize. Without seeking to stigmatize philosophers as a group, the problem of philosophy becoming a specious exercise in head-butting for pay, or a ratio- nalization of whatever the client wants, is an old game, as old as philosophy itself. Plato called the tendency “sophistry.” It is just this tendency Orwell, with his call for plain language, seeks to inhibit; and it is just this tendency Butler and her like seem to be engaged in. At the very least, the burden of proof is with them that this is not so. Notes 1. William Strunk and E. B. White, The Elements of Style, 4th edition (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2000). First published 1919. 2. Here is a characteristic passage from Spivak, chosen almost at random: The Subaltern Studies group seems to me to be revising this general definition and its theorization by proposing at least two things: first, that the moment(s) of change be pluralized and plotted as confrontations rather than transition (they would thus be seen in relation to histories of domination and exploitation rather than within the great modes-of-production narrative) and, secondly, that such changes are signalled or marked by a functional change in signsystems. The most important functional change is from the religious to the militant. There are, however, many other functional changes in sign-systems indicated in these collections: from crime to insurgency, from bondsman to worker, and so on. (Spivak, “Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography,” in In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics [NY: Routledge, 1988], 197). 3. George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” originally published in Horizon 76, April 1946. Also in, among other collections, Inside the Whale and Other Essays (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1957/1962), and A Collection of Essays (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich [Harvest Books], 1981). 4. Bhabha was runner up for Philosophy and Literature’s 1998 Bad Writing Award. Here is his winning passage: If, for a while, the ruse of desire is calculable for the uses of discipline soon the repetition of guilt, justification, pseudo-scientific theories, superstition, spurious authorities, and classifications can be seen as the desperate efforts to “normalize” formally the disturbance of a discourse of splitting that violates the rational, enlightened claims of its enunciatory modality. (Bhabha, The Location of Culture [London: Routledge, 1994]) 5. Judith Butler, “Exacting Solidarities,” The London Review of Books, 21, 13, 1 July 1999. 6. Judith Butler, “A ‘Bad’ Writer Bites Back,” The New York Times, 20 March 1999. 7. Judith Butler, “Exacting Solidarities.” 8. Butler, “Exacting Solidarities.” 9. Butler, “A ‘Bad’ Writer Bites Back.” 10. Butler, “Exacting Solidarities.” 11. Butler, “Exacting Solidarities.” 12. Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life. Trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London: New Left Books, 1974). Original German edition, 1951. Roney 23 13. Kristina Zarlengo, “J’accuse,” Lingua Franca 4, April 1998. 14. Butler, “A ‘Bad’ Writer Bites Back.” 15. Orwell, “Politics and the English Language.” 16. Andrew C. Bulhak, and Pope Dubious Provenance XI, The Postmodernism Generator (Communications from Elsewhere, n.d.). http://www.elsewhere.org/cgi-bin/ postmodern/. 17. Alan Sokal, “Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity,” Social Text 46/47 (Spring/Summer 1996). 18. Alan Sokal, “Sokal’s Reply to Social Text Editorial,” Dissent (Winter 1997). 19. It is possible to doubt Orwell’s Marxism. Nothing mattered more to him than freedom of thought. This being so, he was no doctrinaire or dogmatic Marxist, or anything else. If, however, this is a critical objection to the use of the term “Marxist,” neither were Engels, or Lenin, or Mao Marxists. Orwell was no Stalinist; but many Marxists deny Stalin had much to do with Marx. Orwell fought in Spain, by choice, for the Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification (POUM) (Michael Shelden, Orwell: The Authorized Biography [London: Heinemann, 1991], 276). He did so on letters of introduction from the Independent Labour Party, which Orwell himself describes as Trotskyite in the broad sense (Orwell, Homage to Catalonia [San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1952], 176). On his return from Spain, he continued to write for ILP publications, although he apparently never joined this, or any, party. In his 1941 book, The Lion and the Unicorn, he called for a “specifically English Socialist movement. . . not tainted by Marxism” (Shelden, op. cit., 368). But note the date: at this time England was at war for its life with Germany, and Russia was Germany’s ally. Orwell’s stated reason for rejecting Marxism is that it is essentially a German and Russian doctrine. It is therefore possible to see his opposition as tactical, a matter of rejecting Marx to save socialism in the public estimation. In “Politics and the English Language,” he writes, “Now, it is clear that the decline of a language must ultimately have political and economic causes” (Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” 143). This, surely, is clear only to one who assumes the Marxist doctrine of dialectical materialism, that economic and political conditions are the foundation of all else in society. 20. The fog index is a technique commonly used by editors, especially in educational publishing.

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Not Just Another Apocalyptician Author(s): Samuel Hynes

Source: The New York Times Book Review. (Nov. 3, 1991): Arts and Entertainment: From Academic OneFile.

Document Type: Article Full Text:

GEORGE ORWELL The Authorized Biography. By Michael Shelden. Illustrated. 497 pp. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. $25.

One evidence of George Orwell's place in our lives now, more than 40 years

after his death, is an entry in the Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary: "Orwellian . . . Characteristic or suggestive of the writings of

'George Orwell,' esp. in his satirical novel 1984 ." The examples that follow are from Mary McCarthy and Norman Mailer, and from a variety of

publications, including The New York Times. Some of them refer to Orwell's vision of a future totalitarian state; others use the term to name a corruption

of language, in which meaning is inverted or annihilated.

It was Orwell's great achievement that he made the connection between

those two meanings a clear and urgent issue for his time. His writing years were the 1930's and 40's -- the decades of the great dictators -- and he

wrote in opposition to them and what they stood for: " against totalitarianism," he said, "and for democratic Socialism, as I understand it."

But he might just as well have said that he wrote against debased language and for plain, honest statements. His two best-known books, "Animal Farm"

and "Nineteen Eighty-Four," are as much about what absolute power does to language as they are about what it does to lives. He saw those evils as

inextricably intertwined: bad politics debases language, debased language empowers bad politics. If we aim to oppose the evils of states, we must start

by speaking plain truths.

Not all of Orwell's plain truths were socialist truths; he was humane before

he was political, and he had developed a sense of injustice long before he began to express it in political terms. You might say that he was born into

injustice. His father, Arthur Blair, was a minor British official in Bengal whose job was to keep the opium trade running profitably, and Eric Blair (who was

to become Orwell) was born there in 1903. Young Eric's early years, as Michael Shelden recounts them in "Orwell: The Authorized Biography," were

a string of tyrannies endured -- at home, back in England, in prep school, at Eton and in his first job, as an officer in the Indian Imperial Police in Burma.

Having seen power in action, he hated it, and he shifted his loyalties from

his own class, the wielders of power, to the world's oppressed and

powerless.

In practice that meant quitting the Indian Police and returning to Europe to live among the poor -- with paupers in Paris, with tramps in London, with

the unemployed in the town of Wigan, near Manchester, then with common soldiers of the Loyalist army in Spain. And then to write about their lives, in

"Down and Out in Paris and London," "The Road to Wigan Pier" and "Homage to Catalonia." These books are not autobiographies exactly; Orwell adjusted

events to suit his polemical and literary ends. A better term would be "fables of injustice." Perhaps it was because he wasn't quite writing autobiographies

that he chose not to sign his books with his real name, but adopted instead

a pseudonym composed of an ordinary English first name and the name of an English river. Still, the sufferings he wrote about were sufferings he had

felt; in that sense his accounts were true. Other books of those early years were novels: "Burmese Days," "A Clergyman's Daughter," "Keep the

Aspidistra Flying." These too were written close to Orwell's experience of poverty and injustice -- too close, perhaps, for them to succeed altogether

as novels.

Orwell returned from Burma hating the British Empire; he returned from Spain hating Communism. That was the point, he said, at which he became

a political writer and a socialist. A very Orwellian kind of socialist, though.

His experiences among the poor had convinced him of a few simple truths: that injustice was the great social crime; that the right moral position was

always on the side of the weak; that failure was honorable and success corrupting; that decency was a primary moral value; that common sense

was more trust worthy than systems; that decency and common sense were most likely to be found in ordinary people. You couldn't call that set of

propositions an ideology, but then Orwell wouldn't want you to: he hated ideology. But that too is a possible political position.

Orwell's anti-ideological socialism was eccentric in another way: it went

against the internationalist tradition of the movement by being explicitly and

unashamedly English. "The Lion and the Unicorn," his wartime book about England, is subtitled "Socialism and the English Genius," and that subtitle

would do for virtually all of his political writings. "Every political theory has a certain regional tinge to it," he wrote, and his was as English as bitter beer

and toad-in-the-hole. He had much to say about the English that was unflattering: they were unesthetic, unphilosophical and anti-intellectual, a

nation of tea-drinking, dog-loving, class-conscious, xenophobic hypocrites. But they were also decent, sensible, peaceable people who believed in

justice, liberty, objective truth and the right to privacy. If you wanted an

English socialism, you'd have to start from those qualities, the faults as well

as the virtues.

What Orwell created in his books was not a systematic socialism; you couldn't govern England, or even a village, on the basis of what he wrote.

But system wasn't what he was after. He offered instead a double vision: of what society does to the poor and helpless, and of a good life that ordinary

people might live, if they were allowed to -- a life as simple and unpolitical as a working-class kitchen on a Sunday afternoon. He wanted to believe that

in the future such a life would be possible for everyone; but he was realistic enough to see the human forces of cruelty and greed that work against that

dream, and the future he foresaw, toward the end of his life, was bleak --

bleakest in that terrible image in "Nineteen Eighty-Four": a boot stamping on a human face, forever.

In the years since Orwell's death in 1950, the date he made into a symbol,

1984, has passed into history, and so has the Soviet state that best exemplified what he had made that date mean. Big Brother has been pulled

from his pedestal, K.G.B. is no longer an acronym for terror, and Orwell's books can be bought and read in Moscow. One mustn't be too millennial

about the change; the future will no doubt contain new police states and new gulags, but it seems unlikely that they will be world-class. The global

totalitarianism that Orwell feared and warned against is not going to happen,

at least not for a while.

What, then, will be the future importance of Orwell and his work? Has history made him merely historical, one more apocalyptician whose

predictions were wrong? I think not. He will survive as a voice, telling us that small-scale, decent social democracy is possible, that the world does not

belong to the managers but to ordinary people. His is not the only voice saying that now. Orwell would have felt a kinship with Eastern Europeans

like Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia; he'd have admired Mr. Havel's anti- ideological views, his pragmatism and the "regional tinge" of his politics. I'd

be surprised if Mr. Havel didn't also admire Orwell.

Orwell cared about politics, but he also cared about good writing. He was a

master of the plain style; nobody in our time has written it better. But his writing also has another quality that is crucial to the life of language now: its

fierce intemperateness. He believed that humankind benefited from the unrestrained use of strong, vivid language, and he would have regarded the

lexical pussyfooting of current American academic discourse as political cowardice. His resources of invective and abuse were extraordinary, and he

found targets on the left as well as on the right. His contempt for English socialist intellectuals must have offended entire drawing rooms full in

Hampstead and Oxford: "vegetarians with wilting beards, Bolshevik

commissars (half gangster, half gramophone), earnest ladies in sandals, shock-headed Marxists chewing polysyllables, escaped Quakers, birth-control

fanatics and Labour Party backstairs-crawlers," he called them. Bearded and sandal-wearing readers may find this offensive; but no one can deny that it

expresses the feelings of an individual man. Somebody is there, speaking his own language, plainly and pungently. Orwell knew that he would offend

people; he also knew that offensiveness is a necessary consequence of opinions strongly held and openly expressed, and that free societies should

treasure and protect it. An idea that offends no one is not worth entertaining.

Orwell is a rare case of a modern writer of unquestioned importance and influence who never wrote a great work of art, had no effect on the forms of

literature and has no place in the history of literary modernism. His example is greater than his formal accomplishments; he affected the world by

thinking and feeling about great issues, and by speaking with an angry insistence, in his own voice.

The danger in such a case is that the man will be canonized for his virtue

rather than admired for his achievements. When V. S. Pritchett called Orwell "a kind of saint," he did him a disservice, one that Orwell would have

resented. "Sainthood is a thing that human beings must avoid," he wrote in

an essay on Gandhi, and he proposed his own counterfaith: "The essence of being human is that one does not seek perfection, that one is sometimes

willing to commit sins for the sake of loyalty, that one does not push asceticism to the point where it makes friendly intercourse impossible, and

that one is prepared in the end to be defeated and broken up by life, which is the inevitable price of fastening one's love upon other human individuals."

That is what one gets from Orwell -- the essence of being human.

While Orwell's widow, his second wife, Sonia, was alive, no biographer could count on help from the executors -- quite the opposite, in fact. Peter

Stansky and William Abrahams wrote two intelligent volumes of an intended

life of Orwell, but broke off at 1938, defeated by Mrs. Orwell's obstructionism. Bernard Crick persevered and reached the end of the life,

but only after many tribulations. Neither biography mentions Sonia Orwell among the acknowledgments.

Michael Shelden has been more fortunate; his book is an "authorized

biography," and he has had the cooperation of the Orwell estate. He has been industrious in his research, and has found material that the other

biographers missed. His Orwell is neither a saint nor an ideologue; he is imperfect in his work and contradictory in his thought -- a man, not a model.

Mr. Shelden, a professor of English at Indiana State University, is an

unobtrusive presence, willing to let the life take its shape from events, preferring Orwell's ideas to his own. He sets out his principles of biography

writing in his introduction: the story of a life "deserves to be told with as much accuracy and fairness as possible"; it "must have a strong narrative,

and it must provide some sense of the human character behind the public face." Those are unexceptionable rules, and Mr. Shelden has followed them

faithfully. His accurate, fair book will send readers back to its subject -- to opinionated, unfair, vivid Orwell. That surely is the function of a literary

biography.

CAPTION(S):

Drawing of George Orwell (David Johnson)

By Samuel Hynes;

Source Citation Hynes, Samuel. "Not Just Another Apocalyptician." The New York Times

Book Review 3 Nov. 1991. Academic OneFile. Web. 9 Oct. 2011.

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his essay about "education as an instrument of torture

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untitled folder/Orwell Notes on Nationalism 1945_1.pdf

Notes on Nationalism

George Orwell (1945)

''All tyrannies rule through fraud and force, but once the fraud is exposed—they must rely exclusively on force.'' ~George Orwell

Note: This essay uses the original, mid-20th century British English spelling (e.g., adding the vowel “u” and using “s” in

cases where American usage does not add the “u” and uses “z”, etc.) which might appear incorrect to non-British readers.

Somewhere or other Byron makes use of the French word longeur, and remarks in passing that though

in England we happen not to have the word, we have the thing in considerable profusion. In the same

way, there is a habit of mind which is now so widespread that it affects our thinking on nearly every

subject, but which has not yet been given a name. As the nearest existing equivalent I have chosen the

word ‘nationalism’, but it will be seen in a moment that I am not using it in quite the ordinary sense, if

only because the emotion I am speaking about does not always attach itself to what is called a nation

— that is, a single race or a geographical area. It can attach itself to a church or a class, or it may work

in a merely negative sense, against something or other and without the need for any positive object of

loyalty.

By ‘nationalism’ I mean first of all the habit of assuming that human beings can be classified like

insects and that whole blocks of millions or tens of millions of people can be confidently labelled

‘good’ or ‘bad’(1). But secondly — and this is much more important — I mean the habit of identifying

oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond good and evil and recognising no other

duty than that of advancing its interests. Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism. Both words

are normally used in so vague a way that any definition is liable to be challenged, but one must draw a

distinction between them, since two different and even opposing ideas are involved. By ‘patriotism’ I

mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the

world but has no wish to force on other people. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and

culturally. Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power. The abiding

purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige, not for himself but for the

nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality.

So long as it is applied merely to the more notorious and identifiable nationalist movements in

Germany, Japan, and other countries, all this is obvious enough. Confronted with a phenomenon like

Nazism, which we can observe from the outside, nearly all of us would say much the same things

about it. But here I must repeat what I said above, that I am only using the word ‘nationalism’ for lack

of a better. Nationalism, in the extended sense in which I am using the word, includes such movements

and tendencies as Communism, political Catholicism, Zionism, Antisemitism, Trotskyism and

Pacifism. It does not necessarily mean loyalty to a government or a country, still less to one's own

country, and it is not even strictly necessary that the units in which it deals should actually exist. To

name a few obvious examples, Jewry, Islam, Christendom, the Proletariat and the White Race are all of

them objects of passionate nationalistic feeling: but their existence can be seriously questioned, and

there is no definition of any one of them that would be universally accepted.

It is also worth emphasising once again that nationalist feeling can be purely negative. There are, for

example, Trotskyists who have become simply enemies of the U.S.S.R. without developing a

corresponding loyalty to any other unit. When one grasps the implications of this, the nature of what I

mean by nationalism becomes a good deal clearer. A nationalist is one who thinks solely, or mainly, in

terms of competitive prestige. He may be a positive or a negative nationalist — that is, he may use his

mental energy either in boosting or in denigrating — but at any rate his thoughts always turn on

victories, defeats, triumphs and humiliations. He sees history, especially contemporary history, as the

endless rise and decline of great power units, and every event that happens seems to him a

demonstration that his own side is on the upgrade and some hated rival is on the downgrade. But

finally, it is important not to confuse nationalism with mere worship of success. The nationalist does

not go on the principle of simply ganging up with the strongest side. On the contrary, having picked his

side, he persuades himself that it is the strongest, and is able to stick to his belief even when the facts

are overwhelmingly against him. Nationalism is power-hunger tempered by self-deception. Every

nationalist is capable of the most flagrant dishonesty, but he is also — since he is conscious of serving

something bigger than himself — unshakeably certain of being in the right.

Now that I have given this lengthy definition, I think it will be admitted that the habit of mind I am

talking about is widespread among the English intelligentsia, and more widespread there than among

the mass of the people. For those who feel deeply about contemporary politics, certain topics have

become so infected by considerations of prestige that a genuinely rational approach to them is almost

impossible. Out of the hundreds of examples that one might choose, take this question: Which of the

three great allies, the U.S.S.R., Britain and the USA, has contributed most to the defeat of Germany? In

theory, it should be possible to give a reasoned and perhaps even a conclusive answer to this question.

In practice, however, the necessary calculations cannot be made, because anyone likely to bother his

head about such a question would inevitably see it in terms of competitive prestige. He would therefore

start by deciding in favour of Russia, Britain or America as the case might be, and only after this

would begin searching for arguments that seemed to support his case. And there are whole strings of

kindred questions to which you can only get an honest answer from someone who is indifferent to the

whole subject involved, and whose opinion on it is probably worthless in any case. Hence, partly, the

remarkable failure in our time of political and military prediction. It is curious to reflect that out of all

the ‘experts’ of all the schools, there was not a single one who was able to foresee so likely an event as

the Russo-German Pact of 1939(2). And when news of the Pact broke, the most wildly divergent

explanations were of it were given, and predictions were made which were falsified almost

immediately, being based in nearly every case not on a study of probabilities but on a desire to make

the U.S.S.R. seem good or bad, strong or weak. Political or military commentators, like astrologers,

can survive almost any mistake, because their more devoted followers do not look to them for an

appraisal of the facts but for the stimulation of nationalistic loyalties (3). And aesthetic judgements,

especially literary judgements, are often corrupted in the same way as political ones. It would be

difficult for an Indian Nationalist to enjoy reading Kipling or for a Conservative to see merit in

Mayakovsky, and there is always a temptation to claim that any book whose tendency one disagrees

with must be a bad book from a literary point of view. People of strongly nationalistic outlook often

perform this sleight of hand without being conscious of dishonesty.

In England, if one simply considers the number of people involved, it is probable that the dominant

form of nationalism is old-fashioned British jingoism. It is certain that this is still widespread, and

much more so than most observers would have believed a dozen years ago. However, in this essay I

am concerned chiefly with the reactions of the intelligentsia, among whom jingoism and even

patriotism of the old kind are almost dead, though they now seem to be reviving among a minority.

Among the intelligentsia, it hardly needs saying that the dominant form of nationalism is Communism

— using this word in a very loose sense, to include not merely Communist Party members, but ‘fellow

travelers’ and russophiles generally. A Communist, for my purpose here, is one who looks upon the

U.S.S.R. as his Fatherland and feels it his duty to justify Russian policy and advance Russian interests

at all costs. Obviously such people abound in England today, and their direct and indirect influence is

very great. But many other forms of nationalism also flourish, and it is by noticing the points of

resemblance between different and even seemingly opposed currents of thought that one can best get

the matter into perspective.

Ten or twenty years ago, the form of nationalism most closely corresponding to Communism today

was political Catholicism. Its most outstanding exponent — though he was perhaps an extreme case

rather than a typical one — was G. K. Chesterton. Chesterton was a writer of considerable talent who

chose to suppress both his sensibilities and his intellectual honesty in the cause of Roman Catholic

propaganda. During the last twenty years or so of his life, his entire output was in reality an endless

repetition of the same thing, under its laboured cleverness as simple and boring as ‘Great is Diana of

the Ephesians.’ Every book that he wrote, every scrap of dialogue, had to demonstrate beyond the

possibility of mistake the superiority of the Catholic over the Protestant or the pagan. But Chesterton

was not content to think of this superiority as merely intellectual or spiritual: it had to be translated into

terms of national prestige and military power, which entailed an ignorant idealisation of the Latin

countries, especially France. Chesterton had not lived long in France, and his picture of it — as a land

of Catholic peasants incessantly singing the Marseillaise over glasses of red wine — had about as

much relation to reality as Chu Chin Chow has to everyday life in Baghdad. And with this went not

only an enormous overestimation of French military power (both before and after 1914-18 he

maintained that France, by itself, was stronger than Germany), but a silly and vulgar glorification of

the actual process of war. Chesterton's battle poems, such as Lepanto or The Ballad of Saint Barbara,

make The Charge of the Light Brigade read like a pacifist tract: they are perhaps the most tawdry bits

of bombast to be found in our language. The interesting thing is that had the romantic rubbish which he

habitually wrote about France and the French army been written by somebody else about Britain and

the British army, he would have been the first to jeer. In home politics he was a Little Englander, a true

hater of jingoism and imperialism, and according to his lights a true friend of democracy. Yet when he

looked outwards into the international field, he could forsake his principles without even noticing he

was doing so. Thus, his almost mystical belief in the virtues of democracy did not prevent him from

admiring Mussolini. Mussolini had destroyed the representative government and the freedom of the

press for which Chesterton had struggled so hard at home, but Mussolini was an Italian and had made

Italy strong, and that settled the matter. Nor did Chesterton ever find a word to say about imperialism

and the conquest of coloured races when they were practised by Italians or Frenchmen. His hold on

reality, his literary taste, and even to some extent his moral sense, were dislocated as soon as his

nationalistic loyalties were involved.

Obviously there are considerable resemblances between political Catholicism, as exemplified by

Chesterton, and Communism. So there are between either of these and for instance Scottish

nationalism, Zionism, Antisemitism or Trotskyism. It would be an oversimplification to say that all

forms of nationalism are the same, even in their mental atmosphere, but there are certain rules that hold

good in all cases. The following are the principal characteristics of nationalist thought:

Obsession. As nearly as possible, no nationalist ever thinks, talks, or writes about anything except the

superiority of his own power unit. It is difficult if not impossible for any nationalist to conceal his

allegiance. The smallest slur upon his own unit, or any implied praise of a rival organization, fills him

with uneasiness which he can relieve only by making some sharp retort. If the chosen unit is an actual

country, such as Ireland or India, he will generally claim superiority for it not only in military power

and political virtue, but in art, literature, sport, structure of the language, the physical beauty of the

inhabitants, and perhaps even in climate, scenery and cooking. He will show great sensitiveness about

such things as the correct display of flags, relative size of headlines and the order in which different

countries are named(4). Nomenclature plays a very important part in nationalist thought. Countries

which have won their independence or gone through a nationalist revolution usually change their

names, and any country or other unit round which strong feelings revolve is likely to have several

names, each of them carrying a different implication. The two sides of the Spanish Civil War had

between them nine or ten names expressing different degrees of love and hatred. Some of these names

(e. g. ‘Patriots’ for Franco-supporters, or ‘Loyalists’ for Government-supporters) were frankly

question-begging, and there was no single one of which the two rival factions could have agreed to

use. All nationalists consider it a duty to spread their own language to the detriment of rival languages,

and among English-speakers this struggle reappears in subtler forms as a struggle between dialects.

Anglophobe-Americans will refuse to use a slang phrase if they know it to be of British origin, and the

conflict between Latinizers and Germanizers often has nationalist motives behind it. Scottish

nationalists insist on the superiority of Lowland Scots, and socialists whose nationalism takes the form

of class hatred tirade against the B.B.C. accent and even the often gives the impression of being tinged

by belief in sympathetic magic — a belief which probably comes out in the widespread custom of

burning political enemies in effigy, or using pictures of them as targets in shooting galleries.

Instability. The intensity with which they are held does not prevent nationalist loyalties from being

transferable. To begin with, as I have pointed out already, they can be and often are fastened up on

some foreign country. One quite commonly finds that great national leaders, or the founders of

nationalist movements, do not even belong to the country they have glorified. Sometimes they are

outright foreigners, or more often they come from peripheral areas where nationality is doubtful.

Examples are Stalin, Hitler, Napoleon, de Valera, Disraeli, Poincare, and Beaverbrook. The Pan-

German movement was in part the creation of an Englishman, Houston Chamberlain. For the past fifty

or a hundred years, transferred nationalism has been a common phenomenon among literary

intellectuals. With Lafcadio Hearne the transference was to Japan, with Carlyle and many others of his

time to Germany, and in our own age it is usually to Russia. But the peculiarly interesting fact is that

re-transference is also possible. A country or other unit which has been worshipped for years may

suddenly become detestable, and some other object of affection may take its place with almost no

interval. In the first version of H. G. Wells' Outline of History, and others of his writings about that

time, one finds the United States praised almost as extravagantly as Russia is praised by Communists

today: yet within a few years this uncritical admiration had turned into hostility. The bigoted

Communist who changes in a space of weeks, or even days, into an equally bigoted Trotskyist is a

common spectacle. In continental Europe Fascist movements were largely recruited from among

Communists, and the opposite process may well happen within the next few years. What remains

constant in the nationalist is his state of mind: the object of his feelings is changeable, and may be

imaginary.

But for an intellectual, transference has an important function which I have already mentioned shortly

in connection with Chesterton. It makes it possible for him to be much more nationalistic — more

vulgar, more silly, more malignant, more dishonest — that he could ever be on behalf of his native

country, or any unit of which he had real knowledge. When one sees the slavish or boastful rubbish

that is written about Stalin, the Red Army, etc. by fairly intelligent and sensitive people, one realises

that this is only possible because some kind of dislocation has taken place. In societies such as ours, it

is unusual for anyone describable as an intellectual to feel a very deep attachment to his own country.

Public opinion — that is, the section of public opinion of which he as an intellectual is aware — will

not allow him to do so. Most of the people surrounding him are skeptical and disaffected, and he may

adopt the same attitude from imitativeness or sheer cowardice: in that case he will have abandoned the

form of nationalism that lies nearest to hand without getting any closer to a genuinely internationalist

outlook. He still feels the need for a Fatherland, and it is natural to look for one somewhere abroad.

Having found it, he can wallow unrestrainedly in exactly those emotions from which he believes that

he has emancipated himself. God, the King, the Empire, the Union Jack — all the overthrown idols can

reappear under different names, and because they are not recognised for what they are they can be

worshipped with a good conscience. Transferred nationalism, like the use of scapegoats, is a way of

attaining salvation without altering one's conduct.

Indifference to Reality. All nationalists have the power of not seeing resemblances between similar sets

of facts. A British Tory will defend self-determination in Europe and oppose it in India with no feeling

of inconsistency. Actions are held to be good or bad, not on their own merits, but according to who

does them, and there is almost no kind of outrage — torture, the use of hostages, forced labour, mass

deportations, imprisonment without trial, forgery, assassination, the bombing of civilians — which

does not change its moral colour when it is committed by ‘our’ side. The Liberal News Chronicle

published, as an example of shocking barbarity, photographs of Russians hanged by the Germans, and

then a year or two later published with warm approval almost exactly similar photographs of Germans

hanged by the Russians(5). It is the same with historical events. History is thought of largely in

nationalist terms, and such things as the Inquisition, the tortures of the Star Chamber, the exploits of

the English buccaneers (Sir Francis Drake, for instance, who was given to sinking Spanish prisoners

alive), the Reign of Terror, the heroes of the Mutiny blowing hundreds of Indians from the guns, or

Cromwell's soldiers slashing Irishwomen's faces with razors, become morally neutral or even

meritorious when it is felt that they were done in the ‘right’ cause. If one looks back over the past

quarter of a century, one finds that there was hardly a single year when atrocity stories were not being

reported from some part of the world; and yet in not one single case were these atrocities — in Spain,

Russia, China, Hungary, Mexico, Amritsar, Smyrna — believed in and disapproved of by the English

intelligentsia as a whole. Whether such deeds were reprehensible, or even whether they happened, was

always decided according to political predilection.

The nationalist not only does not disapprove of atrocities committed by his own side, but he has a

remarkable capacity for not even hearing about them. For quite six years the English admirers of Hitler

contrived not to learn of the existence of Dachau and Buchenwald. And those who are loudest in

denouncing the German concentration camps are often quite unaware, or only very dimly aware, that

there are also concentration camps in Russia. Huge events like the Ukraine famine of 1933, involving

the deaths of millions of people, have actually escaped the attention of the majority of English

russophiles. Many English people have heard almost nothing about the extermination of German and

Polish Jews during the present war. Their own antisemitism has caused this vast crime to bounce off

their consciousness. In nationalist thought there are facts which are both true and untrue, known and

unknown. A known fact may be so unbearable that it is habitually pushed aside and not allowed to

enter into logical processes, or on the other hand it may enter into every calculation and yet never be

admitted as a fact, even in one's own mind.

Every nationalist is haunted by the belief that the past can be altered. He spends part of his time in a

fantasy world in which things happen as they should — in which, for example, the Spanish Armada

was a success or the Russian Revolution was crushed in 1918 — and he will transfer fragments of this

world to the history books whenever possible. Much of the propagandist writing of our time amounts

to plain forgery. Material facts are suppressed, dates altered, quotations removed from their context

and doctored so as to change their meaning. Events which it is felt ought not to have happened are left

unmentioned and ultimately denied (6). In 1927 Chiang Kai Shek boiled hundreds of Communists

alive, and yet within ten years he had become one of the heroes of the Left. The re-alignment of world

politics had brought him into the anti-Fascist camp, and so it was felt that the boiling of the

Communists ‘didn't count’, or perhaps had not happened. The primary aim of propaganda is, of course,

to influence contemporary opinion, but those who rewrite history do probably believe with part of their

minds that they are actually thrusting facts into the past. When one considers the elaborate forgeries

that have been committed in order to show that Trotsky did not play a valuable part in the Russian civil

war, it is difficult to feel that the people responsible are merely lying. More probably they feel that

their own version was what happened in the sight of God, and that one is justified in rearranging the

records accordingly.

Indifference to objective truth is encouraged by the sealing-off of one part of the world from another,

which makes it harder and harder to discover what is actually happening. There can often be a genuine

doubt about the most enormous events. For example, it is impossible to calculate within millions,

perhaps even tens of millions, the number of deaths caused by the present war. The calamities that are

constantly being reported — battles, massacres, famines, revolutions — tend to inspire in the average

person a feeling of unreality. One has no way of verifying the facts, one is not even fully certain that

they have happened, and one is always presented with totally different interpretations from different

sources. What were the rights and wrongs of the Warsaw rising of August 1944? Is it true about the

German gas ovens in Poland? Who was really to blame for the Bengal famine? Probably the truth is

discoverable, but the facts will be so dishonestly set forth in almost any newspaper that the ordinary

reader can be forgiven either for swallowing lies or failing to form an opinion. The general uncertainty

as to what is really happening makes it easier to cling to lunatic beliefs. Since nothing is ever quite

proved or disproved, the most unmistakable fact can be impudently denied. Moreover, although

endlessly brooding on power, victory, defeat, revenge, the nationalist is often somewhat uninterested in

what happens in the real world. What he wants is to feel that his own unit is getting the better of some

other unit, and he can more easily do this by scoring off an adversary than by examining the facts to

see whether they support him. All nationalist controversy is at the debating-society level. It is always

entirely inconclusive, since each contestant invariably believes himself to have won the victory. Some

nationalists are not far from schizophrenia, living quite happily amid dreams of power and conquest

which have no connection with the physical world.

I have examined as best as I can the mental habits which are common to all forms of nationalism. The

next thing is to classify those forms, but obviously this cannot be done comprehensively. Nationalism

is an enormous subject. The world is tormented by innumerable delusions and hatreds which cut across

one another in an extremely complex way, and some of the most sinister of them have not yet

impinged on the European consciousness. In this essay I am concerned with nationalism as it occurs

among the English intelligentsia. In them, much more than in ordinary English people, it is unmixed

with patriotism and therefore can be studied pure. Below are listed the varieties of nationalism now

flourishing among English intellectuals, with such comments as seem to be needed. It is convenient to

use three headings, Positive, Transferred, and Negative, though some varieties will fit into more than

one category:

Positive Nationalism

(i) Neo-toryism. Exemplified by such people as Lord Elton, A. P. Herbert, G. M. Young, Professor

Pickthorn, by the literature of the Tory Reform Committee, and by such magazines as the New English

Review and the Nineteenth Century and After. The real motive force of neo-Toryism, giving it its

nationalistic character and differentiating it from ordinary Conservatism, is the desire not to recognise

that British power and influence have declined. Even those who are realistic enough to see that

Britain's military position is not what it was, tend to claim that ‘English ideas’ (usually left undefined)

must dominate the world. All neo-Tories are anti-Russian, but sometimes the main emphasis is anti-

American. The significant thing is that this school of thought seems to be gaining ground among

youngish intellectuals, sometimes ex-Communists, who have passed through the usual process of

disillusionment and become disillusioned with that. The anglophobe who suddenly becomes violently

pro-British is a fairly common figure. Writers who illustrate this tendency are F. A. Voigt, Malcolm

Muggeridge, Evelyn Waugh, Hugh Kingsmill, and a psychologically similar development can be

observed in T. S. Eliot, Wyndham Lewis, and various of their followers.

(ii) Celtic Nationalism. Welsh, Irish and Scottish nationalism have points of difference but are alike in

their anti-English orientation. Members of all three movements have opposed the war while continuing

to describe themselves as pro-Russian, and the lunatic fringe has even contrived to be simultaneously

pro-Russian and pro-Nazi. But Celtic nationalism is not the same thing as anglophobia. Its motive

force is a belief in the past and future greatness of the Celtic peoples, and it has a strong tinge of

racialism. The Celt is supposed to be spiritually superior to the Saxon — simpler, more creative, less

vulgar, less snobbish, etc. — but the usual power hunger is there under the surface. One symptom of it

is the delusion that Eire, Scotland or even Wales could preserve its independence unaided and owes

nothing to British protection. Among writers, good examples of this school of thought are Hugh

McDiarmid and Sean O'Casey. No modern Irish writer, even of the stature of Yeats or Joyce, is

completely free from traces of nationalism.

(iii) Zionism. This the unusual characteristics of a nationalist movement, but the American variant of it

seems to be more violent and malignant than the British. I classify it under Direct and not Transferred

nationalism because it flourishes almost exclusively among the Jews themselves. In England, for

several rather incongruous reasons, the intelligentsia are mostly pro-Jew on the Palestine issue, but

they do not feel strongly about it. All English people of goodwill are also pro-Jew in the sense of

disapproving of Nazi persecution. But any actual nationalistic loyalty, or belief in the innate superiority

of Jews, is hardly to be found among Gentiles.

Transferred Nationalism

(i) Communism.

(ii) Political Catholicism.

(iii) Colour Feeling. The old-style contemptuous attitude towards ‘natives’ has been much weakened

in England, and various pseudo-scientific theories emphasising the superiority of the white race have

been abandoned (7). Among the intelligentsia, colour feeling only occurs in the transposed form, that

is, as a belief in the innate superiority of the coloured races. This is now increasingly common among

English intellectuals, probably resulting more often from masochism and sexual frustration than from

contact with the Oriental and Negro nationalist movements. Even among those who do not feel

strongly on the colour question, snobbery and imitation have a powerful influence. Almost any English

intellectual would be scandalised by the claim that the white races are superior to the coloured,

whereas the opposite claim would seem to him unexceptionable even if he disagreed with it.

Nationalistic attachment to the coloured races is usually mixed up with the belief that their sex lives

are superior, and there is a large underground mythology about the sexual prowess of Negroes.

(iv) Class Feeling. Among upper-class and middle-class intellectuals, only in the transposed form (i.e.,

as a belief in the superiority of the proletariat). Here again, inside the intelligentsia, the pressure of

public opinion is overwhelming. Nationalistic loyalty towards the proletariat, and most vicious

theoretical hatred of the bourgeoisie, can and often do co-exist with ordinary snobbishness in everyday

life.

(v) Pacifism. The majority of pacifists either belong to obscure religious sects or are simply

humanitarians who object to the taking of life and prefer not to follow their thoughts beyond that point.

But there is a minority of intellectual pacifists whose real though unadmitted motive appears to be

hatred of western democracy and admiration of totalitarianism. Pacifist propaganda usually boils down

to saying that one side is as bad as the other, but if one looks closely at the writings of younger

intellectual pacifists, one finds that they do not by any means express impartial disapproval but are

directed almost entirely against Britain and the United States. Moreover they do not as a rule condemn

violence as such, but only violence used in defence of western countries. The Russians, unlike the

British, are not blamed for defending themselves by warlike means, and indeed all pacifist propaganda

of this type avoids mention of Russia or China. It is not claimed, again, that the Indians should abjure

violence in their struggle against the British. Pacifist literature abounds with equivocal remarks which,

if they mean anything, appear to mean that statesmen of the type of Hitler are preferable to those of the

type of Churchill, and that violence is perhaps excusable if it is violent enough. After the fall of

France, the French pacifists, faced by a real choice which their English colleagues have not had to

make, mostly went over to the Nazis, and in England there appears to have been some small overlap of

membership between the Peace Pledge Union and the Blackshirts. Pacifist writers have written in

praise of Carlyle, one of the intellectual fathers of Fascism. All in all it is difficult not to feel that

pacifism, as it appears among a section of the intelligentsia, is secretly inspired by an admiration for

power and successful cruelty. The mistake was made of pinning this emotion to Hitler, but it could

easily be retransferred.

Negative Nationalism

(i) Anglophobia. Within the intelligentsia, a derisive and mildly hostile attitude towards Britain is more

or less compulsory, but it is an unfaked emotion in many cases. During the war it was manifested in

the defeatism of the intelligentsia, which persisted long after it had become clear that the Axis powers

could not win. Many people were undisguisedly pleased when Singapore fell ore when the British were

driven out of Greece, and there was a remarkable unwillingness to believe in good news (e.g., El

Alamein, or the number of German planes shot down in the Battle of Britain). English left-wing

intellectuals did not, of course, actually want the Germans or Japanese to win the war, but many of

them could not help getting a certain kick out of seeing their own country humiliated, and wanted to

feel that the final victory would be due to Russia, or perhaps America, and not to Britain. In foreign

politics many intellectuals follow the principle that any faction backed by Britain must be in the

wrong. As a result, ‘enlightened’ opinion is quite largely a mirror-image of Conservative policy.

Anglophobia is always liable to reversal, hence that fairly common spectacle, the pacifist of one war

who is a bellicist in the next.

(ii) Anti-Semitism. There is little evidence about this at present, because the Nazi persecutions have

made it necessary for any thinking person to side with the Jews against their oppressors. Anyone

educated enough to have heard the word ‘antisemitism’ claims as a matter of course to be free of it,

and anti-Jewish remarks are carefully eliminated from all classes of literature. Actually antisemitism

appears to be widespread, even among intellectuals, and the general conspiracy of silence probably

helps exacerbate it. People of Left opinions are not immune to it, and their attitude is sometimes

affected by the fact that Trotskyists and Anarchists tend to be Jews. But antisemitism comes more

naturally to people of Conservative tendency, who suspect Jews of weakening national morale and

diluting the national culture. Neo-Tories and political Catholics are always liable to succumb to

antisemitism, at least intermittently.

(iii) Trotskyism. This word is used so loosely as to include Anarchists, democratic Socialists and even

Liberals. I use it here to mean a doctrinaire Marxist whose main motive is hostility to the Stalin

regime. Trotskyism can be better studied in obscure pamphlets or in papers like the Socialist Appeal

than in the works of Trotsky himself, who was by no means a man of one idea. Although in some

places, for instance in the United States, Trotskyism is able to attract a fairly large number of adherents

and develop into an organised movement with a petty Führer of its own, its inspiration is essentially

negative. The Trotskyist is against Stalin just as the Communist is for him, and, like the majority of

Communists, he wants not so much to alter the external world as to feel that the battle for prestige is

going in his own favour. In each case there is the same obsessive fixation on a single subject, the same

inability to form a genuinely rational opinion based on probabilities. The fact that Trotskyists are

everywhere a persecuted minority, and that the accusation usually made against them, i. e. of

collaborating with the Fascists, is obviously false, creates an impression that Trotskyism is

intellectually and morally superior to Communism; but it is doubtful whether there is much difference.

The most typical Trotskyists, in any case, are ex-Communists, and no one arrives at Trotskyism except

via one of the left-wing movements. No Communist, unless tethered to his party by years of habit, is

secure against a sudden lapse into Trotskyism. The opposite process does not seem to happen equally

often, though there is no clear reason why it should not.

In the classification I have attempted above, it will seem that I have often exaggerated, oversimplified,

made unwarranted assumptions and have left out of account the existence of ordinarily decent motives.

This was inevitable, because in this essay I am trying to isolate and identify tendencies which exist in

all our minds and pervert our thinking, without necessarily occurring in a pure state or operating

continuously. It is important at this point to correct the over-simplified picture which I have been

obliged to make. To begin with, one has no right to assume that everyone, or even every intellectual, is

infected by nationalism. Secondly, nationalism can be intermittent and limited. An intelligent man may

half-succumb to a belief which he knows to be absurd, and he may keep it out of his mind for long

periods, only reverting to it in moments of anger or sentimentality, or when he is certain that no

important issues are involved. Thirdly, a nationalistic creed may be adopted in good faith from non-

nationalistic motives. Fourthly, several kinds of nationalism, even kinds that cancel out, can co-exist in

the same person.

All the way through I have said, ‘the nationalist does this’ or ‘the nationalist does that’, using for

purposes of illustration the extreme, barely sane type of nationalist who has no neutral areas in his

mind and no interest in anything except the struggle for power. Actually such people are fairly

common, but they are not worth the powder and shot. In real life Lord Elton, D. N. Pritt, Lady

Houston, Ezra Pound, Lord Vanisttart, Father Coughlin and all the rest of their dreary tribe have to be

fought against, but their intellectual deficiencies hardly need pointing out. Monomania is not

interesting, and the fact that no nationalist of the more bigoted kind can write a book which still seems

worth reading after a lapse of years has a certain deodorising effect. But when one has admitted that

nationalism has not triumphed everywhere, that there are still peoples whose judgements are not at the

mercy of their desires, the fact does remain that the pressing problems — India, Poland, Palestine, the

Spanish civil war, the Moscow trials, the American Negroes, the Russo-German Pact or what have you

— cannot be, or at least never are, discussed upon a reasonable level. The Eltons and Pritts and

Coughlins, each of them simply an enormous mouth bellowing the same lie over and over again, are

obviously extreme cases, but we deceive ourselves if we do not realise that we can all resemble them

in unguarded moments. Let a certain note be struck, let this or that corn be trodden on — and it may be

corn whose very existence has been unsuspected hitherto — and the most fair-minded and sweet-

tempered person may suddenly be transformed into a vicious partisan, anxious only to ‘score’ over his

adversary and indifferent as to how many lies he tells or how many logical errors he commits in doing

so. When Lloyd George, who was an opponent of the Boer War, announced in the House of Commons

that the British communiques, if one added them together, claimed the killing of more Boers than the

whole Boer nation contained, it is recorded that Arthur Balfour rose to his feet and shouted ‘Cad!’

Very few people are proof against lapses of this type. The Negro snubbed by a white woman, the

Englishman who hears England ignorantly criticised by an American, the Catholic apologist reminded

of the Spanish Armada, will all react in much the same way. One prod to the nerve of nationalism, and

the intellectual decencies can vanish, the past can be altered, and the plainest facts can be denied.

If one harbours anywhere in one's mind a nationalistic loyalty or hatred, certain facts, although in a

sense known to be true, are inadmissible. Here are just a few examples. I list below five types of

nationalist, and against each I append a fact which it is impossible for that type of nationalist to accept,

even in his secret thoughts:

BRITISH TORY: Britain will come out of this war with reduced power and prestige.

COMMUNIST: If she had not been aided by Britain and America, Russia would have been defeated

by Germany.

IRISH NATIONALIST: Eire can only remain independent because of British protection.

TROTSKYIST: The Stalin regime is accepted by the Russian masses.

PACIFIST: Those who ‘abjure’ violence can only do so because others are committing violence on

their behalf.

All of these facts are grossly obvious if one's emotions do not happen to be involved: but to the kind of

person named in each case they are also intolerable, and so they have to be denied, and false theories

constructed upon their denial. I come back to the astonishing failure of military prediction in the

present war. It is, I think, true to say that the intelligentsia have been more wrong about the progress of

the war than the common people, and that they were more swayed by partisan feelings. The average

intellectual of the Left believed, for instance, that the war was lost in 1940, that the Germans were

bound to overrun Egypt in 1942, that the Japanese would never be driven out of the lands they had

conquered, and that the Anglo-American bombing offensive was making no impression on Germany.

He could believe these things because his hatred for the British ruling class forbade him to admit that

British plans could succeed. There is no limit to the follies that can be swallowed if one is under the

influence of feelings of this kind. I have heard it confidently stated, for instance, that the American

troops had been brought to Europe not to fight the Germans but to crush an English revolution. One

has to belong to the intelligentsia to believe things like that: no ordinary man could be such a fool.

When Hitler invaded Russia, the officials of the MOI issued ‘as background’ a warning that Russia

might be expected to collapse in six weeks. On the other hand the Communists regarded every phase of

the war as a Russian victory, even when the Russians were driven back almost to the Caspian Sea and

had lost several million prisoners. There is no need to multiply instances. The point is that as soon as

fear, hatred, jealousy and power worship are involved, the sense of reality becomes unhinged. And, as

I have pointed out already, the sense of right and wrong becomes unhinged also. There is no crime,

absolutely none, that cannot be condoned when ‘our’ side commits it. Even if one does not deny that

the crime has happened, even if one knows that it is exactly the same crime as one has condemned in

some other case, even if one admits in an intellectual sense that it is unjustified — still one cannot feel

that it is wrong. Loyalty is involved, and so pity ceases to function.

The reason for the rise and spread of nationalism is far too big a question to be raised here. It is enough

to say that, in the forms in which it appears among English intellectuals, it is a distorted reflection of

the frightful battles actually happening in the external world, and that its worst follies have been made

possible by the breakdown of patriotism and religious belief. If one follows up this train of thought,

one is in danger of being led into a species of Conservatism, or into political quietism. It can be

plausibly argued, for instance — it is even possibly true — that patriotism is an inoculation against

nationalism, that monarchy is a guard against dictatorship, and that organised religion is a guard

against superstition. Or again, it can be argued that no unbiased outlook is possible, that all creeds and

causes involve the same lies, follies, and barbarities; and this is often advanced as a reason for keeping

out of politics altogether. I do not accept this argument, if only because in the modern world no one

describable as an intellectual can keep out of politics in the sense of not caring about them. I think one

must engage in politics — using the word in a wide sense — and that one must have preferences: that

is, one must recognise that some causes are objectively better than others, even if they are advanced by

equally bad means. As for the nationalistic loves and hatreds that I have spoken of, they are part of the

make-up of most of us, whether we like it or not. Whether it is possible to get rid of them I do not

know, but I do believe that it is possible to struggle against them, and that this is essentially a moral

effort. It is a question first of all of discovering what one really is, what one's own feelings really are,

and then of making allowance for the inevitable bias. If you hate and fear Russia, if you are jealous of

the wealth and power of America, if you despise Jews, if you have a sentiment of inferiority towards

the British ruling class, you cannot get rid of those feelings simply by taking thought. But you can at

least recognise that you have them, and prevent them from contaminating your mental processes. The

emotional urges which are inescapable, and are perhaps even necessary to political action, should be

able to exist side by side with an acceptance of reality. But this, I repeat, needs a moral effort, and

contemporary English literature, so far as it is alive at all to the major issues of our time, shows how

few of us are prepared to make it.

1945

_____ Author’s Notes

1) Nations, and even vaguer entities such as Catholic Church or the proletariat, are commonly thought of as

individuals and often referred to as ‘she’. Patently absurd remarks such as ‘Germany is naturally treacherous’

are to be found in any newspaper one opens and reckless generalization about national character (‘The Spaniard

is a natural aristocrat’ or ‘Every Englishman is a hypocrite’) are uttered by almost everyone. Intermittently these

generalizations are seen to be unfounded, but the habit of making them persists, and people of professedly

international outlook, e.g., Tolstoy or Bernard Shaw, are often guilty of them. [back]

2) A few writers of conservative tendency, such as Peter Drucker, foretold an agreement between Germany and

Russia, but they expected an actual alliance or amalgamation which would be permanent. No Marxist or other

left-wing writer, of whatever colour, came anywhere near foretelling the Pact. [back]

3) The military commentators of the popular press can mostly be classified as pro-Russian or anti-Russian pro-

blimp or anti-blimp. Such errors as believing the Maginot Line impregnable, or predicting that Russia would

conquer Germany in three months, have failed to shake their reputation, because they were always saying what

their own particular audience wanted to hear. The two military critics most favoured by the intelligentsia are

Captain Liddell Hart and Major-General Fuller, the first of whom teaches that the defence is stronger that the

attack, and the second that the attack is stronger that the defence. This contradiction has not prevented both of

them from being accepted as authorities by the same public. The secret reason for their vogue in left-wing

circles is that both of them are at odds with the War Office. [back]

4) Certain Americans have expressed dissatisfaction because ‘Anglo-American’ is the form of combination for

these two words. It has been proposed to submit ‘Americo-British’. [back]

5) The News Chronicle advised its readers to visit the news film at which the entire execution could be

witnessed, with close-ups. The Star published with seeming approval photographs of nearly naked female

collaborationists being baited by the Paris mob. These photographs had a marked resemblance to the Nazi

photographs of Jews being baited by the Berlin mob. [back]

6) An example is the Russo-German Pact, which is being effaced as quickly as possible from public memory. A

Russian correspondent informs me that mention of the Pact is already being omitted from Russian year-books

which table recent political events. [back]

7) A good example is the sunstroke superstition. Until recently it was believed that the white races were much

more liable to sunstroke that the coloured, and that a white man could not safely walk about in tropical sunshine

without a pith helmet. There was no evidence whatever for this theory, but it served the purpose of accentuating

the difference between ‘natives’ and Europeans. During the war the theory was quietly dropped and whole

armies maneuvered in the tropics without pith helmets. So long as the sunstroke superstition survived, English

doctors in India appear to have believed in it as firmly as laymen. [back]

THE END

____BD____

George Orwell: ‘Notes on Nationalism’

First published: Polemic. — GB, London. — May 1945.

Reprinted:

— ‘England Your England and Other Essays’. — 1953.

URL: http://orwell.ru/library/essays/nationalism/english/e_nat

Machine-readable version: O. Dag

Last modified on: 2004-07-24

George Orwell

‘England, Your England and Other Essays’

© 1953 Secker and Warburg

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SHORT TITLE OF YOUR ESSAY ALL CAPS FLUSH LEFT

The Title of Your Essay in Title Case and Centered

Firstname Lastname

Rogue Community College

WR 121 English Composition I

Instructor: Dr. V. E. Lasnik

DD Month 2015

Words: ????

The Title of Your Essay in Title Case and Centered

Your introduction begins immediately. Begin with an engaging “hook” to interest your reader; within the first paragraph, fully address the reader’s rationale “Why should I care?” With the exception of any block quotes and the end references, all text should be flush left and ragged right, in the same font throughout the document (with the exception of italics when needed), and double-spaced. Indent each paragraph’s first line at a standard depth using the Tab key set to one-half inch or five to seven spaces as shown in this paragraph. Tabs ensure consistency.

Your second of many paragraphs to come logically follows the first. You are permitted to use a simple/open narrative style such as the one show here, or you may choose to use a more formally-structured format in which you identify major sections and subsections of the essay manuscript. However, in such a relatively brief paper as required by the minimum (1000+) word count requirements for this course, section and subsection headings are not required. The exception is the end bibliographic section: in APA style, this final section is simply titled “References,” and the word is centered, begins on a separate page (following your conclusion) and does not contain quotations. Please consult additional APA materials if using headings/subheadings is something you plan on doing, but again—these secondary demarcations are not necessary.

By this point, but certainly no later than this third paragraph, you should have thoroughly engaged your reader as to the interesting, fascinating, intriguing, and salient, compelling nature of the particular problem or issue you will explore in this essay. You should have clearly, unambiguously, and explicitly stated the gist (and arguable through logic and evidence) of the essay or concise set of questions that you will investigate/explore in your paper. If you haven’t completed your in-depth introduction by the end of the first page—do so now!

You should beginning the body of your essay here. You will now understand why we suggest the thoughtful construction of an outline with which to proceed writing your analysis of an argument. You high-level outline can provide the basic organizational strategy of your essay and should begin with the most critical element(s) of the question you are investigating. You should routinely use your most powerful, convincing, and authentic evidence and persuasive logic early in your argument. There is not an absolute rule on this approach, and some writers reverse the pattern of the strongest logic/data first and the weakest—last. However, this is not an easy task to pull off successfully, and although many dramatic courtroom stories have the hero/heroine lawyer do precisely that (saving the best for last in a slam-dunk, final scene evisceration of his/her opponent)—such a theatrically-appealing approach is not recommended for this assignment.

It is a good idea to have multiple sources to support your most important point(s). Two heads may be better than one—and two references are often better than one in convincing the astute, discernable (i.e., critical) reader that an argument corroborated by multiple sources (from different researchers and sources) has more strength, validity, and generalizability. Musing back to the courtroom metaphor, a fair assessment is that your readers are on the jury as you prosecute (or defend) the positions at issue: your research analyses. It is the jury or readers that will render the final verdict after all the evidence (on both sides of the equation) has been presented.

If there are flaws in your thinking or weaknesses in your evidence—your readers will find them! Any fuzziness, uncertainty, vagueness, obscurity or lack of clarity between the evidence you present and the arguments you weave should become apparent by this point in your essay. To summarize your task: you are to (attempt to) write so that you cannot possibly be misunderstood and the “verdict” falls clearly in your favor.

After you have completed the body of your essay and convincingly argued (and richly supported with sound, solid, scholarly empirical (i.e., observable, verifiable, demonstrated) evidence—you should briefly summarize the major findings of your essay. This penultimate essay section is thus known as the summary , and you only need to restate the principal points you already made in your essay. One way of doing this summarizing efficiently is to take the “thesis sentence” (or data) from each of your critical paragraphs, rephrase them to flow together in a convincing and logical narrative form within one or two short paragraphs.

Finally {Note: You may only use this word once and only once in your entire essay), you have an open opportunity to expand and elaborate on your own perspectives in the paper’s conclusion (which follows the summary). Still using only third-person, impersonal, objective voice [i.e., Do not use I, my, me, mine, etc.]—The conclusion is where you can present you own ideas, models, approaches, and potential solutions to your research problem and ask: “Where do we go from here? What future research needs to be conducted to fill in the gaps to our critical knowledge and understanding of the problem/question? How do we get a consensus about how to move forward while reconciling all of the participants, stakeholders, policy-makers, corporate, government, community, and individual interests?” Try to end your essay on a positive, fair-minded (if not optimistic) note—but maintain and emphasize that something needs to be done or some definite action taken if the problems/phenomena you analyzed are to be resolved and remedied. Address the jury’s hearts and minds (this is your last chance to persuade them that their cause is your cause, and that your view(s) should prevail) and then “rest your case.” The judge (your instructor) will act as “jury” in this case—and grade the outcome of your writing performance all things (and stated scoring rubrics) considered! Do not forget the references section that follows.

References

Each of your end references must follow the APA style correctly and fully. Study all of the APA style (format) content/materials included within this course. There is ample information in the course to learn the APA style for in-text and end references, but feel free to explore other outside APA sources as appropriate and helpful, as well as giving/receiving peer reviews. This is flush left, ragged right text but with a hanging indent of one-half inch.

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We Are Living 1984 Today

By Lewis Beale, Special to CNN updated 9:22 AM EDT, Sat August 3, 2013

Police monitor license plates STORY HIGHLIGHTS

 Lewis Beale: We live in age where authorities, companies collect information about us

 He says after Snowden spying revelations, sales of George Orwell's "1984" spiked

 He says elements like "doublethink" and "endless war" have parallels today  Beale: In a modern surveillance state, we're all suspects

Editor's note: Lewis Beale writes about culture and film for the Los Angeles Times, Newsday and other publications.

(CNN) -- It appears that the police now have a device that can read license plates and check if a car is unregistered, uninsured or stolen. We already know that the National Security Agency can dip into your Facebook page and Google searches. And it seems that almost every store we go into these days wants your home phone number and ZIP code as part of any transaction.

So when Edward Snowden -- now cooling his heels in Russia -- revealed the extent to which the NSA is spying on Americans, collecting data on phone calls we make, it's not

as if we should have been surprised. We live in a world that George Orwell predicted in "1984." And that realization has caused sales of the 1949, dystopian novel to spike dramatically upward recently -- a 9,000% increase at one point on Amazon.com.

Comparisons between Orwell's novel about a tightly controlled totalitarian future ruled by the ubiquitous Big Brother and today are, in fact, quite apt. Here are a few of the most obvious ones.

Lewis Beale

Telescreens -- in the novel, nearly all public and private places have large TV screens that broadcast government propaganda, news and approved entertainment. But they are also two-way monitors that spy on citizens' private lives. Today websites like Facebook track our likes and dislikes, and governments and private individuals hack into our computers and find out what they want to know. Then there are the ever- present surveillance cameras that spy on the average person as they go about their daily routine.

The endless war -- In Orwell's book, there's a global war that has been going on seemingly forever, and as the book's hero, Winston Smith, realizes, the enemy keeps changing. One week we're at war with Eastasia and buddies with Eurasia. The next week, it's just the opposite. There seems little to distinguish the two adversaries, and they are used primarily to keep the populace of Oceania, where Smith lives, in a constant state of fear, thereby making dissent unthinkable -- or punishable. Today we have the so-called war on terror, with no end in sight, a generalized societal fear, suspension of certain civil liberties, and an ill-defined enemy who could be anywhere, and anything.

Doublethink -- Orwell's novel defines this as the act of accepting two mutually contradictory beliefs as correct. It was exemplified by some of the key slogans used by the repressive government in the book: War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery, Ignorance is Strength. It has also been particularly useful to the activists who have been hard at work introducing legislation regulating abortion clinics. The claim is that these laws are only to protect women's health, but by forcing clinics to close because of stringent regulations, they are effectively shutting women off not only from abortion, but other health services.

Snowden documents: U.S. spied on EU

Bush vs. Obama on surveillance

Police are tracking where you drive

Brok: NSA's spying on EU 'out of control'

Newspeak -- the fictional, stripped down English language, used to limit free thought. OMG, RU serious? That's so FUBAR. LMAO.

Memory hole -- this is the machine used in the book to alter or disappear incriminating or embarrassing documents. Paper shredders had been invented, but were hardly used when Orwell wrote his book, and the concept of wiping out a hard drive was years in the future. But the memory hole foretold both technologies.

Anti-Sex League -- this was an organization set up to take the pleasure out of sex, and to make sure that it was a mechanical function used for procreation only. Organizations that promote abstinence-only sex education, or want to ban artificial birth control, are the modern versions of this.

So what's it all mean? In 1984, Winston Smith, after an intense round of "behavior modification" -- read: torture -- learns to love Big Brother, and the harsh world he was born into. Jump forward to today, and it seems we've willingly given up all sorts of freedoms, and much of our right to privacy. Fears of terrorism have a lot to do with this, but dizzying advances in technology, and the ubiquity of social media, play a big part.

There are those who say that if you don't have anything to hide, you have nothing to be afraid of. But the fact is, when a government agency can monitor everyone's phone calls, we have all become suspects. This is one of the most frightening aspects of our modern society. And even more frightening is the fact that we have gone so far down the road, there is probably no turning back. Unless you spend your life in a wilderness cabin, totally off the grid, there is simply no way the government won't have information about you stored away somewhere.

What this means, unfortunately, is that we are all Winston Smith. And Big Brother is the modern surveillance state.

URL: http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/03/opinion/beale-1984-

now/index.html?iid=article_sidebar

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